GUJARAT MARITIME UNIVERSITY

CAMPUS GNLU, GANDHINAGAR, GUJARAT

www.gujaratmaritimeuniversity.in

THE LAW OF WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

PROJECT ON

“COMPETITION POLICY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE WTO

DEBATE
”

17, OCTOBER, 2019

Submitted by,

Siddharth Pandey

(GMU 2019 1219)

Project Submitted to,

Prof. Dr. Udayakumara Ramakrishna B.N.

(Faculty)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

 CHAPTER 2: ISSUES OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE WTO DEBATE

2.1: ISSUES RAISED IN THE WTO DEBATES

 CHAPTER 3: HARMONISATION OF COMPETITION LAWS OF

NATIONS TO PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

3.1: PROMOTING MARKET ACCESS FOR IMPORTS

3.2: PREVENTING ABUSE OF ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES

3.3: PREVENTING ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

 CHAPTER 4: SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE

WTO DEBATE

 CONCLUSION

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Trade has been one of the primary factors that have played a fundamental role in the
development of civilization. Theorists have coined new theories and concepts to increase trade,
commerce and profits. With time it has grown more and more intricate and complex, with the
inclusion of additional knowledge, methods and practices of trade. Starting with the fundamental
theory of mercantilism, Adam Smith’s Classical Theory of Economics, Theory of Comparative
Advantage to the balance of a laissez faire and protectionist economy, promoted by John Stuart
Mill, theories and practices of trade have abounded, and gone through a lot of transmutations.
But the essential principle in every one of these theories is ensuring the profits of the country
concerned, and preventing their economies from exploitation and expanding their trade to newer
markets. Exploitation would not occur in that environment where there is a code of conduct or
standards of behaviour laid down. Also access to newer markets occurs when there is an ethical
mode of functioning. This is where competition laws of different countries have come into the
picture. There can be no standard unless it’s the same everywhere and for everyone. This has
lead to the debate over the formulation and adoption of a global competition policy.

This project seeks to outline the international political and economic activities which have
shaped the competition policies at the international level. The issues of competition policy in the
international context and the debates in WTO with respect to this, has been dealt with in Part 2 of
the project. The international scenario would obviously have an effect on domestic legislations of
any economy. Part 3 of the project gives a brief outline of the evolution of competition policies
in India, along with the need for changes in the MRTP Act, 1969. Part 4 analyses and discusses
the Indian Competition Act, 2002 in a detailed manner, apart from elucidating upon its salient
features. In Part 5 I have concluded the project with a few observations of mine and need for
changes in certain sectors of the Competition Act.

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 CHAPTER 2: ISSUES OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT AND THE WTO DEBATE

The idea of an international competition policy figured for the first time in 1946, in the Havana
Charter, which had laid the ground work for the establishment of the International Trade
Organisation [ITO]. Article 46 of the Havana Charter had stated “Each member shall take
appropriate measures and to cooperate with the organisation to prevent, on the part of private or
public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which restrain
competition, limit access to markets or foster monopolistic growth…”. The ITO never came into
existence due to opposition from the United States of America [USA], and the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [GATT], which was the progeny of the Havana Charter never
dealt with competition policies. So the idea of establishing the ITO was disbanded and the
opportunity for developing a new competition policy was also shelved. 1 There had been frequent
complaints by the developing countries about the Restrictive Business Practices [RBPs] of Multi
National Enterprises [MNEs] in the 1950s and 1960s, at the GATT, UN and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], but all to no avail as the developed
countries were against taking any measures controlling or regulating the same. Finally the
UNCTAD “Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices” [UNCTAD RBP] was adopted in the 1980s. But this was retained
as a non-binding instrument, despite calls for making it binding by the developing countries, due
to the opposition of the advanced countries in making it binding, as a result of which the
UNCTAD RBP did not have much of an impact on the competition policies at the international
level.

The WTO discussed competition policies related issues for the first time in the Singapore
Ministerial Conference, 1996, where the link between trade and competition policies were
discussed, among other issues. But there were several oppositions from the developed countries
regarding the issues discussed in the Singapore Ministerial, which contributed to the collapse of

1 Aditya Bhattacharjea, Trade and Competition Policy (Nov. 2004), p. 4, available at http://icrier.org/pdf/wp146.pdf, (last visited
on 5th Sept. 2008).

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the Cancun Round in 2003 and the formal dropping of the discussions of competition policies in
the working plan of the Doha Round of negotiations, by the General Council, after its meeting in
Geneva in 2004.

2.1: ISSUES RAISED IN THE WTO DEBATES

The Singapore Ministerial had set-up a working group for each of the issues discussed in the
conference – Relationship between trade and competition, relationship between trade and
investment, trade facilitation and transparency in government procurement. The agenda for the
Working Group on Trade and Competition Policies [WGTCP] was to “study the issues raised by
the Members relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-
competitive practices, in order to identify any other areas that may merit further consideration in
the WTO framework.”2 Each of the working groups was to draw upon each others’ resources for
their work, apart from using the resource material of the UNCTAD. The General Council was in
charge of reviewing the functioning of all the groups.3

The WGTCP submitted six reports which reported the stand and arguments of the various
Members regarding the competition policy framework, with no breakthrough as to what policies
can be adopted. The conclusion was clear that none of the Members wanted a Multilateral
Agreement on Competition [MAC] under the aegis of the WTO. Subsequently a development-
friendly tone was rendered to the discussions in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, where it was
declared that “full account shall be taken of the needs of the developing countries and least-
developed country participants and appropriate flexibility provided to address them.” 4 There
were several discussions on the MAC and a lot of academic literature emerged out of this, but the
adoption of the MAC and all discussions about the same was finally discarded after the
breakdown of the Ministerial talks at Cancun in 2003. The development of the concept of MAC,
the discussions on it and the reasons for failure of talks shall be dealt with in a detailed manner
as follows.

2 Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996) WT/ MIN (96) / DEC, Para. 20, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (last visited on 10th October 2019)
3 Bhattacharjea, Supra note 2 at p. 6
4 Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) WT/ MIN (01) / DEC / 1, Paras. 23-25, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/doha/mindec.pdf (last visited on 10th Sept. 2008)

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 CHAPTER 3: HARMONISATION OF COMPETITION LAWS OF NATIONS TO
PROMOTE FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The competition laws of nations normally have three main components. They prohibit anti-
competitive agreements, including joint ventures, monopoly or abuse of dominance, and anti-
competitive mergers. In the category of anti-competitive agreements, jurisdictions normally
prohibit cartels, which are agreements among competitors not to compete on terms of trade such
as price or output, and agreements to divide markets. In some cases, the laws enable the
competition authorities to identify or limit anti-competitive practices of state or local
government. While all competition / antitrust laws have some prohibitions against cartels, the
laws of different nations diverge on whether cartels are prohibited per se only when
unreasonable, and to the extent of exceptions and exemptions. For most other acts, practices,
contracts and transactions, laws may differ on the conception of what anti-competitive means,
and whether and to what extent anti-competitive measures may be justified by efficiencies or by
non-market values, such as health and safety, ethics and industrial policy (e.g., Protecting jobs).
The debate on what is anti-competitive reflects a significant divergence in various national
antitrust policies.5Working assumptions are often involved; e.g., the assumptions that markets
tend to work well and government antitrust intervention tends to be inefficient and impose costs,
or the counter-assumptions that private power tends to impair the working of markets and
government intervention is helpful in removing the impediments. Most – but not all – nations
accept the mandate to protect efficient competition and disavow a goal to protect competitors;
but even so nations disagree about how to reach this goal. The controversy is well illustrated in
the jurisprudence of the US and the European Union [EU] on the law of monopoly and abuse of
dominance regarding exclusionary practices and duties to deal. US case law reflects the
presumption that freedom to deal or not, aligns with the interests of the consumers. 6 EU case law
presumes that openness of and access to markets align with the interests of the consumers, and

5 Eleanor M. Fox, World Competition Law – Conflicts, Convergence, Cooperation , p.238, from “Competition Law Today –
Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice” (2007), Edited by Vinod Dhall, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
6 Id. cited Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)

6
unlike US law, imposes duties of special responsibility on dominant firms not to exclude rivals
unnecessarily.7

The US and the EU models are the two principal antitrust models in the world. Nations,
especially newer antitrust jurisdictions, tend to gravitate towards one or the other. Also, its often
asserted that developing countries have special needs and interests that may influence the shape
of their antitrust laws. These ‘special and differential’ needs are seldom articulated, except that
the claim is made that if an international regime is adopted, developing countries should not be
subjected to the same obligations as developed countries (e.g., to open their markets to incoming
trade), and that the effective date of obligations should be delayed.8

In any case, MNCs have to follow different national laws relating to environment, labour,
taxation, product standards, etc., although the MNCs are more willing to invest in those nations
with some competition law rather than no competition law, as the scope for political arbitrariness
is much reduced in those nations. However, there isn’t much of a solution for a cross-border
merger where the merger is accepted by the law of one nation and prohibited by another. Some
compromises have to be made by the concerned Competition Authorities of the two countries.
For example, the mergers between the US firms Boeing and McDonnell Douglas and between
General Electric and Honeywell was accepted by the US, but opposed by the EU. Similarly, the
merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz was approved by the EU, but opposed by the US.9 The
UNCTAD, the OECD and the International Competition Network [ICN] (an association of
national competition authorities) have been working on procedures to handle such cul-de-sacs in
the future. However, this may not be included in the WGTCP as it was not included in the
revised list of activities in the Doha Declaration.10

7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Bhattacharjea, Supra note 1, p. 7
10 Id. p.8

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3.1: PROMOTING MARKET ACCESS FOR IMPORTS
The second pillar of the MAC was promoting market access in all countries. The EU had also
advocated a similar policy and that was its primary agenda behind bringing competition policies
to the WTO and making it an international code. It made this move from its own experience of
abolishing private trade barriers, for restriction on movement of goods, among its member
countries and which contributed to the abolition of official restrictions on trade between them.11
On a global although government-imposed trade restrictions have reduced under the aegis of the
WTO, there is the apprehension that private RBPs would always restrict the access of foreign
firms to new markets through the blocking of distribution channels, or import cartels, etc. In one
of the earliest WGTCP meeting in 1998, India had complained of being precluded from
participating in the Basel Jewellery and Watch Auction, and Dutch flower festival.12 Japanese
business groups have often been accused of import cartels and practicing other RBPs by the US
Courts, as in the famous Kodak-Fuji case in 1998, where the US had taken the Japanese
Government to a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel [DSP] on the ground that some of the market
access concessions given by Japan was violative of the National Treatment principal. Although
the DSP did not rule in favour of US, the panel did investigate the allegations of the US and
ruled in favour of Japan.13 Similarly in the recent, 2004 Telmex case, where the US had initiated
action against Mexico before the WTO for restricting access to US Telecom companies, by not
containing an import cartel functioning in Mexico, in the telecom sector, which adversely
affected the US Telecom companies. The panel ruled in favour of the US telecom companies and
ordered Mexico to take action against the import cartel.14

Recently, the EU has changed its focus away from market access for the promotion of MAC.
Whereas the US has started emphasizing more on the competition-related clauses in the bilateral
trade agreements that it enters into with other countries, for market access. For example, the US
uses the Structural Impediments Initiative with Japan to promote market access.15 The US is not

11 Id.
12 Communication from India, WT/WGTCP/W/11 (Nov. 1998), available at http://commerce.nic.in/wto_sub/CP/sub_cp111.htm
(last visited on 10th Sept. 2008).
13 The International Economics Study Centre (1998), available at http://internationalecon.com/wto/ch2.php (last visited on 10th
Sept. 2008)
14 Bhattacharjea, Supra note 1, p. 9
15 Id.

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apprehensive of restriction of access to the market of India, to US firms as the United States
Trade Representative’s report so succinctly puts that RBPs are rampantly practiced by private
and public enterprises in India, with little governmental action against the same. These practices
do not affect the access of American firms to India, adversely in any manner. The US is more
concerned about the market access restrictions imposed by the Indian Competition Authority,
rather than the restrictions that emerge as a result of RBPs.16

3.2: PREVENTING ABUSE OF ANTI-DUMPING PROCEDURES

The Uruguay Round on Anti-dumping has allowed Member countries to impose anti-dumping
tariffs, if they can prove that goods are being dumped in their markets. Alternately, agreements
can be signed by exporters that they shall not export products at prices much below the market
value, which may affect the industries in another country. But such anti-dumping measures have
often been misused by stating flimsy reasons for imposing the same.

Countries have also tried to determine ways of containing predatory pricing practices of MNCs
as well, which is supposed to be more rigorous than anti-dumping duties. In predatory pricing
private enterprises sell their products at such low prices in the market, incurring a loss
themselves, such that all competitors are killed, until there comes a time when they attain
monopoly position in the market. So curbing predatory pricing is supposed to protect
competition and not the competitors, unlike the anti-dumping laws. But in world market where
there are a lot of competitors, it is unlikely for a particular enterprise to attain monopoly position.
Even if predatory pricing is found to occur, the antitrust remedy for predatory pricing is an
injunction and a fine, which doesn’t have the anti-competitive consequences of price
undertakings or anti-dumping duties. So replacing lax anti-dumping laws with laws curbing
predatory pricing would technically help prevent abuse of anti-dumping laws. But practice has
been very different. In 2000, the DSP adopted a resolution to adopt stringent laws curbing
predatory pricing in place of anti-dumping laws17, but it met with stiff opposition from EU the
US, who were then the most recent and active users of anti-dumping laws.

16 Id.
17 Minutes of the Working Group meeting, July 1998, WT/WGTCP/M/5, Paras. 38, 48 & 49, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/162ra1.doc (last visited on 10th Sept. 2008).

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Ironically even developing countries are opposed to the above resolution, even though they
complain about the abuse of anti-dumping laws by the developed countries. India, being one of
the most vociferous critics of developed countries for abusing anti-dumping laws has one of the
highest records of abusing anti-dumping laws itself. A recent study, applies statistical filters used
in the EU and the US, to determine the number of cases that could have justified as legitimate
use of predatory pricing laws in India, and the study found that only five out of 92 cases passed
the test. In the rest of the cases, anti-dumping laws were found to have been applied to protect
Indian industries.18 So the anti-dumping regime has actually harmed competition and aggregate
employment rather than protected competition. But with developed and developing countries
playing the same game, reforming usage of anti-dumping laws seems to be off the agenda of
WTO.

3.3: PREVENTING ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Intellectual Property Rights [IPRs] is, many times, almost like giving monopolistic license to the
IPR holder. There has been an increasing tendency for large corporations to cross-license their
patented products to each other, with conditions of not sharing it with anyone else, effectively
creating cartel- like arrangements, without an explicit cartel agreement. Other RBPs would
include mandating the licensee to buy an input only from the patent-holder, not to deal with the
products of rivals and making improvements to the patented product and selling it to the patent-
holder alone and not others.

Also, most of the patent-holders are concentrated in the developed countries, so developing
countries are worried about the restriction in access to new medicines or seeds, the patent-rights
for which are concentrated in a few MNCs of developed countries. The developing countries are
also concerned about the protection of their ‘traditional knowledge’, like the use of different
medicinal herbs for various purposes, and prevent their exploitation by MNCs of the developed
countries.

Several discussions have taken place in this regard, to dilute the IPR protection for different
products in the WGTCP, but the discussion has not gone far, with the developed countries firm
on their stand of maintaining the high IPR protection for patented products. Certain concessions

18 Bhattacharjea, supra note 1, p. 10.

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were made with respect to granting licenses to manufacturers of developing countries to
manufacture certain patented medicines, which they have the capacity to produce, just before the
Cancun Ministerial in 2003.19 Developing countries are however, still vulnerable to IPR abuse
with respect to other products.

CHAPTER 4: SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO DEBATE

The WGTCP discussions during the first few years of its existence were diffused and non-
converging. Faced with a lack of consensus on so many issues, the Doha Declaration of the 2001
Ministerial Conference of the WTO limited further discussion at the WGTCP to the issue of
hard-core cartels; application of the fundamental WTO principles of nondiscrimination,
transparency and procedural fairness in competition policy; capacity building in developing
countries; and voluntary cooperation between Members.20 The EU modified its position to press
for a MAC that would require Members to enact and enforce (possibly on a regional basis) a
national competition law incorporating the fundamental principles. Such a law should at least
prohibit hard core cartels, which were to be clearly defined, with any exemptions being well-
defined and transparent. Countries would have to provide deterrent sanctions in their domestic
competition regimes, and take on obligations that would be subject to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism, but these would be limited to the de jure consistency of their laws and
regulations with the agreed framework. De facto implementation of these laws in practice, or the
outcome of specific cases, would not be subject to review, according to the modified EU
position. Transitional periods and technical assistance were offered for developing countries to
enable them to comply with the proposed agreement.21 Underlying the position of the EU and
most developed countries was the presumption that vigorous competition is undeniably a good
thing, and that government policy should be geared towards promoting it.

19 Id.
20 Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 4, Paras. 23-28.
21 Communications from the EU and its member States, (2002), WT/WGTCP/W/193 & WT/WGTCP/W/222, available at
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/wg/wt_wgtcp_w_193.pdf &
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/wg/wt_wgtcp_w_222.pdf, (last visited on 11th Sept. 2008).

11
While acknowledging the harm caused by international cartels, India and many other developing
countries emphasized the need to respect their diversity in terms of stages of development, socio-
economic circumstances, legal frameworks, and cultural norms. They opposed a “one size fits
all” agreement, and drew attention to the dangers of transplanting a competition policy
framework that has evolved over many years in industrial countries into economies lacking in
experience, expertise, and institutional memory. Several developing countries claimed that
development required giving greater priority to policy objectives other than promotion of
competition, and questioned virtually every specific proposal advanced by the proponents,
including the necessity of applying the fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination,
transparency and procedural fairness to competition policy. While they acknowledged the
importance of transparency and procedural fairness, they raised concerns about the financial and
administrative burdens they would have to incur in implementing an agreement which enshrined
developed country standards. The developing countries were also worried about whether they
would receive the kind of assistance that they require from the Competition Authorities of the
developed countries to enforce their competition laws. Overall, the developing countries were
reluctant to enter into the idea of competition policies and their implementation as they had so
little experience in the same, and make them more vulnerable than what they are.22

Due to the irreconcilable differences between the developed and developing countries, a MAC
was not very likely. The developing countries suggested a peer review mode of assessment,
where all Member countries would review the functioning of competition Authorities of every
other country and ensure that they all toed the line, with respect to competition policies. But
other developing countries were apprehensive about this because there was no delineation on the
aspect of who would undertake the review, in what bases and criteria would the review be
undertaken and others.

As late as February 2003, the EU was continuing to insist that according to the Doha declaration
negotiations on all the four Singapore issues “will commence after Cancun”, and that they “are a
key element of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda] and part and parcel of the Single
Undertaking”. Only clarification of modalities of the negotiations remained to be worked out.
However, some new signs of flexibility were apparent. The EU also held open the possibility that

22 Bhattacharjea, supra note 2, p. 16.

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the discussion on modalities on a MAC could include exemptions from the ‘core’ principle of
nondiscrimination; differential levels of commitment and implementation periods for developing
countries; and even “how and in what timeframe (or even whether) WTO Members or certain
categories of WTO Members would assume some or all of the obligations resulting from these
agreements”.23

According to Bhattacharya, the newly conciliatory position could well have been a ploy to
induce wavering developing countries to agree to the commencement of negotiations, with the
EU hardening its stance once they were under way. But ultimately, the developing countries’
opposition to any negotiations towards a MAC, along with disputes over agriculture and the
other Singapore issues, came to a head in September 2003 at the Cancun Ministerial, which
ended with no consensus.24 On the eve of the Ministerial, several developing countries, led by
India, formally protested that their views on the Singapore Issues had been bypassed in
consultations and had not been reflected in the draft of the Ministerial declaration. 25 Their
statement listed several points which they felt had not been adequately addressed and required
further clarification in the Working Group. Most of these are discussed at various points in this
monograph. At Cancun itself, the EU showed a willingness to unbundle the Singapore Issues and
drop competition policy from the agenda, but subsequently it continued to raise the possibility of
introducing it in some other form. In the Framework Agreement that was reached in July 2004,
the WTO General Council formally dropped three of the four Singapore Issues, including
competition policy, from the Doha altogether,26 but the debate is likely to continue outside the
WTO, and competition policy may well be reintroduced in the WTO after completion of the
Doha round. Policymakers and the emerging “competition community” in India should therefore
remain engaged with the issues. This process should also contribute to improving the
effectiveness of the new Competition Act.

23 Comments on the EC Communication WT/GC/W/491, WT/GC/W/501, (2003), available at

http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/08/wtgcw501.doc (last visited on 11th Sept. 2008).
24 Bhattacharjea, supra note 1, p. 17.
25 Communication from Bangladesh on Behalf of the LDC Group (4th Sept. 2003), WT/MIN(03/W/4, available at
http://www.wtocenter.org.tw/SmartKMS/fileviewer?id=5704 (last visited on 11th Sept. 2008).
26 Doha Development Agenda (1st Aug. 2004) WT/L/579, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm (last visited on 11th Sept. 2008).

13
 CONCLUSION

The ultimate result of all these discussion has been that there would be no MAC in the
foreseeable future. The developing countries have not been able to make a headway in those
competition issues with which they were most concerned, like the curbing of hard-core cartels.
Although the proponents of MAC have not been able to develop and introduce the same, fifty
new developing countries have adopted new competition laws in their countries over the last
decade, which is one step closer to the future of a global MAC.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources:
Books:

 Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and et. al., The World Trade
Organization- Law, Practice and Policy (Oxford University Press, New York, 2nd
edn., 2006).
 Surendra Bhandari, World Trade Organisation and Developing Countries (Deep &
Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001).

Secondary sources:

Articles:

 Bryan Mercurio and Mitali Tyagi, “Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute

Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working
Requirements”, 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 275 (Summer, 2010).
 Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, “WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Missing Developed Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector”, available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/200505bown.pdf (Visited on October 2,
2011)
 Aditya Bhattacharjea, Trade and Competition Policy (Nov. 2004), p. 4, available at

14
 http://icrier.org/pdf/wp146.pdf, (last visited on 5th Sept. 2008).
 Singapore Ministerial Declaration (1996) WT/ MIN (96) / DEC, Para. 20,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm
(last visited on 29th July 2008)
 Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) WT/ MIN (01) / DEC / 1, Paras. 23-25,
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/doha/mindec.pdf (last visited on 10th
Sept. 2008)
 Eleanor M. Fox, World Competition Law – Conflicts, Convergence, Cooperation ,
p.238, from “Competition Law Today – Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice”
(2007), Edited by Vinod Dhall, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press).
 Communication from India, WT/WGTCP/W/11 (Nov. 1998), available at
http://commerce.nic.in/wto_sub/CP/sub_cp111.htm (last visited on 10th Sept.
2008).
 The International Economics Study Centre (1998), available at
http://internationalecon.com/wto/ch2.php (last visited on 10th Sept. 2008)
 Communications from the EU and its member States, (2002), WT/WGTCP/W/193
& WT/WGTCP/W/222, available at
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/wg/wt_wgtcp_w_193.pdf (last visited
on 11th Sept. 2008).
 Comments on the EC Communication WT/GC/W/491, WT/GC/W/501, (2003),
available at http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/08/wtgcw501.doc (last visited on 11th
Sept. 2008).

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