Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
IYOY,
respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts: Fely and Crasus Iyoy were married on December 16, 1961 in which they
had five children. Fely went to the United States in 1984 and at the same year sent
divorce papers to Crasus asking the latter to sign them. In 1985, Crasus found out
that Fely married an American Citizen named Stephen Micklus and eventually
bore him a child. Fely went back to the Philippines occasionally, including once
when she attended the marriage of one of her children where she freely used the
surname of her second husband in the invitations. On March 1997, Crasus filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity in their marriage in the ground of
psychological incapacity since Fely unambiguously brought “danger and
dishonor” to the family. Fely however filed a counterclaim and alleged that
Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, and jobless, the reason forced the former to
left for the United States. Furthermore, Fely argued her marriage to Stephen
Micklus valid since she’s already an American Citizen and therefore not covered
by our laws.
Issue: Whether or not the abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy can
be a ground for the declaration of nullity of their marriage in the ground of
psychological incapacity
Held:
This Court ruled contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between
respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code.
While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,
this is one of those situations where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.
In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its
existence. In Santos v.Court of Appeals, the term psychological incapacity
was defined, thus—“. . .[P]sychological incapacity” should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical)incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated… The psychological incapacity must be characterized by—(a)
Gravity—It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; b)
Juridical Antecedence—It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It must be incurable or, even
if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.