their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements being
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARISSA BAYKER different.
G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused
has been so charged under separate informations.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Elements of.—Illegal recruitment is committed by a
person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or
any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code;
and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engagein the recruitment and
placement of workers. It is committed in large scale when it is committed against
three or more persons individually or as a group.
Same; Same; Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in illegal
recruitment once it was shown that he had actively and consciously participated in
illegal recruitment.—The accused-appellant’s denial of her participation in the illegal
recruitment activities of Bermudez and Langreo did not gain traction from her
charging her co-accused with the sole responsibility for the illegal recruitment of the
complainants. Based on the testimonial narration of the complainants regarding their
recruitment, she was unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary and instrumental
role in recruiting them for overseas placement from the inception. Also, her claim of
having been only casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her
criminal liability for the crimes charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment could be held liable, along with
the employer, as a principal in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had
actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because
recruitment and placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Estafa; Double Jeopardy; The
conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did
not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy; Double jeopardy could
not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant for both crimes
considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only from their being
punished under different statutes but also from their elements being different.—The
conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did
not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa
as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or
by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. In contrast, the crime of illegal recruitment
committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires different elements. Double
jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-appellant for
both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other not only from
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the RTC in Makati two separate
amended informations Illegal Recruitment and Estafa against Marissa Bayker, Nida
Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo.
Only Bayker and Langreo were arrested because Bermudez, who eluded arrest,
continues to remain at large. However, the trial proceeded only against Bayker
because of the lack of notification of subsequent proceedings to Langreo.
The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab,
Basilio Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.
Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met Bayker at the house of a friend in
Makati City, and she had then presented herself to be recruiting workers for overseas
employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada; that he had gone to her residence in
Pembo, Makati City to pay P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then
accompanied him to the Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose; that she
had gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead
but the he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the P6,000.00 to her, for which
she had issued a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had called him about his
deployment; that he had gone to her office but no one was around; that he had then
proceeded to her house, and she had then told him that his seaman’s application
would not push through; that the two of them had then proceeded to her office
bringing all his certificates of employment, and that it was here that she had
introduced him to her manager, Bermudez, who promised his deployment in
Hongkong within two weeks; that because he had not been deployed as promised, he
had gone to the POEA, where he had learned that the accused had not been issued the
license to recruit and place people overseas; and that he had then decided to charge
them all with illegal recruitment and estafa in the PNP-CIDG in Camp Crame, Q.C.
Dahab declared that he had met the Bayker at the Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay
P2,500.00 for his medical examination; that a week later, he had undergone the three-
day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he paid P2,500.00; that she had then
demanded from him the placement fee of P25,000.00; and that after he had not been
able t raise the amount, he never saw her again; and that Caniazares soon called him to
urge that he should complain against the accused in the PNP-CIDG.
According to Miparanum, he met Bayker through Caniazares, who was his cousin.
Miparanum went to the residence of Bayker to apply as a seaman. He delivered to her
P6,000.00 for his seaman’s book. She again asked an additional P6,000.00 for the
seaman’s book, and P40,000.00 as the placement fee. Miparanum followed up on his
application after two weeks, but was instead made to undergo training, and he paid
P2,700.00 for his certificate. Sensing that he was being defrauded, Miparanum later
proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.
Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested
assistance from Bayker regarding his medical examination. He insisted that he had
voluntarily paid P5,000.00 to her and she had then paid the amount to the Medical
Center for his medical examination.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for having violated Section
6(m) of RA8042 and for the crime of estafa.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.
RULING:
Yes.
I. Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale
Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment
activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under
Article 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. It is
committed in large scale when it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.
The accused-appellants’ denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities
of Bermudez and Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with
the sole responsibility for the illegal recruitment of the complainants. Based on the
testimonial narration of the complainants regarding the recruitment, she was
unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary and instrumental role in recruiting them
for overseas placement from the inception. Also, her claim of having been only
casually associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her criminal liability for the
crimes charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or corporation
can be engaged in illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment. This is because recruitment and
placement include any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, as well as referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.
Dahab’s supposed recantation by no means weakened or diminished the case. Its
being made after he had lodged his complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which
he supplied the details of his transactions with he) and after he had testified against
her in court directly incriminating her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not
be moreweighty than his first testimony against her which that was replete with
details. Its being the later testimony of Dahad did not necessarily cancel his first
testimony on account of the possibility of its being obtained by coercion, intimidation,
fraud, or other means to distort or bend the truth.
Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal
proceedings. As a general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as
the mere afterthought of the witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be
subjected to the same tests for credibility in addition to its being subject of the rule
that it be received with caution. The criminal proceedings in which sworn testimony
has been given by the recanting witness would be rendered a mockery, and put at the
mercy of the unscrupulous witness if such testimony could be easily negated by the
witness’s subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result is to leave without value not
only the sanctity of the oath taken but also the solemn rituals and safeguards of the
judicial trial. If only for emphasis, we reiterate that it is “a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it
later on changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.”
II. Estafa
The conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale did not preclude
the personal liability for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC on the ground
of subjecting to double jeopardy. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1)
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2)
the offended party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation. In contrast, the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale
requires different elements. Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and
convicting the accused for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct
from each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but also
from their elements being different.
The active representation by the accused of having the capacity to deploy abroad
despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit
as the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim to part with his
money, resulting in damage that is the second element of the estafa.
PEDRO LADINES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EDWIN DE RAMON
G.R. No. 167333, JANUARY 11, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the
justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected
on appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest period.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Newly-Discovered Evidence; The concept of
newly-discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the
reopening of the case in the trial court.—The res gestae statement of Licup did not
constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner’s guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence is
applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the reopening of the case in the
trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the
Court. The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of newly-discovered evidence
at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The Court would be
compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence
for purposes of its appellate adjudication.
Same; Criminal Procedure; The Supreme Court (SC) has issued guidelines designed to
balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity
to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth,
efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other.—The Court has issued
guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to
them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the
public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal
justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered
evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1)
the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if
admitted.
FACTS:
While Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin),
were watching the dance held during the Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog
Elementary School in Sorsogon, the petitioner and Herman Licup appeared and passed
by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin
below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At
that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the
blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it
against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with
Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where
he succumbed.
RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from 10
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs.
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES:
I. WON the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence.
II. WON the 17 years and 4months of the reclusion temporal as maximum can be
imposed.
RULING:
I. NO.
The res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that
created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt. The concept of newly-
discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-
opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal,
particularly one before the Court. The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of
newly-discovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason.
The Court would be compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and
consider the evidence for purposes of its appellate adjudication.
Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts for that purpose.
But the propriety of remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to receive
the newly-discovered evidence would inflict some degree of inefficiency on the
administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or reopen the
decision that is already on appeal.
Hence, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons
charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their
defenses, on the one hand, and public interest in ensuring smooth, efficient and fair
administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the
concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the
following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.
The proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first
two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence
during the trail by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the
alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of
other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
II. No.
The lower courts could not impose 17 years and 4 months of the medium period of
reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for
so imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code,
which has set the rules “for application of penalties which contain three periods,”
requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by
law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that ”within the limits of each
period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the greater or lesser extent
of the evil produced by the crime.” By not specifying the justification for imposing
the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate
sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the
specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be
the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, 8 months
and one day of reclusion temporal.
TEOFILO GIANGAN, SANTOS BONTIA and LIBERATO DUMAIL v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
 G.R. No. 169385, AUGUST 26, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019; Elements of.—In every prosecution for the violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, the State must prove the following essential elements, namely: 1. The
accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2.
He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of his functions; 3. His action caused any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The first element was
present, for Giangan was indisputably a government official at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense charged.
Same; Same; Same; Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and
sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the
obstructed road had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of
Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that
the accused were acting within the scope of their authority.—Conformably with the
foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that Giangan and his co-
accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they removed
the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations evinced
good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access through the road had
long been permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In that context, Giangan
as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then
summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just
reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over
of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting
within the scope of their authority. Good faith means honest, lawful intent; the
condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without intent to assist in a
fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained of was rendered
inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law punished.
Same; Same; Same; Manifest Partiality; Manifest partiality should be inferred only if
there was a clear showing that there had been others who had been bothered by the
similar allegedly illegal constructions and had complained, but the accused, in their
capacities as barangay officials, did not deal with such complaint with the same
alacrity.—The Sandiganbayan further erred in finding the presence of manifest
partiality on the basis that there had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the
accused did not similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should
still not be imputed against them because they were acting on the complaint against
the inconvenience brought about by the obstruction erected on the access road.
Manifest partiality should be inferred only if there was a clear showing that there had
been others who had been bothered by the similar allegedly illegal constructions and
had complained, but the accused, in their capacities as barangay officials, did not deal
with such complaint with the same alacrity. Indeed, in People v. Atienza, 673 SCRA 470
(2012), the Court affirmed the findings of the Sandiganbayan that there was no
manifest impartiality or bad faith on the part of the accused public officials where the
evidence adduced did not show that they had favored other persons similarly situated.
FACTS:
In his capacity as the barangay chairman of Barangay Luyang in the Municipality of
Carmen, Cebu at the time material to this case, Giangan, along with his co-accused
Domail, a barangay councilor, and Bontia, the head of the barangay tanods, were
charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the following
information:
X x x That on or about the 16th day of February 1996, at Barangay Luyang, Municipality
of Carmen, Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above named accused, public officers, having been elected, appointed and qualified to
such public positions above mentioned, taking advantage of their public positions and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously destroy the
fence made of wooden posts and straight wires in an agricultural land situated at
Luyang, Carmen, and owned by Aurelia F. Bernadas, without proper court order or
authority of law, thus accused in the performance of their official functions had given
unwarranted benefits, preference or advantage to themselves, to the damage, injury
and prejudice to Aurelia F. Bernadas.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding all of the accused guilty as charged.
The Sandiganbayan affirmed the judgment of conviction.
ISSUES:
WON Giangan is guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
RULING:
NO. The Court acquitted Teofilo Giangan for failure to establish his guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
In every prosecution for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the State must
prove the following essential elements, namely:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence in the discharge of his functions; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The first element was present, for Giangan was indisputably a government official at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense charged.
Anent the second element, the three modes of committing are distinct and different
from one another.
The second element enumerates the different modes by which means the offense
penalized in Section 3(e) may be committed. “Partiality” is synonymous with “bias”
which “excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather
than as they are.” “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong;
a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud.” “Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on
their own property.” These definitions prove all too well that the three modes are
distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in
connection with the prohibited acts under Section 3(e) should suffice to warrant
conviction.
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that
Giangan and his coaccused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality
when they removed the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their
actuations evinced good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access
through the road had long been permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In
that context, Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere
belief that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the
obstructed road had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of
Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting
that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Good faith means
honest, lawful intent; the condition of acting without knowledge of fraud, and without
intent to assist in a fraudulent or otherwise unlawful scheme. Also, the act complained
of was rendered inconsistent with the manifest partiality and bad faith that the law
punished.
The Sandiganbayan further erred in finding the presence of manifest partiality on the
basis that there had been other allegedly illegal constructions that the accused did not
similarly remove in their capacities as barangay officials. Bias should still not be
imputed against them because they were acting on the complaint against the
inconvenience brought about by the obstruction erected on the access road. Manifest
partiality should be inferred only if there was a clear showing that there had been
others who had been bothered by the similar allegedly illegal constructions and had
complained, but the accused, in their capacities as barangay officials, did not deal with
such complaint with the same alacrity.
In light of the foregoing, the guilt of Giangan was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, he is entitled to acquittal.
ROSAL HUBILLA VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 176102. November 26, 2014; FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through
measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection,
and to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs
applicable to children in conflict with the law. The mandate notwithstanding, the Court
will not hesitate or halt to impose the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a
child in conflict with the law.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide.— Considering that the petitioner was
then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17 years, four
months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,
such minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty
to prisión mayor.
Same; Children in Conflict with the Law ; Republic Act No. 9344; Penalties;
Although Section 38 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344 allows the suspension of the
sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the
suspension is available only until the child offender turns twentyone (21) years of
age, pursuant to Section 40 of RA No. 9344.— We note that the petitioner was
well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC
on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no longer legally
feasible or permissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(c) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344
bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or
arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case
is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of
imprisonment.— A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals,
however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means
prohibited. While Section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in
conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of
their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized,
subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the
detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention
or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby,
the trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act
No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply
because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the
term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Following Section 51 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, the
petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural
camp or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor), in coordination with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), in a manner consistent
with the offender child’s best interest.— Such service of sentence will be in lieu of
service in the regular penal institution.
FACTS
Alejandro Dequito was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary School watching the
graduation ceremony of the high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason
Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant approached the victim and
stabbed the latter. With the appellant’s left arm around the neck of the victim,
appellant stabbed the victim using a bladed weapon. He aided the victim as the latter
was already struggling to his feet and later brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito’s companion at the time of the incident, corroborated
the testimony of Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was stabbed in
front of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She
stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son
was discharged. Later, however, when her son went back to the hospital for a check-
up, it was discovered that her son’s stab wound had a complication. Her son was
subjected to another operation, but died the day after.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide as charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four years
and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction but
reduced appellant's sentence to six months and one day to six years of prision
correccionalas minimum, to six years and one day to twelve years of prision mayor as
maximum. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA sentenced
appellant to an indeterminate penalty of six months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
ISSUE/S
WON the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the
Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law). YES
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for
homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he
committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein,
was prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum
of the indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period – eight years and
one day to 10 years – was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of
eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision
correccional to enable him to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner’s insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor
Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the
further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his
insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to
deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law), Section 46 (2), in
conjunction with Section 5 (k), provides that the restrictions on the personal liberty of
the child shall be limited to the minimum. Consistent with this principle, the amended
decision of the CA imposed the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344
nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the
penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to
qualify for probation.
WON he was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; NO.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968, which disqualifies from
probation an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this reason, we annul
the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was
qualified for probation.
WON imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements. NO.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of
a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is
available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction
for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was
no longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of his
rights as a child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and
international agreements. A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals,
however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means
prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in
conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to
certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment
shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time.Thereby, the trial and appellate
courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the
penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as
a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action taken
herein. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice (Beijing Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention
of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty are consistent in recognizing that
imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and
for the minimum necessary period.
Following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve
his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner
consistent with the offender child’s best interest. Such service of sentence will be in
lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178512, FIRST DIVISION, November 26, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of
such intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be
established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before,
during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds
inflicted on the victim.
Criminal Law; Frustrated Homicide; Elements of.—The elements of frustrated homicide
are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstances for
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. Inasmuch
as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder
under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of
the two other elements.
Same; Same; Intent to Kill; The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide
is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries.— Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must
allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence,
as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the
courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at
the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, 480 SCRA 188
(2006), we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill,
namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as
determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time
of inflicting the injuries on the victim.
FACTS:
Alexander Flojo was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old
Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman, the brother of his
land lady, Lucila Bautista, hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about what
Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na Mang
Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a
rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went
down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo
suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion
of his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him.
Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him
to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors
immediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the
emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to
the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter,
Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected
for further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed wounds. One of which was on the zygoma, left side,
and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the
fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm.
The second stabbed wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim
which resulted to blood air in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a
thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the
physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second
wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely
medical intervention.
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on
December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing
a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to
throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between
them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing
blood to ooze from the latter’s face.
The RTC convicted the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s
conviction. The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
RULING:
YES.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal
or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of
the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, is present. Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the
qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately
proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fist fight
between him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the
fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted
minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have
sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because
the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not
sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to kill is the main element that
distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the
crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the
offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the
information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission
of a felony by dolo. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of
the assault and immediately thereafter. We considered the following factors to
determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive
of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the
victim.
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present.
We concur with them. Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained
by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of
a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on
Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab
wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his
face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such
wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to
kill. There is also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient
to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a
consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will,
i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found
guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the
trial and appellate courts on the credibility of Alexander’s testimony. It is not
disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed
to support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling
application when the lone witness is the victim himself whose direct and positive
identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility,
owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive
to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the manner in which the latter
committed the crime. Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere denial of the
deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical evidence
corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm
the petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO
G.R. No. 183700, FIRST DIVISION, October 13, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily
weaken the State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen
arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant
who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-presentation must be credibly explained and
the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof
beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves
participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.—To
secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the
following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the
accused and the poseurbuyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the
transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
FACTS:
A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavex, PO1 Lindberg,
Edwalberto Vilar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Bagsit, an
asset of the police reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito Andaya.
Two pieces of Php 100.00 bills both duly marked “X” were given to Bagsit to act as
poseur-buyer. Upon reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from
their vehicles and positioned themselves where they could see and observe the asset.
Bagsit then knocked on the door of Andaya’s house. After brief talks, the marked
money then was given to Andaya and Bagsit received something in return. The pre-
arranged signal signifying the consummation of the transaction was given. The team
members approached Andaya and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers
and arrested Andaya. The merchandise was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in
Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna and specimen was positive for methampethamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
The RTC convicted Andaya for violating Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
based on the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the operation. The
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Andaya insisted that the non-presentation of
confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether the Prosecution's non-presentation of the confidential informant was
adverse to the Prosecution and would indicate that the guilt of the accused was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
Yes. (Because of the peculiar circumstance where the informant is at the same time the
poseur-buyer)
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements,
namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur
buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented
in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
A buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher.
In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a
quantity of the dangerous drug and paying the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug
pusher turns over or delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement in
exchange for the price or other consideration. Once the transaction is consummated,
the drug pusher is arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal law. The
arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
In every criminal prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of
proving the illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This
responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence until and unless the
presumption of innocence in his favor has been overcome by sufficient and competent
evidence. Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete.
The confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested
Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre-
arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had
been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did
not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe
how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There
would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the
buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya
and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur
buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.
Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes “any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.” Under the law, selling was any act “of giving away
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for
money or any other consideration;” while delivering was any act “of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with
or without consideration.”
Given the legal characterizations of the acts constituting the offense charged, the
members of the buy-bust team could not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that
they had seen from their positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya
who, in turn, gave something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was
unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team that
what the poseur buyer handed over were the marked P100.00 bills and that what
Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.
REYNALDO S. MARIANO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 178145. July 7, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.:
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of
the consequences is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal
connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the
absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that
the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of
Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the
latter’s injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal
Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances
regarding persons, time and place.
Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is
based on the gravity of the resulting injuries had his act been intentional.—The
penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of
the resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would
constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisiòn correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; and if it would have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its
maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal
Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or
a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in accordance with Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with
a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article
25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the
commission of which a penalty of either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
P200.00, or both is provided.
FACTS:
Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat,
Bulacan. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with
his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano
stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However,
Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while
Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the
assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo
“magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand.” Ferdinand
and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.
Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some
items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom.
However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost
consciousness.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed
for two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00 On
September 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in
Quezon City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical
expenses amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise spent P909.50 for medicines,
P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and P12,550.00 for the services of
his caregivers and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand
suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall
and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by the
certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita,
received the amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial
assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.
The RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide. On appeal, the CA modified
the felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the amount of
P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.
ISSUES and RULINGS:
1. WON the conviction of petitiner for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries is proper?
YES. We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.
“Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”To constitute the offense
of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences
is required. The Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between
the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. In the absence of any
cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner
had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand,
and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s
injuries.
2. WON voluntary surrender may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
in favor of petitiner?
NO. Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised
Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code.
3. WON the penalty imposed by the CA is correct?
NO, CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of
the resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code stipulates that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave
felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony,
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would
have constituted a light felony, arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law
attaches the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictive in
accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which
the law punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in
accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an
infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of either arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.
Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the
right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma; that he
had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on
record that he had testified at the trial that he was unable to attend to his general
merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he had
required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries
did not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered
the petitioner’s act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have
imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical
injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of the
Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article
263, 3, supra, for having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which
he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As
earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not applicable
in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of
imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law
inapplicable, the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor
was the correct penalty for the petitioner.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MA. HARLETA VELASCO
G.R. No. 195668, FIRST DIVISIO, June 25, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against whom the
State establishes a conspiracy are each equally criminally and civilly liable. It follows,
therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily liable to the victims of
the illegal recruitment for the reimbursement of the sums collected from them,
regardless of the extent of the participation of the accused in the illegal recruitment.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment; Civil Liability; Considering that the crime of illegal
recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is
inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts
paid as placement, training and processing fees.—It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our
criminal law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Civil liability
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for
consequential damages. To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to
be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged unless the offended party waives the civil action, or
reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it
involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of
the former, civil liability should include the return of the amounts paid as placement,
training and processing fees. Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to
indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
Same; Conspiracy; Solidary Obligations; The nature of the obligation of the co-
conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each debtor may be
compelled to pay the entire obligation.
Same; Same; Same; Joint Tortfeasors; Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata; They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount.—It would not be an excuse for any of
the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in the wrong was
insignificant as compared to those of the others. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They
cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. Hence, Inovero’s liability
towards the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether
she actually received the amounts paid or not, and notwithstanding that her co-
accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained untried.
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two informations
charging Inovero, Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with
illegal recruitment under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Worker’s Act of
1995), and 11 informations charging the same accused with estafa as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero
was arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large.
Baful went to Harvel International Talent Management and Promotion (“HARVEL”)
upon learning that recruitment for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. On said
date, she allegedly met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero conducting a
briefing on the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager,
directed her to submit certain documents, and to pay Two Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical
examination. After complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala
the amounts of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2) to three (3) months. She
likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her co-applicants on what to wear on
the day of their departure. However, she was never deployed. Finally, she testified
that she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to deploy workers for overseas
employment.
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that Inovero was the one who conducted
the orientation, and represented to all the applicants that most of the time, she
was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants’ visa.
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that despite her undergoing medical
examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to Japan.
Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVEL’s office to apply as
caregiver in Japan, and Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo
training and medical examination, and to pay Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees. However, after complying with said
requirements, she was never deployed as promised.
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the
position of janitress at HARVEL; just like the rest of the complainants, she was
required to submit certain documents and to pay a total amount of Twenty Thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as processing fee; after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero
promised her and the other applicants that they will be deployed in three (3) months
or in June 2003; however, the promised deployment never materialized; she later
found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA
Licensing Branch. She testified that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither
HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as
per records at their office.
Inovero denied the allegations and claimed that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the
owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. She alleged that she worked for her
uncle, Velasco’s husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or three times a
week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified that
her alleged errands mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments during
orientations at HARVEL. Inovero denied receiving any money from the complainants,
nor issuing receipts therefor.
The RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafa but convicting
her of illegal recruitment committed in large scale under Section 6 and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995). Inovero
appealed but the CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
WON Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero should be convicted for illegal recruitment
committed in large scale amounting to economic sabotage
RULING:
YES.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the
accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the
same Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a
license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and (3) that the accused committed
the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the
impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes.
In Our view, despite Inovero’s protestations that she did not commit illegal
recruitment, the following circumstances contrarily convince Us that she was into
illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was
the one who conducted orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others,
on how much their salary would be as caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when
they finally will be deployed. Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private
complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to
correct said representation. Inovero’s silence is clearly an implied acquiescence to said
representation. Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant
Brizuela, represented herself as the one expediting the release of applicants’ working
visa for Japan. Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEA’s Versoza –
Inovero had no license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment.
There is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero committed
illegal recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression
that she can send them abroad for employment purposes, despite the fact that she
had no license or authority to do so.
We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the
illegal recruitment charged against her. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated
beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment
of the complainants. The decision of the CA amply recounted her overt part in the
conspiracy. Under the law, there is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it.
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing fees.
However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inovero’s personal liability for
them in their judgments. Their omission needs to be corrected, notwithstanding
that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be patently unjust
and contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only
the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is,
indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of
Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless the offended party
waives the civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the crime of
illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the
accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the
return of the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence,
Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums
paid.
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court mandates to have the judgment, if it was of
conviction, state, among others, (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4)
the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived.” Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not
themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this
action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but
also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
What was the extent of Inovero’s civil liability?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime
requires solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. As
a co-conspirator, then, Inovero’s civil liability was similar to that of a joint
tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit or those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent
of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words,
joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same
manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed
to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the
responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that
one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person
was not same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it
does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to
a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to
the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual
participation in the wrong was insignificant as compared to those of the others. Joint
tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them,
except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole
amount. Hence, Inovero’s liability towards the victims of their illegal recruitment
was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not,
and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have
remained untried.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LARRY MENDOZA
G.R. No. 192432, FIRST DIVISION, June 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
The law enforcement agents who conduct buy-bust operations against persons suspected
of drug trafficking in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA No. 9165), otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, should comply with the statutory
requirements for preserving the chain of custody of the seized evidence. Failing this, they
are required to render sufficient reasons for their non-compliance during the trial;
otherwise, the presumption that they have regularly performed their official duties
cannot obtain, and the persons they charge should be acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Buy-Bust Operations; The
identity of the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the
dangerous drugs offered in court were the same substances bought during the buy-bust
operation.—The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if
not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such,
the identity of the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing
that the dangerous drugs offered in court were the same substances bought during the
buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain
of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marking; The marking after seizure by the arresting officer,
being the starting point in the custodial link, should be made immediately upon the
seizure, or, if that is not possible, as close to the time and place of the seizure as
practicable under the obtaining circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without the insulating presence of the representative
from the media or the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any elected public official during
the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, “planting” or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the
regime of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their
ugly heads.
Same; Same; Same; The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 expressly provides a saving mechanism
to the effect that not every case of noncompliance with the statutory requirements for
the physical inventory and photograph of the dangerous drugs being made “in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof” would prejudice the State’s case
against the accused. But in order for that saving mechanism to apply, and thus save the
day for the State’s cause, the Prosecution must have to recognize first the lapse or lapses,
and then credibly explain them.
Same; Same; Same; With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused
deserved to be acquitted of the serious charges.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; The Supreme Court (SC) has usually
presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in favor of the members of
buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Same; Same; Same; The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands
only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the
performance of official duty.—The presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity
of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of
regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined
right to be presumed innocent.
FACTS:
Policemen Arnel Diocena and Alfredo DG Lim testified that, on September 29, 2007,
they received reports that an alias ‘Larry’ was selling shabu at St. Claire Street,
Barangay Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. They organized a buy-bust operation where
Diocena acted as the poseur buyer while Lim served as back-up. They proceeded to
the target area with their asset at around 10:45 p.m. There Diocena and the asset
waited in the corner on their motorcycle while Lim and the other cops positioned
themselves in the perimeter. The asset texted Larry and they waited for him to arrive.
Later, Larry arrived and told them, ‘Pasensya na at ngayon lang dumating ang mga
items.’ Larry then asked them how much they were buying and Diocena told P500.00
worth. Larry took out two plastic sachets of shabu and gave it to Diocena who gave him
a marked P500 bill. Diocena lit the left signal light of his motorcycle to signal Lim
and the other cops that the deal was done. They then arrested Larry who turned out to
be the accused. After frisking him, they recovered another sachet of shabu from
him.
The defense witnesses’ version was that on that day, he was minding his own
business, eating with his wife when his friend Rolly Lopez knocked on the door. Rolly
was wanted by the cops (‘may atraso’) and asked Mendoza for help to get them
off his back. Rolly texted somebody and after there was another knock. It was the
police led by one Dennis Gorospe who asked Mendoza for his identity. When he said
yes, Gorospe cuffed him after showing him sachets of shabu with his initials. Gorospe
was then taken to the police station where he was interrogated and asked how
much protection money he can cough up. When he refused, he was arrested and drug
tested. He claims that he was supposed to be a regalo to the new police chief.
The RTC convicted the accused of violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The
accused appealed but the CA affirmed the conviction of the accused.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violations of Section 5 and
Section 11 of RA No. 9165.
RULING:
NO.
The State did not satisfactorily explain substantial lapses committed by the buy-
bust team in the chain of custody; hence, the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged was not established beyond reasonable doubt
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not
indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such, the
identity of the dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that
the dangerous drugs offered in court were the same substances bought during the
buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under RA No. 9165 as the chain
of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed. The dangerous drugs are themselves the corpus
delicti to discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a
judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps
in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team did not observe
the statutory procedures on preserving the chain of custody.
To start with, the State did not show the presence during the seizure and
confiscation of the contraband, as well as during the physical inventory and
photographing of the contraband, of the representatives from the media or the
Department of Justice, or of any elected public official. Such presence was
precisely necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from
any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity.
It is notable that PO1 Diocena, although specifically recalling having marked the
confiscated sachets of shabu with the initials of the accused immediately after the
seizure, did not state if he had made his marking in the presence of the accused
himself or of his representative, and in the presence of a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official.
Similarly, P/Insp. Lim did not mention in his testimony that a representative from the
media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official was present during
the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu.
The consequences of the failure of the arresting lawmen to comply with the
requirements of Section 21(1), supra, were dire as far as the Prosecution was
concerned. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or
the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking
of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, “planting” or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity
and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness
of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
Secondly, the records nowhere indicated, contrary to the claim of P/Insp. Lim,
that the buy-bust team, or any member thereof, had conducted the physical
inventory of the confiscated items. We know this because the State’s formal offer of
evidence did not include such inventory. Without the inventory having been made by
the seizing lawmen, it became doubtful whether any shabu had been seized from the
accused at all.
And, thirdly, although PO1 Diocena asserted that photographs of the confiscated items
and the marked money were taken at the police station, it still behooved him to justify
why the photographs of the seized shabu was not taken immediately upon the seizure,
and at the place of seizure. The State did not explain this lapse. The pictorial evidence
of the latter kind would have more firmly established the identity of the
seized shabu for purposes of preserving the chain of custody.
The last paragraph of Section 21(1) of the IRR of RA No. 9165 expressly provides a
saving mechanism to the effect that not every case of non-compliance with the
statutory requirements for the physical inventory and photograph of the dangerous
drugs being made “in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof” would prejudice the State’s case against the accused. But in order for
that saving mechanism to apply, and thus save the day for the State’s cause, the
Prosecution must have to recognize first the lapse or lapses, and then credibly explain
them.
It appears that the application of the saving mechanism in this case was not
warranted. The Prosecution did not concede that the lawmen had not complied with
the requirement for “the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.” Also, the Prosecution did not tender any justification why no
representatives from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public
official had been present during the seizure and confiscation of the shabu. The
omissions, particularly the failure to justify on the part of the lawmen, were strange
and improbable, particularly because the records indicated that the lawmen had
sufficient time and the opportunity to prepare for the proper conduct of the buy-bust
operation against the accused due to such operation having come in the aftermath of a
successful test buy.
In all, the buy-bust team had about 48 days – the period intervening between July 10,
2007, when the test buy was conducted, and August 28, 2007, when the crimes
charged were committed – within which to have the media and the Department of
Justice be represented during the buy-bust operation, as well as to invite an elected
public official of the place of operation to witness the operation. It puzzles the Court,
therefore, that the buy-bust team did not prudently follow the procedures outlined in
Section 21(1), supra, despite their being experienced policemen who knew the
significance of the procedures in the preservation of the chain of custody.
With the chain of custody being demonstrably broken, the accused deserved to
be acquitted of the serious charges. Even if we rejected the frame-up defense of the
accused, the unexplained failures and lapses committed by the buy-bust team could
not be fairly ignored. At the very least, they raised a reasonable doubt on his guilt
which is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a
captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate
position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow
man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the
defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it
in the most important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
Thus, the accused was entitled to be acquitted and freed, for in all criminal
prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The
Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of
the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of
the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the
Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no
burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other
words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in
the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of
proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
The CA and the RTC erred in relying on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty of the arresting officers
Even if the foregoing conclusion already renders any further discussion of the
applicability of the presumption of regularity in favor of the members of the buy-bust
team superfluous, we need to dwell a bit on the matter if only to remind the lower
courts not to give too much primacy to the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty at the expense of the higher and stronger presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused in a prosecution for violation of the Comprehensive
Drugs Act of 2002.
We have usually presumed the regularity of performance of their official duties in
favor of the members of buy-bust teams enforcing our laws against the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. But the presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or of any failure to perform a duty.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no
reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of
official duty. And even in that instance the presumption of regularity will not be
stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere
rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent. Trial courts are instructed to apply this differentiation, and to always bear in
mind that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not
prevail over the stronger presumption of innocence favoring the accused.
Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed innocent
would be held sub ordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of
evidence. Where, like here, the proof adduced against the accused has not even
overcome the presumption of innocence, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty could not be a factor to adjudge the accused guilty of the crime
charged.
Moreover, the regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly
presumed in favor of the policemen because the records were replete
with indicia of their serious lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of
performance by a police officer must be inferred only from an established basic fact,
not plucked out from thin air. To say it differently, it is the established basic fact
that triggers the presumed fact of regular performance. Where there is any hint of
irregularity committed by the police officers in arresting the accused and thereafter,
several of which we have earlier noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of
performance in their favor.
NOEL A. LASANAS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 159031, FIRST DIVISION, June 23, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and inexistent for lack of a
marriage license, is guilty of bigamy as defined and penalized by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Law; Family Code; - The first and second elements of bigamy were present in
view of the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused
and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to
wit: Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Same; Same; Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.—Considering that the accused’s
subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third element of bigamy
was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to Josefa was invalid
because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no
worth, however, because it was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration
of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272 (2004), the Court has explained that
“[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the
mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.”
FACTS:
On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the MTC of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the
benefit of a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not
executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On
August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious
ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City. They
submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose. Both
ceremonies were evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo
City. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single.
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and
damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City. The complaint alleged that Socorro
had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their
marriage; and that subsequent marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and
her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his complaint, he further
alleged, among others, that he was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968
which marriage was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San
Miguel, Iloilo which marriage was ratified by a wedding at San Jose Church, Iloilo City
on August 27, 1980 and registered at the office of Iloilo City Registrar.
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Iloilo City. After due proceedings, the accused was formally indicted for
bigamy. On November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered its judgment in Civil
Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint for annulment of marriage, and
declaring the marriage between him and Socorro valid and legal. The accused
appealed to the CA.
The RTC (Branch 38) found accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, contended that because he
had not been legally married to Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not
established. However, the CA dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari. He argues that
the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied in Article 40 of the Family
Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before one could contract a subsequent
marriage should not apply in this purely criminal prosecution; that even if Article 40 of
the Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his subsequent
marriage was null and void for being without a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code; that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent
marriage be valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were
sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of Bigamy?
RULING:
YES.
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro.
The requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family Code.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the first marriage
was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by
the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can
still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes
the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the
crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public
Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioner’s strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is affirmed. The crime of
bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage
without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void
by a court of competent jurisdiction. “What makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy,” is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the criminal
complaint against him but after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him because the RTC (Branch 39)
dismissed his complaint for annulment of marriage after the information for bigamy
had already been filed against him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to
Socorro.
Considering that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed
fact, the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that his
marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it was he himself who failed
to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his previous marriage prior to contracting
his subsequent marriage. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of Article
349 of the RPC, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act
of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
REVELINA LIMSON v. EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 162205, FIRST DIVISION, March 31, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.
Criminal Law; Anti-Alias Law; Considering that he was not shown to have used the
names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the
charge against him was justified in fact and in law.—On the issue of the alleged use of
illegal aliases, the Court observes that respondent’s aliases involved the names
“Eugenio Gonzalez,” “Eugenio Gonzales,” “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,” “Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez y Regalado,” “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez,” “Eugenio J. Gonzalez,” and — per
Limson — “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names,
albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled
family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second
names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left
unchecked and unrectified over time. What is significant, however, is that such names
were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such
names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to
have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public,
the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
Civil Law; Alias; Words and Phrases; An alias is a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually, usually in business transactions, in
addition to the real name by which he was registered at birth or baptized the first time,
or to the substitute name authorized by a competent authority; a man’s name is simply
the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which
they distinguish him, but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these
are known as aliases.
FACTS:
Limson filed a criminal charge against Gonzalez for falsification, before the
Prosecutor’s Office of Mandaluyong City based on Limson’s assertion that in the
records of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), a certain ‘EUGENIO
GONZALEZ’ is registered as an architect and that Gonzalez, who uses, among others,
the name ‘EUGENIO JUAN GONZALEZ’, and who pretends to be said architect.
Registered with the PRC, is an impostor and therefore, guilty of falsification.
Gonzalez filed his Counter–Affidavit, wherein he explained in detail that his full name
is EUGENIO (first given name) JUAN (second given name) GONZALEZ (father’s family
name) y REGALADO (mother’s family name). He alleges that in his youth, while he was
still in grade school and high school, he used the name EUGENIO GONZALEZ y
REGALADO and/or EUGENIO GONZALEZ and that thereafter, he transferred to the
University of Santo Tomas and therein took up architecture and that upon
commencement of his professional practice in 1943, he made use of his second name,
JUAN. Consequently, in his professional practice, he has identified himself as much as
possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is
still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he wanted to distinguish
himself with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO.
Gonzalez supposed his allegations with various supporting documents.
The Prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Gonzalez, finding that indeed
EUGENIO JUAN R. GONZALES is the architect registered in the PRC. Limson elevated
the Resolution of the Prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice. Before the Secretary of
Justice, she utilized the basic arguments she had raised before the Prosecutor’s Office,
with slight variations, in assailing said adverse Resolution of the Prosecutor.
After Opposition by Gonzalez, the Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal of Limson.
The Secretary of Justice affirmed and even expanded the findings of the Prosecutor.
Limson filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom; which was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice. Said dismissal was with finality.
Limson filed a new letter complaint against Gonzalez, with the Secretary of Justice. She
alleged the same basic facts, evidence, and charges, as already resolved by the
Prosecutor and affirmed with finality, by the Secretary of Justice; but adding the
accusation that because Gonzalez used various combinations of his name, in different
signature, on the different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated Republic Act No. 6085
(the Anti–Alias Law). Limson, in said letter complaint of September 25, 2000,
suppressed from the Secretary of Justice, the extant before–mentioned Resolutions,
already decreed and adverse to her.
The Secretary of Justice referred this letter complaint of Limson to the Prosecutor’s
Office of Mandaluyong City for investigation. The Prosecutor rendered a Resolution,
dismissing the new complaint.
Not content with said Resolution, Limson filed a motion for reconsideration; which
was again opposed by Gonzalez and which was denied by the Prosecutor. Not
agreeable to said Resolution, Limson filed a Petition for Review with the Secretary of
Justice, to which Gonzalez filed an Answer/Opposition.
The Secretary of Justice denied said Petition for Review of Limson. Although Limson
sought the reconsideration of the adverse resolution, the Secretary of Justice denied
her motion for reconsideration.
Limson assailed on certiorari the adverse resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in the
CA, claiming that the Secretary of Justice had thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for misappreciating her evidence
establishing her charges of falsification and violation of the Anti–Alias Law against
respondent.
The CA promulgated its assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. The CA
denied Limson’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for review on certiorari shall be granted?
RULING:
NO.
We cannot reverse the CA. We find that the conclusion of the CA about the
Secretary of Justice not committing grave abuse of discretion was fully
warranted. Limson did not persuasively demonstrate to the CA how the Secretary of
Justice had been gravely wrong in upholding the dismissal by the OCP of her charges
against respondent. In contrast, the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
were quite exhaustive in their exposition of the reasons for the dismissal of the
charges. And, even assuming that the Secretary of Justice thereby erred, she should
have shown to the CA that either arbitrariness or capriciousness or whimsicality had
tainted the error. Yet, she tendered no such showing. She should be reminded, indeed,
that grave abuse of discretion meant either that the judicial or quasi–judicial power
was exercised by the Secretary of Justice in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, or that the Secretary of Justice evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when the Secretary of Justice, while exercising judicial or quasi–judicial
powers, acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
The discrepancy between photographs supposedly taken in 1941 and in 1996 of
respondent did not support Limson’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Secretary of Justice. It is really absurd to expect respondent, the individual
depicted on the photographs, to look the same after 55 long years.
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that respondent’s
aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J.
Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names
contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second
name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the
erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted
from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified over time. What is
significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the
purview of the Anti–Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each
other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for
unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the charge
against him was justified in fact and in law.
RICARDO MEDINA, JR. y ORIEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 161308, January 15, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
Credibility of witnesses is determined by the conformity of their testimonies to human
knowledge, observation and experience.
Remedial Law; Evidence; The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon
actually used in the killing did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because
other competent evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively
identified and incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino.— Hence, the establishment
beyond reasonable doubt of Ricardo’s guilt for the homicide did not require the
production of the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its
findings on the culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts, clearly looked at,
considered and appreciated the entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the
weapon actually used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was
based on other evidence proving his commission of the crime.
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Defense of Relatives; In order that defense of a
relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) in case the provocation was given
by the person attacked, that the person making the defense took no part in the
provocation.—Like in self-defense, it is the accused who carries the burden to prove
convincingly the attendance and concurrence of these requisites because his
invocation of this defense amounts to an admission of having inflicted the fatal
injury on the victim.
FACTS:
This case concerns the fatal stabbing of Lino Mulinyawe (Lino). The stabbing was
preceded by a fight during a basketball game between Ross Mulinyawe, Lino’s son, and
Ronald Medina, the younger brother of Ricardo and Randolf. Ross was brought to the
hospital for treatment. Once Lino learned that his son had sustained a head injury
inflicted by one of the Medinas, he forthwith went towards the house of the Medinas
accompanied by his drinking buddies. Along the way, Lino encountered Randolf whom
he confronted about the fight. The two of them had a heated argument. Lino, already
holding the knife in his right hand, swung the knife at Randolf who was not hit.
Randolf retreated towards the store and took two empty bottles of beer, broke the
bottles and attacked Lino with them. Arriving at the scene, Ricardo saw what was
happening, and confronted Lino. A commotion ensued between them. Ricardo entered
their house to get a kitchen knife and came out. Lino made a thrust at Ricardo but
failed to hit the latter, who then stabbed Lino on the left side of his chest, near the
region of the heart. Lino fell face down on the ground. After that, Ricardo walked away,
while Randolf threw the broken bottles at the fallen Lino.
The Office of the City Prosecutor charged Randolf with homicide. The information was
amended with leave of court to include Ricardo as a co-conspirator. The Defense
claimed that it was Lino who had attacked Ricardo with a knife, and that Lino had
accidentally stabbed himself by falling frontward and into his own knife.
RTC acquitted Randolf but convicted Ricardo of homicide. It found no evidence of
conspiracy between Randolf and Ricardo because their actions appeared to be
independent and separate from each other and did not show that they had mounted a
joint attack against Lino. CA affirmed the judgment of RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the lower court gravely erred in its factual finding that the petitioner
stabbed Lino in spite of the fact the prosecution withheld the presentation of the
actual knives during the hearing of the case.
2. Whether the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative is present in this case.
RULING:
1. The lower court is correct in finding Ricardo guilty of homicide despite non-
presentation of the actual knives used Ricardo and Lino.
Ricardo contends that the State did not present as evidence in court the two knives
wielded by him and Lino despite repeated demands for their presentation; that had
the knives been presented, his assertion that Lino had stabbed himself when he
stumbled and lost his balance while swinging his knife at Randolf would have been
thereby validated; and that in his testimony, Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Southern Police District, did not rule out the possibility that the
wounds sustained by Lino were self-inflicted.
The non-identification and non-presentation of the weapon actually used in the killing
did not diminish the merit of the conviction primarily because other competent
evidence and the testimonies of witnesses had directly and positively identified and
incriminated Ricardo as the assailant of Lino. Hence, the establishment beyond
reasonable doubt of Ricardo’s guilt for the homicide did not require the production of
the weapon used in the killing as evidence in court, for in arriving at its findings on the
culpability of Ricardo the RTC, like other trial courts, clearly looked at, considered and
appreciated the entirety of the record and the evidence. For sure, the weapon actually
used was not indispensable considering that the finding of guilt was based on other
evidence proving his commission of the crime. In addition, the witnesses incriminating
Ricardo were not only credible but were not shown to have harbored any ill-motive
towards him. They were surely entitled to full faith and credit for those reasons, and
both the RTC and the CA did well in according such credence to them. Their positive
identification of him as the assailant prevailed over his mere denial, because such
denial, being negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving of weight by virtue
of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof. Hence, his denial had no
greater evidentiary value than the affirmative testimonies of the credible witnesses
presented against him.
2. CA is correct for not appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a
relative.
In order that defense of a relative is to be appreciated in favor of Ricardo, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and
(3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the person making
the defense took no part in the provocation.
In invoking defense of a relative, Ricardo states that his immediate impulse upon
seeing Randolf being attacked by Lino with a knife was to get his own weapon and to
aid in the defense of Randolf. But that theory was inconsistent with his declaration at
the trial that Lino’s fatal wound had been self-inflicted, as it presupposes direct
responsibility for inflicting the mortal wound. Thus, his defense was unworthy of belief
due to its incongruity with human experience.
EMERITU C. BARUT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 167454 September 24, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Formal Offer of Evidence; Regional Trial Courts; Pursuant to
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as the trial
court could consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end,
the offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered.—
The CA’s negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extrajudicial sworn
statement was in accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section
34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consider only the
evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must
specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The rule would ensure
the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party
would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly
counter the impact of evidence not formally offered.
Same; Same; Same; The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court
can be considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was
duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in
the records of the case.—The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial
court can be considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the
evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was
incorporated in the records of the case. Furthermore, the rule has no application
where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws
inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4, Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses,
determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
Criminal Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Death Indemnity; Moral damages and death
indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime
always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim’s heirs.—Anent the civil
liability, the RTC granted P250,000.00 without specifying the amounts corresponding
to actual and moral damages, as well as to the civil indemnity for the death of Vincent.
The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower courts thereby erred on a matter of law. Actual
and moral damages are different in nature and purpose. To start with, different laws
govern their grant, with the amounts allowed as actual damages being dependent on
proof of the loss to a degree of certainty, while the amounts allowed as moral damages
being discretionary on the part of the court. Secondly, actual damages address the
actual losses caused by the crime to the heirs of the victim; moral damages assuage the
spiritual and emotional sufferings of the heirs of the victim of the crime. On the civil
indemnity for death, law and jurisprudence have fixed the value to compensate for the
loss of human life. Thirdly, actual damages may not be granted without evidence of
actual loss; moral damages and death indemnity are always granted in homicide, it
being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and
spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and death indemnity require
neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions
moral sufferings on the part of the victim’s heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at
P75,000.00 each in view of homicide being a gross offense.—The death indemnity and
moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each in view of homicide being a gross offense.
Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no treatment of the actual
damages, the Court is now not in any position to dwell on this. Nonetheless, the Court
holds that despite the lack of such treatment, temperate damages of P25,000.00
should be allowed.
Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that temperate
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty.—Article 2224 of the Civil Code declares that
temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated with
receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is certainly
unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such expenses
as actual damages. This is based on the sound reasoning that it would be anomalous
that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less
than P25,000.00 would only be put in a worse situation than others who might have
presented no receipts at all but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
FACTS:
SPO4 Vicente Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna and returning home onboard
a passenger jeepney driven by his brother on the South Luzon Expressway. Ucag’s wife
and 16-year-old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type jeep driven by Villas on
the same route. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat Interchange ahead of Ucag’s
passenger jeepney, PNCC guards Conrado Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas and
directed him to park his vehicle at the road side. After informing Villas that his vehicle
had no headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license. Right about then, the
passenger jeepney carrying Ucag stopped where Villas’ jeep had parked. Ucag and
Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire
what the matter was. Apprised of the reason for the stoppage of Villas’ jeep, Ucag
requested the return of Villas’ driving license. But Ancheta refused because he had
already issued the Traffic Violation ticket. Ucag argued with Ancheta and Barut. Later
on, however, Ucag turned around in order to avoid further argument, and simply told
Villas to return for his driving license the next day. This apparently irked Ancheta, who
dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and then. Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38
caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting Ucag on both thighs. Ucag fired back
and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the exchange of gunshots.
Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to
his succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, however, Barut fired at Vincent(the
son) in the chest causing the latter’s death.
Barut was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the Regional Trial Court and
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Vincent Ucag in the total amount of P250,000.00,
inclusive of the actual and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the conviction of Barut.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the conviction of the crime of homicide is proper.
2. Whether the award of damages is proper.
RULING:
1. The conviction is proper.
There is nocompelling reason to set aside the factual findings of the trial court. Villas
and Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who
had shot Vincent; and that Barut’s bare denial of firing at Vincent cannot prevail over
their positive and categorical identification of him as the perpetrator.
Barut adverts to the extrajudicial sworn statement that Villas gave barely a day
following the fatal shooting of Vincent in which he declared not having seen Barut fire
a gun. the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because
Villas’ extrajudicial sworn statement containing the declaration had not been offered
and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only evidence that was
formally offered and made part of the records could be considered; and that in any
event, the supposed contradiction between the extrajudicial sworn statement and the
court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.
2. The award of damages is not proper.
Anent the civil liability, the RTC granted P250,000.00 without specifying the amounts
corresponding to actual and moral damages, as well as to the civil indemnity for the
death of Vincent. The CA affirmed the grant. Both lower courts thereby erred on a
matter of law. Actual and moral damages are different in nature and purpose. To start
with, different laws govern their grant, with the amounts allowed as actual damages
being dependent on proof of the loss to a degree of certainty, while the amounts
allowed as moral damages being discretionary on the part of the court. Secondly,
actual damages address the actual losses caused by the crime to the heirs of the victim;
moral damages assuage the spiritual and emotional sufferings of the heirs of the victim
of the crime. On the civil indemnity for death, law and jurisprudence have fixed the
value to compensate for the loss of human life. Thirdly, actual damages may not be
granted without evidence of actual loss; moral damages and death indemnity are
always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life
absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages
and death indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death
through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim’s heirs.
The death indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each in view of
homicide being a gross offense. Considering that the decisions of the lower courts
contained no treatment of the actual damages, the Court is now not in any position to
dwell on this. Nonetheless, the Court holds that despite the lack of such treatment,
temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be allowed. Article 2224 of the Civil Code
declares that temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any
doubt that when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not substantiated
with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is
certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such
expenses as actual damages.
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between
attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such
intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the
offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a
naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being
in a position to penetrate the female’s vagina.
Criminal Law; Rape; Rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the
sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.—The basic element of rape then
and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the
act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,” which explains why the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words,
rape is consummated once the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touches
the external genitalia of the female.

Same; Same; Frustrated Rape; As the evolving case law on rape stands, rape in its
frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated
felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are that: (1) the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the
felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the
offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim.—It
is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, 184 SCRA 105 (1990), the Court clarified that the
ruling in People v. Eriñia, 50 Phil. 998 (1927), whereby the offender was declared
guilty of frustrated rape because of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the
genital organ of the offended party, was a stray decision for not having been reiterated
in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its
frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a
frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are that: (1) the offender
has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that
the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.
Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge
of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have
been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.
Same; Same; Attempted Rape; In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the
offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge.—In
attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage
requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts
directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such
overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to
establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be
carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters,
would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr., 636 SCRA 134
(2010): “The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been
committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of
the penis into the vagina, before the interruption.”
Same; Same; As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by
their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent
really was.—We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have
produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former
would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but
the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended
crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty
of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting up
of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for
himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that
evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to
rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Code for
as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent
really was.
Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Attempted Rape; It is obvious that the fundamental
difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to
lie with the female.—It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape,
intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the “touching” of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual
act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
Same; Same; Elements of.—Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony
of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements
concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon
another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is
committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is
under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent,
lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or
that which is carried on a wanton manner.
Same; Rape; The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the
petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed overt acts
directly leading to rape.—The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless he committed
overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v.
Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 (1997), where the accused was charged with attempted rape
through an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, “did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime
of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of
the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her
will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away.” The accused was
held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape “is not
apparent from the act described,” and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her
was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that
the “act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse.”
Same; Acts of Lasciviousness; Penalties; Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prisión
correccional.—Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being
guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prisión correccional. In the absence of
modifying circumstances, prisión correccional is imposed in its medium period, which
ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should
come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prisión correccional which
ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the
indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two
(2) years, four (4) months and one day of prisión correccional, as the maximum.
FACTS:
Petitioner Norberto Bartolome and his wife Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling
of plastic wares and glass wares in different municipalities around the country.
Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in
Bangar, La Union. Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, they brought out all the goods and
wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to sleep.
Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
At around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less than an hour
later, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto
was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was
divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to
scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity
on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires.
Petitioner was convicted of attempted rape in the RTC. The conviction was affirmed by
CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they
faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his
hands, constituted attempted rape.
RULING:
The act constitutes acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not
perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage
requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be
shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is
beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts
directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape without such
overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to
establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminal intent be
carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters,
would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.: “The gauge in
determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the
commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the
vagina, before the interruption.”
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her
genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his
clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances
that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was
so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such
circumstances remained equivocal, or “susceptible of double interpretation.
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts
of lasciviousness? It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted
rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape,
intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the “touching” of the
vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is
manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual
act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the
felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.
The information charged that the petitioner “remove[d] her panty and underwear and
la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast.” With such
allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape.
His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his
intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position
to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie
with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
FELINA ROSALDES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
Family Code; Corporal Punishment; Special Parental Authority; Teachers; The Family
Code expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in
loco parentis).—Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline
Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at
her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less
than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal
punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz.: Article 233. The
person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal
punishment upon the child. (n)
Criminal Law; Child Abuse; In the crime charged against the petitioner, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be
habitual.—In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment
may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual.
The CA concluded that the petitioner “went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a
helpless and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left
thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the
boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of
feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears
and pushed him down on the floor.” On her part, the trial judge said that the physical
pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that
caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling
his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner was
guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and
dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.—Under Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The
information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner
in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the
petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance.
Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the
information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not
do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
FACTS:
Seven-year-old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary
School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner, Felina
Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked
Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to
his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him
up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a
desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up
by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor.
Petitioner was convicted of the crime of child abuse in the RTC which was affirmed by
CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of child abuse is proper.
RULING:
The conviction is proper.
Petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered
by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him. She insists that her act further came under
the doctrine of in loco parentis. However, although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher,
could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries
on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of
disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less
than the Family Code(Art. 233), which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal
punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:
xxxx
(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes any of the following:
xxxx
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of
an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA
concluded that the petitioner “went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless
and weak 7-year-old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and
when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell
down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and
pushed him down on the floor.”
DEGAÑOS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162826, FIRST DIVISION, October 14, 2013, Bersamin, J.
Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability under the penal laws of the
country. Only the. State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused.
Novation is relevant only to determine if the parties have meanwhile altered the nature
of the obligation prior to the commencement of the criminal prosecution in order to
prevent the incipient criminal liability of the accused.
Same; Same; Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal
liability.―Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability.
Article 89 (on total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial extinguishment) of the
Revised Penal Code list down the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal
liability. Not being included in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil
aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is
because only the State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused. The
role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to cast
doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such
that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when
money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
FACTS:
Narciso Deganos is engaged in the selling of religious articles and books. He came to
know Lydia Bordador for he frequently visited her house to sell said religious articles
and books. While at the house of Lydia, he saw her counting pieces of jewelry. He
asked her if she could show said pieces of jewelry to his sister, Aida Luz, to which she
agreed. Thereafter, Deganos returned the jewelry and Aida Luz called Bordador if she
could trust Deganos to get the pieces of jewelry for her to sell the same. Bordador
agreed on the condition that if they could not pay in cash, they should pay it one
month or return the unsold jewelry within the said period.
She delivered the said jewelry starting sometime in 1986 as evidenced by several
documents entitled "Katibayan at Kasunduan", the earliest of which is dated March 16,
1986. Everytime Narciso Degaños got jewelry from her, he signed the receipts in her
presence. They were able to pay only up to a certain point. However, receipt nos. 614
to 745 dated from April 27, 1987 up to July 20, 1987 were no longer paid and Deganos
failed to return the jewelry covered by such receipts. Despite oral and written
demands, he failed and refused to pay and return the subject jewelry. As of October
1998, the total obligation of the accused amounted to P725,000.00.
A case for estafa was then filed in the RTC against Deganos and Luz. However, the RTC
rendered a decision finding Deganos guilty of Estafa and acquitting Luz for the crime
for insufficiency of evidence. As defense on appeal, Deganos alleged that out of his
indebtedness, he already made partial payments in the amount of P53,307.00 which
has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability as there exist novation as to the
basis of his culpability.
The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether novation converted the liability of Degaños from criminal to purely civil in
nature.
HELD:
No.
Degaños claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract
with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil.
He insists that his failure to complete his payments prior to the filing of the complaint-
affidavit by the complainants notwithstanding, the fact that the complainants later
required him to make a formal proposal before the barangay authorities on the
payment of the balance of his outstanding obligations confirmed that novation had
occurred.
The legal effects of novation on criminal liability were explained by the Court, through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in People v. Nery: “The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to
the filing of the criminal information in court by the state prosecutors because up to
that time the original trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary
creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the
original trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its
power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an
offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it”.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by
the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of
novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on
the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its
breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to.
Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Not being
included in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the
liability, and, for that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only
the State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused.
Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an
offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial
payments and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay
proceedings were not at all incompatible with Degaños liability under the agency that
had already attached.
PEOPLE vs. PLACER
G.R. No. 181753, FIRST DIVISION, October 9, 2013, Bersamin, J.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that treachery attended the killing of
the victim, the crime is homicide, not murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.― Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as
conclusively as the crime itself. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack on the unsuspecting victim. Hence, treachery is absent when the victim was
placed on his guard, like when a heated argument has preceded the attack, or when
the victim was standing face to face with his assailants.
FACTS:
Maria Gernale and her husband, Rosalino Gernale, were on their way home on board a
tricycle. They were in the company of Maria’s father, another female passenger and
five young children. While their tricycle was moving, another tricycle carrying Ramon
and Virgilio Placer (Appellants) almost hit them. Appellants and Rosalino alighted
from their respective tricycles and a heated altercation ensued between them. When
things had subsided, Gernale and appellants proceeded their separate ways.
Sometime later, Maria realized that appellants were chasing them. The latter were
able to overtake the tricycle driven by Rosalino and later blocked its path. Appellants
alighted from their tricycle and proceeded towards the direction of Rosalino who had
also alighted from his tricycle. A confrontation followed and Angelina Gestiada,
Rosalino’s sister, tried to pacify appellants. But appellant Ramon Placer did not heed
as he stabbed Rosalino in the chest. Maria who was only about two steps away saw the
incident. Rosalino fell towards the direction of his tricycle and just as he was about to
fall, this time Virgilio stabbed him in the stomach.
Thereafter, appellants immediately fled the area on board their tricycle. It was Virgilio
who drove the tricycle. Maria frantically shouted for help and Angelina ran towards
the house of their nearest relative to ask for assistance. Rosalino was brought to the
Bulan Municipal Hospital where he was pronounced dead.
The RTC convicted Ramon and Virgilio of murder upon finding the States’s version
more credible than that of the Defense.
Ramon and Virgilio appealed via notice of appeal directly to the Court but the Court
remanded the appeal to the CA. Virgilio subsequently filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal in the CA, averring that he had already served more than six years in
detention for this case and had thus qualified to apply for parole or executive
clemency; that he had already applied for parole or executive clemency; and that he
would need a certification of non-appeal to support his application for parole or
executive clemency.
On the other hand, the CA affirmed Ramon’s conviction. Ramon still contends that he
incurred no criminal liability because he had acted in self-defense in stabbing
Rosalino; that, assuming that he was criminally liable for the killing of the victim,
the crime committed was homicide, not murder; and that his voluntary surrender
was a mitigating circumstance that entitled him to a lower penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether treachery is present to qualify the killing to murder.
HELD:
No.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as
conclusively as the crime itself.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting
victim.
Hence, treachery is absent when the victim was placed on his guard, like when a
heated argument has preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face
with his assailants.
The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by Ramon was immediately preceded by two
altercations between Ramon and Virgilio, on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other. The
first altercation occurred right after the near-collision of the tricycles, while the other
happened shortly after Ramon and Virgilio had blocked Rosalino’s tricycle. During the
second altercation, Rosalino stood face to face with Ramon and Virgilio. It was then
when Ramon stabbed the victim twice, the sequential method of attack being borne
out in the necropsy report showing that Rosalino had sustained two fatal stab wounds
in the chest and abdomen. Under the circumstances, Rosalino was rendered
completely aware of the imminent danger to himself from Ramon and Virgilio,
rendering their assault far from sudden and unexpected as to put Rosalino off his
guard against any deadly assault. To stress, treachery cannot be appreciated if the
victim was forewarned of an impending danger and could have foreseen the
aggression of the accused.
With treachery not being proved beyond reasonable doubt, the crime Ramon was
properly guilty of was homicide.
PEOPLE vs. WAGAS
G.R. No. 157943, First Division, September 4, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution
is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such
proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in relation to the
identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is
not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional duty to
acquit him.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Postdating Checks; In order to constitute estafa under
this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; In other words, the
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have
parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the
offender.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of.—The essential elements of the crime charged are that:
(a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c)
damage to the payee thereof. It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check that is punishable, not the non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit
exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount
necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; In every criminal prosecution,
however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.—In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender,
like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that
regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas
who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, a check payable to cash is payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without the need of an indorsement.—The check delivered to Ligaray was
made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was
payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to
Ligaray, but to somebody else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it
to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at
the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who
signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Postdating Checks; What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check.—It bears stressing that the
accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud
the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of
the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had
issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that
it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence
solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other purpose.—The letter of
Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with
Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted
exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of
Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be
considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court
shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any other
purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high
plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his
sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the
offense with the participation of the accused.— The first duty of the Prosecution is not
to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the
commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Civil Liability; An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be
held civilly liable where the preponderance of the established facts so warrants.—An
accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer of
the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.
Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.
FACTS:
Wagas was charged with estafa. After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty, the pre-trial
was held, during which the Defense admitted that the check alleged in the information
had been dishonored due to insufficient funds.
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray
testified that Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he
released the goods to Wagas and at the same time received BPI check for P200,000.00
payable to cash and postdated; that he later deposited the check but the check was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds; that despite repeated demands, Wagas did
not pay him.
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas
because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice
directly to Robert Canada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery
receipt upon receiving the rice.
In his defense, Wagas admitted having issued the BPI check to Canada, not to Ligaray.
He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He
explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Canada’s property
that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore
fund the check.
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter apparently
signed by hi, and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray
P200,000.00 for goods received. However, he insisted that he had signed the letter
only because his sister and her husband (Canada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Wagas
appealed directly to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Wagas is guilty of estafa.
HELD:
NO.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the
defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property
from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or
postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for
the issuance of the check by the offender.
The essential elements of the crime charged are that:
(a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time
the check is issued;
(b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(c) damage to the payee thereof.
It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
nonpayment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within
three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime
itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the
Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had
defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with
whom he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check,
Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he
had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the
telephone.
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the
Negotiable Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be
negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it
highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else
like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray
confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and
thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used
the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of
estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of
guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the check.
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who
delivered the check to him. Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that
Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC had no factual and legal bases to
conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and legal
bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had
conversed with Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was
admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the
denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it
could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence,
the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for
any other purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover,
the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only
because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken
for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi
in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of
the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption
of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the
State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a
crime, and (2) the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of
the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on
the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That
the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the Prosecution to demonstrate the
guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the accused, being
presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this
reason, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the
identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established,
without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
there can be no conviction.
An accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the
preponderance of the established facts so warrants. Wagas as the admitted drawer
of the check was legally liable to pay the amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due
course. Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the amount of the
dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.
PEOPLE VS VICTORINO REYES
G.R. No. 173307, FIRST DIVISION, July 17, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.
Slightest penetration of the labia of the female victim's genitalia consummates the crime
of rape.
FACTS:
Earlier, at around 7:00 p.m., AAA and her 9-year-old sister, BBB, had watched
television at his house just across the street from their house. By 9:00 p.m., AAA and
BBB rose to go home, but as they were leaving, Reyes suddenly pulled AAA into the
store attached to the sala of his house. He told her in the dialect: Umaykan ta agiyyot
ta. (Come here and let us have sex). Alarmed by what his words denoted, AAA
struggled to free herself from him. BBB went to her succor by pulling her away from
him, but his superior strength prevailed. BBB could only cry as he dragged AAA into
the store. BBB was left outside the store crying.
Inside the store, Reyes kissed AAA and mashed her breasts. He threatened her: If you
will shout, I will kill you. He pulled down her long pants and panties below her knees,
took out his penis, grabbed her by the waist, and used his body to anchor her back to a
nearby table. She fought back by boxing and pushing him away, but her efforts were
futile. He twice tried to pry open her legs, but she strained hard to close them. On the
second attempt, however, her effort was not enough to prevent him from pulling her
legs apart, and he then thrust his penis into her vagina and made push and pull
movements. Although his penis achieved only a slight penetration of her
vagina, he succeeded in satisfying his lust, as confirmed later on when CCC, the
mother of the victim, found semen on AAA’s panties.
After he had satisfied his lust, Reyes threatened to kill both AAA and BBB should they
tell anyone else about what had happened. Then they hurriedly left for home. Upon
their arrival in their house, CCC called out to her daughters to go to bed. Only BBB
immediately complied because AAA tarried outside, only to have her mother again call
her inside. AAA entered the house this time, but went to where the aparador was and
took out fresh panties. CCC saw her doing so and became suspicious. She also saw fear
in the face of her daughter. When she inspected the soiled underwear of AAA, CCC
discovered that her panties were wet with semen. Upon being interrogated, AAA
admitted that Reyes had raped her.
At around 6:00 a.m. of the next day, December 27, 1996, CCC reported the rape of her
daughter by Reyes to the Barangay Chairman of San Aurelio, who accompanied AAA
and her father to the Balungao Police Station to bring the criminal complaint for rape.
At the request of the Balungao Police, Dr. Ingrid Irena B. Gancinia, the Municipal
Health Officer of Rosales, Pangasinan, conducted a medical examination on AAA at
around 3:30 p.m. of that day.
The findings reflected no hymenal lacerations noted with one examining finger
difficult to penetrate the vaginal canal.
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed the
information charging Reyes with rape. Reyes pleaded not guilty to the information.
Although admitting that AAA and BBB had watched television in his house at the time
of the rape, Reyes insisted that he had been sleeping on the sofa in front of the
television set in the sala of his house from 7:30 p.m. of December 26, 1996 until 2:30
a.m. of the next day. He denied the accusation, and called attention to the medical
findings showing that AAA’s hymen was intact; hence, she was still a virgin.
The RTC convicted Reyes as charged. The CA affirmed Reyes’ conviction. Hence, this
appeal. Reyes insists that the fact that AAA’s hymen had remained intact, per the
medico-legal report, revealed that no rape had been committed.
ISSUE:
WON the evidence adduced by the State competently proved that the crime reached
the consummated stage.
RULING:
YES. His insistence is not persuasive.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659, the breaking of the hymen of the victim is not among the means of
consummating rape. All that the law required is that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman under the circumstances described in the law. By definition,
carnal knowledge was "the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a
woman." This understanding of rape explains why the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates the crime.
During her examination of AAA, Dra. Gancinia found pamamaga (swelling) on the
victim’s labia majora. Dra. Gancinia opined that such swelling was possibly caused by
the insertion of a hard object, like a hard penis, or by friction with hard objects even
without removing the panties or pants of AAA. Although such medical finding, left
alone, was susceptible of different probable interpretations, AAA’s testimonial
narration about how Reyes had sexually assaulted her, including how his penis
had only slightly penetrated her vagina, confirmed that he had carnal
knowledge of her.
More specifically, the presence of the swelling in AAA’s labia majora was an
indication of the penetration by the erect penis of the labia majora of the
accused. As such, there was sufficient factual foundation for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape, for, in objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential
element in consummated statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of
the female. The mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that
is necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused
capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the
pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis of
the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the
pudendum. The touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact,
or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the
external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis
touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically
situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to
touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the
female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias
must be sufficiently and convincingly established.
BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206236, FIRST DIVISION, July 15, 2013, Bersamin, J.
It is imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has
been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law requires the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished
by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, to sentence the accused “to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.”― Accordingly, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
in this case should be within the range of the medium period of the penalty, i.e., from
16 years and 1 day to 20 years, because neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance attended the commission of the crime; and the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the crime, without regard to its periods.
FACTS:
*No Facts stated but the accused was charged with Arson in the RTC and affirmed by the
CA.
The petitioner submits that both the RTC and the CA erred in their appreciation of the
evidence. He insists:
1. That no witness had actually seen him set the house on fire;
2. That the State did not show that he had the motive to commit the arson; and
3. That only circumstantial evidence was presented against him, but such
evidence, not being incompatible with the hypothesis favoring his innocence,
was insufficient to support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether direct evidence is necessary to establish the guilt of a person
beyond reasonable doubt. (NO)
2. Whether the RTC correctly imposed the penalty for the crime committed.
(NO)
HELD:
Direct evidence is NOT necessary to establish the guilt of a person beyond
reasonable doubt.
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the
accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct evidence. Direct evidence is
not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because
circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant the absence of direct evidence. The
crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to
as indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which, if
proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in issue".
The RTC’s reliance on circumstantial evidence was sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 4
of the Rules of Court, which requires for circumstantial evidence to warrant the
conviction of an accused that, firstly, there are more than one circumstance; secondly,
the facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established in court; and,
thirdly, the circumstances form and unbroken chain of events leading to the fair
conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the crime for which he is convicted.
Ostensibly, our rules "make no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and
evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when
it is direct, for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused."
RTC erred in imposing the penalty for the crime committed.
The indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 16 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum,
prescribed by the RTC was legally erroneous.
The information specifically alleged that the house burned by the accused was an
inhabited dwelling. Pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613
(Amending the Law on Arson), the penalty to be imposed if the property burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Not
being composed of three periods, however, such penalty should be divided into three
equal portions of time, and each portion forms one period of the penalty. Yet, reclusion
perpetua, being an indivisible penalty, immediately becomes the maximum period,
leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in order to fix the medium and
minimum periods of the penalty. The three periods of the prescribed penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua are then as follows:
Minimum period – 12 years and 1 day to 16 years;
Medium period – 16 years and 1 day to 20 years;
Maximum period – reclusion perpetua.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the court, in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, to
sentence the accused "to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Accordingly, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty in this case should be within the range of the
medium period of the penalty, i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to 20 years, because
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the
crime; and the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime, without regard to its
periods.
It appears, therefore, that the maximum of the indeterminate penalty fixed by
the RTC fell short by one day in order to come within the medium period of the
prescribed penalty. Although such fixing by the RTC was contrary to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the CA uncharacteristically condoned the violation. The
correction should now be made to make the sentence conform to law. Accordingly, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence of the petitioner is 16 years and one day of
reclusion temporal.
PEOPLE VS ARNOLD TAPERE
 GR NO. 178065, February 20, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
An accused arrested during a valid entrapment operation is not entitled to an acquittal
on the ground that his arrest resulted from instigation.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Shabu; Elements of.—To establish
the crime of illegal sale of shabu as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of
the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, requires
simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens at the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, the Prosecution must show that the
transaction or sale actually took place, and present in court the thing sold as evidence
of the corpus delicti.
Same; Same; Instigation; Entrapment; “Instigation” and “Entrapment,” Distinguished.—
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime.
Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by
reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal. It follows
that the person instigating must not be a private person, because he will be liable as a
principal by inducement. On the other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means
devised by a peace officer to entrap or apprehend a person who has committed a
crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been committed already. Hence,
entrapment is not mitigating. Although entrapment is sanctioned by law, instigation is
not. The difference between the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent―in
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal, but in instigation,
the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused,
who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
FACTS:
At 7:10 p.m. of September 2, 2002, the team proceeded on board the jeep of SPO2
Cabahug to Alcuizar Avenue in San Antonio, Iligan City where Tapere engaged in drug
pushing. They stopped at some distance from the target area, and walked the rest of
the way. They posted themselves within view of the target place, which was on the left
side of the road going towards Tipanoy, Iligan City and a few meters from the Tubod
Bridge. The first structure nearest the bridge on the left side of the road going towards
Tipanoy was a blacksmith shop, and next to the shop was a row of stalls where fish,
meat and other commodities were sold. The agents spotted Tapere vending lanzones
along that side of the road to Tipanoy, outside the row of stalls.
With each agent being strategically posted, Salgado was signalled to approach Tapere
according to the plan. Salgado went towards Tapere. The agents saw the two
conversing for a brief while before Salgado handed money to Tapere. In turn, Tapere
took a small heat-sealed plastic sachet from his pocket and gave it to Salgado. After
accepting the sachet, Salgado made the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head to
signify the consummation of the transaction. The agents rushed towards Tapere,
introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and placed him in custody. They searched him
and recovered the P100.00 bill (Exhibit E-1) from his right pocket. At that point, he
voluntarily produced three more sachets of shabu from his pocket and handed them to
SPO2 Bastatas. The agents brought Tapere to the PDEA headquarters in Camp Cabili,
Tipanoy, Iligan City.
On the other hand, Tapere denied the accusation. He and his wife rendered their own
version of the incident that led to his arrest.
Arnold P. Tapere was charged with, tried for and found guilty of illegally selling shabu
in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the RTC which sentenced him to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
conviction and the prescribed penalty. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the apprehension of Tapere was the product of an instigation, not entrapment;
and that he should consequently be acquitted because instigation was an absolutory
cause.
RULING:
NO.
The State conclusively established the concurrence of the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Firstly, the members of the buybust team identified Tapere as the
person with whom Salgado had contracted on the purchase of the shabu. Secondly, the
subject of the sale was one plastic sachet of shabu that the PNP Crime Laboratory later
on confirmed in due course to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. It is of no consequence that three other sachets of shabu recovered from
Tapere’s possession at the time of his arrest were also presented as evidence during
the trial, or that the Prosecution failed to specify which of the four sachets was the
sachet involved in the transaction between him and Salgado, because what is decisive
is that one of the four sachets was definitely the subject of the transaction between
Tapere and the poseur buyer. Thirdly, the consideration of the sale was P100.00, and
the actual payment of that amount through the P100.00 bill bearing serial number
YU859011 covered by the public prosecutor’s certification ensured the identification
of it as the consideration. And, fourthly, the Prosecution’s witnesses fully described the
details of the consummated sale of shabu between Tapere as seller and Salgado as
buyer.
The members of the buy-bust team substantially complied with the requirements of
Sec. 21(1), RA No. 9165. To shield the operation from suspicion, they first saw to the
certification of the buy-bust bill by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City,
pursuant to their then standard operating procedure.22 After arresting Tapere, they
lost no time in bringing him and the confiscated sachets (marked and identified as
"AT-1" to "AT-4", inclusive) to the PDEA office, where Team Leader SPO2 Englatiera
immediately prepared and signed the request for laboratory examination. Due to the
lateness of the hour, PO1 Margaja, another member of the team, brought the request
and the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory on the next day, and the request and the
sachets were received in due course. Sr. Police Insp. Jabonillo of the PNP Crime
Laboratory subjected the sachets to examination, and confirmed the presence in all of
them of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. She also gave the
weights of the contents of the four sachets in her Chemistry Report No. D-083-02
dated September 4, 2002. Her report was approved by her superior, Police Supt.
Sabong of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory. Based on all the foregoing, there was a
conscious effort exerted by the buy-bust team to ensure the proper incrimination of
Tapere.
Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of shabu during the
buy-bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to buy from him a definite
quantity of shabu for P100.00. Even if, as he claims, he was unaware that Salgado was
then working as an undercover agent for the PDEA, he had no justification for
accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu. His explanation that he could not have
refused Salgado's offer to buy for fear of displeasing the latter was implausible. He did
not show how Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing something so
blatantly illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the decision to peddle the shabu
emanated from his own mind, such that he did not need much prodding from Salgado
or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not incited, induced,
instigated or lured into committing an offense that he did not have the intention of
committing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMASTEODORO y ANGELES
G.R. No. 175876, FIRST DIVISION, February 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the records
show that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial support
of the accused.
Criminal Law; Rape; Statutory Rape; Elements of.―The crimes charged were two counts
of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female
under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the
victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a female
without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor
the female’s deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the
employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is
necessary to commit statutory rape. Full penile penetration of the female’s genitalia is
not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having
sexual bodily connections with a woman.
Same; Same; Same; The Court has clarified in People v. Campuhan, 329 SCRA 270 (2000),
that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the
sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the
consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the
sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Recantation; As a rule, recantation is viewed with
disfavor; Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to
accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance
of the recantation and the motivations for it.―As a rule, recantation is viewed with
disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the State
like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is always the
possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard
testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the
possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the
recantation. Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is
required to be truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The
trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery, and the
investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the
recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its
value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected
to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation
and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the
test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the
recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the trial court is in a better
position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses.
FACTS:
Two informations charged Teodoro with statutory rape.
BBB left home in Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte on an errand in Surigao; that her
children, including AAA, were left under the care of Teodoro, her common-law
husband; that late that night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival roused the
children from their sleep, because they had not yet eaten; that they eagerly ate the
food he set down for them; that soon after the dinner, he told the children to go to bed;
that the children went to sleep in their respective places on the floor; that AAA became
puzzled when he turned off the lights that were supposed to be left on; that AAA
eventually fell asleep beside her siblings; that at some point later in the night, he
roused AAA, and ordered her to strip naked; that she initially defied him, but he
himself then undressed her; that he took off his pants and drawers down to his knees,
exposing his penis; that he went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and
made push and pull movements; that she felt a sharp pain inside her vagina; that he
stopped his movements when she protested due to her pain becoming unbearable,
because he did not want the other children to be roused from sleep; that he returned
to his own place, but she got up to relieve herself; that she felt searing pain in her
vagina as she was relieving herself; and that she did not tell her mother upon the
latter’s return from Surigao about what Teodoro had done to her.
Anent the second rape committe, BBB was again away from the house, having gone to
Manila. Teodoro committed the rape in a fashion similar to that in the first rape.
However, AAA could no longer bear her ordeal, and told of the rapes to CCC, the older
brother of BBB. CCC immediately reported the crimes to the Kitcharao Police Station.
The police quickly arrested Teodoro. Upon BBB’s return in the afternoon, CCC
informed her about what Teodoro had done to her daughter. BBB and CCC took AAA to
the Kitcharao District Hospital for physical and medical examination.
During the trial, AAA and BBB testified for the Prosecution, but two years later
recanted and turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that
Teodoro had only touched AAA’s vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and
February 8, 1998.

On his part, Teodoro claimed that he had only caressed or touched AAA’s body on the
night of February 8, 1998; that before going home from work on that day, he had
joined his friends in drinking Kulafu; that he had arrived home late that night, and had
gone to bed after serving the children food to eat; that he had later awakened to find
somebody sleeping beside him; that he had embraced and caressed the different parts
of the body of that person, whom he thought was BBB whom he had earlier sent off to
Surigao on an errand; that he had realized that he was caressing AAA only after she
shouted; that he had then gotten up to go to a different part of the room; that he did
not rape AAA on the night of December 18, 1997, although he admitted being at home
then.
The RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on both counts of statutory rape
notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. On appeal, the CA sustained the
RTC, and ignored AAA’s recantation for being dictated by her family’s financial
difficulties.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rapes charged against Teodoro established beyond reasonable doubt?
2. WON the recantation by AAA be accepted?
RULING:
The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape
are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender
has carnal knowledge of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is
carnal knowledge of a female without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or
intimidation on the female, nor the female’s deprivation of reason or being otherwise
unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. Full penile penetration of the
female’s genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal knowledge is simply the act
of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.
The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the commission of
the two counts of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-founded. AAA’s
recollections given in court when she was only eight years old disclosed an unbroken
and consistent narration of her ordeals at his hands. She thereby revealed details that
no child of her very tender age could have invented or concocted. The only rational
and natural conclusion to be made by any objective arbiter is to accord the fullest
credence to her.
Yet, Teodoro would have us undo his convictions for statutory rape, arguing that
AAA’s description of his acts in Cebuano-Visayan, the dialect spoken by AAA, was
guihilabtan, not lugos, the former being the dialect term for touching and the latter for
rape.
Teodoro’s argument is directly belied by the established facts. AAA remained
categorical and steadfast about what Teodoro had done to her all throughout
her testimony in court, even during her delivery of the supposed recantation.
She narrated how he had committed the rape in the evening of December 18, 1997 by
undressing her and himself, going on top of her, inserting his male organ into her
vagina, and making push and pull motions, causing her to suffer severe pain in her
vagina.
Moreover, to believe Teodoro’s argument is to belie that AAA exhibited at the time of
her physical examination by Dr. Abrenillo a peripheral erythema, or redness, in her
hymen, as well as tenderness and gaping in her labia majora and labia minora. Dr.
Abrenillo explained the significance of her physical findings.
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in
consummated statutory rape, does not require full penile penetration of the
female. The mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is
necessary to reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused
capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the
pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the penis
of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of
the pudendum. The touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal
contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on
the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis
touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia. Accordingly, the conclusion that
touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically
situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to
touch either of them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the
female genitalia. It is required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias
must be sufficiently and convincingly established.
Here, the proof of the penis of Teodoro touching the labias of AAA was sufficient
and convincing. Dr. Abrenillo found the peripheral erythema in the hymen of AAA
and the fact that her labia majora and labia minora were tender and gaping, exposing
the hymenal opening. In other words, the touching by Teodoro’s penis had gone
beyond the mons pubis and had reached the labias of the victim. Such physical
findings, coupled with the narrative of AAA that, one, Teodoro went on top of her
body; two, he inserted his penis into her vagina; three, he made push and pull
motions thereafter; and, four, she felt great pain inside her during his push and
pull movements, rendered the findings of rape against him unassailable as to the
rape committed on February 8, 1998. With respect to the rape committed on
December 18, 1997, we concur with the RTC and CA’s conclusion that AAA’s
testimonial account thereon likewise sufficiently and convincingly established the
commission of rape. She suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while his penis was
penetrating her, which could only be understood in the light of the foregoing
explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree of penetration
beneath the surface of her genitalia.
Apart from being incompatible with the established facts, Teodoro’s argument
remained a matter of pure semantics. For sure, rape as defined and used by the
Revised Penal Code is a legal term whose exact nuances and juridical consequences no
victim of AAA’s tender age and naivete could already fully know or realize. As such, her
usage of the term guihilabtan to describe in the dialect what he had done to her should
not be confined to what he would have us accept as the entire characterization of his
deeds. Indeed, his argument on the distinction between the dialect terms guihilabtan
and lugos reflected nothing better than his self-serving opinion on their meanings.
Such opinion, already by its nature argumentative, should not prevail over the physical
evidence. Worse, it was not even relevant, for what he ought to have done, instead,
was to flesh out his opinion through a credible demonstration during the trial that by
her usage of the dialect term guihilabtan she really meant mere touching of her
genitalia that did not amount to his having carnal knowledge of her.
Teodoro’s further submission that AAA recanted the accusations against him is
bereft of substance.
Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such
demeanor reflected how much she despised what he had done to her twice. As such,
her supposed recantation did not conceal the impelling motive for it being that her
mother and her family still needed the material support of Teodoro. This was
confirmed even by BBB. BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the
youngest being born when he was already detained), as well as AAA and her five
siblings that BBB had from an earlier relationship. She unabashedly needed the
material support of Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on AAA to withdraw her charges
against him. But a recantation under such insincere circumstances was
unacceptable.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of
her testimony by a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable,
and secondly because there is always the possibility that such recantation may
later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply
because the witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary
considerations may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in which
testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all circumstances,
are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given
is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous
witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing
to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to
the party adversely affected to crossexamine the recanting witness both upon the
substance of the recantation and the motivations for it. The recantation, like any other
testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances,
including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the
finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that the
trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses.
TEODORO A. REYES vs. ETTORE ROSSI
G.R. No. 159823, FIRST DIVISION, February 18, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations
of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the
checks the buyer issued in connection with the sale.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; A prejudicial question
generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined before
the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.— The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; Same; To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant
the suspension of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes
charged.— The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks
knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in
the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfillment of
Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If,
after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to
have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such
result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal
responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks
that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the
parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the
drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the
obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in
itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission
of the conditional sale.
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes and Advanced Foundation Construction Systems
Corporation executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by Reyes of
equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth P10,000,000.00.
The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as
downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks.
Reyes complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation
under the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine
post-dated checks that would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month
accruing on the unpaid portion of the obligation.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes’ request, and returned the four checks. In
turn, Reyes issued and delivered the nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum
of P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank.
Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks on their maturity dates in Advanced
Foundation’s bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of the checks were denied
payment ostensibly upon Reyes’ instructions to stop their payment, while the third
was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Rossi likewise deposited two more checks in Advanced Foundation’s account at the
PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation Account
Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on
the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored.
In the meanwhile, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages
in the RTC. Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Another criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes.
Reyes claims that the checks had not been issued for any valuable consideration; that
he had discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the
conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated
at only 560 horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had
represented to him; that welding works on the pump had neatly concealed several
cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had written to Advanced Foundation complaining
about the misrepresentations on the specifications of the pump and demanding
documentary proof of Advanced Foundation’s ownership of the pump; that he had
caused the order to stop the payment of three checks; that Advanced Foundation had
replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by saying that the pump had been sold to him on
an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent another letter to Advanced Foundation on
May 18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the request for proper documentation of
ownership; that he had subsequently discovered other hidden defects, prompting him
to write another letter; and that instead of attending to his complaints and request,
Advanced Foundation’s lawyers had threatened him with legal action.
Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati over the
criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon
City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend
the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of
contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings.
The Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation recommended
the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings relating to
the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question.
The City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the handling Assistant
City Prosecutor. Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the
charge for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against the respondent be
suspended until the prejudicial question raised in Civil Case Q-98-35109 for
Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now pending with the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but
the Secretary of Justice denied Rossi’s petition for review.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged
the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.
In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
suspension of the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of
the existence of a prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the
complaints for estafa. The CA GRANTED the instant petition in so far as the issue of the
existence of prejudicial question is concerned.
ISSUE
WON the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a prejudicial question
that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
RULING
NO.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an
issue that must first be determined before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question are (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question,
Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or
not he was criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that
if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of
sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the
dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced
Foundation did not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the
alternative remedies available to a contracting party under Article 1191 of
the Civil Code.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in
reciprocal obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no
corresponding agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that
in reciprocal obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his
part of the contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to
perform may rescind the obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and
willing to perform.
It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the
obligatory relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive
effect. The rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie,
leaving things in their status before the celebration of the contract. However, until the
contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the
suspension of the criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the
crimes charged. The violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of
the following elements, namely: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to
apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that
at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks
knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in
the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of
Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If,
after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to
have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such
result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal
responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks
that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the
parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the
drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the
obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed, under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the offense in
itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission
of the conditional sale.
Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the
rescission of contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 170634, EN BANC, January 8, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:
Criminal Law; Rape; Guiding Principles in the Prosecution of Rape.—In reviewing rape
convictions, the Court has been guided by three principles, namely: (a) that an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to prove
but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving only two persons, the rapist and the
victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (c) that the evidence for the Prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
Defense.
Criminal Law; Rape; The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either
against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the
female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or
is demented).—The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either against
her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is
demented). Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having bodily
connections with a female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or laceration in
the genitalia of the victim is not decisive of whether rape has been committed or not.
Such injury or laceration is material only if force or intimidation is an element of the
rape charged; otherwise, it is merely circumstantial evidence of the commission of the
rape.
Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Minority and Relationship; Penalties; Death
Penalty;—Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed
if the rape is committed with the attendance of any “aggravating/qualifying
circumstances.” One of such “aggravating/quali­fying circumstances” is “when the
victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.” Both minority and actual
relationship must be alleged and proved; otherwise, conviction for rape in its qualified
form will be barred.
Same; Same; Death Penalty; With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic
Act No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited.—With the
intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, however, the
imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. The retroactive application to
Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made
here because it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for
parole, because Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly provides that persons
“whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act” shall not
be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.
FACTS:
On April 13, 1999, at about 3:00 p.m., CCC and her children were attending a get-
together party in the adjacent house of DDD, then already married. The accused
summoned AAA home from the party. Upon AAA getting home, he ordered her to enter
the bedroom, and once she was inside, he undressed her and inserted his finger in her
vagina. He then went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina, giving vent to
his lust. AAA could only cry while he was forcing himself on her.
Missing AAA at the party, CCC returned to the house and saw that her husband was
there. He cursed her many times, but she simply ignored him and went upstairs, where
she found AAA crying. AAA told her mother that her father had just molested her. AAA
further told her mother that he had done the same thing to her several times in the
past, starting when she was still in Grade I. At the time, AAA was already in Grade 4.
AAA told her mother that he had also raped her several times in the past only when
CCC was not home, but that she had kept silent about the rapes because she had been
too afraid of him to complain. Besides, AAA also knew that he kepta gun at home and
had a violent temper, having frequently beaten his wife and children for no apparent
reason. AAA explained in court that she finally revealed her ordeals to her mother
because her sufferings had become unbearable, saying: Nahihirapan po ako.
It was not until June 9, 1999, however, that CCC and AAA mustered the courage to
leave home and denounce the father’s crimes. They hastened to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to finally lodge a complaint against him.
The rape of BBB was committed a few months later. At 6:00 a.m. of November 10,
1999, the accused commanded BBB, who was then in the kitchen of their house, to
undress and lie down on a piece of plywood laid out on the ground. Already naked
from the waist down, he pushed her down to the floor, and lubricated his penis and
BBB’s vagina with cooking oil.
He next went on top of her, inserted his penis into her genitalia, and made pumping
motions. He ignored all her pleas for him to stop. She stated that he had also raped her
many times previously but that she had kept silent about the rapes out of fear of him.
But she could not anymore bear her pain that last time; hence, she went to her older
sister DDD’s house and finally reported the rape to DDD. When BBB was narrating
about her last rape, DDD could only embrace her young sister and cry.
Later on, DDD called up their mother who was then staying at the DSWD Haven in
Alabang to tell her about what the accused had just committed against BBB. CCC
advised DDD to bring BBB to the DSWD office in Valenzuela. The DSWD office
endorsed BBB to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH),
where Dr. Mariella S. Castillo examined the child.
The RTC convicted the accused. Elevated to the Court on automatic appeal, the records
were transferred to the CA for intermediate review. The CA affirmed the conviction,
but reduced the death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
WON Pedro BuadoyCipriano Jr. is guilty of two counts of rape committed against his
two minor daughters.
RULING
YES
Ultimately and frequently, the resolution of the charge of rape hinges on the credibility
of the victim’s testimony. The RTC as the trial court and the CA as the intermediately
reviewing tribunal did not overlook or disregard any fact or circumstance of
significance. Instead, they correctly appreciated the evidence, and rightly concluded
that the accused committed the rapes of his own daughters. They regarded and
accepted AAA and BBB as credible witnesses whose recollections about their father’s
lecherous acts deserved the fullest faith and credence.
The trial records entirely supported the lower courts’ findings in favor of the
credibility of AAA and BBB’s recollections. Indeed, AAA and BBB deserved the
credence accorded to them, for they were reliable in their recollection of their ordeals
at the hands of the accused.
AAA narrated the rape in sufficient detail and candor during her direct examination.
On the other hand, the accused did not bring to the Court’s attention any facts and
circumstances of weight that, if properly considered, would change the result into one
favorable to him. He did not also submit to us any argument that would lead us to
doubt the findings of the RTC and the CA on the credibility of AAA and BBB.
Although the accused would discredit AAA by harping on her failure to immediately
report the rape and to denounce him sooner to the proper authorities, the Court
cannot but reject his attempt to discredit AAA’s accusation. The attempt would rest on
drawing an inference of estoppel against AAA, in that AAA would have denounced him
sooner if he had truly ravished her. However, the inference of estoppel could be
properly drawn against AAA only if the trial records did not plausibly explain the
cause of delay. We find that his frequent acts of domestic violence against even the
young members of his family caused AAA and her mother to fear him. He justified his
violent tendencies by describing himself as a strict disciplinarian at home. His
justification was implausible, however, considering that his having been once charged
with child abuse in which the victim had been one of his own sons confirmed that his
chastisement had exceeded the tolerable limits of parental discipline. Moreover, AAA
knew that he had kept a gun at home. This, coupled by his children’s undue fear of him,
cowed AAA into silence about her great sufferings for a long period of time, and
explained why she came out into the open to denounce him only on June 9, 1999. By
then, his unabated lecherousness towards AAA had become unbearable. Under the
circumstances, the delay in reporting him to the proper authorities is not a factor in
determining the credibility of the charge against him of his own daughter.45 To a child
of very tender years like AAA, the threats of actual physical harm would definitely
instill a fear overwhelming enough to force her to suffer her ordeals in silence for a
period of time.
Verily, there has never been any uniformity or consistency of behavior to be expected
from those who had the misfortune of being sexually molested. The Court has pointed
out that some of them have found the courage early on to publicly denounce the
abuses they experienced, but that there were others who have opted to initially keep
their harrowing ordeals to themselves and to just move on with their lives as if
nothing had happened, until the limits of their tolerance were reached. AAA belonged
to the latter group of victims, as her honest declarations to the trial court revealed.
Also, we cannot expect from the immature and inexperienced AAA to measure up to
the same standard of conduct and reaction that we would expect from adults whose
maturity in age and experience could have brought them to stand up more quickly to
their interest. Lastly, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape to the
proper authorities have not always been considered as an indication of a false
accusation.
The ill motive that supposedly impelled AAA and BBB to initiate the charges against
their own father (i.e., they hated him because of the physical abuse he had inflicted on
them and on their mother)is unworthy of serious consideration. To start with, the
imputation of ill motive, being out rightly speculative, was unreliable. Moreover, the
imputed ill motive, even assuming it to be true, did not necessarily mean that the very
serious charges of rape were fabricated only to get back at him. And, finally, the Court
has not been deterred from affirming the conviction in incestuous rape by rejecting
the lecherous father’ simputation of ill motive based on alleged familial discord and
undue influence, hostility or revenge, or on parental punishment or disciplinary
chastisement.
The accused argues that the findings of old healed vaginal lacerations during the
physical examinations disproved the charges against him, stressing that the old healed
lacerations, being indicative of the lapse of three months from the time of the alleged
sexual assault to the time of the medical examination, belied AAA’s claim of being
raped on April 13, 1999, which was but only two months prior to the medical
examination. He insists that the finding that her genitalia showed no fresh laceration
or hymenal injury suffered in the previous seven days was inconsistent with BBB’s
claim about being raped nine hours prior to her physical examination.
The arguments of the accused are unwarranted. The essence of rape is the carnal
knowledge of a female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or
without her consent (where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).
Carnal knowledge of a female simply means a male having bodily connections with a
female. As such, the presence or absence of injury or laceration in the genitalia of the
victim is not decisive of whether rape has been committed or not. Such injury or
laceration is material only if force or intimidation is an element of the rape charged;
otherwise, it is merely circumstantial evidence of the commission of the rape. Verily, a
medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission
of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape. The accused may
then be convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s credible, natural and convincing
testimony. This is no less true when the rape victim testifies against her own father;
unquestionably, there would be reason to give her testimony greater weight than
usual.
In fine, the proof of guilt adduced against the accused for each of the rapes charged
was beyond reasonable doubt if all he could assert in his defense was a mere denial of
the positive declarations of his two minor daughters. He now deserves to the fullest
extent the condign penalties the law sets for his crimes.
We next deal with the penalty to be properly meted on the accused.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if the
rape is committed with the attendance of any "aggravating/ qualifying circumstances."
One of such "aggravating/qualifying circumstances" is "when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim." Both minority and actual relationship must be
alleged and proved; otherwise, conviction for rape in its qualified form will be barred.
In Criminal Case No. 912-V-99, the amended information alleged that AAA was only
ten years old when the rape was committed in April 1999 and that she was the
daughter of the accused. During the trial, however, the Prosecution adduced no
evidence to establish her minority save her testimony and that of her mother’s. In the
absence of proof of AAA’s minority, we concur with the CA’s conclusion that he could
not be properly found guilty of qualified rape. Indeed, his substantial right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be nullified
otherwise. Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua as the penalty.
On the other hand, the amended information in Criminal Case No. 974-V-99
sufficiently stated the minority of BBB and her being the daughter of the accused.
Further, the Prosecution established that BBB was only nine years old at the time of
the rape on November 10, 1999 through her certificate of live birth. In addition, her
own mother and older sister DDD both attested that she was the legitimate daughter
of the accused. In fact, even the accused himself admitted his legitimate paternity of
BBB.61 Considering that the Prosecution duly proved BBB’s minority and her
relationship with the accused, the CA correctly affirmed the penalty of death meted by
the RTC.
With the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346, however, the
imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. The retroactive application to
Criminal Case No. 974-V-99 of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made
here because it is favorable to the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for
parole, because Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 expressly provides that persons
"whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act" shall not
be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law), as amended.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHAD MANANSALA y
LAGMAN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of
whether his prosecution for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the
information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes
the offense established to have been committed by the accused.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Marijuana; The Supreme Court held
as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession
of marijuana, except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of
another quantity of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the
other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some future dealings or use by
the accused.—For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found
an accused charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty
instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited
case of People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997), the Court held as prevailing the
doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana,
except if the seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity
of marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity
of marijuana was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused.
The premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession, being an element of the
illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale.

Same; Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; The involvement of a single
object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime
proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to
be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the
conviction of the accused for the illegal possession.—The involvement of a single object
in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime
proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information
to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the
conviction of the accused for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is
either deemed absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On
the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that
is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and
separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
would be flagrantly violated.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Variance Between Allegations and Proof; The rule is that when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and
that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged.—The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of
marijuana was “a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or
dealing, for which the accused have been charged with.” The right of Manansala to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated in Section
14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not violated simply because the
information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and
distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being
sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or
less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have
explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana.
As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession.
The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as
charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120,
Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
FACTS:
On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted
a test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same
date, following the test-buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from
the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search
for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence located at No. 55 Johnson
Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. The search yielded the 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information, which the search team
recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also seized was the amount of
P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills used during the test buy.
The information alleged that “on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994,
in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to
another and distributing more or less 750 grams or ¾ kilo of marijuana dried leaves
placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in
his possession and control.”
The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs). But instead of finding him guilty of the crime
charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (Possession or Use of Prohibited
Drugs).
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC
that the trial court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited
drugs on the misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 was necesarily included in the offense of illegal sale
of marijuana in violation of Section 4. The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and
held that his conviction for the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8
under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana under Section 4
was proper.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the
information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4, which the
information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him.
RULING:
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
brought against the petitioner was not violated.
In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna, the Court held as prevailing the doctrine that
the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the
seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana
not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana
was probably intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. The premise
used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale,
was necessarily included in the illegal sale.
Any other illegal substance found in the possession of the accused that is not part of
the subject of the illegal sale should be prosecuted under a distinct and separate
information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him would be
flagrantly violated.
The 750 grams of marijuana leaves is distinct and separate from the quantity of
marijuana worth P100.00 that was the object of the test buy. The 750 grams of
marijuana dried leaves had been seized from the possession Manansala on October 19,
1994 by virtue of the search warrant, while the attributed illegal sale of marijuana had
happened on October 18, 1994 during the test buy conducted to support the
application of the search warrant.
Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands. The CA correctly declared that the
illegal possession of marijuana was “a crime that is necessarily included in the
crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged
with.” The right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was not
violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling,
delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana
leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to
account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna
and similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and
punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior
possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the
crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged.
According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALBERTO GONZALES y
SANTOS, also known as TAKYO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 182417 April 3, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.
The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses in the
procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the
explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal
of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond
reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.—To
secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as
defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must
establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction
or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and Phrases; “Chain of Custody” means the
duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction
Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; Words and Phrases; The corpus delicti is a compound fact
made up of two (2) things, viz.: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis
of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or
result.―Without such dangerous drugs being presented as evidence, the State does not
establish the corpus delicti, which, literally translated from Latin, refers to the body of
the crime, or the actual commission by someone of the particular offense charged.
Corpus delicti, as the Court puts it in People v. Roluna, 231 SCRA 446 (1994) is: xxx the
body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime
has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a
compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz.: the existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this act or result.
Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous
drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or
signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended
violator immediately upon arrest.—The first stage in the chain of custody is the
marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the
dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of
his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of
the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt
marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of the dangerous drugs or
related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart
as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the
moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal
proceedings, thereby forestalling switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. In
short, the marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs
or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary
value.
Same; Same; Same; By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby
delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the
dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and
provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved.—By way
of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance
with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the
seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds
for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus
delicti was preserved. But the non-compliance with the procedures, to be excusable,
must have to be justified by the State’s agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla
tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance with the procedures, the
exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for we
cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the
only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been
legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court
states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the
chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve
those found guilty by the lower courts.
FACTS:
Gonzales was formally charged in the RTC with a violation of Section 5, Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165 alleging willful, unlawful, and felonious sale, trade, delivery,
giving away, dispatching in transit and transporting dangerous drug consisting of one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
weighing 0.194 gram. Both RTC and CA convicted the accused of the crime charged.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the accused for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State
must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that
the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.
Anent the second element, it is indispensable for the State to establish that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale and subsequently examined in the
laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence. The identity
of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving the corpus delicti. To achieve that end,
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 (IRR) define the procedures to be followed by
the apprehending officers in the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs.
Although PO1 Dimla, the State’s lone witness, testified that he had marked the sachet
of shabu with his own initials of “ED” following Gonzales’ arrest, he did not explain,
either in his court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had
been done in the presence of Gonzales, or done immediately upon the arrest of
Gonzales. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of the
sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had subsequently brought the
sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the laboratory. Given the
possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for
examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence
was the same article that had been the subject of the sale by Gonzales. The
indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the
sachet of shabu after PO1 Dimla’s marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the
integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court. We hardly
need to reiterate that the chain of custody, which Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1,
Series of 2002, supra, explicitly describes as “the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction,” demands such record of movements and
custody of seized items to include the identities and signatures of the persons who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the dates and times when such transfers of
custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.
A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1 Dimla nowhere
recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and
photographing of the shabu subject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint
affidavit of arrest,24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not mention any inventory and
photographing. The omission can only mean that no such inventory and
photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and photographing
exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and
photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or
within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or
any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory,
were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR.
By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-
compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were
justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the
evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the non-compliance with the
procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State’s agents themselves.
Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance
with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales
should then follow, for we cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as
defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very
serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In
this connection, the Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the
procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently
caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower courts.
GEORGE BONGALON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as
child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On May 11, 2000 at Legazpi City, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of Jayson Dela Cruz, 12
years of age, acts of physical abuse by striking said child with his palm hitting the
latter at his back and by slapping him hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory
remarks to the latter’s family, which acts of the accused are prejudicial to the child’s
development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child as a
human being.
Further, the Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson and his older brother
Roldan, both minors, joined the procession for the Santo Niño; that when the
procession passed in front of the house of Bongalon, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann
Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that he confronted
Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that he
struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the
petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their
father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house; that Rolando later
brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that
Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital; that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical certificates
attesting that Jayson suffered two contusions.
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and
Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing
stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting
invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to
restrain his sons from harming his daughters.
After trial, the RTC found and declared petitioner guilty of child abuse. On appeal, CA
affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bongalon is guilty of the crime charged (NO)
RULING:
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse must be an appeal
taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The special civil action
for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Hence, where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision,
and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.
However, the procedural transgressions of the petitioner, we opt to forego quickly
dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues
posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about
the sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His
plea is worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the
Court may be seen as an unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in
order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court
has not been intended to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted
first and foremost to ensure justice to every litigant.
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that
the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face,
we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview
of Republic Act No. 7610. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or
embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then
overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan.
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor,
which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. Furthermore, in imposing the
correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion
or obfuscation because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power. With his having acted under the belief that
Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had
burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
passion.
The Court sets aside the decision of the CA and enter a new judgment that petitioner is
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILPPINES V. ROGELIO ABRENCILLO
G.R. No. 183100, November 28, 2012, J. Bersamin*
The rape that was committed was not qualified rape because the accused and BBB were
not legally married to each other. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape
through force, threat or intimidation of a woman 12 years or over in age is punished by
reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon.
Although the information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in the
commission of the rape, the CA still correctly prescribed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua because the information did not allege the attendance of any aggravating
circumstances. With the intervening revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (i.e.,
effective on December 1, 2000) in order to now require the information to state the “acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances xxx in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment,” the Prosecution
became precluded from establishing any act or circumstance not specifically alleged in
the information if such act or circumstance would increase the penalty to the maximum
period.
FACTS:
Rogelio Abrencillo (Abrencillo) and BBB started their cohabitation when AAA and CCC,
who were twin sisters, were only about three years of age. The common-law partners
live with BBB’s daughters in the same house for the next 12 years. On March 1, 1999,
BBB left the house early to sell fish and Abrencillo went out to chat with the neighbors,
leaving AAA alone. Later on, while AAA was taking a nap, she was awaked by the
return of her common-law father as he started making sexual advances on her.
Abrencillo started taking AAA’s clothes off, but when she resisted he went to take his
bolo and poked its sharp tip unto her throat while threatening to kill her. Petrified
with fear and could not do anything more after that, Abrencillo was able to rape AAA.
After Abrencillo had left, AAA ran to the house of her Lolo Armin and reported what
happened. Thereafter, Lolo Armin accompanied AAA to the police station to report the
rape. AAA narrated in her complaint affidavit that Abrencillo had raped her even
before that time, when she was still younger. She underwent physical examination by
the municipal health officer, about two hours after the commission of the rape. The
physical examination stated that there were no evident sign of extragenital physical
injuries noted in the body of the subject at the time of examination and an old healed
hymenal laceration.
Subsequently, the Provincial City Prosecutor filed an information in the RTC charging
the accused with qualified rape. After the RTC rendered judgment convicting the
accused for qualified rape and prescribing death penalty. On review, the accused
contended that medico-legal evidence did not prove recent sexual intercourse.
Nonetheless, the CA upheld the conviction but downgrading the offense to simple rape
and reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly downgraded the offense from qualified rape to simple rape
RULING:
CA correctly downgraded the offense from qualified rape to simple rape and
prescribed reclusion perpetua.
The rape that was committed was not qualified rape because the accused and BBB
were not legally married to each other. What the records show, instead, was that they
were in a common law relationship, which meant that he was not the stepfather of
AAA, contrary to the allegation of the information. Under Art 266 B of the RPC, rape
through force, threat or intimidation of a woman 12years or over in age is punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Art. 266-B of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever
the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Although the information
alleged the use by the accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in the commission of the
rape, the CA still correctly prescribed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua because
the information did not allege the attendance of any aggravating circumstances.
Although the information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in
the commission of the rape, the CA still correctly prescribed the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua because the information did not allege the attendance of any
aggravating circumstances. With the intervening revision of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure (i.e., effective on December 1, 2000) in order to now require the
information to state the “acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances xxx in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient
to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce
judgment,”15 the Prosecution became precluded from establishing any act or
circumstance not specifically alleged in the information if such act or circumstance
would increase the penalty to the maximum period.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LOUIE CATALAN y DEDALA
G.R. No. 189330, November 28, 2012, J. Bersamin
The accused is entitled to an acquittal from the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive lDangerous Drugs Act of 2002) if
the Prosecution does not establish that the links in the chain of custody from the time of
the seizure of the dangerous drugs until the time of their presentation as evidence in
court are unbroken. The arresting officer cannot thereby be presumed to have regularly
performed his duty. Hence, the guilt of the accused is not established beyond reasonable
doubt.
FACTS:
Louie Catalan was arrested during a buy-bust operation conducted at a billiard hall for
selling shabu, a dangerous drug, to a police officer poseur-buyer. On September 25,
2007, the RTC convicted him for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, as
charged, and imposed life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, the CA
affirmed his conviction. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a
violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious. The buy-bust team committed serious lapses that broke the
chain of custody.
The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a
certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a
criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. To discharge its duty of establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must
prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other
hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are
missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized
dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in
court.
A review of the records exposes the abject failure of the buy-bust team to comply with
the statutory procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and it’s IRR on ensuring
the integrity of the chain of custody.
First of all, PO1 Ignacio himself did not do the marking despite being the arresting
officer taking initial custody of the plastic sachet of shabu the accused handed to him.
Instead, he said that it was the investigator who marked the plastic sachet of shabu,
and that the investigator did so only after the accused had been brought to the police
station.
Secondly, the requirement for the presence of a media or Department of Justice
representative, or an elected public official at the time of the seizure and inventory
was to insulate the seizure from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. But that lofty
objective could not be achieved here after PO1 Ignacio did not mention the presence of
either such representative or of the elected public official during the buy-bust
operation or at the time of the seizure of the shabu or even in the police station.
Although the fact that the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the shabu were
warrantless could possibly excuse the absence of the representative or official from
the scene of the transaction, we have to wonder why the Prosecution did not bother to
explain the absence of such representative or official. That is another serious lapse
that broke the chain of custody.
Thirdly, the Prosecution did not present the investigator as its witness to directly
validate his marking of “BLCO 020804” in court. The omission diminished the
importance of the marking as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the
evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the
shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.
And, fourthly, the buy-bust team did not conduct a physical inventory and did not take
any photograph of the seized shabu either at the place of seizure, or in the police
station. This omission was also fatal because the conduct of the physical inventory and
the taking of a photograph were also measures designed by the law to preserve the
integrity of the chain of custody of the seized shabu.
It is true that the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR has a saving proviso to
ensure that not every non-compliance irreversibly weakens the Prosecution’s
evidence. But the saving proviso would not help the cause of the Prosecution at all.
The application of the saving proviso has been conditioned upon the arresting lawmen
recognizing their non-compliance with the procedure and then rendering a plausible
explanation or two for the non-compliance. Here, however, that the members of the
buy-bust team did not own up their lapses. How, then, could the Prosecution tender
any explanation of the lapses committed by the buy-bust team? Given the foregoing,
the accused deserves exculpation, not because we accord credence to his defense of
frame-up but because the Prosecution did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. As SC declared in Patula v. People: xxx in all criminal prosecutions, the
Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution’s duty is to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that
crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In
doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not
anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of
proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set
free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.
In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential
in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of
proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the
accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
Both lower courts favored the members of the buy-bust team with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duty, mainly because the accused did not show
that they had ill motive behind his entrapment. We hold that both lower courts
committed gross error in relying on the presumption of regularity.
The regularity of the performance of their duty could not be properly presumed in
favor of the policemen because the records were replete with indicia of their serious
lapses. As a rule, a presumed fact like the regularity of performance by a police officer
must be inferred only from an established basic fact, not plucked out from thin air. To
say it differently, it is the established basic fact that triggers the presumed fact of
regular performance. Where there is any hint of irregularity committed by the police
officers in arresting the accused and thereafter, several of which we have earlier
noted, there can be no presumption of regularity of performance in their favor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SAMIN ZAKARIA y MAKASULAY
G.R. No. 181042, November 26, 2012, J. Bersamin
To discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the State bears the burden of proving the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime. The
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the corpus
delicti either when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are substantial gaps
in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts on the
authenticity of the evidence ultimately presented in court.
The corpus delicti was not credibly proved because the Prosecution did not establish an
unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the seizure and confiscation of the
shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the incriminatory evidence should not pass
judicial scrutiny.
FACTS:
Samin Zakaria y Makasulay and Joana as Joana Zakaria y Silungan (accused) were
arrested during a buy-bust operation conducted by the police through a prior
information. The recovered sachets and their contents were turned over to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory for examinations of the contents. The examinations yielded
positive results for the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug. The accused denied the claims of the prosecution. After trial, RTC convicted both
accused. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction, thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the state was able to establish the identity of the dangerous drugs seized
during the buy-bust operation.
RULING:
The appeal is meritorious.
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the presentation of the
seized dangerous drugs as evidence in court is indispensable. It is essential that the
identity of the dangerous drugs be established beyond doubt. What is more, the fact
that the dangerous drugs bought during the buy-bust operation are the same
dangerous drugs offered in court should be established. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Moreover, to discharge its overall duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the State bears the burden of proving the corpus delicti, or the body
of the crime. The Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of
proving the corpus delicti either when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there
are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise
doubts on the authenticity of the evidence ultimately presented in court.
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the
marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding
handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of
the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end
of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence.
A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the
chain of custody that the law requires.
The records show that the buy-bust team did not observe the mandatory procedures
under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. Although PO2 Aninias supposedly marked
the confiscated shabu with his initials immediately upon seizure, he did not do so in
the presence of the accused or of their representatives and any representative from
the media and Department of Justice (DOJ), or any elected public official. If he had, he
would have readily stated so in court. In fact, both PO2 Aninias and PO3 Valdez
themselves revealed that no media or DOJ representative, or elected public official was
present during the buy-bust operation and at the time of the recovery of the evidence
at the target area. Instead, the media were only around in the PDEA regional
headquarters.
The certificate of inventory, although signed by a media representative and a barangay
official, was nonetheless discredited by PO2 Aninias’ admission that only the
confidential informant and the members of the buy-bust team were present at the
time of the recovery of the sachets of
shabu from Samin. Verily, although PO2 Aninias declared having personally seen the
media representative and the barangay official affixing their signatures on the
certificate of inventory, he gave no indication at all that the certificate had been signed
in the presence of the accused or of their representative.
Another serious lapse committed was that the buy-bust team did not take any
photographs of the sachets of shabu upon their seizure. The photographs were
intended by the law as another means to confirm the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs.
The suspiciousness and ambiguity irreparably broke the chain of custody required
under Republic Act No. 9165, which was fatal to the cause of the Prosecution. Indeed,
the chain of custody was crucial in establishing the link between the shabu confiscated
from the accused and the evidence presented to the court for its appreciation.
Under the circumstances, the corpus delicti was not credibly proved because the
Prosecution did not establish an unbroken chain of custody, resulting in rendering the
seizure and confiscation of the shabu open to doubt and suspicion. Hence, the
incriminatory evidence should not pass judicial scrutiny.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY ARCILLAS
G.R. No. 181491, July 30, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse
of her mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple rape, although the State
successfully proves the common-law relationship, where the information does not
properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the
female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is inviolable.
FACTS:
In the evening of May 12, 2000, AAA, then 13 years old, went to sleep in a room
together with her two sisters, CCC and EEE, her mother (BBB) and the latter’s live-in
partner, accused Henry Arcillas. At around 11PM, AAA was awakened when she felt
that somebody was lying on top of her. She found out that accused Henry Arcillas was
on top of her. She noticed that she had no more short pants and panties and that she
felt pain in her vagina. She also noticed that something had been inserted into her
vagina and that the accused was making a push and pull movement on top of her. She
then pushed away the accused and awakened her mother Josie, who was just asleep
near her. AAA told her mother that she was sexually abused by Henry Arcillas. BBB
then grabbed an ax and struck the accused with it but the latter was not hit.
Thereafter, BBB complained to Jimmy Lorena, the Barangay Kagawad. Jimmy then
summoned Henry Arcillas and during the confrontation Henry Arcillas was made to
sign a statement and was made to promise that he would not do the same act again.
Despite the confrontation, however, the victim, still lodged a complaint for rape
against Henry Arcillas before the Police Station.
Henry Arcillas testified that he had a drinking spree in the house of the owner of the
thresher where he worked. They started drinking hard liquor, after which he went
home very drunk. He then went to sleep together with his live-in partner, BBB, and the
latter’s three daughters, CCC, EEE and AAA. BBB was on his left side while AAA was on
his right. At around 11PM on that same day, Henry Arcillas was awakened when AAA
complained to her mother that he held her shorts. At that juncture, his live-in partner
tried to strike him with an ax. Henry claimed that he was able to touch the body of
AAA but he did not know what part of her body he had touched nor which part of his
body had touched AAA. He, however, denied having sexually molested the latter.
The RTC convicted Arcillas of qualified rape. The conviction was affirmed by the CA,
however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua on the ground that
the information did not allege that Henry Arcillas was her mother’s common-law
husband, instead of the victim’s step-father, the qualifying circumstance the
information alleged.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in affirming the finding of guilt by the RTC (YES)
RULING:
The CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Arcillas for SIMPLE RAPE.
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, Rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. The
death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim
is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim.
It is the rule that rape is qualified and punished with death when committed by the
victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or by the common-law spouse of the victim’s
parent. However, an accused cannot be found guilty of qualified rape unless the
information alleges the circumstances of the victim’s over 12 years but under 18 years
of age and her relationship with him. The reason is that such circumstances alter the
nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty; hence, they are special qualifying
circumstances. As such, both the age of the victim and her relationship with the
offender must be specifically alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
The minority of AAA was sufficiently alleged in the information. The Prosecution
established that her age when the rape was committed was thirteen years and two
months by presenting her birth certificate. As to her relationship with Arcillas, the
information averred that he was the step-father of AAA. It turned out, however, that he
was not her stepfather, being only the common-law husband of BBB. The RTC itself
found that he and BBB were only "live-in partners." In addition, AAA’s birth certificate
disclosed that her father was CCC, who had been married to BBB, who was widowed
upon the death of CCC in 1996. No evidence was adduced to establish that BBB and
Arcilla legally married after CCC’s death.
Arcillas’ being the common-law husband of BBB at the time of the commission of the
rape, even if established during the trial, could not be appreciated because the
information did not specifically allege it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he
would be deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him.
PEOPLE vs. VILLAFLORES
G.R. No. 184926, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a
crime and the identity of the culprit.
Criminal Law; Composite Crimes; Rape with Homicide; The felony of rape with
homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special complex
crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible and
unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse.—The felony of rape
with homicide is a composite crime. A composite crime, also known as a special
complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and differs from a compound or
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: Article 48.
Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
FACTS:
Marita, a four-year-old girl, was playing at the rear of their residence in the morning of
July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from home. Marita’s
parents searched for her but did not find her. In her desperation, Julia sought out a
clairvoyant, wherein the latter hinted that Marita might be found only five houses
away from their own. Following the clairvoyant’s direction, they found Marita’s lifeless
body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the comfort room of an abandoned
house about five structures away from their own house. Her face was black and blue,
and bloody. Post mortem examination also revealed multiple deep lacerations at the
hymen.
Two witnesses, Bautista and Solidum, narrated that at about 10:00am of July 2, 1999,
they saw Villaflores, leading Marita by the hand. At about noon time they were at
Villaflores’ house where they used shabu for a while. Jovie related that about 3:00pm,
he heard cries of a child as he passed by the house of Villaflores. At about 7:00pm,
Jovie saw again Villaflores carrying a yellow sack towards a vacant house. It was the
sack that he saw earlier in the house of Batman.
The RTC and CA found Villaflores guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide based on circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the special complex crime of
rape with homicide.
HELD:
Yes.
Circumstantial evidence is admissible as proof to establish both the commission of a
crime and the identity of the culprit.
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only
the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The Rules of Court
allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the
identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any
reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast,
circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must
draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would
ultimately lead to setting a felon free.
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered several
circumstances, which when "appreciated together and not piece by piece," according
to the CA, were seen as "strands which create a pattern when interwoven," and formed
an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that Villaflores, to the
exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following.
1. Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the hand
(akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999, leading the child through
the alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away from
the victim’s house.
2. Marita went missing after that and remained missing until the discovery of
her lifeless body on the following day.
3. Solidum passed by Villaflores’ house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and
heard the crying and moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside.
4. At about 7:00 pm of July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his
house carrying a yellow sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards
the abandoned house where the child’s lifeless body was later found.
5. Manito, the father of Marita, identified the yellow sack as the same yellow
sack that covered the head of his daughter (nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time
he discovered her body; Manito also mentioned that a blue sack covered her
body.
6. A hidden pathway existed between the abandoned house where Marita’s
body was found and Villaflores’ house, because his house had a rear exit that
enabled access to the abandoned house without having to pass any other
houses. This indicated Villaflores’ familiarity and access to the abandoned
house.
7. Several pieces of evidence recovered from the abandoned house, like the
white rope around the victim’s neck and the yellow sack, were traced to
Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of his house,
and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet.
8. The medico-legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by
strangulation, which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks
on her neck and the multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas,
contusions and punctured wounds.
9. Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and had fresh
blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from her
body tested positive for spermatozoa
10. The body of Marita was already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of
the autopsy of her cadaver at 8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings
indicated that such stage of flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for
more than 24 hours, or at the latest by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.
These circumstances were links in an unbroken chain whose totality has brought to us
a moral certainty of the guilt of Villaflores for rape with homicide.
As to the rape, Marita was found to have suffered multiple deep fresh hymenal
lacerations, injuries that Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, the medico-legal officer who had
conducted the autopsy of her cadaver attributed to the insertion of a blunt object like a
human penis. The fact that the vaginal and periurethral smears taken from Marita
tested positive for spermatozoa confirmed that the blunt object was an adult human
penis.
As to the homicide, her death was shown to be caused by strangulation with a rope,
and the time of death as determined by the medico-legal findings was consistent with
the recollection of Solidum of seeing Villaflores going towards the abandoned house at
around 7 pm of July 2, 1999 carrying the yellow sack that was later on found to cover
Marita’s head. Anent the identification of Villaflores as the culprit, the testimonies of
Solidum and Bautista attesting to Villaflores as the person they had seen holding
Marita by the hand going towards the abandoned house before the victim went
missing, the hearing by Solidum of moaning and crying of a child from within
Villaflores’ house, and the tracing to Villaflores of the yellow sack and the white rope
found at the crime scene sufficiently linked Villaflores to the crime.
BACOLOD vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 181544, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, Bersamin, J.
Criminal Law; Rape; The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against
her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented).
—Hymenal injury has never been an element of rape, for a female might still be raped
without such injury resulting. The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female
either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where
the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age,
or is demented). It is relevant to know that carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man
having sexual bodily connections with a woman. Thus, although AAA testified on her
sexual penetration by Taguilid, the fact that her hymenal injury was not fresh but
already deephealed was not incompatible with the evidence of rape by him. In this
regard, her claim that he had previously subjected her to similar sexual assaults
several times before May 29, 2002, albeit not the subject of this prosecution, rendered
the absence of fresh hymenal injury not improbable even as it showed how the deep
healed laceration might have been caused.
Criminal Law; Rape; Evidence; Witnesses; Judicial experience has enabled the courts to
accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed against her.—There can be no question
that the testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape is normally given full
weight and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to accept the verity
that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a rape victim is
surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests the possibility
of her being actuated by ill motive to falsely testify against the accused. Truly, a rape
victim’s testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points is entitled to full faith and
credit.
FACTS:
At about 4:00 pm on May 29, 2002 Taguilid suddenly entered AAA’s room while she
was resting. The room of AAA was in the third floor of the house owned by her
parents. Taguilid is a cousin of her mother who had been living with her family since
2000. Upon entering her room, he pushed her down on her back, then inserted his
finger in her vagina and later on inserted his penis in her vagina. She cried and pushed
him away, but to no avail. Then, he next turned her over and penetrated her anus with
his penis while in that position and that she did not shout for help because he
threatened to kill her if she did. At the time of the rape, AAA was 12 years and ten
months old, having been born on July 28, 1989.
The Prosecution further established that BBB, AAA’s father, was at the time tending to
the family store at the ground floor when he decided to go up to the third floor to look
for and talk to AAA. Upon reaching her room, he found Taguilid standing by her bed in
the act of raising the zipper of his pants, and AAA was on her bed, crying and uttering
inaudible words. BBB saw that her skirt was raised up to her waist, and her panties,
though still on her, were disheveled (wala sa ayos) and that it seemed to BBB that his
sudden appearance in the room had taken Taguilid by surprise, causing the latter to
hurriedly leave the room even before BBB could say anything to him.
BBB later on brought his daughter to the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) in
Quezon City for a medico-legal examination before reporting the matter to the
barangay office. He lodged a complaint for rape with the police authorities in order to
seek their assistance in the arrest of Taguilid.
The RTC then rendered a decision finding Taguilid guilty of the crime of rape. During
trial, testimonies of AAA were outright. She answered all questions of her ordeal in
clear-cut language. She mentioned the word "pinataob" to describe the next position
the accused assumed to penetrate her anus. The decision of RTC was affirmed by the
CA.
Taguilid argues that AAA’s testimony on how the rape had happened and how easily
he had undressed her indicated that he did not use force and intimidation against her;
that her fear of him had been only the product of her imagination; and that her silence
during the entire event, and her failure to escape from him or to report his allegedly
previous sexual assaults had revealed her having voluntarily consented to the sexual
act.
ISSUE:
Whether Taguilid is guilty of Rape.
HELD:
Yes.
There can be no question that the testimony of a child who has been a victim in rape is
normally given full weight and credence. Judicial experience has enabled the courts to
accept the verity that when a minor says that she was raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape was committed against her. The credibility of such a
rape victim is surely augmented where there is absolutely no evidence that suggests
the possibility of her being actuated by ill-motive to falsely testify against the accused.
Truly, a rape victim’s testimony that is unshaken by rigid cross-examination and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points is entitled to full
faith and credit.
Taguilid’s defense at the trial was plain denial of the positive assertions made against
him. He then declared that the charge of rape against him resulted from BBB’s
misunderstanding of what had really occurred in AAA’s bedroom just before BBB had
appeared unannounced. Yet, such denial was devoid of persuasion due to its being
easily and conveniently resorted to, and due to denial being generally weaker than and
not prevailing over the positive assertions of both AAA and BBB.
Also, Taguilid’s explanation of why he was then zipping his pants when BBB found him
in AAA’s bedroom, that AAA’s stabbing had caused his pants to fall off, was implausible
without him demonstrating how the pants had been unzipped from AAA’s stabbing of
him as to cause the pants to fall off. Besides, Taguilid’s act of quickly leaving the room
of AAA without at least attempting to tell BBB the reason for his presence in her room
and near the bed of the sobbing AAA if he had been as innocent as he claimed exposed
the shamness and insincerity of his denial.
REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 180177, FIRST DIVISION, April 18, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard
demands that all the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no room
for any doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly impose the
standard in order to prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the accused.
Criminal Law; Buy-bust Operations; The buy-bust operation, according to People v.
Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), was “susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of
which is its use as a tool for extortion,” and the possibility of that abuse was great.—
The buy-bust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an
unnamed lady confidential informant. Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia,
580 SCRA 259 (2009), was “susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is
its use as a tool for extortion,” and the possibility of that abuse was great. The
susceptibility to abuse of the operation led to the institution of several procedural
safeguards by R.A. No. 9165, mainly to guide the law enforcers. Thus, the State must
show a faithful compliance with such safeguards during the prosecution of every drug-
related offense.
Same; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs;
Elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs.—The successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires: (a)
proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (b) the presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti, or the dangerous drugs themselves. On the other hand,
the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs necessitates the following
facts to be proved, namely: (a) the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs, (b)
such possession was not authorized by law, and (c) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. For both offenses, it is
crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a
way that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court.
Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of all law enforcers
arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the
dangerous drugs and substances from them.
FACTS:
A lady confidential informant went to the Police Station to report on the drug dealing
activities of a certain alias Boy (later identified as petitioner) on M. Mapa Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila. A buy bust team of ten members, including PO2 Erwin Payumo as
designated poseur buyer, was formed.
From the police station, the lady confidential informant called petitioner by phone.
The latter instructed her to wait on M. Mapa Street. Thus, the buy bust team proceeded
to that area, PO2 Payumo and the lady confidential informant arrived together to wait
for petitioner.
Petitioner came by five minutes later, and, after asking the lady confidential informant
whether PO2 Payumo was the buyer, instructed Payumo to follow him to his house
where he told PO2 Payumo to wait. Two other individuals, later identified as Conchita
Carlos and Jeonilo Flores, were also waiting for petitioner. Petitioner asked PO2
Payumo for the payment, and the latter complied and handed the marked money
consisting of three P50.00 bills all bearing the initials “TF”. Petitioner then went into a
room and returned with a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that he
gave to PO2 Payumo.
Payumo after a sale placed a missed call to PO1 Miguelito Gil, a member of the buy
bust team, thereby giving the prearranged signal showing that the transaction was
completed. He then arrested petitioner after identifying himself as an officer. PO2
Payumo recovered another sachet containing white crystalline substance from
petitioner’s right hand, and the marked money from petitioner’s right front pocket.
The rest of the buybust came around and recovered two sachets also containing white
crystalline substance from the sofa where Conchita and Jeonilo were sitting. The
buybust team thus also arrested Conchita and Jeonilo. With proper markings made,
the seized items were thereafter turned over to the Western Police District Crime
Laboratory for examination and the items were found positive for methampethamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
Petitioner denied that there had been a buybust operation, and claimed that he had
been framed up. He claims that he was at his house entertaining his visitors Conchita
and Jeonilo in the afternoon of January 20, 2005. Conchita was selling to him a sofa
bed for P800.00, while Jeonilo was only contracted by Conchita to drive the jeepney
carrying the sofa bed. The three of them were surprised when a group of armed men
in civilian clothes barged into his house and conducted a search, and arrested them. He
was also surprised to see a plastic sachet when the armed men emptied his pocket.
According to him PO2 Payumo was not among those who entered and searched his
house and the three of them were made to board a van where PO1 Rudolf Mijares
demanded P30,000.00 for his release and that because he told them he had no money
to give to them, one of the men remarked: Sige, tuluyan na yan. They were then
brought to the police station.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
HELD:
No.
The burden rests in the Prosecution to see to it that the evidence of guilt satisfies the
standard of moral certainty demanded in all criminal prosecutions. The standard
demands that all the essential elements of the offense are established as to leave no
room for any doubt about the guilt of the accused. The courts should unfailingly
impose the standard in order to prevent injustice from being perpetrated against the
accused.
The buybust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an
unnamed lady confidential informant. Such an operation, according to People v. Garcia,
was “susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion,” and the possibility of that abuse was great. The susceptibility to abuse of
the operation led to the institution of several procedural safeguards by R.A. No. 9165,
mainly to guide the law enforcers.

For both offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is crucial
that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the seized dangerous drugs in a way
that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court.
Nothing less than a faithful compliance with this duty is demanded of all law enforcers
arresting drug pushers and drug possessors and confiscating and seizing the
dangerous drugs and substances from them.
Here, the Prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting
lawmen of the rule on chain of custody. To start with, the fact that the dangerous
drugs were inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon seizure in
the presence of petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the
DOJ, and any elected public official, was not shown. As such, the arresting lawmen
did not at all comply with the further requirement to have the attending
representative of the media, representative of the DOJ, and elected public official sign
the inventory and be furnished a copy each of the inventory. Instead, the records
show that PO2 Payumo placed the markings of “RRS1” on the sachet allegedly
received from petitioner and “RRS2” on the two sachets allegedly seized from
petitioner’s hand already at the police station with only petitioner present.
The omissions noted herein indicated that the State did not establish the identity of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from petitioner with the same exacting certitude
required for a finding of guilt.
Although PO2 Payumo declared that he was the one who had received the sachet of
shabu (“RRS1”) from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets of shabu
(“RRS2”) from petitioner, all of which he had then sealed, nothing more to support the
fact that the evidence thus seized had remained intact was adduced. s
In fact, the State did not anymore establish to whom the seized articles had been
endorsed after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at the station, and with whose
custody or safekeeping the seized articles had remained until their endorsement to
P/Insp. Macapagal for the laboratory examination. The Prosecution did not show to
whom the seized articles had been turned over following the conduct of the laboratory
examination, and how the seized articles had been kept in a manner that preserved
their integrity until their final presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.
Such lapses of the Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they
demonstrated that the chain of custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt
on the integrity and identity of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of
the crimes charged.
PEOPLE vs. SABADLAB
G.R. No. 175924, FIRST DIVISION, March 14, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
Criminal Law; Rape; Statutes; The Anti-Rape Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353); It is notable
that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under Republic Act No. 8353
(The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree of resistance
that the victim may put up against the rapist.—Sabadlab’s allegation that AAA did not
sustain any bodily injuries was actually contrary to the medical certification showing
her several physical injuries and the penetration of her female organ. This should
debunk without difficulty his submission that she did not offer any resistance to the
sexual assaults she suffered. Her resistance to Sabadlab’s order for her to go with him
was immediately stifled by his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his
two cohorts. At any rate, it is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape
introduced under Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D,
which adverts to the degree of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist,
viz.: Article 266-D. Presumptions.—Any physical overt act manifesting resistance
against the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended
party is so situated as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be
accepted as evidence in the prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.
Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Forcible Abduction with Rape; Although forcible
abduction was seemingly committed, accused cannot be held guilty of the complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the
rape. Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.—The principal
objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street and in
bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This objective became
evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she had alighted from
the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body (except the eyes due
to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in having carnal
knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly
committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the
circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
FACTS:
AAA was then walking on Dapitan St. in Makati City, proceeding towards MA
Montessori to fetch her employer’s son who was studying there. Suddenly, a man
(later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by the shoulder and ordered her to go with
him. She recognized him to be the man who had persistently greeted her every time
she had bought pandesal near her employer’s house in the past two weeks. Alarmed,
she refused to do his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men
whom she did not recognize joined Sadablab at that point. They forced her into the
backseat of a parked car, and one of Sadablab cohorts blindfolded her with a
handkerchief. The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still
blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove her
clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One of them
tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from the neck
downwards.
Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab because his cohorts were calling
out his name as he was kissing her body. Then they made her lie flat on the ground
with her hands still tied behind her back. Sabadlab raped her in that position. The
others took their turns in raping her after Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for
help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with crumpled newspapers. The three ravished her
again and again, that she could not remember the number of times they did so.
Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA by car back to Dapitan Street,
but let her go only after sternly warning that they would surely kill her if she told
anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her
ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Upon her arrival at the house, AAA’s employer noticed the kiss marks on her neck.
AAA at first lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes because
her irritated employer slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to report
the rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination later that day at the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame Quezon City.
Afterwards, AAA and the policemen went to the vicinity where she had usually bought
pandesal to look for the suspects. She spotted Sabadlab in one of the nearby
restaurants and pointed to him. The policemen apprehended Sabadlab and brought
him to the station, where he gave his name as Erland Sabadlab y Bayquel. That was her
first time to know the name of Sabadlab.
The City Prosecutor of Makati immediately charged Sabadlab and two John Does with
forcible abduction with rape.
The RTC convicted Sabadlab on the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD:
NO. The crime committed is simple rape as defined under Article 266-A of RPC.
Firstly, the supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters
that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of truthfulness
due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not been rehearsed or
concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on minor details or collateral
matters should not adversely affect the substance of the witness’ declaration, veracity,
or weight of testimony. The only inconsistencies that might have discredited the
victim’s credible testimony were those that affected or related to the elements of the
crime. Alas, that was not true herein.
We hardly need to remind that the task of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses and of weighing their credibility is best left to the trial judge by virtue of the
first-hand impressions he derives while the witnesses testify before him. The
demeanor on the witness chair of persons sworn to tell the truth in judicial
proceedings is a significant element of judicial adjudication because it can draw the
line between fact and fancy. Their forthright answers or hesitant pauses, their
quivering voices or angry tones, their flustered looks or sincere gazes, their modest
blushes or guilty blanches—all these can reveal if the witnesses are telling the truth or
lying in their teeth. As the final appellate reviewer in this case, then, we bow to the
age-old norm to accord the utmost respect to the findings and conclusions on the
credibility of witnesses reached by the trial judge on account of his unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and on account of his personal access to the
various indicia available but not reflected in the record.
Secondly, Sabadlab’s allegation that AAA did not sustain any bodily injuries was
actually contrary to the medical certification showing her several physical injuries and
the penetration of her female organ. This should debunk without difficulty his
submission that she did not offer any resistance to the sexual assaults she suffered.
Her resistance to Sabadlab’s order for her to go with him was immediately stifled by
his poking of the gun at her throat and by appearance of his two cohorts. At any rate, it
is notable that among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under Republic
Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Act of 1997) is Section 266-D, which adverts to the degree
of resistance that the victim may put up against the rapist, viz.: Article 266-D.
Presumptions.—Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in
any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to
render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.
Crime committed is simple rape not forcible abduction with rape
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from
Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her. This
objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately after she
had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her whole body
(except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the neck down, and in
having carnal knowledge of her (in that order). Although forcible abduction was
seemingly committed, we cannot hold him guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape when the objective of the abduction was to commit the rape.
Under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the forcible abduction.
Award of damages
The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in a criminal case as
part of the civil liability “when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.” The Civil Code allows such damages to be awarded “by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.” Present here was the need for exemplarity.
Thus, the CA should have recognized the entitlement to exemplary damages of AAA on
account of the attendance of use of a deadly weapon. It was of no moment that the use
of a deadly weapon was not specifically alleged in the information.
Accordingly, the Court grants the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in
addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and the moral damages of P50,000.00 the
CA awarded to AAA. Sabadlab is further liable for interest of 6% per annum on all the
civil damages.
PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 177320, FIRST DIVISION, February 22, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.
Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165); Illegal Sale
of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Sale of Shabu.—To secure a conviction for
illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is material in
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly proven by
the Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to
him during a legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the
substance subject of the transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and
found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2
Caragdag declared that he recovered the buy-bust money from Bautista’s hand right
after the sale. Further, the Prosecution later presented as evidence both the sachet of
shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money used in the buy-bust operation.
Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.
Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs.—For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the
elements are: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to
be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The elements of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug were similarly competently and convincingly
established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybañez stated that upon seeing the pre-arranged
signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team proceeded to arrest
Bautista; and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other plastic sachets from
Bautista’s pocket. Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally authorized as a search
incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the commission of illegal
drug pushing. Forensic Chemist Arturo certified that each of the sachets contained
different shabu of different weights.
Same; Same; Same; Corpus Delicti; Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or
substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been
actually committed; The dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the violation of
the law prohibiting the possession of the dangerous drug.—In drug-related
prosecutions, the State bears the burden not only of proving the elements of the
offenses of sale and possession of shabu under Republic Act No. 9165, but also of
proving the corpus delicti, the body of the crime. “Corpus delicti has been defined as
the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a
crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a
compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the
cause of this act or result.” The dangerous drug is itself the very corpus delicti of the
violation of the law prohibiting the possession of the dangerous drug. Consequently,
the State does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving corpus
delicti when the drug is missing, and when substantial gaps occur in the chain of
custody of the seized drugs as to raise doubts on the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.
FACTS:
An informant went to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Caloocan Police Station
to report the peddling of illegal drugs by Bautista. Forthwith, Police Insp. Cesar Cruz
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Bautista. PO2 Tayag,
designated as the poseur-buyer, was given a P100.00 bill as buy-bust money, on which
he placed his initials ALT. The rest of the buy-bust team would serve as back up for
PO2 Tayag.
Upon arriving at the target area, the informant pointed out Bautista to the team.
Bautista was then standing in front of a house. PO2 Tayag and the informant then
approached Bautista even as the rest of the team took up positions nearby. The
informant introduced PO2 Tayag to Bautista as biyahero ng shabu, after which the
informant left PO2 Tayag and Bautista alone to themselves.
PO2 Tayag told Bautista: “Cesar, pakuha ng piso”. Bautista drew a plastic sachet from
his pocket and handed it to PO2 Tayag, who in turn handed the P100.00 bill buy-bust
money to Bautista. PO2 Tayag then turned his cap backwards as the pre-arranged
signal to the back-up members. The latter rushed forward and arrested Bautista. Upon
informing Bautista of his constitutional rights, SPO1 Ybaez frisked him and found in
his pocket six other plastic sachets, while PO2 Caragdag seized the buy-bust money
from Bautista’s hand. The team brought Bautista and the seized plastic sachets back to
the police station.
In the police station, the team recorded the buy-bust bill in the police blotter and
turned over the plastic sachets to PO2 Hector Castillo, the investigator on duty.PO2
Castillo marked the sachet handed by Bautista to PO2 Tayag as CBS (Bautista’s
initials).
Insp. Cruz, Forensic Chemist Albert S. Arturo conducted a laboratory examination on
the contents of the marked sachets, and stated in his Physical Science Report that the
marked sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
substance.
Bautista however denied the charge. He claimed that on April 25, 2003, at around 6:00
p.m., he and his wife, Rosario, were in their house cutting cloth to be made into door
mats when PO2 Tayag and two others barged and they forced him to go with them,
with PO2 Tayag hitting him on the nape. He was brought to and detained at the
Caloocan City Jail.
ISSUE:
Whether illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu were established beyond
reasonable. doubt
HELD:
Yes.
Bautista’s denial and defense of frame-up were given no consideration due to their
being self-serving and uncorroborated. We declare such treatment warranted. He did
not present Rosario, his wife, to corroborate his claim of being framed up although she
was supposed to have been around at the time of his arrest. He did not also adduce
evidence to substantiate his story of being falsely incriminated in a frame-up by
competent evidence. His claim thereon did not prevail over the positive identification
of him by PO2 Tayag as the drug pusher he had transacted with.

The requisites for illegal sale of shabu were competently and convincingly proven by
the Prosecution. PO2 Tayag, as the poseur-buyer, attested that Bautista sold shabu to
him during a legitimate buy-bust operation. According to Forensic Chemist Arturo, the
substance subject of the transaction, which weighed 0.05 gram, was examined and
found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. PO2
Caragdag declared that he recovered the buy-bust money from Bautista’s hand right
after the sale. Further, the Prosecution later presented as evidence both the sachet of
shabu subject of the sale and the buy-bust money used in the buy-bust operation.
Thereby, the Prosecution directly incriminated Bautista.
For illegal possession of a dangerous drug, like shabu, the elements are: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited or
dangerous drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.
The elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug were similarly competently and
convincingly established by the Prosecution. SPO1 Ybaez stated that upon seeing the
pre-arranged signal given by PO2 Tayag, he and the other members of the team
proceeded to arrest Bautista; and that he frisked Bautista and then recovered six other
plastic sachets from Bautista’s pocket. Undoubtedly, the frisking was legally
authorized as a search incidental to the lawful arrest of Bautista for evidence in the
commission of illegal drug pushing. Forensic Chemist Arturo certified that each of the
sachets contained different shabu of different weights.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELANIO DEL CASTILLO y
VARGAS, HERMOGENES DEL CASTILLO y VARGAS, ARNOLD AVENGOZA y DOGOS,
FELIX AVENGOZA y DOGOS, RICO DEL CASTILLO y RAMOS, and JOVEN DEL
CASTILLO y ABESOLA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 169084 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Defense of Stranger; Elements of.—
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. On the other
hand, the requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (c) the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. In self-defense
and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine
qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense
and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel.
Same; Same; Same; When the accused’s defense is self-defense he thereby admits being
the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.—By invoking self-defense and
defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect admitted their parts in killing the
victims. The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s
defense is self-defense he thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim,
that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the
satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the shifting of the burden of evidence is that
the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily
establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the
end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused,
for self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by
sufficient and satisfactory proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution,
considering that the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in
view of his admission of the killing.
Same; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of
the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to
a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.—Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is either express or implied. Thus, the State
does not always have to prove the actual agreement to commit the crime in order to
establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest. Where the acts of the accused collectively and
individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals. Once a conspiracy is established, each co-
conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-
conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does
he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the
criminal act.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Abuse of Superior Strength; Abuse of superior
strength is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of superior
strength.—Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the
killing of a person to murder. It is present if the accused purposely uses excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if
there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter
takes advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the number
of aggressors and weapons used.
Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Voluntary Surrender; Requisites for Voluntary
Surrender to be Appreciated as a Mitigating Circumstance.—In order that voluntary
surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b) the accused surrenders
himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) surrender is voluntary.
The third requisite requires the surrender to be spontaneous, indicating the intent of
the accused to unconditionally submit himself to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary
for his search and capture.
Same; Murder; Penalties; Murder is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, being indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties.—Any determination of
whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender was vain in light of the penalty for murder being reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. Due to both such penalties being indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances would not affect the penalties except to aid the trial court
in pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua if the only modifying circumstance was
mitigating, or the mitigating circumstances outnumbered the aggravating
circumstances; or to prescribe the death penalty (prior to its prohibition under
Republic Act No. 9346) should there be at least one aggravating circumstance and
there was no mitigating circumstance, or the aggravating circumstances outnumbered
the mitigating circumstances.
Same; Civil Indemnity; The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also
proper, but their corresponding amounts should be increased to P75,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.—The awards of civil indemnity and moral damages are also
proper, but their corresponding amounts should be increased to P75,000.00 in line
with prevailing jurisprudence. The actual damages of P15,000.00 and P8,000.00
granted to the heirs of Sabino and Graciano, respectively, were also warranted due to
their being proven by receipts. However, the Court has held that when actual damages
proven by receipts amount to less than P25,000.00, as in the case of Sabino and
Graciano, the award of temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 is justified in lieu
of actual damages for a lesser amount. This is based on the sound reasoning that it
would be anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in
proving actual damages of less than P25,000.00 only would be put in a worse situation
than others who might have presented no receipts at all but would be entitled to
P25,000.00 temperate damages. Hence, instead of only P15,000.00 and P8,000.00, the
amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages should be awarded each to the heirs of
Sabino and Graciano.
Same; Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty.—The heirs of Victor did not present receipts proving
the expenses they incurred by virtue of Victor’s death. Nonetheless, it was naturally
expected that the heirs had spent for the wake and burial of Victor. Article 2224 of the
Civil Code provides that temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Hence, in lieu of
nominal damages of P10,000.00 awarded by the CA, temperate damages of P25,000.00
are awarded to the heirs of Victor.
Same; Exemplary Damages; Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be granted when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstance.—Exemplary damages of P30,000.00 should be further awarded to the
heirs of the victims because of the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be granted
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. It was
immaterial that such aggravating circumstance was necessary to qualify the killing of
each victim as murder.
FACTS:
All accused were charged in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with three counts of
murder. Perfinian, the eyewitness, testified on the following incidents: On March 20,
2000, at about 9:00 pm, he had just left the house of one Lemuel located in Sitio
Bulihan, Barangay Balete, Batangas City (Bulihan) to walk to his own home located
also in Bulihan when he heard someone pleading: Huwag po, huwag po! He followed
the direction of the voice, and saw the assault by all the accused against Sabino D.
Guinhawa (Sabino), Graciano A. Delgado (Graciano), and Victor B. Noriega (Victor). He
recognized each of the accused because he saw them from only six meters away and
the moon was very bright.
Perfinian recalled that the accused surrounded their victims during the assault; that
Arnold stabbed Graciano on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to fall to the
ground; that Rico hacked Graciano with a bolo; that when Victor tried to escape by
running away, Hermogenes and Felix pursued and caught up with him; that Felix
hacked Victor; and that when Sabino ran away, Melanio and Joven pursued him.
Arnold and Joven admitted the killing but interpose the justifying circumstances of
self-defense and defense of a stranger.
RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of Hermogenes, one of the accused. CA affirmed the
convictions.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a stranger
can be appreciated in favor of the accused.
2. Whether there is conspiracy among the accused.
3. Whether abuse of superior strength can be appreciated in this case.
4. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated in favor of Hermogenes.
RULING:
1. Arnold and Joven did not act in self-defense or in defense of strangers.
In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element,
a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would
be nothing to repel.
By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect admitted
their parts in killing the victims. It becomes incumbent upon them to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. However, Arnold and Joven did
not adequately prove unlawful aggression. We note that in addition to the eyewitness
account of Perfinian directly incriminating them, their own actuations immediately
after the incident confirmed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As the CA cogently
noted, their flight from the neighborhood where the crimes were committed, their
concealing of the weapons used in the commission of the crimes, their non-reporting
of the crimes to the police, and their failure to surrender themselves to the police
authorities fully warranted the RTC’s rejection of their claim of self-defense and
defense of stranger.
Similarly, the victims’ supposed motion to draw something from their waists did not
put Arnold and Joven’s lives in any actual or imminent danger. What the records show
is that Arnold and Joven did not actually see if the victims had any weapons to draw
from their waists. That no weapons belonging to the victims were recovered from the
crime scene confirmed their being unarmed. Lastly, had they been only defending
themselves, Arnold and Joven did not tell the trial court why they had repeatedly
hacked their victims with their bolos; or why they did not themselves even sustain any
physical injury.
2. The State duly established conspiracy.
The accused, armed with bolos, surrounded and attacked the victims, and pursued
whoever of the latter attempted to escape from their assault. Thereafter, the accused,
except Hermogenes, fled their homes and together hastily proceeded to Antipolo,
Rizal. Their individual and collective acts prior to, during and following the attack on
the victims reflected a common objective of killing the latter. Thereby, all the accused,
without exception, were co-conspirators.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is either express or
implied. Thus, the State does not always have to prove the actual agreement to commit
the crime in order to establish conspiracy, for it is enough to show that the accused
acted in concert to achieve a common purpose. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. Once a conspiracy is
established, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for the act of one
is the act of all.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rejects the pleas for exculpation of the other
accused grounded on their respective alibis considering that Arnold and Joven’s
admission of sole responsibility for the killings did not eliminate their liability as co-
conspirators.
3. Abuse of superior strength can be appreciated in this case.
Abuse of superior strength is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a
person to murder. It is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of superior strength. Superiority in strength may refer to the number of
aggressors and weapons used.
A gross disparity of forces existed between the accused and the victims. Not only did
the six accused outnumber the three victims but the former were armed with bolos
while the latter were unarmed. The accused clearly used their superiority in number
and arms to ensure the killing of the victims. Abuse of superior strength is attendant if
the accused took advantage of their superiority in number and their being armed with
bolos. Accordingly, the crimes committed were three counts of murder.
4. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should not be
appreciated in favor of Hermogenes.
In order that voluntary surrender is appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the accused has not been actually arrested; (b)
the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c)
surrender is voluntary. The third requisite requires the surrender to be spontaneous,
indicating the intent of the accused to unconditionally submit himself to the
authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expenses necessary for his search and capture.
Although Hermogenes went to Barangay Chairman Aloria of Bulihan after the killings,
he did so to seek protection against the retaliation of the victims’ relatives, not to
admit his participation in the killing of the victims. Even then, Hermogenes denied any
involvement in the killings when the police went to take him from Chairman Aloria’s
house. As such, Hermogenes did not unconditionally submit himself to the authorities
in order to acknowledge his participation in the killings or in order to save the
authorities the trouble and expense for his arrest.
Nonetheless, any determination of whether or not Hermogenes was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was vain in light of the penalty for
murder being reclusion perpetua to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Due to both such penalties being
indivisible, the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances would not affect
the penalties except to aid the trial court in pegging the penalty to reclusion perpetua
if the only modifying circumstance was mitigating, or the mitigating circumstances
outnumbered the aggravating circumstances; or to prescribe the death penalty (prior
to its prohibition under Republic Act No. 9346) should there be at least one
aggravating circumstance and there was no mitigating circumstance, or the
aggravating circumstances outnumbered the mitigating circumstances.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERON DELOS SANTOS y
MARISTELA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 170839 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BESAMIN J.
The mere denial of knowledge that a substance is a regulated drug is insufficient to
exculpate the person found in possession of it, for he must have to satisfactorily explain
how the drug came to his possession. Without his satisfactory explanation, he will be
presumed to have animus possidendi, or the intent to possess. His guilt will then be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs; In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, proof of animus possidendi
on the part of the accused is indispensable.—In a prosecution for possession of illegal
substances, proof of animus possidendi on the part of the accused is indispensable. But
animus possidendi is a state of mind, and is thus to be determined on a case-to-case
basis by taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused,
as well as the surrounding circumstances. It may and must be inferred usually from
the attendant events in each particular case. Upon the State’s presenting to the trial
court of the facts and circumstances from which to infer the existence of animus
possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the Defense to rebut the inference with
evidence that the accused did not exercise power and control of the illicit thing in
question, and did not intend to do so. For that purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of
the accused that he did not know that he had possession of the illegal drug is
insufficient, and animus possidendi is then presumed to exist on his part because he
was thereby shown to have performed an act that the law prohibited and punished.
FACTS:
An alert security guard halted Geron Delos Santos y Maristela as he was about to bring
a gift-wrapped box out of the Somerset Condominium in Leveriza Street, Pasay City.
When Delos Santos opened the box for inspection upon demand of the security guard,
the box contained plastic bags with 6.2 kilograms of suspected shabu. The security
guard forthwith apprehended Delos Santos and impounded the box and its contents.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was immediately notified of the incident,
and it dispatched its agents to the place. Subsequently, Delos Santos was charged with
a violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Delos Santos denied the accusation, claiming that while he was cleaning at the ground
floor of the condominium the occupant of Unit 706 called the guard on duty to ask for
help in cleaning the unit; that he was summoned to do the chore, and while he was
waiting outside Unit 706, a non-tenant known to him only as Wilson requested him to
bring the gift-wrapped box to someone near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch;
that when he was already downstairs, the security guard on duty wanted to check the
gift-wrapped box; that he voluntarily handed the box for inspection; that the security
guard opened the box in his presence and discovered the shabu; that he told the
security guard on duty that he had no knowledge of the contents of the box and was
only instructed by Wilson to deliver it; that upon the arrival of the NBI agents, he told
them that the box had come from Unit 706; that the NBI agents proceeded to Unit 706
and found more shabu contained in four large suitcases, four small suitcases, and
small bags; and that the NBI agents demanded the keys of the unit from him but he
replied that he did not have any key because he was a mere janitor of the building.
Delos Santos contends that the State did not establish that he had animus possidendi,
or the intent to possess the regulated substances in question.
RTC convicted Delos Santos as charged which was affirmed by CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of Delos Santos on failure to establish animus
possidendi is correct.
RULING:
The contention is not correct.
In a prosecution for possession of illegal substances, proof of animus possidendi on
the part of the accused is indispensable. But animus possidendi is a state of mind, and
is thus to be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior
and contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It
may and must be inferred usually from the attendant events in each particular case.
Upon the State’s presenting to the trial court of the facts and circumstances from
which to infer the existence of animus possidendi, it becomes incumbent upon the
Defense to rebut the inference with evidence that the accused did not exercise power
and control of the illicit thing in question, and did not intend to do so. For that
purpose, a mere unfounded assertion of the accused that he did not know that he had
possession of the illegal drug is insufficient, and animus possidendi is then presumed
to exist on his part because he was thereby shown to have performed an act that the
law prohibited and punished.
It cannot be disputed that Delos Santos had animus possidendi. His conduct prior to
and following his apprehension evinced his guilty knowledge of the contents of the
gift-wrapped box as shabu. His uncorroborated story of having been summoned to
help in the cleaning of Unit 706 was a sham excuse that he peddled to explain his
presence in the Somerset Condominium. His explanation was useless, however,
because he was no longer employed as a janitor of the Somerset Condominium at the
time of his arrest after being already terminated from employment. Correlatively, his
willingness to run for Wilson the errand of delivering the gift-wrapped box to the
unnamed person near the Jollibee Vito Cruz extension branch proved that he was
serving as a courier of shabu. Besides, his guilty knowledge was confirmed by his
unreasonable refusal to exit from Unit 706 despite the demand of the NBI agents to do
so, and by his stealthy transfer to the adjoining Unit 705. Had he been truly innocent,
he would have voluntarily cooperated with the NBI agents instead of attempting to
escape from them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DARWIN RELATO y AJERO
G.R. No. 173794 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.
Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited drugs and
related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the evidence to be
presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the successful prosecution
of illegal possession or illegal sale of prohibited drugs.
Criminal Law; Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (RA No. 9165); Chain of
Custody Rule; Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the procedure to be
followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited drugs.—Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165 provides the procedure to be followed in the seizure and custody of prohibited
drugs, to wit: Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as
well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Same; Same; Same; The marking immediately after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or related items will
use the markings as reference.—The marking immediately after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link, because succeeding handlers of the prohibited drugs or
related items will use the markings as reference. It further serves to segregate the
marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar and related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence. It
is crucial in ensuring the integrity of the chain of custody, which is defined in Section
1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, thus: b. “Chain of
Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment
of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
Same; Same; Same; In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the
heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to
prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.—In a prosecution of the sale
and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No.
9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the
offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the
State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not establish the corpus delicti when
the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial
gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the
authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap
renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as we
recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of the
Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.
FACTS:
PO3 Sonny Evasco of the Bulan Police Station received a tip from his asset to the effect
that Relato would be peddling illegal drugs around midnight in Barangay Aquino, Zone
7, Bulan, Sorsogon. A team to conduct a buy-bust operation against Relato was
immediately organized.
Relato and a companion (later identified as Pido Paredes) arrived together on board a
motorcycle in the site of buy bust operation. Relato alighted to confer with the asset
who was the poseur buyer. After the transaction was completed, PO3 Evasco signaled
to the rest of the team, who drew near and apprehended Relato. Seized from Relato
was the marked P500.00 buy-bust bill. The poseur buyer turned over to PO3 Evasco
the two transparent sachets containing crystalline substances that Relato sold to the
poseur buyer. Paredes escaped. SPO1 Masujer marked the two transparent sachets
with his own initials “EM” upon returning to the police station.
Both RTC and CA found Relato guilty for violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of Relato is proper.
RULING:
The conviction is not proper.
A review of the records establishes that the procedures laid down by Republic Act No.
9165 and its IRR regarding seizure and custody of prohibited drugs were not followed.
Several lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no
photograph of the seized shabu was taken. Secondly, the buy-bust team did not
immediately mark the seized shabu at the scene of the crime and in the presence of
Relato and witnesses. Thirdly, although there was testimony about the marking of the
seized items being made at the police station, the records do not show that the
marking was done in the presence of Relato or his chosen representative. And,
fourthly, no representative of the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected
official attended the taking of the physical inventory and to sign the inventory.
While the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to
ensure that not every case of non-compliance irreversibly prejudices the State’s
evidence, it is significant to note that the application of the saving mechanism to a
situation is expressly conditioned upon the State rendering an explanation of the lapse
or lapses in the compliance with the procedures. Here, however, the Prosecution
tendered no explanation why the buy-bust team had failed to mark the seized shabu
immediately after the arrest. Nevertheless, even assuming that marking the shabu at
the scene of the crime by the buy-bust team had not been practical or possible for the
buy-bust team to do, the saving mechanism would still not be applicable due to the
lack of a credible showing of any effort undertaken by the buy-bust team to keep the
shabu intact while in transit to the police station.
In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of
proving the elements of the offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the
corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not discharge its basic duty of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that the State does not
establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution
is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance
raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as
evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves
exculpation, especially as we recall that his defense of frame-up became plausible in
the face of the weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence of guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the
elements of the crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the
ever-present obligation of the State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.—
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual agreement
to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred
from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the
accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted. Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez
cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand
and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their
acting in concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station
on board a single motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez
commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and immediately followed by Edwin’s
shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other. It was also significant that they
fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had achieved their
common purpose. To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail
of the execution; neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-
conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the
conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through
their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is the employment of means,
methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons which tend to
directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending party arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.—Treachery is the employment
of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes against persons
which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending
party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It encompasses a
wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is
particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a
circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and dependent on each
particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the State to specifically
aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct
or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the
accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real nature
of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.—The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not
from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but
by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano,
469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court elaborated: For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of
the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly vio lated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must
be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes.
The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
Same; Evidence; A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that
aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the
accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail.—A practical consequence of the
non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the introduction or
consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The
allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged,
or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. In that regard, an offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
FACTS:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella)
was at the canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77
Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the
celebration of the birthday of her second husband, Wilfredo Lladones, which was held
later in the evening. Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman,
and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the betting
station. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Estrella’s other sons Joselito Sayson
(Joselito) and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather. At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with
the arrival of Eduardo Valdez(PO2 Valdez) and Edwin Valdez (Edwin), who alighted
from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai
teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin
and tried to reason with them. He went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to
force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of the accused-
appellants threaten Moises with the words “Gusto mo unahin na kita?” Moises replied
“huwag.” Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously
fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately
approached the scene to help his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the
left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he
was hit at the back while running.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC
with three counts of murder qualified with treachery for the killing of Ferdinand,
Moises and Joselito.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction for murder is proper.
RULING:
It is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not
sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of
the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution,
without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble
of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts
in the complaint or information.
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies
“which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently
set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime
was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose.
Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term,
standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short,
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is
to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that
tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the
ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense
proved.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFONSO FONTANILLA y OBALDO
G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.
An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an
unlawful aggression against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused
cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance.
Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of Self-Defense.—In
order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful
aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression
attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to
repel.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Once an accused in a prosecution for murder
or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the
burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.—By invoking self-defense,
however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais.
It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his
infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability. Having thus admitted being the author of the death of the
victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the
burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s
evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.
Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the
State until the end of the proceedings.
Criminal Law; Murder; Penalties; Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes
reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder.—The imposition of reclusion
perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on
the application of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed if there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out that the RTC erroneously
imposed “RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH” as the penalty. Such imposition was
bereft of legal justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should
not be imposed as a compound, alternative or successive penalty for a single felony. In
short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.
Same; Same; Civil Indemnities; Damages that may be Awarded when Death Occurs due to
a Crime.—The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC
to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the
damages to be awarded may include: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary
damages; and (e) temperate damages.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision, the
Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the
deceased to their moral status quo ante.—The CA and the RTC should also have granted
moral damages in addition to the death indemnity, which were of different kinds. The
death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but appropriate and
reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family of Olais. Although mental anguish and emotional
sufferings of the surviving family were not quantifiable with mathematical precision,
the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore the heirs of the
deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should
be reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we are
bound to award despite the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ mental
anguish and emotional suffering.
Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages; It is already settled that when actual damages
substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at
least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount actually
proved by receipts.—Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-
recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim to temperate damages. The victim’s
wife testified about her family’s incurring funeral expenses of P36,000.00, but only
P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that when actual damages
substantiated by receipts sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at
least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual damages in the lesser amount
actually proved by receipts.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; The Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil liability “when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.”—The Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability “when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.” The Civil Code permits such damages to be awarded “by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.” In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the
RTC should have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary
damages on account of the attendance of treachery. It was of no moment that
treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and
absorbed in murder.
FACTS:
At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial
road in Butubut Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck
him in the head with a piece of wood called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground,
but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone. Fontanilla desisted from
hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law
of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their
father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.
At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he
had been standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and
appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the stomach; that although he had then
talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists, striking him
with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs;
that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he
had hit the right side of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the
ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no
longer moving.
Both RTC and CA found Fontanilla guilty of murder qualified by treachery.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of Fontanilla for the crime of murder is proper.
RULING:
The conviction is proper.
Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense,
for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is
unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.
By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that
caused the death of Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder
or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on the deceased, he assumed
the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the justifying
circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.
Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais
did not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanilla’s act of
hitting the victim’s head with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional
to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.
Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some
injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity
was found on the person of Fontanilla when he presented himself to the hospital;
hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical certificate to
him. Nor was any medication applied to him. In contrast, the physician who examined
the cadaver of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The
plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the
location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not
merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant
that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill
his victim, not just to defend himself.
The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had
appeared out of nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and
then with a big stone, causing Olais to fall to the ground facedown. The suddenness
and unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to defend
himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BELOCURA y
PEREZ, accused-appellant.*
G.R. No. 173474 August 29, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.
The credibility of the evidence of the corpus delicti in a prosecution for illegal possession
of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, depends on the integrity of the
chain of custody of the marijuana from the time of its seizure until the time of its
presentation as evidence in court. Short of that, the accused is entitled to an acquittal
because the State fails to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Exclusionary Rules; The consequence of a
violation of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby
obtained.―No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of personal security and
privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than the
Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III, viz.: Section 2. The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The consequence of a violation
of the guarantees against a violation of personal security and privacy and against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained.
This rule of exclusion is set down in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 3. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Same; Same; Warrantless Arrests; There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search
and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the
circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.―The
right against warrantless arrest, and the right against warrantless search and seizure
are not absolute. There are circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure,
although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances
are those mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down
when a warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person,
namely: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Same; Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of exceptions.―The constitutional
proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following
exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of evidence under plain
view; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless search; (e) customs
search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant is
dispensed with.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Elements of Illegal Possession of Marijuana.―The
elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is identified to be
marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. What must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be
done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a
witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
Same; Evidence; Chain of Custody Rule; In every criminal prosecution for possession of
illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence
from the moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in
evidence.―In every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the
Prosecution must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the
moment of seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That
account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence offered has
probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be sufficiently connected to
and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely because it is
available but that it has an actual connection with the transaction involved and with
the parties thereto. This is the reason why authentication and laying a foundation for
the introduction of evidence are important.
FACTS:
Belocura was a police officer. While he was driving his owner-type jeep using a
government plate, about thirty police officers blocked his path. Recovered from
Belocura’s jeep was a red plastic bag under the driver’s seat the contents of which
turned out to be two bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
Belocura, charged with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was
found guilty of the crime charged by the Regional Trial Court. CA affirmed the
conviction.
Belocura argues that the Prosecution did not establish his guilt for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt; that his warrantless arrest was unlawful considering that
his only violation was only a breach of traffic rules and regulations involving the illegal
use of a government plate on his newly-assembled jeep; that the warrantless search of
his jeep was contrary to law for violating his right against illegal search and seizure
protected under Section 17, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution; and
that the bricks of marijuana supposedly seized from him, being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, were inadmissible against him.
ISSUES:
Whether Belocura should be acquitted of the crime charged based on the following
ground:
1. Warrantless search and seizure;
2. Failure to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself; and
3. Failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs.
RULING:
Belocura should be acquitted of the crime of charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself and
failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs. The
warrantless searcha and seizure conducted in Belocura’s jeepney, however, is
valid and hence, it cannot be a basis for acquittal.
1. Warrantless Search and Seizure
Belocura argues that his arrest and the ensuing search of his vehicle and recovery of
the incriminating bricks of marijuana were in violation of his aforementioned rights
under the Constitution because he was then violating only a simple traffic rule on the
illegal use of a government plate. He claims that the arresting policemen had no
probable cause to search his vehicle for anything.
Indeed, no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a
competent judicial authority. However, this rule admits exceptions. One of the
exceptions to a valid warrantless is arrest is in flagrante delicto and one of the
exceptions to a valid warrantless search is one that is conducted incidental to a lawful
arrest. Both exceptions are present in this case.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31 of Republic Act No. 4139
(The Land Transportation and Traffic Code) which he even admitted. The arrest was
valid, therefore, and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with the
authority to validly search his person and effects for weapons or any other article he
might use in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be
used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his
reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The evident
purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen from being
harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the warrantless
character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.
2. Failure to prove the fact of possession of the prohibited drug itself
The elements of illegal possession of marijuana under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, are that: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object that is
identified to be marijuana, a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. What must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the prohibited
drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually
recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the
direct knowledge of the possession.
Chief Insp. Divina who headed the team of policemen disclosed that it was PO2
Santos, a member of the team, who had discovered and had actually recovered the
red plastic bag containing the bricks of marijuana from the jeep. The Prosecution
also presented SPO1 Rojas, another member of the team, but he provided no direct
evidence about the possession by Belocura of the confiscated marijuana bricks, and
actually stated that he did not witness the recovery of the marijuana bricks from
Belocura.
Based on the foregoing, Chief Insp. Divina and SPO1 Rojas’ declarations were
insufficient to incriminate Belocura, much less to convict him. If neither of them was
personally competent to be an eyewitness regarding the seizure of the marijuana
bricks from Belocura, their testimonies could not be accorded probative value,
considering that the Rules of Court requires that a witness could testify only to facts that
he knew of his own knowledge, that is, only to those facts derived from his own
perception. Only PO2 Santos could reliably establish Belocura’s illegal possession of
the marijuana bricks, if Chief Insp. Divina’s account was to be believed. Surprisingly,
the RTC did not give due and proper significance to the failure to present PO2 Santos
as a witness against Belocura. As the arresting officer who alone actually seized the
marijuana bricks from Belocura’s vehicle beyond the viewing distance of his fellow
arresting officers, PO2 Santos was the Prosecution’s only witness who could have
reliably established the recovery from Belocura of the marijuana bricks contained in
the red plastic bag labeled as “SHIN TON YON.” Without PO2 Santos’ testimony, Chief
Insp. Divina’s declaration of seeing PO2 Santos recover the red plastic bag from under
the driver’s seat of Belocura’s jeep was worthless.
3. Failure to establish the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs
The Prosecution thereby failed to establish the linkage between the bricks of
marijuana supposedly seized by PO2 Santos from Belocura’s jeep following his arrest
and the bricks of marijuana that the Prosecution later presented as evidence in court.
That linkage was not dispensable, because the failure to prove that the specimens of
marijuana submitted to the forensic chemist for examination were the same marijuana
allegedly seized from Belocura irreparably broke the chain of custody that linked the
confiscated marijuana to the marijuana ultimately presented as evidence against
Belocura during the trial. Proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded that unwavering
exactitude must be observed in establishing the corpus delicti―the body of the crime
whose core was the confiscated prohibited substances. Thus, every fact necessary to
constitute the crime must be established.
The first link in the chain of custody started with the seizure from the jeep of Belocura
of the red plastic bag said to contain the marijuana bricks. The first link was
immediately missing because the Prosecution did not present PO2 Santos, the only
person with direct knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the marijuana bricks.
Without his testimony, proof that the marijuana bricks were really taken from the jeep
of Belocura did not exist. The second link was the turnover of the marijuana bricks by
PO2 Santos to another officer back at the WPD Headquarters. As to this, Chief Insp.
Divina stated that he learned following the seizure by PO2 Santos that the marijuana
bricks were turned over to the General Assignment Section for investigation. That was
all. On the other hand, SPO1 Rojas’ testimony contributed nothing to the establishment
of the second link because he had immediately left after seizing the gun from Belocura.
As for the subsequent links, the records showed that the marijuana bricks were
forwarded to the General Assignment Section on March 22, 1999, but the Prosecution
did not prove the identities of the officer from the General Assignment Section who
received the red plastic bag containing the marijuana bricks, and the officer from
whom the receiving officer received the marijuana bricks. Although Chief Insp. Nelson
Yabut prepared the request for laboratory examination of the marijuana bricks, which
were thereafter examined by Forensic Chemist Valdez, the records did not show if
Chief Insp. Yabut was the officer who had received the marijuana bricks from the
arresting team. The request for laboratory examination was dated March 23, 1999, or
the day following Belocura’s arrest and the seizure of the marijuana bricks from his
jeep; however, the Prosecution did not identify the person from whom Chief Insp.
Yabut had received the marijuana bricks.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGARDO LUPAC y FLORES,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 182230 September 19, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.
Criminal Law; Rape; The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against
her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is
demented).―The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a female either against her will
(through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female is deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is demented). The
Prosecution showed during the trial that AAA had been asleep when he forced himself
on her. Such showing competently established the rape thus charged, as defined by
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, for AAA, being unconscious in her
sleep, was incapable of consenting to his carnal knowledge of her. Indeed, the Court
has uniformly held in several rulings that carnal knowledge of a female while she was
asleep constituted rape.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Direct evidence is not the only means
of proving rape beyond reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence would also be the
reliable means to do so.―Direct evidence was not the only means of proving rape
beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence would also be the reliable means to
do so, provided that (a) there was more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences were derived were proved; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances was such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What
was essential was that the unbroken chain of the established circumstances led to no
other logical conclusion except the appellant’s guilt.
Same; Same; Res Gestae; For the application of the rule on res gestae, three requisites
must be shown to concur, namely: (a) that the principal act, the res gestae, must be a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.―Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court states: Section 42. Part of the res gestae.―Statements made by a person
while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. For
the application of this rule, three requisites must be shown to concur, namely: (a) that
the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (c)
the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
FACTS:
Under appeal is the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed
the rape conviction of Edgardo Lupac but modified the trial court’s characterization of
the offense as statutory rape because of the failure of the People to properly establish
the victim’s minority under 12 years at the time of the commission of the rape.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA correctly convicted Lupac for the crime of rape.
2. Whether award of exemplary damages is proper despite CA’s non-appreciation of
the age of the victim being under 12 years at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape.
RULING:
1. CA is correct in convicting Lupac for the crime of rape.
CA correctly rectified the mistaken characterization by the RTC of the crime as
statutory rape where being under 12 years of age is an element. Although the
information alleged that AAA had been only 10 years of age at the time of the
commission of the rape, the State did not reliably establish such age of the victim.
Still, the conviction of Lupac for rape is upheld despite AAA’s minority under 12 years
not being competently proved because the information also properly charged him
with raping AAA by its express averment that the carnal knowledge of her by him had
been “against her will and consent.” The essence of rape is carnal knowledge of a
female either against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent
(where the female is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12
years of age, or is demented). The Prosecution showed during the trial that AAA had
been asleep when he forced himself on her. Such showing competently established the
rape thus charged, as defined by paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, for
AAA, being unconscious in her sleep, was incapable of consenting to his carnal
knowledge of her. Indeed, the Court has uniformly held in several rulings that carnal
knowledge of a female while she was asleep constituted rape.
Lupac assails the absence of credible direct evidence about his having carnal
knowledge of AAA because she herself, being then asleep and unconscious, could not
reliably attest to his supposed deed. The position of Lupac is bereft of merit, however,
because his conviction should still stand even if direct evidence to prove penile
penetration of AAA was not adduced. Direct evidence was not the only means of
proving rape beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence would also be the
reliable means to do so provided that that the unbroken chain of the established
circumstances led to no other logical conclusion except the guilt of the accused. The
following circumstances combined to establish that Lupac consummated the rape of
AAA, namely: (a) when AAA went to take her afternoon nap, the only person inside the
house with her was Lupac; (b) about an hour into her sleep, she woke up to find
herself already stripped naked as to expose her private parts; (c) she immediately felt
her body aching and her vaginal region hurting upon her regaining consciousness; (d)
all doors and windows were locked from within the house, with only her and the brief-
clad Lupac inside the house; (e) he exhibited a remorseful demeanor in unilaterally
seeking her forgiveness (Pasensiya ka na AAA), even spontaneously explaining that he
did not really intend to do “that” to her, showing his realization of the gravity of the
crime he had just committed against her; (f) her spontaneous, unhesitating and
immediate denunciation of the rape to Tita Terry and her mother (hindot being the
term she used); and (g) the medico-legal findings signified the forceful penetration of
her with a blunt instrument, like an erect penis.
Under the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed in a criminal case as part of the
civil liability “when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.”
Conformably with the Civil Code, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the
entitlement of AAA to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of the
aggravating circumstance of her minority under 12 years. It should not matter that
the CA disregarded her testimony on her age. At least, the RTC found her testimony on
her minority under 12 years at the time of the rape credible enough to convict the
accused of statutory rape. Nor was it of any consequence that such minority would
have defined the rape as statutory had it been sufficiently established. What mattered
was to consider the attendance of an aggravating circumstance of any kind to warrant
the award of exemplary damages to the victim. This was the point stressed in People v.
Catubig, to wit: It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due
the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

The Court holds that AAA’s denunciation of Lupac as her rapist to Tita Terry and her
own mother with the use of the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega without any
appreciable length of time having intervened following her discovery of the rape was
part of the res gestae (that is, rape). For the application of this rule, three requisites
must be shown to concur, namely: (a) that the principal act, the res gestae, must be a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had the time
to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The requisites were met
herein. AAA went to Tita Terry’s house immediately after fleeing from Lupac and
spontaneously, unhesitatingly and immediately declared to Tita Terry that Lupac had
sexually abused her. Such manner of denunciation of him as her rapist was confirmed
by Tita Terry’s testimony about AAA’s panic-stricken demeanor that rendered it
difficult to quickly comprehend what the victim was then saying. Of course, AAA’s use
of the words hindot and inano ako ni Kuya Ega said enough about her being raped.

2. The Court needs to add exemplary damages to the civil damages awarded to
AAA.