22. AMELIA P. ARELLANO, REPRESENTED BY HER DULY APPOINTED GUARDIANS, AGNES P.

ARELLANO AND
NONA P. ARELLANO, PETITIONER, VS. FRANCISCO PASCUAL AND MIGUEL PASCUAL, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano
represented by daughters Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and
Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration,” filed by respondents before the Regional Trial Court, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a
parcel of land (the donated property) located in Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an
advance legitime" of petitioner. The ordered partition of the probate court was faulted by petitioner and in
the present petition ascribed as errors of CA the rulings that donated property is part of the estate of Angel
Pascual, Jr. subject to collation, that respondents are entitled to legitimes as compulsory heirs and the unequal
partitioning of the estate among petitioner and respondent as intestate heirs.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the property donated is subject to collation

(2) Whether or not the property of the estate should be equally distributed among the parties.

RULING:

(1) No. The donated property is not subject to collation. Collation takes place when there
are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If
there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do not show that the
decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his
siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime - that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it
for compulsory heirs.
There being no compulsory heir, the decedent was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if
nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a "stranger," chargeable against the free portion of the
estate and not subject to collation.
 (2) Yes. The remaining estate of the decedent should be partitioned equally among his siblings--
collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil
Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

23. De Roma vs. CA

Facts:

Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate
on April 30, 1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the
private respondent as guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time filed an inventory
of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by Candelaria to
Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included.

The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding
their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The private
respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article
1062, claims she has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not
officious.

The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the trial court,* which held that the decedent, when she made the
donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited collation.

On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the respondent court** holding that the deed of donation
contained no express prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation and equally
divided the net estate of the decedent, including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. This
is because the deed of donation contained a phrase which reads "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing
muli"

Issue: Whether or not there was a prohibition to collate?

Ruling:

No. We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation
of the donated properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by
a lawyer, and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences of the donation being made. It is reasonable
to suppose, given the precise language of the document, that he would have included therein an express prohibition to
collate if that had been the donor's intention.

Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The
suggestion that there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free portion
of the decedent's estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it claimed that the
disputed donation is officious The sole issue is whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we see
none.

The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general
rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but the rule,
which is categorical enough.

24. VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS 286 SRA 217

FACTS:LauroVizconde and his wife Estrellita has 2 daughters. On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from her
father a parcel of land (Valenzuela property). Later on, she sold the Valenzuela property Lim.

On June 1990, she bought from Premier Homes a parcel of land with improvements (Paranaque property)
using the proceeds from the sale of the Valenzuela property. On June 1991, the Vizconde massacre happened.
Estrellita and her daughters were killed thereafter leaving Lauro as t sole heir of their estate. Later on, Rafael
(Estrellita’s father) died intestate. The heirs of Rafael averred that their legitime should come from the
collation of all the properties distributed by Nicolas to his children during his lifetime, including the Paranaque
property. The trial court in its decision did not include the Paranaque property as part of the estate of Rafael.
Ramon, one of the heirs of Rafael, filed his objection against the order of the trial court.

ISSUE: WON the collation is proper.

RULING:NO.The probate court made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. It was
the Valenzuela property that was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale. The Parañaque property
which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become
collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis.The
order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to
Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of
P900,000.00,by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and
Lauro who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs.
Thus, the probate court's order of collation against Lauro is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged
with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein Lauro who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands,
collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously
given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer
of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any
"claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir"in the Parañaque property.
25.QUASHA ANCHETA PEÑA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND REPRESENTING THE
HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE vs. LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP.

FACTS:
Raymond Triviere passed away. A year later, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were
instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Atty.
Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the
widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate.
As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes,
security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.

Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed a motion for the payment of their litigation expenses. Citing their failure to
submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate under administration, the RTC denied the
motion.Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office, took
over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.

LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere filed its
opposition. LCN countered that the RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when
it denied the first Motion for Payment for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets
and expenses of the estate as required by the court. LCN also averred that the administrators and the heirs
had earlier agreed to fix the former's fees. LCN further asserted that the administrators failed to establish that
the estate was large, or that its settlement was attended with great difficulty, or required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the administrators. Finally, LCN argued that its claims are still outstanding and
chargeable against the estate of the late Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have
been paid.

The RTC declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
considering that estate has no more assets except the money deposited with the Union Bank of the
Philippines.The RTC in a motion, ordered that the shares of the widow and children be paid. LCN sought
recourse from the Court of Appeals and promulgated a Decision ruling in favor of LCN.

The Court of Appeals modified the order of the RTC by deleting the shares from the estate in favor of the
children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere. The appellate court adopted the position of LCN that the
claim of LCN was an obligation of the estate which was yet unpaid and, under Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Revised Rules of Court, barred the distribution of the residue of the estate.

ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC to petitioner
children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.

RULING:NO

Petitioners, though, insist that the awards in favor of the petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond
Triviere is not a distribution of the residue of the estate, thus, rendering Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised
Rules of Court inapplicable.
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC was not yet a distribution of the
residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a
partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being
awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.

Although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the
estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: [1] only part of the estate that is
not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2,
Rule 109); and [2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of
outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).There is no showing that the
RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of
all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the
award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their
respective shares from the estate after all these years.

Petitioners earlier invoked Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 526 (1989), where the Court
sustained an Order granting partial distribution of an estate. However, Dael is not even on all fours with the
case at bar, given that the Court therein found that: Where, however, the estate has sufficient assets to
ensure equitable distribution of the inheritance in accordance with law and the final judgment in the
proceedings and it doesnot appear there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which
provisions should have been made or a bond required, such partial distribution may be allowed. No similar
determination on sufficiency of assets or absence of any outstanding obligations of the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere was made by the RTC in this case. In fact, there is a pending claim by LCN against the
estate, and the amount thereof exceeds the value of the entire estate. Furthermore, in Dael, the Court
actually cautioned that partial distribution of the decedent’s estate pending final termination of the testate or
intestate proceeding should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in extreme cases,
such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this rule is that courts
should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof
be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the inheritance.

26. Dimayuga vs Court of Appeals

Facts:The spouses Genaro Dimayuga and Segunda Gayapanao, who were married in 1915, acquired a
Torrens title for that homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by her son, Manuel, and
her husband, Genaro.During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named Emerenciana Panganiban by
whom he begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaida, Remedios and Socorro. A sixth child,
Nelia Dimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death Emerenciana cultivated a homestead adjoining
the thirteen-hectare homestead in question. So, it was not surprising that she became the
paramour of Genaro.
On September 16, 1948, or about a month before Genaro's death a "partition of real property" was
executed in English. It was duly notarized. It was signed by Genaro, Manuel, Filomeno and Pacita and
thumbmarked by Emerenciana, in representation of her minor children Adelaida, Remedios, Socorro and
Nelia, though Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.
In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the homestead as his sole
property and not conjugal, which it actually was. Manuel was given as share five and one-half
hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The six
illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenth hectares (northern portion also adjoining
Emerenciana's separate homestead). The partition was not registered.
Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire homestead was
inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral ascendancy, executed an
affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare
homestead. About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the
annulment of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven children
including Manuel.
Issue: Whether or not the partition inter vivoswas valid.

Ruling:No.Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of his
property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person who makes an inter
vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the partition is void.

The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner of the entire
homestead. That is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's usufructuary legitime, was
inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-five years.
Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only one-half of the homestead. In that one-half portion, Manuel
and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, had a two-third legitime.

In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived Manuel of his
legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance. The 1951 affidavit cannot be
construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his father's estate because the document does not have that
tenor. For this reason, Manuel is not estopped to ignore that partition.

27. MANG-OY v CA

FACTS: Old Man Tumpao had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the private respondents in
this case. Upon her death, Old Man Tumpao took to himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who
had two children she had “adopted” according to the practice of the Igorots then. It is their children who, with
some others, are the petitioners in this case.

On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called a “last will and testament” the dispositive
portion of which declared:

“Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO, whom I named, that after departing from this life, he shall
be the one to carry or fulfill my Testament, and that he shall have the power to see and dispose all what
 I have stated, he shall not change what I have already stated in my Testament so that there is truth in
my will, I will affix my right thumbmark at the end of my written name because I do not know how to
read and write, after it has been read to me and affirm all what is my Will..”

The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries named therein who at the time were already
occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this document, they then, on
September 7, 1937, executed an agreement providing as follows:

“We who are named children and who will inherit from our father TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA,
ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG, TULINGAN PUL-OT
and ANTHONY MENECIO all of legal age and residing in the town of La Trinidad, Sub-Province of
Benguet we say in truth after swearing under oath in accordance to law that the testament of our
father TUMPAO who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit and also acknowledge or recognize
the lands as included in the area of said land as appearing in Title No. 416 in the name of our father
TUMPAO here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and understood the Will as told by him concerning
our right to the land which we will inherit and also to those whose lands which were included in the said
Title No. 416 because we were all called be present and hear his will. We heard and agreed to his will as
appearing in his testament regarding the land which we will inherit. We also recognized and agree to
the appointment of our brother BANDO to whom the parcels of land is to be delivered and he will also
be the one to deliver to us our shares as soon as we will demand the partition in accordance with the
will of our father TUMPAO as soon in the Testament which we saw and have heard by all.”

Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died. The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them,
apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as expressed in his last “will” and affirmed by the
other abovequoted instrument.

23 years later, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Man
Tumpao among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other persons mentioned in the above-quoted
documents. By virtue of this partition, Old Man Tumpao’s title was cancelled and another one was issued in
favor of the three respondents.

It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who are suing for reconveyance. They had been
sustained by the trial court, which, however, was reversed by the CA.

CA held that the “will” executed by Old Man Tumpao was null and void because it had not been probated. The
agreement of partition among the supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a partition
inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise
held that the land in dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao’s first marriage although it was registered
during his second marriage and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots occupied by them.

ISSUE: W/N the “will and testament” of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being probated

RULING: YES. the document may be sustained on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was
in force at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said article reads as
follows:
 “Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.”

Old Man Tumpao’s “will” affirmed by the beneficiaries in their agreement of September 7, 1937, which
reiterated and recognized the terms of such “will”, while not valid as a partition inter vivos under Articles 816
and 1271 of the old Civil Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their conformity to the
dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his “last will and testament.”

The agreement entered into by the parties in implementation of Old Man Tumpao’s “will” did not have to be
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes because the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu was not extended to the Mountain Province. Moreover, the document was not a conveyance of
properties or property right.

It remains to state that the property in dispute having been registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was
acquired during the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the respondents as the conjugal property of
their mother and Old Man Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as their exclusive
inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots occupied by the petitioners.

28. Chavez vs IAC

The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavistawho had 6 children, named
Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina.

Conception acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel when they sold their shares to her
(with conformity of their mother Manuela) Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6
share of the land with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.

In all the documents(Deeds of Sale), the following stipulation appears: “…” meaning that the owner, Manuela
Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property
(Camarines Norte). The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of
the fruits during her lifetime.Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her
conformity, Manuela signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter,
Raquel and her husband Gerardo Jimenez.Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case against their
mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer with
right to repurchase.

Complaint was dismissed. The plaintiffsappealed. CA reversed the trial court, declaring the deeds of sale in
favor of Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez and the sale in favor of Pepito Ferrer as null and void abinitio,
and declaring further that the documents (Deeds of Sale) are evidence of a valid partition of the land in
question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children. Petitioners filed MR alleging that the late
Manuela was found to have executed during her lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT and there is now a
pending petition for probate and that the validity of documents ceases from the time that she executed the
will because the execution of the Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela. Private respondents
opposed the MR asserting that the partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the
execution of the said will.

Issue: W/N Deeds of Sale are evidence of a valid partition of the land.
Ruling: Yes.

Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter
vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parentis a
case expressly authorized by law.

In the instant case,the Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel in favor of
Concepcion are evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and
her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale are not
contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during
the lifetime of Manuela who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos,
executed by the property owner herself, is valid.

It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself
authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor
of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in
the partition inter vivos

29. CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

FACTS:Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in ‘the name
of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A year later,
his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied,
after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them.
The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and
his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that
he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of
her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.

HELD:YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated.

RATIO:The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the
sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their
right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that killeth” but to “the
spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’swill.

30. Bautista vs Bautista

Facts:

During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square meter parcel of land (the
property) in Poblacion, San Carlos City, Pangasinan. She died intestate leaving behind her spouse Isidro
Bautista (Isidro) and five children, namely: Teofilo, Alegria, Angelica, Pacita, and Gil. Isidro and four of his five
children –Pacita, Gil, Alegria, and Angelica –executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the property in which
Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children. Teofilo was excluded from the partition.

Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired ½ of the property, sold
the same, by Deed of Absolute Sale to their sibling Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc. Pacita
and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations in their names over 209.85 square meters of the property including
the shares they purchased from Angelica and Alegria. Pacita, with Pedro’s conformity, later conveyed via Deed
of Absolute Sale ½ of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedro’s nephew.

Petitioner Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact Francisco Muñoz, filed a Complaint against his
siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his already deceased sister
Pacita), Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already deceased brother Gil), Pricilla’s children Gilbert, Jim, Glenda,
Guen, and Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong for annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership,
possession and damages. Petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the
property and that the deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong was fictitious as it was
impossible for her to have executed the same in Manila, she being already seriously ill at the time. RTC
rendered decision in favot of Teofilo. CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissed
Teofilo’s complaint on the ground of prescription.

Issue: W/N the extrajudicial partition was valid

Ruling:

No.The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo’s co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v.
Segurainstructs:

x xx The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years x xx

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not
prescribe.

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo’s co-heirs.Consequently,
the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well
as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the
transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet.

31. VIADO NON VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned, among others, a house and lot pertained to as the Isarog
property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982, followed by Julian 3 years later. Left as heirs were their children
namely: Rebecca Viado Non, Delia Viado, Nilo Viado, and Leah Viado Jacobs. Both Nilo and Leah died on 22
April 1987. Nilo left as heirs his wife Alicia and their 2 children. The children of spouses Viado lived in the
Isarog property together with Nilo’s widow and children. However, a dispute arose when Rebecca Viado Non
asked that the property be divided equally between the 2 families to make room for their growing children.
Nilo’s wife and children claimed absolute ownership over the property evidence by a deed of donation
executed by Julian in favour of Nilo, covering his ½ conjugal share, and a deed of extrajudicial partition
settlement in which Julian, Leah, and Rebecca waived in favour of Nilo all their interests and rights over their
share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both documents were registered 5 years after its execution, and
a new TCT is issued by the Register of Deeds in Nilo’s favor. Petitioner Rebecca contends that Delia Viado,
their retardate sister, was not part of the extrajudicial settlement, and hence amounts to preterition which
should invalidate the settlement. Both the trial court and CA ruled in favor of Nilo’s wife and children. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Delia’s exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement amounts to preterition?

HELD: Yes. However, in the absence of bad faith and fraud, Article 1104 of the Civil Code must apply which, in
essence, provides that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
 When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in
question included, was transmitted to her heirs—her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca
Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put
an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport
to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not
adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of
the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third
persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof
of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief,
as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect
that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the
preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog
property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.