Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Petitioner, vs. Moreno Dumapis, Elmo TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, Respondents

Remedial Law - Evidence | #GKBM
RULE 129
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO
TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Affidavits; It is not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and
be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party; To require otherwise would be to negate the
rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make
mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.—In Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Phils., Inc., 403 SCRA 699 (2003), the Court ruled that although the affiants had not been presented
to affirm the contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may be given
evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive. Likewise, in
Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission, 237 SCRA 523 (1994), this Court ruled that it was not
necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse
party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of
the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules
of evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value.—The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus,
a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. The distinction is clearly laid out in
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 494 SCRA 661 (2006).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly complied
with before the Labor Arbiter (LA) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), their
decision must be based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.—While it is true that
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a
modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not strictly
complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at
the very least, be substantial.
Same; Same; Evidence; It is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence
presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
—It is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and
the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in
the interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor. The policy is to
extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under
the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and
protection to labor. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumapis, 562 SCRA 103, G.R. No.
163210 August 13, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.

Alibis and Denials; Alibi and denial hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a
trial involving an accused’s freedom and his life.—Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative
and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving
his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative
matters, such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which
becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the
violator of her honor. Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant
with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and
consistent. Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could
be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.
Criminal Law; Rape; In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most
important issue.—In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most important
issue. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The
rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate
impression and conclusion. Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been
overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial court’s finding are
clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the judgment
rendered affirmed.
Same; Same; Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must
be taken seriously—it goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would
drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth.—Such allegation of
a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of
such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human
experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as her family to a
lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. More so,
where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Same; Same; Qualified Rape; Elements.—Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape and a
heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape:
(1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent and, in order to warrant the
imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements that; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age
at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Words and Phrases; Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain
facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them.—
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
mandatory or discretionary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite
the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution’s motion.—In this case, judicial
notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission thereof acceding
to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as
age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the
victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon
showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient
for the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as
the crime itself.—In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the
age of the victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,
we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even
though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula, we reiterated that it is the burden of the
prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was
committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was
bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly certified Certificate of Live
Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its
qualified form. In People v. Veloso, the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the
time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to
prove the victim’s age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
Same; Same; Same; The failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by independent proof is a bar to
conviction for rape in its qualified form.—Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the
Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by
independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J.,
“independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an
‘iota of doubt’ that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances” for the imposition of the death
penalty set by the law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN

PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
Witnesses; As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent.—As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand,
the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the
witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party
objecting to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.
Same; Child Witnesses; No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded
from testifying—the intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a
witness.—Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are
disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are “[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such
as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating
them truthfully.” No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from
testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a witness. It
is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive and, in
perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully the
facts for which he is examined.
Same; Same; In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity
(a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions
thereof, (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath, and (c) to relate those facts truly to the court at
the time he is offered as a witness; The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in
the sound discretion of the trial court.—In determining the competency of a child witness, the court
must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occurred such that he could
receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate
those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show that
the child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The
requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is
wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which is
equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified only if
it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which
he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. The question of competency of a child-witness
rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the trial judge sees the
proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of
intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. Since many of the witness’
manners cannot be photographed into the record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or
reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such finding was erroneous.
Same; Same; The most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a lasting impression
of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the person responsible therefor.—
We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two
years after the alleged rape “when the interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of
earlier years.” It must be noted that it is a most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to have
a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the identity of the person
responsible therefor. In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of
young or tender age is credible and deserves full credit, especially where no motive is attributed to
the victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact
raped.
Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Words and Phrases; The term “hearsay” as used in the law on
evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from
whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon
the confidence which the court may have in him; The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is
that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity
to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed.—The term “hearsay” as used in
the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and
weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the
credit to be given to some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not
subject to cross-examination. If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person
not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence. The reason
for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is
presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements
are attributed. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements
by observing the demeanor of the person who made them.
Same; Same; Same; The mother’s testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be
disregarded as hearsay evidence where the daughter herself was sworn as a witness to the fact
testified by the mother.—In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness
to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover,
the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony
on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded.
Same; Same; Qualified Rape; Birth Certificates; The minority of the victim must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself—the failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age is fatal
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form; A person’s age is best proved by the
birth certificate.—Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed against a “child below seven (7) years old.” We have held that in such a case the minority
of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to
sufficiently establish the victim’s age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified
form. A person’s age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victim’s birth
certificate a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance? Recent jurisprudence has conflicting
pronouncements.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Appreciating Age, Either as Element of the Crime or as a
Qualifying Circumstance.—In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the
foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party
is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a
certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or
authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony,
if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7
years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is
alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years
old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is a competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or support a verdict of guilt.—Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
Same; Same; Once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.—The
grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling
on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once
the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the
accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an
exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the
accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
Same; Same; Courts generally can not interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion as to control over
criminal prosecutions; However it is the court which ultimately determines whether such evidence is
sufficient to sustain an indictment.—It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the
prosecution that determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in the
case shall be utilized as components of the information. Stated differently, the determination of what
evidence to adduce to bolster a successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain
of prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, courts generally can not interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion
as to control over criminal prosecutions. However, it is the court which ultimately determines whether
such evidence is sufficient to sustain an indictment, thus, the care with which the prosecution must
build up its case against the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has been stated time and
again, in any criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the defense.
Constitutional Law; Double Jeopardy; The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.—Given
the farreaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an
alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, or where
the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
Same; Confession; Confession distinguished from Admission.—An admission is defined under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact. A confession, on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense necessarily included therein. More
particularly, a confession “is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the
accused, or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.” In short, in a
confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no such acknowledgment of guilt in an
admission. Only recently in People v. Licayan, the Court distinguished “confession” and “admission”
in this wise: A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only
to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. (Emphasis ours)
Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof of Due Execution of a Document.—The due execution of a document
can be proved through the testimony of: (1) the person/s who executed it; (2) the person before whom
its execution was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it executed and
delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures therein or by a
person to whom the parties to the instrument previously confirmed the execution thereof. Sanvicente
vs. People, 392 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants, vs. JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
discretion of the courts.—The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the
courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites of Judicial Notice.—Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice
have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it
must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are “commonly” known.
—To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is
because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial
notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matters which are “commonly” known.
Same; Same; Same; Facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries and other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety
and so generally understood.—Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice,
may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. A law
which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready
and unquestionable demonstration.—Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on
the basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence
twice removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he
took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when the order of
dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it
becomes effective. The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one
of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Same; Same; Same.—Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not
proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in
force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
RULE 130
LBC EXPRESS, INC. and LBC INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES EUBERTO and
SISINIA ADO, respondents.
Actions; Damages; One is entitled to actual or compensatory damages in form of an adequate
compensation for such preliminary losses suffered as has been duly proved.—One is entitled to
actual or compensatory damages in the form of an adequate compensation for such pecuniary losses
suffered as has been duly proved. In contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,
and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted. In the case where the obligor acted in bad faith, the obligor shall be responsible for all the
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Same; Same; Damages are not presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty.—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that actual or compensatory damages is not presumed,
but must be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent
proof that they have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Indeed, the party alleging
a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.
Same; Same; Quantum of Proof; Where there is preponderant evidence that the respondents indeed
suffered some pecuniary loss due to the loss of the passport but failed to adduce preponderant
evidence of the passport’s value, they are entitled only to temperate damages.—There is
preponderant evidence that the respondents indeed suffered some pecuniary loss due to the loss of
Euberto’s passport. However, the respondents failed to adduce preponderant evidence of the
passport’s value. Nevertheless, they are entitled to temperate damages of P10,000.00 under Article
2224 of the New Civil Code which provides: “[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty.”
Same; Same; While the failure to deliver the respondent’s passport does not per se amount to willful
misconduct or bad faith, the evidence on record shows that the petitioners indeed acted in bad faith
and in wanton disregard of their contractual obligation to the respondents.—The rulings of the trial
and appellate courts that the respondent spouses are entitled to moral damages are correct. While
the failure to deliver Euberto’s passport does not per se amount to willful misconduct or bad faith, the
evidence on record shows that the petitioners indeed acted in bad faith and in wanton disregard of
their contractual obligation to the respondents. The respondents made numerous inquiries from the
petitioners on the whereabouts of Euberto’s passport, and repeatedly made requests for its return;
the petitioners dilly-dallied and gave various excuses. The petitioners told the respondents that the
passport may have been inadvertently transported to their other branches. Exasperated, the
respondents had to secure the services of counsel. Their demands for the production of the passport
(made through counsel) were ignored by the petitioners. Worse still, the petitioners alleged in their
answer to the complaint that the van carrying Euberto’s passport, while parked somewhere along
14th Street, Port Area, South Harbor, Manila, was forcibly opened by unidentified person/s who
pilfered its contents, probably including the said passport. LBC Express, Inc. vs. Ado, 468 SCRA 216,
G.R. No. 161760 August 25, 2005
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK), petitioner, vs. DEL
MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. MORALES,1 AND SPOUSE, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Specific Denials; To deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document, the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or
that it is otherwise false or fabricated.—In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano
Velarde, this Court held that—. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he
allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true
intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his “denial under oath,” stating that
the “promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein
defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties
as stated in the defenses . . . Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny
the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: . . . This means that the
defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by
fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary
such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to
avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
Same; Same; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The “best evidence rule,” according to Professor
Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C.J., was
quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the usages of trade and that “the best proof
that the nature of the thing will afford is only required.”—The “best evidence rule,” according to
Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt,
C.J., was quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the usages of trade and that “the
best proof that the nature of the thing will afford is only required.” Over the years, the phrase was
used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule that the terms of a document
must be proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the
document; it was also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out
of court and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and the phrase was likewise used to
designate the group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to
that of others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale; According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of
evidence, “the only actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the
production of the original writing”; In light of the dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of
written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing
itself, the preference for the original writing is justified.—According to McCormick, an authority on the
rules of evidence, “the only actual rule that the ‘best evidence’ phrase denotes today is the rule
requiring the production of the original writing” the rationale being: (1) that precision in presenting to
the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the
human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects oral testimony
purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in
the case of attempts at describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of recollection, largely avoided through
proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is justified.
Same; Same; Same; Denials; Where defendant fails to deny specifically the execution of the
promissory note, there is no need for the plaintiff to present the original of the promissory note—when
the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by
the defendant.—Respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This
being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in
question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory
note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to
present the original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath
the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove
that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant.
Same; Courts; Judges; Bias and Partiality; In order for the Supreme Court to sustain a charge of
partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show that he or
she is, indeed, biased and partial.—In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and
prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show that he or she is, indeed,
biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which
cannot be presumed particularly if weighed against a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office
to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must
be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in
the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
Same; Demurrer to Evidence; Words and Phrases; A demurrer to evidence abbreviated judicial
proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action; If the defendant’s
motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on
appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to
present evidence—the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceeding but render
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.—A demurrer to evidence
abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action.
Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this ground
as under the rules, if the movant’s plea for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendant’s
motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on
appeal, judgment is rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to
present evidence. The reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it
should render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., 465 SCRA 117, G.R. No.
143338 July 29, 2005
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA
ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Appeals; The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the
Court’s authority to review; A petition for review should raise only questions of law; Exceptions.—The
issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate court’s rejection of their
evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question
involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Court’s authority to review.
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule
that a petition for review should raise only questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are
“(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.”
Same; When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the “clean hands” doctrine
without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise
if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright;
The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is
correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellant’s inadequate discussion, ineffectual
arguments, or even procedural lapses.—This Court dismissed Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI)’s earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged
errors in the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors
in the appellate court’s decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the
respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for
misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not
come to court with clean hands. These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review
the appellate court’s Decision. It is the appellant’s responsibility to point out the perceived errors in
the appealed decision. When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the “clean
hands” doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there
should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is
dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the
appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellant’s inadequate discussion,
ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
Same; A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because another
party had already appealed ahead of him, or just because the other party’s separate appeal had
already been dismissed.—Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI)’s failure to convince the Court of
the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBI’s appeal,
especially because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and
effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse
decision just because another party had already appealed ahead of him, or just because the other
party’s separate appeal had already been dismissed.
Judgments; Res Judicata; Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action.—There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against Rural Bank
of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI). RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the
commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties
involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. Thus,
when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the
said transferees are not bound by any judgment which may be rendered against the vendor.
Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Words and Phrases; The Best Evidence Rule states that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and
no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general
rule—The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the
document; There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule when there is no dispute
regarding the contents of the documents.—The appellate court erred in its application of the Best
Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred
because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document. In the instant case, there
is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the
contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the respondents’ Deed of Sale referred to
TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to
TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong. The real
issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to
TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No.
T-62836).
Same; Same; Same; Parol Evidence Rule; The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic
evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid
agreement or instrument.—The Court of Appeals (CA), however, refused to look beyond the literal
wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual
intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what
it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides: “When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement.” The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic
evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid
agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision
when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best
Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused
to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the
parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not
base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.—Even the application
of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not
parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
“between the parties and their successors-in-interest.” The parol evidence rule may not be invoked
where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document
in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument. Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9: However, a party may present evidence to
modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (1) An
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (2) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; x x x x.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Evidence; Electronic Documents; Words and Phrases; An electronic document refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.—An “electronic document” refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described
or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable
by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. The rules use the word “information” to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Same; Same; Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.—A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the
offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same
may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Same; Same; The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.—No
error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records
petitioner’s Exhibits “A,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “H” and its sub-markings, “I,” “J” and its sub-markings, “K,” “L,”
“M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O,” “P” and its submarkings, “Q” and its sub-
markings, and “R.” The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before
the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence
rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered
copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded
from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The
importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human
memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are
the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
Same; When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.—When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or
destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must
prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in the
case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility
of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence. National Power Corporation vs.
Codilla, Jr., 520 SCRA 412, G.R. No. 170491 April 3, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROWENA HERMOSO BENEDICTUS,

accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Affidavits; Affidavits of Desistance; Courts should not attach persuasive
value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.—We have said before
that courts should not attach persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed
as an afterthought. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly
taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed
their mind for one reason or another, for such rule would make solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. It must always be remembered that a
criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State. To the State belongs the power to prosecute
and punish crimes. While there may be a compromise upon the civil liability arising from an offense,
such compromise shall not extinguish the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty.
Same; Illegal Recruitment; Evidence; A POEA certification is a public document issued by a public
officer in the performance of an official duty; hence, it is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.—The challenge against the POEA
certification (Exh. “A”) that the appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment must likewise fail. The trial court correctly ruled that the said certification is a
public document issued by a public officer in the performance of an official duty; hence, it is a prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. In
any event, as said court noted, the appellant admitted in open court that she was not licensed or
authorized to recruit workers.
Same; Same; There is illegal recruitment in large scale when a person (a) undertakes any recruitment
activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.—It can be gleaned from the foregoing that there is illegal recruitment in large scale when a
person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more
persons, individually or as a group. Paragraph (b) of Article 38, explicitly provides that illegal
recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage. Under Article 39 of the Labor Code the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P100,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. People vs.
Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 123906 March 27, 1998
RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND
ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
Evidence; Parol Evidence; Contracts; Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.—The
parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents’ oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus,
under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon
and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the
written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments
must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even
make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the
parties.
Same; Same; The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument.—The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: “The parol
evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to
show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon
by the parties.”
Same; Same; Parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract but cannot
incorporate additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing
unless there has been fraud or mistake.—Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, “it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud
or mistake.” No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Same; Same; Private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or
that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer and the seller.—We are not persuaded by private
respondents’ contention that they “put in issue by the pleadings” the failure of the written agreement
to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private respondents did not expressly
plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer
(petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be “squarely presented.” Private
respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove
during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the
exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the
contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement. Ortañez vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ, respondent.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Words and Phrases; Marital Disqualification; During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.—Section 22,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.—
During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.” The
reasons given for the rule are: 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If one
were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law
is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of
justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic
tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. Alvarez
vs. Ramirez, 473 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A.
LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO
CARLOS, respondents.
Actions; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Question Doctrine; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of
prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action.—The doctrine of
prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would
be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. In other words, if both
civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Admissions; Stipulation of Facts; A stipulation of facts by the parties
in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon
the parties.—From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a
criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the
parties and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence
and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the
exhibit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Pre-Trial; The stipulation of facts stated in a pre-trial order
amounts to an admission by a party resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his
behalf.—Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by
the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true that
the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution, this right may be waived expressly
or impliedly.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a
prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior
acts of the accused.—Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a
procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all,
the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without
detriment to the community at large. Alano vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 111244
December 15, 1997
BOSTON BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, (formerly BANK OF COMMERCE), petitioner, vs. PERLA
P. MANALO and CARLOS MANALO, JR., respondents.
Appeals; Evidence; The findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on the Supreme Court unless the case falls under any of the exceptions.—
The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and calibrate the evidence on
record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions: (1)
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is
plain error; Although factual issue was not resolved in the trial court, such issue may still be
considered and resolved by the Supreme Court in the interest of substantial justice or when the issue
is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and Court of Appeals.—It must be stressed that
the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when there is plain error. Although a
factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may still be considered and resolved by the
Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds that to do so is necessary to arrive at a just
decision, or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the case. When the trial court decides
a case in favor of a party on certain grounds, the Court may base its decision upon some other
points, which the trial court or appellate court ignored or erroneously decided in favor of a party.
Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Habits and Customs; Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit,
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.—Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did
the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received to prove habit,
usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties. Similar acts as evidence.—Evidence that one
did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
Same; Same; Same; Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage,
of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency
of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi-automatic in nature; It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of
conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples are
admissible.—Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. Courts
must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of
conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response
that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-
automatic in nature. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might
constitute evidence of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence
must be numerous enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts
does not present the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and
confusion. In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the
key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. After all, habit means a course of
behavior of a person regularly represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to
establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct
that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response
or ratio of reaction to situations.
Same; Same; Life casts the moulds of conduct, which will someday become fixed as law—Law
preserves the moulds which have taken form and shape from life; Usage furnishes a standard for the
measurement of many of the rights and acts of men.—There are cases where the course of dealings
to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market or profession. As expostulated
by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme Court: “Life casts the moulds of conduct,
which will someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form and
shape from life.” Usage furnishes a standard for the measurement of many of the rights and acts of
men. It is also well-settled that parties who contract on a subject matter concerning which known
usage prevail, incorporate such usage by implication into their agreement, if nothing is said to be
contrary
LEA MER INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,** respondent.
Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Survey Reports; Where the person who prepared a Survey Report did not
testify during the trial, the Report is hearsay and therefore inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving the truth of its contents.—Petitioner claims that the Survey Report prepared by Jesus Cortez,
the cargo surveyor, should not have been admitted in evidence. The Court partly agrees. Because he
did not testify during the trial, then the Report that he had prepared was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Independently Relevant Statement Rule; A report made by a person is
admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth of the statements—independent of the truth
or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is relevant.—That
witnesses must be examined and presented during the trial, and that their testimonies must be
confined to personal knowledge is required by the rules on evidence, from which we quote: “Section
36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; Hearsay excluded.—A witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.” On this basis, the trial court correctly
refused to admit Jesus Cortez’s Affidavit, which respondent had offered as evidence. Well-settled is
the rule that, unless the affiant is presented as a witness, an affidavit is considered hearsay. An
exception to the foregoing rule is that on “independently relevant statements.” A report made by a
person is admissible if it is intended to prove the tenor, not the truth, of the statements. Independent
of the truth or the falsity of the statement given in the report, the fact that it has been made is
relevant. Here, the hearsay rule does not apply. Lea Mer Industries, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Co.,
Inc., 471 SCRA 698, G.R. No. 161745 September 30, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y CRUZ, defendant-

appellant.
Evidence; Dying Declaration.—It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be
complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything
that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact
should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such
fact. x x x The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other
circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled
to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are
received.
Criminal Procedure; Acquittal on reasonable doubt.—The totality of the case made out against
appellant De Joya thus consists of an incomplete, aborted, dying declaration and a number of
circumstances which, singly or collectively, do not necessarily give rise to a compelling inference that
appellant had indeed robbed and slain Eulalia Diamse. We consider, after prolonged scrutiny, that the
sum total of the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to induce that moral certainty of guilt which
characterizes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The conscience of the Court remains uneasy and
unsettled after considering the nature and speculative character of the evidence supporting the
judgment of conviction. The Court must, accordingly, hold as it hereby holds that appellant’s guilt of
the crime of robbery and homicide was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. People vs. De Joya, 203
SCRA 343, G.R. No. 75028 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMIL PEÑA, accused-appellant.

Criminal Law; Murder; Evidence; Dying Declarations; Requisites.—The requisites for the admissibility
of dying declarations have already been established in a long line of cases. An ante-mortem
statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at the time the declaration was
made, death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to
the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the
victim was competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered
in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious
injuries may be considered the incident speaking through the victim; Even if the victim, after giving his
statement, later on realized that he was dying, his statement can not be considered a dying
declaration—the crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement
was made and the moment of the realization of death, i.e., the time the statement was being made
must also be the time when the victim was aware that he was dying.—The first element is lacking in
the case at bar. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement with
consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his statement, he
expressly stated that accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him. The
significance of a victim’s realization or consciousness that he was on the brink of death cannot be
gainsaid. Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of
death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. The utterance of a victim made immediately after
sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident speaking through the victim. It is entitled to
the highest credence. Granting that Pelagio, after giving his statement, later on realized that he was
dying, his statement still can not be considered a dying declaration. The crucial factor to consider is
the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and the moment of the realization
of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the victim was aware that he
was dying.
Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Words and Phrases; The term “res gestae” comprehends a
situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and
instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as
to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.—A declaration
made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question
and its immediately attending circumstances. In People v. Naerta, this Court held that: The term “res
gestae” comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to
produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made
under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of
their content.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Hearsay Rule; The rule is that testimony by a person regarding
statements made by another as that startling occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, although essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said
statements are natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there had been
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it being said in these
cases, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event.—In People
v. Hernandez, the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should qualify
by any standard as a startling occurrence. And the rule is that testimony by a person regarding
statements made by another as that startling occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, although essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said
statements are natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, made before there had been
opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred, it being said that in
these cases, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event. In this
case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio qualified as a startling
occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in his head while his statement was being
taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or
contrive anything other than what really happened.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The witness who merely testifies on a res gestae is not the declarant
referred to in the second requisite whose statements had to be made before he had the time to
contrive or devise a false-hood.—By stating, however, that the testimonies or the written statements
of the three prosecution witnesses were taken into consideration by the trial court as part of the res
gestae betrays a misapprehension of said principle. This Court agrees with the Solicitor General
when it observed thus: Since res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either
the participants, victims or spectators to a crime before, during or immediately after the commission of
the crime, they should necessarily be the ones who must not have the opportunity to contrive or
devise a falsehood but not the persons to whom they gave their dying declaration or spontaneous
statement. In other words, the witness who merely testifies on a res gestae is not the declarant
referred to in the second requisite whose statements had to be made before he “had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood.” (citation omitted)
Same; Same; Presumptions; There is a presumption that an officer of the law seeks only the truth.—
In any case, there is no reason why SPO1 Bautista would contrive or devise a falsehood especially
on the matter that Pelagio was shot on the head and that it was accused-appellant who shot him. As
a police officer, he was duty-bound to investigate and unearth the facts of the case. There is a
presumption that as an officer of the law, he sought only the truth. Besides, no motive was shown as
to why he would contrive or devise a falsehood against accused-appellant. People vs. Peña, 376
SCRA 639, G.R. No. 133964 February 13, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMICIANO BERAME alias

DOMING, defendant-appellant.
Criminal law; Defense of alibi is not persuasive where accused-appellant was positively identified and
there were compelling tell-tale circumstances.—What is undeniable is that there was testimony
coming from a competent and credible eyewitness to the offense, Danilo Maningo, the son of the
deceased. He heard the shots being fired and saw who perpetrated the deed. He was only a meter
away, right at the scene of the crime. He had direct and immediate knowledge. He identified the
accused. It was not difficult for him to do so as there was a “big light” at the door of the house. He
was subjected to an intensive cross-examination. He stood his ground. He did not budge. His version
of the incident, as a matter of fact, was reinforced. There was, in addition, testimony from one
Carmencita Trinidad, who, coming from the church, heard the shots after which she saw two persons
running away from the house of the deceased, one of whom was slightly taller than she, an assertion
verified when it was shown that appellant’s height as compared to her was precisely that.
Same; Evidence; For factual finding of trial court in a criminal case to be overturned, there must be a
showing that it overlooked a material fact or misinterpreted its significance.—This is a case, therefore,
where the trial, court, after hearing and observing the witnesses testify, and weighing what was said
by them, did choose to believe the prosecution rather than the defense. For such a finding to be
overturned, there must be a showing that it did overlook a material fact or circumstance or did
misinterpret its significance.
Same; Same; The fact that rubber shoe left by someone leaving in a hurry near scene of crime fitted
foot of accused-appellant is demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive kind.—The appealed
decision, moreover, finds impressive support from circumstances that point unerringly to appellant’s
guilt. They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the reason why his counsel did not even
bother to do so. As noted in the decision, a rubber shoe left in a swampy area by someone leaving in
a hurry the scene of the crime was just the right size. It did fit appellant’s right foot. That was
demonstrative evidence of the most persuasive kind.
Same; Same; Where a co-accused who died later admitted participation in killing and pointed to
appellant as one of his companions.—Then, too, there was a statement made by one of the original
co-accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his being captured after the gunplay where he was wounded, it
turned out, mortally. He admitted his participation in the killing of Maningo and pointed to appellant as
one of his companions. While not amounting to a dying declaration, the lower court considered it as
part of the res gestae, and rightly so.
Same; Same; Res gestae; Whether specific statements are admissible as part of res gestae rests on
sound discretion of trial court.—Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily
conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Here again, there cannot
possible be any abuse of discretion. That much is clear. People vs. Berame, 72 SCRA 184, No. L-
27606 July 30, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO HERNANDEZ, MERLITO

HERNANDEZ and MAXIMO HERNANDEZ alias "Putol," accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Dying declaration; Res gestae; The statements made by the victim,
Buenaventura (deceased), to his wife may not qualify as a dying declaration, nevertheless, it may be
admitted as part of the res gestae pursuant to Sec. 36 of Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court, as
amended.—The record of Elena Mendoza's testimony is unfortunately barren of any circumstances
from which a reasonably reliable ascertainment might be made of whether or not her husband,
Buenaventura, had made the identification of the appellants under the consciousness of impending
death. In the People's brief, Elena's relevant testimony on the point is reproduced, as follows: "Q After
the gunshots stopped, what happened next? A I overheard a voice saying 'Eddie tayo na, patay na
sila.' Q Where was the voice coming from, if you know? A Outside our house, sir. Q After you heard
the voice saying 'Eddie tayo na, patay na sila,' what happened next A I approached my husband, sir.
Q What did you do with your husband? A I twisted his body and I saw his body was soaked with
blood, sir. Q What happened afterwards? A My husband asked for some water, sir. Q After drinking
the water, what happened next? A After he drank the water, I asked him if he recognized who shot
him. Q What was his answer? A He said he recognized and he told me the names, sir. Q What did
your husband tell you regarding the persons who fired at him? A The brothers Merlito and Eduardo
Hernandez, and the one who was holding the gun was Maximo Hernandez alias 'Putol', sir. Q After
your husband had identified his assailants, what happened next? A I gave him water and after
drinking, he passed away, sir. (pp. 8-9, TSN, May 10,1982)" It seems therefore that, for lack of
predicate, Buenaventura's statements may not qualify as a dying declaration. Nevertheless those
statements may be admitted as part of the res gestae in accordance with Section 36, Rule 129 of the
Rules, which provision reads as follows: "SEC. 36. Part of the res gestae.—Statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of the res gestae. * * *" The
infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should qualify by any standards
as a startling occurrence. And the rule is that testimony by a person regarding statements made by
another as that startling occurrence was taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto,
although essentially hearsay, is admissible exceptionally, on the theory that said statements are
"natural and spontaneous, unreflected and instinctive, ** ** made before there had been opportunity
to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real fact that occurred," it being said that in these cases,
it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the latter speaking of the event. It seems entirely
reasonable under the circumstances to conclude that Buenaventura's statements, made moments
after receiving his fatal injury, were made without opportunity to devise or contrive, and under the
influence of the occurrence. People vs. Hernandez, 205 SCRA 213, G.R. Nos. 67690-91 January 21,
1992
RULE 132
ANA JOYCE S. REYES, petitioner, vs. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the
RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in his capacity as Special Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO,
ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.—It should be borne in
mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into the public
records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the
status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the
judgment. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by
the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are
entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos
spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will
not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are
presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
Same; Same; The adoption decree cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement
of a decedent’s estate as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344 (1966).—It must be
pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought principally for
the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso, 16
SCRA 344 (1966). Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the
adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner’s claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a
categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the
certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate,
genuine and real. Petitioner’s status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no
serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner'
adoption is considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent’s estate.
Same; Same; Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.—It
must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioner’s opposition, which
is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is
a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the
RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties
have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed
before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter,
only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The
remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it. This is in keeping with
the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. Reyes vs. Sotero, 482 SCRA 520, G.R. No.
167405 February 16, 2006
ERNESTO M. FULLERO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Alibis and Denials; It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and positive
testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.—The rule is that
the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally binding upon this Court. In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised
of denials. Petitioner denied having accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that
someone else had filled it up. However, aside from this self-serving and negative claim, he did not
adduce any convincing proof to effectively refute the evidence for the prosecution. It is a hornbook
doctrine that as between bare denials and positive testimony on affirmative matters, the latter is
accorded greater evidentiary weight.
Same; Falsification of Public Documents; Elements; In addition to the elements of the crime of
falsification of public documents, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification.—The elements of falsification in the
above provision are as follows: a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and c)
the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be
proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of
his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the
preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
Same; Same; Personal Data Sheets (PDS); It is settled that a Personal Data Sheet (PDS) is a public
document.—Petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga
City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is
settled that a PDS is a public document. He stated under Item No. 18 of his PDS that he passed the
civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. In Inting v. Tanodbayan, 97 SCRA
494 (1980), we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS being a requirement under the Civil Service
Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful
statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment. Hence, the filing of a
PDS is required in connection with promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have
the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false
statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.
Same; Same; The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person
is not an essential element of the crime of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed; In falsification of
public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document, and
the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial.—The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third
person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is
jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public
officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to
injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the
intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial. The fact that the petitioner’s false statement in the
PDS did not redound to his benefit, and that the government or any private individual was not thereby
prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear and decisive in this case is that petitioner made an entry
in his PDS that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering despite his full
awareness that such is not true.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Hearsay Rule; Exceptions; A witness may not testify as to what
he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same—such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned; One of the exceptions is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer—official entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person
who made them was presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein, aside from reasons of necessity and trustworthiness.—Section
36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his
perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either
because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule. The
law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the entries
in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. In other words, official entries
are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was
presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The
necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a
witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper
public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty by a public officer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is
not excluded by the law or rules.—Exhibit “A,” or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998,
was signed by Arriola, Director II of the PRC, Manila. Although Arriola was not presented in court or
did not testify during the trial to verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner
did not present any plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit “A” is therefore admissible in
evidence. Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that an evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or rules. Exhibit “C,” which
according to petitioner is the machine copy of the PDS, is very relevant to the charge of falsification
and is not excluded by the law or rules. It was offered precisely to prove that petitioner committed the
crime of falsification by making false statements in the PDS. Further, the information specifically
accuses petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit “C” would show that it is the very PDS
which petitioner falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by petitioner. Being the original
falsified document, it is the best evidence of its contents and is therefore not excluded by the law or
rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN); A transcript of the record
of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct
by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.—Section 2, Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript of the record of the proceedings
made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be
deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. Petitioner failed to introduce proof that
Exhibit “F,” or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March 1998 of the perjury case filed by
petitioner against Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is a civil engineer, is not
what it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier elucidated, one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer. Exhibit “F,” being an official entry in the court’s records, is admissible in evidence and
there is no necessity to produce the concerned stenographer as a witness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof.—Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Exhibit “G,” which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5,
Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit “I,” which is the machine copy of a certification
allegedly issued by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was
allegedly submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his
credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of their original documents
recorded or kept in the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City and, thus, admissible to prove the
contents of their originals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Handwriting Experts; Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not
indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or signatures.—Well-entrenched is the rule
that resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are
not indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or signatures. This is so since under
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, because he has seen the person
write; or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or has been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Moreover, the opinion of a non-
expert witness, for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding the
handwriting or signature of a person with which he has sufficient familiarity.
Criminal Procedure; Jurisdictions; There are three important requisites which must be present before
a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases: first, the court must have jurisdiction over the
offense or the subject matter, second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the
offense was committed, and, third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information
as regards the place where the offense charged was committed.—There are three important
requisites which must be present before a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases. First, the
court must have jurisdiction over the of-fense or the subject matter. Second, the court must have
jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. And third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. There is no dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has
jurisdiction over the of-fense and over the person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the
Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns. The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint or information as regards the place where the offense charged was
committed. It should also be emphasized that where some acts material and essential to the crime
and requisite to its consummation occur in one province or city and some in another, the court of
either province or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the court first taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others. Fullero vs. People, 533 SCRA 97, G.R. No. 170583
September 12, 2007
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Evidence; Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed
by the Supreme Court unless these findings are not supported by evidence.—Normally, we do not
review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial courts. However, this case comes
within the exceptions. The “findings of fact by the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court
unless these findings are not supported by evidence,” In this case, the findings of the lower courts
even directly contradict the evidence. Hence, we review the evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of both barangay
Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan; A trial court errs grievously in not taking judicial
notice of the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction.—The trial court held that the copy of the
license presented was blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely on the certification dated
May 10, 1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and Explosives
Division, Philippine National Police stating that Vicente “Vic” del Rosario of Barangay Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. As against
this, petitioner submitted that he was not the person referred to in the said certification because he is
Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan. The Court takes judicial
notice of the existence of both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in Norzagaray, Bulacan. In fact,
the trial court erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of the barangays within its territorial
jurisdiction, believing the prosecution’s submission that there was only barangay Tigbe, and that
barangay Bigte in the certification was a typographical error.
Same; Same; Same; The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused.—Petitioner presented to the head of the raiding team, Police
Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal Investigation Command, a
valid firearm license. The court is duty bound to examine the evidence assiduously to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It is true that the court may rely on the certification of the Chief,
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a firearm license. However, such
certification referred to another individual and thus, cannot prevail over a valid firearm license duly
issued to petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the printed computerized copy of License No.
RCL 1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993, expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP under the signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr. Supt. (GSC) PNP,
Chief, FEO. On the dorsal side of the printed computerized license, there is stamped the words
“Validity of computerized license is extended until renewed license is printed“ dated January 17,
1995, signed by Police Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief, Licence Branch, FEO. Coupled
with this indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license fees for the extension of the license for the
next two-year period.
Same; Same; The trial court’s ruling that “it is a matter of judicial notice that a caliber .45 firearm
cannot be licensed to a private individual” has no basis in law or in jurisprudence.—The trial court
was obviously misguided when it held that it is a matter of judicial notice that a caliber .45 firearm
cannot be licensed to a private individual.” This ruling has no basis either in law or in jurisprudence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NENITA MARIA OLIVIA GALLARDO (at
large), and REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused. REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused-appellant.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot be considered on
appeal.—Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be
formally offered by him, otherwise, it is excluded and rejected. Evidence not formally offered before
the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other
parties their right to rebut them. By opting not to present them in court, such affidavits of desistance
are generally hearsay and have no probative value since the affiants thereof were not placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon. The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence that has
not been formally offered is to afford the other party the chance to object to their admissibility. People
vs. Gallardo, 388 SCRA 121, G.R. Nos. 140067-71 August 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and

ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence; Evidence not formally offered can be considered
by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.—Appellant then faults the trial court for
appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite
the latter’s failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they again must be
deemed inadmissible. The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered
by the court as long as they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have
themselves been incorporated in the records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in
this case were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case
because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded.
Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the
exhibits.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important
and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.—Again, appellant’s arguments lack merit.
The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points
regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the
credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused
were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important
and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The identity of the person who opened the
bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony
of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different
persons may have different recollections of the same incident.
Same; Dangerous Drugs Act; Alibis and Denials; The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably
viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.—Against the
credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s defense of denial and alibi
cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor
for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases
involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial
and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant.
Hence, we reject her defense. People vs. Libnao, 395 SCRA 407, G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003
ANATALIA B. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES DOMINGO A. DIZON and EDNA MEDINA
DIZON, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence; Evidence not formally offered may be
admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are met, viz.: first, the
same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.—The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this
matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified. The case of Vda. de Oñate, 250 SCRA 283 (1995), which was relied upon by the Court of
Appeals, reiterated our previous rulings in People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 (1989), and People v.
Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981), relative to the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not
formally offered during the trial. We declared in Vda. de Oñate that—From the foregoing provision, it
is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere
fact that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA
385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and
its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the
party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he
believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter,
the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same. However, in People v. Napat-a
[179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 404], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUSANA NAPAT-A y MACABIO, accused-

appellant.
Dangerous Drugs Act; Witnesses; Non-presentation of the poseurbuyer did not destroy the case of
the prosecution; Case at bar.—Appellant questions the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer
(Quevedo) who died before the trial, and the informer, as witnesses at the trial. But as the trial court
pointed out, the death of Quevedo did not destroy the case of the prosecution, for the sale and actual
delivery of the marijuana by appellant to Quevedo were witnessed by Pat. Peralta and A2C Artizona,
who testified at the trial (t.s.n. Nov. 7, 1986, pp. 3-4).
Same; Same; Evidence; The subsequent loss of exhibits did not affect the case for the trial court;
Reasons.—Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting her in view of the
prosecution’s failure to present to the Court the brown carton box (Exh. B) and its contents (dried
marijuana leaves) (Exhs. C, D, E and F) is not well taken. Carlos V. Figueroa, Forensic Chemist of the
PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the box and its contents were presented, identified and marked as
exhibits in court (t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 3-8). The subsequent loss of these exhibits did not
affect the case for the trial court had described the evidence in the records (t.s.n. April 13, 1988, p. 2).
In People vs. Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that “(e)ven without the exhibits which have been
incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish the case because the
witnesses properly identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded.” Furthermore, in this
case, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on those
exhibits (t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 8-9).
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of regularity of performance of duty as law enforcer.—Her defense
that she was framed up by the NARCOM team is the usual story of drug pushers or sellers, which
does not impress us (People vs. Agapito, 154 SCRA 694). The law enforcers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in the absence of proof to the contrary (People vs. Natipravat, 145
SCRA 483; People vs. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989). People vs. Napat-a, 179 SCRA
403, G.R. No. 84951 November 14, 1989
DNA EVIDENCE
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.
Appeals; Evidence; Where the conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court,
the Supreme Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.—True, it is not the function of this Court to
examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which
formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. But since the conclusions of the Court
of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
Parent and Child; Civil Registry; Birth Certificates; Evidence; Under the law, the attending physician
or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth, and only in default of the
physician or midwife can the parent register the birth of his child; A false entry in a birth certificate
regarding the alleged marriage between the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said
birth certificate.—We find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth
of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.
Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent
had admitted she is a “common-law wife.” This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate.
Same; Filiation; Evidence; Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage.—The trial court observed several times that when the child
and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and
head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial court’s conclusion should be given high
respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.
Same; Same; Same; DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Test; Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available; Being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence;
Courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress.—A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “DNA” and “DNA Testing,” Explained.—DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) refers to the chain of molecules found in every cell of the body, except in red
blood cells, which transmit hereditary characteristics among individuals. DNA testing is synonymous
to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling, genetic testing or genetic fingerprinting. Tijing vs.
Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO

@ PUKE, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rape with Homicide; Evidence; An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.—An accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to
prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. In rape with homicide, the evidence
against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime,
where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes
the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the
perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the
modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites before circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.—
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction if: “(a) there is more than one circumstance; “(b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and “(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”
Same; Same; Same; Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.—
DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except
for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed,
material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This
is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from
the suspect and the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Alibi; Alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his
relatives and not by credible persons.—No other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever
called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellant’s sister, Aimee Vallejo,
to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established
mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is well settled that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this Court
looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only
by relatives or friends of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY MARQUEZ y BACAY, accused-

appellant.
DNA; Words and Phrases; DNA test is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting, DNA profiling,
genetic tests, and genetic fingerprinting.—DNA test is synonymous to DNA typing, DNA fingerprinting,
DNA profiling, genetic tests, and genetic fingerprinting. The scientific basis of this test comes first
from the fact that our differences as individuals are due to the differences in the composition of our
genes. These genes comprise a chemical substance, DNA or deoxyribonucleic acid. In the United
States, DNA tests have been used to convict perpetrators of crime, as well as exonerate innocent
individuals. S.C. Halos, Current trends in DNA typing and applications in the judicial system, (3rd
Convention and seminar of the Philippine Judges Association, June 11, 1999), 4 The Court Systems
Journal 47
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOEL YATAR alias “KAWIT,” appellant.
Criminal Law; Witnesses; The Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.—The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Well-
entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing
first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court’s highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
Same; Same; Circumstantial Evidence; An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented to prove beyond doubt that the
accused committed the crime.—The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light
of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Same; DNA Testing; Words and Phrases; DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in
all living organisms, and a person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a
person’s lifetime—the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.—
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical semen to be that of appellant’s gene type. DNA
is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A person’s DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
Same; Same; DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left.—DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where
biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile
source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more
accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing
the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. DNA
evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion
in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s
body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that
there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim,
crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the
scene of the crime.
Same; Same; In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia,
the following factors—how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst
who conducted the tests; Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science
and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters though we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that
has developed in other jurisdictions.—The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which
conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has
become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR
method. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de
Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to
that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that
he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which
are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial. Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence
that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
Same; Same; Evidence; Evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.—In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at
trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the
court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of
human genetics and molecular biology.
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-
relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
Criminal Law; Rape; Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape—whether the child
which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment in determining an individual’s guilt.—It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza’s
paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner’s guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen
Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her
child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the victim’s pregnancy
and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not
an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by
the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual’s
guilt.
Same; Criminal Procedure; New Trial; A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds.—The fact of the
child’s paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only
tangentially related to the issue of petitioner’s guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that
the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow
the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis. Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more
relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for
new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time,
and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that is,
within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a
motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites; DNA Testing; Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly
discovered after trial, it does not meet the criteria for “newly-discovered evidence” that would merit a
new trial—such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence.—The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far
back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of
“newly- discovered evidence.” A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be
granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence
before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this instance, although the DNA evidence
was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for
“newly-discovered evidence” that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could
have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing
speaks of negligence, either on the part of the client, or on the part of his counsel; A client is bound by
the acts of his counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and negligence.—Petitioner-relator’s claim that
he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with
this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part
of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is
binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when
he himself was guilty of neglect. A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter’s
mistakes and negligence. It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De
Villa, 442 SCRA 706, G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI
A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Marriages; Family Code; Filiation; Paternity; The burden of proving paternity is
on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.—Filiation
proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Stages; There are four (4) significant procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.—A
prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In
our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative
father. There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may
show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or
impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at
the time of conception. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate. The child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of
evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However,
although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how
much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the
emotions of the trier of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the
putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father.—Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation
must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father.
A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and
pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of
live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father’s
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; DNA Testing; In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data.—In assessing
the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
who conducted the tests.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Self-Incrimination; The Supreme Court has ruled
that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant.—The Supreme Court has ruled that
the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken
from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body (as cited in People vs. Olvis, Supra); the substance emitting from the body
of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness (US vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145);
morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof (US vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735); an
order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed (People vs. Otadora, 86
Phil. 244); and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test
(Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62), since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on “testimonial
compulsion.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially illegitimate children, is without
prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.—The policy of the
Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or
her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established
by the law, rules, and jurisprudence. Herrera vs. Alba, 460 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 148220 June 15,
2005
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX E. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.)
and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death Certificates;
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr., constitute prima facie proof of their
contents.—Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.” The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2)
the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of
most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of
such errors as might have occurred.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section 39, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
‘pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.” For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a)
the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c)
the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the
person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish
or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of
the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,this Court has acknowledged
the strong weight of DNA testing—“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability
toconduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA or a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUFINO UMANITO, appellant.

Criminal Law; Evidence; New Rule on Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Evidence; Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Testing; If it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire the alleged rape
victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis.—
Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the definitive key
to the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported
rape. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined
with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child. If he is not, his acquittal may
be ordained. We have pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not
sire the alleged victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal
on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate
decision in this case. Thus, we are directing appellant, AAA and her child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules),
which took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) print or identification
technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve
one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available—for purposes of criminal
investigation, Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.—DNA print or identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely
effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological
evidence is available. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can aid immensely in determining a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case. Verily, as we
pointed out in People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 505 (2004), the process of obtaining such vital evidence
has become less arduous—The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted
the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be
copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier
since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
Same; Same; Same; Remand of Cases; Under Section 4 of the New Rule on Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) Evidence, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing; Since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in
the course of daily routine, conduct hearings, it would be more appropriate that the case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due
notice to the parties.—It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the
father of AAA’s child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized,
after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains
jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy,
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of
evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Offer of Evidence; After the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) analysis is obtained, it
shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance
with the rules of evidence.—Should the RTC find the DNA testing feasible in the case at bar, it shall
order the same, in conformity with Section 5 of the Rules. It is also the RTC which shall determine the
institution to undertake the DNA testing and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the
choice of DNA testing center. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the
parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence. The
RTC, in evaluating the DNA results upon presentation, shall assess the same as evidence in keeping
with Sections 7 and 8 of the Rules.
Same; Same; Same; In light of the fact that this case constitutes the first known application of the
Rules on Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Evidence, the Court is especially interested in monitoring the
implementation thereof in this case, for its guidance and continuing evaluation of the Rules as
implemented.—In light of the fact that this case constitutes the first known application of the Rules,
the Court is especially interested in monitoring the implementation thereof in this case, for its
guidance and continuing evaluation of the Rules as implemented. For purposes of supervising the
implementation the instant resolution, the Court designates Deputy Court Administrator Reuben Dela
Cruz (DCA Dela Cruz) to: (a) monitor the manner in which the court a quo carries out the Rules; and
(b) assess and submit periodic reports on said implementation to the Court. Towards the fulfillment of
such end, the RTC is directed to cooperate and coordinate with DCA Dela Cruz.
Same; Same; Same; In order to facilitate the execution of the Court’s Resolution in the instant case,
the costs for the Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing may be advanced by the Supreme Court if
needed.—In order to facilitate the execution of this Resolution, though the parties are primarily bound
to bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by this Court if needed. People
vs. Umanito, 537 SCRA 552, G.R. No. 172607 October 26, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner, vs. Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by
Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
Civil Law; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
support (as in the present case), or inheritance.—As a whole, the present petition calls for the
determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor. Filiation
proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of
proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.
Same; Same; Presumptions; The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy, a presumption which not only flows out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother.—A child born to a husband
and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167. The children shall
be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals, 441 SCRA 96 (2004): The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
Same; Same; DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Testing; With the advancement in the field of genetics,
and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether a
man is the biological father of a child, through DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) testing.—There had been
divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present
petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it
can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor,
through DNA testing. DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up.
DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is
unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA analysis is a procedure in
which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is
processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken.
This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Same; Same; Same; Rules on DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Evidence; The death of the alleged
biological father does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) testing for
as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.—Coming now to the issue of
remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the
Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has
already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer
feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order
of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus: x x
x From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As
defined above, the term “biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood,
saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the
biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can
be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing. Estate of Rogelio G. Ong vs. Diaz, 540 SCRA 480, G.R.
No. 171713 December 17, 2007
NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Direct evidence of
the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt—
the rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt; Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference.—Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial
court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established
by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct
testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the
community. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following requisites are complied with: (1) There is more than one
circumstance; (2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Homicide; Motive; Intent; Words and Phrases; It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a
state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused
before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from
which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred; Motive and intent may be considered
one and the same in some instances.—Intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they
testified relative to the “peeping incident.” Although there was no evidence or allegation of sexual
advances, such incident manifested petitioner’s evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that motive,
being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express
it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred. Motive and intent may be
considered one and the same, in some instances, as in the present case.
Circumstantial Evidence; The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused
cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence—it is more like a puzzle
which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the
accused is the author of the crime.—The DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner
at the scene of the crime. Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances
discussed earlier. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as
the author of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like to
emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused
cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle
which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the
accused is the author of the crime.
Witnesses; It is unnatural for a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody else other than the real culprit—for her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free.—The
prosecution’s evidence, especially the testimonies of the witnesses who happen to be the victim’s
relatives, was not weakened by the fact of such relationship. The Court notes that petitioner himself is
a relative of the witnesses, albeit by affinity, being the husband of the victim’s sister. It is unnatural for
a relative, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real
culprit. For her/him to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that
witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made
under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 461, G.R. No.
164266 July 23, 2008
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION,
respondent.
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792); Evidence; Rules on Electronic Evidence; Best
Evidence Rule; Words and Phrases; To be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or
to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.”—The ruling
of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent
of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an
electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed
by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the
functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.”
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases; While “data message” has
reference to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it
will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation, unlike an “electronic document,” nevertheless
evident from the law is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.—The clause
on the interchangeability of the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document” was the
result of the Senate of the Philippines’ adoption, in Senate Bill 1902, of the phrase “electronic data
message” and the House of Representative’s employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term “electronic
document.” In order to expedite the reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working group of
the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both terms and intended them to be the equivalent of
each one. Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between the two terms. While “data message”
has reference to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean
that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an obligation, unlike an electronic document. Evident from
the law, however, is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The “international origin” mentioned in Section 37 of the
Electronic Commerce Act can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL’s definition
of “data message.”—As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory construction, Section 37 of
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides that Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the
interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin and the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade relations. The
generally accepted principles of international law and convention on electronic commerce shall
likewise be considered. Obviously, the “international origin” mentioned in this section can only refer to
the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the UNCITRAL’s definition of “data message”: “Data message”
means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means
including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy, is substantially the same as the IRR’s characterization of an “electronic data message.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used
in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and
that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment.—Congress deleted
the phrase, “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy,” and replaced the term “data message” (as found in the UNCITRAL Model Law) with
“electronic data message.” This legislative divergence from what is assumed as the term’s
“international origin” has bred uncertainty and now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true
intent of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure,
the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A construction should
be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be
attained by the enactment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Facsimile Transmissions; There is no question that when
Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term
“electronic record” in the Canada law, which construction of the term “electronic data message,”
excludes telexes or faxes, except computergenerated faxes, in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that
it espouses; Facsimile transmissions are not “paperless” but verily are paper-based.—When the
Senate consequently voted to adopt the term “electronic data message,” it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply “to telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic commerce.” In
explaining the term “electronic record” patterned after the ECommerce Law of Canada, Senator
Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term “electronic data message.” This term then, while maintaining
part of the UNCITRAL Model Law’s terminology of “data message,” has assumed a different context,
this time, consonant with the term “electronic record” in the law of Canada. It accounts for the addition
of the word “electronic” and the deletion of the phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.” Noteworthy is that the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada, explains the term “electronic record,” as drafted in the Uniform Electronic Evidence Act, in a
manner strikingly similar to Sen. Santiago’s explanation during the Senate deliberations: x x x There
is no question then that when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended
the same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term
“electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in
harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and the
“functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations of the Legislature are
replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this
sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by
Alexander Bain, is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a telephone line, and
works by digitizing an image; A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a
computer printer combined into a highly specialized package.—A facsimile machine, which was first
patented in 1843 by Alexander Bain, is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a
telephone line. It works by digitizing an image—dividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on or
off, depending on whether it is black or white. Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has
a value of either 0 (off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine translates a picture into a series of
zeros and ones (called a bit map) that can be transmitted like normal computer data. On the receiving
side, a fax machine reads the incoming data, translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and
reprints the picture. A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer
combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a physical
document into a digital image, the modem sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at
the other end makes a duplicate of the original document.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is
no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects,
and are considered as originals; Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which,
as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as
received; While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and
telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data
message.”—In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or
data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in
enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be
the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in
a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals.
Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable
with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original
paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are
distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the
early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which
is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when
it defined the term “electronic data message.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself; The IRR went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim
the UNCITRAL Model Law’s definition of “data message,” without considering the intention of
Congress when the latter deleted the phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.”—Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of
the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law’s definition of “data message,” without
considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase “but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.” The inclusion of this phrase in the
IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the rule-making power of administrative agencies. After
all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened
by a mere administrative issuance—an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle
of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire
wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Same; Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Facsimile Transmisions; A facsimile transmission cannot
be considered as electronic evidence—it is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.—We, therefore, conclude that the terms
“electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best
Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Since a facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data
message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the
Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence.—Since
a facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot
be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax
transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E” and “F”), which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts.
Actions; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Requisites.—Despite the pro forma invoices not being
electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the
existence of a perfected contract of sale. In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is
essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by
the other contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she sustained due to such breach. Actori
incumbit onus probandi. The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a proposition
affirmatively. In other words, a plaintiff in a civil action must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.
ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

Criminal Law; Extortion; Entrapment; Instigation; Distinction Between Entrapment and Instigation.—In
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-
breakers in the execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself
becomes a co-principal.
Same; Same; Evidence; Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a
person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof; Court has no doubt as
to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of
respondent.—Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . . . .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining
the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), respondent.

Actions; Evidence; Burden of Proof; It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the
plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of evidence.—It is basic that in civil cases,
the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of evidence.
The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of proving it. In the complaint Aznar filed before the
RTC, he claimed that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor in several
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia
where he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to use a
blacklisted card. As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, Aznar failed to prove
with a preponderance of evidence that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the
“hot list.” Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal knowledge that his Mastercard was
blacklisted by Citibank and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card.
Same; Same; Whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.—The prevailing
rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. “G,” did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.
Same; Same; Electronic Evidence; A party’s testimony that the person from a travel agency merely
handed him the computer printout and that said party thereafter asked said person to sign the same
cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability.—Even if examined
under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. “G” would still be found wanting. Pertinent
sections of Rule 5 read: Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity.—The person seeking to introduce
an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the
manner provided in this Rule. Section 2. Manner of authentication.—Before any private electronic
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means: (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have
signed the same; (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be
authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to
the document; or (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the
judge. Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the “other evidence
showing integrity and reliability of Exh. “G” to the satisfaction of the judge.” The Court is not
convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer
print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May
29, 1998 Decision, Exh. “G” does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar
merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also
failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the
name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-
out.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, respondents.
Evidence; Electronic Documents; Words and Phrases; An electronic document refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.—An “electronic document” refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described
or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable
by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document. The rules use the word “information” to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other
document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an
electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is
processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,

transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Same; Same; Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.—A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no
stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the
offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same
may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Same; Same; The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.—No
error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records
petitioner’s Exhibits “A,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “H” and its sub-markings, “I,” “J” and its sub-markings, “K,” “L,”
“M” and its sub-markings, “N” and its sub-markings, “O,” “P” and its submarkings, “Q” and its sub-
markings, and “R.” The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before
the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence
rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered
copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded
from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The
importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human
memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are
the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
Same; When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.—When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or
destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must
prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in the
case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed
to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility
of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence. National Power Corporation vs.
Codilla, Jr., 520 SCRA 412, G.R. No. 170491 April 3, 2007
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, complainant, vs.

CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Administrative Law; Quantum of Proof; Substantial Evidence; In administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required.—The complainant in administrative proceedings has
the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is
to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be competent and derived from
direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on
mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.
However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is
not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The findings of
investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their
unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.
Evidence; Rules on Electronic Evidence; Electronic Communication as Evidence; Text messages
have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1 (k), Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to
the same or has personal knowledge thereof.”— The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text
messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such
messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already
admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.
Same; Judges; Trial; Testimonial Evidence; The investigating judge is in a better position to pass
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses, having personally heard them when they testified, and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.—The Investigating Officer also found that the
respondent was “high-strung” during his testimony, and this finding must be accorded respect.
Indeed, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is primarily lodged
in the investigating judge. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment
of the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases where preponderance of
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, respectively, are required, applies a fortiori in
administrative cases where the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. The
investigating judge is in a better position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having
personally heard them when they testified, and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Petitioner, vs. Moreno Dumapis, Elmo TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS LIAGAO, Respondents

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN

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ERNESTO M. FULLERO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and

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NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR y DE LEON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

ZALDY NUEZ, complainant, vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO, respondent.

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, petitioner, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), respondent.

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ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, complainant, vs.

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