1. GSIS v.
Heirs of Caballero appeal, the CA, although affirming the decision of the
G.R. No. 158090
October 4, 2010
FACTS: Respondent Fernando Caballero was the
registered owner of a residential lot situated at Rizal St.,
Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, Fernando built a
residential/commercial building consisting of 2 stories.
On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife Sylvia secured a
loan from Petitioner GSIS. In view of such loan the spouses
executed a Real Estate Mortgage holding the
abovementioned property as a security. Fernando
defaulted on the payment of his loan which eventually
caused the foreclosure of his property. On March 26,
1973, the property was sold in a public auction where
petitioner was the only bidder. For failure of Fernando to
redeem the said property, petitioner executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership in 1975.
Consequently, a new TCT was issued in the name of
petitioner GSIS.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner informed Fernando of
the consolidation of title in its favor and requested
payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando’s
continued occupancy of the subject property. Fernando
requested that he be allowed to repurchase the said
property through partial payment but no agreement was
reached between the parties.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner GSIS scheduled the
subject property for public bidding. On the date of
bidding, Fernando’s daughter, Jocelyn, submitted a bid
of P 350,000 while Carmelita Mercantile Trading
Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid bid of P 450,000.
Since CMTC was the highest bidder, it was awrded the
subject property. A deed of absolute sale was executed
between petitioner and CMTC and thereafter a new TCT
was issued in the name of CMTC.
Fernando filed a complaint against CMTC and GSIS
praying that the resolution issued by GSIS awarding the
property to CMTC, the deed of absolute sale and the TCT
issued in the name of CMTC be held null and void due to
irregularities in the conduct of the bidding specifically the
misrepresentation on the part of CMTC wherein it claimed
that it is a wholly Filipino owned corporation and that it is
not authorized to acquire real estate or invest its funds for
purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando also
alleged that GSIS disregarded his prior right to buy back
his family home and lot.
Petitioner GSIS filed its Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim. It alleged that Fernando has lost his right of
redemption for he failed to exercise the same within the
period fixed by law. In its counterclaim, GSIS alleged that
Fernando owed GSIS P 130,365.81 representing back
rentals and additional interests, and the additional
amount of P 249,800 representing rentals unlawfully
collected from CMTC.
RTC ruled in favor of GSIS and granted its counterclaim
and directed Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid
by CMTC in the amount of P 249,800. However, on
RTC, modified the portion of the judgment ordering
Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of P 249.800 since
the same is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim
which required the payment by GSIS of docket fees
before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction over the
said counterclaim. GSIS failed to pay the docket fees for
the same.
ISSUE: WON GSIS’ counterclaim representing the P 249,800
is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim or
compulsory counterclaim.
HELD: IT IS PERMISSIVE.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the
issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata
bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well
as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions
would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
The issue in the main action is entirely different from the
issue in the counterclaim. Considering that the
counterclaim is permissive in nature, we follow the rule in
permissive counterclaims which states that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over the same, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. Since the petitioner failed to pay the docket fees,
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclain and the decision redered by the RTC is null
and void.
RE: GSIS’ CLAIM THAT IT IS EXEMPTED FROM ALL KINDS OF
FEES
FACTS: GSIS claimed that it is exempted to pay all kinds of
fees as provided for in its charter, specifically Section 39
of RA 8291.
HELD: In In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption
of the Government Service Insurance System from
Payment of Legal Fees,the Court ruled that the provision
in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act
No. 8291, which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds," cannot operate to
exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was
because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed
this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court
now has the sole authority to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts.
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2. Domingo Neypes vs Court of Appeals
G.R. no 141524 (Sept. 14, 2005)
CORONA, J
FRESH PERIOD RULE: “Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules.”
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and
titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
against private respondents.
Timeline:
February 12, 1998 - the trial court
dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the
ground that the action had already
prescribed.
March 3, 1998 - Petitioners allegedly
received a copy of the order of dismissal.
March 18, 1998 (15 days after the
dismissal) – Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.
July 1, 1998 - the trial court issued
another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners
received on July 22, 1998
July 27, 1998 (Five days later) - petitioners
filed a notice of appeal.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding
that it was filed eight days late.
Petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the Court of Appeals where it was dismissed. The
appellate court ruled that the 15-day period to appeal
should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the
day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of
appeal on time.
Ruling: YES. Petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 or the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration.
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word
“or” signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
“or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the July
1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on
July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days.
A party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day
period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.
3. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. and Fairways and Blue-
Waters Resort vs. Hon. Marietta J. Homena-Valencia
G.R. No. 173942
June 25, 2008
Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.:
SUBJECT:
Remedial Law: “Fresh Period Rule”
CASE BRIEF 2008-0571
FACTS:
In 1998, NAVAL et. al. filed a case against FIL-
ESTATE. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
NAVAL of which FIL-ESTATE moved for
reconsideration filed on 10 May 2000, thirteen (13)
days after petitioners received their copy of the
RTC’s decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an
order denying the motion. Petitioners alleged in
their petition that they received the order denying
the motion for reconsideration on 11 August 2005.
They filed a Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2005, or
beyond the reglementary period to perfect the
appeal which is 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s
Decision (this is because the 15 day fresh period
from the denial of the Motion for Recosideration or
Neypes Doctrine was promulgated on September
14, 2005). Consequently, the RTC denied the
appeal and such denial was sustained by the
Supreme Court in its Decision dated October 15,
2007.
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FIL-ESTATE filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
November 19, 2007 questioning the October 15,
2007 Decision of the Supreme Court. It argued that
following the Court’s 2005 decision in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, their Notice of Appeal was
perfected on time, that is, within fifteen (15) days
from their receipt of the RTC’s order denying their
motion for reconsideration. Neypes has established
a new rule whereby an appellant is granted a fresh
15-day period, reckoned from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration, within
which to perfect the appeal.
REPORT THIS AD
FIL-ESTATE argued that since they received the
RTC’s order denying their motion for reconsideration
on 11 August 2005, following Neypes, they were
entitled to a new 15-day period, i.e., until 26 August
2005 or one (1) day after they had posted the full
appellate docket fees, to perfect the appeal on
August 25, 2005.
ISSUE: Whether the “fresh period” rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14
September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
RULING:
Yes. Procedural laws may be given retroactive
effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, there being no vested rights
in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in
character as they do not create new or remove
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
——————————————————–
THINGS DECIDED:
A) Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect
to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage, there being no vested rights in the
rules of procedure.
B) Procedural rules are remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights,
but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.
4. G.R. No. 173038 September 14, 2011
ELENA JANE DUARTE, Petitioner,
vs.
MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN, Respondent.
Facts:
According to respondent, on February 14, 2002, he
offered to sell a laptop computer for the sum of
P15,000.00 to petitioner thru the help of a common friend,
Josephine Dy. Since petitioner was undecided,
respondent left the laptop with petitioner for two
days. On February 16, 2002, petitioner told respondent
that she was willing to buy the laptop on
installment. Respondent agreed; thus, petitioner gave
P5,000.00 as initial payment and promised to pay
P3,000.00 on February 18, 2002 and P7,000.00 on March
15, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner gave her
second installment of P3,000.00 to Dy, who signed the
handwritten receiptallegedly made by petitioner as proof
of payment. But when Dy returned to get the remaining
balance on March 15, 2002, petitioner offered to pay
only P2,000.00 claiming that the laptop was only worth
P10,000.00.Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the
remaining balance, respondent thru counsel sent
petitioner a demand letter dated July 29, 2002.
Petitioner, however, denied writing the receipt dated
February 18, 2002, and receiving the demand letter
dated July 29, 2002. Petitioner claimed that there was no
contract of sale. Petitioner said that Dy offered to sell
respondent's laptop but because petitioner was not
interested in buying it, Dy asked if petitioner could instead
lend respondent the amount of P5,000.00. Petitioner
agreed and in turn, Dy left the laptop with petitioner. On
February 18, 2002, Dy came to get the laptop but
petitioner refused to give it back because the loan was
not yet paid. Dy then asked petitioner to lend an
additional amount of P3,000.00 to respondent who
allegedly was in dire need of money. Petitioner gave the
money under agreement that the amounts she lent to
respondent would be considered as partial payments for
the laptop in case she decides to buy it. Sometime in the
first week of March 2002, petitioner informed respondent
that she has finally decided not to buy the
laptop. Respondent, however, refused to pay and
insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.
Issues:
(1) The timeliness of the filing of the Petition for Review
with the CA;
(2) The existence of a contract of sale;
(3) Respondent's entitlement to attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.
Held:
The Petition for Review was
timely filed with the CA
That litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days
within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the
Rules of Court; counted from May 27, 2004, the date
respondent received the RTC Order dated May 13, 2004
denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Decision dated March 19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004,
3
within which to file his Petition for Review with the CA.
Thus, we find that when he filed the Petition for Review
with the CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not
yet lapsed.
There was a contract of sale between the parties
As to whether there was a contract of sale between the
parties, we hold that there was, and the absence of a
written contract of sale does not mean otherwise. A
contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties
agree upon the object of the sale, the price, and the
terms of payment.Once perfected, the parties are bound
by it whether the contract is verbal or in writing because
no form is required.
In this case, the contract of sale had been partially
executed because the possession of the laptop was
already transferred to petitioner and the partial
payments had been made by her. Thus, the absence of
a written contract is not fatal to respondent's case.
The award for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses was proper
Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the legal
grounds which justify or warrant the grant of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, among which is when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
incur expenses to protect his interest
The interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
however, shall apply from the finality of judgment until
the total amount awarded is fully paid.
5. ERNESTO DY v. BIBAT-PALAMOS
[GR. No. 196200; September 11, 2013]
Facts:
 Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes
Dy (Lourdes), were the proprietors of Limchia
Enterprises which was engaged in the shipping
business.
 In 1990, Limchia Enterprises obtained a loan from Orix
Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent)
to fund its acquisition of M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel.
o A chattel mortgage was thereafter
executed over M/V Pilar-I
 Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was
attacked by pirates, Spouses Dy failed to make the
scheduled payments as required in their promissory
note.
 After receiving several demand letters from
respondent, Spouses Dy applied for the restructuring
of their loan. However, the checks they issued were
dishonored.
 Respondent filed a Complaint and Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Preferred Ship Mortgage
under Presidential Decree No. 1521 with Urgent Prayer
for Attachment at the
o RTC which granted it.
o M/V Pilar-I was transferred to Colorado
Shipyard Corporation (Colorado).
 In 1997, the RTC then rendered a decision in favor of
Spouses Dy, ruling that they had not yet defaulted on
their loan because respondent agreed to a
restructured schedule of payment. There being no
default, the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on
M/V Pilar-I was premature and the vessel should be
returned to Spouses Dy.
o The decision was affirmed by CA and SC.
 On August 17, 2010 (or 20 years after), petitioner filed
a motion for execution of judgment with the RTC.
 In the intervening period, Colorado informed the RTC
that M/V Pilar-I sank.
o Respondent claims that since the vessel
sank, it ask the court to have the parts
cut into pieces and sold. The proceeds
of which are to be given to petitioner.
o Petitioner insisted that he had the right to
require that the vessel be returned to him
in the same condition that it had been at
the time it was wrongfully seized by
respondent or, should it no longer be
possible, that another vessel of the same
tonnage, length and beam similar to
that of M/V Pilar-I be delivered.
o Respondent responded that recovering
the vessel would be impossible and if
petitioner still insist on doing so, petitioner
should bear the costs.
 RTC claimed that it had no right to change the
decision in a motion for execution since the
judgement had already become final. It claimed that
the SC has not decided that petitioner had the right
to insist on its claim to have the original vessel be
returned or new one with a same specification be
given. Also, the deterioration and eventual sinking of
the vessel did not happen overnight, respondents
should have raised the issue while it is being tried by
the SC.
o The petitioner filed an MR but was
denied so they directly went to the SC.
Issue/s:
1) Whether petitioner was justified in resorting directly to
this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65—
YES
2) Whether petitioner is entitled to the return of M/V Pilar-I
in the same condition when it was seized by
respondent. —YES
Held/Ratio: Petition GRANTED. Respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner the value of M/V Pilar- I at the time it was
wrongfully seized by it.
4

1) YES. The case falls under one of the exceptions for the
court to take cognizance of it under its original
jurisdiction under Rule 65. The 20 years it took for the
court to adjudge the case warrants the relaxation of
the rules.
o Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct
recourse to this Court is improper because the
Supreme Court is a court of last resort
 It must remain to be so in order for it to
devote its time and attention to matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction and prevent
the overcrowding of its docket.
o Nonetheless, the invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been
allowed in certain instances on the ground of
special and important reasons such as
 (1) when dictated by the public welfare
and the advancement of public policy;
 (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice;
 (3) when the challenged orders were
patent nullities; or
 (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct
handling of the case.
o This case falls under one of the exceptions to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Justice demands
that this Court take cognizance of this case to put
an end to the controversy and resolve the matter
which has been dragging on for more than twenty
(20) years.
o Additionally, petitioner asserts that there is
GADALEJ warranting a Rule 65 petition. It claims
that its failure to rule in its favor and relax the rules
considering that the case has been languishing for
18 years is GADALEJ.
 Respondent claim that there is no
GADALEJ since it merely observed due
process and followed the principle that an
execution order may not vary or go
beyond the terms of the judgment it seeks
to enforce.
 Respondent claims that an ordinary
appeal should be done and not a
certiorari under Rule 65.
o Difference of ordinary appeal to certiorari under
Rule 65
Ordinary Appeal Certiorari under Rule 65
Remedy for errors of To correct errors of
judgment, whether based jurisdiction, defined to be
on the law or the facts of those "in which the act
the case or on the wisdom complained of was issued
or legal soundness of a by the court, officer, or
decision quasi-judicial body without
or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of
discretion which is
tantamount to lack of in
excess of jurisdiction.
o A court or tribunal can only be considered to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion if its exercise of
judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be
equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction.
o The GR is that there should be a strict application of
rules. However, this case is an exception since strict
application of procedural technicalities would hinder
the expeditious disposition of this case on the merits.
2) YES. The case falls under the supervening event
exception rule which calls on for the court to change
its decision contrary to the rule on the doctrine of
immutability of judgments. Respondent only informed
the court of the sinking of the vessel after it has
rendered its decision.
o Respondent insist that the RTC correctly followed
the rule on immutability of judgement at the
motion for execution. Petitioner cannot ask for the
modification of the judgement when it not asked
for the return of the vessel when the case was
being tried on its evidence and merit.
o This Court is not unaware of the doctrine of
immutability of judgments. Its purpose is to avoid
delay in the orderly administration of justice and to
put an end to judicial controversies.
 When a judgment becomes final and
executory, it is made immutable and
unalterable, meaning it can no longer be
modified in any respect either by the court
which rendered it or even by this Court.
 Even at the risk of occasional errors, public
policy and sound practice dictate that
judgments must become final at some
point
o As with every rule, however, this admits of certain
exceptions. When a supervening event renders the
execution of a judgment impossible or unjust, the
interested party can petition the court to modify
the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the
facts.
 A supervening event is a fact which
transpires or a new circumstance which
develops after a judgment has become
final and executory. This includes matters
which the parties were unaware of prior to
or during trial because they were not yet in
existence at that time.
o In this case, the sinking of M/V Pilar-I can be
considered a supervening event. Petitioner, who
5
 did not have possession of the ship, was only
informed of its destruction when Colorado filed its
Manifestation, dated July 29, 2010, long after the
September 11, 2009 Decision of this Court on the
validity of foreclosure of the vessel.
 During the course of the proceedings in
the RTC, the CA and this Court, petitioner
could not have known of the worsened
condition of the vessel because it was in
the possession of Colorado.
o The modification of the Court’s decision is
warranted by the superseding circumstances, that
is, the severe damage to the vessel subject of the
case and the belated delivery of this information to
the courts by the party in possession of the same.
6. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225 September 6, 2011
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge,
RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, Respondent.
- Doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference-
FACTS:
This case originated from an action for damages
filed in the RTC of Illigan City against Mindanao State
University (MSU) arising from a vehicular accident that
caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries
to several others. On November 29, 1997, the RTC
rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the Iligan City RTC
decision and the CA decision subsequently lapsed to
finality.
On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued a
writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to comply
with the writ. Thus, a sheriff served a Notice of
Garnishment on the MSU’s depository bank. The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the motion for
execution in behalf of MSU which was denied by the RTC
of Illigan. The MSU responded to the denial by filing on
April 1, 2009 a petition with the Marawi City RTC, for
prohibition and mandamus with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction. The petition of MSU was raffled to
the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent
Judge. The respondent Judge set the hearing for the
application for the issuance of a TRO on April 8, 2009.
Later on, the respondent judge approved the TRO.
On May 8, 2009, complainant, counsel of the
private plaintiffs, filed the complaint charging the
respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or
Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Judicial Service. This was due to respondent’s
interference with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6
of the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO. The respondent
Judge denied the allegation by explaining that he merely
gave the parties the opportunity to be heard.
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) found the respondent Judge
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the
elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings
of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Was the respondent Judge violated the
elementary rule of non-interference with the proceedings
of a court of co-equal jurisdiction?
HELD:
Yes. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court
of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the
relief sought by the injunction.
6
 The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction. A court that acquires jurisdiction
over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its
incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
In the present case, the respondent Judge
clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by issuing
a TRO to temporarily restrain the sheriff from enforcing the
writ of execution issued by a co-equal court and from
pursuing the garnishment. The respondent Judge was
aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to the
execution phase of a final decision of a co-equal and
coordinate court.
The respondent Judge should have refrained
from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any question
on the enforcement of the writ of execution.
7. G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
Estoppel by laches
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
MARCH 12, 2019
FACTS:
The spouses Tijam filed a case against the spouses
Sibonghanoy to recover the sum of P1,908.00, with legal
interest, plus costs.
A writ of attachment was issued by the court against
defendants’ properties, but the same was dissolved upon
the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. (Surety).
The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and, after the same had become final and executory,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the
Surety’s bond. The Surety filed its opposition on these
grounds: (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a
demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount
due under the judgment.
Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon
failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs
filed a second motion for execution against the
counterbond.
Upon failure of Surety to file an answer, the Court granted
the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was
issued.
Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing
provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to
the CA.
The CA affirmed the order appealed from.
Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision,
it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which
to file a motion for reconsideration.
The CA granted the motion.
Two days later the Surety filed a MOTION TO DISMISS,
alleging:
that appellee’s action was filed in the CFI for the
recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only;
that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had
already become effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all
civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs;
That the CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and
decide the case. In other words, nisubmit siya sa
jurisdiction sa court at the outset by filing affirmative
reliefs. Subsequently, gi nag-file na pod siyag motion to
dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court citing RA
296.
The CA required the appellees to answer the motion to
dismiss, but they failed to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.
RULING:
(1)Rule on jurisdiction of courts
NO! The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case, We are of the opinion that the Surety is now
barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour
for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in
the case with its active participation.
7
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party, it could have raised the question
of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI to take cognizance of
the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It
failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of
Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
(2) Discussion on laches in relation to jurisdiction
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
The Court frowns upon the “undesirable practice” of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting
the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse.
8. GR No. 147406 JULY 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES, PETTIONER
Vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
FACTS
On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. In his appeal
before the CA, the petitioner questioned for the first time
the RTC’s jurisdiction.
CA, however, considered the petitioner to have actively
participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked
the jurisdiction of RTC; thus, he was already estopped by
laches from asserting the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
[Sidenote: While not an issue, the SC clarified that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution
of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. In this case, at the time
the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now
Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section
32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been
amended by Republic Act No. 7691. And so as the
imposable penalty for the crime charged is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods
(imprisonment for 2 years 4 months and 1 day, to 6 years),
jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on MTC.
Therefore, the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the
case.]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General
acknowledge the fact that RTC did not have jurisdiction,
they nevertheless are of the position that the principle of
estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, the trial went
on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating
therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack
of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be
raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As
undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.
ISSUE
Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC,
notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner failed to raise
the issue during the trial and the alleged laches in relation
to the doctrine in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.
HELD
8
Yes. SC dismissed the case without prejudice. DOCTRINE

The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is
the exception rather than the general rule. For it to be
invoked, laches should clearly be present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had abandoned or declined to assert it.
The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Such jurisdiction
is conferred by law and not by mere consent of the
parties.

SC clarified that in its past decisions concerning the same

issue, it wavered on when to apply the exceptional
circumstance in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the
general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and
expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should,
however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from 9. G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a vs.
person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT
court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its CORPORATION, Respondent.
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. FACTS
This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development
secure any advantage or the adverse party does not
Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
suffer any harm. Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration
of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value of
₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the ₱14,920 for the entire property, more particularly
petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre,
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters,
located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. 3
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that
time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches
to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case
for initial hearing on 22 October 1997.4 On 7 August 1997,
not sustain the defense of estoppel by laches unless it
it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4
further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not
November 1997.5
sought to enforce them until the condition of the party
pleading laches has in good faith become so changed
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application
that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights
for registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were
be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of
still with the RTC.6
title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In
applying the principle of estoppel by laches in the
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted
exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein
motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San
considered the patent and revolting inequity and Juan, because the assessed value of the property was
unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their allegedly less than ₱100,000.7
Calvary once more after more or less 15 years. The same,
however, does not obtain in the instant case.
Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General
Default8 and commenced with the reception of
evidence.9 Among the documents presented by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review respondent in support of its application are Tax
on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is Declarations,10 a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,11 and
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. a Certification from the Department of Environment and

9
Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that
the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable
zone.Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent
Corporation.
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,14 the CA ruled
that since the former had actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise
the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court on appeal.15 The CA further found that respondent
Corporation had sufficiently established the latter’s
registrable title over the subject property after having
proven open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by itself
and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak
of World War II.16
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Republic can be
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court over the application
for original registration of land title even for
the first time on appeal
2. Whether or not the municipal trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the application for
original registration of land title.
HELD
FIRST ISSUE: NO.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question
only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.18 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law.19 It cannot
be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence
of the court.20 Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may
be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.21
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that "a party may be
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he
has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in
the event that the judgment or order subsequently
rendered is adverse to him"22 is based on the doctrine of
estoppel by laches
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the
exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration when the records were still with the RTC. 25 At
that point, petitioner could not have questioned the
delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the
case was not yet with that court. When the records were
transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings
nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On
appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional
question in its Brief.26 Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of
estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it."27 In this case,
petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable
failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it
has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question
the lower court's jurisdiction.
SECOND ISSUE: YES.
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction
over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner
Republic raised two points of contention: (a) the period
for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing; and
(b) the value of the land to be registered.
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to
acquire jurisdiction over the application, because the
RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond
the 90-day period provided under the Property
Registration Decree.28
We disagree.
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application,
issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor
later than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was
filed on 17 July 1997.29 On 18 July 1997, or a day after the
filing of the application, the RTC immediately issued an
Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997, which was 96 days from the Order.30 While the date
set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided
for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the jurisdiction of
the trial court
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize
respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for
registration on account of events beyond its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7
August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997,33 within the 90-day period provided by law,
petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect
10
was still not cured, as the second Order was issued more
than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property
Registration Decree.34
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the date and
hour of the initial hearing within five days from the filing of
the application for registration, as provided in the
Property Registration Decree, did not affect the court’s its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was
merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that
period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the
case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is
mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject
matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
the law.35 It cannot be contingent upon the action or
inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that
the law deliberately meant the provision "to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter."36 However, the records of this case do not show
such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC
immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after
the filing of the application for registration,37 except that it
had to issue a second Order because the initial hearing
had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law.
Second, petitioner contended38 that since the selling
price of the property based on the Deed of Sale
annexed to respondent’s application for original
registration was ₱160,000,39 the MTC did not have
jurisdiction over the case. Under Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,40 the MTC’s
delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which
should not exceed ₱100,000.
We are not persuaded.
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and
land registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, which provides:
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), such value to be
ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of
the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and
land registration cases in two instances: first, where there
is no controversy or opposition; or, second, over
contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
₱100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance,
because petitioner opposed respondent Corporation’s
application for registration on 8 January 1998.41
However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second
instance, because the value of the lot in this case does
not exceed ₱100,000.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained
with reference to the corresponding Tax Declarations
submitted by respondent Corporation together with its
application for registration. From the records, we find that
the assessed value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and
₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire
property.43 Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident
that the total value of the land in question does not
exceed ₱100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its
delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, as amended.
10.
CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA, Petitioner,
vs.
EMELITA BERNARDO, EVELYN BERNARDO as Guardian of
Erlyn, Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo,* Respondents.
G.R. No. 170251 June 1, 2011
FACTS:
Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by
Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera (Alfredo) for
interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment
and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area
of 7,993 square meters.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was
originally owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto
Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto S.
Bernardo.The parcel of land was later on covered by Tax
Declaration No. CD-006-0828 under the name of the
respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of
the subject property consisting of about 700 square
meters was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father,
from a certain Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of
Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter
lot.
The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim
over the subject property. Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S.
Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
11

CA: COSLAP has exclusive jurisdiction over the
present case and, even assuming that the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute
of the parties herein, petitioner is already
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
because Alfredo failed to raise the issue of lack
of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively
participated in the proceedings before the said
body.
Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory
powers to settle and decide the question of ownership
over the subject land. Further, the present case cannot
be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never
resorted to violence in resolving the controversy.
Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of
the subject property.
ISSUE: Has COSLAP jurisdiction to decide the question of
ownership between the parties?
HELD:
NO.
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body
established as a means of providing a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of land problems among small
settlers, landowners and members of the cultural
minorities to avoid social unrest.
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in
acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to
wit:
(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such
case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into
account the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action.
In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or
to refer the same to the particular agency concerned,
the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of
the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of
the questions raised, and the need for immediate and
urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or
problem
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of respondents' complaint. The present
case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated
under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No.
561.The dispute between the parties is not critical and
explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of
parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social
tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as
involving a critical situation that requires immediate
action.
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP
pertains to their claim of ownership over the subject
property, which is an action involving title to or possession
of real property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the
Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed value
of the subject property
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all
the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered,
are null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial
body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source
of any right or create any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Having no legal effect, the situation is the
same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It
leaves the parties in the position they were before the
proceedings.
Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped
from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a
person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction
must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. GRANTED.
11. SANTE VS. CLARAVALL
FACTS:
On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of
Baguio City a complaint for damages against petitioners.
In her complaint, respondent alleged that while she was
inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in
the presence of other persons and police officers,
petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when
translated in English are as follows, "How many rounds of
sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You
fuckin’ bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s
friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards
detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the
killing of petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also
allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling
people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects
in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that
petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the
amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation
expenses; and costs of suit. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had
jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount
12
of the claim for moral damages was not more than the
jurisdictional amount of ₱300,000.00, because the claim
for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total claim.
RTC Ruling:
the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court
held that the total claim of respondent amounted to
₱420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount
for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.
CA Ruling:
On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh
Division, promulgated a decision finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of [the] Regional Trial Court. The
Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under
the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that
plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the
amount of ₱300,000.00, which amount was well within the
jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.
Petitioners Contention:
Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC. They maintain that the
claim for moral damages, in the amount of ₱300,000.00 in
the original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary
damages being discretionary should not Anonymous
Lawyer (https://www.facebook.com/Anonymouslawer/)
be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount. And having no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it allowed the amendment of the
complaint to increase the claim for moral damages in
order to confer jurisdiction.
Respondent Contention:
In her Comment, respondent averred that the nature of
her complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the
totality of the claim for damages, including the
exemplary damages as well as the other damages
alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses, should be included in
determining jurisdiction. The total claim being
₱420,000.00, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not only the amount of moral damages
is the sole basis for determining which court has
jurisdiction in cases where damages is the main cause of
action.
HELD: NO. Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,17 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691,18 states: SEC. 19.
Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property
in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00).
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides: SEC. 5.
After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and
(8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as
amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter,
such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted
after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00).
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the
time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the
MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to
₱300,000.00. But where damages is the main cause of
action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for
in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which
court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the
damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as
exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s
fees, etc., be used? In this regard, Administrative Circular
No. 09-9419 is instructive: x x x x
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind"
in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19
(8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim
for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
In the instant case, the complaint filed a civil case
for the recovery of damages for the alleged
malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally
sought an award of moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for
the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent
by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at
a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff’s causes of action.
It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint,
that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence,
the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to
or consequences of the main action but constitute
the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages
claimed was ₱420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
case.13.Go vs Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010
Facts:
In 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana
Marketing Corporation, ventured into a business of
marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the
world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian
13
national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the
Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia
(AFFA).
The latter signed documents appointing Cordero as the
exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast
ferry vessel in Philippines. After negotiations with Felipe
Landicho and Vicente Tecson, lawyers of Allan C Go who
is the owner or operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu
City, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase
of two (2) SEACAT 25. As agreed Cordero shall receive
commissions totaling 22.43% of the purchase price, from
the sale of each vessel.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis
Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for
a second catamaran engine from their company.
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was
given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even
made Cordero believe there would be no further sale
between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
Consequently, Cordero instituted a Civil Case seeking to
hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly
and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and
wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his
due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and
failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was
no act committed in violation of the distributorship
agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on
December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in
default for failure to file his answer within the period
granted by the trial court.13 As for Go and Tecson, their
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of
action was likewise denied by the trial court on February
26, 1999.14 Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying
that they have anything to do with the termination by
AFFA of Cordero’s authority as exclusive distributor in the
Philippines.
The trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and against the defendants.
Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial but the Trial Court
denied the same. In the same order, Cordero’s motion for
execution pending-appeal was granted.
CA affirmed the Trial Court in allowing Cordero to
present his evidence ex-parte, in finding that it was
Cordero and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA
as the exclusive distributor in the Phil, and in finding that
Cordero is entitled to a commission per vessel.
Issue:
WON Cordero has the legal personality to sue the
respondents for breach of contract
Held:
Yes. Real Party-in-Interestas required by Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one
(1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes
of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of
actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the
case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal
relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a
multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and
keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public
policy.31 A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue
upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
action.32
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was
Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor
of AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification
dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson.
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never
raised petitioner Cordero’s lack of personality to sue on
behalf of Pamana,39 and did so only before the CA when
they contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero, who
was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for
AFFA.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling
Robinson’s objection over the improper resort to
summons by publication upon a foreign national like him
and in an action in personam, notwithstanding that he
raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil
case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them in the manner required by law or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.42 A party who makes a special appearance in
court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on
the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.43
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds
the lack of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he
had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate
responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in
the summons by publication.44 Such motion did not state
that it was a conditional appearance entered to
question the regularity of the service of summons, but an
appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the summons by publication issued by
the court and praying for additional time to file a
responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having
acknowledged the summons by publication and also
having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure
affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he
effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s
jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise,
even before this Court.
14
Hence, petitions are denied
12. G.R. NO. 151800 : November 5, 2009
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF MARGARITA
VDA. DE VENTURA, represented by PACITA V. PASCUAL,
EMILIANO EUSEBIO, JR., and CARLOS RUSTIA, Respondents
Facts:
Heirs of Margarita Ventura ( the Heirs) filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a complaint for Falsification of Public
Documents and violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against
Zenaida Palacio and spouses Edilberto and Celerina
Darang. Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated
Celerina to investigate the claims of the Heirs agaist her
former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the report
with public documents which she falsified and Palacio
issed a recommendation based on that report to award
the landholding in dispute to Edilberto.
The DARAB recommended that the charged against the
respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The CA then took cognizance of the case and granted
the provisional dismissal the complaint against
respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 but
denied the dismissal of the complaint for falsification of
public documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore,
review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.
That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and
orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on
the case is void.
13. G.R. No. 152131 April 29, 2009
FLORAIDA TERAÑA vs. HON. ANTONIO DE SAGUN,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XIV,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS AND ANTONIO B. SIMUANGCO
BRION, J.:
Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Answer; A denial
made without setting forth the substance of the matters
relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so
is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.—
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides
that material allegations in the complaint which are not
specifically denied, other than the amount of
unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial
made without setting forth the substance of the matters
relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so
is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.
FACTS: The respondent Antonio Simuangco owned a
house and lot at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas,
which he leased to the petitioner Floraida Terena.
Sometime in 1996, the petitioner demolished the leased
house and erected a new one in its place.The
respondent alleged that this was done without his
consent. The petitioner allegedly violated the provisions in
the contract of lease which provides: To keep the leased
property in such repair and condition as it was in the
commencement of the Lease with the exception of
portions or parts which may be impaired due to
reasonable wear and tear; and Not to make any
alterations in the Leased property without the knowledge
and consent of the Lessor.
On February 3, 1997, the respondent sent a letter
demanding the petitioner to vacate the leased
property. Despite this letter of demand, which the
petitioner received, she still refused to vacate the said
property.
The respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on
the ground of the petitioner’s violation of the terms of the
Contract of Lease. The respondent prayed for the
petitioner’s ejectment of the leased property, and for the
award of ₱70,000.00, representing the cost of the
materials from the demolished house, attorney’s fees,
and costs.
The MTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff
Antonio B. Simuangco and against the defendant Aida
Terana, despite the parties’ failure to timely file their
respective position papers. Ordering the defendant Aida
Terana and all persons claiming right under her to vacate
and surrender possession of the subject house to the
plaintiff and to pay Attorney’s fees.
The RTC called for a preliminary conference under
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
(RSP) and Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and
required the parties to file their position papers and
affidavits of their witnesses after they failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Instead of filing their position
papers, both parties moved for an extension of time to
file the necessary pleadings. The trial court denied both
motions on the ground that the RSP and the Rules of
Court, particularly Rule 70, Section 13(5), prohibit the filing
of a motion for extension of time.
The RTC initially affirmed decision of the MTC, however, it
granted the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner,
reversing its judgment, as well as the decision of the MTC.
It noted that: 1) the MTC rendered its decision before the
petitioner was able to file her position paper and the
affidavit of her witnesses; 2) the rule on the timeliness of
filing pleadings may be relaxed on equitable
considerations; and 3) the denial of the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and/or new trial will result to a
miscarriage of justice. Thus, believing that it was equitable
15
to relax the rules on the timeliness of the filing of
pleadings, the RTC remanded the case to the MTC for
further proceedings, after giving the respondent the
opportunity to submit his position paper and the affidavits
of his witnesses.
The petitioner challenged the order of remand through
another motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the
motion noting that the petitioner missed the whole point
of the reversal of the decision. First, the reversal was
made in the interest of substantial justice and the RTC
hewed more to the "spirit that vivifieth than to the letter
that killeth," and that "a lawsuit is best resolved on its full
merits, unfettered by the stringent technicalities of
procedure." The RTC further emphasized that a remand is
not prohibited under the Rules of Court and that Section
6 of Rule 135 allows it.
The CA affirmed the RTC. The CA noted that the RTC’s
order of remand was not just based on equity and
substantial justice, but was also based on law, specifically
Section 6 of Rule 135. Thus, the CA ruled that the RTC did
not err in remanding the case to the MTC and ordering
the conduct of further proceedings after giving the
respondent an opportunity to present his position paper
and the affidavits of his witnesses.
This ruling did not satisfy petitioner, giving way to the
present petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON, under the Rules of Summary Procedure (RSP), the
RTC, as well as the CA, may order the case remanded to
the MTC after the respondent, failed to submit evidence
in support of his complaint because his Position Paper,
affidavit of witnesses and evidence, were not submitted
on time and the extension of time to file the same was
denied because it is prohibited under the Rules on
Summary Procedure
2. Whether, the petitioner no longer need to prove her
defense that the demolition and construction were done
with the respondent’s knowledge and consent
3. WON, an action for reimbursement or for recovery of
damages may be properly joined with the action for
ejectment
RULING:
1st Issue: A remand of the case to the lower courts is no
longer necessary in this case, given the pleadings and
submissions filed, and the records of the proceedings
below. A remand would delay the overdue resolution of
this case and would run counter to the spirit and intent of
the Rules of Summary Procedure (RSP). The intent and
terms of the RSP both speak against the liberality that the
petitioner sees. By its express terms, the purpose of the
RSP is to "achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination" of the cases they cover, among them,
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. To achieve
this objective, the RSP expressly prohibit certain motions
and pleadings that could cause delay, among them, a
motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or
any other paper. Nevertheless, the failure of one party to
submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC from
issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint.
2nd Issue: The petitioner’s contention is misplaced.
The petitioner contends that the Court should not give
credence to the respondent’s claim that he neither had
knowledge of nor gave his consent to her acts. She
argued that the respondent had the burden of proving
this allegation with positive evidence after she frontally
denied it in her answer. Since the respondent failed to
discharge this burden, she argues that she no longer
needed to prove her defense that the demolition and
construction were done with the respondent’s
knowledge and consent.
First, the material allegations in a complaint must be
specifically denied by the defendant in his answer.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he
shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of a material averment made in the complaint,
he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court likewise provides
that material allegations in the complaint which are not
specifically denied, other than the amount of
unliquidated damages, are deemed admitted. A denial
made without setting forth the substance of the matters
relied upon in support of the denial, even when to do so
is practicable, does not amount to a specific denial.
The petitioner’s denial in her answer consists of the
following:
1. Maliban sa personal na katangian at tirahan ng
nasasakdal, ay walang katotuhanan ang mga
isinasakdal ng nagsasakdal;
2. Na hindi lumabag sa kasunduan ng upahan ang
nasasakdal;
3. Na, ang pagpapagawa ng bahay na inuupahan ng
nasasakdal ay sa kaalaman at kapahintulutan ng
nagsasakdal at higit na gumanda at tumibay ang bahay
ng nagsasakdal sa pamamagitan ng pagpapagawa ng
nasasakdal; xxx
The court do not find the denial to be specific as the
petitioner failed to set forth the substance of the matters
in which she relied upon to support her denial. The
petitioner merely alleged that consent was given; how
16
and why, she did not say. If indeed consent were given, it
would have been easy to fill in the details. She could
have stated in her pleadings that she verbally informed
the respondent of the need for the repairs, or wrote him a
letter. She could have stated his response, and how it was
conveyed, whether verbally or in writing. She could have
stated when the consent was solicited and procured.
These, she failed to do. Therefore, the petitioner is
deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the
complaint.
Second, both parties failed to present evidence other
than the allegations in their pleadings. Thus, the court
may weigh the parties’ allegations against each other.
The petitioner presented a general denial, while the
respondent set forth an affirmative assertion. The Court
has time and again said that a general denial cannot be
given more weight than an affirmative assertion.
3rd Issue: No, an action for reimbursement or for recovery
of damages may not be properly joined with the action
for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action
requiring a full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful
detainer is a special civil action which requires a
summary procedure. The joinder of the two actions is
specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in
one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as
many causes of action as he may have against an
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or
actions governed by special rules
14. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH
AIRWAYS, respondent. G.R. No. 171092. March 15, 2010.*
FACTS:
4/28/2005 – Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against British Airways at Makati RTC, due to the poor
customer service she has experienced with the airline
while flying from London to Rome on Feb. 28, 2005.
(refusal to help in placing her hand carried luggage;
singling her out as ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in
need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of
the plane; ground customer service declaration that the
FAs were only doing their job)
The petitioner prayed that respondent pays her the ff:
- P5 million as moral damages
- P2 million as nominal damages
- P1 million as exemplary damages
- P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees
- P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and
- cost of the suit.
5/16/2005 – The summons and a copy of the complaint
were served on British Airways through Violeta Echevarria,
General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc.
5/30/2005 - British Airways, via special appearance
through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the caseand over the person of
the respondent.
OVER THE CASE
(Only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome,
Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages
pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1).) check
Escra
Thus, since
a) British Airways is domiciled in London;
b) British Airways’ principal place of business is in
London;
c) Lhuillier bought her ticket in Italy (through Jeepney
Travel S.A.S, in Rome);6 and
d) Rome, Italy is petitioner’s place of destination
then it follows that the complaint should only be filed in
the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome,
Italy.
OVER THE PERSON
No jurisdiction - summons was erroneously served on
Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. which is not its resident
agent in the Philippines.
RTC:
6/3/2005 - issued an Order requiring:
- Lhuillier to file her Comment/Opposition on the
Motion to Dismiss within 10 days from notice
thereof, and for British Airways to file a Reply
thereon.
6/27/2005 - Instead of filing a Comment/Opposition,
Lhuillier filed on Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Formal
Amendment to the Complaint and Issuance of Alias
Summons.
(change name of respondent. Lhuillier found out that the
resident agent of British Airways in the Philippines is Alonzo
Q. Ancheta, via SEC verification)
9/9/2005 - Lhuillier filed a Motion to Resolve Pending
Incident and Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.
10/14/2005 – granted British Airways’ Motion to Dismiss
Warsaw Convention is applicable in this case. PH is a
signatory, therefore, bound to its provisions, including the
place where actions involving damages to Lhuillier is to
be instituted, as provided for under Article 28(1) thereof.
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff
may bring the action for damages before the court:
WHERE? IN THIS CASE.. WHY NOT?
where the carrier PH courts NO PH is not the
is domiciled jurisdiction place of
domicile of British
Airways
where the carrier PH courts NO PH is not the
has its principal jurisdiction principal place
place of business of business
17
where the carrier PH courts NO Lhuillier’s ticket place of departure) or Rome, Italy (Lhuillier’s place of
has an jurisdiction NOT issued in PH destination).
establishment by
which the The Convention also applies because the air travel,
contract has where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was
been made between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both
of the place of PH courts NO Lhuillier’s signatories to the Warsaw Convention. Petitioner’s place
destination jurisdiction destination is in of departure was London, United Kingdom while her
Rome, not PH. place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United
Kingdom and Italysigned and ratified the Warsaw
Following pacta sunt servanda (PIL: every treaty in force is Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in deemed to be an “international carriage” within the
good faith), the case must be referred to the court of coverage of the Warsaw Convention.
proper jurisdiction (London or Rome). This does not
constitute constructive denial of plaintiff’s right to have Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case,
access to our courts since the Warsaw Convention itself then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
provided for jurisdiction over cases arising from is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
international transportation.
Re: Issue 2:
1/4/2006 – RTC denied Motion for reconsideration. Lhuillier
British Airways, in seeking remedies from the trial court
directly went to SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari on
through special appearance of counsel, is not deemed to
pure questions of law.
have voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
trial court.
ISSUE: (JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
AND OVER PERSON OF RESPONDENT) In Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, SC ruled
that Special Appearance to Question a Court’s
1. WON PH courts have jurisdiction over a tortious Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance. A defendant
conduct committed against a PH citizen by a who files a motion to dismiss assailing the jurisdiction of
foreign carrier’s airline personnel, travelling the court over his person together with other grounds
beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country raised therein is not deemed to have appeared
(outside coverage of Warsaw Convention) voluntarily before the court.

2. WON British Airways, in filing motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over subject matter
of the case and over the person, is deemed as
have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
lower court (esp defense lawyer is the resident
agent of British Airways
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage,
but from the tortious conduct committed by airline
personnel of British Airways (violating Civil Code on
Human Relations). Asserts that she has the option to
pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine
laws.
Respondent’s Arguments:
Petitioner’s claim for damages fell within the ambit of
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the
same can only be filed before the courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.
RULING:
Re: Issue 1:
PH courts have no jurisdiction over the case, since
Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in
this country. It says that an action for damages can only
be filed before the courts of London, United Kingdom
(British Airways domicile, place of business; Lhuillier’s
The general rule is defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
However, the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance. A special appearance before the court—
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other
grounds—is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by
the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person;
and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court.
ESCRA:
Place where plaintiff may bring the action for
damages.—Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for
damages before:
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal
place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an
establishment by which the contract has been
made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
Jurisdiction; Damages; Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention is jurisdictional in character.— A number of
reasons tends to support the characterization of Article
28(1) as a jurisdiction and not a venue provision.

18
 1. The wording of Article 32, which indicates the
places where the action for damages “must”
be brought, underscores the mandatory nature
of Article 28(1).
2. This characterization is consistent with one of
the objectives of the Convention, which is to
“regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air.”
3. The Convention does not contain any provision
prescribing rules of jurisdiction other than Article
28(1), which means that the phrase “rules as to
jurisdiction” used in Article 32 must refer only to
Article 28(1). In fact, the last sentence of Article
32 specifically deals with the exclusive
enumeration in Article 28(1) as “jurisdictions,”
which, as such, cannot be left to the will of the
parties regardless of the time when the
damage occurred.
15. OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs HERTZ PHIL.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.,
G.R. No. 183035 January 9, 2013
FACTS:
Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting
out commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants. On 9
March 2004, the parties amended their lease agreement
by shortening the lease period to two years and five
months, commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on
28 February 2006 (from the original period of 3 years).
Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly
sales and a significant decrease in its personnel’s
productivity due to renovations in the building. It then
requested a 50% discount on its rent for 4 months of 2005.
On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of
Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals for 7
months and utility bills for 4 months.
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to
Hertz, reminding the latter that the Contract of Lease
could be renewed only by a new negotiation between
the parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the
lessor at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease
period. As no letter was received from Hertz within the 90-
day period, Optima informed it that the lease would
expire on 28 February 2006 and would not be renewed.
On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly
advising Optima of the former’s desire to negotiate and
extend the lease. However, petitioner Optima no longer
entertained respondent’s notice.
On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a
letter requiring the latter to surrender and vacate the
leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract
of Lease on 28 February 2006. It likewise demanded
payment in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills and other
charges. Hertz, however, refused to vacate the leased
premises. As a result, Optima was constrained to file
before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Mandatory against Hertz.
Fourteen days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to file Answer with
Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with Counterclaim, in
spite of the alleged defective service of summons.
MeTC rendered a Decision, ruling that petitioner Optima
had established its right to evict Hertz from the subject
premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the
expiration of the period of lease.
RTC affirmed it by dismissing the appeal in a Decision
dated 16 March 2007.
CA ruled that, due to the improper service of summons,
the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz. It reversed the RTC and remanded the
case to the MeTC to ensure the proper service of
summons.
ISSUE: WON the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over
the person of respondent Hertz.
RULING:
YES.
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be acquired either by service of
summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance in
court and submission to its authority.
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s
voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Spouses Dy, we had occasion to
state:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case
is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule
that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of
motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.
This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
19
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution. (Emphases supplied)
The following statement appeared in respondent’s
Motion for Leave to File Answer:
In spite of the defective service of summons, the
defendant opted to file the instant Answer with
Counterclaim with Leave of Court, upon inquiring from
the office of the clerk of court of this Honorable Court
and due to its notice of hearing on March 29, 2005
application for TRO/Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was
received on March 26, 2006. Furthermore, the Answer
with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense
of improper service of summons. The defenses that it
pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari delicto,
performance of its obligations and lack of cause of
action. Finally, it even asserted its own counterclaim
against Optima.
Therefore, by virtue of the voluntary appearance of
respondent Hertz before the MeTC, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over respondent’s.
18. GOCHAN v. GOCHAN
G.R. No. 146089, December 13, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix
Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan
Realty Development Corporation. They offered to sell
their shares in the two corporations to the individual
petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban
Gochan, for and in consideration of the sum of
P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid the said
amount to respondents. Accordingly, respondents issued
to petitioners the necessary "Receipts."3 In addition,
respondents executed their respective "Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim,"4 wherein. they undertook that they would
not initiate any suit, action or complaint against
petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.
In turn, respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr.,
required individual petitioners to execute a "promissory
note,"5 undertaking not to divulge the actual
consideration they paid for the shares of stock.
Respondents then filed a complaint against
petitioners for specific performance and damages with
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising affirmative
defenses andone of whichis the lack of jurisdiction by the
trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
Petitioners then filed with the trial court a motion for a
preliminary hearing on the said defenses. But the trial
court denied the motion.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
above Order was also denied by the trial court.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals rendered
the appealed decision dismissing the petition on the
ground that respondent court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the affirmative
defenses.8
Again, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. Did the respondent filed and paid the
necessary docket fees to warrant court’s jurisdiction?
2. What is the real nature of the case?
3. What should be the basis for the assessment of
the correct docket fees?
RULING:
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is
not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the
complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether or not
respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that
the nature of an action is determined by the allegations
in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading.13 The caption of the complaint
below was denominated as one for "specific
performance and damages." The relief sought, however,
is the conveyance or transfer of real property, or
ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their
favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances,
the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it
does title to or possession of real property.
20
 In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of
Lucena,14 this Court held that a real action is one where
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as
indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an
action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.
It has also been held that where a complaint is
entitled as one for specific performance but nonetheless
prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of
land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover
the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real
action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the
proper court where the property is located:
In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is
one for specific performance, and, therefore,
personal and transitory in nature.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed
with the trial court was in the nature of a real action,
although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining
the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the
property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by
the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, provides:
Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. — x x x
(b) xxx xxx xxx
In a real action, the assessed value of the
property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and
shall be the basis in computing the fees.
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case
of Sun Insurance,16 to the effect that in case the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive period. However, the liberal
interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of
docket fees as applied in the case of Sun
Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as
respondents have never demonstrated any willingness to
abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees.
Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the
case they filed was one for specific performance and
damages and that they actually paid the correct docket
fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, which is directed to
forthwith conduct the preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.
SO ORDERED.
19. [G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002.]
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, Petitioner, v. LAURO, DOLORES,
RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO,
and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
FACTS :
On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael,
Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a
complaint2 for reconveyance of two (2) parcels of
coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda
Doria, and the estate of deceased Antonio Copioso, as
well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca,
Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.
Respondents alleged that they together with their
deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of
the subject property having inherited the same from their
parents, and that through fraud and machination
Antonio had the property transferred to his name and
that of spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria who
subsequently sold the same to third parties. When
respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for
bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject
property was P3,770.00, petitioner Lolita Copioso and
spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case
considering that the assessed value of the property was
lower than P20,000.00. The trial court in its twin orders of 5
and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss
holding that since the subject matter of the action was
beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its
jurisdiction.3 Lolita Copioso's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied,4 hence, she filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the
annulment of the twin orders of the trial court. The
appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for
reconveyance. Motion for reconsideration thereon was
similarly denied by the appellate court, hence this
petition.
ISSUE : WON denial of the motion to dismiss was correct.
HELD :
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is
neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in
relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA
7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary
estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation
to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of
pecuniary estimation
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129,
as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases
involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any
interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the
basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of
the real property involved, such that where the sum of
money or the assessed value of the real property does
21
not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that
amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title,
possession and interest of each of the contending parties
over the contested property the assessed value of which
falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC.
Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the
allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its
cognizance by the MTC
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which
comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession
of, or any interest in the real property under contention
but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance
or specific performance, and a claim for damages,
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only
issue involved herein is naked possession or bare
ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be
amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for
reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the
disputed property, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title,
ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined with
the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence
within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The
assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes
merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court,
when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not
determinative of its jurisdiction.
20. FIDEL DABUCO, FELICIANO EBINA, MELICIO BOLO,
AURELIO CABAJAR, EUSTIQUIO CABATUAN, RAFAEL
OCAREZA, SAMUEL RECO, ALEJANDRO IBONALO
TEMPLATURA, NEMESIO OBESO, ALEJANDRA CABILES,
JULIAN RESPONDE, CATALINO BORDAS, FELECISIMA BALILI,
FELIX PAGATPAT, NOLI BALILI, BONIFACIO BORDAS,
VICENTE GONZAGA, EUGENIO HABONITA, ARSENIO
BALDADO, DOMINADOR BORDAS, JUANA CABILES, DINDO
PAGATPAT, LUZVIMINDA LACERNA, ANTONIA TEE LADRAZO
AND VICENTE CABILES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND GABI MULTI PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, REPRESENTED BY MARIA QUISUMBING
ALVAREZ AND COL. SOLOMON DALID, RET., respondents.
G.R. No. 133775 January 20, 2000
FACTS:
The Lazarrabal family was the registered owners of the
properties, the subject matter of this case.
In 1991, on different occasions, the subject properties
were sold to Ruben Baculi, Editha Belocura, Lira Puno,
Rafael Lapuz, Ladrioro Montealto, Joel Masecampo,
Delsa N. Manay, Ilderim Castaares, Maria Theresa Puno,
and Jill Mendoza. On June 27, 1994, GABI Multi-Purpose
cooperative, a registered non-stock, non-profit
cooperative filed a civil complaint against DABUCO, et
al. who were found residing and/or tilling the subject
properties. The trial court issued a TRO enjoining Dabuco,
et al. to desist from further development of GABI’s
properties. The trial court then lifted the TRO upon failure
of GABI to prove its title over the properties. Dabuco, et
al. filed their answer alleging that GABI has no personality
to sue since they do not appear to be buyer of the
properties neither were the properties title in its name.
Dabuco filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action. GABI has no personality to sue and lack
of jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the case. GABI
appealed to the CA and the decision was revered.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the trial court on the ground
of lack of cause of action was proper.
HELD: The dismissal of the trial court was not proper.
Ratio: As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the
distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an
action: failure to state a cause of action, on the one
hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other hand.
The former refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the
pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of actual basis for
the action. Failure to state a cause may be raised in a
Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may
be raised any time. Dismissal for failure to state a cause
can be made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal
for lack of cause is usually made after questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations,
admissions or evidence presented.
We note that the issue of insufficiency of GABI’s cause of
action does not appear to have been passed upon by
the appellate court in its assailed decision.
It appears that the trial court dismissed the case on the
ground that GABI was not the owner of the lands or one
entitled to the possession thereof, and thus had no cause
of action. In dismissal for lack of cause of action, the
court in effect declared that plaintiff is not entitled to a
favorable judgment inasmuch as one or more elements
of his cause of action do not exist in fact.
Because questions of fact are involved, courts hesitate to
declare a plaintiff as lacking in cause of action. Such
declaration is postponed until the insufficiency of cause is
apparent from a preponderance of evidence. Usually,
this is done only after the parties have been given the
opportunity to present all relevant evidence on such
questions of fact.
We do not rule on whether GABI has a cause of action
against petitioners. What we are saying is that the trial
22
court’s ruling, to the effect that GABI had no title to the
lands and thus no cause of action, was premature.
Indeed, hearings were conducted. And the view of the
Court of Appeals was that such hearings were sufficient.
The Court disagrees with the appellate court’s ruling. The
hearing of July 27, 1994 was on the propriety of lifting the
restraining order. At such preliminary hearing, the trial
court required GABI to produce Certificates of Title to the
lands in its name. GABI admitted that it did not have such
Certificates, only Deeds of Sale from the registered
owners.
Anent petitioner’s thesis that dismissal of the complaint by
the trial court was proper of failure to state a cause of
action, we, likewise, find no valid basis to sustain the
same.
Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of
action is provided for by the Rules of Court.
In dismissal for failure to state a cause, the inquiry is into
the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. The test is whether the material allegations,
assuming these to be true, state ultimate facts which
constitute plaintiff’s cause of action, such that plaintiff is
entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law. The
general rule is that inquiry is confined to the four corners
of the complaint, and no other.
The general rule was applied by the Court of Appeals.
Said court stated:
It is a well-settled rule that in determining the sufficiency
of the cause of action, ONLY the facts alleged in the
complaint and no others, should be considered. In
determining the existence of a cause of action, only the
statements in the complaint may properly be considered.
If the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint may be maintained, the same should be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be
assessed by defendants-appellees.
There are well-recognized exceptions to the rule that the
allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and
inquiry is confined to the face of the complaint. There is
no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if
their falsity is subject to judicial notice, or if such
allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts
which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or
document included in the pleading these allegations
appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if there is evidence which has been presented
to the court by stipulation of the parties, or in the course
of hearings related to the case.
Moreover, GABI did not have sufficient chance to prove
its allegation of ownership. Thus, the conclusion that
GABI’s allegation of ownership is false and that its
complaint stated no cause of action, appears to be
without basis.
In sum, as appears from the available records, the Court
of Appeals was correct in ruling that the dismissal by the
trial court of GABI’s complaint was incorrect. The case
should, therefore, proceed to trial where the parties may
adduce evidence to support their claims and defenses.
21. Dolores Macaslang v. Renato and Melba Zamora
(Bersamin) 2011 G.R. No. 156375
Facts:
1. Mar 10, 1999: Zamora’s FILED: Unlawful detainer
with MTCC, alleging among others:
a. Macaslang sold to them a residential lot
in Sabang, Danao City. 400sqm.
including a residential house, where
Macaslang was then living.
b. After the sale, Macaslang requested to
be allowed to live in the house. Zamora
granted the request on the reliance of
Macaslang’s promise to vacate as soon
as she would be able to find a new
residence
c. After 1 year, Zamora’s demanded upon
the defendant to vacate but she failed
and refused. The demand letter (Sept
1998) reads:
i. “This is to give notice that since
the mortgage to your property
has long been expired and that
since the property is already in
my name, I will be taking over
the occupancy of said property
two (2) months from the date of
this letter.”
d. Zamora’s sought the help of the Lupon,
but no settlement was reached as shown
by certification to file.
2. Despite the due service of summons, Macaslang
did not file an answer. Hence MTCC declared
her in default.
3. MTC: In favor of Zamora’s, ordered Macaslang to
vacate, pay atty’s fees, and rental until they shall
have vacated the properties in question.
4. Macaslang appealed to the RTC alleging:
a. Extrinsic Fraud
b. Meritorious defense: there was no actual
sale considering that the deed of
absolute sale relied upon is a patent
nullity as her signature therein was
procured through fraud and trickery.
5. RTC: Ruled in favor of Macaslang and DISMISSED
Zamora’s complaint, for failure to state a COA.
The same maybe refiled in the same court by
alleging a COA, if any. Zamora’s motion for
execution of MTCC decision rendered moot by
this judgment.
6. CA: REVERSED RTC decision for having no basis in
fact and law. MTCC decision reinstated.
23
Issues: W/N RTC in its appellate jurisdiction is limited to
assigned errors
W/N in an action for unlawful detainer, where
there was no prior demand to vacate and
comply with the conditions of the lease, a valid
COA exists.
W/N there was a violation of the Rules on
Summary procedure.
Decision:
1. RTC in its appellate jurisdiction may rule upon an
issue not raised on appeal.
a. CA said that RTC cannot rule on issue not
assigned as an error. This may have been
correct if the appeal to the CA was a first
appeal from RTC to CA (R41). There is an
express limitation of the review to only
specify in the assignment of errors.
b. But HERE this is a, MTC to RTC appeal
governed by a specific rule for unlawful
detainer cases. R70 §18 provides that
MTC judgment may be appealed to the
RTC which shall decide the same on the
basis of the entire record.
c. This difference in procedure is traceable
from BP129 §22, then in the 1991 Rules on
summary procedure §21, then 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure R 40 &7. (Please see
code)
d. Even if the rules did not differentiate in
the procedure, the review on the entire
case is still allowed as an exception (c)
and (d).
GN: Appellate court may only review
errors assigned and properly argued
XPNS: (a) When the question affects
jurisdiction
(b) Matters those evidently plain
or clerical errors
(c) Matters whose consideration
is necessary for a just and complete
resolution
(d) Matters of record having
bearing on the issue that parties failed to
raise
(e) Matters closely related to an
error assigned
(f) Matters upon which the
determination of a question is
dependent
2. CA Correctly delved into w/n there was a COA.
a. RTC: there is no COA because there was
no demand to vacate.
b. CA: No, the complaint readily reveals
that there was a demand to vacate.
c. A complaint for Unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges the withholding of
possession or the refusal is unlawful
without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. (See Fact #1 (c)i)
Demand was not only made but also
alleged in the complaint.
d. A complaint has sufficient COA for
unlawful det. If it states the FF1:
i. Initial possession by defendant
was by contract or tolerance
ii. Eventually possession became
illegal upon notice
re:termination
iii. Defendant still remained in
possession and deprived plaintiff
of its enjoyment
iv. Complaint was instituted within
one year from last demand to
vacate.
e. TEST for sufficiency of complaint: is w/n
the court can render a valid judgment
based on facts alleged in complaint.
f. SC: Complaint sufficiently stated a COA.
Complaint complied with 1-4. BUT Fail to
state and Lack of COA is different. RTC
said there is failure to state COA when in
fact its basis was that there was no
demand to vacate. Again RTC erred in
this regard, see Fact #1 (c)
i. Golden Gate Realty Co. v. IAC:
The term vacate is not a
talismatic word that must be
employed in all notices to
vacate.
3. Ejectment was not proper due to defense of
ownership.
a. Zamora’s COA is based on right to
possess resulting from ownership.
b. BUT exhibits show that the real
transaction is one of equitable mortgage
not sale. NCC1602 instances where a
contract may be presumed to be an
equitable mortgage.
i. Land was sold for P100K, when
the demand letter was for a sum
of P1.6M. Price inadequate.
Then the vendor remained in
possession of the property. Deed
of sale was executed as a result
or by reason of a loan.
c. Nonetheless, findings favorable to
Macaslang’s ownership are not finally
definitive because R70 &16 provide: that
when the defendant raises ownership
and the Q of possession cannot be
resolved, ownership shall only be
resolved to determine possession [not
title].
4. MTC committed procedural lapses.
a. MTC granted M to Declare Macaslang in
default for failure to file an answer.
24
 i. This motion is expressly prohibited
under R70 13 (8)
ii. What MTC should have done
was provided for in R70 § 7: to
simply render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts
alleged in the comlaint and
limited to what is prayed for
therein.
iii. Failure to file an answer under
R70, results only to a judgment
by default not a declaration of
default.
b. MTC’s reception of oral testimony is also
a procedural lapse.
i. R70 envisions the submission only
of affidavits of the witnesses
under s.10
ii. Section11 (2) that should the
MTC need to clarify material
facts, it may require parties to
submit affidavits or other
evidence. (note:in both sections
no mention of testimony, only
affidavits.)
FALLO
WHEREFORE petition is GRANTED. Complaint for unlawful
detainer dismissed.
HELD: No, a failure to state a cause of action which is
provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of
insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was
also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the
court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not
prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of
insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of
action is different from failure to prove a cause of action.
The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the
pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to
the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has
been eliminated in this section. The procedure would
consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause
of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the
trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is
warranted.
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers
the existence of the three (3) essential elements of a
cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c)
an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.

23. SANTOS V. SANTOS-GRAN A judicious examination of petitioner’s Amended

G.R. NO. 197380
2014
FACTS : Petitioner Elisa Santos filed a complaint for
annulment of sale and revocation of title against
respondents Maria Santos-Gran and ROD Marikina
praying that respondent surrender to her the subject
properties of this case situated in Montalban, Rizal and
pay damages and costs of suit.
Complaint readily shows its failure to sufficiently state a
cause of action. Contrary to the findings of the CA, the
allegations therein do not proffer ultimate facts which
would warrant an action for nullification of the sale and
recovery of the properties in controversy, hence,
rendering the same dismissible.
24. NOCUM vs. TAN
G.R. No. 145022 (September 23, 2005)

For her part, Gran filed a motion to dismiss statig that the
action filed by the petitioner had prescirbed and that the
the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action
as the void and voidable documents sought to be
nullified were not properly identified nor the substance
thereof set forth, thus, precluding the RTC from rendering
a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer to
surrender the subject properties.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Doctrines: 1. Jurisdiction and Venue distinguished.
2. Objections to venue in Civil Action arising
from libel may be waived since they do not involve a
question of jurisdiction; In Criminal Actions, it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an
essential element of jurisdiction.

RTC ruled in favor of Gran and dismissed petitioner’s
Amended Complaint for its failure to state cause of action
and that the action based on the written contract had
already prescribed.
CA sustained the dismissal but on the ground of
insufficiency of factual basis. It likewise ruled that the
action has not yet prescribed since an action for nullity of
void deeds of conveyance is imprescriptible.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly denied the petition of
reason of lack of cause of action
FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint (civil action) against
reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP
and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged
malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a
news article.
Respondents (INQUIRER and NOCUM) alleged
that the venue was improperly laid, among many
others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the
residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged

25
commission of the offense and the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice
on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion
seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of
the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended
complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1,
that "This caricature was printed and first published in the
City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and
deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal stating
that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint
appears now to have been cured in the Amended
Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but
only formal, in the Amended Complaint which would
affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
PETREV filed by the petitioners.
Petitioners argue that since the original
complaint only contained the office address of
respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the
place where the allegedly offending news reports were
printed and first published, the original complaint, by
reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to
confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law
based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the
latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here, the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s
cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that it is the RTC that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue.
The Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction
and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to
hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the
case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction
establishes a relation between the court and the subject
matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and
defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d)
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by
the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties.
Here, the additional allegations in the Amended
Complaint that the article and the caricature were
printed and first published in the City of Makati referred
only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These
additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on
the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the
same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege
these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon
motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that venue was not properly laid. The term
"jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed
or "venue." The amendment was merely to establish the
proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule
that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in
criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid
in the court where the action was instituted, that would
be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court
was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its
face, failed to allege neither the residence of the
complainant nor the place where the libelous article was
printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the
finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended. In
so doing, the court acted properly and without any
grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in
CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since
they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it
does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather
than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to
jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It
relates to the place of trial or geographical location in
which an action or proceeding should be brought and
not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their
access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue
is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to
allege the place where the libelous articles were printed
and first published would have been tenable if the case
filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original
complaint to contain such information would be fatal
because this fact involves the issue of venue which goes
into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be
because the case before us is a civil action where venue
is not jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
25. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the
26
Insular Government, et al., defendants-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Tarlac
dismissing the action before it on motion of the
plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
controversy.
FACTS:
On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an
action in CFI Tarlac for the condemnation of
69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This
is for construction of a railroad line "from Paniqui
to Tayug in Tarlac,"
Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had
caused to be made a thorough search in the
Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax
where the lands sought to be condemned were
located and to whom they belonged. As a result
of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in
question were located in Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the
plaintiff, pending final determination of the
action, took possession of and occupied the lands
described in the complaint, building its line and
putting the same in operation.
On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the
defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would be
made to the court to dismiss the action upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter, it having just been ascertained
by the plaintiff that the land sought to be
condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged
in the complaint. This motion was heard and,
after due consideration, the trial court dismissed
the action upon the ground presented by the
plaintiff.
ISSUES:
WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to
take cognizance of condemnation of real
estate located in another province
RULING:
YES, Sections 55 and 56[1]of Act No. 136 of the
Philippine Commission confer perfect and
complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these
Islands with respect to real estate. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality.
There is no suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere provided,
that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in
said province, may not under certain conditions
take cognizance of an action arising in another
province or of an action relating to real estate
located outside of the boundaries of the province
to which it may at the time be assigned.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it
shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in
certain cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. This does
not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter. It means simply that he may thereby
lose jurisdiction of the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate
when it shall attach or when it shall be removed.
That is a matter of legislative enactment which
none but the legislature may change. On the
other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the
person is, in some instances, made to defend on
the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions
of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over
the person, however, may be conferred by
consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may,
by an objection, be prevented from attaching or
removed after it has attached.
WON Sec. 377[2] of the Code of Civil
Procedure and Act. No. 1258[3] are
applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
NO, the terms of section 377 providing that
actions affecting real property shall be brought in
the province where the land involved in the suit,
or some part thereof, is located, do not affect the
jurisdiction of CFI over the land itself but relate
27
simply to the personal rights of parties as to the
place of trial.
That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the
parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was
obtained not only by the usual course of practice
- that is, by the process of the court - but also by
consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff
submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning
the action. The defendants are now in this court
asking that the action be not dismissed but
continued. They are not only nor objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on
this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that
very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in
any position to asked for favors. It is clearly
guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its
complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it
now asserts.
DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE
The question of venue does not relate to
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
it simply granting to the defendant certain rights
and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to
the place of trial, which rights and privileges he
might waive expressly or by implication.
Venue becomes merely a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties litigant. If their
interests are best subserved by bringing in the
Court Instance of the city of Manila an action
affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte,
there is no controlling reason why such a course
should not be followed. The matter is, under the
law, entirely within the control of either party.
The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such
selection is not in accordance with section 377,
the defendant may make timely objection and, as
a result, the venue is changed to meet the
requirements of the law.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not
applicable to actions by railroad corporations to
condemn lands; and that, while with the consent
of defendants express or implied the venue may
be laid and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the
defendants whose lands lie in one province, or
any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to
their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be
changed to the province where their or his lands
lie. In such case the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun. It would be
severed as to the objecting defendants and
ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. While we are
of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the
decision in the case before us for the reason that
the defendants are not objecting to the venue
and are not asking for a change thereof. They
have not only expressly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking
that that jurisdiction be maintained against the
efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
Disposition
The judgment must be REVERSED and the case
REMANDED to the trial court with direction to
proceed with the action according to law.
Supporting American jurisprudence
1. First National Bank of Charlotte vs.
Morgan (132 U.S., 141):
The exemption of national banks from suits in
State courts in counties other than the county in
which the association was located was a personal
privilege which could be waived.
This exemption of national banking associations
from suits in State courts, (aside from principal
office) wasprescribed for the convenience of
those institutions. However, the defendant did
notchoose to claim immunity from suit in that
court. It made defense upon the merits, and,
having been unsuccessful, and in the latter
tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity
granted to it by Congress.
2. Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S.,
369):
The Act of Congress prescribing the place where
a person may be sued is not one affecting the
general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in
28
the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a
defendant, and it is one which he may waive.
Here, the defendant companies have provided
that they can be found in a district other than
that in which they reside, if a particular mode of
proceeding is adopted, and they have been so
found.
3. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway
Co. vs. McBride (141 U.S., 127):
The right to insist upon suit only in the one
district is a personal privilege which he may
waive, and he does waive it by pleading to the
merits.
4. Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290):
Though the suit was brought in the county in
which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon
the defendant in the county of his residence,
unless a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant, was
interposed in the first instance, the objection on
the score of lack of jurisdiction could not
subsequently be successfully raised.
It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere
failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court
would have the effect to confer jurisdiction where
none existed before; for it is well settled that
even consent of parties cannot confer
jurisdiction. But all circuit courts have a general
jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.
5. De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas,
205):
Every district court in the State has cognizance of
such suits; the requirement as to the county in
which the suit may be brought is a mere personal
privilege granted to the parties, which may be
waived like any other privilege of this character.
Supporting Spanish jurisprudence
1. He who by his own acts submits himself to
the jurisdiction of a court shall not
thereafter be permitted to question such
jurisdiction. (Judgment of December
30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)
2. According to article 305 (of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil) the plaintiff shall be
presumed to have tacitly submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
the mere act of filing his complaint
therein, and in the case of the defendant
where the latter after appearing in the
action takes any step therein other than
to object to such jurisdiction. (Judgment
of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur.,
232.)
3. In order that a tacit submission based
upon the mere act filing the complaint
may be valid the court must be one of
ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article
4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento Civil.
(Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ.
Jur., 14.)
Supporting English jurisprudence
1. The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of
England (vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory'
actions, though of far less importance than it was
before the passing of the judicature acts, must
still be borne in mind in connection with actions
relating to land situate outside the local
jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions
were those in which the facts in issue between
the parties had no necessary connection with a
particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst
"local" actions were those in which there was
such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the title
to, or trespasses to, land.
In the case of local actions the plaintiff was
bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county
(originally in the actual hundred) in which the
land in question lay. In the case, however of a
transitory action, he might lay it wherever he
pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter
it in a proper case. Local venues have now been
abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions
relating to land in England are concerned, the
distinction may be disregarded.
29
It is, however, important from another point of
view, viz, that of jurisdiction as distinct from
procedure. In the case of real actions relating to
land in the colonies or foreign countries the
English courts had, even before the judicature
acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the removal
by those acts of a difficulty of procedure viz, the
rule as to local venue which might have stood in
the way, if they had and wished to exercise
jurisdiction, did not in any way confer jurisdiction
in such cases.
The lack of jurisdiction still exists, and our courts
refuse to adjudicate upon claims of title to
foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged
invasion of the proprietary rights attached
thereto, and to award damages founded on that
adjudication; in other words, an action for
trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can
not be maintained in England, at any rate if the
defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership
of such land.
Existing Ph Jurisprudence Not Applicable
1. Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431)
The matter before the court was the jurisdiction
of the CFI over the actions and proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. The determination of that
question required the consideration of section
602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather than
section 377. The argument of the court touching
the last-named section, is inapplicable.
2. Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12)
The issue was WON an agreement between
parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
a particular court to the exclusion of the court
provided by law as the appropriate court in the
premises could be enforced.
3. Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep.,
302)
The court was not discussing or deciding the
question WON an action could be maintained in
the CFI Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real
estate located in Albay; but, rather, whether or
not an action could be maintained in the CFI of
the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on
personal property located in the Province of
Albay. The remark of the court that perhaps the
former action could not be maintained was not
intended to be decisive and was not thought at
the time to be an indication of what the decision
of the court might be if that precise case were
presented to it with full argument and citation of
authorities.
4. Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep.,
310)
Jurisdiction of the CFI to issue a writ of
prohibition against a justice of the peace holding
his court outside the province in which the CFI
was sitting at the time of issuing the writ. The
determination of the question presented different
considerations and different provisions of law
from those which rule the decision of the case at
bar.
Special Laws Relating to The Condemnation
Of Land By Railroad Companies
1. Act No. 1258, SEC. 3. Whenever a
railroad corporation is authorized by law,
to exercise the power of eminent domain
and has not obtained by agreement with
the owners thereof the lands necessary
for its purposes as authorized by law, it
may in its complaintshall be instituted in
the CFI of the province where the lands is
situated.
These special laws contain nothing which in any
way indicates an intention of the legislature to
alter the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of
CFIs granted by Act No. 136. As we said in
discussing the provisions of section 377 of
theCode of Civil Procedure, we cannot hold that
jurisdiction to be limited unless by express
provision or clear intendment.
We have thus far drawn an analogy between
section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure and
section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither
the one nor the other was intended to restrict,
much less deprive, the CFIs of the jurisdiction
over lands in the Philippine Islands conferred
upon them by Act No. 136.
30

[1] SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2.
Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of real property, or any interest
therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into,
and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon
courts of justice of the peace.
[2]SEC. 377. Venue of actions. Actions to confirm
title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real
estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts
from the title to real estate, or to obtain
possession of real estate, or to recover damages
for injuries to real estate, or to establish any
interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or
actions for the condemnation of real estate for
public use, shall be brought in the province were
the lands, or some part thereof, is situated;
actions against executors, administrators, and
guardians touching the performance of their
official duties, and actions for account and
settlement by them, and actions for the
distribution of the estates of deceased persons
among the heirs and distributes, and actions for
the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the
province in which the will was admitted to
probate, or letters of administration were
granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all
actions not herein otherwise provided for may be
brought in any province where the defendant or
any necessary party defendant may reside or be
found, or in any province where the plaintiff,
except in cases were other special provision is
made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant resides within the Philippine
Islands and the action is brought to seize or
obtain title to property of the defendant within
the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to
seize or obtain title to property of the defendant
within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be
brought in the province where the property which
the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is
situated or is found: Provided, that in an action
for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real
estate, when the service upon the defendant is
not personal, but is by publication, in accordance
with law, the action must be brought in the
province where the land lies. And in all cases
process may issue from the court in which an
action or special proceeding is pending, to be
enforced in any province to bring in defendants
peaches and to enforce all orders and decrees of
the court. Thefailure of a defendant to object to
the venue of the action at the time of entering
his appearance in the action shall be deemed a
waiver on his part of all objection to the place or
tribunal in which the action is brought, except in
the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of
this section relating to real estate, and actions
against executors, administrators, and guardians,
and for the distribution of estates and payment of
legacies.
[3]Special law covering rail roads
26. [ GR No. L-37396, Apr 30, 1979 ]
MARCELINO LONTOK v. ALFREDO GORGONIO
Facts:
This case is about the propriety of an information
containing the charge of "reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and multiple physical injuries".
On March 29, 1973, Marcelino Lontok, Jr. was charged
with that delito compuesto (Compound crime) in the
municipal court of San Juan, Rizal. In the information, it
was alleged that on November 14, 1972, while Lontok
was recklessly driving his Mercedes Benz car, he bumped
a passenger jeep and caused damage to it in the sum of
P780 and that the bumping also caused physical injuries
to three passengers who were incapacitated from
performing their customary labor for a period of less than
ten days.
Lontok filed a motion to quash that part of the
information wherein the offense of lesiones leves through
reckless imprudence is charged. He contended that,
because that offense prescribes in two months and it was
committed on November 14, 1972, the last day of the
sixty-day period for filing the charge as to that offense
was January 14, 1973. He prayed that the information be
amended by excluding that light offense.
31
The fiscal opposed the motion to quash. The municipal
court denied it and Lontok pleaded guilty upon
arraignment. But instead of going to trial, he filed a
petition wherein he prayed that the amendment of the
information be ordered by deleting the portion thereof
wherein the offense of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence is charged.
The Solicitor General in his comment agrees with Lontok's
view that damage to property through reckless
imprudence cannot be complexed with a light offense,
that the light offense had already prescribed, and that
two informations should have been filed. Nevertheless,
Lontok did not raise any jurisdictional issue, his petition for
certiorari was not proper and, therefore, it should be
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or Not Lontok, over his objection, can be tried
by the Municipal court on an information charging the
complex crime of damage to property and lesiones leves
through reckless imprudence.
Held:
We hold that he should be tried only for damage to
property through reckless imprudence which is a less
grave felony.As such, it cannot be complexed with the
light offense of lesiones leves through reckless
imprudence which, as correctly contended by Lontok,
had already prescribed since that crime prescribes in sixty
days.
There is a complex crime when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or when a grave
or less grave offense is a means of committing another
grave or less grave offense.
It is assumed that reckless imprudence is not a crime in
itself but is simply a way of committing a crime and it
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability.
Negligence becomes a punishable act when it results in
a crime. Hence, there is no complex crime in such case.
Two separate complaint should have been filed.
The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the
information charging him with light offense for such has
prescribed in two months.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of May 21 and July
12, 1973 are set aside. It is ordered to try Lontok only for
damage to property through reckless imprudence. The
information need not be amended, it being understood
that Lontok has no more culpability for the offense of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
charged therein. No costs.
27. Alonzo vs IAC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
Facts:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro
indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the
name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.On
March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua,
transferred his undivided share of the herein
petitioners for the by way of absolute sale. 2 One
year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his
sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in
an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro
Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. By virtue of such
agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the
said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of
the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one
of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen . On May 27, 1977, however,
Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption
claimed by her brother but was dismissed on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of
the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was
no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-
heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent
court ** declared that the notice required by
the said article was written notice and that
actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
Issue:
Whether or not there was valid notice -YES
Held:
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners.Under Article 1623,
when a vendor sells real property, he must notify
in writing his co-owners who may redeem the
same within thirty (30) days from notice. The
general rule is that written notice of the sale to all
possible redemptioners is indispensable. The 30
day period which is a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right of legal redemption is
counted from the written notice., In the case at
bar the Court held that as an exception to the
general rule the co-heirs who lived with the
32
vendors in the same lot are deemed to have
received actual notice of the sale. The co-heirs
are deemed to have received actual notice of
the sale since the co-heirs, including Tecla
Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of
only 604 square meters, including the portions
sold to the petitioners . Eustaquia herself, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with
her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption
petition. 9Moreover, the petitioners and the private
respondents were close friends and neighbors
whose children went to school together. The co-
heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the
sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-
day period began and ended during the 14
years between the sales in question and the filing
of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.
These are the justifications for this
exception. Hence, they may no longer exercise
their right of redemption.
28. G.R. No. L-15344 May 30, 1960
JOSE R. VILLANUEVA, City Attorney of the City of
Butuan, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. MONTANO A. ORTIZ, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, ANTONIO MORDENO and
MALAQUIAS FORTUN, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 9, 1953, the City Attorney of
Butuan filed with the Municipal Court of that locality a
case for assault upon a person in authority with
disturbance of public order against respondents Antonio
Modreno (Modreno) and Malaquias Fortun (Fortun). It
was alleged that on or about November 10, 1953
(Election Day), in barrio Ba-an, Butuan City, Philippines,
while the board of election inspectors were in session
performing their duties in precincts 35, 35-A, and 36-A, the
said respondents attacked Narciso Medrano, Apolinario
Lupos , Simeon Loquinte, and Pablo Remoneda, duly
appointed and qualified inspectors and watchers of said
precincts.
When the accused having waived their right to
the second stage of preliminary investigation, the case
were forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Agusan
for trial on the merits. The Court of First Instance, however,
instead of deciding the cases upon their merits, issued, on
September 30, 1958, a resolution remanding them to the
Municipal Court for lack of jurisdiction. This on the theory
that the accused by boxing the election inspectors and
watchers as charged in the information committed the
crime of assault without intent to kill, one of the offenses
enumerated in section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
which is within the concurrent Municipal Court, but which
falls, in these cases, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Court because it was the first to take
cognizance thereof.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The
City Attorney, alleging that the lower court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, now petitions to declare null and void the said
resolution, and to order the judge to render judgment in
the said cases in accordance with the evidence
presented during the trial held before him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judges’ resolution
on remanding the case to the Municipal Court was
proper.
RULING:
No. Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of courts
in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information (People vs. Mission, 87 Phil., 641;
48 Off. Gaz., 1330). A careful scrutiny of the allegations in
the information shows that the accused are charged to
have committed not only the crime of assault upon a
person in authority defined in Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code but also that of disturbance of public order
defined in Article 153 of the same Code.
The Revised Penal Code (Article 148) imposes the
penalty of imprisonment of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
1,000 pesos upon anyone who commits the crime of
direct assault when, as in these cases, the offender lays
hands upon a person in authority. And Article 153 of the
same Code imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos for any
serious disturbance in a public place, office or
establishment, or interruption of disturbance of public
performances, functions or gathering of peaceful
meetings. Each separate crime charged in the
information is, therefore, punishable with imprisonment of
more than six months and a fine of more than two
hundred pesos. Consequently, they are, according to
section 44, paragraph (f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act 296), within the original jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance.
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