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Shri Guru Tegh Bahadur Khalsa College

Department of Political Science

Term Paper

Development Studies and Social Movements in India

Jyot Shikhar Singh


2017POL1017
Das Kapital and Development as Freedom

A critical examination of Amartya Sen’s work in


juxtaposition to Marxist development theory
Introduction:-
Why we need to study development? We all know the very meaning of development and
what does it stands for, but what substantial gains are there by studying and understanding the
field of development? What scope it retains in it to lure in more research options in this
particular field? The area and study of development contains one of the most complex
frameworks in terms of understanding what to provide to people and what not to provide
them. As we see that development has been divided into 2 main field:- Quantitative and
Qualitative. We need to understand that both the streams of development complement each
other in perfect proportion. If we focus on the quantitative too much, we won’t be able to
sustain GDP and GNP growth of the nation which correlates with introduction of
technological and industrial development. Whereas if focused too much on qualitative we
will be riddled with the question of which community should get the most and which
shouldn’t and how to balance between all the regional and communal conflicts among the
society so that egalitarian approach and symbolism of development can be attained.

For that it becomes necessary to identify and implement the most balanced ideology of
development we can come up with. As essentially the development process is the work of the
state. If the state is having a biased perception of development and planning process it won’t
be able to provide with optimal conditions of growth and development, which will in turn
create an unstable society in the nation, which is harmful for the society and state as a whole.
And in that sort of paradigm, we are looking at a subject area which is both technical and
substantive in nature. Sensitive and volatile as it follows a certain legal and a particular
system of application. If that system in imbalanced, then growth is impossible and it can be
highly derogatory for the nation. In that sort of light its important to read and understand
various development ideologies that have been given various authors and the message they
all are trying to address to about.

When we study the lights of Amartya Sen, we get to see the diversity in the field of
economics and politics. In brief, how both of these concepts work side by side and effect each
other on substantial levels for creating the perfect social plateau upon which individuals are
to live and achieve their potential. As per Sen’s perspective the main objective of
development and growth policies of any state is to enable the individuals in the nation to
achieve their potential and optimum level of growth. And if the policy and the ideology of
development is not able to address any of these aspects, then the whole concept of
development has been flawed. And history is the proof that every state tends to follow the
policies and various thinking of development in order to create a more efficient and effective
environment for the citizens that abide by the Social Contract, and for the fact that the
available resources and facilities will help in further development in terms of human resource
development for the particular state concerned.

What we want to explore in this particular study is a certain linkage between the development
and economic ideals of two famous economists and philosophers that we know about- Karl
Marx and Amartya Sen. Essentially for years, many scholars have tried and argued for the
fact that both the thinkers have similarities in their development methods and practices. For
the fact that, they are similar in what they talk about and what they are trying to propagate.
And the question, whether one follows the other or not. We will be exploring the works of
Amartya Sen and comparing with the Marxist thinking and try to figure out a constructive
correlation between their works.

Research Question:-
1. What are the main aspects of Sen’s Theory of development and how does it
contemplate to Marxism?

Hypothesis:-
Amartya Sen’s writings can be associated within the framework of Neo- Marxism
Setting the Context:-
Immanuel Kant talks about the necessity of seeing human beings as ends in themselves and
not devising them as the means via which any human being can extract certain amounts of
gain for them and reaching for a certain gain:

“So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every
case as an end withal, never as means only.”1

This principle has importance in many contexts and can be put in diverse situations–even in
analysing poverty, progress and planning (primarily the whole field of planning and
development). Human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but
they also happen to be–directly or indirectly–the primary means of all production. This dual
role of human beings provides a rich ground for confusion of ends and means in planning,
policy- making and execution of those actions in equitable segments. It can take the form of
focusing on production and prosperity as the essence of progress, treating people as the
means through which that productive progress is brought about (rather than seeing the lives
of people as the ultimate concern and treating production and prosperity merely as means to
those lives). The same argument that was given by Karl Marx also in his study of class
conflict in the society and many contemporary development thinkers arguing for the same.
Problem does not, of course, lie in the fact that the pursuit of economic prosperity, as it is
typically taken to be a major goal of planning and policy-making. This need is not
unreasonable in its conception and evaluation. The problem relates to the level at which this
aim should be taken as a goal. Is it just an intermediate goal, the importance of which is
contingent on what it ultimately contributes to human lives? Or is it the object of the entire
exercise?

Essentially these questions become important as we have to then demarcate the line where we
should give importance to the economic prosperity and at what point it becomes derogatory
for the general public and how to balance it for having an egalitarian structure of
development and planning. It is in the acceptance–usually implicitly–of the latter view that
the ends–means confusion becomes significant–indeed blatant. The problem might have been
of no great practical interest if the achievement of economic prosperity were tightly linked–in

1
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics, 6th edition, T. K. Abbot, ed.
(London, Longmans, 1909), p. 47.
something like a one-to-one correspondence–with that of enriching the lives of the people. If
that were the case, then the pursuit of economic prosperity as an end in itself, while wrong in
principle, might have been, in effect, indistinguishable from pursuing it only as a means to
the end of enriching human lives. But that tight relation does not obtain. Countries with high
GNP per capita can nevertheless have astonishingly low achievements in the quality of life,
with the bulk of the population being subject to premature mortality, escapable morbidity,
overwhelming illiteracy. One should take certain conditionality’s into consideration. If we
having an exclusive pattern of development that is only based on economic prosperity we are
limiting the scope of development as we understand. Sure, our basic parameters of
international understanding of development is based of quantitative analysis via the means of
G.D.P and G.N.P. But as a universal principle we should keep this into consideration that
economic prosperity and social development cohesive form the understanding of
development for any country.

In that sort of light, we have gone with the objective to understand the pathway that is given
by Amartya Sen. What Amartya Sen has tried to conceptualize is a revision of development
ideology for all the countries and all the segments of the societies. What we see as
development needs to be revised as our current understanding of national development has
been restricted by many aspects. Economic prosperity as the sole basis clouds the perspective
of what is essentially beneficial to the human development. For that understanding of how it
is essentially clouded, we will understand the capability approach as given by Amartya Sen.

Capability as an expression of Freedom:-


In drafting his work “Development as freedom” Sen, offers a radical view of development.
The conception of development he proposes is constituted of at least seven overlapping
features, including ways of realizing the aspiration of development as freedom. First,
emphasizing upon, ‘an adequate conception of development must go much beyond the
accumulation of wealth and the growth of in the Sen conception of development substantive
freedoms are thus viewed as ‘constituent components of development’. What do we mean by
the discussion of substantive freedoms? For that freedom is not only empirical in its analysis,
objective in its configuration and fully based upon quantitative analysis. We are essentially
trying to level up the conception of development from its basic understanding as a numerical
configuration. We are trying to conceptualize a concept of freedom which substantially, for
the benefit of the human civilization collaborating economic prosperity with direct linkages
to uplifting the social status of individuals. These freedoms are not merely passive
components but are ‘very effective in contributing to economic progress’. In other words,
‘freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its principal
means’. In thus moving away from the “traditional” understanding of development as growth
or industrialization Sen makes the concept of development relevant to advanced
industrialized countries as well.

This understanding also gives the upcoming developing and under- developing countries to
provide a new light as to what should proper national development should account for in its
conception and integration in the policy framework. Second, freedom is defined in his vision
of development in an integral manner as the “capabilities” of persons to lead the kind of lives
they value—and have reason to value’. Sen points in this context to the internal relationship
between different types of freedoms. He thus notes how ‘economic unfreedom” , in the form
of extreme poverty, can make a person a helpless prey in the violations of other kinds of
freedom’. Likewise, ‘political unfreedom’ can also foster economic unfreedom’. To put it
differently, each type of freedom has its own salience and refracts on all other categories of
freedom. None can be privileged over the others. In short, Sen perceives the development
process ‘in inclusive terms that integrate economic, social and political considerations’.

Third, Sen treats ‘the freedom of individuals as the basic building blocks’ of the development
process. His focus on the individual is an important correction to the excessive concentration
on the State to realize the goal of development; it is the individual who is the key “agent” to
bring about social change. Of particular significance is Sen’s emphasis on women’s agency:
“Nothing, arguably, is as important today in the political economy of development as an
adequate recognition of political, economic and social participation and leadership of
women. This is indeed a crucial aspect of “development as freedom”.

Argument for social support for individuals is made out by Sen noting that expanding
people’s freedom can be seen ‘as an argument for individual responsibility, not against it’.
While Sen sometimes does talk of “group activities”, the primary emphasis remains on the
individual as an agent of social transformation. Fourth, in conceptualizing “rights” in relation
to development Sen articulates a “goal-rights system” that does not privilege either negative
or positive liberties but rather assigns significance to both. He rejects the libertarian view of
rights with its blindness to consequentiality of rights and the utilitarian approach that does not
sufficiently appreciate the intrinsic value of rights. He argues for ‘a consequential system that
incorporates the fulfilment of rights among other goals’: ‘It shares with utilitarianism a
consequential approach (but differs from it in not confining attention to utility consequences
only), and it shares with a libertarian system the attachment of intrinsic importance to rights
(but differs from it in not giving it complete priority irrespective of other consequences)’.

Fifth, Sen also treads the middle path on the big debates relating to development: market
versus state and efficiency versus equity. He thus for instance rejects a facile critique or
defence of markets. He considers the reliance on markets for wealth creation as justified for
‘…there is plenty of empirical evidence that the market system can be an engine of fast
economic growth and expansion of living standards’. On the other hand, he does not neglect
the fact that ‘markets can sometimes be counterproductive’ and therefore ‘there are serious
arguments for regulation in some cases’. Depending on the forms of market in play (e.g.,
competitive or monopolistic). In short, in the Sen view ‘the overall achievements of the
market are deeply contingent on political and social arrangements’. Sixth, Sen places a lot of
faith in public discussion to bring about reforms in society. He believes that social change can
be brought about through open arguments. In stressing the need to reach reasoned decisions
through public discussion Sen is offering a concept of development that goes beyond
technocratic fixes. It inter alia draws pointed attention to the need to consult and deliberate
with the subjects of social policies. Last, but not least, Sen stresses the importance of
democracy to the realization of the goal of development as freedom: ‘developing and
strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development’.

The significance of democracy, he stresses, lies in what he calls ‘three distinct virtues’: ‘1) its
intrinsic importance, (2) its instrumental contributions, and (3) its constructive role in the
creation of values and norms’. He thus rejects the so called ‘Asian approach to human
rights’ that privileges economic and social rights over democratic rule. “Political
distribution”, which can be found in the philosophical works of Aristotle for that, made
extensive use of his analysis of “the good of human beings”, and this he linked with his
examination of “the functions of man” and his exploration of “life in the sense of activity”,
which Sen abides by and says that in functionalist framework, still holds utmost relevance
and importance in current generation. The Aristotelian theory is, of course, highly ambitious
and involves elements that go well beyond this particular issue (e.g., it takes a specific view
of human nature and relates a notion of objective goodness to it). But the argument for seeing
the quality of life in terms of valued activities and the capability to achieve these activities
has much broader relevance and application. Essentially, it strives that development of each
individual should be in a framework which doesn’t comprises anyone’s ability and by using
the utility as a method of measurement; it destroys the significance of providing equitable
good to the people.

Stripping Utilitarian calculations from Basic Goods:-


The capability approach can he contrasted not merely with commodity-based systems of
evaluation, but also with the utility-based approach. The utilitarian notion of value, which is
invoked explicitly or by implication in much of welfare economics, examines value,
ultimately, only in individual utility, which is defined in terms of some mental condition,
such as pleasure, happiness, desire-fulfilment. This subjectivist perspective has been
extensively used, but it can be very misleading, since it may fail to reflect a person’s real
deprivation. The person’s deprivation, then, may not at all show up in the metrics of pleasure,
desire fulfilment etc., even though he or she may be quite unable to be adequately nourished,
decently clothed, minimally educated and so on. This issue, apart from its foundational
relevance, may have some immediate bearing on practical public policy. Smugness about
continued deprivation and vulnerability is often made to look justified on grounds of lack of
strong public demand and forcefully expressed desire for removing these impediments. There
is an extensive literature in development economics concerned with valuing the quality of
life, the fulfilment of Basic needs and related matters. This particular literature has been quite
influential in recent years in drawing attention to neglected aspects of economic and social
development. It is, however, fair to say that these writings have been typically
comprehensively ignored in the theory of welfare economics, which has tended to treat these
contributions as essentially ad hoc suggestions. This treatment is partly the result of the
concern of welfare theory that proposals should not just appeal to intuitions but also be
structured and founded. It also reflects the intellectual standing that such traditional
approaches as utilitarian evaluation enjoy in welfare theory, and which serves as a barrier to
accepting departures even when they seem attractive. The inability of utility-based
evaluations to cope with persistent deprivations was discussed earlier, but in the welfare-
economic literature the hold of this tradition has been hard to dislodge.
The “basic needs” literature has, in fact, tended to suffer a little from uncertainties about how
basic needs should be specified. The original formulations often took the form of defining
basic needs in terms of needs for certain minimal amounts of essential commodities such as
food, clothing and shelter. If this type of formulation is used, then the literature remains
imprisoned in the mould of commodity-centred evaluation, and tan in fact be accused of
adopting a form of “commodity fetishism. Judged even as means, the usefulness of the
commodity-perspective is severely compromised by the variability of the conversion of
commodities into capabilities. For example, the requirement of food and of nutrients for the
capability of being well-nourished may greatly vary from person to person depending on
metabolic rates, body size, gender, pregnancy, age, climatic conditions, and parasitic ailments
and so on. The evaluation of commodity-holdings or of incomes (with which to purchase
commodities) tend be at best a proxy for the things that really mutter, but unfortunate Rawls
is much concerned that the fact that different people have different ends must not be lost in
the evaluative process, and people should have the freedom to pursue their respective ends.
This concern is indeed important, and the capability approach is also much involved with
valuing freedom as such. In fact, it can be argued that the capability approach gives a better
account of the freedoms actually enjoyed by different people than can be obtained from
looking merely at the holdings of primary goods.

Primary goods are means to freedoms, whereas capabilities are expressions of freedoms
themselves. The motivations underlying the Rawlsian theory and the capability approach are
similar, but the accountings are different. The problem with the Rawlsian accounting lies in
the fact that, even for the same ends, people’s ability to convert primary goods into
achievements differs, so that an interpersonal comparison based on the holdings of primary
goods cannot, in general, also reflect the ranking of their respective real freedoms to pursue
any given–or variable–ends. The variability in the conversion rates between persona for given
ends is a problem that is embedded in the wider problem of variability of primary goods
needed for different persona pursuing their respective ends.2 Hence, a similar criticism
applies to Rawlsian accounting procedure as applies to parts of the basic needs literature for
their concentration on means and specifically people as the means themselves.

The capability set represents a person’s freedom to achieve various functioning combinations.
If freedom is intrinsically important, then the alternative combinations available for choice
are all relevant for judging a person’s advantage, even though he or she will eventually
2
choose only an alternative. In this view, the choice itself is a valuable feature of a person’s
life. On the other hand, if freedom is seen as being only instrumentally important, then the
interest in the capability set lies only in the fact that it offers the person opportunities to
achieve various valuable states. Only the achieved states are in themselves valuable, not the
opportunities, which are valued only as means to the end of reaching valuable states. So,
essentially what difference is being brought by Sen’s theory of development?

Sen’s Theory of development neglects the subject of political economy that offers
compelling insights into social processes and structures central to the realization of the goals
of development. There is thus little comment in his writings on fundamental social factors
such as the ownership of means of production or the constitution and role of dominant social
classes. Sen tends to treat the modern state as a neutral actor standing above classes. To be
sure, in some writings Sen does recognize the role of “class” and class stratification in terms
of sustaining inequalities: ‘class disparities are not only important on their own, but they also
tend to intensify the disadvantages related to other forms of disparity’. Yet class cleavages
are not assigned adequate significance in relation to either understanding the social world or
in obstructing social change. He therefore does not see dominant class interests being
reflected in state structures. This absence is surprising because Sen admires and draws on the
work of figures such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx who attached deserving significance to
it. Smith, for example, was ‘alert to the abuses that could be generated from many sites of
institutionalized power’ and perceptively noted that the British State in his time was
‘captured by a coterie of its own transnational companies, merchants, and domestic
manufacturers’. Of course Sen is aware of power relationships in society that could hinder
rational changes. Thus he talks of ‘groups that obtain substantial material benefits from
restricting trade and exchange…Political influence in search of economic gain is a very real
phenomenon in the world in which we live’. But this talk of group power is abstracted from
its social basis in the ownership of means of production. Second, the balance Sen strikes
between the values of efficiency and equity or the institutions of the market and state has an
elusive quality. Thus, for instance, insufficient attention is paid to the possibility that ‘a
human rights approach may import many market values incompatible with the practical fight
for poverty reduction’. A primary reason for this is that his analysis does not seriously
explore specifics in the context of real world situations. In simultaneously supporting
liberalization of markets and the goals of investing in education and health facilities he tides
over the tensions between the two sets of goals.
Is Amartya Sen relevant in Marxist terminologies?
One way of understanding the correlation between Amartya Sen and Marx( for our purpose
of study, we will be referring and analyzing the ideas and terminologies of Marx and
Amartya Sen) could be in terms of freedom and rights. Mutual support among equals within
societies (and even within a global community) could possibly take place more easily under
conditions where institutions and social policy facilitate more freedoms and rights which then
may strengthen individual agency, that means the institutions and the proportion of wealth
that has to be equated among the individuals in the societies should be in a equilibrium.
Persons who are empowered by certain rights and freedoms and could participate as active
agents in the world are, arguably, in a better position to be in solidarity with the rest of
mankind compared to those who are disenfranchised, poor and oppressed, or colonised
citizens of hegemonic Western globalisation. These active agents, will be able to build the
base for a more productive and status wise a more stable society, which will mutually benefit
other sections of the society, without any grave compromise of being’s capability and
poltential. It is in this vein of reasoning that examining Marx and Sen's convergences on the
discourses on freedom and institutions may be useful because, perhaps, as the effects of
globalisation intensify and we see the recent examples of trade wars and economic coercive
policies by the powerful West, increasingly we realise a need not only for workers in a
capitalist society but all of mankind to unite, generally.

Parallelism between certain aspects of the conceptions of "species-being" and "agency," it


becomes apparent that both Sen and Marx value a situation where man has possession of
certain conditions in life that enhance his/her being a "species being" or an "agent": as in
active willing or conscious participation in his/her life activities (and not one where he/she is
merely forced into), and the presence of real opportunities and desirable options (functioning
and capabilities). Arguably, both Marx and Sen conceive man to be worthy of a certain level
of existence, and below such level, man ceases to be the species being or the free agent. For
Marx, living below such level of existence forms part of man's alienated existence under
capitalism (this will be further explored in the following section). And the idea that Marx tries
to contextualizes with the idea of alienation of individuals, we can see that from Sen’s ideas
of what is known as “Positive Freedom”.
Marx's conception of alienation, as the opposite of man's ideal existence as a "species being,"
expresses the basic importance of positive freedom. For as Marx strongly asserts his
objections against alienation of man in the division of labour, he argues for the importance of
certain conditions that will empower man in the face of coercive circumstances, namely the
imposition by private property and exploitation of labour (imposed by the institutions of
private property and the division of labour), and that will enable him/her to live the life of a
"species being"; hence, his argument, for positive freedoms, a life with quality and essence if
one puts in Jean Paul Sartre’s terminology. Alienation occurs because the worker is enslaved
by the object of his work. Alienation, then, in some of its forms, may be interpreted as a state
of unfreedom, and this may be seen in the situation of a worker who is left without a choice
but to hire out his labour, in circumstances not of his own choosing, in order to live.
Moreover, the division of labour coerces man in certain spheres of activity that warps his
humanity, and thus does not provide him/her the real freedom to pursue activities/lives of
his/her own choice (what he has "reason to value," to use Sen's phraseology). Alienation in
the division of labour can then be viewed as a violation of species freedom—as positive
freedom—in that the worker is deprived, in a very real sense, of the freedom to pursue
activities that would fulfil his humanity—his "species being"; for he is merely forced into an
exclusive activity of production—activities that do not fulfil his "species being"—his
potentiality for a true human existence. These conditions of alienation can be understood as
violations of positive freedom.

The preceding interpretations of Marx's ideas as involving conceptions of freedom relate to


and complement Sen's ideas on and arguments for positive freedom. Sen (who goes beyond
Hayek's negative conception of freedom) argues that freedom can and should also be
conceived positively, essentially it should be the duty of the state to be able to provide certain
amenities to the individuals in order to provide them with the ability to be able to lead
progressive as well as qualitatively3 productive life. Our interpretation of Marx's affirmative
position on the issue of positive freedom can be further seen with sensitive insights at various
points. As we can find details for this topic by exploring in the details in his "Economic and
Philosophic Manuscripts" the different ways in which the worker is exploited and how he can
be empowered. In this work, Marx critically notes the stark contrast between the life of a
human being and the life of the "slave class of workers". Marx must have had a conception of
what should be the ideal life of a human being, in which one has options or opportunities to

3
Reference to Amartya Sen’s capability approach to development and progress.
live not as an enslaved worker but as a human being—one who can freely choose to engage
in what Marx calls "free conscious activity4," and one in which he is not forced into and
cannot escape from an exclusive sphere of activity, as well as become accomplished in any
branch he wishes and further create a good social classes on the basis of individual will.

Marx observes that the worker in a capitalist society, far from being accomplished in any
branch he wishes, and "far from being in a position to buy everything, must sell himself, and
his humanity" in order for him to exist. Furthermore, Marx also speaks in explicit terms of
rights and real opportunities for workers. For example, in his "Critique of the Gotha
Programme" Marx speaks of the worker's right to receive the proceeds of his/her labour
"according to his work", at least in the earlier phase of what he calls a socialist society (a
"bourgeois right" to be replaced by a system based on needs in a more advanced form of
Communism, to which Sen agreed, admitting that "a system based on needs would seem to
have a greater use for the complex idea we call humanity" ). Education must also be provided
for, at least up to a point. The preceding ideas, therefore, could be seen in some way as
expressing complementary practical considerations (in terms of rights to social safety nets,
right to health care, right to education, etc.), very much coherent with—indeed supportive of
Sen's conception of positive freedom.

Marx may have had in mind the importance of basic conditions to provide the workers
freedom from the threat of beggary or starvation, ill health, etc. Now, Sen clearly recognises
that what institutions are in place, and how they function, are important as Sen argues that the
availability of the opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and
how they function. Not only do institutions contribute to our freedoms, their roles can be
sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to our freedom. Elsewhere, Sen admits
that "a person's ability to achieve various valuable functionings may be greatly enhanced by
public action and policy… there is a very real sense in which the freedom to live the way one
would like is greatly enhanced by public policy…". In view of such, Marx's ideas in effect
raise some very hard questions as what sorts of, or which, institutions could contribute to
which freedoms that may be considered valuable? And in what ways do these contribute to
these freedoms? One critical point related to policy and institutions for instance was what Sen
discussed in connection to the issue of poverty?

4
Sen answers this by emphasizing the important role of public policy in determining
important measurement standards related to the evaluation and identification of poverty and
inequality. He took pains to emphasise that not becoming critical of traditional measurement
standards (and their arbitrariness) will do little justice in the pursuit of a life relatively free
from deprivation. For instance, making the important distinction between distributive from
aggregative consequences, how do we assess, then, on these two different (though related)
considerations, which policy measures effectively and in a morally desirable way contribute
to human freedom? Related to these thus is the question: which freedoms and whose
freedoms matter? For instance, should freedom from poverty take precedence over freedom
from discrimination, freedom from oppression? Moreover, should the freedom of women or
children supersede the freedoms of men, the freedom of the long oppressed over the recently
condemned?

Marx speaks of how, in the context of political emancipation, certain rights to equality,
liberty, security and property actually limit man's freedom, instead of being a realisation of
freedom. He argues that the political rights that come with political emancipation are rights of
the "egoistic man" who is separated from other men and from the community; liberty is "a
right of man is not based on the association of man with man but rather on the separation
from man". For Marx, "political emancipation" is not "complete" "human emancipation" and
that, in fact, political emancipation is a reduction of man to an egoistic individual. For
instance, in the right of private property Marx explains that such a right is nothing but the
right of self-interest because it is but "the right to enjoy and dispose of one's possession as
one wills, without regard for other men and independently of society" and the right "to enjoy
and dispose of his goods, his revenues, the fruits of his labour and of his industry as he wills".
Hence, the right to private property, as one exercise of the right of liberty, "lets every man
find in other men not the realization but rather Hence, instead of political emancipation
(together with its right to liberty, property, equality, and security), Marx speaks of some form
of "human emancipation" as a desirable ideal, to be realised in his ideal of a communist or
co-operative society of the future. In such social arrangement, one can draw the inference that
since Marx conceives of a situation where the means of production and the proceeds of
labour are already for common-ownership rights are no longer necessary and hence have to
be abandoned.

Marx conceives of the ideal communal life as one where men are not separated by their
selfish interests but rather, are actually united together by virtue of mutual interdependence
among them and where, instead of individual interests, communal interests reign. Since
everything is already communally owned (and where the "springs of co-operative wealth
flow more abundantly"), rights that protect property and assign what to whom seem no longer
necessary. One can understand how Marx could, with his idea of communism and of the real
human emancipation he seems to associate with it, eventually abandon the concept of
rights—even attack its historical conceptual and social limitations—something he seems to
have initially used and presupposed in light of his critical concerns on the plight of workers in
a capitalist system. Certainly of course, such conceptual and hermeneutical issues can
perhaps be clarified by understanding the different contexts within which Marx and Sen can
be seen to situate their conceptions of freedoms. Sen, especially in his book "Development as
Freedom," speaks of the importance of freedom, characterised by capabilities, rights, and
instrumental freedoms, in a context of poverty, scarcity, and widespread deprivation; hence,
there is the most pressing need to "empower" people through certain freedoms, rights and
capabilities in order to survive, and live as "human beings". By contrast, Marx speaks of the
limitations of the concepts of rights in a context where "all the springs of co-operative wealth
flow more abundantly", where men, as "species-beings," share and enjoy communal interests.

Can we categorize Amartya Sen as a Neo- Marxist?


The argument regarding Amartya Sen being a Marxist or a neo Marxist in fact has been a
complete interpretative aspect for the scholars who have been reading the Marxist text and
Amartya Sen’s text. In our discussion above we have come to recognize the very build up
that has been created in Sen’s argument as given by Marx in his analysis of the society and
functioning of the economy as per the welfare of the people. We can also argue about the fact
that in theoretical aspects, we have tendencies where both the authors of their respective
works are arguing for the same thing. We have already seen the concept of political freedom
and true emancipation of human both have the same contents in terms of what they are
aiming about. And it’s also not wrong to say about this Amartya Sen’s harsh critics have also
been on a trend because of the rising globalizati and the misconception that we have created
that globalization is also propagating the idea of a just society and a morally sustained one.
And upon that we have seen Amartya Sen working upon in his work as how globalization just
cogulates in terms of thinking of a better society in terms of only quantitative evaluation and
construction. But the question still remains is Amartya Sen a Marxist or even a Neo- Marxist?
Conceptualizing Amartya Sen as Marxist or a Neo- Marxist means that we are putting Sen’s
idea in the same context of complete eradication of the majority and claiming to start with a
revolutionary idea to create a whole new society at once. But when we study Amartya Sen we
don’t study only the factors which should abolish the class and we don’t only study the stern
critic of class which would compel us to change the whole structure of the society. The fact is
that when we study Marx we study from a perspective which is society and class oriented.
MArxis does talk about class emancipation and removing the false consciousness in the
society for the individuals in the society in order to save them from exploitation of the weaker
section by the majority class. But that is the sole focus of Marx’s study. A harsh criticism
followed by only state and community based arguments and solely focusing upon the interest
of the class as a whole which will then implicitly work for the individual benefits in the class
which will in turn emancipate the people which is mentioned in all the Marxist works as we
know about. But in that process we are forget about the individual demands. Responsibility of
the state in the cloud of providing them amenities doesn’t means that only certain criteria
accepted by the ruling or the leading majority should be applied for every class and group in
the society. Responsibility of state extends upto the fact each individual is able to reach their
maximum potential in the society and is able to work upon it. Real emancipation lies if every
individual is able to attain their desires and reach their potential in the society and that can
only be done if the economic and political environment is created such which provides the
maximum number of opportunities and resources in terms distribution of wealth for each
individual. In that sort of line of thinking, we have Amartya Sen more of a humanist, not a
Marxist( To be exact a Post- Modern Humanist, up for further debate).

Sen’s main ideal in his development theory is mainly focused upon the facts that how can
each individual gain the maximum out of the growth that we talk about. That each individual
is able to maximize its gain and resources without any discrepancies created in the society
and without any inequality being widened in the society. Benefit of the humanity as a whole,
in terms of respecting the individual needs and capabilities is what is professed by Amartya
Sen in his discussion. And this discussion is not exaggerated by any class overthrow or
revolutionary tendencies, what we see here is a revision of the economic model, not solely
based on criticism, technically what classical Marxism is based upon and implementing that
economic model not having the quantitative measurements of goal as the priority instead the
quality of individual’s life being the focus. In that light, categorizing Amartya Sen, would
prove to be a mistake as it would be based on false interpretation and basis of facts.
Conclusion:-
The works of both Amartya Sen and Karl Marx stand relevant even today. We cannot ignore
the work of a classical philosopher and a modern philosopher (again, which I say is up for
debate in juxtaposition to his ideology being post modernist), upon the understanding the
relevance on economy and how it effect individuals in different spheres. Upon this work only
we get to see that he field and study of development is ever widening and increases with
every subsequent economic policy and how it should be implemented in the society. As far as
the deliberation that goes upon our hypothesis whether Amartya Sen is categorized as a neo-
Marxist we have proved our hypothesis wrong as in our evaluation of both the ideologies and
their aspects, Amartya Sen’s work points towards a more humanistic approach rather than
focusing upon a fixed ideology and trying to construct than society upon. Amartya Sen’s
work even though focusing upon positive notions of freedom and tools similar to what
Marxism stands by, still tends to focus upon individual as a whole whereas Marxism dilutes
into the idea of having the perfect society and the ideology of a perfect community.

Bibliography

1. Agarwal, B, J. Humpheries and I. Robeyn (eds), Capabilities, Freedom and Equality:


Amartya Sen’s Work from a Gender Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2006).
2. Bedjaoui, Mohammed, Towards a New International Economic Order (New York:
Holmes and Meir, 1979).
3. European Journal of International Law 1 (2004). An Outline of a Marxist Course on
Public International Law, 17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004).
4. Paul Blackledge; Perry Anderson (2004). Marxism, and the New Left. Merlin Press.
ISBN 978-0-85036-532-0.
5. Sen, Amartya, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2000).
-The Argumentative Indian (Oxford University Press, 2004).

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