DONATION 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware
G.R. No. 194199. March 22, 2017.*
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS
RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., petitioner, vs. BODEGA
GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; The essence of
an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully recover the
property through lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting
possession of the property from its current occupant.—Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. These actions are summary proceedings and are devised to
provide for a particular remedy for a very specific issue. Actions for
unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of actual
possession. In these actions, courts are asked to ascertain which
between the parties has the right to the possession de facto or physical
possession of the property in question. Its purpose is to restore the
aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully establishes his
or her right to possess the property. The essence of an ejectment suit
is for the rightful possessor to lawfully recover the property through
lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting possession of the property
from its current occupant. Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or
forcible entry is a summary proceeding and is an expeditious means to
recover possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts
may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining who has
the better right of possession. Any ruling involving ownership is not final
and binding. It is merely provisional and does not bar an action between
the same parties regarding the title of the property.
Same; Same; Unlawful Detainer; Words and Phrases; Unlawful
detainer refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property
initially obtained possession lawfully. This possession only became
unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a
contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.—An action for
unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
296
dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current occupant
of the property initially obtained possession lawfully. This possession
only became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which
may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdictional Facts Which Must be Alleged
and Established in an Action for Unlawful Detainer.—An action for
unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key
jurisdictional facts: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Civil Law; Donations; Revocation; The Supreme Court (SC) has
affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in
the case of De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA 150, promulgated in 1990.—
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause
in donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA 150,
promulgated in 1990. We explained the nature of automatic revocation
clauses by first identifying the three categories of donation. In De
Luna, we said that a donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous.
A donation is simple when the cause is the donor’s pure liberality. It is
remuneratory when the donor “gives something to reward past or future
services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of
said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the
donation.” A donation is onerous when it is “subject to burdens,
charges, or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the
thing donated x x x.” This Court found that the donation in De Luna was
onerous as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a
kindergarten. We then went on to explain that an onerous donation is
governed by the law on contracts and not by the law on donations. It is
within this context that this Court found an automatic revocation clause
as valid.
Same; Contracts; Rescission; An automatic rescission clause
effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without need of any judi-
297
 VOL. 821, MARCH 22, 2017 297
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware
cial declaration.—We explained in De Luna v. Abrigo, 181 SCRA
150 (1990), that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties “to
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.”In contracts law, parties may
agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a contract
unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an onerous
donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of
contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the
Philippines v. De los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 (1970), and Angeles v.
Calasanz, 135 SCRA 323 (1985),where we held that an automatic
rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract upon breach without
need of any judicial declaration.
Actions; Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right
of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it.—As petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted
back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner
sources its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of
the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
Civil Law; Lease; While a lessor need not be the owner of the
property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to
lease it out.—This right of possession prevails over Bodega’s claim
which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA’s
act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated
in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the
automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an
owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to
Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property leased,
he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out. None
exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis for its continued possession
of the property.
Same; Donations; Revocation; The breach of the condition in the
donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to
formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only
becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety
298
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Bodega Glassware
of the revocation.—We cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that
the petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the
property, and that petitioner’s action has prescribed since it did not file
the action within 10 years. This reveals a failure to understand the
nature of a donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of
repetition, the breach of the condition in the donation causes the
automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the
donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary
if the donee questions the propriety of the revocation. Even then,
judicial intervention is required to merely confirm and not order the
revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file
an action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation,
no court action is necessary.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Unlawful
Detainer; Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking
to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the action
for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.—As
owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its
possession. The petitioner’s action for ejectment is anchored on this
right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party
seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must file
the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to
vacate. This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to
comply with in this case. The records show that the petitioner served
its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for
ejectment on March 13, 2008 or around four months from the last
demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Provincial Legal Officer for petitioner.
Guzman & Associates for respondent.
The Case
This is a verified petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Province of Camarines Sur
(petitioner) challenging the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on May 31, 2010 (assailed Decision) and its Resolution3
dated October 12, 2010 (assailed Resolution). The assailed Decision
affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 26 (RTC Naga City), which in tum, reversed the ruling5 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 2 (MTC Naga City) in the
action for ejectment filed by the petitioner against respondent Bodega
Glassware (Bodega).
The Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia,
Naga City under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22.6 On
September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G.
Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel
of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA)
through a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation).7 The
Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause which
states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the
above-described portion of land subject of the present donation for no
other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and
to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to
be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in
connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the
Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High
School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the
DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein
donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any
party and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one
(1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this
donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and of no
further force and effect.8
CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of
law and complied with the conditions stated in the deed. However, on
August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with
Bodega over the donated property.9 Under the Contract of Lease,
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years
commencing on September 1, 1995 and ending on September 15,
2015. Bodega took actual possession of the property on September 1,
1995.10
Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the
Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega regarding the building it
built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer requested Bodega
to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal basis
for his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless,
petitioner left Bodega undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession
of the property.11
On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega dated
October 4, 2007.12 In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner.13
As it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects,
petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender
its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with the
demand.14
Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F.
Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of
Donation15 (Deed of Revocation) dated October 14, 2007. It asserted
that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation when it
leased the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic
revocation clause in the Deed of Donation, petitioner revoked,
annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation.16 It appears from
the record that CASTEA never challenged this revocation.
On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer
against Bodega before the MTC Naga City. It prayed that Bodega be
ordered to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner its peaceful
possession. Petitioner also prayed for the payment of P15,000 a
month from October 2007 until Bodega vacates the land.17
In a Decision18 dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City ruled
in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and
to pay P15,000 a month as reasonable compensation.19 The
dispositive portion of this Decision states:
Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered, plaintiff having
established by preponderance of evidence its cause of action against
the defendant, the latter is ordered:
1)
To immediately vacate and surrender to plaintiff, Province of
Camarines Sur, the peaceful possession of the portion of the land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22 registered in the name
of the plaintiff with an area of Six Hundred (600) square meters
subject of the lease contract executed by CASTEA in favor of the
herein defendant dated 7 September 1995 where the defendants (sic)
building is constructed, and,
2)
[T]o pay plaintiff the amount of Php15,000.00 a month from date of
judicial demand until it vacates the subject properties as reasonable
compensation for the use of the same.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against defendant.20
Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed
it in a Decision21 dated May 13, 2009. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE premises considered, the decision of the court a quo is
hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered DISMISSING
the above case for failure of the plaintiff to present evidence to sustain
its cause of action[.]22
The petitioner then went up on appeal to the CA which rendered the
now assailed Decision. The CA disposed of the appeal thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated May 13, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Naga City is hereby AFFIRMED.23
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga
City that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the
property. The CA explained that Bodega 's possession of the property
is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA, in tum,
claims ownership of the property by virtue of the Deed of Donation.
According to the CA, while petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated
the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic revocation
clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of
the property against CASTEA. The CA theorized that judicial
intervention is necessary to ascertain if the automatic revocation
clause suffices to declare the donation revoked. In support of its
argument, the CA cited the ruling of this Court in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals.24
The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed.
According to it, Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code applies in this case.
Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for reconveyance from
the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As the Contract of Lease
was entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years
from this date to file the action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful
detainer was filed more than 12 years later. Further, the CA added
that even the revocation of the donation was done beyond the 10-year
prescriptive period. The CA also denied petitioner ' s motion for
reconsideration.25
Petitioner filed this verified petition for review on certiorari challenging
the assailed Decision. It argues that the CA wrongly applied the
doctrine in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. It asserts that the
assailed Decision in fact categorically stated that in donations
containing an automatic revocation clause, judicial intervention is not
necessary for the purpose of effectively revoking the donation. Such a
revocation is valid subject to judicial intervention only when its
propriety is challenged in court.26
In its comment, Bodega anchors its right of possession on its Contract
of Lease with CASTEA. It insists that the Contract of Lease is valid
because CASTEA is the owner of the property. The automatic
revocation clause did not immediately revoke the donation in the
absence of a judicial declaration. It also agrees with the CA that the
petitioner's action has already prescribed.27
The Issues
The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and Bodega has
the right to the actual physical possession of the property. The
resolution of this issue requires us to look into the basis of their claims
of possession. Essential to this is the determination of the effect of the
automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation. We note,
however, that an action for unlawful detainer pertains only to the issue
of possession de facto or actual possession. Thus while we may rule
on the basis of the parties' claims of possession—which, in the case
of the petitioner, involves an assertion of ownership—this
determination is only provisional and done solely to settle the question
of possession .
The Ruling of the Court
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. These actions are summary proceedings
and are devised to provide for a particular remedy for a very specific
issue. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the
question of actual possession.28 In these actions, courts are asked to
ascertain which between the parties has the right to the possession
de facto or physical possession of the property in question.29 Its
purpose is to restore the aggrieved party to possession if he or she
successfully establishes his or her right to possess the property. The
essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully
recover the property through lawful means instead of unlawfully
wresting possession of the property from its current occupant.30
Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary
proceeding and is an expeditious means to recover possession. If the
parties raise the issue of ownership, courts may only pass upon that
issue for the purpose of ascertaining who has the better right of
possession.31 Any ruling involving ownership is not final and binding.
It is merely provisional and does not bar an action between the same
parties regarding the title of the property.32
An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific
circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a situation where the
current occupant of the property initially obtained possession
lawfully.33 This possession only became unlawful due to the
expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or
implied, or by mere tolerance.34
An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following
key jurisdictional facts:
(1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2)
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4)
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.35
When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of
possession alleges that the opposing party occupied the subject
property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts
of tolerance established.36 Further, the party seeking possession
must identify the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily
present evidence establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked
Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for occupying the property.
Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years,
petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to
continue using its building and conducting business on the property.
Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property in November
2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere
tolerance.
Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its
ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on its position that the property
reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as
provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.
We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the
purpose of ascertaining who between petitioner and Bodega has the
right to possess the property.
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause
in donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo37 promulgated in 1990.
We explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses by first
identifying the three categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a
donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous. A donation is
simple when the cause is the donor's pure liberality. It is remuneratory
when the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or
because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said
services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation."38
A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or
future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated
x x x."39 This Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous
as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a
kindergarten. We then went on to explain that an onerous donation is
governed by the law on contracts and not by the law on donations. It
is within this context that this Court found an automatic revocation
clause as valid.
We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the
parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses , terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy."40 In contracts
law, parties may agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind
a contract unilaterally. This is akin to an automatic revocation clause
in an onerous donation. The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in
the field of contracts law therefore applies in an automatic revocation
clause.
Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the
Philippines v. De los Angeles41 and Angeles v. Calasanz42 where we
held that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the
contract upon breach without need of any judicial declaration.
In University of the Philippines, this Court held that a party to a
contract with an automatic rescission clause, who believes that there
has been a breach warranting rescission, may consider the contract
rescinded without previous court action. Speaking through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, we said:
x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting party
who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment
before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the
party injured by the other's breach will have to passively sit and watch
its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final
judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he
should exercise due diligence to minimize its own damages x x x.43
We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the
extrajudicial rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the
rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the issue
becomes necessary.
Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna
that:
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for
rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.44
While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations
with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this doctrine to
apply to donations inter vivos in general in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila. We explained in this case that Article 732 of the
Civil Code states that the general provisions on obligations and
contracts shall govern donations inter vivos in all matters not
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Title III has no explicit
provisions for instances where a donation has an automatic
revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law regarding
automatic rescission of contracts as well as the jurisprudence
explaining it find suppletory application. We then reiterated in Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a donation has an automatic
revocation clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the
parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider
the donation revoked without need of any judicial action. A judicial
finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other
party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the
propriety of the revocation. Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x x x
the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation,
but it is not in itself the revocatory act."45 We also explained in this
case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions arising from an
automatic revocation clause in donations, the general provisions on
prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764—which provides
for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the
donation in case of breach of a condition—governs an instance where
the deed of donation does not contain an automatic revocation
clause.46

We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D.
Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas.47 We once again held that
if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion
in case of a breach of a condition and the donee violates it or fails to
comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts back to the
donor without need of any judicial declaration. It is onl y when the
donee denies the rescission or challenges its propriety that the court
can intervene to conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper.
This was also the import of our ruling in Zamboanga Barter Traders
Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata.48
In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic
revocation clause. The clause states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the
above-described portion of land subject of the present donation for no
other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and
to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to
be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in
connection with its function s under its charter and by-laws and the
Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High
School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the
DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property here in
donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any
party and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one
(1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this
donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and of no
further force and effect.49
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the
property shall be used for "no other purpose except the construction
of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named
DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur
Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well
as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA
shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated
including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party," and
(3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall
be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the
execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise,
this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x."50 We
read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation
clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and
second conditions.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased
the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the Deed of
Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even
executed a Deed of Revocation. The records show that CASTEA
never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De
Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga
Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the
donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause,
this revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of judicial
intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner
should have first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the
doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders nugatory the
very essence of an automatic revocation clause.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted
back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner
sources its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of
the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is
anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of
leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in
the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the
automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as
an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it
to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property
leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it
out.51 None exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis for its
continued possession of the property.
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to
file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not prescribed.

First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that
Article 764 on the prescription of actions for the revocation of a
donation does not apply in cases where the donation has an
automatic revocation clause.52 This is necessarily so because Article
764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a donation. It
cannot govern cases where a breach of a condition automatically, and
without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner
should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property, and
that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the action
within 10 years. This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a
donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition,
the breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic
revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the donee of
the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the
donee questions the propriety of the revocation. Even then, judicial
intervention is required to merely confinn and not order the revocation.
Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to
speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation, no court
action is necessary.
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to
its possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is anchored on
this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a
party seeking to eject another from a property for unlawful detainer
must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand
to vacate.53 This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound
to comply with in this case. The records show that the petitioner
served its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action
for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or around four months from the last
demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.
We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner.
Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff
for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent
or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to
recover damages, which refer to "rents" or "the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises," or "fair
rental value of the property"54 and attorney's fees and costs. More
specifically, recoverable damages are "those which the plaintiff could
have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of
the use and occupation of the property."55
In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of P15,000 monthly as
damages. Petitioner argued that considering that the Contract of
Lease between CASTEA and Bodega shows that the monthly rent for
the property is P30,000, the amount of P15,000 which it prays for is
fair and reasonable.56 We agree with the petitioner's position. The
amount of rent in the Contract of Lease is evidence of the fair rental
value of the property. That the petitioner asked for half of this amount
as damages is reasonable given the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petltwn is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2010 which AFFIRMED the
Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13, 2009 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC Naga City is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 224307, August 06, 2018
THE MISSIONARY SISTERS OF OUR LADY OF FATIMA (PEACH
SISTERS OF LAGUNA), REPRESENTED BY REV. MOTHER MA.
CONCEPCION R. REALON, ET AL., Petitioners, v. AMANDO V.
ALZONA, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision2
dated January 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 101944, and its Resolution3 dated April 19, 2016, denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision partly
granted the respondents' appeal and set aside the Decision4 dated
August 14, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City,
Branch 92 in Civil Case No. 3250-02-C.
The Antecedent Facts
The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima (petitioner), otherwise
known as the Peach Sisters of Laguna, is a religious and charitable
group established under the patronage of the Roman Catholic Bishop
of San Pablo on May 30, 1989. Its primary mission is to take care of
the abandoned and neglected elderly persons. The petitioner came
into being as a corporation by virtue of a Certificate issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on August 31, 2001.5
Mother Ma. Concepcion R. Realon (Mother Concepcion) is the
petitioner's Superior General.
The respondents, on the other hand, are the legal heirs of the late
Purificacion Y. Alzona (Purificacion).
The facts giving rise to the instant controversy follow:
Purificacion, a spinster, is the registered owner of parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-57820* and T-
162375; and a co-owner of another property covered by TCT No. T-
162380, all of which are located in Calamba City, Laguna.6
In 1996, Purificacion, impelled by her unmaterialized desire to be nun,
decided to devote the rest of her life in helping others. In the same
year, she then became a benefactor of the petitioner by giving support
to the community and its works.7
In 1997, during a doctor's appointment, Purificacion then
accompanied by Mother Concepcion, discovered that she has been
suffering from lung cancer. Considering the restrictions in her
movement, Purificacion requested Mother Concepcion to take care of
her in her house, to which the latter agreed.8
In October 1999, Purificacion called Mother Concepcion and handed
her a handwritten letter dated October 1999. Therein, Purificacion
stated that she is donating her house and lot at F. Mercado Street and
Riceland at Banlic, both at Calamba, Laguna, to the petitioner through
Mother Concepcion. On the same occasion, Purificacion introduced
Mother Concepcion to her nephew, Francisco Del Mundo (Francisco),
and niece, Ma. Lourdes Alzona Aguto-Africa (Lourdes). Purificacion,
instructed Francisco to give a share of the harvest to Mother
Concepcion, and informed Lourdes that she had given her house to
Mother Concepcion.9
Sometime in August 2001, at the request of Purificacion, Mother
Concepcion went to see Atty. Nonato Arcillas (Atty. Arcillas) in Los
Baños, Laguna. During their meeting, Atty. Arcillas asked Mother
Concepcion whether their group is registered with the SEC, to which
the latter replied in the negative. Acting on the advice given by Atty.
Arcillas, Mother Concepcion went to SEC and filed the corresponding
registration application on August 28, 2001.10
On August 29, 2001, Purificacion executed a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos (Deed) in favor of the petitioner, conveying her properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-67820 and T-162375, and her undivided
share in the property covered by TCT No. T-162380. The Deed was
notarized by Atty. Arcillas and witnessed by Purificacion's nephews
Francisco and Diosdado Alzona, and grandnephew, Atty. Fernando
M. Alonzo. The donation was accepted on even date by Mother
Concepcion for and in behalf of the petitioner.11
Thereafter, Mother Concepcion filed an application before the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) that the petitioner be exempted from
donor's tax as a religious organization. The application was granted
by the BIR through a letter dated January 14, 2002 of Acting Assistant
Commissioner, Legal Service, Milagros Regalado.12
Subsequently, the Deed, together with the owner's duplicate copies of
TCT Nos. T-57820, T-162375, and T-162380, and the exemption
letter from the BIR was presented for registration. The Register of
Deeds, however, denied the registration on account of the Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated September 26, 2001 filed by the brother of
Purificacion, respondent Amando Y. Alzona (Amando).13
On October 30, 2001, Purificacion died without any issue, and
survived only by her brother of full blood, Amando, who nonetheless
died during the pendency of this case and is now represented and
substituted by his legal heirs, joined as herein respondents.14
On April 9, 2002, Amando filed a Complaint before the RTC, seeking
to annul the Deed executed between Purificacion and the petitioner,
on the ground that at the time the donation was made, the latter was
not registered with the SEC and therefore has no juridical personality
and cannot legally accept the donation.15
After trial, on August 14, 2013, the RTC rendered its Decision16
finding no merit in the complaint, thus ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED with costs
against the [respondents]. The Compulsory counterclaim of the
[petitioner] is likewise dismissed for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.17
In its decision, the RTC held that all the essential elements of a
donation are present. The RTC set aside the allegation by the
respondents relating to the incapacity of the parties to enter into a
donation.18
In the case of Purificacion, the RTC held that apart from the self-
serving allegations by the respondents, the records are bereft of
evidence to prove that she did not possess the proper mental faculty
in making the donation; as such the presumption that every person is
of sound mind stands.19
On the capacity of the donee, the RTC held that at the time of the
execution of the Deed, the petitioner was a de facto corporation and
as such has the personality to be a beneficiary and has the power to
acquire and possess property. Further then, the petitioner's incapacity
cannot be questioned or assailed in the instant case as it constitutes a
collateral attack which is prohibited by the Corporation Code of the
Philippines.20 In this regard, the RTC found that the recognition by
the petitioner of Mother Concepcion's authority is sufficient to vest the
latter of the capacity to accept the donation.21
Acting on the appeal filed by the respondents, the CA rendered the
herein assailed Decision22 on January 7, 2016, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
August 14, 2013 Decision of the RTC, Branch 92, Calamba City in
Civil Case No. 3250-02 is SET ASIDE by declaring as VOID the deed
of Donation dated August 14, 2013. [The respondents'] prayer for the
award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees is
nevertheless DENIED.
SO ORDERED.23
In so ruling, the CA, citing the case of Seventh Day Adventist
Conference Church of Southern Phils., Inc. v. Northeastern Mindanao
Mission of Seventh Day Adventist, Inc.,24 held that the petitioner
cannot be considered as a de facto corporation considering that at the
time of the donation, there was no bona fide attempt on its part to
incorporate.25 As an unregistered corporation, the CA concluded that
the petitioner cannot exercise the powers, rights, and privileges
expressly granted by the Corporation Code. Ultimately, bereft of
juridical personality, the CA ruled that the petitioner cannot enter into
a contract of Donation with Purificacion.26
Finally, the CA denied the respondents' claim for actual damages and
attorney's fees for failure to substantiate the same.27
The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated January
7, 2016, but the CA denied it in its Resolution28 dated April 19, 2016.
In the instant petition, the petitioner submits the following arguments
in support of its position:
The Donation Inter Vivos is valid and binding against the parties
therein [Purificacion] and the [petitioner] and their respective
successors in interest:
1.)
The [petitioner] has the requisite legal personality to accept donations
as a religious institution under the Roman Catholic Bishop of San
Pablo authorized to receive donations;
2.)
The [petitioner] has the requisite legal capacity to accept the donation
as it may be considered a de facto corporation.
3.)
Regardless of the absence of the Certificate of Registration of
[petitioner] at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation, the
same is still valid and binding having been accepted by a
representative of the [petitioner] while the latter was still waiting for the
issuance of the Certificate of Registration and which acceptance of
the donation was duly ratified by the corporation.
4.)
The intestate estate of Purificacion is estopped from questioning the
legal personality of [the petitioner].
The Respondents lack the requisite legal capacity to question the
legality of the deed of donation.29
In sum, the issue to be resolved by this Court in the instant case is
whether or not the Deed executed by Purificacion in favor of the
petitioner is valid and binding. In relation to this, the Court is called
upon to determine the legal capacity of the petitioner, as donee, to
accept the donation, and the authority Mother Concepcion to act on
behalf of the petitioner in accepting the donation.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner argues that it has the requisite legal personality to
accept the donation as a religious institution organized under the
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, a corporation sole.30
Regardless, the petitioner contends that it is a de facto corporation
and therefore possessed of the requisite personality to enter into a
contract of donation.
Assuming further that it cannot be considered as a de facto
corporation, the petitioner submits that the acceptance by Mother
Concepcion while the religious organization is still in the process of
incorporation is valid as it then takes the form of a pre-incorporation
contract governed by the rules on agency. The petitioner argues that
their subsequent incorporation and acceptance perfected the subject
contract of donation.31
Ultimately, the petitioner argues that the intestate estate of
Purificacion is estopped from questioning its legal personality
considering the record is replete of evidence to prove that Purificacion
at the time of the donation is fully aware of its status and yet was still
resolved into giving her property.32
In response, the respondents submit that juridical personality to enter
into a contract of donation is vested only upon the issuance of a
Certificate of Incorporation from SEC.33 Further, the respondents
posit that the petitioner cannot even be considered as a de facto
corporation considering that for more than 20 years, there was never
any attempt on its part to incorporate, which decision came only after
Atty. Arcillas, suggestion.34
In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the
following elements must be present: (a) the essential reduction of the
patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the patrimony of the donee;
(c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi; (d) the
donation must be contained in a public document; and e) that the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public
instrument; if acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
must be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both
instruments.35
There is no question that the true intent of Purificacion, the donor and
the owner of the properties in question, was to give, out of liberality
the subject house and lot, which she owned, to the petitioner. This
act, was then contained in a public document, the deed having been
acknowledged before Atty. Arcillas, a Notary Public.36 The
acceptance of the donation is made on the same date that the
donation was made and contained in the same instrument as
manifested by Mother Concepcion's signature.37 In fine, the
remaining issue to be resolved is the capacity of the petitioner as
donee to accept the donation, and the authority of Mother Concepcion
to act on its behalf for this purpose.
Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, "[t]he donor's capacity shall be
determined as of the time of the making of the donation." By analogy,
the legal capacity or the personality of the donee, or the authority of
the latter's representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time
of acceptance of the donation.
Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all
those who are not specifically disqualified by law may accept
donations either personally or through an authorized representative
with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general and
sufficient power.
The Court finds that for the purpose of accepting the donation, the
petitioner is deemed vested with personality to accept, and Mother
Concepcion is clothed with authority to act on the latter's behalf.
At the outset, it must be stated that as correctly pointed out by the CA,
the RTC erred in holding that the petitioner is a de facto corporation.
Jurisprudence settled that "[t]he filing of articles of incorporation and
the issuance of the certificate of incorporation are essential for the
existence of a de facto corporation."38 In fine, it is the act of
registration with SEC through the issuance of a certificate of
incorporation that marks the beginning of an entity's corporate
existence.39
Petitioner filed its Articles of Incorporation and by-laws on August 28,
2001. However, the SEC issued the corresponding Certificate of
Incorporation only on August 31, 2001, two (2) days after Purificacion
executed a Deed of Donation on August 29, 2001. Clearly, at the time
the donation was made, the Petitioner cannot be considered a
corporation de facto. 40
Rather, a review of the attendant circumstances reveals that it calls
for the application of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel as
provided for under Section 21 of the Corporation Code, viz.:
Sec. 21. Corporation by estoppel. - All persons who assume to act as
a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable
as general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or
arising as a result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such
ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a
corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not be
allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate personality.
One who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation as such,
cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact
no corporation. (Emphasis Ours)
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of
equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. It applies
when a non-existent corporation enters into contracts or dealings with
third persons.41 In which case, the person who has contracted or
otherwise dealt with the non-existent corporation is estopped to deny
the latter's legal existence in any action leading out of or involving
such contract or dealing. While the doctrine is generally applied to
protect the sanctity of dealings with the public,42 nothing prevents its
application in the reverse, in fact the very wording of the law which
sets forth the doctrine of corporation by estoppel permits such
interpretation. Such that a person who has assumed an obligation in
favor of a non-existent corporation, having transacted with the latter
as if it was duly incorporated, is prevented from denying the existence
of the latter to avoid the enforcement of the contract.
Jurisprudence dictates that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel
applies for as long as there is no fraud and when the existence of the
association is attacked for causes attendant at the time the contract or
dealing sought to be enforced was entered into, and not thereafter.43
In this controversy, Purificacion dealt with the petitioner as if it were a
corporation. This is evident from the fact that Purificacion executed
two (2) documents conveying her properties in favor of the petitioner –
first, on October 11, 1999 via handwritten letter, and second, on
August 29, 2001 through a Deed; the latter having been executed the
day after the petitioner filed its application for registration with the
SEC.44
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel rests on the idea that if the
Court were to disregard the existence of an entity which entered into a
transaction with a third party, unjust enrichment would result as some
form of benefit have already accrued on the part of one of the parties.
Thus, in that instance, the Court affords upon the unorganized entity
corporate fiction and juridical personality for the sole purpose of
upholding the contract or transaction.
In this case, while the underlying contract which is sought to be
enforced is that of a donation, and thus rooted on liberality, it cannot
be said that Purificacion, as the donor failed to acquire any benefit
therefrom so as to prevent the application of the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel.45 To recall, the subject properties were
given by Purificacion, as a token of appreciation for the services
rendered to her during her illness.46 In fine, the subject deed partakes
of the nature of a remuneratory or compensatory donation, having
been made "for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services,
which services do not amount to a demandable debt."47
As elucidated by the Court in Pirovano, et al. v. De La Rama
Steamship Co.:48
In donations made to a person for services rendered to the donor, the
donor's will is moved by acts which directly benefit him. The
motivating cause is gratitude, acknowledgment of a favor, a desire to
compensate. A donation made to one who saved the donor's life, or a
lawyer who renounced his fees for services rendered to the donor,
would fall under this class of donations.49
Therefore, under the premises, past services constitutes
consideration, which in tum can be regarded as "benefit" on the part of
the donor, consequently, there exists no obstacle to the application of
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel; although strictly speaking, the
petitioner did not perform these services on the expectation of
something in return.
Precisely, the existence of the petitioner as a corporate entity is
upheld in this case for the purpose of validating the Deed to ensure
that the primary objective for which the donation was intended is
achieved, that is, to convey the property for the purpose of aiding the
petitioner in the pursuit of its charitable objectives.
Further, apart from the foregoing, the subsequent act by Purificacion
of re-conveying the property in favor of the petitioner is a ratification
by conduct of the otherwise defective donation.50
Express or implied ratification is recognized by law as a means to
validate a defective contract.51 Ratification cleanses or purges the
contract from its defects from constitution or establishment, retroactive
to the day of its creation. By ratification, the infirmity of the act is
obliterated thereby making it perfectly valid and enforceable.52
The principle and essence of implied ratification require that the
principal has full knowledge at the time of ratification of all the material
facts and circumstances relating to the act sought to be ratified or
validated.53 Also, it is important that the act constituting the
ratification is unequivocal in that it is performed without the slightest
hint of objection or protest from the donor or the donee, thus
producing the inevitable conclusion that the donation and its
acceptance were in fact confirmed and ratified by the donor and the
donee.54
In this controversy, while the initial conveyance is defective, the
genuine intent of Purificacion to donate the subject properties in favor
of the petitioner is indubitable. Also, while the petitioner is yet to be
incorporated, it cannot be said that the initial conveyance was tainted
with fraud or misrepresentation. Contrarily, Purificacion acted with full
knowledge of circumstances of the Petitioner. This is evident from
Purificacion's act of referring Mother Concepcion to Atty. Arcillas, who,
in turn, advised the petitioner to apply for registration. Further, with the
execution of two (2) documents of conveyance in favor of the
petitioner, it is clear that what Purificacion intended was for the sisters
comprising the petitioner to have ownership of her properties to aid
them in the pursuit of their charitable activities, as a token of
appreciation for the services they rendered to her during her illness.55
To put it differently, the reference to the petitioner was merely a
descriptive term used to refer to the sisters comprising the
congregation collectively. Accordingly, the acceptance of Mother
Concepcion for the sisters comprising the congregation is sufficient to
perfect the donation and transfer title to the property to the petitioner.
Ultimately, the subsequent incorporation of the petitioner and its
affirmation of Mother Concepcion's authority to accept on its behalf
cured whatever defect that may have attended the acceptance of the
donation.
The Deed sought to be enforced having been validly entered into by
Purificacion, the respondents' predecessor-in-interest, binds the
respondents who succeed the latter as heirs.56 Simply, as they claim
interest in their capacity as Purificacion's heirs, the respondents are
considered as "privies" to the subject Deed; or are "those between
whom an action is binding although they are not literally parties to the
said action."57 As discussed in Constantino, et al. v. Heirs of Pedro
Constantino, Jr.:58
[p]rivity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee,
donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees, vendor
by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in
estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in
question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance. In fine,
respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are
in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now
stand.59 (Citation omitted)
Anent the authority of Mother Concepcion to act as representative for
and in behalf of the petitioner, the Court similarly upholds the same.
Foremost, the authority of Mother Concepcion was never questioned
by the petitioner. In fact, the latter affirms and supports the authority of
Mother Concepcion to accept the donation on their behalf; as she is,
after all the congregation's Superior General.60 Furthermore, the
petitioner's avowal of Mother Concepcion's authority after their SEC
registration is a ratification of the latter's authority to accept the
subject donation as the petitioner's representative.61
In closing, it must be emphasized that the Court is both of law and of
justice. Thus, the Court's mission and purpose is to apply the law with
justice.62
Donation is an expression of our social conscience, an act rooted
purely on the goodness of one's heart and intent to contribute.
Purificacion, the donor is worthy of praise for her works of charity.
Likewise, the petitioner is worthy of admiration for with or without the
promise of reward or consideration, the Court is certain that it is
impelled by sincere desire to help the petitioner in overcoming her
illness.
It is unfortunate that the will of a person moved by the desire to
reciprocate the goodness shown to her during the lowest and
culminating points of her life is questioned and herein sought to be
nullified on strict legality, when the intent of the donor to give is
beyond question.
The promotion of charitable works is a laudable objective. While not
mentioned in the Constitution, the Court recognizes benevolent giving
as an important social fabric that eliminates inequality. As such,
charitable giving must be encouraged through support from society
and the Court.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Decision dated January 7, 2016 and Resolution dated April 19, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101944, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
PRESCRIPTION
G.R. No. 219070. June 21, 2017.*
CONRADO R. ESPIRITU, JR., TERESITA ESPIRITU-GUTIERREZ,
MARIETTA R. ESPIRITU-CRUZ, OSCAR R. ESPIRITU, and
ALFREDO R. ESPIRITU, petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Civil Law; Land Registration; For registration under Section 14(1)
to prosper, the applicant for original registration of title to land must
establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the
applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.—Registration
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was
susceptible to private ownership at that time. Thus, for registration
under Section 14(1) to prosper, the applicant for original registration of
title to land must establish the following: (1) that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that
the applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
78
78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Espiritu, Jr. vs. Republic
Same; Same; The rule is that applicants for land registration bear
the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable
and disposable.—The rule is that applicants for land registration bear
the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable
and disposable. In this regard, the applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, he must also present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Same; Same; The present rule requires the presentation, not only
of the certification from the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office/Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO/PENRO), but also the submission of a copy of the
original classification approved by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records.—In this case, during the
proceedings before the RTC, to prove the alienable and disposable
character of the subject land, the petitioners presented the DENR-NCR
certification stating that the subject land was verified to be within the
alienable and disposable part of the public domain. This piece of
evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of State
ownership. As already discussed, the present rule requires the
presentation, not only of the certification from the CENRO/PENRO, but
also the submission of a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.
Same; Same; The subject land cannot be registered in the name
of the petitioners under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529 for their failure to prove its alienable and disposable character,
and their possession and occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.—
Finally, assuming that the use of the land in salt-making and as a
fishpond could be considered as a manifestation of acts of dominion,
the petitioners still failed to satisfy the requirements of the law for
registration of the subject land. Although the petitioners claim that
79
VOL. 828, JUNE 21, 2017 79
Espiritu, Jr. vs. Republic
they inherited the salt-making and fishpond businesses from their
parents, no mention was made when the aforesaid businesses actually
started operation on the subject land. Thus, they failed to demonstrate
cultivation or use of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Hence, the petitioners failed to establish possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership within the period
required by law. From the foregoing, the subject land cannot be
registered in the name of the petitioners under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 for their failure to prove its alienable and disposable
character, and their possession and occupation from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Same; Same; For registration under this provision to prosper, the
applicant must establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an
alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the public
domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title, or for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as
patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or
30-year period of possession.—In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines, 587 SCRA 172 (2009), the Court explained
that when Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that persons “who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws,” it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as
a valid basis for the registration of lands. For registration under this
provision to prosper, the applicant must establish the following
requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial
property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in
good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good
faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or
declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the
said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sunico, Malabanan & Rana Law Offices for petitioners.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Espiritu, Jr. vs. Republic
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the March 20, 2015 Decision1 and June 18, 2015 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 101002, which reversed
and set aside the July 30, 2012 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 274, Parañaque City (RTC) in Land Registration Case No. 10-
0026 (LRC No. 10-0026), which approved the application for land
registration filed by the petitioners.
The Antecedents
On March 1, 2010, the petitioners, with their now deceased sibling,
Carmen Espiritu, filed before the RTC an Application for Registration
of Title to Land4 covering a parcel of land with an area of 6,971 square
meters, located at Barangay La Huerta, Parafiaque City, Metro
Manila, and identified as Lot 4178, Cad. 299 of the Paranaque
Cadastre Case 3 (subject land).
Attached to the petitioners' application were copies of the following
documents: (1) Special Powers of Attorney respectively executed by
petitioners Oscar Espiritu (Oscar)5 and Alfredo Espiritu (Alfredo )6 in
favor of petitioner Conrado Espiritu, Jr. (Conrado, Jr.), to represent
them in the proceedings relating to the application; (2) Advanced
Survey Plan7 of Lot No. 4178, Cad. 299 of the Parafiaque Cadastre
Case 3; (3) Technical Description8 of Lot 4178, AP-04-003281, being
an advanced survey of Lot 4178, Cad. 299, Parafiaque Cadastre
Case 3; and (4) Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. E-005-01718-TR.9
The petitioners alleged that their deceased parents, Conrado Espiritu,
Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) and Felicidad Rodriguez-Espiritu (Felicidad), were
the owners of the subject land; that they inherited the subject land
after their parents passed away; and that they, by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, public, and
continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner for
more than thirty (30) years.
Subsequently, the RTC determined that it had jurisdiction to act on the
application. Thereafter, trial ensued, during which Oscar, Conrado,
Jr., Ludivina Aromin (Aromin), Ferdinand
Encarnacion (Encarnacion), and Marrieta Espiritu-
Cruz (Marrieta), were presented as witnesses.
Encarnacion, a staff in the Docket Division of the Land Registration
Authority, testified that the notices relative to the application for
registration of the subject land were served on the owners of the,
adjoining lots.
Marrieta testified that she is one of the children of Conrado, Sr. and
Felicidad; that she was born on February 23, 1933; that she has
known the subject land since she was seven (7) years old because
her parents owned the same; that before her parents, her
grandparents and Felicidad's parents, Dalmacio Rodriguez and
Dominga Catindig were the owners of the subject land; that she,
together with her siblings, inherited the subject land from Conrado, Sr.
and Felicidad, who died in March 1984 and on January 10, 1986,
respectively; that they possessed the subject land openly and
continuously since the death of their parents; that the subject land
was agricultural in nature because it was being used as salt land
during summer and as fishpond during rainy season; and that there
were no adverse claimants over the subject land.
Oscar corroborated Marietta's testimony. He reiterated that they were
in possession and occupation of the subject land because they could
visit the property whenever they wanted to, introduce improvements
thereon, and prevent intruders from entering it.
Conrado, Jr. testified that he commissioned the survey of the subject
land; that he requested and received from Laureano B. Lingan, Jr.,
Regional Technical Director of the Forest Management
Services (FMS), Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
National Capital Region (DENRNCR), a Certification, 10 dated October
6, 2010, stating that the subject land was part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and that they utilized the subject
land in their salt-making business, which they inherited from their
parents.
On cross-examination, Conrado, Jr. admitted that their salt-making
business ceased operation in 2004, and that the subject land had
become idle.
For her part, Aromin, the Chief of the Technical Services of the
DENR-NCR, testified that their office issued a certified copy of the
technical description of Lot No. 4178 (AP 04-003281) on February 18,
201 O; and that the technical description was verified to be consistent
with the approved survey plan of Lot No. 4178.
In addition to the testimonies of their witnesses, the petitioners also
presented in evidence several tax declarations covering the subject
land, the earliest of which was T.D. No. 318011 issued on April 28,
1970; a Certification, 12 dated January 26, 2011, issued by the
Parañaque City Treasurer's Office stating that the real property tax for
the subject land had been fully settled up to year 201 O; and the
DENR-NCR certification alluded to by Conrado, Jr. during his direct
examination, to the effect that the subject land was verified to be
within the alienable and disposable land under Project No. 25 of
Parañaque City, as per LC Map 2623, and that it is not needed for
forest purposes.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated July 30, 2012, the RTC granted the application
for registration. The trial court opined that the petitioners were able to
establish possession and occupation over the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It gave
credence to the testimony of Marrieta that she had known that the
subject land belonged to their parents as early as 1940 because she
was already seven (7) years old at that time.
The trial court was convinced that the petitioners were able to prove
that the subject land was part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain. In so ruling, it relied on the contents of the DENR-
NCR certification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 as amended,
judgment is hereby rendered granting the application of the
applicants, namely, Carmen R. Espiritu, Conrado R. Espiritu, Jr.,
Marrieta R. Espiritu, Oscar R. Espiritu, Alfredo R. Espiritu, and
Teresita R. Espiritu, confirming the title of said applicants over the
parcel of land fully described on its technical description described as
follows:
xxx
and ordering the registration of said parcel of land in the name of the
applicants.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding Order for the
issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.13 (Boldface omitted)
The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by
the R TC in its resolution, dated April 1, 2013.
Aggrieved, the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an appeal to the
CA.14
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated March 20, 2015, the CA reversed and
set aside the July 30, 2012 RTC decision. In reversing the trial court,
the appellate court reiterated the prevailing doctrine that to
successfully register a parcel of land, the application must be
accompanied by: (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification stating the
alienable and disposable character of the land applied for; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. It opined that the DENR-NCR certification presented by the
petitioners would not suffice to prove that the subject land was indeed
classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. The
CA explained that under Department of Agriculture
Orders (DAO) Nos. 20 and 38, the Regional Technical Director of the
FMS had no authority to issue certificates of land classification; and
that the petitioners failed to present a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated July 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 274 in Parafiaque City in LRC Case No. 10-0026 is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration
of land title filed by the applicants-appellees Carmen R. Espiritu,
Conrado R. Espiritu, Jr., Marrieta R. Espiritu, Oscar R. Espiritu,
Alfredo R. Espiritu and Teresita R. Espiritu is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.15 (Boldface omitted)
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was
denied by the CA in its resolution, dated June 18, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE
TRIAL COURT AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE.
The petitioners, relying on the cases of Republic of the Philippines v.
Serrano (Serrano )16 and Republic v. Vega (Vega), 17 argue that they
had substantially complied with the presentation of the required proof
that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable part of
the public domain. They assert that the DENR-NCR certification they
submitted, together with all the documentary evidence they presented,
constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement that the
land must be proved to be alienable and disposable part of the public
domain. The petitioners insist that the DENR-NCR certification they
submitted was sufficient proof of the character of the subject land
because under DAO No. 2012-09,18 dated November 14, 2012, the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR is vested with authority to
issue certifications on land classification for lands situated in Metro
Manila.
The petitioners further claimed that they already submitted a certified
true copy of the original land classification covering the subject land.
They assert that in their Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 3,
2015, filed before the CA, they attached a copy of Forestry
Administrative Order (PAO) No. 4-1141, dated January 3, 1968,
signed by Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
In its Comment, 19 the Republic countered that the petitioners failed to
comply with the requirements that the application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO/PENRO
certification; and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary. It contended that the petitioners'
reliance on Serrano and Vega were misplaced, because the rulings
therein on substantial compliance were mere pro hac vice. The
Republic further av.erred that while the petitioners were able to
present a copy of PAO No. 4-1141, the same had no probative value
as it was not presented during the proceedings before the RTC.
Lastly, it claimed that assuming arguendo that the petitioners had
sufficiently established the character of the subject land as alienable
and disposable, registration would still not be proper, considering that
they failed to establish the necessary possession and occupation for
the period required by law.
In their Reply,20 dated July 21, 2016, the petitioners insisted on the
application of Serrano and Vega to the present case. They also assert
that even if their copy of F AO No. 4-1141 was not presented during
the proceedings before the RTC, the same still have probative value.
On the basis of Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria v. Republic of the
Philippines (Sta. AnaVictoria),21 the petitioners claim that in land
registration cases, the Court has allowed the presentation of
additional certifications to prove the alienability and disposability of the
land sought to be registered when the authenticity thereof were not
sufficiently contested.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Court notes that the subject application was filed under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, considering the
allegation therein of possession and occupation in the concept of
owner for more than thirty (30) years. The trial court, however,
granted the application under Section 14(1) of the same decree after
finding that the petitioners were able to establish open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Manifestly, there has been some uncertainty under what provision of
law the present application for registration is being sought because
the requirements and basis for registration under these two provisions
of law differ from one another. Section 14(1) mandates registration on
the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on
the basis of prescription.22 Nevertheless, for the proper resolution of
the issues and arguments raised herein, the present application would
be scrutinized based on the requirements of the provisions of
Sections 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Registration under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
Section 14, paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1529 provides:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to
whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that
time. 23 Thus, for registration under Section 14(1) to prosper, the
applicant for original registration of title to land must establish the
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by
themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.24
Petitioners failed to prove
that the subject land is
alienable and disposable
The rule is that applicants for land registration bear the burden of
proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and
disposable. 25 In this regard, the applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, he must also present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.26
In this case, during the proceedings before the RTC, to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the subject land, the petitioners
presented the DENR-NCR certification stating that the subject land
was verified to be within the alienable and disposable part of the
public domain. This piece of evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of State ownership. As already discussed, the present
rule requires the presentation, not only of the certification from the
CENRO/PENRO, but also the submission of a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.27
Likewise, the petitioners' claim of substantial compliance does not
warrant approval of the application.
The rule on strict compliance enunciated in Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties (T.A.N. Properties)28remains to be the
governing rule in land registration cases. This rule was neither
abandoned nor modified by the subsequent pronouncements
in Vega and Serrano as these latter cases were mere pro hac vice. In
fact, in Vega, the Court clarified that the ruling on substantial
compliance applies pro hac vice and did not, in any way, detract from
the Court's ruling in T.A.N Properties and similar cases which impose
a strict requirement to prove that the land applied for registration is
alienable and disposable.
Further, in Republic of the Philippines v. San Mateo (San
Mateo), 29 the Court expounded on the reason behind the subsequent
decisions which granted applications for land registration on the basis
of substantial compliance, viz.:
In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered
its decision on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict
compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008.
Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the
time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case
reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N.
Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial
compliance, because there was no opportunity for the registrant to
comply with the Court's ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial court and
the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties. 30 (Italics omitted)
From the foregoing, it is clear that substantial compliance may be
applied, at the discretion of the courts, only if the trial court rendered
its decision on the application prior to June 26, 2008, the date of the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties. In this case, the application for
registration, which was filed on March 1, 2010, was granted by the
RTC only on July 30, 2012, or four (4) years after the promulgation
of T.A.N. Properties. Evidently, the courts did not have discretion to
apply the rule on substantial compliance. Thus, the petitioners'
reliance on Vega and Serrano, as well as on Sta. Ana Victoria, which
similarly appreciated substantial compliance, is clearly misplaced.
Hence, the petitioners failed to prove the first requisite for registration
under Section 14(1).
Petitioners failed to prove possession and occupation of the subject
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier
As to the second and third requisites, the Court concurs with the
appellate court that the petitioners failed to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land on or before June 12, 1945.
In this case, the petitioners presented several tax declarations in their
names, the earliest of which dates back only to 1970.1âwphi1 This
period of possession and occupation is clearly insufficient to give the
petitioners the right to register the subject land in their names
because the law requires that possession and occupation under
a bona fide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
In a similar vein, the respective testimonies of petitioners Marietta,
Oscar, and Conrado, Jr. were insufficient to support their claim of
possession and occupation of the subject land. The only relevant
testimonies offered by the petitioners were to the effect that they had
known the subject land since they were children, as the same were
owned by their parents; that it was used as a fishpond during the rainy
season and in their salt-making business during the summer, which
business, however, ceased operation in 2004; and that they could visit
the subject land whenever they wanted to, introduce improvements on
it, and prevent intruders therefrom.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises, Inc.,31 the
Court held that for purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of
P .D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented
to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements
which are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property. 32
In this case, the petitioners failed to sufficiently show that on or before
June 12, 1945, they and their predecessors-in-interest actually
exercised acts of dominion over the subject land. Their assertion that
they could visit the subject land could not be considered an act of
dominion which would vest upon them the right to own the subject
land. Likewise, their general claim that they could prevent any person
from intruding thereto was unsubstantiated by any evidence aside
from their allegations.
Finally, assuming that the use of the land in salt-making and as a
fishpond could be considered as a manifestation of acts of dominion,
the petitioners still failed to satisfy the requirements of the law for
registration of the subject land. Although the petitioners claim that
they inherited the salt-making and fishpond businesses from their
parents, no mention was made when the aforesaid businesses
actually started operation on the subject land. Thus, they failed to
demonstrate cultivation or use of the subject land since June 12, 1945
or earlier. Hence, the petitioners failed to establish possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
within the period required by law.
From the foregoing, the subject land cannot be registered in the name
of the petitioners under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 for their failure
to prove its alienable and disposable character, and their possession
and occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements under Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529
Neither could the subject land be registered under Section 14(2),
which reads:
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,33 the Court
explained that when Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that
persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands.
For registration under this provision to prosper, the applicant must
establish the following requisites: (a) the land is an alienable and
disposable, and patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at
least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land
had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of
the State at the beginning of the said 10- year or 30-year period of
possession.34
As regards the first and most important requisite, the Court has ruled
that declaration of alienability and disposability is not enough for the
registration of land under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. There must
be an express declaration that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial
property.35 This is only logical because acquisitive prescription could
only run against private properties, which include patrimonial
properties of the State, but never against public properties.
Here, the petitioners failed to present any competent evidence which
could show that the subject land had been declared as part of the
patrimonial property of the State. The DENR-NCR certification
presented by the petitioners only certified that the subject land was
not needed for forest purposes. This is insufficient because the law
mandates that to be subjected to acquisitive prescription, there must
be a declaration by the State that the land applied for is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
petitioners failed to prove that they acquired the subject land through
acquisitive prescription. Thus, the same could not be registered under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
In fine, the petitioners failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration
of title to land under either Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. The
CA's reversal of the July 30, 2012 RTC decision, and denial of the
petitioners' application for original registration of imperfect title over
Lot No. 4178 must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 20, 2015 Decision
and June 18, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 101002 are AFFIRMED. The petitioners' application for original
registration of title of Lot No. 4178 in LRC Case No. 10-0026
is DENIED, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175763. April 11, 2012.*
HEIRS OF BIENVENIDO AND ARACELI TANYAG, namely: ARTURO
TANYAG, AIDA T. JOCSON AND ZENAIDA T. VELOSO,
petitioners, vs. SALOME E. GABRIEL, NESTOR R. GABRIEL, LUZ
GABRIEL-ARNEDO married to ARTURO ARNEDO, NORA GABRIEL-
CALINGO married to FELIX CALINGO, PILAR M. MENDIOLA,
MINERVA GABRIEL-NATIVIDAD married to EUSTAQUIO
NATIVIDAD, and ERLINDA VELASQUEZ married to HERMINIO
VELASQUEZ, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Registration of a piece of
land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.—Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not
a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described
therein. Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the
registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered
property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that
reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of
fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree
of registration is respected as incontrovertible.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
285
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 285
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel
What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better
right.
Same; Same; Reconveyance; An action for annulment of title or
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
possession of the property subject of the acts; The party seeking
reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to
the property and the fact of fraud.—An action for annulment of title or
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
possession of the property subject of the acts. The totality of the
evidence on record established that it was petitioners who are in actual
possession of the subject property; respondents merely insinuated at
occasional visits to the land. However, for an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking
reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to
the property and the fact of fraud.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; Questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of
law shall be raised in such petitions.—Settled is the rule that questions
of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of law shall be raised in such
petitions. While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn
by the appellate court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in
the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the
correct factual conclusions based on the record.
Civil Law; Property; Ownership; Prescription; Words and Phrases;
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.—Acquisitive prescription is a mode of
acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time.
In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when
it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
286
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel
his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription.
Same; Prescription; Civil Interruption; Civil interruption takes place
with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing
of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim.—In the case of Heirs of Marcelina
Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 532 SCRA 391 (2007), this Court citing
Article 1123 of the Civil Code held that civil interruption takes place with
the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a
mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus: Article 1123 of the Civil Code is
categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to
the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial
summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons shall
not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to
interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2)
if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the
proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from
the complaint. Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code
underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil
interruption to take place, the possessor must have received
judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of
Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more
than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’
possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption.
We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977
did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because
there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its
judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no
compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is
that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against
respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was
received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take
the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption
provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able
to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period
of
287
VOL. 669, APRIL 11, 2012 287
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag vs. Gabriel
acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.
Same; Property; Ownership; Under Article 434 of the Civil Code,
to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real
property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title
thereto.—Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain
an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of
the land claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first
requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he
has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he
is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodrigo, Berenguer and Guno for petitioners.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse the
Decision[1] dated August 18, 2006 and Resolution[2] dated December
8, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81224. The
CA affirmed the Decision[3] dated November 19, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267 in Civil Case No. 67846
dismissing petitioners’ complaint for declaration of nullity of Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1035, reconveyance and damages, as
well as respondents’ counterclaims for damages and attorney’s
fees.cralaw
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at
Ruhale, Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig (now part of Pasig
City, Metro Manila). The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area of 686
square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel
under Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 1603 and 6425 issued for the years
1949 and 1966, while the second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147
square meters was originally declared in the name of Agueda
Dinguinbayan under TD Nos. 6418 and 9676 issued for the years
1966 and 1967.[4] For several years, these lands lined with bamboo
plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of
Jose Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944
notarized instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold the said
property to spouses Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga. Said
document states:
DAPAT MALAMAN NG LAHAT NG MAKABABASA
Na, akong Benita Gabriel, balo sa nasirang Calixto Lontoc, Filipina may
karapatang gulang naninirahan sa nayon ng Palingon, Tagig, Rizal, x x
x sa pamamaguitan nitoy
ISINASAYSAY KO AT PINAGTITIBAY
1.) Na, sarili ko at tunay na pagaari ang isang lagay na lupang
kawayanan na sapagkat itoy kabahagui ko sa aking kapatid na [J]ose
Gabriel, na itoy mana ko sa aking nasirang ama Mateo Gabriel sa kami
lamang dalawa ng aking kapatid na binabanguit ko na Jose Gabriel
siyang mga anak at tagapagmana ng aming amang nasirang Mateo
Gabriel, maliban sa amin ay wala nang iba, kayat kami ay naghati sa
mga ari-arian na na iwan sa amin ng nasirang ama namin na Mateo
Gabriel, na ang lupang kawayanang itoy may nakatanim na walong (8)
punong kawayan at na sa pook na kung pamagatan ay Ruhale nayon
ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, at na sa loob ng mga kahanganan at sukat
na sumusunod[:]
Na, ang kahangan sa Hilagaan Sapang Ruhale at Vicente Bunye, sa
Amihanan Felipe Pagkalinawan, sa Timugan Juan Flores, at sa
Habagatan Apolonio Ocol may sukat na 6 areas at 85 centiareas may
halagan amillarada na P80.00) Pesos alinsunod sa Tax Blg. 20037, sa
pangalan ng aking kapatid na Jose Gabriel. Na, ang lupang itoy hindi
natatala sa bisa ng batas Blg. 496 ni sa susog gayon din sa Hipotecaria
Espanola itoy may mga mojon bato ang mga panulok at walang bakod.
2.) Na, alang-alang sa halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM (P96.00) na
Pisong salaping guinagamit dito sa Filipinas na bago dumating ang
mga sandaling itoy tinaggap ko at ibinayad sa akin ng boong
kasiyahang loob ko ng magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT CORNELIA
SANGA, mga Filipinos may mga karapatang gulang mga naninirahan
sa nayon ng Calzada, Tagig, Rizal, ngayon ay inilipat ko at ipinagbili ng
bilihang tuluyan (Venta real soluta) ang isinasaysay kong lupang
kawayanan sa itaas nito ng nasabi halagang SIYAMNAPO AT ANIM
(P96.00) na Piso at sa nabanguit na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT
CORNELIA SANGA, gayon din sa lahat ng mga tagapagmana nila,
ngayong mga arao na ito ay ang may hawak at namamahala ng lupang
itoy ang mga nakabili sa akin na magasawang GABRIEL SULIT AT
CORNELIA SANGA.
3.) Na, ang kasulatang itoy ng bilihan ay nais na itala sa bisa ng batas
Blg. 3344.
NA SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITOY ako ay lumagda sa
kasulatang ito dito sa Tagig, Rizal, ngayong ika - 28 ng Junio 1944.
(Nilagdaan) BENITA GABRIEL[5]
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own
daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit
gave it to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was
Florencia’s husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido
S. Tanyag, father of petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of
sale dated October 14, 1964.[6] Petitioners then took possession of
the property, paid the real estate taxes due on the land and declared
the same for tax purposes, as shown by TD No. 11445 issued in 1969
in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag; TD No. 11445
cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel. TD Nos. 3380
and 00486 also in the name of Araceli Tanyag were issued in the
years 1974 and 1979.[7]
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda
Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on
October 22, 1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said
property and declared the same for tax purposes as shown by TD
Nos. 11361, 3395, 120-014-00482, 120-00-014-20-002-000, C-014-
00180 and D-014-00182 issued for the years 1969, 1974, 1979, 1985,
1991 and 1994.[8] Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly,
notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their
caretaker Juana Quinones[9]; they fenced the premises and introduced
improvements on the land.[10]
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured TD
No. 120-014-01013 in his name over Lot 1 indicating therein an
increased area of 1,763 square meters. Said tax declaration
supposedly cancelled TD No. 6425 over Lot 1 and contained the
following inscription[11]:
Note: Portions of this Property is Also Declared
in the name of Araceli C. Tanyag under
T.D.#120-014-00858 686 sq. m.
Also inscribed on TD No. 120-014-00858[12] (1979) in the name of
Araceli Tanyag covering Lot 1 are the following:
This property is also covered by T.D. #120-014-01013
in the name of Jose P. Gabriel
1-8-80
which notation was carried into the 1985, 1990 and 1991 tax
declarations, all in the name of Araceli Tanyag.
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 67846
alleging that respondents never occupied the whole 686 square
meters of Lot 1 and fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in TD
No. 120-014-01013 such that Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters
originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to
1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No.
1035 on October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of
respondents heirs of Jose Gabriel was null and void from the
beginning.[13]
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no
cause of action against them for they have not established their
ownership over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in
respondents’ name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had
become unassailable one year after its issuance and petitioners failed
to establish that it was irregularly or unlawfully procured.[14]
Respondents’ evidence showed that the subject land was among
those properties included in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
Jose P. Gabriel[15] executed on October 5, 1988, covered by TD No.
B-014-00643 (1985) in the name of Jose Gabriel. Respondents
declared the property in their name but the tax declarations (1989,
1991 and 1994) carried the notation that portions thereof (686 sq.
ms.) are also declared in the name of Araceli Tanyag. On October 28,
1998, OCT No. 1035[16] was issued to respondents by the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila under Decree No. N-219177 pursuant
to the Decision dated September 20, 1996 of the Land Registration
Court in LRC Case No. N-11260, covering Lot 1836 MCadm-590-D,
Taguig Cadastral Mapping, Plan Ap-04-002253, with an area of 1,560
square meters.
On the other hand, respondents’ TD Nos. D-014-00839 and D-014-
01923 issued in 1993 and 1999 respectively, showed that
respondents sold 468 square meters of Lot 1 to Jayson Sta.
Barbara.[17] The segregation of said 468 square meters pertaining to
Jayson Sta. Barbara was reflected in the approved survey plan of Lot
1836 prepared by respondents’ surveyor on March 18, 2000.[18]
At the trial, petitioners presented their witness Arturo Tanyag, son of
Bienvenido Tanyag and Araceli Tanyag who died on March 30, 1968
and October 30, 1993, respectively. He testified that according to
Florencia Sulit, Benita Gabriel-Lontoc and her family were the ones in
possession of Lot 1 since 1944; Benita Gabriel had executed an
Affidavit of Sale declaring said property as her inheritance and
conveying the same to spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. He
affirmed that they had been in possession of Lot 1 from the time
Bienvenido Tanyag bought the land from Florencia Sulit in
1964. Based on the boundaries indicated in the tax declaration, they
fenced the property, installed Juana Quinones as their caretaker who
also attended to the piggery, put up an artesian well and planted
some trees. From 1964 up to 1978, nobody disturbed them in their
possession or claimed ownership of the land; four years after
acquiring Lot 1, they also purchased the adjacent property (Lot 2) to
expand their piggery. Lot 2 was also separately declared for tax
purposes after their mother purchased it from Agueda
Dinguinbayan. He had personally witnessed the execution of the
1968 deed of sale including its notarization, and was also present
during the physical turn over of Lot 2 by the seller. In fact, he was one
of the instrumental witnesses to the deed of sale and identified his
signature therein. He further described the place as inaccessible at
that time as there were no roads yet and they had to traverse muddy
tracks to reach their property.[19]
Arturo further testified that the first time they met Jose Gabriel was
when the latter borrowed from their mother all the documents
pertaining to their property. Jose Gabriel came looking for a piece of
property which he claims as his but he had no documents to prove it
and so they showed him their documents pertaining to the subject
property; out of the goodness of her mother’s heart, she lent those
documents to her brother Jose Gabriel. During the cadastral survey
conducted in 1976, they had both lots surveyed in preparation for their
consolidation under one tax declaration. However, they did not
succeed in registering the consolidated lots as they discovered that
there was another tax declaration covering the same properties and
these were applied for titling under the name of Jose Gabriel
sometime in 1978 or 1980, which was after the time said Jose Gabriel
borrowed the documents from their mother. No notice of the hearings
for application of title filed by Jose Gabriel was received by
them. They never abandoned the property and their caretaker never
left the place except to report to the police when she was being
harassed by the respondents. He also recalled that respondents had
filed a complaint against them before the barangay but since no
agreement was reached after several meetings, they filed the present
case.[20]
The next witness for petitioners was Juana Quinones, their caretaker
who testified that she had been staying on petitioners’ property since
1964 or for 35 years already. She had built a nipa hut and artesian
well, raised piggery and poultry and planted some root crops and
vegetables on the land. At first there was only one parcel but later the
petitioners bought an additional lot; Arturo Tanyag gave her money
which she used for the fencing of the property. During all the time she
occupied the property there was nobody else claiming it and she also
had not received any notice for petitioners concerning the property,
nor the conduct of survey on the land. On cross-examination, she
admitted that she was living alone and had no Voter’s ID or any
document evidencing that she had been a resident there since
1964. Although she was living alone, she asks for help from other
persons in tending her piggery.[21]
Angelita Sulit-delos Santos, cousin of petitioners and also
of respondents, testified that she came to know the subject property
because according to her paternal grandfather Gabriel Sta. Ana Sulit,
her maternal grandmother Benita Gabriel-Lontoc mortgaged the
property to him. It was Benita Gabriel Lontoc who took care of her,
her siblings and cousins; they lived with her until her death. She
identified the signature of Benita Gabriel in the 1944 Affidavit of Sale
in favor of Gabriel Sulit. Lot 1 consisting of 600 square meters was
vacant property at that time but her family was in possession thereof
when it was sold to Gabriel Sulit; it was her father Eliseo Sulit and
uncle Hilario Sulit, who were incharge of their property. On cross-
examination, she was asked details regarding the supposed mortgage
of Lot 1 to Gabriel Sulit but she admitted she does not know anything
as she was still very young then.[22]
Respondents’ first witness was Roberto Gabriel Arnedo, son of Luz
Gabriel-Arnedo. He testified that when he was about 5 or 6 years old
(1953 or 1954), his grandfather Jose Gabriel used to bring him along
to visit the subject property consisting of 1,763 square meters based
on the tax declaration and OCT. They had picnics and celebrate his
grandfather’s birthday there. He recalled accompanying his
grandfather in overseeing the planting of gumamela which served as
the perimeter fence. Jose Gabriel had not mentioned anything about
the claim of petitioners over the same land; Jose Gabriel handed the
documents pertaining to the land to his eldest aunt and hence it now
belongs to them.[23] On cross-examination, he claimed that during
those years he had visited the land together with his grandfather, he
did not see Florencia Sulit and her family.[24]
Virginia Villanueva, daughter of Salome Gabriel, testified that they
acquired the subject property from their grandfather Jose Gabriel who
had a tax declaration in his name. Her mother furnished them with
documents such as tax declarations and the extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Jose Gabriel; they also have an approved survey plan
prepared for Salome Gabriel. She does not know the petitioners in
this case.[25] On cross-examination, she said that the subject property
was inherited by Jose Gabriel from his father Mateo Gabriel; Jose
Gabriel was the sole owner of the land while Benita Gabriel has
separate properties in Palingon and Langkokak.[26] Though they are
not actually occupying the property, they visit the place and she does
not know anybody occupying it, except for the portion (486 square
meters) which petitioners sold to Sta. Barbara. A nine-door apartment
was built on the said portion without their permission. She had talked
to both Sta. Barbara and with Arturo Tanyag they had meetings
before the barangay; however, petitioners filed the present case in
court. She insisted that there is nobody residing in the subject
property; there is still the remaining 901 square meters which is
owned by their mother. She admitted there were plants on the land
but she does not know who actually planted them; it was her
grandfather who built a wooden fence and gumamela in the
1960s. As to the hearings on the application for title, she had not
attended the same; she does not know whether the petitioners were
notified of the said hearings. She also caused the preparation of the
survey plan for Salome Gabriel. On the increased area of the
property indicated in the later tax declarations, she admitted the
discrepancy but said there were barangay roads being built at the
time.[27]
Esmeraldo Ramos, Municipal Assessor of Taguig, testified that he
was formerly a Land Appraiser in the Office of the Municipal Assessor
of Taguig and in the course of his duties had certified one of the tax
declarations in the name of respondents (TD No. EL-014-10585). He
identified and verified said document and the other tax declarations
submitted in court by the respondents. He admitted that on January
10, 1980, they made the entry on TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose
Gabriel that the same was cancelled by TD No. 120-014-01013 also
in the name of Jose Gabriel who presented a supposed deed of sale
in favor of Araceli Tanyag which caused the earlier cancellation of TD
No. 6425 in his name. However, upon investigation they found out
that the seller Florencia Sulit was not the owner because the declared
owner was Jose Gabriel; even the deed of sale recognized that the
property was declared in the name of Jose Gabriel. They also
discovered from the cadastral survey and tax mapping of Taguig that
the property is in the name of Jose Gabriel both in the Bureau of
Lands and Municipal Assessor’s Office. As far as he knows, it was
Jose Gabriel who owned the subject property which he usually visited;
he recalled that around the late 70’s and 80’s, he ordered the fencing
of barbed wire and bamboo stalks on the land which is just 3 lots
away from his own property. As to the discrepancy in the area of the
property as originally declared by Jose Gabriel, he explained that the
boundaries in the original tax declaration do not change but after the
land is surveyed, the boundaries naturally would be different because
the previous owner may have sold his property or the present owner
inherits the property from his parents. He admitted that the tax
declaration is just for tax purposes and not necessarily proof of
ownership or possession of the property it covers.[28]
Respondents’ last witness was Antonio Argel who testified that he had
resided for 52 years on a land near the subject property and as far as
he knows it was Jose Gabriel who owns it and planted thereon. On
cross-examination, he admitted that Jose Gabriel was not in physical
possession of the property. He just assumed that the present
occupants of the property were allowed by Jose Gabriel to stay
therein because he is the owner. There is an apartment and three
small houses existing on the property, and about five families are
living there. He confirmed that there is a piggery being maintained by
a certain Juana who had been residing there maybe for fifteen years
already.[29]
In rebuttal, petitioners presented two witnesses who are owners of
properties adjoining that of the subject land. Rodante Domingo
testified that it was only now did he learn that the property of Arturo
Tanyag is already titled in the name of respondents. He was not
aware of the titling proceeding because he never received any notice
as adjoining owner. His own property is already titled in his name and
he even asked Arturo Tanyag to act as a witness in his application for
titling.[30] On the other hand, Dado Dollado testified that he acquired
his property in 1979. He likewise affirmed that he did not receive any
notice of the proceedings for application for titling filed by respondents
and it was only now that he learned from Arturo Tanyag that the
subject property was already titled in the names of respondents.[31]
The last rebuttal witness for petitioners was Dominador Dinguinbayan
Ergueza, son of Agueda Dinguinbayan. He testified that the subject
property was formerly owned by his mother and the present owner is
Araceli Tanyag who bought the same from his mother in 1968. He
described the boundaries of the property in relation to the adjoining
owners at that time; presently, the left portion is already a street
(Rujale St.) going towards the sea. He admitted that his wife, Livina
Ergueza was an instrumental witness in the 1968 deed of sale in favor
of Araceli Tanyag.[32]
In its decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim, holding that petitioners failed to establish ownership of
the subject property and finding the respondents to be the declared
owners and legal possessors. It likewise ruled that petitioners were
unable to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents
acquired title over the property through fraud and deceit.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s
ruling. The CA found that apart from the Affidavit executed by Benita
Gabriel in 1944 claiming that she inherited Lot 1 from their father,
Mateo Gabriel, there is no evidence that she, not Jose Gabriel, was
the true owner thereof. It noted that just four years after Benita
Gabriel’s sale of the subject property to the Sulit spouses, Jose
Gabriel declared the same under his name for tax purposes, paying
the corresponding taxes. The appellate court stressed that
petitioners’ allegation of bad faith was not proven.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assail the CA in not finding that the respondents obtained
OCT No. 1035 in their names fraudulently and in bad faith. They also
claim to have acquired ownership of the subject lots by virtue of
acquisitive prescription.
The issues presented are: (1) whether respondents committed fraud
and bad faith in registering the subject lots in their name; and (2)
whether petitioners acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription.
Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein.[33] Thus, notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The
rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-
subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an
action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property
or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with
a better right.[34]
An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property
subject of the acts.[35] The totality of the evidence on record
established that it was petitioners who are in actual possession of the
subject property; respondents merely insinuated at occasional visits to
the land. However, for an action for reconveyance based on fraud to
prosper, this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must
prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and
the fact of fraud.[36]
The CA correctly observed that the only evidence of Benita Gabriel’s
supposed title was the 1944 Affidavit of Sale whereby Benita Gabriel
claimed sole ownership of Lot 1 as her inheritance from their father,
Mateo Gabriel. The property until 1949 was still declared in the name
Jose Gabriel despite the 1944 sale executed by Benita Gabriel in
favor of spouses Gabriel and Cornelia Sulit. As to the alleged fraud
perpetrated by Jose Gabriel and respondents in securing OCT No.
1035 in their name, this was clearly not proven as Arturo Tanyag
testified merely that Jose Gabriel borrowed their documents pertaining
to the property. No document or testimony was presented to show
that Jose Gabriel employed deceit or committed fraudulent acts in the
proceedings for titling of the property.
However, the CA did not address the issue of acquisitive prescription
raised by the petitioners. In their Complaint before the lower court,
petitioners alleged –
15. Defendants never occupied the whole area of the lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 1603 (686 sq. m.) neither were they able to set foot
on the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 6542 [sic] for the
reason that those lots had been in actual, open continuous, adverse
and notorious possession of the plaintiffs against the whole world for
more than thirty years which is equivalent to title.
x x x x[37]
Such character and length of possession of a party over a parcel of
land subject of controversy is a factual issue. Settled is the rule that
questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as only questions of
law shall be raised in such petitions. While this Court is not a trier of
facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is
manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the
evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based on
the record.[38]
In this case, the CA was mistaken in concluding that petitioners have
not acquired any right over the subject property simply because they
failed to establish Benita Gabriel’s title over said property. The
appellate court ignored petitioners’ evidence of possession that
complies with the legal requirements of acquiring ownership by
prescription.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a
possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into
ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted.[39] Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine.[40] It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;
and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party
who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.[41]
On the matter of prescription, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may
be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also
prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners’ adverse possession is reckoned from 1969 with the
issuance of TD No. 1145 in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which tax
declaration cancelled TD No. 6425 in the name of Jose Gabriel.[42] It
is settled that tax receipts and declarations are prima facie proofs of
ownership or possession of the property for which such taxes have
been paid. Coupled with proof of actual possession of the property,
they may become the basis of a claim for ownership.[43] Petitioners’
caretaker, Juana Quinones, has since lived in a nipa hut, planted
vegetables and tended a piggery on the land. Aside from paying
taxes due on the property, petitioners also exercised other acts of
ownership such as selling the 468-square meter portion to Sta.
Barbara who had constructed thereon a nine-door apartment building.
It was only in 1979 that respondents began to assert a claim over the
property by securing a tax declaration in the name of Jose Gabriel
albeit over a bigger area than that originally declared. In 1998, they
finally obtained an original certificate of title covering the entire 1,763
square meters which included Lot 1. Did these acts of respondents
effectively interrupt the possession of petitioners for purposes of
prescription?
We answer in the negative.
In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon[44] this
Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code[45] held that civil interruption
takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and
not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus:
Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is
produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even
with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as
to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and
shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of
legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or
should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be
absolved from the complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the
judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take
place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None
appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was
filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which
did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice
could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion
of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt
the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a
necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed
was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the
Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by
petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial
summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court
of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse
Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the
civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case,
petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession
since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962
continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of
Adverse Claim. (Emphasis supplied.)
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March
2000, the latter have been in continuous, public and adverse
possession of the subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the
property for the period and in the character required by law as
sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive prescription, petitioners have
indeed acquired ownership over the subject property. Such right
cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring again the
property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate
of title in their name in 1998.
This notwithstanding, we uphold petitioners’ right as owner only with
respect to Lot 1 consisting of 686 square meters. Petitioners failed to
substantiate their claim over Lot 2 by virtue of a deed of sale from the
original declared owner, Agueda Dinguinbayan. Respondents
asserted that the 147 square meters covered by the tax declarations
of Dinguinbayan being claimed by petitioners is not the same lot
included in OCT No. 1035.

Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action

to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a
better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land
claimed; and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite,
in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a
better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is
claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.[46] In
this case, petitioners failed to identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of
the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be compared
with the technical description contained in OCT No. 1035, which
would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square meters was
erroneously included in respondents’ title. The testimony of Agueda
Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said witness merely
stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax
declarations of his mother. On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he
had the lots surveyed in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation
of the two parcels. However, no such plan was presented in
court.cralaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The

Decision dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 81224 is MODIFIED in that petitioners heirs of Bienvenido and
Araceli Tanyag are hereby declared the owners of 686 square meters
previously declared under Tax Declaration Nos. 11445, 120-014-
00486, 120-014-0085, B-014-00501, E-014-01446, C-014-00893 and
D-014-00839 all in the name of Araceli Tanyag, which lot is presently
covered by OCT No. 1035 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig,
Metro Manila in the name of respondents Salome Gabriel, Nestor R.
Gabriel, Luz Gabriel-Arnedo, Nora Gabriel-Calingo, Pilar Gabriel-
Mendiola, Minerva Gabriel-Natividad and Erlinda Gabriel-
Velasquez. Respondents are ORDERED to RECONVEY the said
686-square meter portion to the petitioners.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.