Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018

RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE, Petitioners, v. RICKY JAMES
RELUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 12, 2017 and the Omnibus
Resolution3 dated October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406, which set aside the Orders
dated December 4, 20154 and January 7, 20165 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 (RTC) in
Special Proceeding (SP) No. FC-15-239, directed the remand of the case to the RTC for trial, and granted respondent
Ricky James Relucio (Ricky James) "temporary custody" once a month for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours
over the minor, Queenie Angel M. Relucio (Queenie), his illegitimate daughter with petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate
(Renalyn), on top of visitation rights fixed at two (2) days per week.

The Facts

Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's parents
without the benefit of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila,
supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.6

Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took Queenie
from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead
showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney7 (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and
custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child
custody8 docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC (petition a quo).9

A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the desire for her
daughter to remain in her custody.10

The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated December 4, 2015, the RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to
Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which states that "[n]o child under seven [(7)]
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." The RTC likewise found that, while Renalyn went to Manila to
study dentistry and left Queenie in the custody of her parents, her intention was to bring Queenie to Manila at a later
time. Thus, in the fallo of said Order, the RTC declared that it will "NOT GIVE FURTHER DUE COURSE" to the petition a
quo.12

Dissatisfied, Ricky James moved for reconsideration,13 lamenting the "[extraordinary] speed in the issuance of the x x x
award of custody over the child to [petitioners]."14 He claimed that the hearing conducted on December 3, 2015 was not
the kind of hearing that was procedurally contemplated under A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,15 otherwise known as the "Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors," because the RTC merely propounded
random questions without placing the witnesses on the stand to testify under oath. Moreover, he was allegedly
deprived of his right to due process when the RTC refused to give further due course to the petition a quo.16

The motion was denied in an Order17 dated January 7, 2016, wherein the RTC emphasized that Queenie was born out of
wedlock, for which reason she shall be under the parental authority of her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to Article 17618 of
the Family Code. In addition, the RTC faulted Ricky James for failing to present credible evidence in court to demonstrate
that Renalyn is unfit to take custody of their daughter.19

Aggrieved, Ricky James filed an appeal20 before the CA, imputing error upon the RTC: (a) in not conducting a full blown
trial and not receiving evidence; (b) in granting sole custody to Renalyn without giving paramount consideration to the
best interests of the child; and (c) in not granting him shared custody and/or visitation rights.21 Ricky James insisted that
the tender-age presumption in Article 213 of the Family Code is rebuttable by evidence of the mother's neglect,
abandonment, and unemployment, among other factors, and claimed that Renalyn abandoned Queenie when she went
to live in Manila and failed to seek employment to support her daughter.22

For their part, Renalyn and her parents (petitioners) moved for the outright dismissal of the appeal on the ground that
no appeal can be had against an order denying a motion for reconsideration. In addition, petitioners argued that being
the illegitimate father of Queenie, Ricky James has absolutely no right of custody over her, and that Renalyn's act of
entrusting the care of Queenie to her parents was not a renunciation of parental authority but only a temporary
separation necessitated by her need to adjust to her studies, which she undertook to improve her and Queenie's life.23

On September 2, 2016, the case was referred to mediation, but the parties were unable to arrive at a settlement.24

The CA Ruling
In a Decision25 dated January 12, 2017, the CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case to the lower
court for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie.26 The CA found that the RTC hastily dismissed the
petition a quo upon Queenie's production in court, when the objective of the case was to establish the allegation that
Renalyn had been neglecting Queenie, which was a question of fact that must be resolved by trial.27 Citing Section 18 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that, "[a]fter trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the
minor to the proper party considering the best interests of the minor," the CA declared that the dismissal by the RTC of
the petition a quo was not supported by the Rules.28

Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn "pending the outcome of the case," stating
that only Queenie's mother, Renalyn, has parental authority over her as she is an illegitimate child. Further, the CA
declared that the RTC must thresh out Renalyn's capacity to raise her daughter, which shall, in tum, determine whether
or not the tender-age presumption must be upheld, or whether Queenie's well-being is better served with her remaining
in the custody of her maternal grandparents in the exercise of their substitute parental authority or with Ricky James,
who was Queenie's actual custodian before the controversy.29

Finally, the CA granted Ricky James visitation rights of two (2) days a week, with provision for additional visitation days
that may be permitted by Renalyn.30

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,31 while Ricky James filed a motion for clarification32 asking that he be
allowed to pick up Queenie from petitioners' residence on a Friday afternoon and to return the child on a Sunday
afternoon.33 In their Comment,34 petitioners argued that the arrangement proposed by Ricky James is not within the
scope of his visitation rights, but that he may, through Renalyn's written consent, take Queenie home on certain family
occasions.35

In its Omnibus Resolution36 dated October 3, 2017, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit, insisting on its application of the case of Bagtas v. Santos,37 which held that a trial is still necessary to determine
the issue of custody despite the production of the child.38 On the other hand, the CA ruled in favor of Ricky James'
motion for clarification, granting the latter what it calls a " limited and temporary custody" that will allow him to take
Queenie out once a month, or on the first Saturday of each month, for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) hours,
but which shall not reduce his visitation days fixed at two (2) days per week.39 In so holding, the appellate court cited
"humane and practical considerations"40 and argued that it is in Queenie's best interest to have an exclusive time with
Ricky James.41

Undaunted, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, maintaining that the RTC correctly dismissed
the petition a quo after the hearing on December 3, 2015 on the grounds that: (a) the purported custodial right that
Ricky James seeks to enforce in filing his petition has no legal basis; (b) the petition a quo does not comply with the
requisites for habeas corpus petitions involving custody of minors; and (c) there are no more factual issues to be
resolved as it had already been admitted by Renalyn during the hearing that she goes to Manila to study but that she
comes home every week for Queenie and whenever there is a problem.42

Ricky James filed a Comment/Opposition43 as well as an Urgent Omnibus Motion44 to dismiss the petition and for
immediate execution pending appeal of the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, claiming that the instant
petition was filed out of time and that it was erroneous for petitioners to state that the last day of filing fell on
November 4, 2017, a Saturday, which compelled them to file their petition on November 6, 2017, a Monday. By his
calculation, the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period, which commenced to run upon petitioners' receipt on October 19,
2017 of the Omnibus Resolution dated October 3, 2017, ended on November 3, 2017, a Friday, and not on November 4,
2017.45
 The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination
of who should exercise custody over Queenie.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partially meritorious.

I.

At the outset, it must be stressed that while petitioners may have erroneously determined the expiration of the
reglementary period for filing the instant petition, which resulted in the same being filed a day late on November 6,
2017, the Court finds it proper to overlook this procedural lapse given the compelling merit of the petition in the interest
of substantial justice.

The Court has declared that rules on the perfection of appeals, particularly on the period of filing thereof, must
occasionally yield to the loftier ends of substantial justice and equity. In the same manner that the CA took cognizance of
respondent's appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dated December 4,
2015,46 which is technically prohibited under the Rules of Court, so shall this Court hold that the ends of justice would be
served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some procedural nicety, but on the merits – after
all the parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not override – substantial justice.47

In this relation, it may not be amiss to point out that the fundamental policy of the State, as embodied in the
Constitution in promoting and protecting the welfare of children, shall not be disregarded by the courts by mere
technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth.48 The State is mandated to provide protection
to those of tender years. Through its laws, it safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that
their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired
by family acrimony.49

Accordingly, the Court shall delve into the substantive arguments propounded in this case.

II.

It is settled that habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where "the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto."50 In custody cases involving minors, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the
purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. The grant of the writ depends on the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the
minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondents; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondents.51

"The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, 'there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.'"52

As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.53 However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 17654 of the Family Code states
that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn)
are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's
recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate
children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative cause showing the
mother's unfitness to exercise such authority and care.55

In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age presumption, stating that "[n]o child
under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." The rationale behind the rule was explained by the Code Commission in this wise:

The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from
her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed
by the rule has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's
heart is not to be unduly hurt. x x x56

According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute "compelling reasons" to wrest away custody from a
mother over her child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.57

As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC, ratiocinating that there is a need to establish
whether or not Renalyn has been neglecting Queenie,58 for which reason, a trial is indispensable for reception of
evidence relative to the preservation or overturning of the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code.59 In opposition, petitioners contend that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code would not even
apply in this case (so as to determine Renalyn's unfitness as a mother) because the said provision only applies to a
situation where the parents are married to each other.60 As basis, petitioners rely on the Court's ruling in Pablo-
Gualberto v. Gualberto V61 (Pablo-Gualberto), the pertinent portion of which reads:

In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been
held to connote a mandatory character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents
of the minor are married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de
facto separation. x x x62

For easy reference, Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, which were cited
in Pablo-Gualberto, are quoted hereunder in full:

Article 213 of the Family Code

Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.

Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court

Section 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. – When husband and wife are divorced or living
separately and apart from each other, and the question to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their
marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court,
upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be
for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age,
unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are improper persons to have the care,
custody, and control of the child, the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or
his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to any
suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code order either or both parents to support or help support said child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and
may make any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the
child or have temporary custody thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made in accordance with the
provisions of this section. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds
there are compelling reasons therefor.

Notably, after a careful reading of Pablo-Gualberto, it has been determined that the aforequoted pronouncement
therein is based on a previous child custody case, namely, Briones v. Miguel63(Briones), wherein the Court pertinently
held as follows:

However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation
in which the parents of the minor are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal
separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and
Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which
parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.64
For guidance, the relevant issue in Briones for which the stated excerpt was made is actually the application of Section 6,
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court insofar as it permits the child over ten (10) years of age to choose which parent he prefers
to live with. As the Court's ruling in Briones was prefaced: "[t]he Petition has no merit. However, the assailed Decision
should be modified in regard to its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court."65 Accordingly,
since the statement in Pablo-Gualberto invoked by petitioners, i.e., that "Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a
situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other x x x," was based on Briones, then that same
statement must be understood according to its proper context – that is, the issue pertaining to the right of a child to
choose which parent he prefers to live with. The reason as to why this statement should be understood in said manner is
actually not difficult to discern: the choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only
between married parents because they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. On the other hand, this choice is not available to an illegitimate
child, much more one of tender age such as Queenie (second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole
parental authority is given only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the Family
Code). Thus, since the issue in this case is the application of the exception to the tender-age presumption under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, and not the option given to the child under the first paragraph to
choose which parent to live with, petitioners' reliance on Pablo-Gualberto is grossly misplaced.

In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which was the basis
of the CA's directive to remand the case, does not even distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children – and
hence, does not factor in whether or not the parents are married – in declaring that "[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." "Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize
any distinction."66 As such, petitioners' theory that Article 213 of the Family Code is herein inapplicable – and thus,
negates the need for the ordered remand – is not only premised on an erroneous reading of jurisprudence, but is also
one that is fundamentally off-tangent with the law itself.

III.

The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners' contention that even if there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie
from her mother, Renalyn, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, Ricky James would still
not acquire custody over their daughter because there is no provision of law granting custody rights to an illegitimate
father.67

In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family Code mandates
that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. However, the same Code further
provides in Article 216 that "[i]n default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:"

Article 216. x x x
(1)
The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;

(2)
The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3)
The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

The same order of preference with respect to substitute parental authority is reiterated in Section 13 of A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC, the "Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors," to wit:

Section 13. Provisional order awarding custody. – After an answer has been filed or after expiration of the period to file
it, the court may issue a provisional order awarding custody of the minor. As far as practicable, the following order of
preference shall be observed in the award of custody:

(a) Both parents jointly;

(b) Either parent, taking into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the minor over seven years of
age and of sufficient discernment, unless the parent chosen is unfit;

(c) The grandparent, or if there are several grandparents, the grandparent chosen by the minor over seven years of age
and of sufficient discernment, unless the grandparent chosen is unfit or disqualified;

(d) The eldest brother or sister over twenty-one years of age, unless he or she is unfit or disqualified;

(e) The actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless the former is unfit or disqualified; or

(f) Any other person or institution the court may deem suitable to provide proper care and guidance for the minor.

It was not disputed that Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for Manila to pursue
her studies until the instant controversy took place. As such, Ricky James had already assumed obligations and enjoyed
privileges of a custodial character, giving him a cause of action to file a case of habeas corpus to regain custody of
Queenie as her actual custodian.

Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father of an illegitimate child
from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he were the actual custodian of the child under
the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot
adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of
the minor. Even way back, Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount.68 Under present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC
explicitly states that "[i]n awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the minor and shall give
paramount consideration to [her] material and moral welfare. The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the
circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of security of the minor
encouraging to [her] physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the minor."69

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Queenie's best interest demands that a proper trial be conducted to
determine if she had, indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering the latter unfit to exercise
parental authority over her, and in the event that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is in Queenie's best interest
that she be in the custody of her father rather than her grandparents upon whom the law accords a far superior right to
exercise substitute parental authority. In the case of Bagtas v. Santos,70 which was a tug-of-war between the maternal
grandparents of the illegitimate minor child and the actual custodians of the latter, the Court faulted the trial court for
hastily dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and awarding the custody of the minor to the grandparents without
conducting any trial. The import of such decision is that the preference accorded by Article 216 of the Family Code does
not automatically attach to the grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their fitness to take care of
their grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court ratiocinated that the child's welfare being the most important
consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. Reiterating its pronouncement in the early
case of Sombong v. CA,71 the Court held that:

[I]n passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any
mere legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim
founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the
legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the
court's view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.
Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short, the child's
welfare is the supreme consideration.

Considering that the child's welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code
unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child
so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be
proper under the circumstances.72

The Court cannot close its eyes to the sad reality that not all fathers, especially those who have sired children out of
wedlock, have risen to the full height of a parent's responsibility towards his offspring. Yet, here is a father of an
illegitimate child who is very much willing to take on the whole gamut of parenting. He, thus, deserves, at the very least,
to be given his day in court to prove that he is entitled to regain custody of his daughter. As such, the CA's order to
remand the case is proper.
 IV.

While the appellate court correctly remanded the case for trial, the Court, however, holds that it erred in granting Ricky
James temporary custody for a limited period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours once every month, in addition to
visitation rights, invoking "humane and practical considerations,"73 which were based solely on Ricky James' allegations.

It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides for temporary visitation rights, not temporary
custody, as follows:

Section 15. Temporary visitation rights. – The court shall provide in its order awarding provisional custody appropriate
visitation rights to the non-custodial parent or parents, unless the court finds said parent or parents unfit or disqualified.

The temporary custodian shall give the court and non-custodial parent or parents at least five days' notice of any plan to
change the residence of the minor or take him out of his residence for more than three days provided it does not
prejudice the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or parents.

It is only after trial, when the court renders its judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party, that the
court may likewise issue "any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and
custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody," pursuant to Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, to wit:

Section 18. Judgment. – After trial, the court shall render judgment awarding the custody of the minor to the proper
party considering the best interests of the minor.

If it appears that both parties are unfit to have the care and custody of the minor, the court may designate either the
paternal or maternal grandparent of the minor, or his oldest brother or sister, or any reputable person to take charge of
such minor, or to commit him to any suitable home for children.

In its judgment, the court may order either or both parents to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance
and education of the minor, irrespective of who may be its custodian. In determining the amount of support, the court
may consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the
minor; (2) the physical and emotional health, special needs, and aptitude of the minor; (3) the standard of living the
minor has been accustomed to; and (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents would make toward the care
and well-being of the minor.

The court may also issue any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of the care and
custody of the minor to visit or have temporary custody. (Emphasis supplied)

By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court overturned the tender-age presumption
with nothing but Ricky James' bare allegations, to which the Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the
issue surrounding Renalyn's fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be
denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie.

In view of the disposition in Silva and Briones and the rules quoted above, the Court can only uphold Ricky James'
visitation rights, which shall be limited to two (2) days per week, without prejudice to Renalyn allowing him additional
days. However, consistent with the aforesaid cases, as well as the more recent case of Grande v. Antonio,74 Ricky James
may take Queenie out only upon the written consent of Renalyn. Contrary to the posturing75 of the appellate court, the
requirement for the consent of the mother is consistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code with respect to children under seven (7) years of age, which may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness.76 Until and unless Ricky James is able to substantiate
his allegations, he can only claim visitation rights over his daughter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 12, 2017 and the Omnibus Resolution dated
October 3, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144406 are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION deleting the grant of limited and temporary custody for lack of legal and factual basis. The grant of
visitation rights of two (2) days per week shall be maintained. Respondent Ricky James Relucio may take his daughter,
Queenie Angel M. Relucio, out but only with the written consent of petitioner Renalyn A. Masbate in accordance with
this Decision.

The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay, Branch 8 is DIRECTED to immediately proceed with hearing Special
Proceeding No. FC-15-239 upon notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 28, 2015 and the
Resolution3 dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which affirmed the
Judgment4 dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-
87386 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,5 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."

The Facts
An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial support, with
deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,6] and her minor son, [BBB] (12
years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and AAA entered into a compromise
agreement8 on the civil aspect of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the
criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June
24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the
ground that Melgar sold the property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his
son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement. Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal
aspect of the case and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.9

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB,
an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live
Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour
as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving
support, prompting AAA to file a case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still
refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.10

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of P8,000.00 per month because he
has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the other hand, her
son, BBB, is a scholar at and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for
P8,000.00 as support.11

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his repeated failure to appear
during trial.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5
(e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.14

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting
them. Worse, he sold the property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.15
 Melgar moved for reconsideration,16 which was, however, denied in an Order17 dated May 9, 2013 of the RTC.
Aggrieved, Melgar appealed18 to the CA.

The CA Ruling
19
In a Decision dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that Melgar is legally obliged to
support BBB.20 As such, when he deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed
economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal
case was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment based on compromise agreement,
particularly, in providing support to his son; and worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to 2010.21 Lastly, the CA ruled that
Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her child[,
BBB]."22

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a Resolution24 dated February 10, 2016;
hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section
5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic
abuse.25 The said law defines economic abuse as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.

xxxx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation of support of a common child of
the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.26 This specific act is penalized
by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children
is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in,
or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other hann, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
 xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her
family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence against
women and children.27 Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense.28

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as
it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely
acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year
old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a third party his property which
was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best
position to assess and detennine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference
should be accorded to the same.29

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that he was charged of violation of
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation
of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.30

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,31 punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children."
Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an
element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or
similar acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party."32 Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial
thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence
was presented to show that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore,
Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration
the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but
necessarily included in the crime charged33 - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of
RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of psychological
violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be
punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty
provided therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People,34 the
Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No.
4103,35 otherwise known as the Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the
offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate
sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark
mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the situation is different where although
the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under
such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the
speciallaw.36
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of
the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.37

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an
indetenninate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, to undergo a
mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report compliance to the court.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated
February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L.
Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing
petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) to pay a
fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment
and report compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on official business.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

January 8, 2018

G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner

vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010 Decision4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.

Factual Antecedents

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition5 for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.

It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before the
Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four children, all of
whom are now of legal age; that when they started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest,
unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,"7 and a
compulsive gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that respondent
was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made him
completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her; and that because she could expect no help or
assistance at all from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility,8 a
rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:

Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological
Gambling as manifested by:

a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his
stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]

b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired effect[;]

c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]

d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in order to
finance his gambling[;]

e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good career in
banking because of gambling[;]

f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate fmancial situation
caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to say
that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically related to the general medical condition
that occurred in his childhood.

Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of
our culture as manifested in the following areas:

a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]

b. his emotional response[;]

c. his poor impulse control[;]

Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational and interpersonal
relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can be traced back [to] his adolescence
since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.

All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations.9

Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a "dysfunctional"
childhood;10 that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as the youngest child for some time;
but that these parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred to his youngest brother who was born
when respondent was almost five years old; and that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from
which he never recovered.

Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already betting on jai alai. She
also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.

Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their
prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.

On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11

Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant case because petitioner's allegations are not
supported by facts.

Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner and
their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children are living was in fact his own capital property; that
his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders
that would satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing
more than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to
petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business administration, and is a bank
employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him
and petitioner.

Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that he
is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from a
distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even
slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions
and behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to
hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that
were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.

Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their family
home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have
a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also
have investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal
assets because they came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.

Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused him to be admitted
into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility,
he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their
finances and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."

On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.12

Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio.

On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of the marriage
contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008; Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a notarized
document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31, 2008"
executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses paid for with the proceeds of respondent's
share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13

Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14

On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15

On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on the ground that the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply with the essential martial obligations x x
x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and respondent tendered his Comment thereon.19

On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order.20

During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving the right to present
countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision on the
basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus declared the case submitted for decision.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]

1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N.
SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between
them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of the respondent.

2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of Marriage.

There are no other issues in this case.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and Parañaque City, the Office of
the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Parañaque City.

SO ORDERED.22

The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the family Code are
present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a psychological
condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical antecedence.

The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations; that respondent's inability to
perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological
abnormality arising from a pathological and utterly irresistible urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering from Personality Disorder
known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has been shown that this personality disorder was present at the
time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had
already jeopardized his relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the
performance of his obligations as a husband and as a father.

Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of the parties' children
as evidenced by TCT No.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.

But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It reiterated that the
expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality
Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal25 which was given due course by the RTC in its order26 dated February 28, 2011.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and
Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.27

The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be grave or serious,
much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and
nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological disorder that
completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
union.

According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due
to a personality disorder known as pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable
of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the family from the
sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the
family home with petitioner and their children.

On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological
condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the
marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got
married; that petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was courting
her; that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four instances
when she gave birth to their four children.

In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to be incurable or
permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution of
January 6, 2014.29

Issue

Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC].30

Petitioner's Arguments

In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC
Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity had
been duly proved in court, including its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.

First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect, and support;
that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of
whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform
the essential marital obligations; that for his pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved and built
had been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of
the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.

Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological incapacity, which included pathological gambling,
can be traced back when respondents was already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his
family; that the Clinical Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister,
and by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by countervailing
evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed relationship with his parents which
developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the marriage.

Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders are generally
incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case the Clinical Summary; had
pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only at the surface level; and that in point of
fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should be affirmed. He argues
that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that
petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.

Our Ruling

The Petition will not succeed.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the marriage
and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of the
Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties."37

Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution."

In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting and construing the
quoted Article, to wit:

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines
incorporate the basic requirements that the Court established in Santos.38

In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such
incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings between the trial court
and the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found
that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather
general statement that respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic
obligations as a husband and a father.

We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was
grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family
from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with
petitioner-appellee and their children."40

Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain
point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both
included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit
investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.42

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated
February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents'
home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this
amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the
items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills
came from this money.

And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the family home was
built, thus -

[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: He does not [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred
with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of [respondent],
Filipino, of legal age, single.

xxxx

[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Who owned this property?

A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.

Q: Where is this property located?

A: It is located in United Paranaque.

Q: Where in United Paranaque?

A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.

Q: Are you staying in that property?

A: We are staying in that property.

xxxx

[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]

Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?

A: It was donated to the children.

xxxx

[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?

A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.

Q: Who owns it now?

A: The children because it was donated [to them].43

What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their marriage on July 6, 1974
(and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was under treatment at
the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.

To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the
hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children.44

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation
center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a
job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely
the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will."45 "[I]t is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness."46

Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to the
charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear from the
following testimony –

[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]

Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?

A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.

Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?

A: Yes, [S]ir.

Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?

A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of [behavioral] problem, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?

A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the
maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage and drove out bumping the car parked
right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he
[would] immediately take them out again. So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled
behavior, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?

A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that [respondent] is suffering
from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the
behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering
from a personality disorder, [S]ir.

Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other
people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?

A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.

COURT: Go ahead.

A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and
social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get money
with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing
amounts of money in order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.

COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]

Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?

A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.

Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request [from] this Honorable
Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you concluded that the respondent is suffering from
personality disorder?

A: Yes,[S]ir.

Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?

A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to perform his functions as a
married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who is supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir.47

Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere
nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and appellate court,49 we
take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective postures taken by the parties.

Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause has
to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity."51

Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises for this particular
finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:

Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his marital obligations was a
result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by psychological abnormality. Such psychological
incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became
manifest only after the solemnization. x x x.52

As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a
definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral
changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006."53 Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests.54 And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that,
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai alai when
he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called to the
witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection
therewith, the latter did testify in court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the
sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is
an inviolable institution protected by the State."55

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could be attributed to the
latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to
substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught"
and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious
charges which must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce. Indeed,
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's alleged inability to appreciate
marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed
before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an
Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth."56

To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to
establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If
anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by
respondent before they got married and that respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.58

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that respondents alleged
psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally
incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court.59

"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie."60 This is the situation here.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 05, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner, v. DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated April 20, 2006
and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP
No. 01154) and granting respondent’s petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).

The factual background is as follows:

On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.

In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses
here and abroad.4

After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite,
as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eye[s]
which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is
payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount
of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until
the hearing of the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from
September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00)
Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is
ordered to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5)
days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
monthly support of P250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court may grant
plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings
for the main action for support. 6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering
that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support
the family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to the
P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent.

In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory since
respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the three-day notice period
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running
of the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite.8

His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondent’s contention that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual
income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed Orders dated March 31,
2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case
No. CEB No. 29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua” are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new
one is entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005
and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;

b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number of months starting
from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support; and

c) to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a
copy of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in
the CA decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the
CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalling P2,645,000.00, the advances given by
him to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).

In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the
expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84740.

On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution
as it rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge
Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is
prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of
plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.

Notify both parties of this Order.

SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition
for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 (“Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y.
Lua”). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (“Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua”). The two cases were consolidated.

By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against
Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders
dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case
No. CEB-29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one
is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of

PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deductions
aforementioned.
 iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.

SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and
the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the
two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the monthly support
adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent
said he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by
the trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA- G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the
petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I
.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.

II
.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64,
OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE
PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support
in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.

The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling
or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars
and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the
family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered
the said items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was
fixed on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondent’s alleged income from various businesses and petitioner’s
testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment,
thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the
groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using respondent’s credit card, totalling P594,151.58 for the period
September 2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the
Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan
had never in their entire life commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals at “carinderias”. Hence,
the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the value of which were properly
deducted from the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.

As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged
to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.18 Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to
the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind
and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.20

In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended
primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers,
and other household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.

ATTY. ZOSA:

xxxx

Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?

A Presently, Sir?

ATTY. ZOSA:

Yes.

A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.

xxxx

ATTY. ZOSA:

Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?

A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.

Q How much other expenses do you incur?

WITNESS:

A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.

Q Why do you incur that much amount?

A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to
straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now.
Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go
marketing because for my age, I cannot carry anymore heavy loads.

xxxx

ATTY. FLORES:

xxxx

Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?

A Yes, for the food alone.

Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver,
am I correct?

A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.

Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?

A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.

Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something between P3,000.00 to
P4,000.00. That’s quite…

A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another which I will give a compensation of P5,000.00.

xxxx

Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?

A My clothing.

COURT:
 How about the schooling for your children?

WITNESS:

A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.

COURT:

Everything?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you would like to add so I
can tell my client, the defendant.

WITNESS:

A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three
(3) times a week.

Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?

A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins
from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.

Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for the operation of that
scoliotic?

A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost P60,000.00 and the other eyes P75,000.00.

Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?
A Yes.

xxxx

Q You talk of therapy?

A Yes.

Q So how much is that?

A Around P5,000.00 a week. 21

As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner
who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested during the same
hearing that respondent was willing to grant the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for
the children and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show
how much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter
altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly support
offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However,
since the supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint
and registration documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and
siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite to P115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by
both parties.

Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he
deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two
cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained
that the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two children’s
monthly support.

The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by
receipts22:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Car purchases for Angelli
- Php1,350,000.00
Suzanne
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli
- 51,232.50
Suzanne
Credit card statements of Daniel
- 348,682.28
Ryan
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel
- 118,960.52
Ryan
TOTAL - Php2,482,348.16
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting
that the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner
and the children23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15
Credit card purchases of Angelli Suzanne 408,891.08
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli Suzanne 87,112.70
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64

GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in
equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and
the two children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for
their children.

We reverse in part the decision of the CA.

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:

(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be supported
from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.

(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a
child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary
to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate employment, and
that spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative financial resources of the
spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each spouse;
(6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-making, child care, education,
and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional conditions
of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking into account that spouse’s earning
capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just
and equitable.

(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the spouse.

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership.

Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the
support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the necessities of the recipient.

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the
child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-
monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.

The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in
settling the support in arrears.

On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant the following
rulings by US courts.

In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his
child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the
arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him to
the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the
suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband
(appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for
an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody
of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any
relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will
meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not
be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to
the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah
1935). In the latter case the court said in part: “The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been
made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We
do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs.
Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother
will not give them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not
treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress.”26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a divorce decree to
make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the
children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his
indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the
support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he
cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon,
supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting
such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs,
supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be
allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended
primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis
therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente
lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein
respondent to pay the support in arrears “less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support,” the deductions should be limited to those basic needs
and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from
the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the
respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important,
it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by
the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to
petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children
via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support
to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon
the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of
defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it
nevertheless held that considering respondent’s financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support
for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses
of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for
various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount
of more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay
the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of
P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent,
be fixed as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the
household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of
P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred Thirty-Five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the conduct of
such operation. Likewise, this monthly support of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof
that the trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof
submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by
him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods)
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
228,869.38
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due
administration of justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.33

Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court,
which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondent’s act was not contumacious
considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that
respondent continued shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping
with the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon
equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.

Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because she presently
maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending
money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business
earning their own salaries.

Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the
assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu
City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled “Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:

i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in
arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction
aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.”
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.