REM (SCA) - Hubby

Remedial Law – Civil Procedure | #GKBM
I. INTERPLEADER
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEE E. WON alias
RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
Interpleader; Interpleader under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Purpose of.—The action
of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a remedy whereby a person who
has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required
to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing.
The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in
respect of one liability.
Same; Same; Difference between interpleader under the Code of Civil Procedure and under the Rules
of Court.—The procedure under the Rules of Court is the same as that under the Code of Civil
Procedure except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the
nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is
proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the
performance of an obligation.
Same; Stakeholder should file action of interpleader within reasonable time after dispute has arisen
without waiting to be sued by claimants; Reason.—A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to
hale the contending claimants to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits
against him before filing a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a
reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable
diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
Same; Where stakeholder files action of interpleader after judgment has been rendered against him
in favor of one of claimants, action deemed too late; Reason.—A stakeholder’s action of interpleader
is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending
claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the
judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment
was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he
becomes liable to the latter.
Same; Party who files action of interpleader should show that he has not been made independently
liable to any of the claimants.—Before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order
of interpleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become
independently liable to any of the claimants.
Same; Where stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed to judgment
against him, action of interpleader deemed too late.—If a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of
the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later
on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit.
Same; A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in action of
interpleader and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants.—A successful
litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to
prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the judgment. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. vs. Won, 70 SCRA 165, No. L-23851 March
26, 1976
ZOILA CO LIM, petitioner, vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
No L-41831. February 18, 1976.*
CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BENITO GERVASIO TAN and

ZOILA CO LIM, respondents.
Civil procedure; Interpleader; It is error for trial court to dismiss a complaint for interpleader where it
is clear that there is an active conflict of interest between the two defendants.—Since there is an
active conflict of interests between the two defendants, now herein respondent Benito Gervasio Tan
and petitioner Zoila Co Lim, over the disputed shares of stock, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing the complaint for interpleader, which practically decided ownership of the
shares of stock in favor of defendant Benito Gervasio Tan. The two defendants, now respondents in
L-41831, should be given full opportunity to litigate their respective claims. Lim vs. Continental
Development Corporation, 69 SCRA 349, No. L-41818, No L-41831 February 18, 1976
LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.
Same; Same; Interpleader; An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the
person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property.—The good faith of Tirona is
put in question in her preference for Maria Lourdes Breton-Mendiola. As a stakeholder, Tirona should
have used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants to court. Tirona need not have
awaited actual institution of a suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader. An action
for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to
conflicting claims on the property. The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has
property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by
the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property or
who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate
among themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The
remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a
double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the claimants litigate among
themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a
case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a
crosscomplaint. Ocampo vs. Tirona, 455 SCRA 62, G.R. No. 147812 April 6, 2005
II. DECLARATORY RELIEF
EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING

INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
Actions; Declaratory Relief; Words and Phrases; “Declaratory Relief,” Defined; The only issue that
may be raised in a petition for declaratory relief is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute—corollary is the general rule that such an action must be
justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.—Declaratory
relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising
from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction
or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action
must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
Same; Same; Requisites.—Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief,
as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and
the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening
seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action
or proceeding.
Same; Same; When Dismissible; A petition for declaratory relief may not be dismissed despite the
filing of an action for rescission, ejectment and damages where the trial court had not yet resolved
the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition.—It is true that in
Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, 395 SCRA 624 (2003), we held that the petition
for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, we cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful
detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory
relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be
preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had
not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition.
In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. We are not unmindful of the
doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956), where the declaratory relief action
was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet,
again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory
relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant
case. Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant
declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write
finis to the parties’ dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper
interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ABAD, LEONOR ABAD, SABINA ABAD, JOSEPHINE “JOSIE”
BEATA ABAD-ORLINA, CECILIA ABAD, PIO ABAD, DOMINIC ABAD, TEODORA ABAD,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Declaratory Relief; There is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or
contract subject of the complaint.—Without doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not
essentially entail an executory process. There is nothing in its nature, however, that prohibits a
counterclaim from being set-up in the same action. Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special
civil action for declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same
transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially
different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of
Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same rules
governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if
they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Same; Appeals; Issue not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first time in the petition
at bar.—Petitioner additionally submits that the issue of determining the amount of deposit insurance
due respondents was never tried on the merits since the trial dwelt only on the “determination of the
viability or validity of the deposits” and no evidence on record sustains the holding that the amount
of deposit due respondents had been finally determined. This issue was not raised in the court a quo,
however, hence, it cannot be raised for the first time in the petition at bar. Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 402 SCRA 194, G.R. No. 126911 April 30, 2003
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by SECRETARY ROMULO L.

NERI, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, represented by POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO L. LOMIBAO, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRMAN
ANGELO T. REYES, AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, represented by CHAIRPERSON
KARINA C. DAVID, petitioners, vs. MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by P/COL. FELICISIMO G. LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER INP
RETIREES, respondents.
Retirement; Philippine National Police; The Integrated National Police (INP) was never, as posited by
the petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by R.A. No. 6975.—It appears clear to us
that the INP was never, as posited by the petitioners, abolished or terminated out of existence by
R.A. No. 6975. For sure, nowhere in R.A. No. 6975 does the words “abolish” or “terminate” appear in
reference to the INP. Instead, what the law provides is for the “absorption,” “transfer,” and/or
“merger” of the INP, as well as the other offices comprising the PC-INP, with the PNP. To “abolish” is
to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely; to “absorb” is to assimilate, incorporate or
to take in. “Merge” means to cause to combine or unite to become legally absorbed or extinguished
by merger while “transfer” denotes movement from one position to another. Clearly, “abolition”
cannot be equated with “absorption.”
Same; Same; Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) which include the herein respondents
are, therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to
Philippine National Police (PNP) retirees under Sections 74 and 75 of R.A. No. 6975 as amended by
R.A. No. 8551.—With the conclusion herein reached that the INP was not in fact abolished but was
merely transformed to become the PNP, members of the INP which include the herein respondents
are, therefore, not excluded from availing themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP
retirees under Sections 74 and 75 of R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551. It may be that
respondents were no longer in the government service at the time of the enactment of R.A. No.
6975. This fact, however, without more, would not pose as an impediment to the respondents’
entitlement to the new retirement scheme set forth under the aforecited sections.
Same; Same; Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of rationalized retirement
benefits to Philippine National Police (PNP) members who have meanwhile retired before its
enactment was not prohibited.—Under the amendatory law (R.A. No. 8551), the application of
rationalized retirement benefits to PNP members who have meanwhile retired before its (R.A. No.
8551) enactment was not prohibited. In fact, its Section 38 explicitly states that the rationalized
retirement benefits schedule and program “shall have retroactive effect in favor of PNP members and
officers retired or separated from the time specified in the law.” To us, the aforesaid provision should
be made applicable to INP members who had retired prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975. For, as
aforeheld, the INP was, in effect, merely absorbed by the PNP and not abolished. Department of
Budget and Management vs. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc., 523 SCRA 90, G.R. No.
169466 May 9, 2007
“However, the execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not

necessarily indefensible. In Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation [PDIC] v. Court of
Appeals,27 wherein the Court affirmed the order for the petitioners therein to pay the
balance of the deposit insurance to the therein respondents, we categorically ruled:
“Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract
subject of the complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an
ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court,
except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity between their fundamental nature is such that the same
rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules
governing special civil actions.”
Similarly, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,29
the Court upheld the lower court’s order for a party to refund the amounts paid by the
adverse party under the municipal ordinance therein questioned, stating:
“x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief may be converted into an
ordinary action and the parties allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
proper, if before the final termination of the case “a breach or violation of an . . .
ordinance, should take place.” In the present case, no breach or violation of the ordinance
occurred. The petitioner decided to pay “under protest” the fees imposed by the ordinance.
Such payment did not affect the case; the declaratory relief action was still proper because
the applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still remained to be resolved,
although the matter could also be threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes
paid . . . . In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee alleged that by reason of
the enforcement of the municipal ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under
protest the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and accordingly, one of the reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner was that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts
it paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of the case. The inclusion of
said allegation and prayer in the petition was not objected to by the respondents in their
answer. During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the petitioner was introduced.
Respondents were thus fully aware of the petitioner’s claim for refund and of what would
happen if the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.”
The Court sees no reason for treating this case differently from PDIC and Matalin. This
disposition becomes all the more appropriate considering that the respondents, as
petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the immediate adjustment of their retirement benefits
which, significantly, the herein petitioners, as respondents in the same court, did not object
to. Being aware of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew logical consequence if, as
it turned out, a declaratory judgment is rendered in the respondents’ favor. Department of
Budget and
Management vs. Manila’s Finest Retirees Association, Inc., 523 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 169466
May 9, 2007”
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as

Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs. VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 170657. August 15, 2007.*
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs. MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM,
INC., respondent.
Declaratory Relief; Requisites; The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is

satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of
whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the
controversy.—The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there
must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d)
the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. The requirement of the presence of a
justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist
between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will
help in ending the controversy. A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of
right which is actually contested.
Same; Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA); For the transportation companies to wait
for the actual issuance by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority of an order for the closure
of their bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be
for declaratory relief which must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.—The
MMDA’s resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is
also evident from telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of
Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003 expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of
the Project. Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to “remove the
bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the
different transport modes.” The 7th Whereas clause proceeds to mention the establishment of the
North and South terminals. As alleged in Viron’s petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail
Terminal had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in
its Answer and Position Paper, in fact affirmed that the government had begun to implement the
Project. It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely
conjectural or anticipatory. Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance
by the MMDA of an order for the closure of respondents’ bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by
then, the proper action to bring would no longer be for declaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach or violation of rights.
CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, and DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS EDWARD O. BALTAZAR,
respondents.
Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites for a petition for declaratory relief to prosper.—The
requisites for a petition for declaratory relief to prosper are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party
seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination.
Same; Same; Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 55 has removed from the courts’ jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief involving tax assessments.—As a substantive law that has not been repealed by
another statute, CA No. 55 is still in effect and holds sway. Precisely, it has removed from the courts’
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief involving tax assessments. The Court cannot repeal,
modify or alter an act of the Legislature.
Same; Same; A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
matter.—The proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or other written
instrument, or the construction or validity of statute or ordinance. CJH hinges its petition on the
demand letter or assessment sent to it by the BOC. However, it is really not the demand letter which
is the subject matter of the petition. Ultimately, this Court is asked to determine whether the decision
of the Court en banc in G.R. No. 119775 has a retroactive effect. This approach cannot be
countenanced. A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject
matter. CJH Development Corporation vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 575 SCRA 467, G.R. No.
172457 December 24, 2008
VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, petitioner, vs. JOSE J. CAFE, GLICERIO L. ALERIA, RUDY G.

ADLAON, DAMASCENO AGUIRRE, RAMON PARING, MARIO ARGUELLES, ROLANDO STA.
ANA, NELLIE UGDANG, PEDRO ATUEL, RUBY BONSOBRE, RUTH FORNILLOS, DANIEL
GATCHALIAN, RUBEN GUTIERREZ, JULIET GATCHALIAN, ZENAIDA POBLETE, ARTHUR
LOUDY, LILIAN LU, ISABEL MEJIA, EDUARDO ARGUELLES, LAO SUI KIEN, SAMUEL
CONSOLACION, DR. ARTURO MONTERO, DRA. LILIOSA MONTERO, PEDRO LACIA, CIRILA
LACIA, EVELYN SANGALANG, DAVID CASTILLO, ARSENIO SARMIENTO, ELIZABETH SY,
METODIO NAVASCA, HELEN VIRTUDAZO, IRENE LIMBAGA, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE, JUANA
DACALUS, NELLIE RICAMORA, JUDITH ESPINOSA, PAZ KUDERA, EVELYN PANES,
AGATON BULICATIN, PRESCILLA GARCIA, ROSALIA OLITAO, LUZVIMINDA AVILA,
GLORIA OLAIR, LORITA MENCIAS, RENATO ARIETA, EDITHA ACUZAR, LEONARDA VILLA-
CAMPA, ELIAS JARDINICO, BOBINO NAMUAG, FELIMON NAMUAG, EDGAR CABUNOC,
HELEN ARGUELLES, HELEN ANG, FELECIDAD PRIETO, LUISITO GRECIA, LILIBETH
PARING, RUBEN CAMACHO, ROSALINDA LALUNA, LUZ YAP, ROGELIO LAPUT,
ROSEMARIE WEE, TACOTCHE RANAIN, AVELINO DELOS REYES and ROGASIANO
OROPEZA, respondents.
Judicial Review; Requisites; There is an unbending rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question unless the requisites for judicial review are satisfied.—The petition for
declaratory relief challenged the constitutionality of the subject resolutions. There is an unbending
rule that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following
requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2)
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised at
the earliest opportunity, and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal
and substantial interest in such a case that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged; The term “interest” means a material interest, an
interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest.—Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial
interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a person’s constitutional
rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing.
Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer Suits; A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity; Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.—Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer
of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning
the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease
contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity. Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals cited by the CA
does not apply because it involved contracts between two private parties. Parties suing as taxpayers
must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were
appropriations ordinances. Petitioner alleged that these ordinances were “passed for the business,
occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private benefit
of respondents) because even before they were passed, respondent Mayor Cafe and private
respondents had already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market
stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal treasurer, which
amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits,
however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was
gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who
advanced their personal funds for their construction.
Same; Same; The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and presume the
acts of the political departments are valid, absent clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.—
We note that the foregoing was a disputed fact which the courts below did not resolve because the
case was dismissed on the basis of petitioner’s lack of legal standing. Nevertheless, petitioner failed
to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking
this Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao del Norte, he should
have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified
and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation
that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore, there was the time-honored
presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary. And this is not to
mention that: The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers.
This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the legislative and executive
departments and found to be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and
approved.
Judgments; Judicial Notice; In addition to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from committing to
be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice in another case as long as
the parties give their consent or do not object.—Adverting to the first issue, we observe that
petitioner was the one who wanted the parties to await the decision of the Supreme Court in UDK
Case No. 9948 since the facts and issues in that case were similar to this. Petitioner, having expressly
agreed to be bound by our decision in the aforementioned case, should be reined in by the dismissal
order we issued, now final and executory. In addition to the fact that nothing prohibits parties from
committing to be bound by the results of another case, courts may take judicial notice of a judgment
in another case as long as the parties give their consent or do not object. As opined by Justice
Edgardo L. Paras: A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of
facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public
records on file in the same court. In addition, judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or
judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties,
as well as of the record of another case between different parties in the same court. Jumamil vs.
Cafe, 470 SCRA 475, G.R. No. 144570 September 21, 2005
“The CA held that petitioner had no standing to challenge the two resolutions/ordinances
because he suffered no wrong under their terms. It also concluded that “the issue (was) not
the ordinances themselves but the award of the market stalls to the private respondents on
the strength of the contracts individually executed by them with Mayor Cafe.” Consequently,
it ruled that petitioner, who was not a party to the lease contracts, had no standing to file
the petition for declaratory relief and seek judicial interpretation of the agreements.
We do not agree. Petitioner brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the
Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte23 and not in his personal capacity. He was
questioning the official acts of the public respondents in passing the ordinances and
entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party
to the contract to challenge its validity.24 Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals 25 cited by the CA does not apply because it involved
contracts between two private parties. Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA 475, G.R. No. 144570
September 21, 2005
Brother MARIANO “MIKE” Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,

respondent.
Remedial Law; Actions; Declaratory Relief; An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected
by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance; Essential Requisites of an Action for
Declaratory Relief.—Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is
to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of
the parties’ rights or duties thereunder. The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there
is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.
Same; Same; Same; A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.—A
justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition for Declaratory
Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between
the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what
specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act
or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.—Such premise is
highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a
justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part
of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock
to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation
does not give rise to an actionable right.
Same; Same; Same; A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal
right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter; Essential Elements of a Cause of Action.—A
cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of
another, causing injury to the latter. Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.
Same; Same; Same; In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action
under ordinary civil actions does not apply strictly.—The failure of a complaint to state a cause of
action is a ground for its outright dismissal. However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the
concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this
exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be
impending, imminent or at least threatened.
III. CERTIORARI
NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
39, ILOILO CITY and EQUITABLE PCI BANK, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment; Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.—The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed
of the wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in
the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. More importantly, since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the
lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
or adequate remedy. A petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice
of judgment, order, or resolution, and a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the
filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors. New Frontier Sugar Corporation vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, 513 SCRA 601,
G.R. No. 165001 January 31, 2007
MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft Investigation
Officer I and/or OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN—MINDANAO, SIXTO O. DALEON, AIDA
AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, and the BOARD OF REGENTS of the
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES; SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY RENO CAPINPIN—of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, and NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR
SANTIAGO ENGINCO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under Rule 65, it must first
be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.—A special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction.
To invoke the Court’s power of judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents
may not be subjected to our review under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies
are generally accorded respect and even finality by the Court provided such findings are supported by
substantial evidence.—From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the
respondent Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3,
1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily
verifiable from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative
agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. SILANGAN

INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INC. and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 170673. March 25, 2010.*
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. POLYGON

INVESTORS AND MANAGERS, INCORPORATED and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
must show that respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion.—The Court is not
impressed. In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show that
respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Angara v. Fedman Development
Corporation, 440 SCRA 467 (2004) the Court held that: Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow
in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only
a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It
can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Presidential Commission on Good
Government vs. Silangan Investors and Managers, Inc., 616 SCRA 382, G.R. Nos. 167055-56<br/>
March 25, 2010
NORMA MANGALIAG AND NARCISO SOLANO, petitioners, vs. HON. EDELWINA

CATUBIGPASTORAL, Judge of The Regional Trial Court, 1st Judicial Region, San Carlos
City, (Pangasinan), Branch 56 and APOLINARIO SERQUINA, JR., respondents.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Jurisdictions; It is necessary to stress that generally a direct
recourse to the Supreme Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.—It is necessary to stress that generally a direct
recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of
the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice
of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally
applies to cases involving warring factual allegations.—The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an
ironclad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason,
litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity
of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on
disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not
triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when
the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The contention of petitioner that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may
be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial is not the general rule but an
exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
(1968).—Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by
estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an
exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In
Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case
because of the presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on
April 15, 1994, provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds
P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,
and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with the RTC. The jurisdictional amount was
increased to P200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 and
Administrative Circular No. 21-99.—Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on
April 15, 1994, provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds
P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,
and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same
law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court. The jurisdictional amount was increased to P200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. and JOVENCIO P. BANTANG, JR., petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division)
and RUPERTO EVANGELISTA, JR., respondents.
Actions; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; The rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition in the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject
to certain exceptions.—The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before
resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct
its error, if any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, in Abraham v. NLRC, the Court ruled: “Generally, certiorari as a special civil action
will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an
opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions
to the rule: (a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.” (Italics supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file
the required motion for reconsideration; The petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.—Certiorari is not a shield
from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its decision, petitioners may not arrogate to
themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. In Zapata
v. NLRC, this Court held: “Petitioner cannot, on its bare and self-serving representation that
reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and deny respondent
NLRC its right to review its pronouncements before being hailed to court to account therefor. On
policy considerations, such prerequisite would provide an expeditious termination to labor disputes
and assist in the decongestion of court dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse to
judicial proceedings. The present case exemplifies the very contingency sought to be, and which
could have been, avoided by the observance of said rules.”
Same; Same; Same; To dispense with the requirement for the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the
requirement.—The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court or
agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this
requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with
the requirement.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot re-examine the probative value or evidentiary weight of the
evidence presented below unless the appreciation of the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly
erroneous.—The instant case, however, is a petition for review where only questions of law may be
raised. What petitioners are attempting to do here is to urge the Court to re-examine the probative
value or evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below. The Court cannot do this unless the
appreciation of the pieces of evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. This is where petitioners fail.
Same; Same; Labor Law; The findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court unless patently erroneous; It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.—The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter that
petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to establish that Evangelista stole the 2,000 pieces
of tokens. The findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court unless patently erroneous. In the instant case, we find no patent errors. It
is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited only to reviewing errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower courts. Likewise, it is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of an
administrative tribunal which has expertise in its special field. Metro Transit Organization, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 392 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 142133 November 19, 2002
ESTEBAN YAU, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA BANKING COR PORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 128623. July 11, 2002.*
THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ESTEBAN YAU, THE COURT OF
APPEALS (SEVENTEENTH DIVISION), and the HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64,
respondents.
Actions; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; Pleadings and Practice; As a general rule, the filing
of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non in order that certiorari shall lie;
Exceptions.—At the outset, this Court notes that, admittedly, Manilabank did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the Orders of RTC Cebu City, which directed Manila Golf to issue a certificate in
Yau’s name, prior to initiating its petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 37085) in the CA. Thus, the
petition before the appellate court could have been dismissed outright since, as a rule, the CA, in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
unless the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. This Court
has settled that as a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non in order that certiorari shall lie. However, there are settled exceptions to this Rule, one of which
is where the assailed order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction, which is
evident in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—Other exceptions to the rule are: (a) where the questions raised
in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (b) where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (c) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (d) where the petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (f) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (g) where the proceedings was ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (h) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved. Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], 292
SCRA 452, 457-458 (1998) citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 568, 574, 575 (1997).
Same; Attachments; Garnishment; Courts; A Notice of Garnishment brings the property affected into
the custodia legis of the court issuing the writ, beyond the interference of all other co-ordinate
courts.—The Notice of Garnishment of the Silverio share upon Manila Golf brought the property into
the custodia legis of the court issuing the writ, that is, the RTC Makati City Branch 64, beyond the
interference of all other co-ordinate courts, such as the RTC of Cebu, Branch 6. “The garnishment of
property operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by which the property is
brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under the
sole control of such court. A court which has control of such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over the same, retains all incidents relative to the conduct of such property. No court, except one
having supervisory control or superior jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and
change that possession.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-interference; The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted
axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of another co-equal
court to entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to a property which is under the
custodia legis of another court by virtue of a prior writ of attachment.—The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted

axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to the competencia of the RTC Cebu City
to entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to the Silverio share which is under the
custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the
policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly
described in Parco v. Court of Appeals, thus: . . . [J]urisdiction is vested in the court not in any
particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance
of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same level as the
other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law.
In the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or
city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective
cases, much less with their orders or judgments. It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different
rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, and in the
ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.
Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court.—
It is furthermore evident from the records that Yau is guilty of forum shopping in seeking relief
before Branch 6 of RTC Cebu City, despite being allowed to intervene in Civil Case No. CG-271 before
Branch 64 of RTC Makati City to protect his interests in the Silverio share. A party is guilty of forum
shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issue either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court. And what is truly important to consider in determining whether
forum shopping exists is the vexation caused the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues. Since Yau recognized the jurisdiction of RTC Makati City, Branch
64 to protect his interest in the Silverio share, he should have desisted from pursuing a similar
remedy or relief before RTC Cebu City inasmuch as the assailed Orders issued by the latter RTC had
the effect of pre-empting the authority of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, to act and decide upon the
intervention of Yau in Civil Case No. 90-271.
Same; Intervention; Attachment; It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has reduced his claim
to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest in property upon
which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which the writ of
attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.—The contention of
Manilabank that Yau has no legal interest in the matter in litigation lacks buoyancy. Under Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was
decided by the trial court and the appellate court, “a person may, before or during trial, be permitted
by the Court in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof.” Yau falls under the last instance. It is recognized that a judgment creditor who has
reduced his claim to judgment may be allowed to intervene and a purchaser who acquires an interest
in property upon which an attachment has been levied may intervene in the underlying action in which
the writ of attachment was issued for the purpose of challenging the attachment.
Same; Same; The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules
to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same—the rule on
intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in litigation by permitting parties
interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust the matter in one instead of
several suits.—On the matter of allowing the intervention after trial, suffice it to state that the rules
now allow intervention “before rendition of judgment by the trial court.” After trial and decision in a
case, intervention can no longer be permitted. The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention
shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same. The rule on intervention was evidently intended to expedite and economize in
litigation by permitting parties interested in the subject matter, or anything related therein, to adjust
the matter in one instead of several suits. Yau vs. Manila Banking Corporation, 384 SCRA 340, G.R.
No. 126731, G.R. No. 128623 July 11, 2002
IV. PROHIBITION
ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR and JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS (First Division) comprised of HON. COMMISSIONERS RESURRECION
BORRA and ROMEO A. BRAWNER, THE NEW SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE comprised of ATTY. DAISY DACUDAOREAL,
ATTY. JESSIE SUAREZ and ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, and SALVACION Z. PEREZ,
respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sitting
en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance as the COMELEC in division has such authority; Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the
resolution or decision of the COMELEC in division.—Under Sec. 2, Article IV-C of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC exercises original jurisdiction over all contests, relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials, and has
supervision and control over the board of canvassers. The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does
not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in
the first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such authority. The COMELEC en banc can exercise
jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the COMELEC in
division.
Same; Same; Members of Board of Canvassers (BOCs) can be filled up by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) not only from those expressly mentioned in Sec. 21 of Republic Act No. 6646,
but from others outside if the former are not available.—Petitioners’ contention that the COMELEC’s
choice of officials to substitute the members of the BOC is limited only to those enumerated under
Sec. 21 of Republic Act No. 6646 is untenable. x x x Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the
enumeration above is not exclusive. Members of BOCs can be filled up by the COMELEC not only
from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted provision, but from others outside if the former
are not available.
Same; Same; Omnibus Election Code; Decisions and resolutions of any division of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in special cases become final and executory after the lapse of five days, unless
a timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc.—It bears noting that
pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisions and resolutions of any division of the
COMELEC in special cases become final and executory after the lapse of five days, unless a timely
motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc. Pacificador vs. Commission on
Elections, 581 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 178259 March 13, 2009
Even if the Court relaxes the Rules to allow the present petition, however, just the same it
fails, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the COMELEC when it rendered the assailed June 22, 2007 Resolution.
“x x x The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of

authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Stated differently, prohibition
is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.”17
(Emphasis supplied) Pacificador vs. Commission on Elections, 581 SCRA 372, G.R. No.
178259 March 13, 2009 xxx
Clearly, not only does prohibition not lie against the COMELEC First Division which has the
mandate and power to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies; the assailed
Resolution has also become final and executory in view of the failure of petitioners to file a
timely motion for reconsideration of said Resolution in accordance with the COMELEC Rules
of
Procedure and the Rules of Court. Pacificador vs. Commission on Elections, 581 SCRA 372,
G.R. No. 178259 March 13, 2009
JOSE O. VERA ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE A. AVELINO ET AL., respondents.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; MANDAMUS; LEGISLATIVE BODY NOT
COMPELLABLE BY, TO PERFORM LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS.—Mandamus will not lie against the
legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of purely legislative duties.
2.ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVISE LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—The

judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to
that department by the Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF SUPREME COURT TO ANNUL LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT.—In proper cases and
with appropriate parties, this court may annul any legislative enactment that fails to observe the
constitutional limitations.
4.ID.; ID.; JUDICIARY NOT REPOSITORY OF REMEDIES FOR ALL POLIT-ICAL OR SOCIAL
WRONGS.—The judiciary is not the respository of remedies for all political or social ills.
5.ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION; SCOPE OF.—Prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, exercising functions judicial or ministerial. As the respondents exercise
legislative functions, the dispute falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, MARCELO ADDURU, DOMOCAO ALONTO, PEDRO C.

HERNAEZ, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, ALEJO MABANAG, CLARO M. RECTO, JOSE O. VERA and
JOSE VELOSO, petitioners, vs. VICENTE DE VERA, as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections, respondent.
1.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION OF ITS MEMBERS; RULE 126 OF RULES OF

COURT NOT APPLICABLE.—The Rules of Court are not applicable to the Commission on Elections,
and consequently whether or not a Commissioner may or may not act on matters in which a son of
his is directly interested, is a question of decorum and ethics for him exclusively to decide. The
silence of the Constitution in that regard may well be interpreted to mean that all prohibition to that
effect is unnecessary because the persons to be selected for such delicate positions in the
Commission should be of such high morality as to exclude all probability of transgression of simple
rules of decency or good taste.
2.PROHIBITION; IT CANNOT BE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR QUO WARRANTO.—In this jurisdiction the

writ of prohibition cannot be availed of as a substitute for quo warranto.
3.ID.; CASES WHEN IT MAY ISSUE.—The writ of prohibition has been allowed in the Philippines, not
only against courts and tribunals in order to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and
to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but also, in appropriate
cases, against an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
4.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS, VALIDITY OF; QUO WARRANTO

IS THE PROPER REMEDY.—Quo warranto and not prohibition is the proper remedy to inquire into the
validity of respondent's appointment as chairman of the Commission on Elections.
CARLITO L. MONTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, OFFICE OF

THE OMBUDSMAN, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY, respondents.
Same; Prohibition; Requisites; A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the
lower court or agency.—For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the
following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain,
speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial
tradition.—Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and lawyers
to strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition should be dismissed. As we
ruled in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto, 156 SCRA 753 (1987), to wit: The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of
dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement
must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts
and lawyers must strictly observe.
Same; Same; Extraordinary Writs; A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.—The Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
however should not be taken to mean that the parties have an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which they will file their application or petition. There is an ordained sequence
of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the next
highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and is
likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent the further clogging of the Court’s docket.
Same; Prohibition; Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.—
As the present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact,
as manifested by the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already been implemented on
17 July 2000. The act sought to be enjoined having taken place already, there is nothing more to
restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical
interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Montes vs.
Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON,
CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA,
ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA
MAGSAYSAY, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL
TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Courts may issue a mandatory writ to restore matters at status quo
ante.—The argument of fait accompli, viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held
and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been constituted,
begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it “does not look
with favor upon parties ‘racing to beat an injunction or restraining order’ which they have reason to
believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the appropriate
petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been
properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters
to the status quo ante.” (Banzon v. Cruz, 45 SCRA 475, 506 [1972]). Where, as in this case, there
was somehow a failure to properly issue the restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal
plebiscite, the Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo
ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the
unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials. Tan vs. Commission
on Elections, 142 SCRA 727, No. L-73155 July 11, 1986
V. MANDAMUS
MANTRADE/FMMC DIVISION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION (represented by

PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNION—PSSLU Fed.—TUCP), petitioner, vs.

ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN and MANTRADE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
Labor; Arbitration; Decisions of voluntary arbitrators given the highest respect and generally accorded
finality.—These contentions have been ruled against in the decision of this Court in the case of
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) vs. Romero, promulgated on July 16, 1984, wherein it stated: “We agree
with the petitioner that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators must be given the highest respect and
as a general rule must be accorded a certain measure of finality. This is especially true where the
arbitrator chosen by the parties enjoys the first rate credentials of Professor Flerida Ruth Pineda
Romero, Director of the U.P. Law Center and an academician of unquestioned expertise in the field of
Labor Law. It is not correct, however, that this respect precludes the exercise of judicial review over
their decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards final, inappealable
and executory, except where the money claims exceed P100,000.00 or 40% of the paid-up capital of
the employer or where there is abuse of discretion or gross incompetence refers to appeals to the
National Labor Relations Commission and not to judicial review. “In spite of statutory provisions
making ‘final’ the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken cognizance of petitions
questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due
process, denial of substantial justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law were brought to our
attention.
Same; Same; Same; Voluntary arbitrators, nature of functions of; Decisions of voluntary arbitrators
subject to judicial review.—A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasijudicial
capacity. There is no reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond this
Court’s review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do not
hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of
discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari.” (130 SCRA 392, 399, 400-
401)
Same; Same; Holiday Pay; Legal duty of a corporation to grant its monthly salaried employees
holiday pay.—This issue was subsequently decided on October 24, 1984 by a division of this Court in
the case of Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong. From the
above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of
holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of
Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting under Rule IV, Book III of
the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: ‘employees who are uniformly paid by the
month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the
statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month
whether worked or not.’ ” (132 SCRA 663, 672-673)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus, an appropriate remedy; Case at bar.—
Lastly, respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of
an act which the law does not clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to
enforce a contractual obligation, the remedy being an action for specific performance (Province of
Pangasinan vs. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376). In the case at bar,
however, in view of the above-cited subsequent decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty
to grant holiday pay to monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy
(Dionisio vs. Paterno. July 23, 1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales vs. Government Service Insurance
System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 492). Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers
Union vs. Bacungan, 144 SCRA 510, No. L-48437 September 30, 1986
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS AND DEAN

PATRICIO LAZARO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Br. VI, RTC-BAGUIO
CITY, AND UP COLLEGE BAGUIO HIGH SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED
HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, SALVADOR VALDEZ, JR.,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Academic Freedom; The University of the Philippines as an institution of higher
learning enjoys academic freedom.—It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher
learning, enjoys academic freedom—the institutional kind.
Same; Same; Scope of academic freedom as recognized by the Constitution.—In Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the Court had
occasion to note the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution as follows: xxx xxx
xxx “ ‘It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the ‘four essential
freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.’ ”
Same; Same; UPCBHS was established subject to a number of condititons.—At this juncture, it must
be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities, e.g., it must be
self-supporting, it can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and
demonstration school for prospective teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition
on academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; The University of the Philippines was created under its Charter to provide
advanced tertiary education and not secondary education.—Specifically, the University of the
Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced
tertiary education and not secondary education. Section 2 of said Act states that “the purpose of said
University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts,
and to give professional and technical training.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of
the Philippines.—It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the
University of the Philippines; consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the
UPCBHS especially so when the requirements for its continuance have not been met, Rep. Act No.
6655 to the contrary notwithstanding. The findings of facts by the Board of Regents which led to its
decision to phase out the UPCBHS must be accorded respect, if not finality. Acts of an administrative
agency within their areas of competence must not be casually overturned by the courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As an institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom,
the UP cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education.—A careful perusal of Rep. Act No.
6655 could not lend respondents a helping hand either. Said Act implements the policy of the State
to provide free public secondary education (Sec. 4) and vests the formulation of a secondary public
education curriculum (Sec. 5), the nationalization of public secondary schools (Sec. 7) and the
implementation of the rules and regulations thereof (Sec. 9) upon the Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Rep. Act No. 6655 complements Sec. 2 (2), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates that the State shall establish and maintain a system of free public
secondary education. However, this mandate is not directed to institutions of higher learning like UP
but to the government through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). As an
institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for
secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its academic
freedom, Rep. Act No. 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein “shall be free from payment
of tuition and other school fees.” University of the Philippines vs. Ayson, 176 SCRA 571, G.R. No.
88386 August 17, 1989
BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO C.

MARIANO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch X), and LUCIO ADRIANO,
JR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Nature and concept of; Requirement before
mandamus may be issued.—The Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 65) on Petition for
Mandamus provides that “[w]hen any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner, by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.” Stated differently, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that can be resorted to only in
cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief
where there is no other clear, adequate and speedy remedy. Before a writ of mandamus may be
issued, it is obligatory upon the petitioner to exhaust all remedies in the ordinary course of law. He
must show that the duty sought to be performed must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office. (Quintero vs. Martinez, 84 Phil. 496; Perez vs. City Mayor of
Cabanatuan, 3 SCRA 431; Alzate vs. Aldana, 8 SCRA 219; and, Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 23 SCRA 492).
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Rule that if appeal or other adequate remedy is still
available in the ordinary course of law, action for mandamus is improper; Filing of a simple motion
with the Fiscal to include in the information Land Registration Commissioner Noblejas as one of the
accused, or to amend the information, is much more speedy and adequate than a mandamus
petition.—Thus, if appeal or some other equally adequate remedy is still available in the ordinary
course of law, the action for mandamus would be improper. In the case at bar, private respondent
Adriano, Jr. did not request Fiscal Aquino to include in the information Commissioner Noblejas as one
of the accused. Had he done so and the same was met with a denial, Adriano, Jr. could have
appealed to the Secretary of Justice who may reverse petitioner and designate another to act for the
purpose. That way, the filing of a simple motion with the Fiscal to include or to amend the
information is much more speedy and adequate than a petition for mandamus.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners, vs. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
Courts; Separation of Powers; Mandamus; The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court
setting time frames be set for the executive agencies to perform their assigned tasks pursuant to
earlier decision of the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution,
because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court,
not an encroachment by the Court over executive powers and functions.—The case is now in the
execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities
undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In
the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for
the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the
powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. This view is
misplaced. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral
part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the
Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are required of the
agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and
parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; With the final and executory judgment in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA), the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until
petitioneragencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing
jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.—The submission of periodic reports is
sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases: Sec. 7.
Judgment.––If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to
grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the
respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress
and execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the
appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its
comments or observations on the execution of the judgment. Sec. 8. Return of the writ.—The
periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be
contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the
writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA
means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court
exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643 SCRA 90, G.R. Nos. 171947-48
February 15, 2011
VI. QUO WARRANTO
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS:

DEOGRACIAS R. ARGOSINO III, BENITO T. CAPIO, EMMANUEL R. CORTEZ, NORMANDO
MONTILLA, LEONARDO C. UY, FIDEL C. AURELLANA, PEDRO C. CARABIT, LEONARDO D.
AURELLANA, FABIAN M. MEDENILLA, TRINIDAD F. CORTEZ, SALVADOR M. MEDENILLA,
CERELITO B. AUREADA and FRANCISCA A. BAMBA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO V.
MENDEZ, SR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, 4th Judicial Region,
Gumaca, Quezon; MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON; MAYOR FRANCISCO DE
LEON; COUNCILORS: FE LUPINAC, TOMAS AVERIA, MANUEL O. OSAS, WILFREDO O.
FONTANIL, ENRICO U. NADRES, RODELITO LUZOIR, LENAC, JOSE L. CARABOT, DOMING
AUSA, VIDAL BANQUELES and CORAZON M. MAXIMO, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Practice and Procedure; Where the petitioners raise in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rules 42 and 45 the issue of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction, they intend to submit their case under Rule 65.—Petitioners consider the
instant petition to be one for “review on certiorari” under Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; at
the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been issued with
“grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to correct
said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal
issues involved.” Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under
Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.
Actions; Quo Warranto; Municipal Corporations; Parties; When the inquiry is focused on the legal
existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or
any other direct proceeding.—The special civil action of quo warranto is a “prerogative writ by which
the Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or
exercises a public franchise.” When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the
action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding. It
must be brought “in the name of the Republic of the Philippines” and commenced by the Solicitor
General or the fiscal “when directed by the President of the Philippines x x x.” Such officers may,
under certain circumstances, bring such an action “at the request and upon the relation of another
person” with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence
an action for quo warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when he claims to be
“entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.” While the
quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the
Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of
the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
Same; Same; Same; A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision must be timely raised.—Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San
Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June
1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive
order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a
position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with
greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Even if Executive Order No. 353 creating the Municipality
of San Andres is a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case hardly could offer a choice other than to
consider the Municipality to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating,
if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation.—Granting that Executive Order No.
353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power,
the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider
the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely
approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December
1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a
similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case.
On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State’s recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district,
Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after
having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as
municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain
municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33,
dated 13 June 1978, issued by this Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this
administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of Quezon.
Same; Same; Same; Local Government Code; The power to create political subdivisions is a function
of the legislature; Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code converted municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders into regular municipalities.—At the
present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Repre-sentatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of
the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally
significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
“organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.” No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext,
even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the
legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Curative statutes are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.—Curative laws,
which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving “validity to acts done that would have been
invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with,” are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. Municipality of San
Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr., 239 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) committed no grave abuse of
discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto; A decision is not deemed tainted with
grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.—On the issue of
whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo
warranto, the Court rules in the negative. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Court appreciates no abuse of
discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo
warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed
tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.
Same; Quo Warranto; The Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for
quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.—In the exercise of sound discretion, the
Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there
are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, 205 SCRA 816 (1992), the Court ruled: Like
the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to
prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General
may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with
the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just
drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise
must be, not only within the parameters get by law but with the best interest of the State as the
ultimate goal.
Same; Same; Quo warranto, the title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo
warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to
annul or set aside order.—Being a collateral attack on a public officer’s title, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through
mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126
(1949), the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of
a public officer.
Same; Same; A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to
the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment; For a quo waranto petition to
be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office.—A quo
warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to
have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be
commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person
claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v.
Flor, 5 Phil. 18 (1905), reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, 556 SCRA 348
(2008), that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show a clear
right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can
lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.
Public Officers; If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his
presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de
facto officer.—The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, given Ong’s actual
physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion the de facto doctrine. Suffice it to mention
that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under
color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment,
however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. If a person appointed
to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give
him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer. Topacio vs. Ong, 574 SCRA
817, G.R. No. 179895 December 18, 2008
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. [PLDT], petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND CELLCOM, INC., (EXPRESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. [ETCI]), respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Factual issues are not proper subjects of a special
civil action for certiorari.—Whether or not ETCI, and before it FACI, in contravention of its franchise,
started the first of its radio telecommunication stations within two (2) years from the grant of its
franchise and completed the construction within ten (10) years from said date; and whether or not its
franchise had remained unused from the time of its issuance, are questions of fact beyond the
province of this Court, besides the well-settled procedural consideration that factual issues are not
proper subjects of a special civil action for Certiorari (Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 41859, 8 March 1989, 171 SCRA 49; Ygay vs. Escareal, G.R. No. 44189, 8 February
1985, 135 SCRA 78; Filipino Merchant's Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 71640, 27 June 1988,162 SCRA 669).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Quo Warranto; Legislative Franchises; The determination of the
right to the exercise of a franchise is more properly the subject of quo warranto proceedings, the
right to assert which as a rule, belongs to the State upon complaint or otherwise.—More importantly,
PLDTs allegation partakes of a collateral attack on a franchise (Rep. Act No. 2090), which is not
allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of
law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy Such
privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise"
(Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct
proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its
unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. "A . . . franchise is . . . granted by law, and
its . . . unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the Government. Hence, the latter as a rule is the
party called upon to bring the action for such . . . unlawful exercise of. . . franchise." (IV-B V.
FRANCISCO, 298 [1963 ed.], citing Cruz vs. Ramos, 84 Phil. 226).
JOVENTINO MADRIGAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ,

VICE-GOVERNOR CELSO ZOLETA, JR., PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS DOMINGO RIEGO

AND MARCIAL PRINCIPE; PROV. ENGR. ENRIQUE M. ISIDRO, ABRAHAM T. TADURAN
AND THE PROVINCE OF MARINDUQUE, respondents-appellees.
Public Officers; Quo Warranto; Mandamus; Petitions for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles
to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner was ousted from his
office to provide stability in the service so that public business may not be unduly hampered.—The
unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and
mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the
petitioner is ousted from his position (Galano, et al. v. Roxas, G.R. No. L-31241, September 12, 1975,
67 SCRA 8; Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663; Sison v.
Pangramuyen, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-40295, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 364; Cui v. Cui, G.R. No.
L18727, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 755; Villaluz v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. L-22754, December 31, 1965,
15
SCRA 710; Villegas v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-23752, December 31; 1965, 15 SCRA 720; De la Maza v.
Ochave, G.R. No. L-22336, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 142; Alejo v. Marquez, G.R. No. L-29053,
February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 762). The reason behind this ruling was expounded in the case of
Unabia v. City Mayor, etc., 99 Phil. 253 where We said: “x x x [W]e note that in actions of quo
warranto involving right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year. This
has been the law in the island since 1901, the period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the
part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of
one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are
weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for
persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so that
public business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the
service must be discouraged.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; In a case where pure questions
of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues
of law cannot be resolved with finality by administrative officers.—And this one (1) year period is not
interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy (Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436).
Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a
case where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Appeal to the administrative officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in
futility since administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality (Cebu Oxygen and
Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Drilon, et al., G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989, citing Pascual v. Provincial Board
of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466; Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). In the present case, only a legal
question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal’s position was in
accordance with law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim for back salaries and damages is also subject to the
prescriptive period of one (1) year.—Again, We uphold the view advanced by public respondents.
Madrigal loses sight of the fact that the claim for back salaries and damages cannot stand by itself.
The principal action having failed, perforce, the incidental action must likewise fail. Needless to state,
the claim for back salaries and damages is also subject to the prescriptive period of one (1) year (see
Gutierrez v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 105 Phil. 9). Madrigal vs. Lecaroz, 191 SCRA 20, G.R. No.
46218 October 23, 1990
DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR.

SOSEPATRO AGUILA, and THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, respondents.
Administrative Law; Department of Health; Power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees vested in the Secretary of Health.—Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the
National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove
subordinate officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the
Medical Center Chief. The latter’s function is confined to recommendation.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that petitioner was not appointed but merely transferred in the
interest of the public service will not alter the situation.—Respondent Medical Center Chief’s
argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely transferred in the interest of the public
service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment,
which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend, supra. Besides, the
transfer was without petitioner’s consent, was tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as
such is invalid and without any legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal
without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that “no officer or employee of the civil
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Position of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional Services
are basically one and the same except for the change in nomenclature.—Petitioner’s “designation” as
Assistant Director for Professioinal Services on 8 August 1986 in accordance with the organizational
structure of the Department of Health under Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, issued by
respondent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that position temporary in character.
It bears stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional Services
are basically one and the same except for the change in nomenclature. Petitioner’s permanent
appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics, therefore, remained effective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent Medical Center Chief cannot rely on Section 2, Article
III of the Freedom Constitution and its implementing Rules and Regulations,—Neither can respondent
Medical Center Chief rely on Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations embodied in Executive Order No. 17, Series of 1986. The relevant provision
was effective only “within a period of one year from February 25, 1986." The Hospital Orders in
question were issued only on 29 May, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Neither Executive Order No. 119justifiespetitioner’s
removal.—Executive Order No. 119, or the “Reorgariization Act of the Ministry of Health”
promulgated on 30 January 1987, neither justifies petitioner’s removal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Argument that petitioner’s term of office ended on
January 30, 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over
capacity, untenable.—The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner’s term of office
ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a
holdover capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate
reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but
advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon.
Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059,31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of
the latter on security of tenure govern.
Same; Quo Warranto; Petitioner has a valid cause of action; Quo warranto is the proper remedy.—It
follows from the foregoing disquisition that petitioner has a valid cause of action. Where there is
usurpation or intrusion into an office, quo warranto is the proper remedy.
Same; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Rule is not a hard and fast one but admits
ofexception.—The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner
from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions among
which are that (1) the question in dispute is “purely a legal one” and (2) the controverted act is
“patently illegaT (Carino vs. ACCFA, No. L-19808, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183). The questions
involved here are purely legal. The subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner’s constitutional right to
security of tenure and were, therefore, “patently illegal.” Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin
the implementation of the controverted acts.
Same; Same; Petitioner has substantially complied with the requirements of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.—There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest with the respondent
Secretary of Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the Chairman of the
Government Reorganization Commission, but the same remained unacted upon and proved an
inadequate remedy. Besides, an action for quo warranto must be filed within one year after the cause
of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies
does not operate to suspend the running of the one-year period (Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice L-
32818, June 24,1974, 57 SCRA 663). Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, 160 SCRA 751, No. L-78946
April 15, 1988

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Remedial Law – Civil Procedure | #GKBM

ZOILA CO LIM, petitioner, vs. CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

No L-41831. February 18, 1976.*

CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BENITO GERVASIO TAN and

LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA TIRONA, respondent.

II. DECLARATORY RELIEF

EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, vs. BATHALA MARKETING

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE

DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, represented by SECRETARY ROMULO L.

“However, the execution of judgments in a petition for declaratory relief is not

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as

G.R. No. 170657. August 15, 2007.*

HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA

Declaratory Relief; Requisites; The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is

CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, petitioner, vs. JOSE J. CAFE, GLICERIO L. ALERIA, RUDY G.

Brother MARIANO “MIKE” Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. SILANGAN

G.R. No. 170673. March 25, 2010.*

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs. POLYGON

NORMA MANGALIAG AND NARCISO SOLANO, petitioners, vs. HON. EDELWINA

G.R. No. 128623. July 11, 2002.*

stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, as an accepted

ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR and JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION

“x x x The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of

JOSE O. VERA ET AL., petitioners, vs. JOSE A. AVELINO ET AL., respondents.

2.ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WITHOUT POWER TO REVISE LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—The

THE NACIONALISTA PARTY, MARCELO ADDURU, DOMOCAO ALONTO, PEDRO C.

1.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; DISQUALIFICATION OF ITS MEMBERS; RULE 126 OF RULES OF

2.PROHIBITION; IT CANNOT BE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR QUO WARRANTO.—In this jurisdiction the

4.ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS, VALIDITY OF; QUO WARRANTO

CARLITO L. MONTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DIVISION, OFFICE OF

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

MANTRADE/FMMC DIVISION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION (represented by

PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY LABOR UNION—PSSLU Fed.—TUCP), petitioner, vs.

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE UP BOARD OF REGENTS AND DEAN

BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, petitioner, vs. HON. HERMINIO C.

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

VI. QUO WARRANTO

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON; MAYOR JUAN K. UY; COUNCILORS:

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN

JOVENTINO MADRIGAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. PROV. GOV. ARISTEO M. LECAROZ,

VICE-GOVERNOR CELSO ZOLETA, JR., PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS DOMINGO RIEGO

DR. NENITA PALMA-FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. DR. ADRIANO DE LA PAZ, DR.

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