Beruflich Dokumente
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Q. E was having a drinking spree with a certain B. It was alleged that V encountered E who
suddenly poked him with an iron pipe, which turned out to be a homemade firearm or sumpak.
E fired the sumpak and fallen hit the latter's head twice. Thereafter, E hastily left.
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During trial, E admitted having shot L but claimed self-defense. He averred that on the date and
time in question, L suddenly approached, boxed, and threatened to kill him. Thereafter, L went
inside his office and upon his return, E saw L pointing a sumpak at him. They struggled for the
possession of the weapon and it was when E finally took hold of it that he fired at L. When E saw
that L had fallen to the ground, he immediately left the place and went into hiding until he was
finally arrested in Tanay, Rizal. Was there a valid self-defense on the part of Ernie?
Answer: There was no valid self-defense. The elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. The requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, L, is absent. Instead, it was E who
was the aggressor, having fired the sumpak at L when they crossed paths by the side of the road,
and when the latter had fallen to the ground, hit his head twice with the said weapon. (People v.
Orense, G.R. No. 21338, June, 22, 2015)
Q. R and his granddaughter, 2-year old M were in the terrace of their house when U suddenly
came and attacked R with a panabas. R was able to evade the blows, but M was hit on her
abdomen and back causing her death. Upon seeing M bloodied, U walked away.
U then went to the next house where his nephew J was sleeping. J was awakened by the
commotion and saw his uncle charging towards him. He, along with his sister and cousin rushed
to a room, but J was cornered by U. U only left when he saw J, who pretended to be dead,
bloodied and leaning on the wall.
During trial, U set up the defense of insanity but did not take the witness stand. Dr. Q stated that
U was manifesting psychotic symptoms during May 2002, February 2003 and March 2003.
However, he could not tell with certainty whether U was psychotic at the time of the commission
of the crimes. Will U’s defense of insanity prosper?
Answer: No, U’s defense will not prosper. The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession
and avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime, but
claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of
sanity, anyone who pleads the said defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence.
Dr. Q’s testimony only showed that he evaluated U’s mental condition in May 2002, February
2003, and March 2003 and did prove U’s insanity. U’s defense of insanity remained
unsubstantiated. (People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 09, 2014)
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Q. Is the qualifying circumstance of treachery present in both incidents?
Answer: Yes, treachery was present in both incidents. While it was not shown that U consciously
employed treachery so as to insure the death of M, who was then just two (2) years old at the
time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous, and thus,
qualifies M’s killing to Murder. The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the
manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to her tender age
results in the absence of any danger to the accused.
There was also treachery in the case of J. While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated
even when the victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, a
review of the factual circumstances herein would reveal that it was not impossible for J to put up
a defense against U’s attacks.
Q. Who has the burden of proof in establishing the criminal liability for use of unlicensed
firearm?
Answer: The onus probandi of establishing the foregoing elements as alleged in the Information
lies with the prosecution. While it is undisputed that the victim sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police
officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo
that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. Having failed in this
respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance.
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Q. What is the reason why a justifying circumstance exonerates the accused?
Answer: A justifying circumstance affects the act, not the actor. The act is considered to have
been done within the bounds of law, hence, legitimate and lawful in the eyes of the law. Since
the act is considered lawful, there is no crime. Where there is no crime, there is no criminal
liability and no civil liability except under paragraph 4. It contemplates unintentional acts and
hence incompatible with dolo.
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Since corruption of out–of–court identification contaminates the integrity of in–court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out–of–court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1)
the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. (See Neil vs. Biggers, 409 US 188 [1973];
Manson vs. Brathwaite, 432 US 98 [1977]; Del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and
Practice, 3rd Edition, p. 346)
Q. W claimed alibi as a defense in the case for rape with homicide against him and his co-
accused. A, the star witness of the prosecution, however, testified in open court and identified W
as having committed. What are the criteria to establish positive identification.
Answer: To be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. The witness
is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with him. His
word has, to one who knows him, its weight in gold; and
Second, the witness’ story of what he personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something he never saw runs into inconsistencies and
makes bewildering claims. (People v. Webb, G.R. No. 176864, December 14, 2010)
Q. If alibi is successfully proven by W, one of the accused, what is the effect of this defense upon
his co-accused?
Answer: W’s documented alibi altogether impeaches A's testimony, not only with respect to him,
but also with respect to L, E, F, G, R, and B. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that W was
in the U.S. when the crime took place, A’s testimony will not hold together. W’s participation is
the anchor of A’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must necessarily fall.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that:
(a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. (People v. Webb, ibid.)
Q. May a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude suffering the penalty of
reclusion perpetua precluded to file a Certificate of Candidacy?
Answer: A person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is precluded to file a Certificate
of Candidacy. Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. The use of
the word “perpetual” in the aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction
and in this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its
principal penalty. Further, it is well to note that the use of the word “perpetual” in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in this respect, does not
depend on the length of the prison term which is imposed as its principal penalty. (Jalosjos v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013)
Q. Accused-appellant had died pending his appeal at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Will the
criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto ipso
facto extinguished in lieu of accused appellant's death pending his appeal?
Answer: The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
The accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other than the subject delict survives,
and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules. (People v. Dimaala, G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017)
Note: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
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liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; x x x x”
Q. What is the effect on the accused’s civil liability of an acquittal based on reasonable doubt?
Answer: An extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater
weight of the credible evidence," is required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be
held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant (Diaz v. People, G.R.
No. 208113, December 02, 2015)
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certificate was belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not
adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs. (People v. Agacer et. al., 07
January 2013)
People v. Pruna (G.R. No. 138471, 10 October 2002, Davide, C.J.) formulated a set of guidelines
that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court
decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases.
The Pruna guidelines are as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Q. The Sandiganbayan rendered found Reyes guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019,
and the other with usurpation of judicial functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Sandiganbayan appreciated the mitigating circumstance of old age in favor of the petitioner
by virtue of his being already over 70 years old. Was the ruling of the Sandiganbayan correct?
Answer: The Sandiganbayan erred. The mitigating circumstance of old age under Article 13 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code applied only when the offender was over 70 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. The petitioner, being only 63 years old when he committed the
offenses charged, was not entitled to such mitigating circumstance of age. (Reyes v. People,
G.R. Nos. 177105-06, 04 August 2010)
Q. What is conspiracy?
Answer: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual
agreement among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission
of the crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after the crime, demonstrates their
unity of design and objective, and is sufficient to prove conspiracy. When conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.
(People v. Milan, Chua and Carandang, 653 SCRA 607, People v. Webb et al., G.R. No. 176389,
December 14, 2014)
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Q. What is the concept of implied conspiracy?
Answer: On matters of conspiracy, it is a settled rule that it need not be proven by direct
evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from
the conduct of the accused in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design.
(People v. Pablo, et.al., GR Nos. 120394-97, January 16, 2001)
It may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is
not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective
suffices. (People v. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011)
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2. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if were to serve a prison sentence; and
3. To prevent the commission of offenses (P.D. No. 968, Sec. 2)
Q. May a person convicted upon final judgment and sentenced to a non-probationable penalty
still apply for probation on the ground that his sentence should be reduced because the trial
court failed to consider mitigating circumstances?
Answer: No, a person convicted upon final judgment and sentenced to a non-probationable
penalty may no longer apply for probation on the ground that his sentence should be reduced
because the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances. The defendant should have
appealed his conviction. Had his appeal from his conviction been granted, and the judgment is
modified, he would have been entitled to apply for probation based on the modified decision
before such decision becomes final (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011).
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Q. What is the Good Conduct Time Allowance?
Answer: Good conduct time allowance or GCTA is a sentence reduction provision afforded
prisoners who show good behavior. It has been in existence since 1906. Act 1533 provided for
the “diminution of sentences imposed upon prisoners” in consideration of good conduct and
diligence.
Q. What are the benefits which can be derived under the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law?
Answer: R.A. 10592 provides the following benefits:
(1) credit of preventive imprisonment;
(2) good conduct allowance for preventive imprisonment; and
(3) good conduct allowance for imprisonment.
Q. State the rule how Act No. 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW) as amended by
Act No. 4225, is applied in the imposition of sentence.
Answer: In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
If the offense is punished by any other law (special penal laws), the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same (Act No. 4103, Sec. 1).
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Note: The court has equated the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life
imprisonment for purposes of ISLAW (People v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 158797, July 29,
2005). Hence, a person punished with reclusion perpetua I not entitled to the benefits of
ISLAW (1 FESTIN, SPL Reviewer, p. 31)
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
Note: Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (People v. Jaranilla, L-
28547, February 22, 1974). An offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of the
ISLAW even if the crime is committed while he is on parole (People v. Clareon, CA 78
O.G. 6701, November 19, 1982, as cited in Bacar v. De Guzman, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-96-
1349, April 18, 1997).
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief
Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year;
9. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of the law, except
as provided in Section 5 hereof (Act No. 4103, Sec. 2).
Q. Cite the rule in arriving at the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence under the RPC.
Answer: The law provides that the minimum should be: “within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense” (Act No. 4103, Sec. 1). The ISLAW leaves it
entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it
is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into
which it might be subdivided (Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009).
Q. What are the rules in arriving at the maximum and minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence under a special law?
Answer: The following rules shall apply:
1. The maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law;
2. The minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law; and
3. The presence of mitigating circumstance is immaterial.
Q. What is the effect of voluntary surrender and voluntary confession in the prosecution of a
crime?
Answer: Article 13, subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code, considers as mitigating
circumstance voluntary surrender to the authorities as well as voluntary confession of guilt prior
to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. Under the law, any of these facts
constitutes mitigating circumstance. Although these circumstances are considered mitigating in
the same subjection of the Article 13, when both are present they should have the effect of
mitigating the penalty as two independent circumstances. If any of them must mitigate the
penalty to a certain extent, when both are present they should produce this effect to a greater
extent.
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5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice
Q. What is the distinction between online libel and libel under Article 353 of the RPC?
Answer: Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be
the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same
elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a
new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the
computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would
be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.
Q. What are the elements of estafa under Article 315(1) of the RPC?
Answer: The elements of Estafa under Article 315(1) are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion
by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c)
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the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the
offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, the offender acquires material or physical possession and juridical possession
of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Q. C works with SIAM Bank, Inc. For failure to explain the discrepancies in the 853 provisional
receipts amounting to P470,768. 00. She was charged with Estafa under Article 315(1) of the
RPC. Was the charge against C correct?
Answer: No, she should have been charged with theft, qualified or otherwise. A sum of money
received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material
possession of the employee. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did
not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise, and not Estafa under Article 315(1). Benabaye, as a collector, the money merely
passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day.
She had no juridical possession over the missing funds. (Cherry Ann M. Benabaye v. People,
G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015)
Q. An Information for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) against M before the RTC for failure to account to the Estate of P the amount
of P2,800,000.00 entrusted to him the sale of a share of the deceased in Wack Golf and Country
Club. The RTC, however, granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by M. Is M civilly liable despite
the approval of his Demurrer to Evidence?
Answer: M is not civilly liable. In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, the Court discussed the
concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa cases under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the RPC
(with which M was likewise charged), stating that when the element of misappropriation or
conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does
not exist.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of
misappropriation or conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is
missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability
ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil
liability may be sourced.
More significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's evidence utterly failed to show
that M personally received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust
for or to make delivery to the latter.
Q. C was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape. However, before an
Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court received a Letter from the
Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death as evidenced by the
Certificate of Death. Is Cs’ criminal liability extinguished by reason of his death?
Answer: C’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
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case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by the death of the accused. Criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the
recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that C's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file
a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules. (Culas v. People, G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017)
Q. What are the elements of Falsification of Private documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
and Article 171 (4) of the RPC??
Answer: The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC
are: (a) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7)
of the same Code; (b) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that
the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage.
On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated
by him are absolutely false.
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Q. What are the elements of qualified rape?
Answer: The elements of Rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) are: (a) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through force, threat
or intimidation.
The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will. On the other hand,
Statutory Rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) is committed by having sexual intercourse with a
woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the sexual act.
Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as these
are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve.
In determining, whether a person is “twelve (12) years of age” under Article 266 –A (I) (d), the
interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if he or she
is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is
established
Moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force
and intimidation, since in rape committed by a close kin, moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation. (People v. Aliganga, GR No. 189836, June 5, 2013)
Q. What is the effect upon the accused who raped his minor daughter three times when the first
two incidents happened before the enactment of R.A. 8353 and last incident after the effectivity
of the new law?
Answer: Since the first two incidents occurred in 1996 when RA 8353 was not yet existent, the
accused can only be held liable of statutory rape under Article 335 of the RPC.
However, he can already be held liable for qualified rape for the third incident as it occurred
sometime in June 2000 – when RA 8353 is already in effect. The crime was qualified by the
relationship of the accused to AAA, the former being the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim (Article 266-B, paragraph 1, of the RPC as amended by R.A. 8353). (People v.
Guillermo B. Cadano, Jr. G.R. No. 207819, March 12, 2014)
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When the accused forcibly took away the victim, for the purpose of raping her, as in fact he did
rape her, lewd and chaste designs existed since the commencement of the crime. As a result, the
accused committed the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. (People v. Espiritu, G.R.
No., 128870, October 27, 1999)
Q. What acts are considered as child prostitution and other sexual abuse under R.A. 7610?
Answer: Under RA 7680, children whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. It covers not only a situation in which a child is abused
for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages n any
lascivious conduct. The very title of Sec. 5, Art III of RA 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. (Roallos v.
People, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013)
Q. Will the failure to mark the seized drugs fatal to cause the acquittal of the accused? Will it
constitute a break in the link of the chain of custody?
Answer: Yes, the failure to mark the seized drugs will cause the acquittal of the accused. In this
case, the shabu "constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction
under [RA 9165], the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to
have been preserved."
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures
that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed The initial link in the chain of
custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachets from accused and their marking by the
apprehending officer. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is
vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, ‘planting,’ or contamination of evidence. As a final note, it does not escape the Court’s
attention that there was also no testimony from the police officers that they conducted a physical
inventory and took photographs of the sachets of shabu confiscated from appellant pursuant to
Section 21(1) of Article II of RA 9165. Their sworn statements did not mention any inventory-
taking or photographing of the same. They also did not bother to offer any justification for this
omission (People v. Butial, G.R. No. 192785, February 4, 2015)
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Q. Distinguish rebellion from insurrection.
Answer: The term “rebellion” is more frequently used where the object of the movement is
completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government; while “insurrection” is more
commonly employed in reference to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of
minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with respect to
particular matters or subjects.
Rebellion or insurrection is an act of terrorism under R.A. No. 9372 when it is committed in a
manner which tends to create a condition of widespread fear or panic in order to pursue its
objectives.
Q. What are the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention?
Answer: Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private
individual;
(b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances are present:
i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;
ii) it is committed by simulating public authority;
iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or
iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notable the
duration of detention is immaterial if the victim if a minor, or if the purpose of the
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kidnapping is to extort ransom. (People v. Brahim Lidasan et. al., G.R. No. 227425,
September 4, 2017)
Q. Does the law require proof of purchase of the stolen articles to give rise to a presumption of
fencing?
Answer: The law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles as mere possession
thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. Section 5 of PD 1416 provides: "Mere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing." (Dunlao vs. CA, G.R. No.
111343, August 22, 1996)
The presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (Dizon-
Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994)
ACCOMPLICE
1. The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he
has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring.
2. The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have
actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall
be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Sec 4, RA
8049)
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The penalties shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment.
The new also bans all forms of hazing in fraternities, sororities and organizations in schools,
communities and even businesses and uniformed service learning institutions.
Those who planned or participated in the hazing which results in death, rape, sodomy or
mutilation will be slapped with a penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P3 million.
Unlike the Anti-Hazing Act of 1995, the new measure also penalizes individuals who will try to
cover up hazing activities.
Moreover, it mandates schools to “take more proactive steps to protect its students from the
dangers of participating in activities that involve hazing.”
Q. SPO1 M was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife and daughter. While on a stop
position due to heavy traffic, B-1and a certain B-2 suddenly appeared on either side of
the vehicle, with B-1 poking a gun on the side of SPO1 M saying, “putang ina, ilabas mo!” B-1
grabbed the phone of SPO1 M on the latter’s chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his
torso.SPO1 M tried to react by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle, but failed
to fire at the accused as he fell to the ground. He was taken to a hospital, but died despite
undergoing operation and medical intervention. What crime was committed?
Answer: Robbery with homicide was committed. The crime takes place when a homicide is
committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain conviction, the
following elements must be present: (1) taking of the personal property of another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide was committed. Moreover, it
requires that the robbery was the main purpose of the accused and not the killing. (People v.
Balute, G.R. No. 212932, January 21, 2015; Peoplev. Hinlo, G.R. No. 212151, February 18,
2015)
Q. What are the rules when both burning and death are present?
Answer: In cases where both burning and death occur, the following rules will apply:
0. If the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or
on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed
1. If the main objective is to kill a particular person who maybe in the building or edifice, when
the fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime is murder
2. If the objective is likewise to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but the fore is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate crimes committed-homicide/murder and arson. (People v. Malngan, G.R. No.
170470, September 26, 2006)
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Q. What constitutes sexual harassment?
Answer: Under Anti Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, sexual harassment maybe committed by
one having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work training or
education environment against the person over whom the influence or moral ascendancy is
exerted. In an education or training environment in particular, the law expressly provides that
it may be committed against “one who is under the care, custody or supervision of the offender”
or “against one whose education, training, apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the
offender. Abuse of power is the gravamen of sexual harassment (Philippine Aelus Automotive
v.NLRC, G.R. No. 124617)
Q. What acts are considered as child prostitution and other sexual abuse under RA 7610?
Answer: Children whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct
RA 7610 covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages n any lascivious conduct. The very title of Sec.
5, Art III of RA 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to prostitution but also to
a child subjected to other sexual abuse (Roallos v. People, GR No. 198389, December 11, 2013)
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