Republic of the Philippines Department of Justice OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR Quezon City JOHN R. CASTRICIONES Complainant, -vs- XV-INV-17H-08212 For: Libel RAMBO TALABONG and MARIA A RESSA, Respondents. x x DIF 08/23/17 DIA 08/24/17 DIS 11/23/17 RESOLUTION Complainant alleged that he was an Undersecretary for Operations of the Depart- ment of the Interior and Local Government (DILG for brevity) during the filing of this complaint. In the morning of August 22, 2017, while he was inside his office located at the 26th Floor, DILG-NAPOLCOM Center, EDSA cor. Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, his attention was called by his subordinates about an article entitled “DILG asks Mala- caftang to decide fate of 3 “floating” execs soon”, published on August 14, 2017 in so- cial media by RAPPLER authored by respondent Rambo Talabong. He was shocked to have read the following portions of the article, as follows: “DILG Officer-in-Charge Catalina Cut on Monday, August 14, appealed to Malacaftang to decide soon on the fate of 3 undersecretaries who have been the sub- ject of employees’ corruption complaints. Undersecretaries Emily Padilla, Jesus Hinlo, and Jon Castriciones have been placed on “floating” status ever since April 2017, after the Palace received a letter from DILG officials and employees, alleging corruption committed by the 3. The officials denied the claims. ‘Their tasks have since been delegated to other officials, but the 3 continue to receive salaries.” These paragraphs, according to complainant, clearly conveys the following mali- cious imputations, to wit: 1. The three (3) undersecretaries, including complainant, are on a floating sta- tus and despite such status, they continue to receive their salaries; 2. The three (3) undersecretaries were the subject of a formal corruption com- plaint by DILG employees, which the latter submitted and was allegedly received by Malacafiang; and - The cause of their floating status was by virtue of the corruption complaint by DILG officials and employees committed by the three undersecretaries. The truth of the matter was that he did not commit any act of corruption in his service at the DILG and there are no cases filed against him in any court of law or office of the Ombudsman for any case of corruption. Respondent Talabong in his article tary 10f8nished his personality and good reputation by making it to appear that he is corrupt without mentioning any detail as to how the corruption was done except for citing an al- leged complaint by DILG officials and employees. Worse, respondent Talabong unjustly made malicious imputations as he insinuates that he has been rendered useless and in- utile in the DILG and that he continue to receive his salary as public official despite not doing anything since April 2017 ‘There is no truth that complainant is on floating status because at present he con- tinues to discharge his duties and functions, among others, as follows: 1. Chairman of the Bids and Awards Committee; 2. Official representative of the DILG at the National Power Corporation Board meeting 3. Official representative of Justice Sector Coordinating Committee; 4. Official representative of DILG in the meetings of GPBB: 5. Chairman of the Grievance Committee; and 6. Promoting Federalism around the country with the approval of the OIC and with pertinent Travel Authority. Respondent Talabong’s allegation that he is on a floating status and yet receiving salary is a malicious imputation which was merely designed to tamish his honor and reputation and to expose him to public ridicule and contempt. His insinuation is clear: complainant is receiving salary despite doing nothing. The truth of the matter is he was improperly stripped of his powers by the then DILG Secretary Sueno. When the latter is about to be relieved from his post, he made midnight Department Orders thereby removing complainant’s supervisory authority over Administrative and Finance Department and Anti-Illegal Drugs program. Said Depart- ment Orders are well documented, thus, respondent Talabong’s news report that he is on a floating status because of corruption charges is wholly wrong, unsubstantiated, and malicious. He violated the tenets of his profession by building news articles based on mere hearsay. He was writing a news article and not an editorial/opinion. In a news released by Philippine Star dated June 23, 2017 (Annex “B”), Mala- cafiang itself has clarified that there is no complaint filed against herein complainant. Despite this news release by Malacafiang, respondent Talabong insists that there is a complaint against Castriciones and further maliciously claimed that it was the basis of his floating status. Aside from this article, respondent Talabong and Rappler made other published articles containing the same allegations, to wit: 1. 3 DILG Undersecretaries floating since April 2017 published on June 23, 2017 (Annex “C”) 2. DILG Officials, Employees urge Duterte to Fire 3 Undersecretaries; pub- lished on June 20, 2017 (Annex “D”). ‘These articles of respondent Talabong, which complainant recently took notice of, are deceitful, inaccurate and full of inconsistencies and misrepresentations and are clear- ly written and designed to tarnish his honor and reputation and expose him to embar- rassment, public ridicule, and contempt. 2 0f8 4.Respondents filed their Joint Counter-Affidavit stating that in the June 20, 2017 Teport (Annex “1”), respondent Talabong first reported on the issues raised against com- plainant and two (2) other Undersecratries of the DILG. He disclosed the role of the three (3) undersecretaries in the removal of then Secretary Suefio. The said report then disclosed the existence of what respondent then referred to as a confidential memo given to the president, which the Office of the President received on June 1, 2017. Parts of the contents were already disclosed in the report as follows: “Mahal na Pangulo, Hindi po namin pwedeng ibunyag ang lagat ng mag kabalbalan ng tatlong sec na naghasik ng lagim sa amine departamento dahil kukulangin ang iyong Panahon, subalit kami po ay naniniklop-tuhod at nagsusumamo sa inyo na sana ay tu Juyan na ninyong alisin sa presto an mua uses na ito" In the next report on the matter on June 23, 2017 (Annex “2”), respondent then Teported that the complainant was placed on a floating status by former Secretary Suetio in April 2017. The report was based on statements issued by DILG Assistant Secretary Epimaco Densing. In the same report, complainant explained that they “expected that their responsibilities be returned to them after Suefio had been received from his Post, but they were surprised to find out that they remained floating officials”. In the same re. port, despite categorizing complainant as being on floating status, the “3 can still repre- sent DILG in government and civic events.” The final report dated August 14, 2017 (Annex “3”) which is the subject of the present complaint, respondent merely reported the updates given by Officer-in-Charge- Cuy as to the status of the floating undersecretaries. The reports made by respondent Talabong are factually accurate. To be liable for libel, they were informed that all the elements thereof must be present. Libel expressly excludes fair and true reports in relation to the exercise of a public officer of his func- tions as stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. These are classified as privi- leged communications which would exempt the author from liability for libel or defama- tion unless the person aggrieved proves the existence of malice on the author's part. There is no dispute that complainant is a public officer being an Undersecretary of the DILG. Fair and true reports on the complainant, as a high ranking public official, cer- tainly fall within Article 354(2). The article subject matter of the complaint would show that it is simply a report on the DILG, particularly the operations of the Department and the status of the three (3) undersecretaries mentioned therein based on information pro- vided by DILG Officials and other information already published. Being a fair and true report, the subject article is privileged and not actionable under the laws on libel. Considering that complainant admits that he was stripped of his powers, and the powers stripped of him corresponds directly to those stated in the report, it is ludicrous for the complainant to question the use of the term “floating status”. Respondents were not alone in disclosing that complainant was stripped of his powers as the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported the same (Annex ‘‘4”). To avoid confusion, it must be reiterated that despite describing them as “in floating “status”, respondents still disclosed in an ear- lier report that the “3 can still represent the DILG in government and civic events.” The admission of complainant that he was stripped of his powers by then Secretary Suefio has also been confirmed by DILG Assistant Secretary Epimaco Densing. Respondent’s assertion therefore that complainant is on floating status is truthful, 3of8Complainant intentionally misstates and changes the meaning of respondent's re- port. Respondent Talabong reported about a letter (Annex “7") from DILG officials and employees. In an earlier report, respondent described the same letter s a confidential memo. The respondent never referred to any formal complaint against the complainant. Even assuming that respondent inadvertently committed any errors in his report, the same are still privileged speech that cannot be deemed libelous. The guarantee of free speech, expression and of the press is needed for democracy to work properly. Re- spondent Talabong exerted efforts to communicate with complainant. Admittedly, the report did not contain any direct statement from complainant as he did not reply to any message sent by respondent Talabong (Annex “9”). Respondent Talabong has readily available channels for communication, and had complainant wished to air his side, he could have contacted respondents or Rappler via e-mail or telephone or even through their social media accounts. ‘The parties submitted their respective Reply and Rejoinder Affidavits reiterating their allegations and arguments in their previous pleadings. Hence this resolution. The elements of libel are: a) it must be defamatory; b) —_itmust be malicious; ©) __ itmust be given publicly; and d) the victim must be identifiable. (Almendras Jr. vs. Almendras, G.R. No. 179491, January 14, 2015) In the case of Lopez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011, the Supreme Court held: “xxx. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be con- strued in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary mean- ing as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. Moreover, [a] charge is suffi- cient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. Relative to the elements of malice and publicity, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines is explicit. It provides: “Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is pre- sumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following case: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the per- formance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, reports or speech delivered in said proceed- ings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their func- tions{— 40f8The undisputed facts are as follows: 1. Complainant is an Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG for brevity) and continues to hold such position on the dates material to this complaint. 2. Rappler is an online media outfit 3. Respondent Rambo Talabong is a reporter of Rappler. 4. Respondent Maria Ressa is the Editor-in-Chief of Rappler. 5. Three (3) articles were published and posted on the website of Rappler authored by respondent Rambo Talabong, particularly on June 20, 2017, June 23, 2017, and August 14, 2017 pertaining to three (3) undersecretaries of the DILG. 6. The three (3) undersecretaries were specifically named in all three (3) articles, namely Undersecretary Jesus Hinlo, Undersecretary Emily Padilla, and Undersecretary John Castriciones. Complainant denied the existence of the said “confidential memo”. He even stated that there is no complaint against him that was received by the Office of the Cabinet Secretary. This allegation was bolstered by an online article authored by Alexis Romero of the Philippine Star (Annex “B”, Complaint). Said online article however, acknowl- edged the existence of the “confidential memorandum” which “outlined the alleged wrongdoings of the three undersecretaries” including the complainant. Said “confiden- tial memorandum” was submitted to the “President”. This being the case, the existence of the “confidential memorandum” cannot be denied. Examining the article that appeared in Rappler on June 20, 2017 in its entirety, it appears that respondents did not commit libel in the context of Article 353 of the Re- vised Penal Code. As can be gleaned from the said article, respondents merely summa- rized the contents of the “Confidential Memo to the President” (Annex “7°, Counter-Af- fidavit”) without any remarks or comment, The contents thereof did not came from respondents, but from the “Confidential Memo to the President” authored by “Concemed Citizens and employees sa DILG”. It is not a formal complainant, but rather, a communication addressed to the President of al- leged wrongdoings by the three (3) named undersecretaries of the DILG. Complainant has a cause of action, but not against herein respondents, as they merely summarized the contents of the alleged libelous remarks. It is a fair and true report within the context of paragraph 2, Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code hence exempt. Relative to the article posted on June 23, 2017, it appears that said article is like- wise in the same category as the one posted on June 20, 2017. However, it must be pointed out that aside from these statements emanating from Assistant Secretary Dens- ing, the article included the following statements: “This, while the 3 continue to be paid at salary grade 30 - about P117,600 each per month.f 5 offHowever, the 3 can still represent the DILG in government and civic events.” “With this, the 3 have limited their activities to attending seminars and conferences organized by local government units and the mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte National Exeeu- tive Coordinating Committee (MRRD-NECC), the national volunteer organization which campaigned for Duterte in 2016." The same is true with respect to the article posted on August 14, 2017. With the statement that “Their tasks have been delegated to other officials, but the three continue to receive salary”. The Supreme Court, in the consolidated cases of Tulfo vs. People and So, G.R. No. 161032 and Cambri, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 161176, dated Sep- tember 16, 2008, held: “The trial court found Tulfo’s accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of contents of articles does not affect their privileged character. It may be that the falsity of the articles does not prove malice, Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications. It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged communication. The portion of Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further: Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice, Errors or misstatements are in- evitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held ~ A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to re- port on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with min- imum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. ‘To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of “actual malice” ‘on the part of the person making the libelous statement. (Emphasis supplied.) Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done “consistent with good faith and reasonable care.” This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead misin- forming the public, Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exer- cise of their profession, but this margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this, margin cover total abandonment of responsibility. 4 6 of8Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified privileged communications is repro- duced as follows To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable impu- tation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily ac- tionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be ac- tionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reason- ably be inferred from the facts. (Emphasis supplied.) The expansion speaks of “fair commentaries on matters of public interest.” While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from liability. Borjal allows that for a dis- creditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty, So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify the information before publishing his articles.” (Citations omitted) ‘Treating the above as guidelines, the articles subject of this complaint is not ac- tionable as the same were based on facts. It appears that the articles subject of this com- plaint falls within the exception mentioned in Article 354, paragraph 2 mentioned above, it being a fair and true report on the part of respondents. The statements made by respondents in their online website are not in itself defamatory. On the contrary, it has been established that several functions and duties of the three (3) Undersecretaries were to be performed by other DILG Officials. They con- tinue to function as Undersecretaries of the DILG performing tasks assigned to their re- spective offices aside from those to be discharged by other officials. Lastly, they still re- ceived salaries pertaining to their salary grade. Thus, the same were true nd fair report in accordance with Article 354 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. In parting, the Supreme Court held in the case of Yabut and Tamargo vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Doran, G.R, No. 11304, June 17, 1994, as follows: “Xxx We second the Solicitor General in this observation: A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict per- sonal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a prop- erty of the public, He is looked upon to set an example how public official should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always, he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people2}—> 7 0t8WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that this case be DISMISSED for lack of probable cause. September 10, 2019. Quezon City, Philippines. RECOMMENDINf: APPROVAL Chief, Division 1 APPROVED BY AUTHORITY OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR: RAYMUND OLIVER S. ALMONTE Deputy City Prosecutor VEYA RICTORIA GIRER-VILLAMOR y City Prosecutor ce JOHN R. CASTRICIONES - 102 Kayumangei St, Karungalaa Village, Cant, Rizal RAMBO TALABONG and MARIA RESSA.- Unit B, 3/P North Wing Fstancia Ofies, Capitol Commons, Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 8 Oof8