REVIEWS

M U L L A, T H E CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Thirteenth Edition. By

T . L. V e n k a t a r a m a Aiyar. Volume 1, 1965. P p . xxviii+947. Bombay:
N. M . T r i p a t h i Private, L t d . Price Rs. 80/- (for two volumes).
M R . T . L . VENKATARAMA A I Y A R has placed the legal profession in his
debt by bringing out the much-needed thirteenth edition of Sir Dinshah
Fardunji Mulla's classic. T h e previous edition, by M r . R . C. Mitter,
was as old as 1953. M a n y things h a d happened since t h e twelfth
edition, the most important of them being the establishment of several
new H i g h Courts, the spate of new legislation a n d other rules a n d a
number of decisions of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts.
ft was a stupendous task which the present editor had to face. Despite
the same we have his assurance that h e has taken particular care not to
alter the framework a n d the broad features of t h e original publication.
O n the whole its identity has been preserved. This, it must be apparent,
was not so easy a task, especially since the work had already undergone
two editions, each at a n interval of nine and twelve years respectively,
the original author having brought out his last edition in the year 1934.
T h e reviewer must confess a certain nostalgia in reading the
present edition under review, for, as a new entrant to the profession,
he then read, as advised, the tenth edition from cover to cover. T h e
welcome changes in the present edition a r e t h e reversion back to the
mode of giving references adopted by the original author, which had
been departed from by the editor of the twelfth edition, a n d the rules
being dealt with in t h e body of the work, not in t h e appendices,
having regard to the importance of these rules.
T h e reviewer is, however, unable to repress t h e thought that the
discussion of t h e principles of statutory interpretation at pages 3-4
could have been m a d e fuller including some of t h e latest thinking on
this subject. I t is a sad feature of legal education in this country that
this important aspect of t h e lawyers' work has been neglected; it seems
difficult to expose the average lawyer in this country to many sensitive
areas of interpretation a n d juristic thought. T h e summary treatment
of the rules of interpretation in the edition under review is perhaps too
simplified to be of effective use. I t is hoped that even the most conser-
vative lawyer m a y admit that only to the extent to which the lawyer is
aware of a n d sensitive to the latest juristic techniques can the instrument
of law become responsive to the necessities, felt or otherwise, of the time.
T h e editor has dealt with these rules under the following captions :
literal and grammatical interpretation, logical construction, harmonious

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construction, literal construction, associate words a n d legal fiction.

T h e reviewer does not propose to charge the editor with not writing a
kind of book that he did not wish to write; he only wishes to convey his
own feeling that since this work is of immense importance for practi-
tioners, the lawyers who consult it ought to have been exposed to at least
some of the nuances of semantics. T h e r e could have been some refer-
ence, not only to Maxwell but also, to jurists like Professor Julius Stone,
who admit that better understanding by the lawyer of the operation of
language is now necessary for clarifying all problems. Semantics, includ-
ing not only semantics in the narrow sense (relations between words as
linguistic signs) but also "syntactics" (formal relation of words to other
words) and "pragmatics" (the relation of words to those who utter or
receive or understand them) has become the chief field of the lawyer and
the judge. According to Professor Stone " t h e semantic teaching that
words have many meanings (Plurisignation or Polysemy), so that mean-
ing can only be delimited contextually a n d syntactically, goes far beyond
the common place that some words are ambiguous." 1 T o briefly attempt
some newer thoughts on the subject of interpretation, t h e reviewer
trusts, would neither be outside the scope of a work of this magnitude
nor a d d appreciably to its bulk.
Similarly the note on "Judicial Precedents" at page 4 is somewhat
over-brief. Difficulties which the various High Courts, carved out of pre-
viously existing High Courts as a consequence of the reorganization of
states, face in regard to decisions of those courts a n d the binding nature
of obiter dicta of the Supreme Court, especially where there is the addi-
tional complication of conflicting obiter dicta, have not been considered.
Yet another matter to which reference could profitably have been
m a d e at appropriate places is the Twentyseventh Report of the Law
Commission published in 1964. I n a work like t h e present edition it
would perhaps be unavoidable to note a n d evaluate at least some of the
major proposals of the Law Commission. It is common knowledge that
at the time the proposals for reform of law emanated the response from
the bar was not w h a t could be expected.
Pooling the experience of the members of the profession is essential,
if reform, particularly in the realm of procedure, has to b e realistic or
adequate. T h e Twentyseventh Report includes not only matters covered
by and suggestions m a d e in the Fourteenth Report of the L a w Commis-
sion but also those not covered by it. T h e Twentyseventh R e p o r t is,
therefore, a fuller document. It has suggested, for instance, the dele-
tion of section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. This section has
been discussed in about 11 pages of the edition under review. 2 T h e
commentary may not, therefore, be complete without even a reference to
the fact that the section is proposed to be completely dropped. T h e
Twentyseventh Report naturally covers the problems of delay due to
defective procedure : delays before trial (in service of summons a n d other

1. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings 30-31 (1964).

2. 1 Mulla, The Code of Civil Procedure 359-70 (13th ed.
www.ili.ac.in by Venkatarama
© The Aiyar
Indian Law Institute
1965) [hereinafter cited as Mulla].
134 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE [VOL. 8 : 132

processes, in filing of written statements, in filing of the lists of documents

and in settling issues), during trial (non-attendance of witnesses, adjourn-
ments on account of convenience of party or counsel), delays at the appel-
late stage (necessitating even curtailment of the right of appeal in
certain cases) a n d the stage of execution (putting a premium, as it were,
on the dilatory tactics of judgment-debtors). If the reviewer can make a
suggestion it would be, if it is feasible and not too late already, to
incorporate them briefly as appendix to the second volume, with brief
comments on the proposals. T h e reviewer has m a d e bold to venture
this suggestion since the present editor would be so pre-eminently suited
for the task not only because of his eminence as a lawyer and judge but
also because he has been the C h a i r m a n of the Law Commission.
T h e difficulty generally which editors or authors face is that of
covering the g a p between the date of the manuscript going to the press
and the date of publication. These difficulties seem to be somewhat
greater in this country. T h e present edition under review does not
seem to have escaped this difficulty. I n several places, the reviewer
noticed, some of the important decisions, especially those rendered in the
year 1964, have been missed. It is needless to list them here. A reference
has, nonetheless to be m a d e to one very important decision of the
Supreme C o u r t : State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali? It concerns what is
known as a n " a c t of state." U n d e r the commentaries to section 9 of
the Civil Procedure, an endeavour has been m a d e a t page 43 to sum up,
as seven propositions, in the language of the Supreme Court, the import
of what is known as " a c t of state." I n the Vora Fiddali case, M r . Justice
Rajagopala Ayyangar, has summed up, as ten propositions, what had
been laid down by the Supreme Court in Promod Chandra Deb v. State of
Orissa.* T h e Promod Chandra Deb case has been noticed in the edition
under review, but neither the Vora Fiddali case nor Virendra Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh,5 which was overruled by the former, have been
noticed. T h e majority view in the Vora Fiddali case upheld the view of
Lord D u n e d i n in Vaje Singhji v. Secretary of State for India6 which has
been wrongly printed as Vajid Singh in footnote (v) of page 43. T h e r e
were different approaches to whether the right to enforce lay with the
high contracting parties alone or not. Lord Dunedin's view was that
it did; the opposite approach was that of M r . Chief Justice Marshall
in United States v. Perchman 7 t h a t these acts must be interpreted by
municipal courts whenever t h e question arose before them. T h e rules
which have been summed u p at page 43 of the edition under review do
not bring out the most important ideas, viz., (1) that the municipal
courts have jurisdiction to find out whether or not the new sovereign has

3. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 447.

4. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1288, 1299-1300.
5. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 447.
6. A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 216.
7. 7 Pet. 51(1831-1834).

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1966] REVIEWS 135

recognized or acknowledged t h e rights in question, either expressly

or by implication a n d (2) t h a t in a n y controversy as to existence of t h e
right t h e burden of proof lay on t h e person claiming against the n e w
sovereign to show that he h a d recognized or acknowledged t h e right in
question. I t is submitted t h a t the better a n d fuller way of setting out
the position may be to incorporate t h e summary of t h e law given by
Mr. Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar in the Vora Fiddali case. 8 As against
this, the mere statement as rule (5) t h a t " i t is not within t h e compe-
tence of municipal courts to go into t h e question of the validity of a n
act of State" 9 m a y not convey the true position.
W h a t has been stated above does not, however, in anyway detract
from t h e undoubtedly high quality of t h e revised work. T h e present
editor richly deserves the most grateful thanks of the profession for the
inestimable service he has done by bringing out the present edition.

5. Rangarajan*

INTERNATIONAL L A W — INDIAN COURTS AND LEGISLATURE. By S. K .

Agrawala. Bombay: N . M . T r i p a t h i Private Ltd. 1965. P p . x +289 +
Ixxxix. Price R s . 30/-.

T H I S IS A WELCOME addition to t h e literature of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law in

India. It is founded upon a doctoral dissertation of t h e Lucknow
University which must be given credit for producing two doctorates in
about a decade's t i m e — " a rare distinction in I n d i a " — a s the blurb
claims.
As regards the form a n d substance of the book, first of all, it must be
pointed out that the title of the book—despite the sub-title—is inappro-
priate a n d , indeed, misleading. This is not a book on international
law, nor is it a n exposition of the rules of international law as applied
by the I n d i a n courts a n d legislature. T o be sure, it deals with Indian
state practice in regard to three topics of international law, namely,
state succession, nationality, a n d extradition. These three topics ob-
viously do not constitute the whole complex of international law, nor
are the applicable rules in regard to these topics to be found exclusively
in the decisions of municipal courts a n d legislative organs. So much
for the title a n d sub-title of the book.
In order perhaps to provide a perspective for the subject, the
author explains in a n introduction t h e value of municipal decisions as
sources of international law. H e is of the view that " t h e cumulative
effect of uniform decisions of the courts of the most important states is to

8. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 447, 462-63.

9. Mullatt.
*Director of Legal Studies, Madras.

www.ili.ac.in © The Indian Law Institute