Intentionality – understanding – self-knowledge.

Philosophical problem of cognition in the light of cognitive sciences

Table of contents

Introduction
Part I. Issues related to cognition in the light of the relation between cognitive science and
epistemology.
1. A discussion on the relation between cognitive science and epistemology and its
consequence for the conception of a cognizing subject.
1.1. The problem of the relation between cognitive science and epistemology.
1.1.1 Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology
1.1.2 The role of cognitive science for philosophy – hopes and fears
1.2. The problem of the cognizing subject
1.2.1 The issue of the cognizing subject in philosophy
1.2.2. The issue of the cognizing subject in cognitive science
2. The conception of e-cognition as a result of cooperation between cognitive science and
epistemology
2.1 The basics of e-cognition and related issues
2.1.1. E-theories
2.1.2 Externalism in e-theories
2.2. The role of chosen cognitive processes in e-cognition
2.2.1 The role of attention in e-cognition
2.2.2 The role of proprioception in e-cognition
Part II The problem of intentionality, understanding and self-knowledge in discussions on
epistemology and cognitive science
3. Intentionality
3.1. Intentionality as a feature of the mind
3.1.1 Intentionality and consciousness
3.1.2 Intentionality as a strategy of explaining behaviour
3.2. Intentionality as an attitude – target orientation
3.2.1 From attention to intentionality
3.2.2 Intentionality as a basis of social competences
4. Understanding
4.1. Understanding as a grasp of meaning
4.1.1 Theory of understanding as a theory of meaning
4.1.2 Understanding as an ascription of beliefs
4.2. Understanding as participation
4.2.1 From mirror neurons to understanding
4.2.2 Gradation of understanding
5. Self-knowledge
5.1. Self-knowledge as a higher level of consciousness (self-awareness)
5.1.1. The problem of misidentification
5.1.2 Perceptual model of self-knowledge
5.2. Self-knowledge as a kind of knowledge
5.2.1. The problem of self-knowledge in psychological externalism
5.2.2. The 'me-other' relation as the basis for self-knowledge
Summary
Bibliography
Index

Summary

The main purpose of this book is a philosophical and cognitive analysis of three cognitive
abilities: intentionality, understanding and self-knowledge, which play a key role in human
cognition. The analysis will be carried out with respect to selected conceptions voiced on the
grounds of epistemology and cognitive science. Cognition is expressed here as an effect of
fusion of these abilities, which are an intentional reference of the subject to the external world
and its own mental states, understanding of oneself and other subjects and self-knowledge
defined as knowledge (a true, justified belief) of one's mental states.
For the purpose of isolating these three abilities as essential for cognition, a criterion of
generality has been used, the reason being that they encompass more basic abilities such as the
ability to represent the world, use of concepts, or use of language. It is not claimed that they
represent the foundation of cognition in general, but that they endow human cognition with
specific nature because it is in humans that they are most advanced. They are indispensable for
cognition understood as an outcome of the subject's interaction with the world, which is effected
not only in the physical, but also social world that is highly complex in humans. These abilities
enable one to navigate in this world of complexity: reading intentions, sharing beliefs,
understanding actions, cooperating, or working on self-improvement. In other words, in
accordance with an assertion made in this book, the exceptionality of human cognition is
dependent on the combination of three abilities: intentionality, understanding and self-
knowledge, which are its pillars.
Reflections made in the light of this assertion are accompanied with the claim that
cognition is constituted as an outcome of the individual – world relation, i.e. through
interactions between the subject and the world. Theories that indicate that the environment has
an essential impact on cognition are called e-theories, as they include enactivism, embodied
mind theories, ecological theories of the self and theories of extended mind. They assume that
the subject and its environment constitute an unified system and the adequate models of
cognition include those which account for the external environment as a component of
cognition.
It has been assumed that this interaction of the subject with the world is constituent for
the cognition based on intentionality, understanding and self-knowledge. This type of
cognition, that is the one in which the world has a significant impact on the cognitive outcome
of the subject, is referred to as e-cognition. However, it is not a question of the subject passively
yielding to external stimuli, but a specific coupling of the offers sent by the world (affordances)
and the subject's reactions to them in the form of its actions. In e-cognition the subject has an
active impact on the world and vice versa, making an interactive loop. An embodied mind
cannot be simply considered as a mind in a body, not under the skull. In such a representation
it will still be a Cartesian mind which does not extend beyond the boundaries of the subject's
body. It makes no changes in its restrictions. It is only the mind which transgresses the body
that stops being a Cartesian mind and becomes a mind within the world. The conception of such
a mind is related to externalism in the issue of justifying and determining the content of mental
states. Externalism of e-theories is different from the classic approach in that it emphasises that
it is not only meanings that are not in the mind, i.e. the content of mental states does not
determine their reference, but also cognitive processes, at least partially, are not in the mind
either. They are only of external nature, as long as their course is related to the interaction of
the subject with the environment, e.g. with the manipulation of objects, or acting in general
which is quicker in certain situations from the thinking process.
Two cognitive processes in particular are a frequent point of reference in e-theories.
They are attention and proprioception. Both endogenous and exogenous attention is a frequent
topic of analysis in reference to the creation and formation of the self, and also its specific
activities, such as meditation or even hypnotic states. These unusual situations uncover the
capabilities of the self and present the role of attentional processes in entering these states.
Attention is thus related to consciousness and impacts on the perception of the subject.
Proprioception is the other cognitive process, otherwise referred to as the sixth sense, but only
because it supplements the other five senses. Nevertheless, it has some specific properties. First,
it is a sense that integrates sensory information on the limb position and the location of the
body. It thus integrates data from many sources. One may say that proprioception is a sense
which is often considered by e-theories on account of being an essential link between the subject
and the external world. It is constituent for bodily consciousness which precedes reflexive
conscience.
The issue of the role of bodily consciousness, as well as cognitive processes particularly
emphasised by e-cognition sends back to the issue of how to properly understand the subject.
According to minimalist theories of the self it can be formed through such processes as
proprioception. Such a minimalistic self is already created in the bodily consciousness, devoid
of notions and reflectivity typical for self-awareness. It is a conception which does not
necessarily have to convince everyone. Beyond all doubt, the self is related to consciousness,
but is it present at the bodily level – one might say a sub-personal level, if the processing of
information there is mechanical and devoid of thinking? All the doubts boil down to one general
question – what in fact is the cognizing subject? How should we understand it? How is it
formed? What is the one to which we ascribe cognition?
The argument for acknowledging intentionality for a basic cognitive category was that,
as feature of consciousness, it is inextricably connected with it, and this in turn constitutes a
ground for cognition, for even minimal selves are conscious. However, intentionality is not only
a feature of consciousness, or – as it is presented in this book, a feature of the mind.
Intentionality is also a feature of propositional attitudes, a strategy of their interpretation and
the basis for action.
On assumption that intentionality is a feature of being target-oriented eludes discussion
over who should be ascribed which degree of intentionality, as it is assumed that it is gradable,
both in the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of organisms. In the conceptions of
intentionality presented in the framework of evolutional psychology, an image of intentionality
as a basis for social competence emerges, on account of which other subjects are interpreted as
creatures equipped with beliefs that not only think like us, but also can have different opinions
and intentions from us. This expression of intentionality, when reflected upon more deeply, will
refer to its nature as a feature of the mind, which will shut the circle of reflections.
However, a question arises why subjects ascribe beliefs, desires or general intentional
attitudes to others. The answer seems to be self-evident: they do that to understand others.
However, what is understanding? Why isn't it enough to ascribe beliefs to others, but it is also
important to understand them? It turns out that intentionality is only an introduction to a more
advanced cognition wherein the subject seizes the sense and meaning of the utterances of others,
conceptualises the surrounding world, both the natural and social environment, rationalising its
own and others' behaviour, explaining the processes and relations occurring in the world. All
of this takes place in understanding, which in this book is referred to as another key cognitive
category, metaphorically referred to as 'the second pillar of cognition'.
The problem of what is understanding and what in consists in is vast. It has been
broached upon in the present work in reference to the relationship between cognitive science
and epistemology. Two pivotal points have been adopted around which the theories of
understanding are centred: one, where understanding consists in seizing the meaning, and the
other, where understanding consists in participation. From this mere division emerges a course
of deliberations which heads towards philosophy in the first case, and towards empirical
cognitive sciences in the other. The philosophical interpretation views understanding as
grasping the meaning. Meaning will be constituted here on the grounds of linguistic practices,
depending on the context. On the other hand, the cognitivist approach to understanding will
describe it as a participation consisting in joint actions and sharing intentions by the subjects.
It needs to be emphasised that such a definition of understanding is also in line with
philosophical conceptions, e.g. operating philosophy. However, what makes the other approach
to be deemed as cognitivist in this book, is the manner in which it is formed. Cognitivist
approach to understanding in this book shows that it is created from down below, from the
processes on the sub-personal level in which an important role is played by mirror neurons.
The following is a general conclusion from the deliberations on understanding in the
interpretation presented in this book: Understanding is realised in action. Even when we define
understanding as grasping the meaning, it is related to action, because the meaning is revealed
in linguistic practices which determine the use of expressions. Understanding has also been
presented as related to rationality, which refers us to the ability of ascribing rational beliefs to
others. Thus it must be based upon the principles that guarantee the ascription of rationality to
all subjects only on the basis of their utterances and actions. This is ensured by the principle of
charity and the principle of solidarity. The former, inspired by Davidson's conception, requires
interpreting a subjects action to be rational and, in the case of any disagreement of the ascribed
belief and behaviour of the observed subject, searching for its best interpretation. The latter,
which has been introduced in this book, ensures that all the subjects follow the former principle,
but it also enables all subjects a verification, or falsification of all beliefs ascribed not only to
other subjects, but also to oneself. In other words, it imposes the same conditions of verifying
beliefs on all subjects. The principle of solidarity causes knowledge to stop being something
privileged and creates interpersonal subjectivity which forms a social space.
Understanding as ascribing beliefs has been linked to the rationality of subjects. Already
in this point the role of self-knowledge has been emphasised for that which means to truly
understand. In order to be able to say that one understands, the subject must have the ability of
self-reference, i.e. it should be able to ascribe to oneself this specific state, hence the reference
to self-knowledge. Reflective understanding must be accompanied by self-knowledge.
However, in the chapter devoted to understanding it was not determined what self-knowledge
is.
Issues related to self-knowledge were broached in the last chapter, in which self-
knowledge was scrutinised in a twofold manner: as strictly related to self-consciousness and as
a kind of specific knowledge. The former approach pointed to a number of problems generally
relating to the question of the first-person authority and the cases which undermine it, such as
errors in self-identification or misidentification the content of one's states. It has been found
that if such cases exist, then the authority of the first person must be redefined. A privileged
access to one's states remains in the sense that it is a first-person access, but it does not guarantee
authority as far as own states are concerned. It has been demonstrated that self-knowledge based
on self-consciousness inherits its errors – errors of inner perception. The mind’s eye does not
always perceive correctly. Even internalism does not protect us from such mistakes. As it has
been mentioned, such an assertion may paradoxically enhance the first-person authority. The
assumption of the principles of psychological externalism and following its rules within self-
knowledge is the way forward. Self-knowledge is not a higher activity of consciousness. It is a
separate activity of the subject which requires effort and will to take on specific actions of the
mind. Not everything in self-knowledge happens automatically. The content of mental states is
created in a manner that is independent of us, as an effect of determination from the world, but
the manner in which they are processed by the mind depends on the subject. Self-knowledge is
thus a specific ability consisting in self-reflection, with the involvement of other key cognitive
abilities – intentionality and understanding – for the purpose of self-cognising. Not the
perception of oneself, not the experience of oneself, but the cognising of oneself, such as that
which is based upon justified beliefs. However, the justification for these beliefs must not be
sought inside the subject but outside it, through the interaction with the external world and the
'me-other' relation.
The issues broached upon in the present book have been centred around the relationship
between cognitive science and epistemology. One of the first questions posed in this work
related to the contribution of cognitive research in epistemology and how to integrate and
assimilate them. A twofold approach to the discussed abilities was to be an example of such an
integration and assimilation, demonstrating a mutual permeation of philosophy and cognitive
science. As it has been mentioned, although the scales tipped to one or the other side, a general
dialogue between philosophical and cognitive conceptions enabled a creation of coherent
approaches to intentionality, understanding and self-knowledge – the fundamental cognitive
abilities, which in such a triangulation are unique for human cognition.
The consideration on the cooperation of cognitive science and epistemology, or in a
broader sense, cognitive science and philosophy, should lead to the conclusion that the diversity
of analyses in cognitive sciences requires a binder which is philosophy. Philosophy approaches
the problems of cognition more broadly, whereas cognitive science delivers substantial results
of empirical analyses which may subsequently become an object of philosophical analyses.