1. Agustin v. Hon. Edu, GR L-49112, February 02, 1979, Fernando, J.

(Section 2)
FACTS:
Letter of Instruction 229 of Marcos, because “statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal
accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled etc. motor vehicles along streets without
early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence,” mandates that all owners,
users etc. of motor vehicles shall have at least 1 pair of early warning device on the motor vehicle.
It mandated the Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the order. Accordingly, respondent Edu issued the implementing rules.

Agustin, owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, assails Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing
rules. He claims that it violates delegation of police power and is oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, etc.

ISSUE:
Whether Letter of Instruction 229 is valid.
HELD: YES.
1) The letter of instruction was issued in the exercise of police power. Petitioner failed to lay the
necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. Also, the president had in his
possession statistical information when he issued the letter of instruction. Such factual foundation
cannot be defeated by petitioner’s naked assertion that EWDs are “not too vital to prevent
nighttime vehicular accidents.”

The claim of oppressiveness is untenable. There is nothing in the letter of instruction requiring
vehicle owners to purchase the EWDs prescribed thereby. All that is required is for owners to
equip their motor vehicles with a pair of EWD form whatever source. With a little industry and
practical ingenuity, owners can even personally make this EWD so long as it substantially
conforms with the specifications in the letter of instruction 229.

2) To avoid unlawful delegation, there must be a standard which implies that the legislature at
least determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. a standard defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries, and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. The standard may be
express or implied. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole.

With the growing complexity of modern life and increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a growing tendency toward delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the
approval of the practice by the courts.

3) The conclusion that the petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The Letter
of Instruction’s whereas clauses state:
"[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government xxx.”
This declaration of principle in the constitution is relevant: "The Philippines . . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land xxx.” The 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for
this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of pacta
sunt servanda stands in the way of such attitude.

2. Kuroda v. Maj. Gen. Jalandoni, GR L-2662, March 26, 1949, Moran, C.J. (Section 2)
FACTS:
Kuroda, formerly a lieutenant-general of the Japanese army in PH during 1943 and 1944, is now
charged before a military commission for unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his
duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them
to commit brutal atrocities against noncombatant civilians. He comes before SC seeking to
establish the illegality of EO 68 as it violates local laws and the constitution as PH is not a signatory
to the Hague Convention rules on land warfare. Thus, he claims that he is charged of “crimes” not
based on law, national and international. He also claims that his prosecution by American attorneys
Hussey and Port, not lawyers authorized to practice in PH, diminishes PH’s personality as an
independent state.

ISSUE:
Whether the Hague Convention etc. applies in PH.
HELD: YES.
1) EO 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules governing trial of
accused war criminals, was issued by the PH president. This is valid and constitutional. Art. 2 of
the constitution provides:
"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, including the Hague
Convention, Geneva Convention, and precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the UN, all persons, military or civilian, guilty of planning or waging a war of aggression and of
commission of crimes incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity,
and of civilization are held accountable.

The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of the generally accepted
principles of international law.

Also, when the crimes charged against Kuroda were allegedly committed, PH was under the
sovereignty of US. Thus, we were bound together with US and Japan (who accepted the
conventions) to the rights and obligations contained in the Hague and Geneva conventions.

2) The promulgation of EO 68 is an exercise by the president of his powers as commander in

chief of all our armed forces. War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. Incidents
of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An important incident
to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to defeat the
enemies but to subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who have violated the law of war.
A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This includes
the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective date of a treaty of peace.

The president, as commander in chief, is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect
of war- the trial and punishment of war criminals, thru EO 68.

3) Kuroda claims that the participation of 2 American attorneys in the prosecution of his case, on
the ground that such attorneys are not qualified to practice law in PH, violates PH national
sovereignty.

But the military commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the
RoC which govern ordinary civil courts. EO 68 is a valid law. There is nothing there requiring the
counsel appearing before the commissions to be attorneys qualified to practice law in PH.

3. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003, Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Upon her assumption to office after the EDSA Revolution, President Cory issued EO 1, creating
PCGG. PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The AFP
Board investigated reports of the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General
Josephus Ramas.

On March 3, 1986, a raiding team served at Elizabeth Dimaano’s (Ramas’ mistress) residence a
search warrant for illegal possession of firearms. The team seized one rifle and some ammunition,
one pistol, communications equipment, P2.87M and $50k, and land titles. AFP Board
recommended that Ramas be prosecuted for violation of RA 3019 and RA 1379. Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case because Republic could not submit its evidence and, after many postponements
granted to it to present evidence, it filed instead a re-amended complaint. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate Ramas.
2) Whether there was illegal search and seizure of the things confiscated from Dimaano.
HELD:
1) NO.
Under EO 1, PCGG is given specific responsibilities:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard
to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all
business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to
the Commission from time to time.
The PCGG, thru AFP Board, can investigate the unexplained wealth of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories in S2 of EO1: 1) AFP personnel who accumulated ill-gotten
wealth during the administration of Marcos by being his immediate family, relative, subordinate,
or close associate, taking advantage of their public office etc. or 2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the president assigns their cases to PCGG. PCGG does
not claim that the president assigned Ramas’ case to it. We also hold that Ramas was not a
“subordinate” of Marcos in the sense contemplated in EO1.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a “subordinate” without
a showing that he enjoyed close association with Marcos. Applying ejusdem generis,
“subordinate” refers to one who enjoys a close association with Marcos similar to the immediate
family member, relatives, etc. Ramas’ position alone as commanding general of the PH Army
does not suffice.

2) NO.
Republic claims that SB erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as
illegally seized. Republic claims that the raid was conducted on March 3, 1986, 5 days after the
EDSA revolution. At the time, a revolutionary government was operative by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1. This government withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which
guaranteed Ramas’ exclusionary right. The exclusionary right applies only starting Feb. 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution was ratified.

The EDSA Revolution took place on Feb. 23-25, 1986. As stated in Cory’s Proc. 3 on March 25,
1986, the revolution was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. The resulting
government was a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations
except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in PH,
assumed under international law.

The 1973 Bill of Rights was not operative during the interregnum (Feb. 26, 1986 to March 24,
1986). But the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained
in effect.

During the interregnum, the orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because
no constitution limited the extent thereof. there was no municipal law higher than the directives
and orders of the government with the abrogation of the 1973 constitution. Thus, during the
interregnum, a person could NOT INVOKE any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
.the organization of Cory’s government and her control of the state evidence by the appointment
of the cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the juridiciary and military signaled the point where the legal system then in
effect had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. To hold that the 1973 constitution remained
operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by PCGG
before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution (on March 25, 1986).

The authority of the PCGG to issue sequestration has also received constitutional sanction. S26,
Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution ratifies the “authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation 3 dated March 25, 1986.” The framers of the Freedom and 1987 Constitution
were aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights and thus included
specific language recognizing the validity of the orders despite the plea by Commissioner Bernas
against excepting said orders from the Bill of Rights.

The revolutionary government also assumed responsibility for the state’s good faith compliance
with the ICCPR to which PH is a signatory. Under Art. 17(1), the revolutionary government had
the duty to insure that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.” The UDHR in Art. 17(2) also states that “no one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” although the signatories of UDHR did not intend it as a
legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted it as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the state. Suffice it to say that
the Court considers UDHR as part of customary international law. The revolutionary government
did not repudiate the ICCPR or UDHR (whether they can repudiate though is another issue) in the
same way that it did the 1973 constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the state’s GF compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.

Thus, the search is valid as to the items specifically described therein. But as to the items seized
not included in the warrant such as the monies, communications equipment, jewelry, and land titles
(the warrant described only firearms), the raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items and
thus exceeded its authority when it seized the items. The Court ordered the items not included in
the warrant to be returned to Dimaano.

4. Tanada v. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997, Panganiban, J.

FACTS:
Secretary of DTI Rizalino Navarro, representing PH, signed in Marrakesh Morocco the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By signing the Final
Act, Navarro, on behalf of PH, agreed to submit the WTO Agreement for approval to competent
authorities. On Dec. 14, 1994, PH Senate adopted a Resolution which concurred in the
ratification of President Fidel Ramos of the WTO Agreement. The WTO Agreement ratified is
composed of the Agreement Proper and associated legal instruments included in annexes 1, 2, and
3. The Final Act signed by Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement and its annexes but
also the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services.

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 was filed praying for
nullification of the concurrence of the PH Senate in the ratification by the president of the WTO
Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether the PH is prohibited by its Constitution from ratifying the WTO Agreement.
HELD: NO.
1) Petitioners claim that the spirit and letter of the constitution mandating economic nationalism
are violated by the WTO agreement and its annexes etc. The constitutional provisions referred to
are:
 Art. II, Sec. 19: The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Art. XII, Sec. 10: The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Art. XII, Sec. 12: Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.
The WTO provisions claimed to violate these constitutional provisions are:
1) Par. 4, Art. III of GATT 1994: The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws,
regulations and requirements
2) In the area of trade related to intellectual property rights: Each Member shall accord
to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords
to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property...
3) In the area of general agreement on trade in services: xxx, each Member shall accord to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its own like services
and service suppliers.
Petitioners claim that these parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products
of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products in contravention of the
Filipino First policy of the constitution.

A. Art. II principles are not intended to be self-executing principles. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review and by the legislature in enacting
laws. As Justice Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa v. Factoran explained, unless the
legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively.

B. S10 and S12 of Art. XII must be read in relation to the other sections in said article, especially
S1, and S13:
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition and trade practices. Xxx.
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes
all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
It is true that in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, we held that S10, par.2, Art. XII is complete in itself
and needs no implementing law for its enforcement; that it is per se judicially enforceable. But it
is enforceable only in regard to the grant of rights xxx and not to every aspect of trade and
commerce. The issue here is not whether this paragraph is self-executing but whether there are
enough balancing provisions in the constitution to allow the senate to ratify the PH concurrence
in the WTO Agreement.

While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, etc., it recognizes
the need for business exchange with the rest of the world and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The
constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community.

C. WTO has advantages to protect weak and developing economies. Unlike UN where major states
have permanent seats in the Security Council, in WTO, decisions are made based on sovereign
equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of others. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council. Thus, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the organization.

D. The WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment. Thus, as to tariffs,
the amount of reduction rate is 36% for developed countries to be effected within 6 years while
developing countries are required only 24% within 10 years.

E. The WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the constitution was drafted and ratified in
1987. But that does not mean that the charter is flawed in that the framers might not have
anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. Constitutions are designed to meet not
only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and
unknown circumstances.

2) The WTO Agreement provides that each member ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.
Petitioners claim that this impairs PH sovereignty, particularly legislative power, because
Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest if such would not
conform with the WTO Agreement.

While sovereignty has been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
subject to limitations voluntarily agreed to by PH, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the
family of nations. The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by GAP of
international law which are considered automatically part of our laws. Pacta sunt servanda-
international agreements must be performed in good faith. By their voluntary act, nations may
surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by a
convention. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between states concerning widely
diverse matters including commercial relations. Thus, sovereignty cannot be considered absolute
and is restricted by 1) limitations imposed by the very nature of MEMBERSHIP in the family
of nations, and 2) limitations imposed by TREATY stipulations.

When PH joined UN, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty
as AUTO-LIMITATION. In Art. 2 of the UN Charter, “all members shall give the United Nations
every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or
enforcement action.” In an advisory opinion, ICJ held that money used by the UN Emergency
Force in the Middle East and Congo were UN expenses under Art. 17, par. 2 of the UN Charter.
Thus, all UN members must bear their share in such expenses. In this sense, PH Congress is
restricted in its power to appropriate.

Also, in Art. 105 of UN Charter, UN representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges, limiting the
exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory.

Also, although sovereign equality and domestic jurisdiction of all members are underlying
principles in the Charter, such provisos are subject to enforcement measures by the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Also, in Art. 103, in case of conflict between the obligations of members under the UN Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the UN
Charter prevails, thus denying PH the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of
conflicting obligations to honor.
Unless anarchy is preferred as an alternative, we accept in most cases that the benefits of the
reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political
sovereignty.

5. Gonzales v. Hechanova, GR L-21897, October 22, 1963, Concepcion, J.

FACTS:
Respondent Executive Secertary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice for
stockpile of the army. The PH Government has entered into contracts with Vietnam and Burma
therefor. Petitioner Gonzales, a rice planter and president of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed this petition, averring that the importation of foreign rice is illegal under RA
3452 and RA 2207 which explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn
Administration or “any other government agency.”

ISSUE:
Whether the contracts with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice may be invalidated by
our courts.
HELD: YES.
1) The language of RA 2207 and 3452 is such as to include within its purview all importaitons of
rice and corn. Pursuant to RA 2207, it is unlawful for any person or government agency to import
rice and corn into PH although it adds, as exception, that the president may authorize the
importation of these commodities if the conditions in S2 thereof are met. Also, RA 3452 enjoins
the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency from importing rice and corn.
The restrictions imposed in said RAs are merely additional to those prescribed in CA 138, “An
Act to give native products xxx the preference in the purchase of articles for the government.”
Under S1, in all purchase by the government, including those made for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials produced in PH.

It is claimed that even if the proposed importation violates RA 2207 and 3452, it should still be
permitted as it redounds to the benefit of the people. But this implies that if an executive officer
believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to
disregard it. That idea must be rejected. We still live under a rule of law. It is not for respondent
executive officers to set their own opinions against that of the legislature.

2) It is contended that the PH Government has already entered into 2 contracts for the purchase of
rice with Vietnam and Burma; that these are valid executive agreements under international law;
that in case of conflict between RAs 2207 and 3452, on one hand, and these contracts on the other,
the contracts should prevail because if a treaty and statute are inconsistent, the conflict must be
resolved in favor of the one which is latest in point of time.

We are not satisfied that the contracts are executive agreements. But even assuming that they are,
they are unlawful and void for being inconsistent with RAs 2207 and 3452. Although the
president, under the American constitutional system, may enter into executive agreements without
previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction
which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. The main function of the executive is to
enforce laws. It may not interfere in the performance of legislative powers except in the exercise
of veto power.

The American theory that in a conflict between a treaty and statute, the one latest in time shall
prevail, is not applicable here for the contracts are not treaties.

3) As to whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, the constitution

provides in the affirmative in S2, Art. VIII that the SC may not be deprived of its “jurisdiction to
review, revise xxx on appeal, certiorari xxx, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in- 1)
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive
order, or regulation is in question.” In other words, our constitution authorizes nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also when it runs counter to an act
of Congress.

6. Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the PH v. Health Sec. Duque, GR 173034,
October 09, 2007, Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
EO 51 (Milk Code) was issued by Pres. Cory on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution. The law seeks to give effect to Art. 11 of the International Code
of Marketing Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982-2006, WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported and promoted. In 1990, PH ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Art. 24 of which provides that state parties must take measures to
diminish child mortality and ensure all segments of society are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.

DOH issued AO 2006-0012, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order
No. 51, Otherwise Known as The Milk Code, Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner seeks to nullify RIRR on the ground that some of its provisions go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement. Petitioner represents its members that are breastmilk substitutes
manufacturers.

ISSUE:
Whether ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolution relating thereto are binding on PH.
HELD: NO.
1) Petitioner has standing as an association filing suit for its workers despite lack of direct interest
if its members are affected by the action.

2) DOH claims that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code but also various international
instruments regarding child nutrition which are deemed part of the law of the land. DOH invokes
1) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 2) ICESCR, and 3) CEDAW. But these provide only
in general terms what steps must be taken by state parties. The international instruments that do
have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are ICMBS and the various WHA
resolutions.

A. Under 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law either by
TRANSFORMATION or INCORPORATION. Transformation requires that an international
law be transformed into a domestic law. Incorporation applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land thru transformation pursuant to Article VII, S21 which
states that “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” ICMBS and the WHA Resolutions are not
treaties as they have not been concurred in by the senate under Art. VII, S21. But ICMBS had
been transformed into domestic law thru the Milk Code. Thus, it is the Milk Code that has
the force of law in this jurisdiction and not ICMBS per se. Milk Code is almost a verbatim
reproduction of ICMBS except that the Code did not adopt the ICMBS provision absolutely
prohibiting advertising of some products. Milk Code instead allows such marketing if authorized
by the Inter-Agency Committee.

B. S2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the incorporation method, states:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.
GAP of international law refers to norms of customary international law which are binding on all
states like renunciation of war as instrument of national policy, sovereign immunity, right to life
liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda. Customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination of two elements: 1) the established, widespread, and consistent PRACTICE on
the part of states, and 2) a psychological element known as OPINION JURIS SIVE
NECESSITATES. Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Fr. Bernas defines customary international law as a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. This contains the 2 basic elements of custom:
1) the material factor- how states behave, and 2) the psychological or subjective factor- why they
behave the way they do. Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our
domestic system.

C. WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in local legislation. Are they customary law?

World Health Organization (WHO) is one of UN’s specialized agencies. Under the 1947 WHO
Constitution, it is WHA which determines the policies of WHO and has the power to adopt
regulations concerning advertising and labelling of biological, pharmaceutical etc. products
moving in international commerce and to make recommendations to members. As opposed to
recommendations, regulations duly adopted by WHA bind member states:
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: xxx
(e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all
Members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except
for such Members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within
the period stated in the notice
On the other hand, under Art. 23, recommendations of WHA do not come into force for members.
Art. 23 of WHO Constitution states that WHA shall have “authority to make recommendations to
members with respect to any matter within the competence of the organization.” The absence of
a provision in Art. 23 of any mechanism by which the recommendation would come into force
for member states is conspicuous. WHA recommendations are generally not binding, but they
carry moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the highest
international body in the field of health. Even ICMBS was adopted as a mere recommendation.

Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging
member states to implement ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
Thus, unlike ICMBS which was enacted by Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6months etc. have not been adopted as domestic
law.

Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed
by most member states, were practices by at least a majority of them. Respondents have also not
proven that any compliance by member states with the WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Thus, respondents failed to establish that the WHA Resolutions are customary international law.
thus, they cannot be considered part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law.
D. It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute soft law or non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law does not fall into any categories
of international law under Art. 38, Chpt III of the 1946 Statute of the ICJ. But it is an expression
of non-binding norms etc. that influence state behavior. Some declarations and resolutions of UN
GA fall under this. Most notable is the UDHR enforced by this Court in various cases.

WHO has resorted to soft law, most evidently at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrone
(SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks. The SARS and IHR Resolutions define member-states’ duty to
cooperate with other countries and the WHO in connection with infectious disease. This duty is
neither binding nor enforceable but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful
politically.

3) Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA resolutions, can be
validly implemented by DOH thru the RIRR.

7. Holy See v. Hon. Rosario, GR 101949, December 01, 1994, Quiason, J.

FACTS:
Holy See who exercises sovereignty over Vatican City is represented in PH by the Papal Nuncio.
Msgr. Cirilos, on behalf of Holy See (HS), sold to Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B, and 5-D for P1,240/m2.
P100k earnest money was paid by Licup and the sellers were obliged to clear the lots of squatters.
Licup paid the P100k earnest money to Cirilos. Licup later assigned his rights to private respondent
Starbright Sales Enterprises. Starbright demanded Cirilos to clear the property of squatters.
Cirilos informed Starbright of the Squatters’ refusal to vacate and proposed that either Starbright
undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned. Starbright counterproposed a
reduction of price if it were to evict the squatters. Cirilos returned the earnest money and gave
Starbright 7 days to pay the original price.

Starbright returned the earnest money, but the lots were sold to Tropicana by HS. Starbright filed
a complaint praying for annulment of the sale to Tropicana and damages against HS and Tropicana.
HS claims that TC lacked jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. TC denied the
motion to dismiss, finding that HS shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into the business
contract. Hence this petition directly to SC.

DFA moved to intervene, claiming that it adopts the allegations of HS insofar as they refer to
arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether trial court has jurisdiction over HS over the transactions involved.
HELD: NO.
1) In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued
to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In US, the process followed is the process of “suggestion” where the foreign state sued in an
American court requests the Sekcretary of State to make a determination of whether it is immune.
If the secretary finds it immune from suit, he asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
“suggestion” that defendant is immune.

In PH, the practice is for the foreign government/international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity but how the PH Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the court varies. In a case, the secretary of foreign affairs just
sent a letter directly to the secretary of labor and employment, informing the latter that
respondent-employer enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In WHO v. Aquino, the secretary sent the TC
a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, US Embassy asked the secretary of FA to request the
solgen to make a “suggestion” to respondent judge. The solgen embodied the “suggestion” in a
Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

Here, DFA moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of HS. The Court allowed
DFA to file its memorandum.

2) In 1929, Italy and HS entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive
dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the
right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries,
and to enter into treaties according to International Law. The Lateran Treaty established the
statehood of the Vatican City. From the wordings of the treaty, it is difficult to determine whether
statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City.

One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication
— that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by
states to be invested with international personality.

PH has accorded the HS the status of a foreign sovereign.

3) We have adopted the generally accepted principles of international law (Art. II, S2). Even
without this affirmation, such principles are deemed incorporated in our law as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

4) There are 2 conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only
with regard to public acts or jure imperii but not with regard to private acts or jure gestionis.

Without legislation defining what activities are jure gestionis, we must have our own guidelines,
tentative as they may be. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the
activity in the regular course of business. If not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the
particular transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii especially when not undertaken for
gain or profit.

Here, if HS bought and sold the lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, the acts are
jure gestionis. But HS claims that it acquired the property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in PH. Starbright failed to dispute this claim. Lot 5-A was donated by the
Archdiocese of Manila for use of HS as the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property in a receiving state to create its diplomatic mission
is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. PH senate concurred in
this on Nov. 15, 1965. A diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from civil and administrative
jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property in
the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for purposes
of the mission (Art. 31[a]). If this immunity is provided a diplomatic envoy, all the more to the
sovereign itself, which in this case is HS.

The decision to transfer the property and its subsequent disposal are also clothed with a
government character. HS sold Lot 5A not for profit but only because the squatters living thereon
made it almost impossible for HS to use it for the purpose of the donation.

5) The privilege of sovereign immunity was established by the certification of DFA. The
determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to
sovereign/diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts. When
the plea of immunity is recognized by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept
this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm in conducting the country’s foreign relations.

8. Vinuya v. Hon. Executive Secretary Romulo, GR 162230, April 28, 2010, Del Castillo, J.,
En Banc.
FACTS:
Petitioners are members of Malaya Lolas, a non-stock, non-profit organization established for the
purpose of providing aid to victims of rape by the Japanese military in PH during WWII. They
claim that since 1998, they have been approaching the executive department thru DOJ, DFA, and
OSG requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in PH. But they declined to assist petitioners.

Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by PH in the Treaty of Peace with Japan
is void. They claim that Japan violated jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible.
Respondents argue that all claims of PH and its nationals were dealt with in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. They also argue that Japan
had addressed the individual claims of the women thru atonement money paid by the Asian
Women’s Fund (AWF).

ISSUE:
Whether respondents may be compelled to espouse the claims of petitioners.
HELD: NO.
Various officials of the government of Japan have issued public statements of remorse. In 1995,
the Japanese government established AWF. Its purpose was to show atonement of the Japanese
people thru expressions of apology and remorse to former comfort women. AWF had 3 programs
for comfort women who applied for assistance: 1) atonement fund, 2) medical and welfare support
programs, 3) a letter of apology from the Japanese prime minister to each woman. Funding came
from the Japanese government and private donations by the Japanese people. On January 15, 1997,
AWF and PH government signed a MOU for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. These were implemented over the next 5 years by DSWD.

1) In Tañada v Cuenco, we held that political questions refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

The conduct of foreign relations of our government is committed by the constitution to the
executive and legislative- the “political” departments and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry. The question of whether the
PH government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. Here, the executive has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan
in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations
and its sole representative with foreign relations. The president possesses the most comprehensive
and confidential information about foreign countries and has unlimited access to ultra-sensitive
military intelligence data.

2) Since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords, governments have dealt with private
claims as their own. Except as an agreement might provide otherwise, international settlements
generally wipe out underlying private claims, terminating any recourse under domestic law. In
affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of
another are sources of friction between the two sovereigns. To resolve this, nations have often
entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals.

The allied powers concluded the peace treaty with Japan not necessarily for complete atonement
or payment of reparations, but to prevent the spread of communism in Japan. Thus, the Peace
Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.

Thus, from a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie.

3) In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individual’s
rights that are being asserted, but the state’s own rights. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and resorting to diplomatic action on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own right
to ensure respect for the rules of international law. Should the natural or legal person on whose
behalf the state is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no
remedy in international law. Since exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the state,
reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states.

The International Law Commission's (ILC's) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support
this traditional view.
4) It is argued that the State has a duty to protect its nationals. However, at present, there is no
sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic
protection of their own nationals abroad. Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor
opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not
a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.

5) Even the invocation of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violates jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators
of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation.

5.1) The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
A distinction must be drawn between obligations of a state towards the international community
as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another state. The former is the concern of all states. Such
obligations derive, for example, from the outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide.

5.2) This is closely connected with jus cogens (literally, “compelling law”), which refers to norms
that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s, but peremptory norms began
to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937
article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law. The recognition of jus cogens gained even more
force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC's preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT). Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens, the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for
identifying peremptory norms. ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any
generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the
character of jus cogens," and that the “prudent course seems to be to leave the full content of this
rule to be worked out in state practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Thus,
while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance.

9. Bayan Muna v. Romulo, GR 159618, February 01, 2011, Velasco, Jr., J., En Banc.
FACTS:
On Dec. 28, 2000, PH, thru Charge d’affaires Enrique Manalo, signed the Rome Statute,
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary
to the national criminal jurisdictions.”

On May 9, 2003, Ambassador Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note 0470 to DFA proposing the
terms of the Non-Surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement) between US and PH. Via
Exchange of Notes, PH, represented by DFA Sec. Blas Ople, accepted the US proposals under
the US Embassy Note and put in effect the Agreement with US. The Agreement pertinently
provides:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, "persons" are current or former Government officials,
employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express
consent of the first Party, (a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any
international tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the
UN Security Council, or (b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity
or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer
to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
Petitioner party list filed this petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition seeking to nullify
the Non-Surrender Agreement. Romulo is impleaded as Executive Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether the Agreement is valid.
HELD: YES.
1) Petitioner challenges the Agreement’s form in that the exchange of notes cannot be a valid
medium for concluding the Agreement.

This is untenable. We adopt the doctrine of incorporation in S2, Art.II. An exchange of notes falls
into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement. The exchange consists of the exchange of two documents, each of
the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the
usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The
term “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably. The point
where ordinary correspondence between governments ends and where agreements begin may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment.

Thus, exchange of notes is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international

written contract among nations.

2) No need for Senate concurrence. International agreements may be in the form of 1) treaties
that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or 2) executive agreements that
are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less
formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. Under international law,
there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects
on the contracting states. But one is distinct from another. A treaty has greater "dignity" than an
executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it
the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive
agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment.

Petitioner submits that the subject Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories
enumerated in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading ("International agreements
involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international
arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties while those embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive
agreements."). But the categorization in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no
hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive
agreement.

The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements without need of congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage.

3) Agreement does not violate Rome Statute. Petitioner argues that the Agreement undermines the
establishment of ICC and is void. The Agreement’s sole purpose is to provide individuals with
immunity from the jurisdiction of ICC.

But far from going against each other, one complements the other. The principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of ICC. The jurisdiction of ICC is to be “complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions of signatory states” under Art. 1 of the Rome Statute. The 6th
preambular paragraph thereof states that it is the “duty of every state to exercise its criminal
jurisdictions over those responsible for international crimes.” This indicates that primary
jurisdiction over international crimes rests, at the first instance, with the state where the
crime was committed, and secondarily with the ICC in appropriate situations under Art. 17, par.1.

Of note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem under par.3, Art. 20 of the Rome
Statute: “no person who has been tried by another court for conduct constituting crimes within its
jurisdiction shall be tried by ICC with respect to the same conduct.

Thus, the Rome Statute recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, the complementary
jurisdiction of ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unable or unwilling to
prosecute. Thus, nothing in the Agreement diminishes the efficacy of the Rome Statute.

3.1) Moreover, there is considerable difference between a state-party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty; while a state-party is legally
obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith. Here, PH is only a signatory to the
Rome Statute, not a state-party for lack of ratification by the senate. Petitioner’s argument that
state-parties with non-surrender agreements are prevented from meeting their obligations under
the Statute must fail, for these are binding on state-parties only, not signatories.

4) The nullity of the Agreement cannot be predicated on the argument that its provisions constitute
a virtual abdication of sovereignty. Almost every time a state enters into an international
agreement, it voluntarily sheds off part of its sovereignty. The underlying consideration in this
partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or reciprocal undertaking.

5) Petitioner faults the president for performing, thru respondents (DFA secretary Blas Ople), a
task conferred the president by the constitution- the power to enter into international agreements.
The president, as head of state and government, is the sole organ and authority in the external
affairs of the country. In agreeing to conclude the Agreement, then president GMA, represented
by DFA secretary, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the
constitution. In Pimentel Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, we emphasized that the power
to ratify a treaty rests with the president subject to concurrence of the senate, whose role is
limited merely to concurring in or withholding the ratification. Concomitant with this treaty-
making power is the president’s prerogative to refuse to submit a treaty to the senate; or having
secured the latter’s consent to the ratification of the treaty, refuse to ratify it. This prerogative is
the president’s alone and cannot be encroached upon via mandamus.

6) On Dec. 11, 2009, GMA signed into law RA 9851, PH Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity. S17 thereof states:
Section 17 .Jurisdiction. — . . . In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities
may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a crime punishable under this Act if
another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or
undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or
extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international
court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties.
It is argued that the Agreement conflicts with RA 9851. For example, in case of a US national
under prosecution by an international tribunal for any crime in RA 9851, PH has the option to
surrender the US national to the international tribunal if it decides not to prosecute him in PH. This
option, it is argued, is not subject to the consent of US, and requiring the consent of US (*like in
the Agreement) before PH can exercise such option requires an amendatory law.

But we find the Agreement is not repugnant to RA 9851. S17 does not require PH to surrender the
person to the international tribunal if it does not exercise primary jurisdiction, but gives PH
discretion on whether to surrender him because the provision uses “may”, denoting discretion.”
Besides, even if the surrender was mandatorily required, the provision provides that the surrender
may be made to another state pursuant to “applicable extradition laws and treaties.”

PH and US already have an existing extradition treaty- RP-US Extradition Treaty.

6.1) In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carpio stated that “an executive agreement has the force and
effect of law; it cannot amend or repeal prior laws.” This is inapplicable since RA 9851 is a
subsequent law, not a prior one.

7) It is argued that the RP-US Extradition Treaty is inapplicable to RA 9851 since under par.1,
Art. 2 thereof, “an offense shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws of
both contracting parties.” It is argued that while PH has criminalized under RA 9851, the acts
defined in the Rome Statute, US has no similar legislation.

But US has already enacted legislation punishing these high crimes. Moreover, it has been held
that genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary
international law. Some even go so far as to state that these crimes have attained the status of jus
cogens.
7.1) To establish the customary status of a norm, 2 elements must concur: 1) state practice, the
objective elements; and 2) opinion juris sive necessitates, the subjective element. State practice is
demonstrated by these elements: 1) generality, 2) uniformity and consistency, and 3) duration.

The first element of customary international law- established, widespread, and consistent practice
of states, does not obtain. As of Oct. 12, 2010, only 114 states have ratified the Rome Statute out
of 194 countries in the world. Res ipsa loquitor. More than 8 years (since July 1, 2002) have
elapsed since the PH signed the statute, but the treaty has not been transmitted to the senate for
concurrence. The PH, judging by the action or inaction of its top officials, does not even feel bound
by the Rome Statute.

7.2) Jus cogens means the “compelling law.” A jus cogens norm holds the highest hierarchical
position among all other customary norms and principles. Thus, such are deemed “peremptory
and non-derogable.” Jus cogens crimes are deemed so fundamental to the existence of a just
international legal order that states cannot derogate from them, even by agreement. Jus cogens
crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e. any state may exercise jurisdiction
over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses even when no
other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists. The rational is that the crime committed is so
egregious that it is considered committed against all members of the international community and
thus granting every state jurisdiction.

Thus, even without domestic legislation of US, it still has both the doctrine of incorporation and
universal jurisdiction to try these crimes.

10. Baer v. Hon. Tizon, GR L-24294, May 03, 1974, Fernando, J., Second Div.
FACTS:
Respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for injunction in CFI against Baer, Commander of
the US Naval Base in Olongapo. Gener claims that he was engaged in the business of logging and
that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations. Judge Tizon issued a
restraining order. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the suit was against a
foreign sovereign without its consent. Baer claims that in directing the cessation of logging by
Gener within the Naval Base, Baer was acting within the scope of his authority and official duty,
the maintenance of the security of the base being his duty as commander. Judge Tizon granted
Gener’s application for preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether CFI has jurisdiction.
HELD: NO.
1) A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it by
permission of its government or sovereign is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the
place. After the conclusion of the PH-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions
should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the
submission to jurisdiction of the foreign power whenever appropriate.
In Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, plaintiffs as lessors sued the commanding general of the US army in
PH, seeking restoration to them of apartment buildings they owned leased to US forces stationed
in Manila. SC ruled that the action must be considered as one against US government and thus PH
courts have no jurisdiction since US government has not given its consent to the filing of the suit.

In Marvel Building v. PH War Damage Commission, where respondent, a US agency established

to compensate damages suffered by PH during WWII, was held as falling within the doctrine as
the suit against it would eventually be a charge against or financial liability of the US
Government since the Commission has no funds of its own to pay money judgments.

It is a widely accepted principle of international law, which is made part of the law of the land,
that a foreign state may not be brought to suit before courts of another state or its own courts
without its consent.

2) What Judge Tizon granted amounted to interference with the performance of the duties of
petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the PH-
American Military Bases Agreement. Assuming that PH Government, thru Bureau of Forestry,
has the authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs inside a military base, the Bases Agreement
subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issed by PH government to the exercise
by US of its rights within the bases. The finding of the Mutual Defense Board, agency of both PH
and US, that “continued logging by Gener within the boundaries of the US Naval Base would not
be consistent with the security and operation of the base” is conclusive upon respondent judge.

The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in pecuniary charge
against the sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Preventing a sovereign
from doing an affirmative act pertaining to a most important public function- defense of the state-
is equally untenable.

3) There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of this decision. Baer, as commander of the
US Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may thus be proceeded
against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents.

11. PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, GR 124772, August 14, 2007, Tinga, J., Second Div.
FACTS:
OSG wrote the federal office for police matters in Berne, Switzerland requesting assistance for the
latter office to provide OSG with information as to where the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses
are located, the names of depositors, and the banks and amounts involved, and to take
precautionary measures, like sequestration or to freeze the assets. The office of the distrct attorney
in Zurich, pursuant to OSG’s request, issued an order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze
the accounts of accused in PCGG. Thus, Bankers Trust AG (BTAG) of Zurich froze the accounts
of Officeco Holdings NV. Officeco appealed to the attorney general in Zurich but the order was
affirmed. Its appeal to Swiss federal court was also dismissed.

Officeco made representations with OSG and PCGG for them to officially advise the swiss federal
office for police matters to unfreeze its assets. PCGG required Officeco to present countervailing
evidence. Instead, Officeco filed a complaint in Sandiganbayan, praying for OSG and PCGG to
officially advise the Swiss government to exclude its account from the freeze order. PCGG moved
to dismiss. SB denied. hence this petition.

PCGG, among others, claims that SB has no jurisdiction on account of the “act of state doctrine.”

ISSUE:
Whether the act of state doctrine is applicable.
HELD: NO.
1) The classic American statement of the Act of State Doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other state, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another,
done within its territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
This dotrine is one of the methods by which states prevent their national courts from deciding
disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another state, the other two being immunity and
non-justiciability. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes
relating to legislative or other governmental acts which a foreign state performed within its
territorial limits.

2) PCGG claims that SB could not grant or deny the prayers in Officeco’s complaint without first
examining the freeze order of the Swiss officials and would thus sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another country. But we disagree. The parameters of the doctrine were clarified in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino where the US SC held that international law does NOT
REQUIRE the application of this doctrine nor does it forbid the application of the rule even
if the act of state in question violated international law.

Even assuming international law requires its application, SB will not examine and review the
freeze orders of the Swiss officials. It will not require them to submit to its adjudication. SB will
only review the propriety of maintaining PCGG’s position as to Officeco’s accounts with
BTAG. The Act of State Doctrine finds no application in this case.

12. Syquia v. Lopez, GR L-1648, August 17, 1949, Montemayor, J., First Div.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo Syquia are the joint owners of 3 apartment buildings in
Manila. In 1945, they executed 3 lease contracts, one for each apartment, in favor of US. The term
for the leases was to be for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter.

Under the theory that the leases terminated 6 months after September 2, 1945, when Japan
surrendered, petitioners in March 1946 approached the predecessors of respondents Moore
(commanding general, US army Ryukus command, Manila) and Tillman (Chief, real estate
division, US Army Manila) and requested the return of the apartments to them, but they were
advised that the US army wanted to continue occupation. Petitioners requested renegotiation and
for a lease of 3 years and payment of a higher rental, but the predecessors refused, advising that
US army will vacate prior to Feb. 1, 1947. Because of failure to comply with the assurance that
the apartments will be acated prior to Feb. 1, 1947, petitioners, on Feb. 17, 1947, served notice
upon Moore and Tillman and the 64 army officers occupying the buildings demanding increase in
rent or cancellation of the leases, new leases, or release of the apartment within 30 days. since
respondents did not comply within the 30-day period, petitioners filed this action in Manila
municipal court for unlawful detainer against Moore, Tillman, and the 64 occupants.

Municipal court ruled that US government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its
consent. CFI affirmed and dismissed petitioners’ complaint. Hence this petition for mandamus
seeking to compel municipal court to take jurisdiction over the case.

The apartments were eventually returned and backrentals of P109k were paid. But upon suggestion
of counsel of petitioners that a decision be rendered on the merits to serve as guide in future similar
cases, SC ruled upon the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the municipal court had jurisdiction.
HELD: NO.
1) A private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recover
possession, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the government said to be illegally
withholding the same from him, though said officers may claim that they are acting for the
government, and the courts may entertain the suit although the government is not included as
defendant. The government is not bound by the decision. The philosophy is that unless courts are
permitted to assume jurisdiction, a private citizen would be helpless. In such case, the officials
must prove their claim before the courts. But where the judgment in such case would result not
only in recovery of possession of the property but also in a charge against the financial
liability to the government, then the suit should be regarded as one against the government
itself, and consequently it cannot be entertained by the courts except with the government’s
consent.

Here, the real party in interest as defendant is USA. The lessee was USA and the lease agreements
executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The rentals were always paid by US
government. Any back rentals would have to be paid by US government not only because the
contracts were entered into its name but also because the premises were used by officers of her
armed forces during the war and after termination of hostilities.

2) Moore and Tillman had no intervention in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial
occupancy as this was effected thru their predecessors in office. Petitioners’ original request for
the return of the buildings were denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors.

3) Tillman was the chief, real estate division of the US army and was in control of the leases
according to the complaint, but he was under the command of Moore, his superior officer. Tillman,
in assigning new officers to occupy the apartments in obedience to order from his superior Moore
cannot be held personally liable for rentals.

4) As to general Moore, when he assumed command in Manila, the lease agreements had already
been negotiated. He found the apartments occupied by his government and devoted to the use of
army officers stationed in Manila under his command, and he had reason to believe that he could
continue using the premises.

5) As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments, they were not given the choice
of their dwellings when coming to their station in Manila. They were merely assigned quarters in
the apartments. Said assignments may be regarded as orders, and all that the officers did was to
obey them.

Thus, the real party defendant in interest is the government of the United States of America.
Any judgment for back and increased rentals will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and
Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the US government. The present action must be
regarded as one against the US government. PH courts have no jurisdiction. The US government
has not given its consent to be sued.

13. USA v. Hon. Guinto, GR 76607, February 26, 1990, Cruz, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Consolidated cases:
A. GR 76607
The US Air Force solicited bids for contracts for barbering services in its base. Respondents
Valencia, Tanglao, and del Pilar submitted bids. But the bid was won by Ramon Dizon over
respondents’ objections. They complained to the PH Area Exchange (PHAX). PHAX, thru its
representatives petitioners Reeves and Smouse, explained that Dizon was already operating the
concession. Respondents filed a complaint against PHAX and individual petitioners to cancel the
award to Dizon and to conduct a rebidding. Petitioners moved to dismiss claiming that the action
was in effect against US. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence this petition for certiorari.

B. GR 79470
After investigation, Genove was ascertained to have poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers of the US Air Force Recreation Center at John
Hay Air Station. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and the case was referred to a board
of arbitrators conformably to their CBA. The board recommended his dismissal and he was
dismissed. Genove filed a complaint against petitioners. Defendants, joined by US, moved to
dismiss alleging that Lamachia, as officer of the US Air Force, was immune from suit. The motion
to dismiss was denied. hence this petition for certiorari.

C. GR 80018
Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, extension of Clark Air Base,
was arrested after a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners. Bautista was charged with
violation of RA 6425 and the petitioners-officers testified against him. As a result, Bautista was
dismissed form employment. He filed a complaint against petitioners. The defendants filed an
answer without the assistance of counsel or authority from the US DOJ. Later, a law firm was
retained to represent them who filed a motion to withdraw answer and dismiss the complaint on
the ground that US cannot be sued without its consent. The motion was denied, with the judge
holding that defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their
answer. Hence this petition for certiorari.
D. GR 80258
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners for injuries allegedly
sustained by plaintiffs from the acts of defendants. They claim that defendants beat them up and
unleashed dogs on them. Defendants claim that petitioners were arrested for theft and were bitted
by dogs as they were resisting arrest. US moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was in effect
against US. This was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

HELD:
1) The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Art. XVI, S3, is one
of the generally accepted principles of international law adopted as part of the law of the land
under Art. II, S2. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority
of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition
and consequence of its membership in the society of nations.

2) The doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification by Justice Holmes that “there can
be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.” In case
of a foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is par in
parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over
one another.

The doctrine also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts performed in the
discharge of their duties. If the judgment against such officials would require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit is against the state although not formally
impleaded.

The doctrine is sometimes called “the royal prerogative of dishonesty” as it grants the state the
privilege to defeat any legitimate claim against it.

3) The consent to be sued may be manifested EXPRESSLY or IMPLIEDLY. Express consent

may be embodied in a general or special LAW. Consent is implied when the state enters into a
CONTRACT or it itself COMMENCES LITIGATION.

The general law waiving immunity is Act 3083, under which the PH government “consents to be
sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract xxx.” When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature thru a duly enacted statute. Also,
not all contracts constitute implied waiver. Distinction must be made between its SOVEREIGN
and PROPRIETARY acts. As for the filing of complaint by the government, suability will result
only where the government is claiming an affirmative relief from defendant.

The US will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract
in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign capacity
that no such waiver may be implied.
4) A. GR 80018
The petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-
bust operation and testified against complainant. The petitioners were connected with the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators and were charged with preventing the distribution etc. of drugs and
prosecuting those guilty of such acts. Thus, as agents of US, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

Respondents invoke Art. 2180 of NCC which holds the government liable if it acts through a
special agent. But respondents fail to distinguish between SUABILITY and LIABILITY.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
established facts. That a state is suable does not mean it is liable. On the other hand, it can never
be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Art. 2180 establishes a rule of liability, not
suability.

Also, Art. 2180 regulates the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and applies only to the
PH government and not to foreign governments impleaded in our courts.

B. GR 80258
The contradictory factual allegations in this case deserve a closer study of what actually happened.
The record is too meager to indicate if defendants were really discharging their official duties or
had actually exceeded their authority. The inquiry must first be made by the lower court.

C. GR 79470
The restaurant services offered at John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business
enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not
extended to American servicemen for free as perquisite of membership in the US Armed Forces.
The services are also not exclusively offered to such servicemen and are available to the general
public, including tourists in Baguio city. Although the prices are relatively low, such services are
undoubtedly operated for profit and not for a governmental activity.

Thus, petitioners cannot invoke state immunity. Not even the US government can claim such
immunity. However, while suable, petitioners are not liable. Respondent Genove’s dismissal
was decided upon after a thorough investigation that he polluted the soup stock with urine.

D. GR 76607
The barbershops subject of the concessions by US are commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs
of customers for a fee. Thus, petitioners cannot plead immunity.

However, the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of barbershop concessions is not
before us. Thus, trial court will have to receive that evidence first to determine if plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek. This case was also remanded.

14. USA v. Hon. Ruiz, GR L-35645, May 22, 1985, Abad Santos, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
US had a naval base in Subic as provided in the Military Bases Agreement between PH and US.
US invited submission of bids for repair of its wharf. Eligio de Guzman & Co. submitted bids.
But the company received a letter from Collins, Director in the Department of the Navy of US,
that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. Eligio sued US et al. praying
that US be required to allow Eligio to work on the projects or, in case this is an unavailable remedy,
for damages. Defendants US et al. moved to dismiss. Trial court denied the motion and issued a
writ of preliminary injunction. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the case is covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
HELD: YES.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them- between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial, and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts.
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. The correct
test for applying state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a state but the legal nature
of the act.

Here, the projects are an integral part of the naval base devoted to the defense of both US and PH,
indisputable a function of the government of the highest order. They are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

15. USA v. Hon. Reyes, GR 79253, March 1, 1993, Davide, Jr., J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Private respondent Montoya is an American citizen who was employed as an ID checker at the US
Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in QC.
Petitioner Maxine Bradford is also an American citizen who was the activity exchange manager at
JUSMAG.

On January 22, 1987, after working as ID checker, Montoya went shopping. While outside the
NEX JUSMAG store, Mrs. Kennedy, also an ID checker, upon instruction of Bradford, approached
Montoya and told her that she needed to search her bags. Bradford informed Montoya that all
JUSMAG employees were to be searched that day. Montoya’s person, car, and bags were searched
in the presence of Bradford and onlookers. She was allowed to leave the premises. But when
Montoya checked the records, she found that she was the only person who was searched that day.
She protested the illegal search but no action was undertaken. Montoya claims that the act is
motivated by racial discrimination and subjected her to speculations of theft and shoplifting.

Montoya filed a complaint in RTC against Bradford for damages. USA intervened, claiming that
the suit is a suit against USA who is immune from suit. Bradford and USA filed a motion to
dismiss. They claim that checking of purchases at NX is routine procedure to safeguard
merchandise. Thus, Bradford acted in the exercise of her duties as manager of NEX-JUSMAG.
They also claim that NEX is an instrumentality of US and is essential for governmental functions,
providing a reliable source of articles and services for the well-being of navy personnel. Montoya’s
complaint was related to the mission of a unit of the US navy and thus cannot be allowed. To allow
it would violate the military bases agreement.

Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment, alleging that Bradford was about to depart PH.
USA and Bradford opposed. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary
attachment.

Instead of moving to reconsider, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari. They then filed a
motion to suspend proceedings in RTC, which RTC denied. RTC eventually declared Bradford in
default and granted Montoya P300k moral, P100k exemplary damages, and P50k actual expenses.
An entry of final judgment was made because petitioners did not file a MR or appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether Bradford’s acts are covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
HELD: NO.
Montoya argues that Bradford and her acts are not exempt from PH jurisdiction because the search
was conducted outside of JUSMAG and thus outside the territory of the US military bases and
that her acts were outside the scope of her authority. petitioners claim that even if Bradford’s acts
were ultra vires, she is still immune because the rule that public officers may be sued in their
personal capacity for ultra vires and tortious acts is “domestic law” and not applicable in
international law.

1) Montoya’s cause of action is premised on the theory that the acts of Bradford were not only
outside the scope of her authority or in her private capacity, but also outside the territory where
she exercises such authority, i.e. outside NEX-JUSMAG or in its parking area.

2) The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. If the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,, the suit is
against the state although not formally impleaded.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injuriouis to the rights of plaintiff. Unauthorized acts of government
officials are not acts of the state. The rationale is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. Thus, immunity from suit may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private or personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
This situation usually arises where the official acts without authority or in excess of his powers.

3) Bradford was sued in her personal or private capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope
and even beyond her place of official functions. The complaint is thus not vulnerable to a motion
to dismiss as the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.

4) Even on the claim of diplomatic immunity, which Bradford does not even pretend to have, Art.
31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions:
 '1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in
the case of : xxx xxx xxx (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions."

16. Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion, GR 139465, January 18, 2000, Melo, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Marcos issued PD 1069 on January 13, 1977, “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country." On Nov. 13, 1994, SOJ Franklin
Drilon signed the RP-US Extradition Treaty which was ratified by the Senate. On June 18, 1999,
DOJ received from DFA US Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to US. Attached were the Grand Jury indictment, warrant of arrest
issued by US District Court, and supporting documents. Jimenez appears to be charged in US with
various crimes.

Petitioner issued DO 249, designating a panel of attorneys to handle the case pursuant to S5(1) of
PD 1069. Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the panel, Jimenez, thru counsel,
wrote a letter to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from US and all
documents submitted therewith and that he be given ample time to comment thereon after
he receives them. In response, petitioner sent a reply-letter, denying the requests.

Thus, Jimenez filed in RTC a petition against SOJ, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. for
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. RTC ordered petitioners to refrain from conducting further
proceedings for 20 days and set a hearing on whether RTC will issue the preliminary injunction.
Forthwith, petitioner filed this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Jimenez is entitled to receive the extradition documents during the evaluation stage.
HELD: YES.
1) The extradition request is made by the foreign diplomat of the requesting state addressed to
the secretary of foreign affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued
by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other
instruments having equivalent legal force; 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is
requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time
and place of the commission of these acts; 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement
of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law,
sufficient for evaluation of the request; and 4. Such other documents or information in
support of the request. (Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
S5 of PD 1069 sets forth the duty of the SFA:
(1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
Thus, the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and
supporting documents is SFA. What is the coverage of this task? Under Art. 7, pars. 2 and 3 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, he must ascertain whether the request is supported by documents which
describe the identity or probable location of the person sought, statement of the facts of the offense
and procedural history of the case, etc. SFA must also see to it that the documents are certified by
the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the requesting state.
Par. 3, Art. 3 of the treaty provides that extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority
(SFA) determines that the request is politically motivated or the offense is a military offense not
punishable under non-military penal legislation.

2) Extradition petition. Upon a finding by SFA that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient in form and substance, he shall deliver it to SOJ who shall designate an
attorney in his office to take charge of the case (S5(1), PD 1069). The lawyer shall then file a
written petition with the RTC. The judge shall as soon as practicable issue an order summoning
the prospective extraditee to appear and answer. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it
appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of accused will best serve the ends of
justice.

3) Extradition hearing. PD 1069 does not indicate if the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil,
or a special proceeding. S9(1) provides that in the hearing, RoC, insofar as practicable and not
inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. S8 provides that the attorney
in charge of the case may, upon application of the requesting state, represent the latter. Upon
conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting extradition and giving reasons
therefor upon a showing of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (S10). The decision is
appealable to CA whose decision is final and immediately executory (S12; S13).

Trial court determines if the offense is extraditable, applying the dual criminality rule and other
conditions in Art. 2 of RP-US Extradition Treaty. (Art.3, [1]).

4) A strict observance of PD 1069 indicates that the only duty of SOJ is to file the extradition
petition after the request and all supporting papers are forwarded to him by SFA. It is SFA
who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers and to assure their sufficiency, to determine
if the request is politically motivated, or the offense is a military offense not punishable under non-
military penal legislation. Under S5(1) of PD 1069, SOJ has the ministerial duty of filing
extradition papers.

But here, DFA forwarded the extradition request less than 24 hours after its receipt, believing that
it was merely acting as post office so it simply forwarded the request to DOJ. After, DOJ evaluated
the documents. It was at this stage that Mark Jimenez insisted on his right to be furnished the
documents and to be heard.

The extradition process is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation. The process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding in the
exercise of an administrative body’s quasi-judicial power. The body has no power to adjudicate
as to the rights and obligations of both the requesting state and prospective extraditee. The body’s
power is limited to an initial finding whether the extradition petition can be filed in court.
5) But in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure may result in deprivation
of liberty of the prospective extraditee at 2 stages: 1) his provisional arrest pending submission
of the request because the treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request
the provisional arrest of the person sought, but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days
(20days in PD 1069) if no request is submitted. Thus, once a request is forwarded, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained. The purpose is to prevent his flight. 2) His temporary
arrest during pendency of the extradition petition in court (S6, PD 1069).

Thus, there is an impending threat to liberty as early as the evaluation stage.

We conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an

investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal. The evaluation
process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. A favorable action in an extradition
request exposes a person to eventual extradition, thus exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect. In
this sense, the evaluation is akin to a preliminary investigation since both processes may result
in arrest and imprisonment.

6) In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, S3, Rule 112

guarantees respondent’s right to basic due process, granting him the right to be furnished a copy
of the complaint, affidavits, etc. These rights may be dispensable 1) in proceedings where there
is urgent need for immediate action, 2) there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is,
where respondent can enjoy the right at a later time without prejudice, 3) where the twin rights
have been previously offered but not claimed. Does the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings fall under any of these?

7) Jimenez emphasizes that petitioners’ primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation
process. We agree with his citation of US SC ruling: The constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.

Is there really urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that t=point, there is
no extraditee yet. Extradition may or may not occur. The DOJ in this case exerted notable efforts
in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and treaty since it even informed US of
certain problems in the extradition papers. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation which
cannot be completed in an abbreviated period, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that
urgently necessitates immediate action where notice and hearing can eb dispensed with?

8) Can Jimenez exercise the right at a later time without prejudice? While tehre is yet no extraditee,
there is an administrative determination which, if adverse to the person, may cause his
incarceration. The “accused” faces the threat of arrest even during the evaluation proceeding. Thus,
the prejudice is blatant and manifest. The notice and hearing requirements of administrative
due process cannot be dispensed with.

9) Also, if a third party invokes right to information stating that the extradition papers are matters
of public concern as it may result in the extradition of a Filipino, the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government (*so bawal ibigay info). During the evaluation, no official governmental action has
as yet been done. Thus, the invocation of the right is premature. Later, records of the extradition
hearing would fall on matters of public concern because our government will have already made
an official decision to grant the extradition request.

10) Would entitling Jimenez to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage constitute a breach
of the legal duties of PH under RP-US Extradition Treaty? (pacta sunt servanda, doctrine of
incorporation). In a situation of irreconcilable conflict between a rule of international and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld since municipal courts
are organs of municipal law. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with national legislative enactments. Thus, lex posterior derogate
priori, a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. Both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if in conflict with the constitution.

Here, there is no occasion to choose which of international or municipal law should be upheld.
Instead, there is a void in RP-US Extradition Treaty as to due process rights of a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage. Jimenez not only faces a danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself. This Court’s equity jurisdiction may be availed of only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law. The issue in this case does not even call for “justice
outside legality” since Jimenez’s due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by
treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.

SC thus ordered petitioner to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him a reasonable period to file his comment.

17. SOJ v. Hon. Lantion, GR 139465, October 17, 2000, Puno, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
MR of Case 16 filed by SOJ.

ISSUE:
Whether Jimenez is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.
HELD: NO.
1) PD 1069, implementing RP-US Extradition Treaty, provides the time when an extraditee shall
be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition and supporting papers: after the filing of the
petition for extradition in the extradition court:
Sec. 6. Xxx- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court
shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on
the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused
after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge
shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
The summons includes the petition for extradition.

There is no provision in the treaty and PD 1069 granting an extraditee the right to demand from
SOJ copies of the extradition request while the request is undergoing evaluation. We cannot write
a provision in the treaty giving Jimenez that right where there is none. “Courts cannot alter, amend,
or add to a treaty xxx.”

2) All treaties should be interpreted in light of their intent. PD 1069’s preambular paragraphs
define its intent (“suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed
but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped xxx”). Countries today like PH
forge extradition treaties to stop the rise of transnational crimes. Implicit in the treaties is the
commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state.

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees and expedite their trial. Jimenez’ claim that
he should be furnished copies of the US request for his extradition while under evaluation does
not meet this desideratum. SOJ’s fear that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee
must be rooted on the experience of the executive branch and thus deserves careful consideration
of this Court.

3) An equally compelling factor is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Treaty
and the general interpretation by other countries with similar treaties with PH. DFA and DOJ has
maintained that the treaty and PD 1069 do not grant Jimenez a right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage. This understanding is shared by US government, the other party. Also,
other countries with similar extradition treaties with PH have expressed the same
interpretation like Canada and HK.

4) Jimenez likens the extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to
a preliminary investigation. But an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights. The
process of extradition does not involve the determination of guilt or innocence of an accused.
Such will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Thus, constitutional
rights relevant only to determine guilt or innocence cannot be invoked by an extraditee during
evaluation.

There are other differences of extradition and a criminal proceeding. Extradition is summary while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. Unlike in a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards.
A criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited upon showing of a prima facie case. Unlike in a criminal case where judgment
become executory after becoming final, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the
president has the final discretion to extradite him.

Thus, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage is not akin
to preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not apply to the former.

5) Jimenez claims urgency of his right to notice and hearing, alleging threat to his liberty.

RP-US Treaty provides:

 1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person
sought pending presentation of the request for extradition.
S20 of PD 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest. — (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant
to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition xxx.
Both provide that Jimenez may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for
extradition. DFA has long received such request and turned it over to DOJ. Until today, US has
not requested for Jimenez’s personal arrest. Thus, the threat to his liberty is more imagined
than real.

Also, under S6 of PD 1069, a warrant of arrest for temporary detention pending extradition hearing
may only be issued by the judge upon filing of the petition for extradition. Here, the extradition
process is still in the evaluation stage and there is no certainty that a petition will be filed. The
threat to Jiemnez’s liberty is merely hypothetical.

6) While Jimenez’ plea for due process deserves serious consideration, it collides with important
state interests which cannot be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash
of rights demands a balancing of interests approach.

Since the extradition proceeding is only at the evaluation stage, the nature of the right claimed
by Jimenez is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak; we accord
greater weight to the interests of the government thru SOJ.

Executive power includes the power to enter into treaties or international agreements. The
executive is accorded deference on matters of foreign relations.

7) The Court is not ruling that Jimenez has no right to due process all throughout the length of the
extrajudicial proceedings. A prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an
individual will suffer grievous loss.

PD 1069 and the RP-US treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence
against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for him to know the basis of the request
is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. His right to know is
momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage to accommodate the more compelling state
interest to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by premature
information of the basis of the request for his extradition.

18. Rodriguez v. RTC Judge, GR 157977, February 27, 2006, Quisumbing, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
US filed a petition for extradition thru the DOJ against petitioners. After Eduardo and Imelda
Rodriguez’s, petitioners, arrest, they applied for bail which RTC granted at P1M each. US moved
to reconsider, which was denied. US filed a petition for certiorari with SC in US v. Hon.
Ponferrada.SC directed RTC to resolve the matter of bail. In compliance, RTC, without prior
notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of petitioners and issued a warrant of arrest. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners’ bail may be cancelled without prior notice and hearing.
HELD: NO.
Respondents claim that prior notice and hearing would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant
since it could give warning that petitioners would be arrested and even encourage them to flee.
Petiitoners claim that they fall under the exception to the general rule of no-bail since they are not
flight risks nor dangers to the community.

As to Eduardo Rodriguez, the issue is moot since he voluntarily extradited himself and went to US
to face the charges against him.

1) In Government of USA v. Purganan, we held that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to

notice and hearing before issuance of a warrant of arrest because notifying him only tips him of
his pending arrest. But this is for issuance of warrant, not in a cancellation of bail issued after
determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. A prospective extraditee is arrested to avoid
his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he is no flight risk. If
the trial court finds that he is not a flight risk, it grants him bail.

2) Here, Imelda offered to go on voluntary extradition. She and her husband had posted a cash
bond of P1M. Her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition. Imelda’s passport is in the
possession of authorities. She never attempted to flee. There is a hold-departure order against her.
She is now in her sixties and under medical treatment. We believe that bail should not be revoked
without giving Imelda notice and hearing.

3) Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee if 1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community, AND 2) there exist special, humanitarian, and compelling circumstances. TC’s
immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to our ruling in Purganan. The
cancellation of Imelda’s bail without prior notice and hearing could be considered a violation of
her right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

19. Justice Cuevas v. Muñoz, GR 140520, December 18, 2000, De Leon, Jr., J., Second Div.
FACTS:
HK magistrate’s court issued a warrant of arrest (WoA) for respondent Juan Antonio Munoz for
7 counts of accepting an advantage as an agent contrary to Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of
HK, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud contrary to HK common law. PH-DOJ received a
request for provisional arrest of Munoz from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of HK-DOJ
pursuant to the “Agreement between RP and Govenrment of HK for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons.” PH-DOH forwarded the request to NBI. In behalf of HK, NBI filed an
application for provisional arrest of Munoz in RTC Branch 19. RTC granted and issued an order
of arrest. Munoz was arrested on Sept. 23, 1999 and detained in NBI detention cell.

Munoz filed with CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus and writ of HC assailing
the validity of the order of arrest. CA ruled that the order is void as there was no urgency under
Art. 11(1) of the RP-HK Extradition Agreement, the request for provisional arrest was
unauthenticated, etc. Thus, Justice Cuevas, as secretary of DOJ, filed this petition.

DOJ manifested that PH-DOJ received from HK-DOJ a formal request for Munoz’s surrender on
Nov. 5, 1999. PH-DOJ, representing HK, filed on Nov. 22, 1999 a petition for extradition in RTC
Branch 10.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisional arrest of Munoz was valid.
HELD: YES.
1) CA ruled that the offence of accepting an advantage is not punishable under RA 3019 and thus
the requirement of PD 1069 that the offense must be punishable under the laws both of the
requesting state and PH is not met. But the issue of whether the rule of double criminality applies
was not for CA to decide. RTC Branch 10 where the petition for extradition is filed has jurisdiction
to determine if the offenses in the petition are extraditable based on the dual criminality rule.

2) CA held that there was no urgency for Munoz’s provisional arrest. SC found there is.

S20(a) of PD 1069 states that in case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant
treaty, request for the provisional arrest of accused, “pending receipt of the request for
extradition xxx.” Art. 11 of RP-HK Agreement states: “(1) In urgent cases, the person sought
may, in accordance with the law of the requested Party, be provisionally arrested on the application
of the requesting Party.”

Nothing in the treaty or PH legislation defines “urgency”. Using reasonable standards of

interpretation, urgency connotes such conditions relating to the nature of the offense charged
and the personality of the prospective extraditee which would make him susceptible to the
inclination to flee form the jurisdiction if he were to learn about the impending request for his
extradition. Here, such conditions exist.

a) Munoz is charged with 7 counts of accepting advantage as agent and 7 conspiracy to defraud
punishable by 7 and 14 years imprisonment respectively. The gravity of the penalty is a factor in
determining the likelihood that the accused will abscond if allowed provisional liberty. Also,
Munoz appears to be affluent and has sufficient resources to escape from this jurisdiction.

Munoz claims that he is not a flight risk because he did not flee or hide when CB and NBI
investigated the matter alleged in the request for extradition, when HK issued a warrant for his
arrest, he never changed his address or identity, and he has never evaded arrest. But these do not
convince this Court. These are not a guarantee that he will not flee now that proceedings for his
extradition are on the way.

3) 12 days after Munoz was provisionally arrested, PH-DOJ received form HK-DOJ a request for
his surrender or extradition. S20(d) of PD 1069 states that if within 20 days after the provisional
arrest SFA has not received the request for extradition and documents in S4, the accused shall be
released from custody. Art. 11(3) of RP-HK Agreement states:
 (3) The provisional arrest of the person sought shall be terminated upon the expiration of
45 days from the date of arrest if the request for surrender has not been received,

Petitioner claims that Art. 11(3) allowing 45 days amended S20(d) of PD 1069 allowing only 20
days. But this argument is moot since on Nov. 5, 1999, or 12 days after Munoz’s arrest on
September 23, 1999 (*sept-nov=12days??), PH-DOJ already received from HK-DOJ a request
for Munoz’s surrender.

4) Munoz’s claim that his incarceration cannot continue beyond 20 days without a petition for
extradition being filed in court is bereft of merit. It is clear from the above provisions cited that
for the provisional arrest of an accused to continue, the formal extradition request is not required
to be filed in court. It only need be received by the requested state within the period in PD1069
and RP-HK Extradition Agreement.

5) The request for provisional arrest of Munoz and its accompanying documents are valid despite
lack of authentication. It is clear in S20(b) of PD 1069 and Art. 11(1) of RP-HK Agreement that
there is no requirement for authentication of a request for provisional arrest and its
accompanying documents.

RP-HK Agreement enumerates the documents that must accompany the request: 1) indication of
intent to request surrender of the person sought; 2) text of a WoA or judgment of conviction against
that person; 3) statement of penalty for that offense; 4) further information as would justify the
issuance of a WoA had the offence been convicted within the jurisdiction of the requested party.
The enumeration does not specify that these documents must be authenticated copies. Art.
11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional arrest to be
authenticated, but Art. 9 makes authentication a requisite for admission in evidence f any
document accompanying a request for surrender or extradition. Authentication is required for
request for extradition but not for request for provisional arrest.

6) Munoz claims that his provisional arrest was defective since the person who made the request
was not a foreign diplomat under S4(2), PD 1069:
SEC. 4. Request; By Whom Made, Requirements. — (1) Any foreign state or government
with which the Republic of the Philippines has entered into extradition treaty or
convention, and only when the relevant treaty or convention, remains in force, may request
for the extradition of any accused who is suspected of being in the territorial jurisdiction
of the Philippines.
(2) The request shall be made by the Foreign Diplomat of the requesting state or
government, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs xxx.

But S4(2) refers to the requirements for a request for extradition and not for provisional arrest.
Art 11(2) of RP-HK Agreement is pertinent:
An application for provisional arrest may be forwarded through same channels as a request
for surrender xxx.
Art. 8(1) provides that “Requests for surrender xxx shall be conveyed through the appropriate
authority xxx.” Thus, there is compliance with the foregoing if the request for provisional arrest
is made by an official authorized by the government of the requesting state to make such
request.

Here, the request for provisional arrest was signed by Wayne Walsh, government counsel of the
Mutual Legal Assistance Unit of HK-DOJ who stated that he is authorized to make such request.

7) There was sufficient factual and legal basis for determination of probable cause as a requisite
for issuance of the order of arrest. The request for Munoz’s arrest was accompanied by facsimile
copies of the outstanding WoA issued by HK, a summary of facts of the case against him,
particulars of his birth and address, an intention to request his provisional arrest and reasons
therefor. These formed the basis of the judge’s finding of probable cause for issuance of a WoA
against Munoz. RTC Judge made a personal determination of the existence of probable cause based
on such documents.

20. Govenrment of HK Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, GR 153675, April 19,
2007, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, PH and the then British Crown Colony of HK signed an “Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.” It took effect June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, HK
reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the HK Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the HK court with 3 counts of “accepting an
advantage as agent.” He also faces 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each charge.

The DOJ received from the HK DOJ a request for the provisional arrest of Muñoz. This ws
forwarded to the NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC an application for Muñoz’s provisional
arrest. The RTC ordered his arrest. The NBI agents arrested and detained Muñoz. He filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the validity of the order of arrest. The CA declared
said order void. The DOJ filed with this Court for certiorari, praying reversal of the CA decision.
The SC granted the petition, sustaining the validity of the order of arrest against Muñoz. The
decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, on Nov.22, 1999, petitioner HK Admin Region filed with the RTC a petition for the
extradition of Muñoz. Muñoz filed a petition for bail in said case. The RTC Judge Bernardo
denied the bail holding that there is no PH law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz
is a high “flight risk.” Judge Bernardo inhibited himself. The case was raffled to Judge Olalia.
Muñoz moved for reconsideration. Olalia granted the motion, allowing Muñoz to post bail. Olalia
set bail at P750k and ordered him to surrender his valid passport to the Court. He was also required
to report to the government prosecutors handling the case and if they desire, they can manifest
before the RTC to require that all assets of Muñoz be filed with the RTC which will all be forfeited
if he flees.

HKAR moved to vacate this order, which was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Muñoz, a potential extraditee, may be granted bail upon application for his extradition by
the Hongkong Administrative Region to face criminal prosecution therein.
HELD: YES, upon showing of clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk.
HKAR alleges that the RTC committed GADALEJ in admitting Muñoz to bail and there is nothing
in the constitution or law providing that a potential extradite has a right to bail, said right being
limited to criminal proceedings.

Art.III provides:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
It was held in Government of US of America v. Hon. Purganan that bail does not apply to
extradition proceedings and that it is available only in criminal proceedings. At first glance, the
ruling therein applies squarely here. But this Court cannot ignore the following trends in
international law: 1) growing importance of the individual person in public international law who,
in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; 2) the higher value now being to
human rights in the international sphere, 3) the duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling treaty obligations; and 4) duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual
under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern
trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person
and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may be a
subject of international law is now taking root.

Thus, on Dec. 10, 1948, the UNGA adopted the UDHR. While not a treaty, the principles therein
were now recognized as customarily binding upon members of the international community.
It was held that the principles therein are part of the law of the land. The ICCPR was also adopted.

PH, along with other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental
human rights. This commitment is enshrined in S2, Art.II of the constitution (The state values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.) thus, PH is under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty, including the right to bail. In light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly to life and liberty, a reexamination
of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, we note that the state’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, like deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, PH jurisprudence has not limited bail to
criminal proceedings only. Bail has been allowed to persons in detention during pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking cognizance of the obligation of PH under international
conventions to uphold human rights.

In the 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco, a Chinese facing deportation was granted bail. The Court
opined while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used is the
“machinery of criminal law.” In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the SC held that foreign nationals
against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending finality
of an order of deportation. The Court there relied on the UDHR.

If bail can be granted in deportation proceedings, we see no justification why it should not be
allowed in extradition cases. Since the UDHR applies to deportation, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition. Both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue. The right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in light of the various treaty obligations of PH.

Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding even if the potential extradite is a criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime even
though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to
treaty obligations between different nations. It is merely administrative in character. Its object
is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for trial or punishment.

But while it is not a criminal proceeding, extradition is characterized by: 1) deprivation of liberty
and 2) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the “machinery of criminal
law. ”PD 1069, S6 (PH Extradition Law) mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused” if such will “best serve the interest of justice.” Thus, while an
extradition proceeding is ostensibly administrative, it bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extradite may be subjected to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, there is no
provision prohibiting him from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
constitution.

However, the applicable standard of due process should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. The standard in the latter is premised on the presumption of innocence. It is from
this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in
mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind issuance of the arrest awarrant
and temporary detention is the possibility of flight of the potential extradite. This is based on
the assumption that he is a fugitive from justice. Thus, the extraditee bears the ONUS
PROBANDI of showing that he is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Pacta sunt servanda demands that PH honoes its obligations under the extradition treaty with
HKAR. The standard of proof in an extradition proceeding, being sui generis, cannot be beyond
reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence. The standard of substantial evidence in
administrative proceedings cannot likewise apply even if it is administrative in character given the
object of extradition to prevent the extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. The new standard
proposed in CJ Puno’s separate opinion in Purganan, CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE, should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. This should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

Since there is no showing that Muñoz presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk, this
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine if he may be granted bail based on clear
and convincing evidence.

21. People v. Wong Cheng, GR L-18924, October 19, 1922, Romualdez, J., First Div.
FACTS:
In this appeal, attorney-general urges the revocation of the CFI order sustaining the demurrer of
defendant to the information accusing Wong of having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay
2.5miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether PH has jurisdiction over a crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.
HELD: YES.
1) There are 2 fundamental rules on this matter in connection with International Law: 1) the
French Rule- crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; 2) English Rule- followed in US, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
whose territory they were committed. English Rule obtains in this jurisdiction because it is
prevailing in US, PH being now a territory of US.

2) It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed like in Mali v. Keeper of Common
Jail (120 US 1):
Disorders which disturb only the peace of the ship are dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the ship, but those which disturb public peace may be suppressed and, if
need be, the offenders punished by the authorities of the local jurisdiction.
Thus, in US v. Look Chaw (18 Phil 573), we held:
Although mere possession of an article prohibited in PH aboard a foreign vessel in transit
in any local port does not constitute a crime, such vessel being considered an extension of
its own nationality, this does not apply when the article is landed from the vessel upon
PH soil.
3) The mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court as not
triable by our courts because the object of the Opium Law is to protect PH from its disastrous
effects arising from its use. Mere possession without use does not bring about such effects. But to
smoke opium within our territory, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is a breach of
public order as it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.

22. Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, GR L-14279, October 31, 1961,
Concepcion, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Respondent EST was consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the
Manila Port. Some shipments came from Japan and others from HK. Since none of the shipments
had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45, the goods were seized. Collector
of Customs of Manila rendered a decision declaring the goods forfeited to the government. The
goods were previously released to the consignees on surety bonds, so the amount of the bonds
were ordered paid to the Bureau of Customs. Commissioner of Customs, on appeal, affirmed.
CTA reversed, ruling that, among others, that the forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan
cannot be justified under EO 328 since it seeks to implement an executive agreement (which
extended the effectivity of our Trade and Financial Agreements with Japan) which, CTA believed,
is of dubious validity since Senate had not concurred in its making. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the executive agreement with Japan is valid.
HELD: YES.
1) Concurrence of the Senate is required by the constitution (Art. VII, S10[7], *1935)in the making
of “treaties” which, however, are distinct and different from “executive agreements”, which
may be validly entered into without such concurrence. Treaties are formal documents which
require ratification with approval of 2/3 of Senate. Executive agreements become binding thru
executive action without need of a vote by senate or congress.

2) The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements without need of congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered
into EAs covering commercial and consular relations, patent rights, navigation arrangements, etc.

3) International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a temporary nature usually
take the form of executive agreements.

4) Agreements concluded by the president which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and sometimes of
more formal documents denominated as “agreements” or “protocols.” The point where ordinary
correspondence ends and agreements begin may sometimes be difficult to ascertain.

SC reversed CTA’s decision and affirmed that of commissioner of customs’/

23. Bayan v. ES Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000, Buena, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
On March 14, 1947, PH and US forged a Military Bases Agreement. In the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory. In view of the impending
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, PH and US negotiated for a possible
extension. PH Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship which would have
extended the presence of US military bases in PH.
On July 18, 1997, US panel, headed by US Defense Secretary for Asia Pacific Campbell, met with
the PH panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Usec Severino Jr. to to exchange notes on
“complementing the strategic interests of US and PH in the Asia-Pacific region.” They negotiated
on a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). On Oct. 5, 1998, Pres. Erap thru SFA ratified the VFA.
The president, thru ES Zamora, officially transmitted the VFA to senate for concurrence pursuant
to S21, Art. VII of the 1987 cosntitution. Senate approved VFA on May 27, 1999. VFA officially
entered into force on June 01, 1999 after an exchange of notes between Sec. Siazon and US
Ambassador Hubbard.

These are consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
VFA.

ISSUE:
Whether VFA is validly ratified and thus valid in PH.
HELD: YES.
1) Petitioners argue that S25, Art. XVIII applies since VFA’s subject is the presence of foreign
military troops in PH while respondents claim that S21, Art. VII applies since VFA is not a basing
arrangement but only involves temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.

S21, Art. VII reads:

"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
S25, Art. XVIII reads:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by
the other contracting State."
S21, Art. VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general while S25, Art. XVIII is a
special provision that applies to treaties involving the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities in PH.

a) VFA defines the treatment of US troops and personnel visiting PH. It provides guidelines to
govern such visits and defines the rights of US and PH in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment and supplies.
Undoubtedly, S25, Art. XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in this case. But in a limited sense, Lex specialis derogate
generali.

b) It is specious to argue that S25, Art. XVIII is inapplicable to transient agreements. The
constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguire debemos.
c) We do not subscribe to the argument that S25, Art. XVIII is not controlling since no foreign
military bases but merely foreign troops and facilities are involved in VFA. The provision covers
“foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” The clause does not refer to “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use
of comma and the disjunctive “or” signifies disassociation. Any of the three standing alone
places it under the coverage of S25, Art. XVIII. (SC cites 1986 concom deliberations)

2) S25, Art. XVIII disallows foreign military bases etc. unless these conditions are met: 1) it must
be under a treaty 2) “duly concurred in by the senate” and, when so required by congress,
ratified by national referendum; and 3) it is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first 2 requisites. The senate’s concurrence is in
accordance with the constitution whether in S21, Art. VII or S25, Art. XVIII. National referendum
is unnecessary since congress has not required it.

a) S21, Art. VII requires concurrence by 2/3 of the senators while S25, Art. XVIII simply requires
that the treaty be “duly concurred in by the senate.” Applying these, 2/3 vote of all members of
senate is clearly required. S25, Art. XVIII must be read in light of S21, Art. VII. S25, Art. XVIII
must not be treated in isolation to S21, Art. VII.

b) Petitioners claim that “recognized as a treaty” in S25, Art. XVIII means that VFA should have
the consent of US Senate pursuant to its constitutional process and that it should not be merely
considered an executive agreement by US.

But “recognized as a treaty” means that the other party accepts or acknowledges the agreement
as a treaty. To require the other contracting state or US to submit VFA to US Senate is to accord
strict meaning to the phrase. Words in the constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. Its language should be understood in the sense they
have in common use.

b.1) Also, it is inconsequential whether US treats VFA only as an executive agreement because
under international law, an executive agreement is AS BINDING AS a treaty. A treaty is defined
by the Vienna convention on the Law of Treaties (“an international instrument concluded between
states xxx.”). there are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of
which are: act, protocol, agreement, compromise d’ arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration,
exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter, and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius
onward, have pointed out that the names or titles of international agreements included under the
general term “treaty” have little or no legal significance. Certain terms are useful but furnish little
more than mere description.

Art. 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that “the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use
of terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the
meanings which may be given to them in the internal law of the State." Thus, in international
law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements IN THEIR BINDING
EFFECT upon states concerned. They are equally binding obligations upon nations.
c) In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without
concurrence of the senate or congress (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading).

3) US Government, thru Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, has stated that US government has fully
committed to living up to the terms of VFA. For as long as USA accepts or acknowledges VFA
as a treaty and binds itself to comply with its obligations thereunder, there is compliance with
the mandate of the constitution.

4) The president’s ratification of VFA is also an unequivocal expression of our nation’s consent to
be bound by VFA. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of
the state or of the government, thru which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. The
consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides
for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that
ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to
ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from
the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the president and not in the legislature as
commonly believed.

5) Art. 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by ILC in 1949 states: "Every
State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse
for failure to perform this duty." Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which provides
that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." This is pacta sunt servanda.

SC dismissed the petitions.

24. Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, GR 101538, June 23, 1992, Cruz,J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Santos is a minor and PH resident. NOA is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota
USA and licensed to do business in PH. Santos purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San
Francisco USA for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. No date was
specified for his return to San Francisco. Santos checked in at the NOA counter in San Francisco
airport for his departure to Manila. despite previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight. He had to be wait-listed.

Santos sued NOA for damages in RTC of Makati. NOA moved to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Citing Art. 28 of the Warsaw convention, NOA claims that the complaint could be
instituted only in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before 1) the court of the
domicile of the carrier, 2) of its principal place of business, 3) where it has a place of business thru
which the contract had been made, 4) of the place of destination. NOA claims that PH was not its
domicile nor principal place of business. Santos’ ticket was not issued in this country nor was his
destination Manila but San Francisco in US.
RTC dismissed. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Warsaw Convention still applies in the PH.
HELD: YES.
1) Santos claims that the convention was intended to protect airline companies under conditions
prevailing then and which have long ceased to exist due to significant developments in the
airline industry thru the years. The treaty has thus become irrelevant and become
unconstitutional.

Santos is invoking the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine constitutes an attempt to
formulate a legal principle which would justify non-performance of a treaty obligation if the
conditions with relation to which the parties contracted have changed so materially and
unexpectedly as to create a situation in which the exaction of performance would be
unreasonable. The key element of this doctrine is the vital change in the condition of the
contracting parties that they could not have foreseen at the time the treaty was concluded.

It is true that when the Warsaw Convention was drafted, the airline industry was still in its infancy.
But that circumstance alone is not sufficient justification for the rejection of the treaty at this time.
The changes cited by Santos were not entirely unforeseen although they were expected in a general
sense only. The convention, anticipating such developments, contains:
Article 41. Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier than two years after the
coming into force of this convention to call for the assembling of a new international
conference in order to consider any improvements which may be made in this convention.
To this end, it will communicate with the Government of the French Republic which will
take the necessary measures to make preparations for such conference.
2) But the more important consideration is that the treaty has not been rejected by the PH
government. Rebus sic stantibus does NOT OPERATE AUTOMATICALLY to render the
treaty inoperative. There is a necessity for a FORMAL ACT OF REJECTION, usually made
by the head of state, with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no
longer required.

In lieu thereof, the convention may be denounced even without an expressed justification. Such
denunciation is authorized under its Art. 39:
Article 39. (1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by
a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at once
inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
3) Rejection of the treaty, whether on the ground of rebus sic stantibus or pursuant to Art. 39, is
not a function of the courts but of the other branches of government. This is a political act.

4) SC also ruled that PH has no jurisdiction applying Art. 28:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of
the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through
which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
The “place of destination” means the ultimate destination, which is San Francisco. Manila is only
an agreed stopping place. Although the date of return flight was left open, the contract of carriage
between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport Santos to San Francisco from
Manila.

25. Gonzales v. ES Hechanova, GR L-21897, October 22, 1963, Concepcion, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
ES Hechanova authorized the importation of 67k tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources and created a rice procurement committee, other respondents herein, to implement the
importation. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed this petition, claiming that the importation violates RA 3452 and RA 2207 and
that a preliminary injunction is needed to preserve the rights of the parties during pendency of the
case.

ISSUE:
Whether the importation may be validly authorized.
HELD: NO.
1) SC ruled that the importation violated RA 3452, RA 2207, CA 138.

2) It is contended that PH has already entered into 2 contracts for the purchase of rice, one with
Vietnam and another with Burma, and that these contracts are valid executive agreements under
international law. In case of conflict between RAs 2207 and 3452 and these contracts, the latter
should prevail because, if a treaty and statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be
resolved in favor of the one latest in point of time (under American jurisprudence). Respondents
also claim that PH has already paid the price of the rice involved.

The Court is not satisfied that the contracts are executive agreements. The parties thereto do not
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But even assuming that they are
executive agreements, the same are unlawful and null and void, being inconsistent with RAs
2207 and 3452. Although the president may, under the American constitutional system, enter into
EAs without previous legislative authority, he may not, by EA, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statues enacted prior thereto. The main function of the executive is to enforce
laws. It may not interfere with legislative powers except in the exercise of veto power. He may
not defeat laws by indirectly repealing them thru an EA.

a) The American theory that, in case of conflict between a treaty and statute, the one latest in point
of time prevails, is not applicable. Respondents not only admit, but also insist, that the contracts
here are not treaties. The American theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which
US is signatory require the consent of its senate, and thus a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as to EAs not authorized by previous
legislation.

b) International agreements may be invalidated by our courts since the Constitution provides in
S2, Art. VIII (*1935) that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise reverse,
modify, or affirm, on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, xxx final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in -1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance xxx
is in question.

SC declared ES as having no power to authorize the importation in question but didn’t issue the
injunction prayed for.

26. Ichong v. Hernandez, GR L-7995, May 31, 1957, Labrador, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
RA 1180, “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibits persons not PH citizens and
corporations etc. not wholly owned by PH citizens from engaging in retail trade except those
already engaged on May 15, 1954 unless their licenses are forfeited or until their death or 10 years
in case of juridical persons, prohibits aliens engaged in retail business from opening additional
stores or branches etc. Petitioner in his own behalf and that of other alien residents or corporations
adversely affected assail the constitutionality of RA 1180.

ISSUE:
Whether
HELD:
1) SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 1180 (police power, equal protection, due process).

2) Another argument against RA 1180 is its supposed violation of the Charter of the United Nations
and the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by UNGA. This has no merit. The UN Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects. The
Declaration of HR contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and nations. That such is their import can be inferred from the fact
that members of UN prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the
world, laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

3) The Treaty of Amity between PH and China is also claimed to be violated. But all that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment of Chinese nationals upon the same terms as nationals of any
other country. The nationals of China are not discriminated against since nationals of all other
countries, except US, are all prohibited from engaging in retail trade. But even if RA 1180 violates
the treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and
the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

27. Philip Morris Inc. v. CA, GR 91332, July 16, 1993, Melo, J., Third Div.
FACTS:
Philip Morris, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of Virginia, USA. Benson and Hedges
(Canada) Inc. and Fabriques of Tabac Reunies are subsidiaries of PM. They are not doing business
in PH and are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered owners of “MARK VII”, “MARK
TEN”, and “LARK” trademarks, petitioners claim that Fortune Tobacco Corporation, private
respondent, has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the allegedly confusingly
similar trademark “MARK” in violation of the Trademark Law and should thus be precluded from
doing so via a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners’ prayer for writ of PI was denied by the RTC. It took cognizance of the fact that
Fortune’s application for registration of its trademark was still pending in the PH Patent Office
(PPO). Later, petitioners cited supervening events, that is, that the application of Fortune with PPO
was rejected and moved again for issuance of writ of PI. But RTC denied again, ruling that there
is no proof that petitioners’ products which they want to protect from any adverse effect of the
trademark applied for by Fortune is in actual use in PH.

CA initially granted the issuance of a writ of PI, enjoining Fortune from advertising “MARK”
cigarettes. But when Fortune moved to dissolve the writ with offer to post counterbond, CA acted
favorably premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to answer for whatever prejudice
petitioners may suffer. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD: NO.
1) SC held that petitioners have personality to sue in PH under S21-A of the Trademark Law
despite not doing business in PH.

2) Petitioners claim that actual use of their trademarks in PH commercial dealings is not an
indispensable element under Art. 2 of the Paris Convention of 1965:
(2) . . . no condition as to the possession of a domicile or establishment in the country where
protection is claimed may be required of persons entitled to the benefits of the Union for
the enjoyment of any industrial property rights.
But S2 and 2-A of the Trademark Law requires actual commercial use of the trademark in
the local forum:
SEC. 2. What are registrable. — Trademarks, tradenames and service marks owned by
persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in the Philippines and by
persons, corporations, partnerships or associations domiciled in any foreign country may
be registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act; Provided, That said trademarks,
tradenames, or service marks are actually in use in commerce and services not less than
two months in the Philippines before the time the applications for registration are filed;
SEC. 2-A. Ownership of trademarks, tradenames and service marks; how acquired. —
Anyone who lawfully produces or deals in merchandise of any kind or who engages in any
lawful business, or who renders any lawful service in commerce, by actual use thereof in
manufacture or trade, in business, and in the service rendered, may appropriate to his
exclusive use a trademark, a tradename, or a service mark not so appropriated by another,
to distinguish his merchandise, business or service from the merchandise, business or
service of others.
3) Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding
the requirement of actual use in PH must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch
as the clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. The fact that international alw has been
made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primary of international law
over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of international law are given a standing EQUAL, not superior, to national
legislative enactments.
Thus, petitioners have capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in
PH under S21-A of the Trademark Law but the question of whether they have an exclusive right
over their symbol as to justify issuance of the writ of PI will depend on actual use of their
trademarks in PH in line with S2 and 2-A.

28. Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. v. Blaylock Transportation Services Employees

Association-Kilusan, GR L-41518, June 30, 1976, Second Div.
FACTS:
The US Naval Base authorities in Subic, Zambales conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract
for the right to operate and manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding
was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner of Guerrero’s Transport Services Inc., over Concepcion
Blaylock, then the incumbent concessionaire doing business as Blaylock Transport Services,
whose 395 employees are members of respondent union BTEA-Kilusan. When Guerrero, after
commencing operations, refused to employ the members of BTEA, the latter filed a complaint in
NLRC to compel Guerrero to employ its members pursuant to Art. 1, S2, of the RP-US Base
Agreement.

NLRC ordered petitioner to absorb all complainants who filed applications before the deadline
previously set by Guerrero. The Secretary of Labor affirmed. BTEA filed a motion for execution.
Respondent labor arbiter directed Guerrero to reinstate 129 complainants and pay them backwages
and issued a writ directing the sheriff to levy on money and properties of petitioner.

Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioner claims that respondent LA had no
jurisdiction. The parties then entered into a compromise agreement where they agreed to submit
to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of BTEA who shall be reinstated by petitioner.
SC approved this agreement. Sec. of Labor, pursuant ot the agreement, issued an order, ordering
the LA to implement absorption of BTEA members subject to these conditions: 1) that they were
bona fide employees of Blaylock at the time its concession expired; 2) the applicants shall pass
final screening and approval. In compliance, LA de los Reyes conducted a hearing to determine
who were “bona fide employees” of Blaylock and found that 174 employees were such.

For implementation, the list of names of the 174 are submitted to the US Navy authorities for
screening and approval.

ISSUE:
Whether Guerrero must employ the employees of the previous concessionaire Blaylock.
HELD: YES.
1) Pursuant to S6, Art. 1 of the PH-US Labor Agreement of May 27, 1968, the US Armed Forces
undertook “to provide security, for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted
out, the United States Armed Forces shall require the contractor or consideration to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment."

2) A treaty has 2 aspects: 1) as an international agreement between states, and 2) as municipal

law for the people of each state to observe. As part of municipal law, S6 enters into and forms
part of the contract between petitioner and the US Naval Base authorities. Thus, the new
contractor is bound to give priority to the employment of the qualified employees of the
previous contractor. It is in recognition of such obligation that petitioner entered into the
compromise agreement.

3) According to BTEA, Commander Vertplaetse of the US Navy Exchange declined to implement

the order of LA, as it is petitioner who should request for the screening and approval of the
applicants. A compromise agreement has the authority of res judicata and is enforceable upon
approval by the court.

SC ordered petitioner to employ members of BTEA who satisfy the 2 conditions in the Sec. of
Labor’s order and to secure from the authorities of the US Naval Base in Subic the requisite
screening and approval the names of the 174 BTEA members.

29. WHO v. Aquino, GR L-35131, November 29, 1972, Teehankee, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned to the Manila regional office by WHO. When his
personal effects contained in 12 crates entered PH as unaccompanied baggage, they were allowed
free entry from duties and taxes. But upon application of respondents COSAC (Constabulary
Offshore Action Center) officers, judge Aquino issued a search warrant for alleged violation of
RA 4712, amending S3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. upon protest of Dr. Dy, WHO
Regional Director for the western pacific station in Manila, SFA Carlos Romulo wired judge
Aquino, advising that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search as to his personal baggage
as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement. Judge Aquino set
Romulo’s request for hearing. But notwithstanding the official plea of diplomatic immunity,
Aquino still issued his order maintaining the effectivity of his search warrant.

Verstuft’s special appearance to plead diplomatic immunity and motion to quash search warrant
was also heard, where OSG appeared and stated the official position of the executive branch that
Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity. But Aquino still denied quashal of the search warrant.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Dr. Verstuyft’s personal effects and crates may be searched.
HELD: NO.
1) DFA formally adised Aquino of the PH Government’s official position that Verstuft cannot be
subject of a PH court summons without violating an obligation in international law of PH. OSG,
as principal law officer of the government, expressly affirmed Verstuyft’s diplomatic immunity.
Diplomatic immunity is essentially a POLITICAL QUESTION and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive. Where the executive affirms the plea of diplomatic
immunity, it is the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity. Courts may not so
exercise jurisdiction as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations.

2) PH is bound by the procedure in Art. VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the Specialized Agencies of the UN for consultations between the host state and UN agency to
determine, in the first instance, the fact of occurrence of abuse alleged, and if so, to ensure that no
repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treaty commitment of PH and thus has the
force and effect of law.

3) Even arguendo that Aquino had some ground to prefer the COSAC officers’ suspicion that there
had been abuse of diplomatic immunity, the continuatuoiin of the search warrant proceedings was
not the proper remedy. In deference to the exclusive competence of the executive to act on the
matter, he should have acceded to the quashal and forwarded his findings to believe that there had
been abuse of diplomatic immunity to the DFA for it to deal with.

30. DFA v. NLRC, GR 113191, September 18, 1996, Vitug, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Private respondent Jose Magnayi filed a case for illegal dismissal against Asian Development Bank
(ADB) and its violation of labor only contracting law. summonses were served to ADB and DFA.
ADB and DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that ADB and its officers were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings etc. pursuant to Ar.t 50(1) and Art. 55 of the
Agreement Establishing the ADB (charter) in relation to S5, S44 of the Agreement Between the
Bank and the Government of PH Regarding the Bank’s Headquarters (HQ Agreement).

LA took cognizance of the case on the impression that ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity
from suit. LA ruled in favor of Magnayi. DFA referred the matter to NLRC and sought a vacation
of the “void judgment.” NLRC replied to the letter, saying that it had jurisdiction under the LC.
Hence this petition for certiorari. OSG also filed its comment that ADB was immune under its
Charter and the HQ Agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether ADB is immune from suit.
HELD: YES.
Art. 50(1) of the Charter states:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising
out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee
obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of securities."
Art. 55 states:
"All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the Bank, including
experts performing missions for the Bank: "(1) shall be immune from legal process with
respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives
the immunity."
Like provisions are found in the HQ Agreement.

1) The provisions should be well enough to establish that, except in specified cases of borrowing
etc., ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. Its officers enjoy immunity as to all
acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and HQ Agreement are commitments
voluntarily assumed by PH which must be respected. In WHO v. Aquino, we have declared that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question xxx.

2) Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, ADB is
independent of municipal law. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction. The reason is that the subjection of such organization to the
authority of local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions.

3) Magnayi argues that, by entering into service contracts, ADB has descended to the level of an
ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit,
citing the case of Holy See v. Rosario (on jure imperii, jure gestionis). But the service contracts
have not been intended by ADB for profit but are official acts over which waiver of immunity
would not attach.

4) DFA has legal standing to file this petition. Its functions include determining persons or
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities. DFA must be allowed to plead its case when
necessary to enable it to help keep the credibility of PH before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, parties are deemed to have accepted the responsibility of
seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In PH, this task falls on DFA.

31. Liang (Huefeng) v. People, GR 125865, March 26, 2001, Ynares-Santiago, J., First
Division.
FACTS:
2 criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against petitioner, a Chinese national
employed as economist by ADB, alleging that on 2 occasions, he uttered defamatory words to
Joyce Cabal, clerical staff member of ADB. MTC, acting pursuant to advice from DFA that Liang
enjoyed diplomatic immunity, dismissed the informations. On certiorari by the People, RTC set
aside the MTC dismissal. Hence this petition for review. On January 28, 2000, SC rendered the
assailed decision denying the petition for review, ruling that immunity of ADB staff is limited to
acts performed in an official capacity. Hence this MR.

Liang’s MR deals with the diplomatic immunity of ADB and its officials.

ISSUE:
Whether the criminal informations against Liang must be dismissed on the ground of his
diplomatic immunity.
HELD: NO.
Nowhere in the asailed decision is diplomatic immunity denied. The issue in this case, rather,
boils down to whether Liang’s statements were uttered while in the performance of his official
functions so that it may fall squarely under S45(a) of the HQ Agreement:
Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities: (a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
We find no cogent reason to disturb our January 28, 2000 decision. Slander of a person cannot be
considered within the purview of immunity granted to ADB officers.

32. Jose B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR L-65366, November 09, 1983, Fernando, CJ. En Banc.
FACTS:
Petitioner, retired justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from
Manila City to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 from 2pm-5pm, starting from
Luneta to the gates of the US embassy, 2 blocks away. Once there, on an open space of public
property, a short program would be held. After 2 brief speeches, a petition would be presented to
a representative of the embassy so that it may be delivered to the US Ambassador.

A mandamus suit was filed on Oct. 20, 1983 due to the fact that petitioner had not been informed
of any action taken on his request. It turned out that on Oct. 19, the permit was denied due to police
intelligence reports that there are plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate any assembly
or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent Mayor
Bagatsing suggested that the rally be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area.

On Oct. 25, 1983, a minute resolution was issued by SC, granting the mandatory injunction prayed
for on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that could justify denial of a permit. The last sentence of the minute resolution
states that it is “without prejudice to a more extended opinion.” Hence this exposition.

ISSUE:
Whether the rally may be allowed.
HELD: YES.
1) If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question would have arisen. But there would be a short
program on the public space between the 2 gates of the US Embassy at Roxas Boulevard.

PH is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was

concurred in by the PH Senate on May 3, 1965. The instrument of ratification was signed by the
president, and was thereafter deposited with the SecGen of UN on Nov. 15. As of that date, it
was binding on PH.

2) Art. 22, 2nd par. thereof reads:

"2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the
premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of
the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity."
The constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land. To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the GAP of international
law, it should bep art of the law of the land. Thus, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity,there
would be justification to deny the permit.

Moreover, Mayor Bagatsing relied on Ordinance 7295 of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies
within 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery.

3) It is admitted that Ordinance 7295 finds support in Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. But there was no showing that the distance between the chancery and
embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if such condition was satisfied, it does not follow that
Bagatsing could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial could still be challenged. It
could be argued that there is an unconstitutional application of the ordinance to the exercise of the
right of peaceable assembly. But since there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet,
the need to pass on that issue was obviated.

SC upheld the rally as exercise of the right to free speech and to peaceably assemble.

33. Deutsche Gesellschaft v. CA, GR 152318, April 16, 2009, Tinga, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
In 1971, Germany and PH ratified an agreement on technical cooperation. In 1999, PH and
Germany agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This 1999 Arrangement
affirmed the commitment of both governments to promote a project called Social Health Insurance
Networking and Empowerment (SHINE), designed to enable PH families to secure sustainable
and quality health care. In the Arrangement, both parties agreed to contribute to the project. PH
designated DOH and PhilHealth as implementing agencies of SHINE. Germany charged Deustche
Gessellschaft Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).

Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work on SHINE
(information systems manager, project assistant etc.). In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay,
Belgian, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements arose between Nicolay and
respondents as to the course Nicolay was taking in implementing SHINE. Respondents sent a letter
to Nicolay, DOH, and PhilHealth, and the director of GTZ, raising several issues. They ended the
letter with: “We could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues
be addressed immediately and appropriately.”

In response, Nicolay wrote the respondents that she accepted their resignation as found in the end
of their letter. Respondents received a letter informing them of the pre-termination of their
contracts of employment on the grounds of gross insubordination resulting to loss of confidence.

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC. GTZ moved to dismiss, claiming
that it was immune from suit. LA denied, stating that GTZ was a private corporation and it failed
to secure from DFA of its diplomatic status. LA eventually ruled that respondents were illegally
dismissed.

GTZ filed a petition for certiorari directly with the CA (not NLRC), which was dismissed. Hence
this petition. OSG took the side of GTZ, saying that GTZ was immune from suit.

ISSUE:
Whether GTZ is immune from suit.
HELD: NO.
1) The principle of state immunity from suit, local or foreign, is reflected in S9, Art. XVI of the
Constitution- “The state may not be sued without its consent.” What consists of the “state?” For
one, the doctrine is available to foreign states.

2) The fact that GTZ entered into employment contracts did not disqualify it from invoking
immunity from suit as held in Holy See v. Rosario Jr (depends pa if jure imperii or jure gestionis).
There is no dispute that GTZ was not performing proprietary functions. But is GTZ able to enjoy
Germany’s immunity from suit?
3) GTZ’s counsel characterizes GTZ as “implementing agency of” Germany. This does not
automatically invest GTZ with ability to invoke state immunity from suit. The distinction lies in
whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated.

An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical
personality. If incorporated, the test of suability is found in its CHARTER. It is suable if its
charter says so, regardless of the functions it is performing.

a) State immunity may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form
of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. It is useful to note that PH
designated PhilHealth as implementing agency. PhilHealth was established in RA 7875, S16(g) of
which grants it the power to sue and be sued in court. It would not enjoy immunity from suit even
in performing its functions connected with SHINE, however governmental in nature they may be.

b) Neither GTZ nor OSG go beyond the claim that GTZ is Germany’s implementing agency.
Private respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was
a private corporation.

But GTZ’s own website states that it is “Federally owned”, a “federal enterprise”, and “founded
in 1975 as a company under private law.” Germany’s own official website says that GTZ is a
private company owned by Germany. It appears that GTZ was organized not thru a legislative
public charter, but under private law, in the same way that PH corporations can be organized
under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the PH government.

c) It is possible that under German law, an entity like GTZ is not vested with the power to sue or
be sued. But GTZ failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be sued despite
being owned by Germany. We adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of PH, and following
the most intelligent assumption, GTZ is akin to a GOCC without original charter which, by virtue
of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued.

4) LA ruled that it was imperative for GTZ to secure from DFA a certification of diplomatic status
and entitlement to diplomatic privileges, including immunity from suits. The requirement might
not necessarily be imperative. But had GTZ obtained such certification, it would have provided
factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable
evidentiary presumption that it is immune which the opposing party will have to overcome.

a) Would the fact that OSG endorsed GTZ’s claim of state immunity sufficiently substitute for the
DFA certification? The rule in PIL quoted in Holy See referred to endorsement by the foreign
office of the state where the suit is filed, such office in PH being the DFA. Nowhere in OSG’s
comment is it manifested that DFA has endorsed GTZ’s claim, or that OSG had solicited DFA’s
views on the matter. The comment filed by OSG does not inspire the same degree of confidence
as a certification from the DFA would have elicited.
34. International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, GR 85750, September 28, 1990,
Melencio-Herrera, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
1) GR 85750.
After the Vietnam war, the plight of Vietnamese refugees confronted the international community.
In response, an agreement was forged between PH and UNHCR for an operating center to process
Indo-Chinese refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries to be established in Bataan.
ICMC was one those of refugee processing centers. It is registered with UN ECOSOC. In 1986,
Trade Unions of the PH and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the ministry of labor a petition
for certification election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. ICMC opposed,
claiming that it is an international organization and enjoys diplomatic immunity.

LA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Director Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR),
on appeal, reversed LA and ordered the conduct of certification election.

Later, PH, thru DFA, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with diplomatic privileges
and immunities. ICMC sought dismissal of the TUPAS petition invoking the immunity expressly
granted but was denied again by Calleja. Hence this petition.

2) GR 89331.
PH and the Ford Rockefeller Foundations signed a MoU establishing the International Rice
Research Institute (IRR) in Laguna. It was intended to carry out research on the rice plant etc. IRRI
was initially registered with SEC as a private corporation but, by virtue of PD 1620, IRRI was
granted the status and privileges and immunities of an international organization.

The local union in IRRI, Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI, filed a petition for
certification election with DOLE RO. LA dismissed. BLR Director Calleja authorized the
certification election on appeal. On appeal again, SOLE set aside Calleja’s order and dismissed
the petition for certification election, ruling that the grant of specialized agency status by PH to
IRRI bars DOLE from assuming jurisdiction over IRRI. Hence this petition by Kapisanan.

ISSUE:
Whether the DOLE has jurisdiction over the petitions for certification election of the rank and file
employees of ICMC and IRRI.
HELD: NO.
1) Art. III, S4 and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies,
adopted by UNGA and concurred in by the PH Senate, state:
"Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever located
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except
insofar as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity. It is however,
understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution."

PD 1620 of Art. 3 grants immunity to IRRI:

"Article 3. Immunity from Legal Process . — The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any
penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives."
2) Thus, DFA sustained ICMC’s invocation of immunity when in its memorandum, it expressed
the view that the order of BLR for the conduct of certification election within ICMC violates its
diplomatic immunity. As to IRRI, DFA maintained in a letter to SOLE that IRRI enjoys immunity
fmor DOLE jurisdiction. These constitute a categorical recognition by the executive branch of
government that ICMC and IRRI enjoy immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the courts in order not to
embarrass a political department of government.

a) It is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of immunity (*legal
process, penal etc. proceedings) as it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be
viewed as an isolated process. It could trigger off a series of events in the collective bargaining
process (e.g. Concerted activities) which could inevitably involve ICMC in the “legal process”
which includes “any penal xxx proceedings.” The eventuality of court litigation is not remote.
The immunity covers the organizations’ property and assets and equally applicable in proceedings
in personam and in rem.

3) The term "international organization" is generally used to describe an organization set up by

agreement between two or more states. The United Nations, for instance, is an international
organization dedicated to the propagation of world peace.

"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The
term appears in Articles 57, and 63 of the UN Charter:
"The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting
progress and international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational
and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of
the United Nations itself but by autonomous international organizations established by
inter-governmental agreements outside the United Nations.

a) There are 3 propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international

organizations: 1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control
or interference by any one government in the performance of functions; 2) no country should
derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the
facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its individual
member States. The raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded
performance of their functions.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is necessitated by their
international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality
and interference by the host country in their internal workings.

4) ICMC employees are not without recourse. S31 of the convention on privileges and immunities
of specialized agencies staes that the specialized agencies shall make provision for appropriate
modes of settlement of disputes arising out of contracts. Also, Art. IV of the MOA between PH
and ICMC, whenever there is abuse of privilege by ICMC, the government is free to withdraw the
privileges and immunities accorded.
IRRI employees are also not without remedy as there has been organized a forum for better
management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the council of IRRI
employees and Management.

35. Alvero v. Dizon, GR L-342, May 04, 1946, De Joya, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
On Feb. 12, 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, US soldiers arrested Alvero, who was
suspected of collaboration with the enemy and seized certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal.
Alvero was accused of treason in crim case No. 3. He filed a petition, demanding the return of the
papers taken from his house. He also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution
presented the papers which were admitted as evidence. The bail was denied. at the trial on the
merits, the prosecution presented again the papers and documents which were admitted as part of
its evidence.

Alvero alleged that: Respondent judges permitted the prosecution to present the papers as
evidence, which were considered in the petition for bail, which was denied. During trial on the
merits, respondent judges set for hearing his petition for return of the papers, wherein he and his
wife testified that US soldiers searched his house and seized the documents. The respondent judges
denied the petition to return the papers and admitted these as evidence. Hence this petition. Alvero
claims that respondent judges, in denying the petition for return of the papers, acted with grave
abuse of discretion. He alleges that his constitutional rights are violated.

ISSUE:
Whether the documents were validly seized from Alvero’s house and may thus be presented in
evidence against him in his charge for treason.
HELD: YES.
1) The right of officers of the US Army to arrest Alvero as a collaborationist suspect and to seize
his personal papers without search warrant in the zone of military operations is unquestionable
under the provisions of Art. 4, Chapter II, S1 of the Regulations relative to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of
military papers in the possession of prisoners of war; and under the proclamation of Gen.
Douglas MacArthur as commander in chief of the US Army, declaring his purpose to remove
certain PH citizens, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy in violation of the
allegiance due the US and PH Governments/Commonwealth, from any position of political and
economic influence in PH and to hold them in restrain for the duration of the war.

2) An exception to the need for search warrant is the search as an incident to a lawful arrest. A
lawful arrest may be made while a crime is being committed or after its commission. When one is
legally arrested, whatever is found in his possession or control may be seized and used in evidence
against him.

3) The majority of states have held that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not
violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure.
4) When Alvero consented to the presentation of the documents at the hearing in his petition for
bail and trial on the merits, without insisting that the question of the alleged illegality of the seizure
of the papers should first be litigated, he is deemed to have waived his objection to their
admissibility since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be waived.

At the hearing on his petition for bail, Alvero himself rquestion the production of the paper marked
Exhibit A, which was a letter sent by him to Dr. Jose P. Laurel, another paper which was a
memorandum to Col. Suzuki, and another paper which was a memorandum on Nippongo classes.
He is thus estopped form questioning their admission.

36. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, GR L-5, September 17, 1945, Feria, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
On Jan. 02, 1942, the Japanese forces occupied Manila. the next day, their commander in chief
proclaimed the “military administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army.” In
this proclamation, it was provided that “xxx. All laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well
as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective xxx.”

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of “PH Executive
Commission” (PEC) was organized by Order 1, issued Jan. 23, 1942, of the Japanese forces CiC.
PEC Chairman issued Eos 1 and 4, in which the SC, CA, CFI, and justices of the peace under the
Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction. On Oct. 14, 1943, the so-called
“Republic of the PH” was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the
jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the PEC.

On Oct. 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, Gen. Douglas MacArthud issued
a proclamation to the People of the PH which declared:
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally
binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines
than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.
On Feb. 27, 1945, Gen. MacArthur declared the “full powers xxx under the constitution restored
to the Commonwealth xxx.”

This is a petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that respondent judge of the lower court.
Arsenio Dizon (*same judge sa alvero v dizon)be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case
3012, which were initiated under the regime of the “Republic of the PH”. Respondent judge
refused to continue the proceedings on the ground that the proclamation of Gen. MacArthur on
Oct. 23, 1944 nullified all judicial proceedings of PH courts under the PEC and “Republic of
the PH”.

ISSUES:
A) Whether the judicial acts of the court during the PEC and “Republic of the PH” were valid and
remained so even after liberation of the PH by the US.
B) Whether the proclamation on Oct. 23, 1944 of Gen. MacArthur invalidated all judicial acts and
proceedings of said courts.
C) If the judicial acts were not invalidated by the proclamation, whether the courts may continue
those proceedings.
HELD:
A) YES.
There are several kinds of de facto governments: 1) government de facto in a proper legal sense,
is that the government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter; 2)
that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war, denominated a government of paramount force; 3) that which is
established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state.

a) As to the second kind, its distinguishing characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained
by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established
and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government.

The powers and duties of this de facto government are regulated in Section III of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, “the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands
of the occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible,
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and
is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he
possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspend the old laws and
promulgate new ones, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances in the prevailing territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those
laws which enforce public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the
other hand, laws of a POLITICAL nature such as the right of assembly, to bear arms, free press
etc. are considered suspended during the military occupation.

The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession is one of the incidents of war and flows directly from the right to conquer. We thus
do not look to the constitution or political institutions of the conqueror for authority to govern
enemy territory in his possession. such authority are derived directly from the laws of war as
established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decision
of courts- in fine, from the law of nations. The municipal laws of conquered territory or the laws
which regulate PRIVATE RIGHTS, continue in force during military occupation, except so far
as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror.
b) As to de facto government of the third kind, the US SC in discussing the validity of the acts of
the Confederate States in William v. Bruffy said“the same form of government, the same general
laws for administration of justice and protection of private rights which existed prior to the
rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the states do
not impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the
constitution, they are to be treated as valid.” The existence of a state of insurrection and war did
not do away with civil government or regular administration of the laws. Order was to be
preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, etc.

c) Thus, the PEC was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and a de
facto government of the second kind. The government established over enemy territory during
military occupation may exercise all powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror and is
subject to restrictions which that code imposes. Those laws alone determine the legality or
illegality of its acts.

The fact that the PEC was a civil and not military government and was run by Filipinos and
not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called “Republic of the PH”, apparently
established as a sovereign state by the Filipino people, was in reality a government established by
the belligerent occupant or Japanese forces of occupation. It is of the same character as PEC
and the ultimate source of authority was the same- the Japanese military authority.

Japan had no legal power to grant independence to PH or transfer the sovereignty of US or

to recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino before its military occupation and possession
of PH had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of
peace or other means recognized by the law of nations. It is recognized in Art. 45 of Hague
Conventions of 1907 that the belligerent occupation, being provisional, does not transfer
sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is deprived of the power
to exercise its rights as such.

d) Even if the “Republic of the PH” was established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking
advantage of the withdrawal of the US forces and occupation of the Japanese, had organized an
independent government under the support f Japan, such government would be one established by
Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the US. It would have been a de
facto government (*third kind?). The government of a country in possession of belligerent forces
in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state rests upon the same principles as that of a
territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at war.

e) Thus, since PEC and “Republic of the PH” are de facto governments, it follows that the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were valid. And by virtue of the principle of postliminy (postliminium), they
remained valid after liberation of PH by US. According to postliminy, the fact that a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an
invader. Otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion. It
would be contrary to the general interest that sentences passed upon criminals, for example, should
be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government.
Not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, not of a political complexion,
are and remain valid after reoccupation. This is confirmed by Gen. MacArthur’s proclamation
since it is not necessary to abrogate all laws etc. if they were invalid ab initio.

B) NO.
The phrase “processes of any other government” in Ge. MacArthur’s proclamation is broad and
may. Refer not only to the judicial processes, but to administrative or legislative as well. Taking
into consideration the fact that according to well-known principles of international law all
judgments and judicial proceedings not of a political complexion of the de facto governments
during the Japanese occupation were good and valid, it should be presumed that it was not the
intention of Gen. MacArthur, in using “processes of any other government”, to refer to
judicial processes. It is to be presumed that Gen. MacArthur, acting as agent of the US
Govenrment, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of natinos asserted by the US
SC from the early period of its existence, applied by the presidents of the US, and later embodied
in the Hague Conventions of 1907. It is not to be presumed that he should reverse the international
policy and practice of his own government.

C) YES.
a) Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is
suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader
does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
prevented, to respect. From a theoretical point of view, it may be said that the conqueror is armed
with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive, judicial. From the standpoint of actual practice, such arbitrary will is restrained by the
provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution
so far as military necessity will permit.

Following this, the CiC of the Japanese forces proclaimed on Jan. 03, 1942, when Manila was
occupied, that “all laws now in force in the Commonwealth as well as executive and judicial
institutions shall continue to be effective xxx.” EO 1 and 4 of PEC continued the SC, CA, CFI,
and justices of the pease with the same jurisdiction. If the proceedings pending in the different
courts of PH prior to the Japanese occupation had been continued during the Japanese
administration, the PEC and “Republic of the PH”, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which were reestablished and conceived of as having continued in existence upon reoccupation
of PH by virtue of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts without need of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings.

b) Respondent judge claims that CFI has no authority to continue the civil case unless the PH
government provides for the transfer of jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct “Republic of
the PH” and that “said courts were then a government alien to the PH government.” The laws the
courts enforced, and the courts had become institutions, of Japan by adoption.
But belligerent occupation is provisional and does not transfer sovereignty. What the court said in
US v. Reiter is not that the laws and institutions of the country occupied become that of the occupier
by adoption, but that if the laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become
his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The
laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the
occupied territory. Thus, the laws and courts of PH did not become, by being continued as
required by the law of nations, that of Japan.

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends upon the laws that confer jurisdiction
on them, such laws, not being political in nature, are not abrogated by change of sovereignty
unless repealed. A proclamation that the laws and courts are continued is not necessary, and these,
if made, are but declarations of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Thus, even
assuming that Japan acquired sovereignty which it transferred to the “Republic of the PH”, and
that the laws and courts became that of Japan, since the laws conferring jurisdiction upon the courts
have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the
same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before restoration of the PH government unless
the laws conferring jurisdiction are repealed.

37. Gibbs v. Rodriguez, GR L-1494, August 03, 1949, Feria, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Allison J. Gibbs, acting for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Allison D. Gibbs and Finley Gibbs,
sold 2 lands to Navarro for $125k on April 18, 1941. The first installment of $16k was paid, but
none of the other installments worth $126k were paid and are now due. Navarro sold the property
for P40k to Rodriguez Sr. who assumed the obligation of the mortgage in favor of the mortgagees.
On Dec. 16, 1941, Rodriguez, with the consent of the mortgagees, assigned his rights, title, and
interest in the property to respondent Luzon Surety Co., Inc. for P42k together with Rodriguez’s
obligations under the mortgage which were assumed by Luzon Surety. There was a stipulation that
Rodriguez and Luzon Surety would be jointly and severally liable for the mortgages.

During the Japanese occupation in or about July, 1943, Rodriguez and Luzon Surety were required
by the Department of Enemy Property (Bureau of Enemy Property) established by the Japanese
Military Administration in Manila to pay to the department the debt due to the Gibbs. Luzon Surety
communicated this demand to Allison J. Gibbs, who said that they could not do anything to avoid
its compliance. Thus, respondents had to obtain a loan of P120k from PNB and paid to the
department P202k which they owed to plaintiffs Gibbs. The director of the department issued
a receipt and cancelled the mortgage credit of plaintiffs, and the register of deeds cancelled the
mortgage on the back of the title of the property mortgaged.

On Aug. 22, 1945, plaintiffs filed a complaint. They claim that the department had no authority to
demand and accept such payment. The lower court declared invalid the payment to the department
and void the cancellation of the mortgage and sentenced defendant to pay plaintiff the balance due.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the payment to the department of enemy property extinguished the obligation to plaintiff.
HELD: YES.
1) In HK and Shanghai Banking Corp v. Luis Perez Samanillo Inc., the debt due from defendant
to plaintiff was paid by order of the Japanese military administration (JMA) to the Bank of Taiwan
as liquidator of local enemy banks and Bureau of Enemy Property of the enemy bank’s properties.
Here, by order of the JMA, defendants paid to Bank of Taiwan as Bureau of Enemy Property the
debt to plaintiffs. The question in Samanillo was whether the collection of Samanillo’s debt by the
Bureau of Enemy Property of the JMA was a confiscation of plaintiff’s credit. Here, the question
is whether the collection by the department, JMA, of the mortgage debt due to plaintiffs was
confiscation of the latter’s credit.

The Court in Samanillo, on the strength of Haw Pia v. China Banking, reversed the lower court.
In Haw Pia, we held that the collection by Bank of Taiwan of CBC’s credit from its debtor by
order of JMA was not a confiscation but a sequestration of the enemy private personal
property, and thus the payment by Haw Pia to the Bank of Taiwan was valid and released
Haw Pia’s obligation to the defendant bank. Thus, we reverse also the lower court’s decision in
this case.

2) The plaintiff’s contention that the debt of defendants was payable in dollars or its equivalent in
PH peso at plaintiff’s option is immaterial because both PH peso and American dollars at the rate
of $1 for P2 were then legal tender in PH. Besides, we have held in Haw Pia:

Whatever might have been the intrinsic or extrinsic worth of the Japanese war notes which
Bank of Taiwan has received as payment, it is of no consequence. The Japanese war notes
were issued as legal tender at par with the PH peso and guaranteed by the Japanese
government which takes full responsibility for their usage. Now that the war has turned
against japan, enemy banks have the right to demand from japan, thru states,
compensation in PH pesos or US dollars for loss or damage on the property by the
emergency war measures taken by the enemy. If japan had won the war, the property of
said banks sequestrated might be retained by Japan and credited to the state of which the
banks were nationals as payment for indemnity under the treaties, and the owners were to
look for compensation in PH pesos or US dollars to their respective states.

MR, Dec. 21, 1950, Feria, J.

38. Haw Pia v. China Banking Corporation, GR L-554, April 09, 1948, Feria, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Haw Pia filed an action in CFI against CBC to compel CBC to execute a deed of cancellation of
mortgage on the property described in the complaint and to deliver to Haw the title with the
mortgage already cancelled. The cause of action is that Haw’s indebtedness to CBC has been
completely paid to CBC thru the defendant Bank of Taiwan that was appointed by the Japanese
authorities as liquidator of CBC. CFI held that the Japanese army was not authorized under
international law to liquidate the business of CBC, and the payment did not extinguish the
indebtedness of Haw to CBC. CFI ordered Haw to pay CBC P5k and, in case of failure, the
property mortgaged be sold at public auction. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the JMA had authority to order liquidation or winding up of the business of CBC and
to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator authorized to accept payment by Haw to CBC.
2) Whether the payment of Haw to Bank of Taiwan extinguished her obligation to CBC.
HELD:
1) YES.
The Japanese authorities had the power under international law to order the liquidation of CBC
and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question because such
liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of CBC.

a) Before the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, it was the practice
to allow the confiscation or appropriation by the belligerent occupant not only of public but also
of private property of the enemy in occupied territory by the belligerent. As such usage or
practice was allowed, a fortiori, any other act short of confiscation was necessarily permitted.
Section III of the Hague Regulations on Military Authority over Hostile Territory only prohibits
confiscation of private property. As to public property, Article 53 provides that cash and property
and other movables belonging to the state susceptible of military use or operation may be
confiscated or taken possession of as booty and used for the benefit of the invader. The
belligerents, to control enemy property to avoid their use in aid of the enemy, after the Hague
Convention, had to resort to measures of prevention which do not amount to straight
confiscation like freezing, blocking, placing under custody, and sequestrating enemy private
property. Such acts are recognized as not repugnant to the Hague Regulations and are authorized
in the Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs not only of US but also
of other civilized countries, as well as in the Trading with the Enemy Acts (TEA) of said countries.

b) Hyde, in his International Law chiefly as interpreted and applied by the US, says:

In examining the efforts of a belligerent to control property within its domain that has a connection
with enemy nationals that it may be regarded as enemy property, it is important to inquire whether
1) the attempt is made to appropriate property without compensation, divesting him not only of
title, but also of any right or interest in what is taken without prospect of reimbursement, 2) or
whether those efforts constitute an assumption of control which, regardless of transfer of title, is
not designed to produce such a deprivation. The two acts are not identical. The point is that a
belligerent may deprive an alien enemy owner of property by process that are not
confiscatory, even though the taking and retention may cause him severe loss and hardship.
These may be appropriately referred to as SEQUESTRATIONS.

This analysis differs from those that regard all uncompensated deprivations of property as
confiscatory and thus internationally illegal. But belligerent states have not generally acted on such
a theory. They have in fact proceeded, especially since 1914 (*WWI), to exercise varying degrees
of control over enemy private property by strictly non-confiscatory processes.

c) Oppenheim in his International Law says:

The desire to eliminate the financial and commercial influence of the enemy led most states to
exceptional war measures against the property of enemies which, though not confiscation, inflicted
great injury. Sometimes, these measures stopped short of divesting the enemy of ownership. But
in other cases, the businesses or property were liquidated.

Private personal property which does not consist of war materials or means of transport serviceable
for military operations may not be, as a rule, seized (SC: “Seized” means confiscated).

d) Feildchenfeld supports the conclusion of Hyde when he says that “According to Art. 46 of the
Hague Regulations, private property must be respected and cannot be confiscated. This rule
protects against loss of property through outright confiscation, but not against losses under
lawful requisition, contribution, seizure, fines, taxes, and expropriation.”

e) The sequestration and liquidation of banks in occupied territories is authorized by the US Army
and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs. Also, similar manuals of other
countries authorize liquidation or impounding of assets of enemy banks or freezing, blocking,
impounding of enemy properties in the occupied hostile territories without violating Art. 46 of the
Hague Regulations. They do not amount to an outright confiscation of private property.

f) The provisions of the TEA of US and almost all principal nations since WWI confirms that the
assets of enemy corporations, specially banks, may be legally sequestrated, and the business
thereof wound up or liquidated. Such sequestration is not confiscation of enemy property, but
for the conservation of it, subject to further disposition by treaty between the belligerents at the
end of the war.

The purpose of sequestration is: “In the absence of effective measures of control, enemy-owned
property can be used to further the interest of the enemy xxx. All enemy-controlled assets can be
used to finance propaganda, espionage, and sabotage xxx.

g) CBC comes within the meaning of “enemy” as used in the TEAs of civilized countries, because
not only was it controlled by Japan’s enemies, but it was incorporated under the laws of a
country with which Japan was at war. Under the US TEA, it is provided that during war, any
property or interest of any foreign country shall be administered, liquidated etc. by such agency
designated by the US president. S6(e) thereof provides that “any payment xxx of money or
property made to the alien property custodian xxx shall be a full xxx discharge for all
purposes of the obligation of the person making the same to the extent of the same xxx.”

The US TEA, like those of other countries, may be enforced in a hostile country occupied by the
US Armed forces because S2 of the US TEA states that “the words ‘US’ shall be deemed to mean
all land xxx within the jurisdiction of the US or occupied by the military or naval forces
thereof.”

h) It is presumed that Japan, in sequestrating and liquidating CBC, must have acted in accordance
with her own Manual of the Army and Navy or TEA. Even if not, it being permitted to the Allied
Nations to sequestrate etc. enemy properties occupied during war, and it being not contrary to
international law, Japan has also the right to do the same in PH by virtue of the international
law principle that “what is permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other.”
i) It is evident that Japan did not intend to confiscate the assets of CBC or the debts due from its
debtors. It is true that as to private personal properties of the enemy, freezing etc. is sufficient to
prevent their being used in aid of the enemy. But as to funds of commercial enemy banks, it is
impossible to attain this purpose without liquidating the banks and collecting the loans given by
them to thousands of persons scattered all over PH. Without doing so, the money loaned to so
many persons cannot be properly impounded to prevent their use in aid to the enemy.

That the liquidation of CBC was not confiscation but merely sequestration is evidenced by these
facts: 1) Out of P34M collected from the debtors by the liquidator Bank of Taiwan (BT), BT paid
to the depositors P9M. 2) Chinese Associations members were allowed to withdraw from their
deposits with CBC a considerable amount of money. 3) The collection of the debts from CBC’s
debtors and the withdrawals of the depositors were entered into the books of the Banks, which
would have been useless were it the intention to close definitely the enemy banks and appropriate
all their resources. 4) There was no reason to confiscate CBC’s funds because by sequestrating,
the purpose of preventing the use of the funds to aid Japan’s enemy was accomplished.

j) That the Japanese military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks the balance of money
collected by Bank of Taiwan did not change the sequestration into confiscation because 1) it was
physically impossible for the Japanese to do so being forcibly driven out of PH, 2) the owners of
properties sequestrated who are nationals of the victorious belligerent are entitled to receive
compensation for the damage on their property by the emergency war measures taken by the
enemy, thru their respective states who may demand payment on behalf ot their nationals. As the
Japanese war notes were issued as legal tender at par with the PH peso by the Japanese which in
its proclamations, “takes full responsibility for their usage xxx,”Japan is bound to indemnify the
aggrieved banks for the damage on their property interms of PH peso or US dolalrs.

2) YES.
a)Since the Japanese had power to sequestrate CBC and liquidate it by collecting the debts due to
CBC form its debtors and paying its creditors, it follows that the payments by the debtors to the
Bank of Taiwan of their debts to CBC have extinguished their obligation to CBC. The
payments were made to a person, Bank of Taiwan, authorized to receive them in the name of the
bank creditor under Art. 1162 of the *old Civil Code.

b) That the debts were paid thru Japanese war notes did not affect the validity of payments. The
occupant, in exercising his powers in regard to currency, may adopt one of the following methods:
1) When the coverage of the currency of the territory occupied has become inadequate, and the
local currency continues to be used, an occupant may reorganize the national currency, such as
creating new types/supplies of coverage. 2) The occupant may use his own currency in the
occupied region. But this may be inconvenient if the coverage for their national currency is already
inadequate, and authorities are thus afraid of exposing it to additional strain. 3) New types of
money may be created by the occupant which may have a new name. The 3rd method was the one
adopted by Japan in PH.

Be that as it may, whatever might have been the worth of Japanese war-notes which Bank of
Taiwan received as payment of the obligations of CBC’s debtors, it is of no consequence in this
case. Japanese war-notes were issued as LEGAL TENDER at par with the PH Peso and
guaranteed by the Japanese government. Now that the war has turned against Japan, enemy banks
have the right to demand from Japan thru their states for compensation in PH peso or US Dollars
for loss or damage on their property inflicted by the emergency war measure taken by the enemy.
Had Japan won the war, the property of the banks sequestrated might be retained by Japan and
credited to the respective state of which the bank-owners were nationals, as payment of sums
payable by them as indemnity (*indemnity ng loser enemy banks) under the treaties, and the
bank-owners were to look for compensation in PH Pesos or US dollars to their respective states.
If they cannot get sufficient compensation from their states or from the enemy, they have naturally
to suffer, as everybody else, the losses incident to all wars.

39. Laurel v. Misa, GR L-409, January 30, 1947, En Banc.

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus on the theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted
for treason under Art. 114 of RPC because: 1) The sovereignty of the legitimate PH government
and, consequently, the allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was suspended; and 2) there was a
change of sovereignty over the PH upon proclamation of the PH Republic.

ISSUE:
1) Whether PH sovereignty was suspended during the Japanese occupation.
2) Whether there was a change of sovereignty when the Japanese proclaimed the PH Republic.
HELD:
1) NO.
a) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and
permanent allegiance; and that this allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance a foreigner owes to the sovereign of the territory where he resides, so long
as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which sonsists in the obedience
to the laws of the sovereign.

b) This allegiance of the inhabitants of occupied territory to their legitimate sovereign is not
severed by enemy occupation, because sovereign de jure or sovereignty of the government is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. If it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily
remain vested in the legitimate government. Sovereignty vested in the titular government must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto. The subsistence of the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in occupied territory, although it is prevented from exercising
supremacy over them, is one of the rules of international law recognized by necessary implication
in Arts. 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation. Thus, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government/sovereign subsists.

c) The conclusion in US v. Rice that US sovereignty was suspended must have been based either
1) on the theory in the Hague Convention of 1907 that military occupation of enemy territory does
not transfer sovereignty, or 2) on the old theory that occupation transfers sovereignty to the
occupant. In the first, “sovereignty” must be construed to mean exercise of the rights of
sovereignty. In the second, if it refers to suspension of the sovereignty itself, this has become
obsolete after the Hague Regulations in 1907, and thus cannot be applied in this case.
d) Even adopting the words “temporary allegiance” repudiated by publicists as descriptive of the
relations between the inhabitants and enemy, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar
to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the sovereign of the territory where he
resides in return for protection, and does not do away with the absolute/permanent allegiance
which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own sovereign. Just as a citizen may be
convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of occupied
territory may commit treason against his own legitimate government. If allegiance is nothing more
than obedience to a sovereign’s laws in return for the protection he receives, it would follow that
a citizen residing in a foreign country would acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey
the laws of that country on public order etc. in return for protection he receives and would lose his
original citizenship because he would not be bound to obey most laws of his own sovereign.

e) Corollary to the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the legitimate

government, the political laws prescribing the reciprocal rights and duties of government and
citizens are suspended or in abeyance for the only reason that as they exclusively bear relation
to the ousted legitimate government, they are not applicable to the occupant’s government.
Crimes against national security like treason, espionage, inciting to war etc. and those against
public order like rebellion, sedition etc. which are of political complexion because they are
crimes against the legitimate government are also suspended because they cannot be committed
against the occupant. YET, Art. 114 of RPC was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government because the inhabitants of the occupied
territory were still bound by their ALLEGIANCE to the latter during enemy occupation.

f) Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances, those laws that enforce public order, he has nonetheless all the powers of a de
facto government and may change existing laws or make new ones when exigencies of the
military service demand, that is, when necessary for the occupier to do so for control of the
country and protection of his army.

g) Since the obligation of fidelity of a citizen to his sovereign does not demand from him positive
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy, the occupant has
no power to suspend the operation of the law of treason or compel them to adhere and give aid and
comfort to him because such action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service
or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants and protection of his army, and because it
is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance.

h) Adoption of petitioner’s theory of suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences

and repugnant to the laws of humanity for it would allow invaders to recruit the inhabitants to fight
against their own government without incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason.

2) NO.
a) Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, though
not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated
as Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by US Congress in the
Independence Law and the PH Constitution but also by the Executive Department of US (Pres.
Roosevelt); and that the question of sovereignty is a purely political question determined by the
legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binding the judges.

b) One of the few limitations to the sovereignty of Filipinos is in SI(1) of the Ordinacne appended
to the Constitution that PH citizens “shall owe allegiance to the US”. But these limitations do not
do away with PH sovereignty, in the same way that US states preserve their own sovereignty
although limited by that of the US conferred upon the latter by the states.

40. People v. Agoncillo, GR L-985, January 23, 1948, Paras, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Agoncillo was convicted of treason by People’s Court. According to the prosecution, his adherence
to the enemy is inferable from these facts:
1) Rufina Cepeda, Agoncillo’s cousin, examined his clothes while he was taking a bath and found
his ID written in Japanese and Chinese, tending to show him to be a Japanese undercover. In
January 1945, Rufina told him that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese notese were
no longer accepted in said place. The next day, Rufina was arrested by the Japanese and asked
about what she saw in Bohol. After her release, Agoncillo came to her house and fed chickens to
the Japanese who arrested her.

2) As to the overt acts of giving aid and comfort, Agoncillo sold about 300kg of alum crystals at
P3/kg to Keribo, a Japanese army construction company. He also sold 100 pcs of water pipes, the
price of which is unknown. He was also seen helping push a handcart full of truck and auto tires
etc. into the intermediate or highschool premises then used by the Japanese army as a motor pool.

ISSUE:
Whether Agoncillo is guilty of treason.
HELD: NO.
1) The overt acts imputed to Agoncillo have not been duly proven.

2) Even supposing that Agoncillo had really sold alum crystals and water pipes, this did not per
se constitute treason. As said articles were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not
necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the enemy. It is not
unlikely that at the time Agoncillo made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain,
uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where 2 probabilities arise from evidence, the
one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted.

41. People v. Alvero, GR L-820, April 11, 1950, Montemayor, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Aurelio Sevilla Alvero was charged with treason on 22 counts before the People’s Court. He was
convicted on all counts except 2 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua with P10k fine. Hence this
appeal. The People’s Court grouped the 22 counts against him under 3 main classifications:

1) ECONOMIC collaboration.
Alvero established a buy and sell of automobile spare parts, considered as war materials under the
name ASA Trading. He began with a P15k capital and at the end of 1944, had accumulated a net
profit of P2M. The only purchasers of his stocks were the Japanese and on a big scale. In most
cases, he personally closed the deals with them. (SC cites his diary entries, exhibit ZZ)

2) POLITICAL collaboration.
a) The day after the declaration of war made by president Jose P. Laurel of the Puppet Republic
against US and Great Britain, Alvero sent him a letter of congratulations and offered a “small
contribution of P10k” to raise funds for the national defense.

b) Alvero joined the KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas). One of its main
objectives was to assist filipinos in comprehending the significance of the principles of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, adhere strictly to the policies of the imperial Japanese forces in
PH, etc. He delivered speeches in its labor institute. But he eventually resigned.

c) Alvero, together with Duran, Kawamoto, Yoshida, organized the New Leaders’ Association
(NLA) whose objectives were to encourage young people in the noble task of nation building in
close collaboration with the various Japanese organizations in east asia countries etc. To show the
close relation between the NLA and Japanese, the offices of NLA were furnished by Nippon Bunka
Kaikan next to its offices. The funds of the association came from Japanese individuals and
commercial houses, and were paid out by Kawamoto, cashier of Nippon. He prepared NLA’s 5-
point program, one of which was collaboration with the Japanese in safeguarding public works
and communication facilities. Other objectives were pacification efforts etc. While President
Osmeña was urging Filipinos to “strike hard against the enemy xxx and fight as did Lapulapu and
Dagohoy xxx without counting the cost,” Alvero thru NLA was trying to secure pacification.

Alvero also prepared a resolution which he had NLA adopt and which he, with Duran, Artemio
Ricarte, Benigno Ramos, and other NLA leaders presented to a cmomander of a certain unit of the
Japanese Navy, congratulating the alleged kamikaze of the Sikisima Unit who “sacrificed life and
all by crash-diving against the vessels of the American task force.”

3) MILITARY collaboration.
a) Alvero helped found and organize the MAKAPILI (Makabayan Kalipunan ng mga Pilipino).
Some of its objects are to collaborate unreservedly with the Japanese army and navy in PH and to
propagate throughout PH the principles for which the Empire of Japan and other Asiatic nations
are not fighting in the Pacific war. He claims that he joined MAKAPILI and signed its articles of
association against his will, but the evidence completely refutes this claim (SC cited his diary
entries).

b) Alvero organized the Bisig Bakal ng Tagala as a military unit whose members were recruited
from those of the NLA. In his memorandum to Colonel zusuki, he “offer[ed] the assistance of the
NLA.” In the memorandum, he says that the “bulk of the Filipino nation” cannot be expected to
fight beside the Japanese. At best, there will be only some loyal to the death. So the Japanese must
maintain peace and order so that, instead of training guns against riotous people, the Japanese can
concentrate on its defense. “A satisfied stomach is not anxious to revolt.”

HELD:
1) Petition for DISMISSAL.
Alvero filed a motion to dismiss the political, cultural, and economic counts of the information
pursuant to the Amnesty Proclamation No. 51 of Jan. 28, 1948. The SC dismissed the economic
collaboration count even if the automobile spare parts sold by Alvero materially aided the
Japanese. As to the cultural and political collaboration, it is also covered by the amnesty.

2) SC also found other acts of adherence of Alvero. He spoke by radio over the Radio Broadcasting
Station then controlled by the enemy. In the middle of January 1945, he, in a radio talk, hailed as
heroes the Makapilis fighting with the Japanese in the beaches of Pangasinan against the American
forces that landed there. This is not covered by the amnesty proclamation.

3) Alvero’s assignments of error 1-3 raise the defense of suspended sovereignty, that treason law,
being political, was suspended during enemy occupation, and that due to change in government
from the Commonwealth to the “Republic of the PH”, treason against the Commonwealth is not
punishable. But these have been rejected in Laurel v. Misa.

4) Alvero claims that Art. 297 of the US Rules of Land Warfare provides for the right of a military
occupant to enforce from the inhabitants of occupied territory such obedience as may be necessary
for the security of its forces and for the maintenance of law and order. But according to
international law (Hague Conventions of 1907, Art. 43), the duty to maintain peace and order
is imposed upon the military occupant, not upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory.
Here, Alvero, thru his Bisig Bakal, assisted in maintenance of peace and order thru his military
organization. His purpose was to relieve the Japanese armed forces of the need of assigning a
portion of their forces to maintain such peace and order so that they can concentrate on defending
Manila.

5) Alvero claims that People’s Court erred in disregarding and not considering as evidence of his
intention the services he rendered to Filipinos. His having saved the life of Cascante, a guerilla,
bears explanation. At that time, the guerrillas were gaining the upperhand. The Americans and
their guerrilla colleagues were nearing Manila. It was but natural that Alvero do something for the
guerillas for his own safety later.

Alvero was found guilty of treason and sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the fine increased to
P20k.

42. People v. Benedicto Jose y Santos, GR L-22, December 20, 1945, Feria, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Santos was accused of violation of Art. 159 of RPC. The information states that he was convicted
of violating Act 65 of the national assembly of the “Republic of the PH” in connection with
Ordinance 1 of the president of said republic and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. After
serving 6 months, he was granted a conditional pardon by said president, the condition being that
he should not violate any PH penal law, which was accepted by Santos. But Santos was later
prosecuted and convicted for qualified theft. Santos moved to quash the information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offence because the judgment of the court of the special
exclusive criminal jurisdiction and the conditional pardon granted by the president of the so-called
PH Republic are void since the proceedings of said court are the creatures of an agency of the
imperial Japanese army.
The fiscal opposes, claiming that the defunct PH Republic, being a de facto government, its courts
and laws should be upheld as legal. The court, in a resolution, dismissed the case, holding that the
facts in the information constitute no offense. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the 10-year sentence should be denied validity after the reoccupation of PH and
restoration of the Commonwealth.
2) Whether Santos can be prosecuted for violation of conditional pardon.
HELD:
1) YES.
S11 of Ordinance 1 reads:
"No one except the control organization of the persons designated by said organization
shall engage in the purchase, importation, sale of transfer of rice and corn, or act as agent,
broker, or intermediary in the purchase, sale or transfer of such commodities for the
purpose of their sale and transfer unless authorized by the Minister of Agriculture and
Commerce."
In accordance with Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, judicial acts of a de facto government remain
valid, except those of political complexion, upon restoration of the commonwealth. The ten-year
sentence was of a political complexion and thus became of no effect upon the reoccupation of PH
because it penalized as a crime an act “not criminal by the municipal law.” By virtue of
postliminium, upon restoration of the legitimate government, judicial acts done under his control,
if not of a political complexion, remain valid. Political acts on the other hand fall through. The
execution of punitive sentence ceases when they refer to acts not criminal by the municipal law
of the state.

2) NO.
An individual cannot be required to serve a void sentence of penalty even without a pardon. A
violation of conditional pardon is not a substantive or independent offense. The invalidity of the
original sentence upon restoration of the commonwealth carried with it the ineffectiveness of
the conditional aprdon.

43.Raquiza et al. v. Bradford, GR L-44, September 13, 1945, Hilado, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Gen. Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation on Dec. 29, 1944:
"WHEREAS evidence is before me that certain citizens of the Philippines voluntarily have
given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy xxx.
"WHEREAS military necessity requires that such persons be removed xxx.”
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army, United States Army,
as Commander-in-Chief, xxx, hereby do publish and declare it to be my purpose to remove
such persons, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in
the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war; whereafter I shall
release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases
Petitioners were arrested and detained by virtue of said proclamation. Petitioners filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus. Respondent Lt. Col. Bradford and Capt. Caroline de Eason made return
to the Court’s show cause order.

ISSUE:
1) Whether Gen. MacArthur had power to issue the proclamation.
2) Whether the war has terminated within the meaning of the proclamation “for the duration of the
war.”
3) Whether courts may exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over the US army.
HELD:
1) NO. The power of the commander in chief of the US army to issue the proclamation cannot be
seriously questioned.

2) NO. It is necessary to refer to a public act of the Executive Department to fix the date of the
closing of the war. The condition of hostility remained impressed on the whole island until it was
removed by the proclamation of the President. "War, in the legal sense, continues until, and
terminates at the time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to
proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not of the judicial department, of
government to determine when war is at an end.

Even if the war had terminated, under the proclamation, petitioners would continue legally under
custody of the military authorities for a reasonable time after termination of the war. If MacArthur
had expressly declared in the proclamation that after termination of the war he will release the
persons therein named to the PH government within a reasonable time, he could have done so
within his legitimate powers as CIC of the US army. For obvious reasons, he should be the best
and only judge of how long or short that time should be under the circumstances. Otherwise,
we would give the proclamation an interpretation impossible for him to carry out- to make delivery
to the PH government immediately upon termination of the war.

3) NO. The existence of military necessity to which MacArthur refers in the proclamation, and its
continuance, is a question exclusively for military authorities to determine. The civil courts should
not interfere. A foreign army, permitted to march thru a friendly country or to be stationed in it,
by permission of its sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.
The sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction when he allows the
troops of a foreign prince to pass thru his dominions. By exercising jurisdiction, the purpose for
which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a portion of the military force of a
foreign independent nation would be withdrawn from the control of the sovereign. Grant of
free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the troops durin their passage.

Here, not only has the PH commonwealth asked, and the US agreed, that it come to PH, but US is
here for the very purpose of realizing the desire of the Filipino people to be freed from the shackles
of Japanese tyranny. Thus, with much more reason should the US army be exempt from the civil
and criminal jurisdiction of this place, at least for the time covered by said agreement of the 2
governments.
4) Also, petitioners may be considered as prisoners of war. An army in the field may avail itself
of the right to make civilians prisoners of war (Hyde). Hyde cites form the Rules of Land
Warfare which enumerate civilians who may be made PoWs, including:
"(c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and beneGt to the hostile army or its
government, xxx.”

Whether the doctrine here laid down would be applicable to cases arising in time of peace, we do
not decide.

SC dismissed the petition.

44. Tomoyuki Yamashita v. Styer, GR L-129, December 19, 1945, Moran, C.J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Yamashita, commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese imperial army in PH, and
now charged before an American military commission, filed this petition for habeas corpus and
prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Styer, commanding general of the US army, western pacific.
He alleges that he became a PoW of US after his surrender but was later removed from such status
and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal before the military commission constituted
by Styer. He asks to be reinstated to his former status as PoW and that the commission be
prohibited from further trying him.

ISSUE:
Whether the habeas corpus may be granted.
HELD: NO.
1) The petition does not seeks to discharge Yamashita from confinement but merely his restoration
to his former status as a PoW, to be interned, not confined. The difference as to the degree of
confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.

2) The petition for prohibition against Styer cannot prosper. The military commission is not made
party respondent in this case. But even if the commission is joined as respondent, this Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. As held in Raquiza v. Bradford, an attempt of our civil
courts to exercise jurisdiction over the US army before the state of war expires would be a violation
of this country’s faith which this Court should not be the last to uphold.

The power to create a military commission to try and punish war criminals is an aspect of waging
war. A military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective date of a treaty of
peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.

3) This Court, in times of war and peace, has no power to review on habeas corpus the proceedings
of a military or naval tribunal. Thus, we find that the military commission has been validly
constituted and it has jurisdiction both over the person of Yamashita and over the offenses with
which he is charged.

4) The Commission was validly constituted by Styer by order of Gen. MacArthur. Under the Rules
of Land Warfare, a military commission must be designated by the belligerent. Since the power
to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders have that power
unless expressly withdrawn from them.

5) It is claimed that under the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific, the
military commission shall have jurisdiction over japan and other areas occupied by the armed
forces commanded by the US CIC. PH is not occupied territory of US. But the Americans have
occupied PH or the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of Japanese tyranny,
and the creation of the commission for trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals is an
incident of such war of liberation.

6) It is claimed that Spain, Japan’s protecting power, has not been given notice before trial was
begun against Yamashita contrary to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But there is nothing
in that convention showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of military commissions
appointed by the victorious belligerent.

7) It is claimed that the rules of procedure and evidence followed by the military commission are
a denial of a fair trial. But the supposed irregularities committed by the commission in admitting
allegedly immaterial or hearsay evidence cannot divest the commission of its jurisdiction and
cannot be reviewed in a petition for habeas corpus.