Title II

EN BANC

APRIL 3, 2018

G.R. No. 215305

MARCELO G. SALUDAY, Petitioner

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 June 2014 1 and the Resolution
dated, 15 October 20142 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Sentence dated 15 September 2011 3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in
Criminal CaseNo. 65, 734-09, finding petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree No. 1866, 4 as amended (PD
1866).

The Antecedent Facts

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a
checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force,
requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He
then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and
suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag on the seat
at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then
looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept
peeping through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag
was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco
then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following
contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live
ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to
produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested
and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City. In its Resolution dated 7
May 2009,5 the latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition,
and explosive under PD l 866. The Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:

That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with intent to possess, had in his possession and under his
custody an improvised high powered firearm caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1)
magazine loaded with three (3) live ammunitions and one (1) "'cacao" type hand grenade explosive, without first securing
the necessary license to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura (Tabura), a representative of the
Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police, and SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification
dated 5 November 20097 attesting that petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per
verification from records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and testified on
the details of the routine inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner. On cross-examination, SCAA Buco
further elaborated on the search conducted:

Atty. Mamburam

Q And that check point, which was conducted along llang [R)oad,

Davao City, was by virtue of a memorandum?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a Metro Shuttle passenger bus and you
requested all passengers to alight?

A Yes.

Q passengers were left inside?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the passengers in the bus?

A Yes.

xxxx

Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black gray colored pack bag which was placed at the
back portion of the bus?

A Yes.

Q You said that the hag was heavy?

A Yes.

Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the bus and that was the only thing or item
inside the bus which was heavy. Is that correct?

A There were many bags and they were heavy. When l asked who is the owner of the bag because it was heavy but
the bag was small. when I asked, he said the content of the bag was a cellphone. But 1 noticed that it was heavy.

xxxx
Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?

A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)

Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male passenger you pointed as the accused
kept looking at you'?

A Yes.

Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not looking at you?

A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window looking towards his bag.

xxxx

Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open the bag'?

A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.

Q And, when he opened it?

A I saw the handle of the firearm. 8 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct examination, petitioner denied ownership
of the bag. However, he also admitted to answering SCAA Buco when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco
to open it after the latter sought for his permission:

ATTY. MAMBURAM

Q x xx After the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you and your brother were seated at the
back of the bus. can you please tell us what happened next'?

A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were the contents of the bag.

Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?

A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.

Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?

A I told him it was only a cellphone.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?

A My elder brother.
Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force when, in fact, you were not the owner
of the bag?

A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who were seated at the back.

xxxx

Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content of the bag was cellphone, what happened
next?

A He asked if he can open it.

Q And what was your reply?

A I told him yes, just open it.

xx xx

Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was your brother, what is the name of your
brother?

A Roger Saluday.

Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009.9 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor when the latter was asked who
owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never disclosed he was with his brother when he boarded the bus:

PROS. VELASCO

Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of saving yourself considering you don't own the
bag> did you not volunteer to inform them that [the] bag was owned by your brother?

A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother because I was also afraid of my brother.

Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a brother at that time when you
were boarding that bus, correct?

A No, sir, I did not.

xxxx

Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you confirm now that it was the conductor of that
bus who pointed you as the owner of the bag, correct?

A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the back. 10
(Emphasis supplied)

The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to present rebuttal evidence. Upon order
from the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him to be in actual or constructive
possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license. Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence
dated 15 September 2011, petitioner was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm,
ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of
illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive. For the offense of illegal possession of high
powered firearm and ammunition, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its minimum
period. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00. For the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal. He is likewise ordered
to pay a fine of ₱50,000.00.

xxxx

SO ORDERED. 11

On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial
court and the supposed illegality of the search. 13 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that
the warrantless search was valid being a consented search, and that the factual findings of the trial court can no longer
be disturbed. 14

In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner and affirmed the ruling of
the trial court with modification:

WHEREFORE. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated September 15, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65, 734-09, finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is imposed an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum
term, to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition to the fine of
Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00); and

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 16 to which the OSG filed its Comment. 17 In its Resolution dated 15
October 2014, 18 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence,
petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue

Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to warrant his conviction for
the offenses charged.
 The Ruling of this Court

We affirm.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.19 As a
result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through the evidence presented during trial. 20 Further,
factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect, even finality. 21

Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition under PD 1866, and
illegal possession of explosive under the same law. The elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the
firearm, ammunition or explosive; (2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of
license to own or possess.22 As regards the second and third elements, the Corn1: of Appeals concurred with the trial
court that petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive
without the requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 reads in pertinent part:

In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no license or permit to own or possess
the firearm, ammunition and explosive by presenting NUP Daniel Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms
and Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP. He identified the Certification issued by the Chief. Records Section. FED of the
PNP, stating that appellant "is not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from records of this
office."

Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the veracity or truthfulness of the Ce1tification.
He claims that the officer who issued it should have been the one presented so he would not be denied the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:

xxxx

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution
more than complied when it presented both.

xxxx

Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms, ammunition and explosive. However, his
denial flies in the face of the following testimonies which he himself made:

xxxx

Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, on the contents of the bag. He even allowed the police officer to open it.
Based on his actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the bag containing the firearm, ammunition and
explosive.

Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate. Besides, the allegation that his brother
owned the bag is uncorroborated and self-serving. 23

As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and
explosive raises questions of fact. Considering further that the Court of Appeals merely echoed the factual findings of the
trial court, the Court finds no reason to disturb them.

As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on four important points: one, that
petitioner was a passenger of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009 at a military checkpoint in Ilang, Davao
City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and searched the bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as the
owner of a small, gray-black pack bag on the back seat of the bus; and four, that the same bag contained a .30-caliber
firearm with one magazine loaded who three live ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably, petitioner does not
challenge the chain of custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely raises a pure question of law and argues that
they are inadmissible on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

The Court disagrees.

Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to the United States (U.S.)
Constitution,24 reads:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures only. 25

Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article HI of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as
a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction,26 may shed
light on the matter.

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, 27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone
conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth
Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected, thus:

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the
characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued
that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not.
But this effo1i to decide whether or not a given "area,'' viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253; £:y; parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733.28 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the
Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.29 Second, the expectation is
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). 30

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. Hence, only when
the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment
triggered. Conversely, where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not
reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson,31 the
Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an
expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable:
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in
a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects. physical searches are conducted to determine what
the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity
of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs. and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to
search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply
to routine airport procedures.32 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches on the ground that the
safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy:

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not unreasonable
searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny
reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

xxxx

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not
unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine
security procedures in airports.

xxxx

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of
passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities
had probable cause to conduct u search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray
scan.34

In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justified a bus search owing to the reduced expectation of privacy of the riding public:

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance of his duty. Prior to Breis'
resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yurnol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an excess of
authority. The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact,
at that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving
vehicles has been upheld.36

Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.37 Other factors such as customs, physical surroundings and
practices of a particular activity may diminish this expectation. 38 In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a common
carrier was held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to the hostile acts of armed men who boarded and
subsequently seized the bus. The Could held that "simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers,
such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors,
before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional
rights."40 In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals,41 a compulsory right of way was found improper for the failure of the
owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway they sought to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial
to the owner of the servient estate. The Court thus explained, ''[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and
beach resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within its premises. Otherwise, the
convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be compromised." 42 Similarly, shopping malls install
metal detectors and body scanners, and require bag inspection as a requisite for entry. Needless to say, any security
lapse on the part of the mall owner can compromise public safety.

Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose owners have every right
to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because these private premises are accessible to the public,
the State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference
in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of
ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion
of public safety. Necessad1y, a person's expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises
that arc accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a
reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a
reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive
inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals
where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus
search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner consented to the search) thereby
making the seized items admissible in evidence.43 Petitioner contends otherwise and insists that his failure to object
cannot be construed as an implied waiver.

Petitioner is wrong.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be
waived.44 However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.45 Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the consenting
party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or
passively looked on;46 (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the
belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;47 (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in
which the questioning took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 48

In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,49the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to
which the latter agreed. According to the Court, petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the search. In People v.
Montilla, 50 the Court found the accused to have spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted to a clear waiver of his right. In People v.
Omaweng,51 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag, to which the accused said
"you can see the contents but those are only clothings." The policemen then asked if they could open and see it, and the
accused answered "you can see it." The Court held there was a valid consented search.

Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he
could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just open if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear
consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals
aptly held:

A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of
his bag and he answered "you can see the contents but those are only clothings.'' When asked if they could open and see
it, he said "you can see it." In the present case, accused-appellant told the member of the task force that "it was only a
cellphone" when asked who owns the bag and what are its contents. When asked by the member of the task force if he
could open it, accused-appellant told him "yes, just open it." Hence, as in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-
appellants right against warrantless search. 52

To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive.
While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are
different. A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar
public ·places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a
search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain
view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following guidelines. 1âwphi1 Prior to
entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and seaport
security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed at bus terminals.
Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and
luggages for inspection, which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or
she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the
following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus
where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects.
This is no different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or
private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus
is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at
the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can
board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the
bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the
manner of the search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can
the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all
instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups
should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to
the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to
ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the present
circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships
and seaports, are in that category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its
route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at
the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes
unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving vehicles
dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or a group of passengers such
that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the
vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution dated 15 October 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Title V

EN BANC

G.R. No. 231989, September 04, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMY LIM Y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN, which
affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision2 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal
Case Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating Sections 11
and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess or
use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly have in his possession,
custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally
known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance recovered
from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal sale
of shabu, committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally
and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, and give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a
total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos
(Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked and
recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.4

In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty.5 They were detained in the city jail during the joint trial of the
cases.6

The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, IO1 Nestle Carin, IO2 Vincent Orcales, and Police
Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the defense.

Version of the Prosecution

Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain "Romy" has been engaged
in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they were directed by their Regional
Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IOl
Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-
buyer, respectively. The team prepared a P500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA
blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.

Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about 15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. and arrived in the target
area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IO1 Carin and the CI alighted from the vehicle near the comer leading to the house of
"Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and positioned themselves in
the area to observe. IO1 Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a house. The CI knocked at the
door and uttered, "ayo, nang Romy. " Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa
while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get
one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to
Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid
him with the buy-bust money.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-arranged signal.
The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the
CI were standing near the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that
they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous
drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda
rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both.

When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IOl Orellan ordered him to
pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size.
They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was
seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a disposable
lighter. IOl Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked
the two plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the representative from the media
and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.

The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the seized
items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory examination on
the drug evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the filing of the case.
Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also,
there was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional Crime Laboratory
Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres,
who was a Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Bajas7 personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces
of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim
and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found
positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-196 and 197-2010. With
respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of shabu after a
chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-
2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she
gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office
during the inquest.

Version of the Defense

Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City.
Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was watching the television. When the latter heard that somebody
jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was already forced opened by
the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him,
instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where
the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was
sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was
pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. The men let him and
Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were brought to the PDEA Regional
Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel,
ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not
involved in drugs at the time of his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was
acquitted in the case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and
that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.

Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the night
when the arrests were made. The following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened and its lock
was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense, which the court
admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC Ruling

After trial, the RTC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres for lack of
sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12] years and
one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to pay Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00]
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of Fine;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the Fine in the amount
of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].

3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of ELDIE
GORRES y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from detention unless he is being charged of other crimes
which will justify his continued incarceration. 8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence favors the positive
testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller, and the delivery of
the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication
as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions that are
poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an
iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of
evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative
value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the RTC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to support the
claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what the box
contained. It also noted Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was "NEGATIVE" of
the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution adequately
established all the elements of illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial
showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous
drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not present any proof or justification that he was fully authorized by
law to possess the same. The CA was unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity
and integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify
on every link in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from the time the seized items were first
discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and
frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were
inspired by an improper motive. Instead. the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.

Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a Supplemental Brief, taking into account
the thorough and substantial discussions of the issues in their respective appeal briefs before the CA. 9 Essentially, Lim
maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated
in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. 10 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as-
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition.11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its admission
into evidence.12 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent needs only to
prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be.13 In other words, in a
criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that
an item still is what the government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established
federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to
alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the
item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.15 This was adopted in Mallillin v. People,16 where this Court also
discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic
chemist to the court.18

Seizure and marking of the illegal

drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof[.]19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially
incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a phyical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe
admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of
the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of
the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the
courts."21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For
one, media representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For
another, there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts
apprehended. "22 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very
limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended." 23

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related
cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need
for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard
implementation."24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international
syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to
apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It
makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where
the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized
illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate
retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and
photographed has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present
during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted
either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will
provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for
an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal
of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or
illegal, as long as the law enforement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the
phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ
available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the
presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may
be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or
of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the
resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not one of those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the P500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a
disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house, IO1
Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the marking and physical
inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold
by Lim to IO1 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-
RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28

Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to witness the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. 29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:30

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the
trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law.
Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance
with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply
mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the
steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity
of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.31
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of
the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during
the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved
in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which
often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos33 requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the
prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law
for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non- compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must
in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under
the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene
because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house. 35 IO2 Orcales similarly
declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and there were no
available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. 36 He admitted that there are
times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they. might leak the confidential
information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient
attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure the presence of
a barangay official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:

xxxx

Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official to witness the
operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.

Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information.38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a representative from the Department
the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and
the media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with and
secure presence of the required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for
the representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two
accused were the only persons in the house.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated items are
properly preserved applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-bust operation but also on
those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or
international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident
to a lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are
not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made without
a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody
Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A.1.10. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No.
9165, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing officers, as well
as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record
of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A.
No. 9165 shall be presented.39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases elevated
before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any orchestrated or poorly built
up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized/confiscated items.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the
investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for
further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse
to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in
accordance with Section 5,40
Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections
11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from
detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali, Davao del
Norte, for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as well as to the Head/Chief of the
National Prosecution Service, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police,
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office of the Court Administrator
is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 227707, October 08, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME PASCUA Y AGOTO A.K.A. "OGIE,", Accused-
Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal filed by appellant Jerome Pascua y Agoto a.ka. "Ogie" from the October 9, 2015 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 05998, affirming the December 4, 2012 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 14722, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165.

The Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 12, Article II of RA 9165, while his co-accused, Manilyn Pompay
Remedios (Manilyn), was charged with violation of Section 12 of Article II of the same law. Pertinent portions of the aid
Informations are quoted below:

Criminal Case No. 14722: Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

That on or about the 31st day of March 2011, in the City of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, not being a person authorized [to] sell, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell 0.0154
grams of met[h]amphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug placed inside one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 14723: Violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165

That on or about the 31st day of March 2011, in the City of Laoag, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, control and custody the following dangerous drugs [paraphernalia] to
wit: one (1) piece glass tooter; one (1) piece black lighter; three (3) pieces foil; two (2) pieces wooden clip; one (1) piece
paper scoop; and one (1) piece brown box, without any license or authority to possess the same, in violation of the
aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to both crimes of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under
Section 12, Article II of RA 9165 and illegal selling of shabu under Section 5, Article II of the same law. 5 Manilyn, on the
other hand, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. 6

During the trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the proffered testimonies of the receiving officer of the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, SPO2 Teodoro Flojo (SPO2 Flojo), and the forensic chemist of the said
crime laboratory, Police Inspector Roanalaine Baligod (PI Baligod). Forensic chemist PI Baligod was called to the stand to
explain why she failed to indicate the "TCF" markings placed by SPO2 Flojo on the plastic sachet of shabu and glass
tooter submitted as specimen.7

Thereafter, the prosecution presented on the witness stand PO2 Jefferson Sulmerin (PO2 Sulmerin), the poseur-buyer,
and PO2 Cristopher8 Pola (PO2 Pola), one of the arresting officers.9

Version of the Prosecution

Based on their testimonies, the version of the prosecution is, as follows:

At around 2:00 p.m. of March 31, 2011, the Office of the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group
(PAIDSOTG) received an information or "tip" from a female informant regarding the rampant selling of shabu by
appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Pola, PO2 Joey Aninag (PO2 Aninag) and PO2 Sulmerin coordinated with the resident agents
of the Regional Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (RAIDSOTG), PO2 Jovani Butay (PO2 Butay) and PO2
Dennis Ramos (PO2 Ramos), as well as with the members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Laoag City led by SPO4
Rovimanuel Balolong (SPO4 Balolong) to conduct a buy-bust operation in the residence of appellant at Brgy. 40, Nalbo,
Laoag City.10

At around 4:00 p.m., PO2 Sulmerin, the poseur-buyer, and the confidential informant went to the house of
appellant.11 PO2 Pola and PO2 Aninag, the designated arresting officers, stayed close behind while the rest of the team
stayed inside their vehicles to wait for the pre-arranged signal, which was a "missed call" on the cellphone of PO2 Pola
from PO2 Sulmerin.12 When PO2 Sulmerin and the confidential informant reached the house of appellant, the confidential
informant knocked on the door.13 Appellant opened the door and asked the confidential informant who she was with,
referring to PO2 Sulmerin.14 She said that PO2 Sulmerin was her companion who wanted to buy "stuff." 15 Appellant then
invited them inside the living room of the house. 16 PO2 Sulmerin then told appellant his desire to buy shabu worth
P1,000.00 and gave appellant the marked money. 17 Appellant placed the marked money inside his front pocket and went
inside one of the rooms.18 When he came back, he handed PO2 Sulmerin one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance.19 PO2 Sulmerin then called PO2 Pola's cellphone.20 PO2 Pola and PO2 Aninag immediately rushed
into the house and announced their authority as police officers. 21 Appellant was handcuffed, apprised of his constitutional
rights, and frisked.22 Recovered from him was the marked P1,000.00 bill. 23 He was then asked to sit in the living room
while the team searched the room from where he got the shabu.24 Inside the room, they found Manilyn sitting on the
bed.25 Likewise recovered from the room was a brown box which contained a glass tooter, a lighter, three pieces foil, two
wooden clips, and a paper scoop.26 PO2 Sulmerin asked Manilyn to join appellant in the living room.27 PO2 Sulmerin then
placed the seized items together with the marked money and the plastic sachet of shabu on the table in the living room
for marking and inventory in the presence of appellant, Manilyn, media person Juvelyn Curameng (Curameng) of the
DZEA media station, and Chief Tanod Atanacio Bugaoisan (Chief Tanod Bugaoisan). 28 PO2 Sulmerin marked the items
with his initials "JS" and the initial of appellant "JP" while PO2 Pola took pictures.29

After the inventory, PO2 Sulmerin placed the seized items inside a resealable bag. 30 Appellant and Manilyn were then
brought to Camp Juan.31 PO2 Elison Pasamonte (PO2 Pasamonte) prepared the booking sheets for both suspects while
PO2 Pola prepared two sketches32 of the vicinity and floor plan of the house.33 PO2 Sulmerin prepared the request for
laboratory examination and delivered the seized items to the crime laboratory. 34 SPO2 Flojo received the items, which he
marked with his initials "TCF," and indorsed the same to forensic chemist PI Baligod. 35

Upon receipt of the seized items, forensic chemist PI Baligod conducted an initial test and a confirmatory test on the
white crystalline substance contained in the plastic sachet and on the residue inside the glass tooter, which both tested
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or commonly known as shabu.36 She then prepared the
Initial Laboratory Report37 and the Confirmatory Chemistry Report.38 After placing her initials "RBB" on the plastic sachet
of shabu and the glass tooter, she kept the items and the reports in her evidence locker. 39 On April 7, 2011, she turned
over the said items to the court through Clerk of Court Atty. Bernadette Espejo.40

Version of Appellant

Appellant and Manilyn denied the accusations against them.

Appellant testified that, around 1:00 p.m., he went out to buy a fluorescent lamp; that when he came back at around
2:00p.m., he saw his friend Ronald Ramos (Ronald) standing by the door of their house waiting for a friend; that after
replacing the fluorescent lamp, appellant again went out to buy shampoo; that when he came back, Ronald was still at
the door; that appellant went inside their house to get a towel and then went to the back of the house to take a bath;
that while he was pumping water, he saw Ronald running towards the back of their house where there was an egress;
that he heard someone shouting; that he looked inside their house and saw a woman he did not know; that he also saw
the police officers, who were in civilian clothes, rummaging through their kitchen; that they asked him whose house it
was; that when he answered that it was their house, they immediately handcuffed and pulled him inside the house; that
they frisked him and took his money in the amount of P870.00; that he was boxed by one of the police officers; that he
was allowed to sit at the living room; that he saw a glass tube being placed on the table in the living room; that he and
Manilyn were boarded in a van and brought to Camp Juan; that when they were already at the camp, the police officers
boxed him on the stomach and asked him where he placed the shabu and from whom was he getting the shabu; and that
he denied any knowledge of what they were asking him.41

Manilyn, for her part, testified that she was the girlfriend of appellant; that on March 31, 2011, she visited appellant; that
at around 2:00 p.m., after eating, she went inside the room of appellant; that she heard somebody shout "police" in front
of the house; that she did not go out to check as she was then texting her sister; that she noticed that somebody was
trying to open the door of the room; that when it was opened, she saw a man wearing civilian clothes; that he pointed a
gun at her and asked her where the rest of the shabu were hidden; that she told the man that she did not know what he
was talking about; that she was told to get out of the room; that she saw appellant handcuffed in the living room; that
she saw some items were being placed on the table in the living room; and that she and appellant were later taken to the
camp.42

To corroborate the testimonies of appellant and Manilyn, the defense also presented the testimonies of Rogelio Pascua
(Rogelio), the brother of appellant, and Reynald Burmudez (Reynald), the cousin and neighbor of appellant.

Rogelio testified that on March 31, 2011 at around 2:30 p.m., he went out of their house to take a snack; that when he
returned to their house after 10 minutes, he saw his brother surrounded by three police officers at the back of their
house; that when he went inside their house, he saw things being placed on the table in their living room; that he saw
appellant and Manilyn, who were seated beside each other, being photographed; and that he saw the lady from DZEA
and the Tanod, who were signing something.43

Reynald, on the other hand, testified that on March 31, 2011 at around 2:30 p.m., he went out of their house which was
adjacent to the house of appellant; that he saw that the door of the house of appellant was open; that when he looked
inside, he saw Ronald watching television; that while he and his cousin, Jonifer Loa-ang, were talking, they saw a lady
going towards the house of appellant; that they saw her talking to Ronald in front of the house; that a closed van then
arrived from which about five men alighted; that SPO4 Balolong pointed a gun at him and asked him where appellant
was; that he replied that he did not know; that SPO4 Balolong went to the back of the house; that he also went to the
back of the house and saw a man searching the drawer of a plastic cabinet; and that SPO4 Balolong again asked him if
the man sitting inside the living room of the house was appellant. 44

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 4, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of illegal sale of shabu. The RTC
upheld the validity of the buy-bust operation and gave more credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
than to the denial of appellant as it found no ill motive on the part of the police officers to falsely accuse appellant.45 As
to the testimonies of Rogelio and Reynald, the RTC found that these did not help the defense of denial of appellant as
Rogelio apparently only witnessed what happened after the arrest, while the testimony of Reynald did not negate the fact
that a buy-bust operation was conducted on the said date.46 The RTC also found that the chain of custody of the seized
items was established by the prosecution. 47

However, as to the charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, the RTC resolved to acquit appellant and Manilyn
due to inadmissibility of evidence. The RTC explained, that since appellant was already handcuffed, the possibility him
getting a weapon or any contraband in the room was remote. Thus, the search of the room incidental to the arrest was
not valid.48 As to Manilyn, the RTC found that there was no ample evidence to show that she was the live-in partner of
appellant or that she was in control and dominion of the room from which the seized paraphernalia were found. 49

Thus, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [appellant] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in Criminal
Case No. 14722 of illegal sale of shabu as punished under Section 5, Article II of [RA] No. 9165 and is therefore
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a [fine] of P2,000,000.00.

Said [appellant] and Manilyn Pompa are however ACQUITTED as charged in Criminal Case No. 14723 for illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia for inadmissibility of evidence.

The shabu and the drug paraphernalia subject hereof are confiscated, the same to be disposed as the law prescribes.

SO ORDERED.50
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Appellant appealed to the CA.

On October 9, 2015, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC Decision. The CA ruled that there was a valid buy-bust
operation based on the evidence presented. 51 Although there was no prior surveillance, the CA explained that it was not a
prerequisite for a valid buy-bust operation.52 The CA also found that the Chain of Custody Rule was complied with and
that the failure of forensic chemist PI Baligod to indicate the actual markings on her reports was adequately
explained.53 The CA further said that the non-presentation of the confidential informant was not fatal to the case.54 What
is important was that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu were duly established by the evidence presented
by the prosecution.55

Hence, appellant filed the instant appeal, raising the same arguments he had in the CA.

Our Ruling

The appeal has merit.

The Chain of Custody Rule, embodied in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, 56 the law applicable at the time of the
commission of the crime charged, provides -
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice [DOJ], and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That
when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination
on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours
xxxx
In the recent case of People v. Lim57 the Court stressed the importance of the presence of the three witnesses (i.e. any
elected public official and the representative from the media and the DOJ) during the physical inventory and the
photograph of the seized items. In case of their absence, the Court ruled that -
It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of
the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during
the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved
in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which
often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the
prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law
for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must
in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under
the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.
Simply put, under prevailing jurisprudence, in case the presence of the necessary witnesses was not obtained, the
prosecution must allege and prove not only the reasons for their absence, but also the fact that earnest efforts were
made to secure their attendance.

Here, the prosecution failed to prove both.

Under RA 9165, the law prevailing at that time, the physical inventory and photography must be witnessed by three
necessary witnesses. In this case, PO2 Sulmerin conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of appellant,
Manilyn, media person Curameng, and Chief Tanod Bugaoisan, who, as aptly pointed out by Justice Bernabe, was not
even an elected public official. There was also no DOJ representative present at the time. Thus, strictly speaking, there
was only one valid witness, media person Curanmeng, who signed the Receipt of Properties/Article Seized. 58 The Court
has carefully reviewed the records and found that no explanation was also offered by the prosecution to explain the
absence of the DOJ representative and an elected public official, nor did it show that earnest efforts were exerted to
secure the presence of the same. In view of the foregoing, the Court is constrained to reverse the conviction of the
appellant due to the failure of the prosecution to provide a justifiable reason for the non-compliance with the Chain of
Custody Rule, which creates doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet of shabu.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The October 9, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05998, which affirmed the December 4, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal
Case No. 14722, finding appellant Jerome Pascua y Agoto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, appellant Jerome Pascua y Agoto, a.k.a. "Ogie," is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 228255, June 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. MARY JANE CADIENTE Y QUINDO @ JANE,

ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Appellant Mary Jane Cadiente y Quindo @ Jane appeals from the April 29, 2016 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR. CR-HC No. 07261 that affirmed the December 10, 2014 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 135, in Criminal Case No. 14- 1089, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article
II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165.

Factual Antecedents

Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The accusatory portions of the
Informations are quoted as follows:

Criminal Case No. 14-1089:

Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

On the 11th day of July 2014, in the city of Makati, Philippine accused, without the necessary license or prescription and
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away one
(1) plastic sachet weighing zero point zero eight [0.08] gram of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, in consideration of Php500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 14-1090:

Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165

On the 9th day of July 2014, in the city of Makati, Philippines, accused, without the necessary license or prescription and
without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in [her] direct custody and
possession one (1) piece of small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet weighing zero point one four [0.14] gram of
white crystalline substance presented and marked as "RAG-1", containing of [sic] Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During her arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both offenses. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On July 9, 2014, a confidential informant reported to the office of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Group of the Makati police that appellant and her husband were peddling prohibited drugs in Barangay Rizal, Makati.
Acting on said information, P/Chief Insp. Gaylord Tamayo formed a team and held a briefing for the conduct of a buy-
bust operation. PO2 Rexell Gabelo (PO2 Gabelo) was designated as poseur-buyer and given a 500-peso bill as marked
money. The planned buy-bust operation was coordinated with the Southern Police District and the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon the arrival of the buy-bust team at the target area, PO2 Gabelo and the confidential informant saw the appellant
standing along a street. They approached and talked with appellant for the sale of P500.00 worth of shabu. PO2 Gabelo
gave the first pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team watching from their vantage points that he
had identified their target. He then handed appellant the marked money as payment for a sachet of shabu, which
appellant took from her wallet; PO2 Gabelo thereafter gave the second pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated. SPO1 Randy L. Obedoza (SPO1 Obedoza), who was assigned as a back-up in the buy-bust operation,
rushed toward the scene of the crime and assisted PO2 Gabelo in arresting appellant. Recovered from appellant was the
marked money, a one hundred peso bill, another sachet of shabu and a disposable lighter. When a crowd started to
gather, the buy-bust team decided to conduct the inventory of the seized items at the nearest barangay hall of Rizal,
Makati. However, they transferred to the barangay hall of Pembo, Makati after waiting in vain for five hours for the arrival
of an elected public official. The marking and inventory of the seized items were then conducted in the presence of
appellant and the barangay captain of Brgy. Pembo. Photographs were also taken during the inventory.

The buy-bust team then proceeded to the police office and turned over the custody of appellant and the seized items to
the duty investigator, PO3 Laurence Charmino (PO3 Charmino). In turn, PO3 Charmino prepared the letter-request for the
drug test of the seized shabu, which SPO1 Obedoza brought to the police crime laboratory together with the
seized shabu. The forensic chemist, P/Sr. Insp. Rendielyn L. Sahagun, received the same and conducted laboratory
examinations, and confirmed that the sachet sold by appellant during the buy-bust operation, marked with the initials
"RAG", and the sachet recovered from appellant's possession during the lawful search of her body and marked as "RAG-
1", with a weight of 0.08 gram and 0.14 gram, respectively, were positive for, and indeed contained shabu.

Version of the Defense

At around 1 a.m. of July 7, 2014, appellant was inside her house with her husband and her four-year-old daughter, when
five armed men suddenly barged inside and ransacked the same. She did not resist their illegal act for fear of physical
abuse. The armed men then took her and her family to the police office where they were detained for two days, and not
given food. Her husband and her daughter were later released and told to return with P50,000.00 as payment for her
freedom. When her husband failed to bring the money, false charges were filed against her.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 10, 2014, the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. It ruled that the State had succeeded in establishing all the elements of the offense for
illegal sale of shabu. However, the RTC held that there was reasonable doubt to acquit appellant for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165 because SPO1 Obedoza, who allegedly recovered the sachet of shabu from appellant's
possession, failed to identify the same during his cross-examination.

Thus, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 14-1089, finding the accused MARY JANE CADIENTE y QUINDO @ "Jane", GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT for Violation of Section 5 of Article II of R.A. 9165, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing her to
suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00;

2. In Criminal Case No. 14-1090, there being reasonable doubt, accused MARY JANE CADIENTE y QUINDO @ "Jane" is
hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of Section 11[,] Article II of R.A. 9165; and
Let the zero point zero eight (0.08) gram and zero point fourteen (0.14) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) be turned over to the PDEA for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On April 29, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. Rejecting appellant's plea that the prosecution did not adduce
evidence that the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 had been met, the CA declared that the failure of the
buy-bust team to comply strictly with the procedure mandated by Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, particularly, in
ensuring the presence of a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during the physical
inventory and the photographing of the confiscated shabu, did not render the arrest of appellant illegal or make
the shabu inadmissible in evidence. The CA held that the buy-bust team had substantially complied with this procedural
requisite as it was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu by establishing an unbroken
link in the chain of custody of evidence.

Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated December 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135 of
Makati City finding accused-appellant Mary Jane Cadiente y Quindo @ Jane GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for
Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, this appeal, which is prosecuted chiefly upon appellant's postulation that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the procedural requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, particularly in regard to the non-attendance of a
representative from the media and the DOJ at the time of the physical inventory and the photographing of the
seized shabu. In consequence, the State has miserably failed to establish the integrity of the dangerous drug itself.
Hence, it is appellant's constitutional right to be acquitted of the indictment against her.

Our Ruling

There is merit in the appeal. In a successful prosecution for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the following
elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. What is material is proof that the transaction
actually occurred, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.7 What is more, the prosecution
must also establish the integrity of the dangerous drug, because the dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the
case.8

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 spells out the mandatory procedural safeguards in a buy-bust operation, thus —

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/ Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
 x x x x.

Moreover, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) have further marked out in detail the proper procedure to be
observed by the PDEA relating to the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs
under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165, thus—

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

In People v. Lim,9 the Court stressed the importance of the three witnesses, namely, any elected public official, the
representative from the media, and the DOJ representative, at the time of the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized items. In the event of their absence, the Court held:

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of
the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during
the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved
in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or
media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code prove[d] futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which
often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the
required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 10 (Emphasis in the original)

More than that, there must be evidence of earnest efforts to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses. In People
v. Ramos,11 the Court ruled:

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible.
However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the
required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the
prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law
for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious
attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary
arrangements beforehand knowing fully well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in
Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must
in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under
the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.12 (Emphasis in the original)
In other words, jurisprudence requires that, in the event that the presence of the essential witnesses was not obtained,
the prosecution must establish not only the reasons for their absence, but also that earnest efforts had been exerted in
securing their presence.13 The prosecution must explain the reasons for the procedural lapses, and the justifiable grounds
for failure to comply must be proven, since the Court cannot presume what these grounds were or whether they even
existed.14

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove both requisites. While the inventory and photograph of the seized shabu were
done in the presence of a barangay captain, who is an elected public official, there was no mention that the same was
conducted in the presence of a representative from media and the DOJ. The signatures of the representative from the
media and the representative from the DOJ do not even appear in the Inventory Receipt. And no reason at all has been
advanced for the complete failure of the arresting officers to secure the attendance of these required witnesses. On top
of these, there is nothing on record to indicate that the arresting team exerted a genuine and sufficient attempt to secure
their presence.

In the absence of the representative from the media and from the DOJ during the physical inventory and the
photographing of the seized shabu, the evils of switching, "planting'" or contamination of the evidence create serious
lingering doubts as to its integrity and evidentiary value. In the context of these circumstances, the conviction of the
appellant cannot be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The April 29, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
07261 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Mary Jane Cadiente y Quindo @ Jane is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless
she is confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City, for
immediate implementation. The said Superintendent is DIRECTED to report the action taken to this Court, within five (5)
days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

August 15, 2017

G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable
penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated
drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have,
in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP
03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to
withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3,
Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being
contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense
it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to
the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3,
Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay,
issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule
of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the
rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional
rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect,
suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory
pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to
rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea
bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with
possession of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December
2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of
Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of
R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional
questions, the Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec.
23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution
of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order 9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising
the issues as follows:

I.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW.

II.

WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF
THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

III.

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition should be
dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as
an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3)
the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before
the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further
ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper
conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the
supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final
arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications.11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental
importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic,"
"monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens. 14 At the same
time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently,
if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who,
because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted."15 Fully aware of the
gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords,
pushers and users.16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from
having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional
issue.18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a necessary
complement of its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this
tenet, viz. :

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently
held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared
with the Executive and Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and
development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our
Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence
and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."
Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in
the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the
Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not
the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious,
therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section
5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xxxx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the
power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design,
vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this
Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xxxx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands,
the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision
of institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether or
not the Court's rulemaking powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence
"The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S.
Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be
followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to
any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration
was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure.x x x.24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. 25 The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify
any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28

- The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
29

Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
30

Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of
the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which
prohibits courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or
even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To
reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence. 34

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the
1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty
of any lesser offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or
information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision was retained under Rule 118
(Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to
a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118
mandated:

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was
modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially
adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair and expeditious
trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense
after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir.
38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. 38 "Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the
test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within
the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be procedural
in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a
question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken
within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates
a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. 41

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example,
in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused. 43 Speaking through
then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the
offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It
took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest
shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en
banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and
the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of
either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or
refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors
and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he
greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant
cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its
case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of
witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may
become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to
the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The
possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for
employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable
to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and
disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade
with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of
the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an
accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against
the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the manner through which an existing right may
be implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the
remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of
petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of
criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by
agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential," "highly desirable," and
"legitimate" component of the administration of justice. 48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable
penalty are obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment after
an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce
judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's
guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261
[1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy
disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may
be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks
posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system -
speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a
vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him
and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. 54 In any case, whether it
be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by
himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party 57 and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in
the offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his
duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are
well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a
case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities.
Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot
accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision
whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea. 61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea
of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
compromise for the convenience of the accused. 62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already
rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court
or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its
case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be served. 67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness
of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular.69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right
to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations
behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases
until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
Title VIII

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 216061, December 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAPOLEON BENSURTO, JR. Y BOLOHABO, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision1 dated March 28, 2014 dismissing appellant's appeal and
affirming the Joint Decision2 dated November 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Masbate City, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10225-26 convicting appellant of two (2) counts of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under
Article 266-A (1) (a), in relation to Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353.

The facts follow.

The victim, AAA,3 was born on July 10, 1991, and sometime in February 1999, when she was only 9 years old, she was
left alone by her adoptive mother, BBB, in their house, together with appellant, her father (as indicated in the birth
certificate presented before the court). While she was sleeping in her room, appellant entered thereat with a rope in his
hand. AAA was awakened by the presence of her father who proceeded to tie her feet. Appellant then pulled AAA's
underwear to her feet and immediately laid on top of her. Thereafter, appellant undressed himself and then forced his
penis into AAA's vagina. After appellant satisfied his carnal desires, he threatened AAA not to tell anyone about the
incident or else he would kill her and her mother. Fearing for her life, as well as her mother, AAA never told anyone about
the incident. The said incident, however, was repeated sometime in June 2000. After appellant ordered their househelper
to go home, he instructed AAA to sleep in his room. Left alone with only her father as companion, she was forced to
accede to her father's demand. While in the appellant's room, the latter pulled down AAA's underwear and again sexually
abused her despite her pleas not to. Appellant again told her not to tell anyone under the threat of death upon her and
her mother. AAA was only able to relate the incident to her mother in November 2000. Subsequently, AAA and her
mother went to Edna Romano, the Rural Health Midwife of Cabitan, Mandaon, Masbate to seek assistance. Romano,
thereafter, accompanied BBB and AAA to the Mandaon Medicare Community Hospital where AAA was examined by Dr.
Napoleon Villasis. Based on the examination, AAA was found to have hymenal tears at 10 o'clock position. Hence, two (2)
Informations were filed against appellant, which read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 10225

That sometime in the month of February, 1999 at Barangay Cabitan, Municipality of Mandaon, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his 9-year-old daughter,
[AAA], against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 10226

That sometime in the month of June 2000 at Barangay Cabitan, Municipality of Mandaon, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his 9-year-old daughter,
[AAA], against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

AAA testified during the trial, as well as Dr. Napoleon Villasis, Edna Romano and BBB, AAA's mother.

Appellant offered denial, alibi and no ill motive as defenses. According to him, all the accusations against him were mere
fabrications of his wife who only forced AAA to file the two criminal cases and testify against him. He added that he knew
about the illicit affair of his wife with a certain Relino Retudo, hence, his wife was only trying to escape from him for fear
that he would kill her together with her paramour.

After more than 7 years since AAA testified in court, the latter retracted her previous testimony that she was raped by
appellant. Testifying for the defense, AAA narrated that she was not raped by her father and was merely being dictated
by her mother to fabricate the rape charges against appellant so as to allow her mother to live freely together with her
paramour.

The RTC, on November 28, 2011, convicted the appellant on both counts of rape, the dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, accused Napoleon [Bensurto] y Bolohabo GUILTY of:

1. Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 10225, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay "AAA"
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;

2. Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 10226, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code for
which he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay “AAA"
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;

The period of detention of accused Napoleon [Bensurto, Jr.] y Bolohabo shall be credited in his favor.

The Provincial Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail, Masbate is directed to immediately transfer Napoleon [Bensurto Jr.] y
Bolohabo to the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED.4

Notwithstanding the recantation of AAA, the RTC gave credence to her earlier testimony wherein she clearly narrated how
the appellant raped her.

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated March 28, 2014, dismissed the same with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby ordered DENIED and, consequently,
DISMISSED. The appealed Joint Decision rendered by Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region in
Masbate City dated November 28, 2011 in Criminal Cases Nos. 10225-26 is hereby AFFIRMED,

SO ORDERED.5

According to the CA, the presence of healed lacerations is consistent with and corroborative of AAA's testimony that she
had indeed been raped by the appellant months before the date of examination. The CA added that the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more
competent to do conclude, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand and
the manner in which they gave their testimony. It was also adjudged that it was not adequately and convincingly shown
that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded significant facts and circumstances which, when considered, would
have affected the outcome of the case or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the trial court.
Furthermore, it ruled that a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. According
to the CA, it is worth noting that the recantation was made only seven years from the date of her last testimony in open
court, when AAA was already 19 years old and, as noted by the trial court, unemployed. It was also ruled that the failure
of AAA to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the appellant is not equivalent to consent. Lastly, the CA ruled
that long silence and delay in reporting the crime is not an indication that the accusations are false.

Hence, the present appeal where appellant insists that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

The appeal has no merit.

Under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. However, when the offender
is the victim's father, as in this case, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father
commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the
offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. 6 All the elements,
therefore, are present. The clear and straightforward testimony of AAA, as corroborated by the medical findings show
beyond reasonable doubt that AAA was already in a non-virginal state after she was raped. When the victim's testimony is
corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge.7

The appellant claims that the medical evidence, with respect to the lacerations on the hymen of AAA, failed to
convincingly corroborate the crime of rape as the cause of the same was not determined with possibility. This is a flawed
argument. The medical report revealed that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations at 10 o'clock position and it must be
emphasized that the said examination was made in November 2000, or months after the incidents of rape occurred in
February of 1999 and June of 2000. Thus, the CA was correct when it ruled that the presence of such healed lacerations
is consistent with and corroborative of AAA's testimony that she had indeed been raped by appellant months before the
date of the medical examination.8 The healed lacerations on the victim's hymen do not disprove that accused appellant
raped the victim and cannot serve to acquit him. 9 Proof of hymenal laceration is not even an element of rape, so long as
there is enough proof of entry of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum of the female organ.10

Appellant also contends that the testimony of AAA is full of inconsistencies and, hence, should not be given credence,
however, this Court has ruled that discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
veracity or detract from the essential credibility of a witness' declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole.11 Furthermore, it is an accepted doctrine in rape cases that in the absence of evidence of
improper motive on the part of the victim to falsely testify against the accused, her testimony deserves credence. 12

As to the retraction of AAA, this Court has ruled that when a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and marked with
consistency despite gruelling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such
testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on
it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her
original testimony.13 As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by a
vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly, because there is always the possibility that
such recantation may later be repudiated. Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court simply because the
witness recants it ignores the possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the
recantation.14 Court proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all
circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was given is made a mockery,
and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the
court must not be too willing to accept it, but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected to cross-examine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.15 The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant
circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination,
the reason being that the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses.16 In this regard, the CA was correct with the following findings:

In the case at bench, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of "AAA's" accusations and recantation is
facilitated by the fact that her recantation was made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where
recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the opportunity to see the demeanor of "AAA" not
only when she narrated the sordid details of the alleged rape by her "adoptive" father, but also when she claimed that
she made up the previous rape charges upon the ill advice of her "adoptive" mother.

As such, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after examining the young
witness as she made a complete turnaround and admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial court is in the best
position to assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this case where "AAA" was
subjected to gruelling cross examinations, redirect examinations and re-cross examinations both as a prosecution and
defense witness. Still, the trial court found that the private complainant's testimony for the prosecution was the one that
was worthy of belief.

Even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying,
it is clear which of the narrations of "AAA" was sincere and which was concocted. As found by the trial court, "AAA's"
testimony for the prosecution was clear, candid, and filled with emotions. It is worth noting that the recantation was
made only seven years from the date of her last testimony in open court, when "AAA" was already nineteen (19) years
old and, as noted by the trial court, unemployed.

Verily, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of "AAA" when she was presented as witness for the prosecution.
The RTC found that her clear narration of how the crime of rape on two counts was committed and her categorical
statement that the accused-appellant committed said crime, are sufficient to warrant the conviction of the appellant for
two counts of rape.17

Another point raised in this appeal is AAA's lack of resistance if indeed it was true that she was subjected to sexual abuse
because according to appellant, such absence of resistance tarnished AAA's testimony. Such argument, however,
deserves scant consideration. In People v. Enrique Quintos,18 this Court ruled that resistance or the absence thereof does
not carry any weight in proving the crime of rape, thus:

In any case, resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. It need not be shown by the prosecution. Neither is it
necessary to convict an accused. The main element of rape is "lack of consent."

"Consent," "resistance," and "absence of resistance" are different things. Consent implies agreement and voluntariness. It
implies willfulness. Similarly, resistance is an act of will. However, it implies the opposite of consent. It implies
disagreement.

Meanwhile, absence of resistance only implies passivity. It may be a product of one's will. It may imply consent. However,
it may also be the product of force, intimidation, manipulation, and other external forces.

Thus, when a person resists another's sexual advances, it would not be presumptuous to say that that person does not
consent to any sexual activity with the other. That resistance may establish lack of consent. Sexual congress with a
person who expressed her resistance by words or deeds constitutes force either physically or psychologically through
threat or intimidation. It is rape.

Lack of resistance may sometimes imply consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may imply consent, there
are circumstances that may render a person unable to express her resistance to another's sexual advances. Thus, when a
person has carnal knowledge with another person who does not show any resistance, it does not always mean that that
person consented to such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when a man has carnal
knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or intimidation. It enumerates at least four other
circumstances under which rape may be committed: (1) by taking advantage of a person's deprived reason or
unconscious state; (2) through fraudulent machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person's age (12 years of age) or
demented status; and (4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in
circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.

Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is unconscious, deprived of reason,
manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or mental age.

This Court also not persuaded by appellant's contention that AAA's delay in reporting the crime indicates that the
accusations against him are false. The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually
molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. 19 Delay in prosecuting the
offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against
the rapists.20 They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders'
making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.21

Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the
victim. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. On the other hand, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant
to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of commission. 22

As to the penalty imposed, the RTC and the CA were correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of
death by virtue of R.A. No. 9346, as the rape is qualified by private complainant AAA's minority and appellant's paternity.
However, in the award of damages, a modification must be made per People v. Ireneo Jugueta.23 Where the penalty
imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. No. 9346, the amounts of damages shall be as
follows:

1. Civil Indemnity - P100,000.00

2. Moral Damages - P100,000.00
3. Exemplary Damages - P100,000.00

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Napoleon Bensurto, Jr. y Bolahabo is DISMISSED for lack merit and the Decision dated
March 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Joint Decision dated November 28, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 48, Masbate City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 10225-26, convicting appellant of two (2) counts of the crime of
qualified rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1) (a) in relation to Art. 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353 and imposing on each count, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of damages on each count must be in this manner per People v.
Ireneo Jugueta:24 P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, with legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 215198, November 09, 2016

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JHUN VILLALON Y ORDONO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA,***J.:

This case seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals ( CA) Decision1 dated June 30, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05471. The CA upheld the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, dated February 29,
2012 in Family Court Case No. A-1021, which found accused-appellant Jhun Villalon y Ordono guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape.

An Information was filed charging Villalon of raping AAA,3 which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

That on or about the 17th day of April 2010, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, coercion and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his cousin AAA, a minor child 14 years of age,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon arraignment on June 14, 2011, Villalon pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryJhun Villalon was charged with raping his cousin, AAA. AAA testified that she was born on
February 2, 1996 and that her cousin (their mothers are sisters) raped her on April 17, 2010 when she was merely 14
years old. At 7:30 a.m. of that date, Villalon went to AAA's house in San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union. He invited AAA
to gather mangoes in the mountain, which was 2-3 kilometers away. AAA then left with Villalon with her mother's
knowledge. After harvesting mangoes, Villalon asked AAA to go to the higher part of the mountain. Thereafter, Villalon
invited his cousin to have sexual intercourse with him so she could experience it. AAA then felt like ciying because she
could not understand why her cousin would say that. She became nervous and wanted to leave but Villalon held her
hands and removed her lower garments. She struggled to free herself, but Villalon overpowered her. He laid her down on
the ground and started kissing her. AAA tried to avoid Villalon's kisses and to wriggle out of his embrace, but he placed
himself on top of her and was able to fulfill his bestial desires. He then threatened AAA not to tell anybody.

AAA tried to hide the incident but after a month, she could no longer contain the nightmares caused by the abuse so she
told her mother, BBB. Hence, BBB accompanied her daughter to the barangay captain to report the incident. When
confronted, Villalon became angry and refused to cooperate,so BBB and AAA went to the police station. The physician
who examined the victim found multiple healed hymenal lacerations and an infection which could have been caused by
sexual intercourse.

When the case was already in court, Villalon's mother and wife allegedly brought AAA and BBB to the office of the
defense counsel to sign an affidavit of desistance. AAA refused to sign the affidavit so she ran and hid at the market.
When their relatives found her, they brought her back to the office to sign the affidavit. After signing, BBB was instructed
to submit it to the Prosecutor's office, where she learned that the consequence of the affidavit would be the dismissal of
the case. BBB then changed her mind and left with the affidavit.

For his part, Villalon asserted that it was on April 10, 2010 that he invited AAA's brother to gather mangoes in the
mountain but AAA volunteered to go with him. When they finished at 9:00 a.m., they immediately proceeded to Caba to
sell the fruits. On April 17, 2010, however, when the rape was supposedly committed, he just stayed at home all day with
his wife. He was shocked when three (3) weeks later, he learned that he was being charged with rape. He, likewise,
refused to settle at the barangay because he did nothing wrong.

On February 29, 2012, the RTC convicted Villalon in Family Court Case No. A-1021 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages,
thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Jhun Villalon y Ordono GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape,
and hereby [sentences] him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay [AAA] the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Therefore, Villalon elevated the case to the CA. On June 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Villalon now comes before the Court, insisting that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
presents the following errors:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH FORCE, VIOLENCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION AS ELEMENTS OF RAPE.

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY.
The appeal is devoid of merit.

The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved Villalon's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Even if AAA did not
shout for help, such could not and would not diminish her credibility. It must be emphasized that there is no standard
form of reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a horrifying experience such as sexual assault.
The actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience should not be judged by the norms of behavior
expected from adults when placed under similar circumstances. People react differently to emotional stress and rape
victims are no different from them.7chanrobleslaw

Also, Villalon's alibi must necessarily fall. Physical impossibility pertains to the distance between the place where the
accused was during the commission of the crime and the place where the crime was actually committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places. 8 Here, Villalon resided some twenty (20) meters away from AAA's house, which
was about two to three (2-3) kilometers away from the place where the incident transpired. Thus, there was no physical
impossibility for Villalon's presence at the scene of the crime. His allegation that he was just at home on April 17, 2010
with his wife is, likewise, self-serving and remains uncorroborated by any evidence. His wife did not even testify to
support said claim.

Regarding the affidavit of desistance, it must be stressed that, as a rule, it is viewed with suspicion and reservation. It
has been regarded as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration, and attains no probative value in light of the alleged affiant's
testimony to the contrary. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable.9 BBB has explained that they were merely forced by their relatives into signing
the affidavit and that she had not fully understood the effects of signing said affidavit, until the secretary of the
prosecutor finally explained to her its contents, which were all written in English. Thus, they chose to leave and decided
to pursue the case.

Indeed, AAA testified in a candid, vivid, and straightforward manner, and remained firm and unswerving even on cross-
examination. It has been consistently held that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on
such matter will not be disturbed unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility of the
witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard them
and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through
its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion,
whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. Also, where there is no evidence that the witnesses of
the prosecution were influenced by ill motive, as in this case, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.10 As to the amount of damages, however, the accused should be ordered to
pay another P75,000.00 as exemplary damages based on recent jurisprudence. 11chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the
Decision dated June 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05471 finding accused-appellant Jhun
Villalon y Ordono guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The Court sentences Villalon to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
another P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 188751, November 16, 2016

BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the February 25, 2009 Decision2 and July 9, 2009 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CR No. 31336, finding petitioner Bonifacio Nieva (Nieva) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide.

Facts

In an Information dated November 2, 2005, Nieva was charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch 73.4 The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 33415-
MN, reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 28th day of October 2005, in the City of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting with discernment, while armed with a gun, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
shoot with the said gun one JUDY DELATAVO IGNACIO, hitting the latter on her left leg, thus accused performed all
the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
some other causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to
the victim which prevented her death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
During arraignment, Nieva entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then ensued. The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses,
namely: the victim, Judy Ignacio (Judy); the eyewitnesses, Luna Ignacio (Luna) and Raymundo Delatavo (Raymundo);
the attending physician, Dr. Dindohope Serrano (Dr. Serrano); and the arresting officer, PO2 Jesus Del Fiero (PO2 Del
Fiero).6chanrobleslaw

Prosecution's version

On October 28, 2005, at around six o'clock in the evening, Luna and Raymundo were doing carpentry works for Judy at
Kaunlaran, Hernandez, Catmon, Malabon City. Judy was supervising the construction of her nipa hut when Nieva arrived
and approached her.7 Judy was then the President of the Catmon Homeowners Association. Nieva inquired on the
electrification project of the Homeowners Association, to which Judy replied that the matter was already taken care of by
the Manila Electric Company (MERALC0). 8 However, Nieva suddenly shouted at Judy and cursed her saying: " Mga putang
ina nyo, lima kayo mga president kayo, kung gusto nyo magkaroon ng mga problema, bibigyan ko kayo ng mga problema
ngayon."9 He then drew a .357 caliber revolver (wrapped in a white piece of cloth) from his waist. 10 Overwhelmed with
fear, Judy clung to Luna's back and used him as a shield against Nieva. 11chanrobleslaw

Nieva, who was about two arms' length away, pointed his gun at Judy and fired several times but the gun jammed. 12 At
this point, Raymundo, who was at the roof of the nipa hut, jumped from the hut to help her aunt, Judy. However, before
Raymundo reached Judy, he heard a gunshot and saw Judy fall to the ground.13 As she simultaneous fell, Judy was able
to push Luna towards Nieva. Luna and Nieva then grappled for the gun. With the help of Raymundo, Luna seized the gun
from Nieva.14chanrobleslaw

Judy was brought to the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital. Dr. Serrano, a surgeon at the MCU Hospital, attended
to the wound of Judy. He stated that Judy suffered a gunshot wound at her right leg, which caused a bone fracture at her
right tibia and lacerated wound at the left thigh.15 He confirmed that Judy's gunshot wound could have led to her death if
not for the timely medical attention. 16chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, PO2 Del Fiero, who was also a resident of Kaunlaran, Hernandez, Catmon, Malabon City, went to the scene of
the crime upon learning that Judy was shot. Luna surrendered the gun to PO2 Del Fiero. 17 Thereafter, PO2 Del Fiero
arrested Nieva in the latter's home.18chanrobleslaw

Defense's version

The defense had three witnesses, namely: petitioner Nieva himself; his wife, Luz, and son, Julius. However, the
testimonies of Luz and Julius were dispensed with since they would merely corroborate Nieva's defense. 19chanrobleslaw

Nieva narrated that at about six-thirty in the evening, while on his way to buy cigarettes, he passed by the Kaunlaran ng
Samahan Hernandez Catmon Homeowners, where he met Judy. He inquired on the electrification of the Homeowners
Association and Judy informed him that it was already done. 20 Thereafter, a heated argument ensued between him and
Judy. The latter accused him of having a hand on an electric post that fell down. Irritated, Nieva pulled a handkerchief
from his pocket and wrapped it on his right hand, preparatory to boxing Judy. Suddenly, however, Luna got in front of
Judy and pointed a gun towards Nieva.21chanrobleslaw

Nieva then grabbed the gun from Luna. In the process, the gun went off and Nieva was unaware if the bullet hit anyone.
He and Luna went down as they continued to wrestle for the possession of the gun. However, Raymundo intervened and
smashed Nieva at the back with a hammer causing Nieva to let go of Luna. 22chanrobleslaw

As Luna now had the gun, Nieva clung at Raymundo. Luna tailed to shoot Nieva because the latter's wife, who happens
to be Luna's first cousin, shielded Nieva with her body.23chanrobleslaw

RTC Ruling

In its Decision24 dated October 11, 2007, the RTC convicted Nieva of Frustrated Homicide only, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [T]he Court cannot agree that this is a case of frustrated murder. The reason is simple.

As stated above, it is not disputed that an argument between complainant and the accused immediately preceded the
shooting incident. There was, therefore, no evident premeditation and there could be no treachery as well. Consequently,
the Court finds that the offense committed is frustrated homicide only. 25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, Nieva was sentenced to imprisonment of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He was
also ordered to pay Judy the amount of P40,000.00 by way of reimbursement for her hospitalization expenses; and
another P40,000.00 as moral damages.26chanrobleslaw

Nieva appealed to the CA. He took issue with the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly Judy, Luna and Raymundo. He also claimed that the exempting circumstance of accident is applicable in his
case;27 but assuming that he is criminally liable, he should only be convicted of physical injuries because he had no intent
to kill Judy.28chanrobleslaw

CA Ruling

In its Decision dated February 25, 2009, the CA affirmed Nieva's conviction, with modification only as to the penalty
imposed. The decretal portion reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City finding accused appellant Bonifacio Nieva y Montero guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that he is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Nieva filed a Motion for Reconsideration30 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated July 9, 2009; hence, this petition
for review.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Nieva.

Our Ruling

We rule in the negative and resolve to deny the petition.

Nieva submits the following defenses to prove that he is innocent of the crime of frustrated homicide:

a. The accounts of the prosecution witnesses are highly questionable;

b. Nieva is exempt from criminal liability because the shooting of Judy is a mere accident; and cralawlawlibrary

c. Nieva had no intent to kill Judy, thus, he should only be convicted of physical injuries.

We are not persuaded.

As his first defense, Nieva harps on the alleged inconsistencies among the testimonies of Judy, Luna and Raymundo,
particularly on the position of the gun during the shooting incident. He recounts that while Judy testified that the gun was
pointed to the ground when it fired, Luna claimed that the gun was pointed to him (Luna) since he was in front of Judy;
whereas, Raymundo averred that when the gun was fired, it was pointed at Judy.31 Nieva maintains that the conflicting
versions of the prosecution witnesses strongly suggest that Nieva did not really aim a gun towards Judy and that Judy
might have only fabricated the charge against Nieva to pin him down because of the animosity between
them.32chanrobleslaw

At the outset, it is a basic rule that questions on the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the trial courts because
of their unique position to not only examine real and testimonial evidence but also observe the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment while on stand, a privilege which is denied to the appellate
court.33 The trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is therefore accorded great respect on appeal, in
the absence of evidence showing that the trial court disregarded or overlooked significant facts that would merit the
reversal of its findings.34 The reviewing court is bound by the findings of the trial court, more so when the same is
affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. 35chanrobleslaw

In the case before us, both the RTC36 and the CA37 found that the witnesses categorically and positively identified Nieva
to have fired a gun towards Judy. Nieva fired the gun several times, with each attempt misfiring, until finally the gun
went off and hit Judy at her upper right leg. The perceived inconsistency on where the gun was aimed at is a trivial
matter which cannot negate the credibility of the witnesses, especially where the witnesses were consistent on their
account relating to the principal occurrence, which is the shooting of Judy, and their positive identification of Nieva as the
assailant.38chanrobleslaw

Further, far from weakening the credibility of the witnesses, minor inconsistencies actually bolster their credibility. Thus,
in People v. Malate,39 we stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Furthermore, accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant to
discredit her account of the incident. Even if they do exist, minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to
bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was not
contrived or rehearsed. Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the credibility of the
witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of scheming. As aptly held in
the American case of State v. Erikson, the rule that a victim's testimony in sexual assault cases must be corroborated
"does not apply where the inconsistency or contradiction bears upon proof not essential to the case." Well to point,
even the most truthful witnesses can sometimes make mistakes, but such minor lapses do not necessarily
affect their credibility.40 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In this connection, we concur with the CA's finding that the slight variance on Judy's testimony as to the aim of the gun
could have been attributed to the suddenness of the situation and her confusion. 41 Thus, the minor lapse in her testimony
does not affect her credibility.

As his next defense, Nieva denies that he fired a gun towards Judy. Instead, he accuses Luna to have brought the gun,
pointed it against him and together they grappled for the possession of the same until suddenly the gun fired. He pleads
that the shooting of Judy is a mere accident; hence, he should be exempt from criminal liability. 42chanrobleslaw

We disagree. It is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that denial is an intrinsically weak defense.43 If not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, denial is merely a negative and self-serving evidence which has no weight in law. It
cannot prevail over the categorical and consistent positive identification of credible witnesses. 44 Here, Nieva's version of
the story is not substantiated with proof other than his own bare assertions. Nieva's testimony cannot stand against the
testimonies of Judy, Luna and Raymundo which are consistent in material points.

Nieva cannot also invoke the exempting circumstance of accident to free him from criminal liability. Article 12 (4), Book I
of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines 45 (Revised Penal Code) reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
The basis for exemption under the above-stated provision is the complete absence of negligence and intent. The accused
commits a crime but there is no criminal liability. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by
the person to whom it happens.46 It is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove by clear and
convincing evidence.47chanrobleslaw

To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the following circumstances are present: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) he had
no fault in or intention of causing the injury.48None of these circumstances are present in this case.

To start, Nieva was not performing a lawful act when he drew a gun and pointed it at Judy. Thus, in People v.
Nepomuceno, Jr.,49 we ruled that drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not being in self defense, is
unlawful, as it at least constitutes light threats. 50 Subsequently, Nieva fired the gun several times. In his initial attempts,
the bullet of the gun jammed; yet, Nieva did not stop until the gun finally fired and hit its target.

This clearly shows that Nieva intentionally and persistently performed the act complained of in order to successfully maim
Judy. He cannot now claim that he is without fault.

As his last defense, Nieva submits that he has no intent to kill Judy considering that the gun was pointed to the ground
when it was fired and Judy's wound was not fatal. 51chanrobleslaw

Nieva's contentions are untenable.

In Rivera v. People,52 we explained that intent to kill may be proved by: (a) the means used by the malefactors; (b) the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; (d) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and (e) the
motives of the accused.53chanrobleslaw
We concur with the findings of the CA that intent to kill was present. 54 It is undisputed that Nieva used a gun, a deadly
weapon, in assaulting Judy. At that time, Judy was unarmed and could not have defended herself. Nieva fired the gun
several times towards Judy. If the bullets had not jammed, Nieva could have killed Judy through multiple gunshot
wounds. As it was, the gun's bullets jammed and the gun fired only once; albeit, leaving Judy with a wound on her upper
right leg, which according to Dr. Serrano could have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention at the
MCU Hospital. Prior to the incident, Nieva also admitted that there had been several quarrels between him and
Judy.55 These circumstances showing the weapon used, the nature of the wound sustained by Judy, and the conduct of
Nieva before and during the incident, manifest Nieva's intent to kill Judy.

Nieva repeatedly uses the testimony of Judy that the gun was aimed at the ground when it fired in order to exculpate him
from liability. However, as we had explained earlier, Nieva fired the gun several times before the bullet finally went off.
With the urgency and suddenness of the situation, minor lapses in Judy's testimony cannot be used against her.

In fine, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of frustrated homicide, which are: first, the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; second, the victim
sustained a fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and third, none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present. 56chanrobleslaw

Finally, in light of recent jurisprudence, we modify the award of damages granted by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA. People v. Jugueta57 teaches that where the crime of frustrated homicide is committed, moral damages as well as civil
indemnity should be awarded to the victim in the

amount of P30,000.00 each. Thus, we rule that Judy is entitled to recover civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00.
However, we decrease the amount of moral damages given by the courts a quo from P40,000.00 to P30,000.00. The
monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this
decision until fully paid.58chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 25, 2009 Decision and July 9, 2009 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31336 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:

1. The award of moral damages is decreased from P40,000.00 to P30,000.00;

2. Judy Ignacio is awarded civil indemnity m the amount of P30,000.00; and cralawlawlibrary

3. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all monetary awards from the date of the finality of this
Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary