ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE

I. Sec. 1
a. Garcia vs. Comelec, GR 111230, September 30, 1994
b. SBMA vs. Comelec, GR 125416, September 26, 1996
II. Sec. 3
a. Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR 157870,
Nov. 3, 2008
III. Sec. 4
a. Borja vs. Comelec, GR No. 133495, September 3, 1998
IV. Sec. 5
a. Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec, GR No. 136781, Oct. 6,
2000
b. Banat vs. Comelec, GR No. 179271, April 21, 2009
c. Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec, GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001
d. Paglaum vs. Comelec, GR 203766, April 2, 2013
e. Ang Ladlad Party vs. Comelec, GR 190582, April 8, 2010
f. Sema vs. Comelec, GR Not. 177597, July 16, 2008
g. Aquino III vs. Melo, GR 189793, April 7, 2010
V. Sec. 6
a. Marcos vs. Comelec, GR No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995
b. Aquino vs. Comelec, GR No. 120265, Sept. 18, 1995
VI. Sec. 11
a. Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, GR No. L-15905, Aug. 3, 1966
b. People vs. Jalosjos, GR No. 132875, Feb. 3, 2000
c. Trillanes vs. Judge Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
VII. Sec. 13
a. Liban vs. Gordon, GR 175352
i. En Banc (July 15, 2009)
ii. Resolution (Jan. 18, 2011)
b. Adaza vs. Pacana, GR No. L-68159, March 18, 1985
VIII. Sec. 14
a. Puyat vs. De Guzman, GR No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG,
BATAAN, respondents.
Alfonzo M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioners.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Power; Two Kinds of Legislative Power; Original
legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people while derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated to legislative bodies, and is subordinate
to the original power of the people.—The case at bench is of transcendental
significance because it involves an issue of first impression—delineating the
extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father
Bernas explains that “in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of
legislative power, original and derivative. Original legislative power is possessed
by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which has been
delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the
original power of the people.”
Same; Same; Initiative; One of the lessons of the people’s sad experience with
the government of former President Marcos is the folly of completely
surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature, such that the
Constitution thereafter adopted became “less trusting of public officials than the
American Constitution.”—In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the
determination of their destiny. They toppled down the government of former
President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was
rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is
the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature.
The result, in the perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution
became “less trusting of public officials than the American Constitution.” For the
first time in 1987, the system of people’s initiative was thus installed in our
fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The Constitution clearly includes not
only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative; A law
should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution.—
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: “The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x” An act
includes a resolution. Black defines an act as “an expression of will or purpose . .
. it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and
determinations x x x.” It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony with
and not in violation of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional command to include acts as
appropriate subjects of initiative implemented by Congress when it enacted R.A.
6735, an intent confirmed by the congressional debates.— The constitutional
command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative
was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled
“An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor.” Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects
of initiatives on local legislations. There can hardly be any doubt that when
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intended resolutions to be proper
subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent.
Same; Same; Same; The subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code
of 1991 did not change the scope of local initiative, or limit the coverage of local
initiatives to ordinances alone.—Contrary to the submission of the respondents,
the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which also
dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More
specifically, the Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances
alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX, Book I of the Code cited by respondents
merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters
that can be taken up in a local initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code
which does.
Same; Same; Same; Sec. 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not
limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact.—This
provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances,
but to all “subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
Sanggunians to enact,” which undoubtedly includes resolutions. This
interpretation is supported by section 125 of the same Code which provides:
“Limitations upon Sanggunians.—Any proposition or ordinance approved through
the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from
the date of the approval thereof x x x.” Certainly, the inclusion of the word
proposition is inconsistent with respondents’ thesis that only ordinances can be
the subject of local initiatives.
Same; Same; Same; Resolutions and Ordinances, Distinguished.—We note that
respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of
a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a
resolution and an ordinance—i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the
legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect
while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters
applying to persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally
subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the
successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Petitioners were denied due process when
they were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition to the COMELEC praying for
denial of their petition for a local initiative, a circumstance that was made worse
when the COMELEC granted the same without affording the petitioners any fair
opportunity to oppose it.—Finally, it cannot be gainsaid that petitioners were
denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice
Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of
their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording
petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at
stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people,
their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty
to listen and the obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the
only force that could foil the mushrooming abuses in government.
PUNO, J.:
The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be
trusted to check excesses of government. One of the means by which people
power can be exercised is thru initiatives where local ordinances and resolutions
can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected.
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act
No. 7227.
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition
states:
I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na
walang kondisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa
SSEZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at
isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan:
(A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" — isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at
punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
(K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta
ng salaping ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue
Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.
(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat
bayan ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.
(E). Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga
lupa.
(H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at
bukod dito sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at
Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing
bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-
Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa
pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.
(J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong,
Hermosa at Bataan.
The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty
(30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of
initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to solicit the
required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown
to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June
11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the
petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just
promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility." 5 We quote the letter, viz:
The Executive Director
COMELEC
Intramuros, Metro Manila
S i r:
In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T.
Garcia, relative to the conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the
annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, may we respectfully
request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the issues raised by the
proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other
government agencies by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues
raised by the petitioners with the corresponding actions undertaken by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit:
ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS
I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung:
a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pag-aaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval
Reservation;
b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila
sa SSEZ;
c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at
Dinalupihan;
d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at
Dinalupihan;
e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng
dalawang (2) pinto pa;
(f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan;
g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar.
ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG
1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
Development Act of 1992, all actions of LGU's correlating on the above issues are
merely recommendatory in nature when such provisions were already embodied
in the statute.
2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and
approved Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of
the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its
position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg. 12, Serye ng taong
1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same issues raised
by the petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).
3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its
letter to His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached
and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying letter from BCDA Vice-Chairman
Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated June 3, 1993
that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA.
4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of
Morong, Bataan Mayor Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and
Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of Concurrence to SBMA was
submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of completion of
Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road) Project, including the Morong-Poblacion-
Mabayo Road to DPWH. (Attached and marked as Annex "C").
Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had
accommodated the clamor of the petitioners in accordance with its limited
powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong cannot
afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps drag
for several months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong,
Bataan.
Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local
initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness,
counter productive and futility.
Thank you and more power.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON
Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer
In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the
petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution
(pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." 6 On July 13, 1993, the
COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.
Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being
gathered by petitioners. 7
These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench.
The petition makes the following submissions:
5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside
Comelec Resolution Nos. 93-1676 and 93-1623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as
it disallowed the initiation of a local initiative to annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN
BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and authentication of the required
number of signatures in support thereof.
5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe
due process in the conduct of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions,
Annexes "E" and "H", were issued ex parte and without affording petitioners and
the other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. More
importantly, these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. A Sangguniang Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned
local legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper subject of initiative. (Sec. 32,
Art. VI, Constitution)
5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command
the respondent Comelec to schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of
the petition, and should the required number of signatures be obtained, set a
date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof.
5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely
ministerial. It is duty-bound to supervise the gathering of signatures in support
of the petition and to set the date of the initiative once the required number of
signatures are obtained.
If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a
date for the initiative during which the proposition shall be submitted to the
registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their approval within
sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case
of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall
then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and
proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h) R.A. 7160.
Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it
contends that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be
the subject of a local initiative. The same stance is assumed by the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong. 8
We grant the petition.
The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue
of first impression — delineating the extent of the all important original power of
the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains that "in republican systems, there
are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative. Original
legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative
power is that which has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative
bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people."9
Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly
exercised legislative power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the
Constitution or the power to enact ordinary laws. Section 1, Article VI of the
1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." Similarly, section 1, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, provided that "the Legislative power shall be
vested in a Batasang Pambansa." 10
Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for
their benefit. So total was their trust that the people did not reserve for
themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The omission was to prove
unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed the
expectations of the people especially when former President Marcos wielded
lawmaking powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws
which could have bridled the nation's downslide from democracy to
authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day.
In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their
destiny. They toppled down the government of former President Marcos in a
historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was rewritten to embody the
lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of completely
surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the
perceptive words of Father Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less
trusting of public officials than the American Constitution." 11
For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in
our fundamental law. To be sure, it was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the
state of South Dakota has adopted initiative and referendum in its
constitution 12 and many states have followed suit. 13 In any event, the framers
of our 1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an
ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and
misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus, thru an
initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec.
2 of Art. XVII provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein." Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also
endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local
legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide:
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereto.
The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. 14 Worthwhile
noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or referendum as delineated by
section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra — any act or law passed by
Congress or local legislative body.
In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted
laws to put into operation the constitutionalized concept of initiative and
referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An
Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American laws, 15 R.A. No. 6735, among
others, spelled out the requirements 16 for the exercise of the power of initiative
and referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum; 17 procedure
of local initiative and referendum; 18 and their limitations. 19 Then came Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter
2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and
referendum.
In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at
bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative.
Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative.
They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the
legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may
directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."
We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it
will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in
enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and
referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ."
An act includes a resolution. Black 20 defines an act as "an expression of will or
purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not
merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards,
and determinations . . . ." It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the constitution. 21 In line with this postulate, we held
in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions, that interpretation will be adopted
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used." 22
The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate
subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act
No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes
resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall
mean;
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.
(Emphasis ours)
Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies — Any
proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative
and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended,
by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its
Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum, on
National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of
initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative —
The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a
national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
law,resolution or ordinance."
There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6735 it intend resolutions to be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates
confirm this intent. We quote some of the interpellations when the Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of Representatives, viz:
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions
between Senate Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which
refers to the system providing for the initiative ad referendum, fundamentally,
Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both
versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the House of Representatives correctly provided
for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills
was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local initiative and
referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and
referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided purely for national and
constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were
incorporated.?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum
both in the constitutional amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the
provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the
enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be done every five years.
Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the
1987 Constitution, it is every five years. 23
Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the
local Government Code of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not
change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the Code did not limit the
coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX
Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local
initiative as the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does
not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local
initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:
Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall
not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sanggunians to enact.
xxx xxx xxx
This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to
ordinances, but to all "subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of
the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes resolutions. This
interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides:
"Limitations upon Sanggunians. — Any proposition or ordinance approved
through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be
repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned within six (6)
months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the inclusion of
the word proposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances
can be the subject of local initiatives. The principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, espouses the same
view. In his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz: 24
4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct
initiative for as long as these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to
enact. In California, for example, direct initiatives were proposed to enact a
fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to levy a special tax
to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to
prevent discrimination in the sale of housing and similar bills.
Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures
provided that these are within the power of the local Sanggunians to enact,
subject of course to the other requisites enumerated in the Section.
5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only
of "ordinance," although the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the
registered voters can propose ordinances, why are they not allowed to propose
resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not only
with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions.
The discussion hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that
resolutions may indeed be the subject of local initiative.
We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be
the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known
distinction between a resolution and an ordinance — i.e., that a resolution is
used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only
a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and
control matters applying to persons or things in general. 25 Thus, resolutions are
not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to
the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. 26
In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of
the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the
people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government. The
inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching
implications in the governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of
section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion
of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose, Providing Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. — Subject to the concurrence by
resolution of the sangguniang panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and
the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa,
there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the
City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced,
covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, hereinafter referred to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose
metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the
President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act,
each local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the
President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and
bounds of the zone as provided herein.
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the
Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code, the
Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive
foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital
within, into a exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as
provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw material, capital
and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory
shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code
and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:
(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic
Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%) of the of the
gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%)
each to the local government units affected by the declaration of the zone in
proportion to their population area, and other factors. In addition, there is
hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross income
earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone
to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo
and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to the base
areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption
privileges in the Subic Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in
favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign
exchange, gold, securities and futures shall be allowed and maintained in the
Subic Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate
the operations of banks and other financial institutions within the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign
currency depository units of local commercial banks and offshore banking units
of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing
investment shall not be less than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000),
his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall
be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic Zone.
They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special
Economic Zone without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority referred to in Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every two (2) Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, JJ., are on leave.
which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified
by the Department of Labor and Employment. The names of aliens granted
permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within
thirty (30) days after issuance thereof.
(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the
responsibility of the National Government in coordination with the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority shall provide and
establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces; and
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities
shall be governed by their respective charters and the municipalities shall
operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991.
In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides:
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government
Units. —
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Subic Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-
making and disbursement of funds over the Subic Special Economic Zone in
conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government
units concerned on matters affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than
defense and security, the decision of the Subic Authority shall prevail.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and
economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality
in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the
matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of
Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its
enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong.
Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were
not furnished a copy of the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to
the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of their petition for a local initiative
on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent COMELEC
granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose
it. This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the
sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their original power to legislate through
the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the obligation to obey the
voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the
mushrooming abuses in government.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623
dated July 6, 1993 and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A.
CALIMBAS, respondents.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Referendum; The Constitution clearly
includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative.—The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: ‘The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system
of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people
can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x x.’ “ An act includes
a resolution.
Same; Same; Same; In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections.—In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the
respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these “people-power” features of our Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Courts may decide only actual controversies not hypothetical
questions or cases.—Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private
respondent Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would
be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for
it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented there-under. At this point, it is merely
a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies,
not hypothetical questions or cases.
Same; Same; Same; The Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion.—So too, the
Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon errors of law (and
sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of
lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any “branch or
instrumentality” of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission
of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in
regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved,
or passed upon by any “branch or instrumentality” or lower court, for that matter.
The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about
the issues brought by the pleadings.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it
institutionalized people power in law-making. Learning from the bitter lesson of
completely surrendering to Congress the sole authority to make, amend or repeal
laws, the present Constitution concurrently vested such prerogatives in the
electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to ordain
legislation directly through the concepts and processes of initiative and of
referendum.
In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and
discusses the practical and legal implications of such differences. It also sets down
some guidelines in the conduct and implementation of these two novel and vital
features of popular democracy, as well as settles some relevant questions on
jurisdiction -- all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the
people's exercise of direct democracy.
In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the
respondent Commission on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution
No. 2848 promulgated on June 27, 1996[1] denying petitioner's plea to stop the
holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
The Facts
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the
creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone, thus:
"Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by
resolution of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and Hermosa, there is
hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands
occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced,
covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of
Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes
and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of
the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local
government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic
Special Economic Zone to the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of
the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the
zone as provided herein." (Underscoring supplied)
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive
uses.[2] Petitioner was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion
which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with,
among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12
hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory
not otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government
agency.[3]
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the
implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of
the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed
a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.The petition prayed for the following:
"I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na
walang kundisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa
SSEFZ kung ang mga sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at
isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong at Bataan:
(A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at
punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
(K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng
salaping ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment'
(IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.
(D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling 'special economic zones' ang bawat bayan
ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan.
(E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga
lupa.
(H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at
bukod dito sa magbukas pa ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at
Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga nasabing
bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-
Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa
pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.
(J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang
Morong, Hermosa at Bataan."
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents
Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A.
No. 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E)
and (G) of private respondents' petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also
informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and
favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases
Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein
respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code
of 1991,[4] Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides as follows:
"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. -
xxxxxxxxx
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the
proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian
concerned.
 x x x x x x x x x."
On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No.
93-1623 denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on
the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang
kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent
Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676) further directed its
Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures
being solicited by private respondents.
On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition
for certiorari and mandamus[5] before this Court against the Commission on
Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec
Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No.
93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from
proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support
of the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of
the Philippines issued proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic
Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting
therein a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal
ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which
indicated, among others, the scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday).
On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848
providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of theSangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan".
On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia,
that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes
an amendment of a national law. x x x"
The Issues
The petition[6] presents the following "argument":
"Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in scheduling a local initiative which seeks the
amendment of a national law."
In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has
failed to show the existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) x x x petitioner
seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and executory;
(3) x x x public respondent has not abused its discretion and has in fact acted
within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) x x x the concurrence of local government units is
required for the establishment of the Subic Special Economic Zone."
Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his
Reply (should be Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several
meetings with petitioner's Chairman and staff and after consultation with legal
counsel, respondent Calimbas discovered that the demands in the petition for a
local initiative/referendum were not legally feasible."[7]
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues,
as follows:
"1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the
local intiative proposing to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the request of petitioner SBMA to stop the local initiative."
On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which,
it issued the following resolution:
"The Court Resolved to (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attached Comment
filed by counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996
and (2) NOTE the: (a) Reply (should be comment) to the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunctiom, filed by counsel for respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated
July 22, 1996; (b) Separate Comments on the petition, filed by: (b-1) the
Solicitor General for respondent Commission on Elections dated July 19, 1996
and (b-2) counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996
and (c) Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner dated July 22, 1996.
At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and
argued for petitioner Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto
Brillantes for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for
respondent Catalino Calimbas. Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor
General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Zenaida Hernandez-Perez appeared for
respondent Commission on Elections with Solicitor General Goco arguing.
Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to
INFORM this Court by Friday, July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on
Elections would push through with the initiative/referendum this Saturday, July
27, 1996.
Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.
At 2:50 p.m. July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order
dated also on July 23, 1996 from the respondent Commission on Elections En
Banc inter alia 'to hold in abeyance the scheduled referendum (initiative) on July
27, 1996 pending resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In view of this Order, the
petitioner's application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction has become moot and academic and will thus not be
passed upon by this Court at this time. Puno, J., no part due to relationship.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave."
After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and
arguments of the parties, the Court believes that the issues may be restated as
follows:
(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long
become final and executory"; namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al.;
(2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the
conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and
(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."
First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment
Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in
Enrique T. Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.[8] on "the very issue
raised in (the) petition:whether or not there can be an initiative by the people of
Morong, Bataan on the subject proposition -- the very same proposition, it bears
emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now
sought to be enjoined by petitioner x x x".
We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a
municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper
subject of an initiative and/or referendum. We quote from our said Decision:[9]
"In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at
bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative.
Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of
initiative. They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides: 'Local Initiative Defined. -- Local
initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government
unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.'
We reject respondent's narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it
will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in
enacting the provisions of the Local Government of 1991 on initiative and
referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in
luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body x x
x'. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an acts 'an expression of will or
purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not
merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards
and determination x x x.' It is basic that a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulates, we held
in In Re Guarina that if there is doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more construction, that interpretations will be adopted
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used.' "
Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that
the sole issue presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a
Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the subject of a valid initiative or
referendum".[10]
In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal
resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the
people may validly exercised.What is at issue here is whether Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form and substance for
submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted
properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848
The main issue in this case may be re-started thus: Did respondent Comelec
commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution
No. 2848?
 We answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE
but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in
the body of the Resolution[11] as reproduced in the footnote below the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at
all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the
ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise
is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and
an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,[12] Congress
differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition
sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or
reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or
reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz [13] defines initiative
as the "power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them
at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he
explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most
cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing
definitions, which are based on Black's[14] and other leading American authorities,
are echoed in the Local Government Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process whereby
the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance.
"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve,
amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45)
days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or
initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses
to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they
want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the
local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If its
refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body
concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed
conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on
Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the
proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned x x x".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to
the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making
authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction
of the Commission on Elections.[15]
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate,
referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a
process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and
against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists
merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted
by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are
understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters
will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and
referendum as "powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice
Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative)
being referred to in this Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec
to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to
the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true where the
proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down
into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care
must also be exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall
be submitted to the electorate,"[16] although "two or more propositions may be
submitted in an initiative".[17]
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.
Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of
Conditionalities -- Ultra Vires?
Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the
plebiscite, namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or
beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan to enact, [18] stressing that under
Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall cover
only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to
enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such ordinances or
resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact.[19]After
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned
(Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of concurrence, and by
reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and bounds had already
been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in accordance
with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence and/or
to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer within the authority
and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to legislate.Furthermore,
petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in the questioned municipal
resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to impose. Hence, such
withdrawal can no longer be enacted or conditionalities imposed by initiative. In
other words, petitioner insists, the creation of SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the
benefit of the entire nation. Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its
concurrence or impose new conditions for such concurrence as this would
effectively render nugatory the creation by (national) law of the SSEZ and would
deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived therefrom. Once created,
SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern. It has become a national project.
On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument
is premature and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a
proposal. If the people should reject it during the referendum, then there is
nothing to declare as illegal.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia
that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an
approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest
and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become
an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions
or cases.[20]
We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides[21] that
"(n)othing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act x x x."
So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.[22] It passes upon errors
of law (and sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital
offenses) of lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
"branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear
that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine
the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same
authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for
that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable
pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there
is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise
of its review powers.
Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no
power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we
are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the
Commission -- to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been
addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first
instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over
"approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass upon such
proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as discussed earlier;
and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof
are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to
enact."[23] Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of this initiative is
within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact may be ruled upon
by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties thereon.
While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be
fruitful for the parties and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the
question of whether Grande Island and the "virgin forests" mentioned in the
proposed initiative belong to the national government and thus cannot be
segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of
passing a municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of
the full subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized capital stock of the
Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from cash and other assets, the "...
lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, ..." which includes
said island and forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that may
be taken up in the proper forum -- the Commission on Elections.
Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon
remand of the initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity
of the Municipal Council to enact, may be divided into several parts for purposes
of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall, nullify and render without effect (bawiin,
nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of 1993. On the
other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said resolution with
another municipal resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions
enumerated thereunder would be granted, obeyed and implemented
(ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong
and Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want a total dismemberment
of Morong from the Authority -- but may not agree with any of the conditions set
forth in Item II. Should the proposal then be divided and be voted upon separately
and independently?
All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of
prematurity.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to
the present controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from
the questions involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an
opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848
and in preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said
Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass
upon the question of whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language and
whether such proposal or part or parts thereof are clearly and patently outside
the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of
law.
In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as
concepts and processes, are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to
the Comelec so that proper corrective measures, as above discussed, may be
undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the
actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that "(p)rovisions
for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes,
to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby."[24]In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be used should the legislature show
itself indifferent to the needs of the people."[25] Impelled by a sense of urgency,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the constitutional
mandate. Congress also interphased initiative and referendum into the workings
of local governments by including a chapter on this subject in the local Government
Code of 1991.[26] And the Commission on Elections can do no less by seasonably
and judiciously promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local use,
in implementation of these laws. For its part, this Court early on expressly
recognized the revolutionary import of reserving people power in the process of
law-making.[27]
Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of
expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine
will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise. For
it is but sound public policy to enable the electorate to express their free and
untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed lawmakers and
executives, but also in the formulation of the very rules and laws by which our
society shall be governed and managed.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings
consistent with the foregoing discussion. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
Puno, J., no part due to relationship.
 Respondent.
November 3, 2008
Republic of the Philippines x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SUPREME COURT
Manila Remedial Law; Actions; Power of Judicial Review; Parties; Party-in-Interest; The
power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide
EN BANC controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed; Even with the
presence of an actual case or controversy, the court may refuse to exercise judicial
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870 review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the
Petitioner, requisite standing to challenge it.—It is basic that the power of judicial review can
- versus - only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed. But even with the presence of an actual case or
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing
AGENCY (PDEA), to challenge it. To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered
Respondents. some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
x-----------------------------------------------x government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633 is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner,
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on standing is a matter of procedure; hence,
- versus - it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT public interest.—The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence,
AGENCY, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
Respondents. legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
x-----------------------------------------------x transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658 public interest. There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and
Petitioner, candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
Present: he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other
PUNO, C.J., preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax
QUISUMBING, the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
- versus - CORONA, violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
CARPIO MORALES, effect.—Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
AZCUNA, should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
TINGA, an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
CHICO-NAZARIO, and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
VELASCO, JR., conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge
NACHURA, of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
REYES, but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and imposes must be observed.
BRION, JJ.
Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.—
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain
limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in
the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise: Someone has
said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the
boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of
the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers
as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of
legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash,
but over which it cannot leap.
Same; Same; The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.—In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise
of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations
to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process
of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution; Whether or not the drug-
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one
cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement—Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a
pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
“[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Same; Same; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional.—Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the
view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
Same; Same; A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected.—The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,
particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion,
a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s
laws against the importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress,
the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that
the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Same; Same; The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason.—Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary
level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS,
other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right
to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of
the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and
gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
Same; Same; If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people
and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.—Taking into account
the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the
well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their
counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in
the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people
and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Same; Same; In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless; To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical
test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165.—We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be
the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt
to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
declared unconstitutional.—WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition
in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing
Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or
by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored
by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The
drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing
methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following
shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the schools student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug
testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall
be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in
the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
 In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those
found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to
the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug
test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are
electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority
vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws,
RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the
following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug
testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with
their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees
concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate
lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates
who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file
drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office shall
enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under
Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write,
a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand
the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the
equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the
matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB
and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court
may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. [4] To have
standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.[5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed
for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and
candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other
preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax
the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for
senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
(4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator
and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or
an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject
to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department
of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of
each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may
dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications
of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator
or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution
add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office
for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the
drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate
of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception,
made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to
the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public
office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer
to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only
the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that
electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate
to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one
aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp
out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs. This statutory
purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the
pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs
and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those
found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of
RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or
 any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by
himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the
drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring
forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant
be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x
results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent,
he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the
Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under
Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems
of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to
drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. [15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as
a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy
has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random
drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal
point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first
impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence.
With respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v.
Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18]both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-
decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to
address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of
frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they
required random urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a
high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he
refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming
that the schools drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth
Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised
in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their
students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the
school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than
non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports
events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring
urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a student need not undress
for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of
the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held
that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th
Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school
in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to
join extra-curricular activities.Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching
band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the
drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th
Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are
entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of
drug testing even among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between
a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place
of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the
students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing
policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a
reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied
to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty
to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools
have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just,
and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs
in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth
and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To
borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren is as
important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the
importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact
that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory
but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees
of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner
Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit
serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals
have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory
drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have
been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests
violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.[25]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right
to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person
or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement
as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, translation
of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that
the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the states exercise of police power.[29]
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched
and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated
intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the
drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in
the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as
swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature
of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within
the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office
or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
companys work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into
by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer
to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in
a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the
search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly
embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While
every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is
really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use
by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x
for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
 For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and
dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the
more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the
Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure
an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does
not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug
in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug
test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use
is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender,
age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be
an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of
such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by
random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen
method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met
by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by
the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a
high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test
for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable
at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on
the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively
drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the
manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students
of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing.
In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules.
In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons
to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality
of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in
consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among
other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be
subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what
conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of
the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged

before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6)
years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be
the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still,
the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.

161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in
G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998]
BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Suffrage; Term Limits; Political Dynasties; To
prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in
Article X, §8 of the Constitution—the other policy is that of enhancing the freedom
of choice of the people.—To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not
the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other
policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider,
therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that
office—whether by election or by succession by operation of law—would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A consideration of the
historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power.—A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of
the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were
as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected
a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and
legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner
Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same
position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive
term. Monsod warned against “prescreening candidates [from] whom the people
will choose” as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that
the draft constitution contained provisions “recognizing people’s power.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A fundamental tenet of representative
democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please
to govern them.—Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that
the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.
To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms,
although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election,
would therefore be to violate this principle.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Not only historical examination
but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8
contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of
election.—Not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service by local officials for
three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of “the
term of office of elective local officials” and bars “such official[s]” from serving for
more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an
elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states
that “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for which [the
official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official
may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because
he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot
be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units;
There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of
the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes
incapacitated, or is removed from office—the vice-mayor succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law while the Representative is elected to fill the
vacancy.—There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and
that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who
dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the
constitutional provision is to limit the right to be elected and to serve in Congress,
his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, §8 with regard to elective
local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the
theory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidency; The Vice-President is elected
primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death, permanent
disability, removal, or resignation—in running for Vice-President, he may thus be
said to also seek the Presidency.—There is another reason why the Vice-President
who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years
is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to
succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death, permanent disability,
removal, or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming
so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-
President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the
electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Code, the three-term
Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for limitation refers to the term
more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. of office for which the local
official was elected. It
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not enough that an individual has made no reference to
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office—he must also have been succession to an office to
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the which he was not
disqualification can apply.—To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials elected. In the case before
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the the Commission,
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served respondent Capco was not
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected elected to the position of
to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can mayor in the January 18,
apply. 1988 local elections. He
succeeded to such office by
operation of law and served
DECISION
for the unexpired term of
MENDOZA, J.: his
predecessor. Consequently,
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision such succession into office
barring elective officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from serving is not counted as one (1)
more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice- term for purposes of the
mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the computation of the three-
remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the term limitation under the
purpose of the three-term limit. Constitution and the Local
Government Code.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years Municipal Board of Canvassers.
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated May
another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.[1] 7, 1998, of he COMELEC and to seed a declaration that private respondent is
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy disqualified to serve another term as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos service as mayor from
U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification September 2, 1989 to June 30, 992 should be considered as service for full one
on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor,
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the
another term after that. contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on
in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter served
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.[2]However, on motion of private the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private
respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the constitutional
Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.[3] The majority stated provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to
in its decision: prevent a monopolization of political power.

In both the Constitution This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
and the Local Government
SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of
enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay
in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by
election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the
purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a
proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and
legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running
for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the
third consecutive term.[4] Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from]
whom the people will choose asa result of the proposed absolute disqualification,
considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples power. [5]
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a
temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms
in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the
Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission
exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will
already have served their terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think
the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the
excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a
cap on consecutive service in the case of the President, six years; in the case of
the Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In
the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative districts and from
the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later
on the policy concerning local officials will be taken up by the Committee on
Local Governments.The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent
future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent
reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to
develop a proprietary interest in their position and to accumulate those powers
and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts
to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care
of because we put a gap on the continuity or the unbroken service of all of these
officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the
people or politicians, if we want to use the coarser term, under a perpetual
disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the
people, whereas we should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms
of their own freedom of choice.[6]
Other commissioners went on record against perpetually disqualifying
elective officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny
the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, why
should we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want? [7]
Commisioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on
her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and
[rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself.[8]
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: Why should we not leave
[perpetual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise
accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically
mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not
when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who
may aspire to serve them longer?[9]
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from
the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in
office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right
of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of reelection. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI 4 and 7 of the
Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time
before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
 MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen
will remember- was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one
election which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo
expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of
the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on
the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate
can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was
the Committees stand.[10]
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people
should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them.[11] To bar the
election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the
first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports
the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for
three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the
term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for
more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an
elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states
that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the
official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he
is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which
similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more
than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative
to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter how short,
will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.[12]
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in
answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: For example, a special election is
called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion
of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the
correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from
running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam
President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and if there
is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular
term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of
the Lower House.[13]
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that
of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law.[14] On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy.[15] In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of the
constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress,
his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective
local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the
theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for
succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that
office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this
provision says that No person who has succeeded as President and has served as
such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at
any time.Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be
considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office
and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without
it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would
be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than
four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials
throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the
constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have
been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials,
disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the
Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for
election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the
President in the event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely
dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he
may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in
the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four
years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government
Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them.[16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer
to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or
situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the
death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is
twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not
actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term
limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one
for which he was elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for
which the deceased and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the
full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the
deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and
therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify
reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish
to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can
remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the
other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can
return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if
his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term
limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be
protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care
should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., on official leave.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that,
can he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred,
namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times
and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the
local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his
resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not
been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession
involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of
applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to
run again in the next election?

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA,
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA,
PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-
ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-
POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY
PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List
Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His
Capacity as Speaker of the House of
Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN
(AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL,
BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN,
ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN,
ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS'
ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-
ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN,
KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-
BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the
Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number
of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed
Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related
laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority
to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to
implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent
them.
 In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal
feature of parliamentary democracies - into our presidential form of government,
modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and
novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into
mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested
jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with
applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998
Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in
Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution[3] of the Comelec
en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete
the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system
of government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any
national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission
on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon
their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular
members.[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a
district congressman and another for a party-list representative.[5]
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or
election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3,
1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end,
the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and
win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (italics
ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are
prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the
party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
 Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated
Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election
of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and
25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having
garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was
proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit
in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations[8] filed their respective Motions
for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on
substantially the same grounds.Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other
party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay
Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation
of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus
total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the
system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to
51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election
laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant
petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based
on the list of names submitted by their respective parties, organizations and
coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN 36. KATIPUNAN
8. PAG-ASA 37. ONEWAY PRINT
9. MAHARLIKA 38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
10. OCW-UNIFIL to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as
provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-
flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc
13. KAMPIL had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the
14. BANTAY BAYAN Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under
these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two
15. AFW percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently
relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable
17. WOMENPOWER, INC. reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its
three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.[10]
18. FEJODAP
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed
19. CUP winners on the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for
the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed
20. VETERANS CARE
separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11
21. 4L (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House
22. AWATU of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should
23. PMP be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion
to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section
24. ATUCP 11.
25. NCWP Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
26. ALU
27. BIGAS Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that
the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House "should
28. COPRA be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the
apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue
29. GREEN
was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given
30. ANAKBAYAN (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of
the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if
31. ARBA they had not passed the two percent threshold?
32. MINFA The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had
hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of
33. AYOS
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
34. ALL COOP to thirteen organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and
four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict
35. PDP-LABAN application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open
party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it
"will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and
statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a
razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners concurring[11] and two
members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It,
however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote
requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and
circumvented its application, holding that there were more important
considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary
injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had
obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.[13] In
the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties
and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
Comelec to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias
U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A.
Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for
petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra,
for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP; and
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court,
retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus
curiae.Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as
a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their
respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine
the winners of the subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the
following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons
be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats
of a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that
the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be
granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is
Mandatory
The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the
House of Representatives reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation[16] means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering
that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to
comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution
require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which
it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the
legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or
coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of
the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed
together with this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of
participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent
vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the
House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The Comelec
cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves
are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and
how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent
parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the
broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the
total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA
7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute
legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled
to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the
House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently
that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may
result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress.[17] Our task now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault
in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but
to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by
the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must
be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This
intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below
a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a
point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political
party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this
law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of
the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have
said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not
really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their
constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House
of Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based
at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of
seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I
think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote
requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half
percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes
in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000
votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a
seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about
400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking
about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able
to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over
10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we are
trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe
that it is our job to open up the system and that we should not have within that
system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard,
and should earn their seats within that system.[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers
of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. [21] But to
have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list
system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable
of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the
stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to
"the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio"[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement
is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention. [23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote
and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote
Commissioner Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system.But we also wanted to
avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a
concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for
the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable
sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x
x x.[24]
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such
three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is
not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling,
and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of
determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively
referred to as "parties") according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage
of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the
total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing
in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional
proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement
for the first seat.[25]Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of
the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four
percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be entitled
to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided
votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast;
Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described,
Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and Party C, to 3
seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each
uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party
garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting
the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect,
proportional representation will be contravened and the law rendered nugatory by
this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula,
which was developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its
method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the
number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is
determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the
total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total
number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the
resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned
is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties
in the descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based
on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer
method would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each
party, those obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess
seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be
entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous
proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no
application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-
mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress
and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for
them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably
pointed out by private respondents,[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled
up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because
German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941,
as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of
the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the Niemeyer
formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras
mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental environmental differences, neither
can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential
variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique
paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally
defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that
a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of the Filipino
party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number
of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number
of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional
representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent
or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the
private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is
to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest
to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for
each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the
parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the
computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes
shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party
is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to
be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000
votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty
percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its
votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than
the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party
will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical
rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an
arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary
because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the
voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional
contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27] that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no
party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left
to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither
will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to
a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled
to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent
of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were
to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to
twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing concerned party
the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows: ------------------
Total no. of votes
Number of votes Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
of first party Proportion of votes of for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
-------------------- = first party relative to party No. of votes of the first party
Total votes for total votes for party-list system first party
party-list system ------------------
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is Total no. of votes
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, for party list system
then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats In simplified form, it is written as follows:
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than
four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional No. of votes of
or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat. for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always first party
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled
the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an to is computed as follows:
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the No. of votes of
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved Additional seats ABA No. of additional
in the House of Representatives. for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes first party (APEC)
cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two seats. Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number Additional seats 321,646
of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of election to be as follows:
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of 1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will 2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The 3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the 4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party. FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties 6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that
PINAY
the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
No. of votes of 11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the
ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied
by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified
parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of
the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one
additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual
mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the
reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit
to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats
happily coincides with the present number of incumbents; namely, two for
the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence,
we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the
use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too
strict. We say, however, that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal
parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its
wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also
be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of
RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the
Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.[28]
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners
and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused
their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[29]
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-
related laws,[30] cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the
law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any
of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike
down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional
seats (for a total of three each), because granting such plea would plainly and
simply violate the proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA
7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not
be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system
of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the
requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart
of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list
representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign
for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion
call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active
sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be more responsive to future
party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our
marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in
Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for
the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as 10 BUTIL 215,64 2.36% 1 2.45 3 - 3
to costs. 3
11. 194,61 2.13% 1 2.21 3 - 3
SO ORDERED.
SANLAKA 7
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, S
and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur. 12. 189,80 2.07% 1 2.16 3 - 3
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result. COOP- 2
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion. NATCCO
Mendoza, J., dissents. 13. 186,38 2.04% 1 2.12 3 - 3
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza. COCOFE 8
D
Consolidated Table 14. 143,44 1.57%
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS SENIOR 4
CITIZEN
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) S
Actual Percent Guarant Additio Extr Tot Seat Total 15. 5,582, Each
votes age of eed nal a al6 s in numb Other 427 with
receiv votes seat3 seats4 seat exce er Parties less
ed1 cast for s5 ss of than
party- of seats 2%
list2 3 allow TOTAL 9,155, 100% 13 32 7 52 13 39
ed7 309
1. APEC 503,48 5.50% 1 5.73 1 7 4 3
7
2. ABA 321,64 3.51% 1 3.66 1 5 2 3
6
3. 312,50 3.41% 1 3.55 4 1 3
ALAGAD 0
4. 304,90 3.33% 1 3.47 4 1 3
VETERA 2
NS
FEDERAT
ION
5. 255,18 2.79% 1 2.90 1 4 1 3
PROMDI 4
6. AKO 239,04 2.61% 1 2.72 1 4 1 3
2
7. 338,30 2.60% 1 2.71 1 4 1 3
NCSFO 3
8. 235,54 2.57% 1 2.68 1 4 1 3
ABANSE! 8
PINAY
9. 232,37 2.54% 1 2.64 1 4 1 3
AKBAYA 6
N!
 EN BANC

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271 Respondent.
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT _______________________
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner, x---------------------------------------------------x

- versus - Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of

additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11
(sitting as the National Board of (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.—We rule that, in computing the
Canvassers), allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
Respondent. threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
PROFESSIONALS, maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
Intervenor. party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
AANGAT TAYO, permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
Intervenor. shall consist of party-list representatives.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
CITIZENS), sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore
Intervenor. strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295 The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present: attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
AND HARMONY TOWARDS interests in the House of Representatives.”
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING, Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO, representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the
CARPIO, allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations,
CORONA, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties,
TINGA, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
CHICO-NAZARIO, votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
VELASCO, JR., 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
NACHURA, paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party,
BRION, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In moot.BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to
computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the Constitution.
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior
fractional seats. Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
from participating in the party-list system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-
Same; Same; By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning
indirectly.—By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-
list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia. Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

Same; Same; If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system The Facts
electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list
sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution.—The evils that faced our representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under
marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 the Party-List System.[6]
Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members
frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is,
party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no
frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19
opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system. July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
DECISION No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners
in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan
CARPIO, J.: Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher,
The Case Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, [1] assails the below:
Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-
List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and
public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local
Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation
Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher
than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes
given the following statistical data:
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a
formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%)
votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all
party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have
thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as
follows:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

Elections COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
i. Total party-list votes already 15,283,659
canvassed/tabulated
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/
3 CIBAC 760,260
untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) 1,337,032
4 GABRIELA 610,451
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%
outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass 5 APEC 538,971
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; 6 A TEACHER 476,036
and Pagalungan, Maguindanao) 102,430
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121
8 ALAGAD 423,076
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List 9 BUTIL 405,052
System Act) provides in part:
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
The parties, organizations, and coalitions 11 BATAS 386,361
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those 13 ARC 338,194
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
14 ABONO 337,046
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes:
provided, finally, that each party, organization, or WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
(3) seats. PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer
total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes; organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list
are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list
system of representation in the meantime.
 resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the proceedings therein moot and academic.
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution,
the Party-List System: furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of
Cooperatives the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment A TEACHER

Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections
Towards Educational Reforms, Inc. sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions
based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462
8 Alagad ALAGAD votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed
party-list seat each;
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected
maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in
13 Abono ABONO Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum
votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and
that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13)
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes
cast under the Party-List System. Party-List Projected total number of
votes
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or 1 BUHAY 1,178,747
coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass 2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
of the party-list results. 3 CIBAC 755,964
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng 4 GABRIELA 621,718
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final 5 APEC 622,489
 6 A TEACHER 492,369 - - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190 which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

9 BUTIL 409,298 WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920 qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula
as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846 No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
13 ABONO 340,151 Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan first party
Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:
making it the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Party List Percentage Additional Seat
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
participating under the party-list system of representation that CIBAC 1.28 1
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an
additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the GABRIELA 1.05 1
Supreme Court in Veterans; APEC 1.05 1
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party,
the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is: A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for ALAGAD 0.71 0
Total votes for party-list system party-list system BUTIL 0.69 0

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
(without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats: ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party ABONO 0.57 0

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than One (1) additional seat Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144,
6% Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the
Less than 4% No additional seat Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the entitled to additional seats, to wit:
following percentage:

1,178,747
 Party List Additional Seats
BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%)
CIBAC 1 Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be
GABRIELA 1 proclaimed.
APEC 1 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,
organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to
have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast
under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed
seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to
one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise
be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list,
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to
wit:
-- of Party-List representatives as mandated by
prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted
on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall
be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the
number of seats corresponding to every 2% of
the votes they received and the additional seats
shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12
of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party-list
group in relation to the total nationwide votes
cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were
allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In
fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A
of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of
determining how many seats shall be
proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled
to representative seats and how many of their
nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats
for party-list representative prescribed by
Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
 The petition of BANAT is now moot and 1.3 CIBAC 2
academic.
1.4 Gabriela 2
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 1.5 APEC 2
07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter
of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation 1.6 A Teacher 1
of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions 1.7 Akbayan 1
Participating Under the Party-List System During
the May 14, 2007 National and Local 1.8 Alagad 1
Elections resolved among others that the total 1.9 Butil 1
number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined 1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
pursuant to the Veterans Federation 1.11 Anak Pawis 1
Party versus COMELEC formula upon
1.12 ARC 1
completion of the canvass of the party-list
results. 1.13 Abono 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of
1.14 AGAP 1
Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC 1.15 AMIN 1
Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being
moot and academic. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution. Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal
SO ORDERED.[10] of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred
pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Issues
Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting
as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the 7941 constitutional?
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector 3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by
Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list
organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008: 4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]

Party-List No. of Seat(s) Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues
in their petition:
1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
 I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said
rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of
proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating
additional seats for the First Party violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats,
one for the First Party and another for the qualifying parties,
violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are
different from those required under RA 7941;
C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-
list system as provided for under the same case of Veterans
Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same
being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in
nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation
of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation.[17]
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in
these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments
set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives
in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely
a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-
list elections?[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list
election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-
list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.[19]
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to
revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of
party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the
number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula
in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats Number of seats available to
available to legislative x .20 = party-list representatives
districts
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available
for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since
the 14thCongress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55
seats available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating
the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the
legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats
reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the
total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-
List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V.
Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21] as an
alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating
the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No.
7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the
following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall
 be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank
them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-
list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas
to allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the
2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure
as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent
(20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives
including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of
RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June
1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the
14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All
seats shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for
every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more
than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained
by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes
corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be
allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not
secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold
rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote
requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the
COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according
to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization
or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the
proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total
nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list
with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the
COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both
formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is
generated by dividing the votes of a qualified partyby the total votes of all qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by
multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There
will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the
equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation
is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked
from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list
representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to 26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the CITIZENS
elections.[27]
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
Votes Votes ILONGGO
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered 29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868 30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386 31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
MUNA KASANGGA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541 32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424 PILIPINO
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327 33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200 34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686 35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544 36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220 37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
NATCCO 38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993 39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717 PINAY
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872 40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522 FILIPINA
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722 44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837 45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478 46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612 47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations,
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282 and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512 party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat
to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835 for illustration purposes.The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least
number of votes cast for all party-list candidates. 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified
party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party- allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
list.[28] The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
Votes proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and
Garnered intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
Votes over Total Guaranteed clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the
Rank Party votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language
Garnered Votes for Seat
Party-List, in of R.A. No. 7941.
%
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1 the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two
percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available
11 BATAS [29]
385,810 2.42% 1 party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes
for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to
the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
Total 17 interests in the House of Representatives.[30]
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
 Total intege seat
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two Votes rs cap
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to for
one guaranteed seat each. Party (First
List, in Round) (Second
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking % Round)
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total (B)
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (C)
(D) (E)
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more (A)
than three (3) seats.
1 BUHAY 1,169,23 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included 4
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two- 2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional MUNA
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The 6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the 9[31] COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole NATCCO
integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign
one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are 11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
13 ANAKPAW 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
IS
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
WARAY
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
Guarante Addition (B) 19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
Votes Votes Applyin
Ran ed Seat al plus
Party Garner Garner g the 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
k Seats (C), in
ed ed over three
whole 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A. and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
23 KABATAA 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A. ceiling on the number of representatives from any single
N party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. list system. x x x.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. xxx

26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats
is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A. to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A. as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or
must they be under the district legislation side of it only?
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties
that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise,
KASANGG
they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent
A
or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. are allocating under the party list system.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A. district candidates and can also participate in the party list
system?
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party
list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
Tot 17 55
al
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate
in the party list system?

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are
55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of
three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under
BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he
qualify?

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we
suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted
to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a
multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system,
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party
list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass
on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin
ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties,
are not prohibited to participate in the party list election
if they can prove that they are also organized along
sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all
political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base
of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would
the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang
UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at
mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng
political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa
political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run
there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would
UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral
candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he
shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral
lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus
for political parties and mass organizations to seek common
ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I
see no reason why they should not be able to make common
goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation of mass
organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being
formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many
mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong,
there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so
that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be
radically transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system
is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC
the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with
them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that
they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives,
for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic
Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their
very presence there has a transforming effect upon the
philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the
AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican
Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence
and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we
set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in
a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore,
I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral
representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system; and even
beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of
contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for
major political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
 (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates
for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a
coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In
defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or
a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-
list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There
should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth
wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing
can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No.
7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day
of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attainsthe age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list
organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is
no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a
senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow
the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling

in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the

Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well
as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional
the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are
disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW),
represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO! GO! PHILIPPINES; THE
TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE,
ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE
BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS
(OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
"Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO
NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY;
ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties"
of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION
(NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY;
MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION, respondents.
Election Law; Actions; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Under both the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, a challenge on the validity of a Comelec
Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion may be brought
before the Supreme Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.—At
bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed
respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before
this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; No motion for
reconsideration of a Comelec en banc resolution, order or decision is possible,
the same being a prohibited pleading.—The assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d),
Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence
of other remedies, “where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency.”—In any event, this case presents an
exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has been held that certiorari is available,
notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, “where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.” Indeed,
the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Educative Function of the Supreme Court.—Moreover, this
case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which
this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to “formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.”Same;
Same; Same; Procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x
when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief
is extremely urgent.”—Procedural requirements “may be glossed over to prevent
a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x
x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.”
Same; Party-List System; Under the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) 7941,
political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections merely on the
ground that they are political parties.—We now rule on this issue. Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides that members of the House of
Representatives may “be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.”
Same; Same; The key words in the statutory policy set out in RA 7941 are
“proportional representation,” “marginalized and underrepresented,” and “lack
[of] well-defined constituencies.”—The foregoing provision mandates a state
policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style
party-list system, which will “enable” the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1. who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2. who lack well-
defined constituencies; but 3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. The
key words in this policy are “proportional representation,” “marginalized and
underrepresented,” and “lack [of] well-defined constituencies.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Proportional representation” does not refer to
the number of people in a particular district, but rather to the representation of
the “marginalized and underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in
Section 5 of the law—namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.”—“Proportional representation” here does not refer
to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law;
namely, “labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.”
Same; Same; The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in
Section 5, and the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be “Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties.”—It is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by
the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]” refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral groups, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government.—“Lack of well-defined
constituenc[y]” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government.
Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
“marginalized or underrepresented.”
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Noscitur A Sociis; It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related.—While the
enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented
under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.
Same; Same; The party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens.—
specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties—to be elected to the House of Representatives, and
the assertion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy.—The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks
to enable certain Filipino citizens—specifically those belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties—to be elected to the
House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is
not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Same; Same; Allowing the non-matginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it.—Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would
not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-
list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis; The
fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that the primary source
from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the
provision itself.—The fundamental principle in constitutional construction,
however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent
or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the
meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to
extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of
the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.
Same; Same; Same; The function of all judicial and quasi-judicial
instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-
guess it.—When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on
Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck
down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the
function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
Same; Same; Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants,—The Court,
therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec fqr the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down
the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
Comelec in its work. First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system,
they must comply with the declared statutory policy enabling Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the
House of Representatives. Third, the religious sector may not be represented in
the party-list system. Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified
under Section 6 of RA 7941. Fifth, the party or organization must not be an
adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. Sixth, the party must not only comply with t)ie requirements of the
law. Its nominees must likewise do so. Seventh, not only candidate party or
organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. So also
must its nominees. Eighth, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to
the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in
the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the
State's benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-
list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice
mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-
list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According
to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the
last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of
the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as
deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a
result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes
observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the
Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10
February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec
Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to
participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond
the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations)
of 154 parties and organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system
of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and
enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly
participate in this electoral window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of
proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize
the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties,
organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those
who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly
the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a
Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted
from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May
14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be
counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On
April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set
the date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently reset it to May 3,
2001.7 During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment
on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in
the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May
15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added
that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast
for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein,
until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were received by the Court and,
on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective
Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address
the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises.
More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the
Comelec which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the
154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is
improper because there are other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. 17 The Office of the Solicitor General argues that
petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for
disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21
and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated November 9, 2000.19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus
Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as
it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed,
under both the Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being
a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22 The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of
the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this
Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events
have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not
yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a
formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has
made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." 24 Indeed, the instant case is indubitably
imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves
the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list
system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines,
or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage
of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion
of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private
respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political
parties may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or
coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under
the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration
boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers
in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S.
Monsod pointed out that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, 31Magsasaka, or a
regional party in Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople: 33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng
UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga
partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently
place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in
Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the
past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we
count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they
were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice
in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is
essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of
political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start
of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the
party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate
in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -
- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of
the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list
provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when
the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of
August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history,
by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in
fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be
provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the
statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation
as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete
for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
"enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
 1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack ofwell-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither
does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent
the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization
must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to the absence of a
traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate
interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who
are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under
the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Where
the language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the
party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of
such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform
or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other
relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with,
and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with
which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute
may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General submits that RA No. 7941 "does not limit the participation in the party-
list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society." 39 In
fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section
6 40 of RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the
Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes
Park or Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list system seeks to enable
certain Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties – to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear
statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented can
participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position
to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral
Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join
the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark
reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than
their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more
directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst
are the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them
that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope,
but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent
the specific concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct
voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the
party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine
change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past –
the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground
movement – to come out and participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the
congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and
vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set
aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list
elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the
fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the
party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, 44 in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to
gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest
scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who
have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in
regular elections and who therefore need the "simplest scheme possible" to do
so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long
been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when
compared to a student dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open house" is for the benefit of
outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is
only for the "outsiders" who cannot get elected through regular elections
otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented who already fill
the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the
remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the
intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit
of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to
the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and
prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It
cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must
permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other
organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and
Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the
primary source from which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of
the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous
aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain
the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail
as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its face.' The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is
couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and
implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first.
Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of
construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain
words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives was designed to "enable underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The criteria
for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to
constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any
event, the framers' deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are,
at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA
7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary,
it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The
OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list
elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by
this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of
all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP,
NPC, LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they
have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties
in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the
"advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass,
preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation does
not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to
watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual
determination of whether respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in
the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan
Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a trier of facts. 51 It is not
equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an
opportunity to show that they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this
Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be
elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the
latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with
the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist
the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In
other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,
bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents
and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of
its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it
must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the
ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they
represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of
Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as
much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying
is, the political party must claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the registration of Ang Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the
express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented
in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is
demonstrated by the following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international
networks of members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition,
decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had
mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-
established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the
prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction." 54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed "EXCEPT RELIGIOUS
GROUPS," he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia
ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a member57 of the
Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious
organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for
violation of or failure to comply with election laws and regulations. These laws
include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to
"enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives." A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply
with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens,
organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a
party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and unfair to other parties, but also
deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to
the House of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To
repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who
belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To
allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political
constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that
"the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a
particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: "to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle
that those who have less in life should have more in law. The party-list system is
one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great
masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the
destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change
is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and
the other respondents that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the
marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the
substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a
mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and
aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the
Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a
mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people
empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby
DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its
hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within
30 days from notice hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec "to refrain
from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain in
force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance
with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections' receipt
thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.
 Republic of the Philippines KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.
SUPREME COURT (KAKUSA), Petitioner,
Manila vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
EN BANC
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
G.R. No. 203960
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan
Igot, Petitioner, 1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-
vs. CARE), Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
G.R. No. 203976
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. (ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203922 x-----------------------x

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES G.R. No. 203981

(APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, Petitioner, ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP
vs. (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 203936 x-----------------------x

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its G.R. No. 204002

President Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
G.R. No. 204094 Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 204139

G.R. No. 204100 ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni

Cataluña Causing, Petitioner,
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) vs.
formerly PGBI, Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 204141

G.R. No. 204122 BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,
President, Petitioner,
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., vs.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. x-----------------------x
BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C. G.R. No. 204153
VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka
Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204125
x-----------------------x
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner, G.R. No. 204158
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS
G.R. No. 204126 R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.
PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.
(KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA
(AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President
Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF
MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x G.R. No. 204240

G.R. No. 204216 AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS

MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
INC., Petitioner, vs.
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
G.R. No. 204220
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner, FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204236 G.R. No. 204318

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-
vs. LIST, Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238
G.R. No. 204321
ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,
vs. ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin
Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM,
and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA,
PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners thereof, Respondents.

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, x-----------------------x

represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204367
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204356
x-----------------------x
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204370
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T.
x-----------------------x Tuazon, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204358 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL x-----------------------x

PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204374
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA
x-----------------------x MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204359 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY x-----------------------x

(SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
G.R. No. 204379 x-----------------------x

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye G.R. No. 204421
Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
x-----------------------x vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204394
x-----------------------x
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,
DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE G.R. No. 204425
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs. COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
x-----------------------x COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS,
ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
G.R. No. 204402 MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. x-----------------------x

Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs. G.R. No. 204426
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND
x-----------------------x HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 204408 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH
M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson and
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
Commissioners, Respondents.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
G.R. No. 204410
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General,
Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435 G.R. No. 204486

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner, 1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st
vs. KABAGIS), Petitioner,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
G.R. No. 204490
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex
T. Suplico, Petitioner, PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs. vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x PERLAS-BERNABE,*

G.R. No. 204455 Election Law; Party-List System; The party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.—The 1987
vs. Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent. put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in
x-----------------------x
the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another
for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
G.R. No. 204484
Same; Same; The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.—
General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner, Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system
vs. to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political
x-----------------------x parties can participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long as they field
candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
G.R. No. 204485 designate in this Constitution.”

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Same; Same; The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral
parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they
can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that
winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections.—The common
denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot
expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide
elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner
in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to
membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional
parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
Same; Same; The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1)
national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.—What the framers intended, and what they
expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is
composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one
of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that
national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-
list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
Same; Same; “Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party
or a coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral
party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political party refers
to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other hand, Section
3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized
group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral
party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 7941; R.A. No. 7941 does not require national
and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors.—R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and
regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to
deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from
the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-
list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear
intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under
the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as
a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status
as citizens.
Same; Same; Same; The economically “marginalized and underrepresented” are
those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.—The phrase “marginalized and underrepresented” should
refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
“marginalized and underrepresented.” These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the
members of the sectoral party must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented.” The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the
sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
Belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector does not mean one
must “wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity.” It is sufficient that one, or his
or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
“marginalized and underrepresented” are those who fall in the low income group
as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Same; Same; Same; Major political parties can participate in subsequent party-
list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections.—Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the “first five (5)
major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress” from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to
the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate
in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major
political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies,” will facilitate the entry of the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political constituencies” as
members of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major
political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to
work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political
constituencies.”—The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political
parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.”
The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
“marginalized and underrepresented” and those who “lack well-defined political Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the
constituencies,” giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus, to participate in party- Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of
urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
party-list system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own
constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13
a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December
in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which
provides that “component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941)
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and
part does not participate in the party-list system.”
organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
Same; Same; Same; A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral
parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector G.R. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.—Section 9 of No.
R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector. A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.—No person shall be nominated Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a Resolution dated 23 November 20128
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a 1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at (PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty- underrepresented;
five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the - Failure to prove track
youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) record; and
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who - Failure of the nominees to
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in qualify under RA 7941 and
office until the expiration of his term. A party-list nominee must be a bona fide Ang Bagong Bayani.
member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the
case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
sector. Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 694 SCRA 477, G.R.
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
No. 203766 April 2, 2013
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
DECISION (Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers
CARPIO, J.: by
profession.
The Cases
3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its
(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
 and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to the
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify. memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
Resolution dated 27 November 201210 five nominees.
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to Resolution dated 4 December 201214
(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party, 8 204485 12-175 Alliance of - Failure to establish that
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not (PL) Organizations, the
residents of the region; and Networks and group can represent 14
four of the five nominees do Associations of sectors; - The sectors of
not belong to the the Philippines, homeowners’
marginalized and Inc. (ALONA) associations, entrepreneurs
underrepresented. and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
Resolution dated 27 November 201211 underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not
5 204367 12-104 Akbay - Failure of the group to
belong
(PL) Kalusugan show
to the marginalized and
(AKIN), Inc. that its nominees belong to
underrepresented.
the urban poor sector.
B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration
Resolution dated 29 November 201212
of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a and organizations
(PP) (AAB) marginalized sector of
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
society, despite the
formation 9 204139 12-127 Alab ng - Failure to prove track
of a sectoral wing for the (PL) Mamamahayag record as an organization;
benefit of farmers of Region (ALAM) - Failure to show that the
8; group actually represents
- Constituency has district the
representatives; marginalized and
- Lack of track record in underrepresented; and
representing peasants and - Failure to establish that
farmers; and the
- Nominees are neither group can represent all
farmers nor peasants. sectors it seeks to
represent.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
Resolution dated 7 November 201216
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the
(PP), Party (AI) party represents a 10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an
12-165 marginalized and (PP) (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
(PLM) underrepresented sector, as environment, and is not
the Province of Iloilo has representative of the
district representatives; marginalized and
- Untruthful statements in underrepresented;

- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not
belong
to the sector which the
group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
11 204394 12-145 Association of - Failure to prove
(PL) Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not
and belong
Nanny of the to any of the sectors which
Philippines, Inc. the group seeks to
(GUARDJAN) represent.
Resolution dated 5 December 201218
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks
to
represent.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB)
registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region.
However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to
establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
"marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI,
ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a
mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued
Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong
Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
G.R. SPP Group Grounds for Denial
No. No.
Resolution dated 10 October 201224
1 203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and
19 (PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225
2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and (1GANAP/ volunteer workers is too
(PLM) Righteousness accreditation GUARDIANS) broad to allow for meaningful
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for representation; and
Leadership violation of election laws; - The nominees do not appear
(ARAL) - The nominees do not to belong to the sector of
represent the sectors which community volunteer
the party represents; and workers.
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious 8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
purposes. (PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and Fishermen the sector of farmers and
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation International, fishermen, the sector sought
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to Inc. (A to be represented; and
qualify; and BLESSED - None of the nominees are
- Failure of the party to prove Party-List) registered voters of Region
that majority of its members XI, the region sought to be
belong to the sectors it seeks represented.
to represent.
Resolution dated 16 October 201227
5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Movement accreditation 9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug (PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Foundation counsellors and lecturers, Alliance for consumers is not
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are Rural Energy, marginalized and
not marginalized and Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
underrepresented; - The party’s track record is
- Failure to establish track related to electric
record; and cooperatives and not rural
- Failure of the nominees to energy consumers; and
qualify as representatives of - The nominees do not belong
the youth and young urban to the sector of rural energy
professionals. consumers.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226 Resolution dated 16 October 201228

6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration 10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector (PLM) Philippine accreditation
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and Electric - Failure to represent a
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong Cooperatives marginalized and
to a marginalized and (APEC) underrepresented sector; and
underrepresented sector. - The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration claims to represent.
(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity; Resolution dated 23 October 201229
- The sector of community
11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.
14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido - Failure to show that
Tinig ng majority of its members are
Masa (AKMA-PTM) marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230 15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
(PLM) Rural and accreditation Pilipinong were not signed by an
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that (KAP) party;
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ; - Failure to show track record
- The nominees do not belong for the farmers and peasants
to the sectors that the party sector; and
seeks to represent; - Failure to show that
- Failure to show that three of nominees actually belong to
the nominees are bona fide the sector, or that they have
party members; and undertaken meaningful
- Lack of a Board resolution activities for the sector.
to participate in the party-list
elections. 16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration
(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231 Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Kaunlaran
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
(AKO-BAHAY)
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and 17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration
farmers that the party seeks to (PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
represent; (for God, majority of its members are
- Only four nominees were Country and marginalized and
submitted to the COMELEC; People) underrepresented; and
and Association of - Failure to prove that two of
- Failure to show meaningful the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
activities for its constituency. Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration Resolution dated 30 October 201232
(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban 21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new (PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
Advancement application; - Failure to attend the
and Welfare - Failure to show track record summary hearing;
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and - Failure to show track record
underrepresented; for the marginalized and
- Failure to prove that underrepresented; and
majority of its members and - The nominees did not
officers are from the urban appear to be marginalized and
poor sector; and underrepresented.
- The nominees are not
Resolution dated 7 November 201233
members of the urban poor
sector. 22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
underrepresented sector;
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Only three nominees were
- Nominees are either
submitted to the COMELEC;
operators or former operators.
- The nominees do not
20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration belong to the marginalized
(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that and underrepresented; and
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala, - Failure to submit its
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA) Statement of Contribution
majority of its officers and and Expenditures for the
members belong to the 2007 Elections.
marginalized and
Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234
underrepresented;
- The incumbent 23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and
representative in Congress (PLM) the Environment accreditation
failed to author or sponsor Sons and - The party is an advocacy
bills that are beneficial to the Daughters of group and does not represent
sector that the party Mother Earth the marginalized and
represents (persons (GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
imprisoned without proof of - Failure to comply with the
guilt beyond reasonable track record requirement; and
doubt); - The nominees are not
- Failure to show track record marginalized citizens.
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and 24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and
- The nominees did not (PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
appear to be marginalized and (FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
underrepresented. belong to the sector that the
 party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.
25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and
(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list
Progress system; and
(AAMA) - Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201236
27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration
(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 7 November 201237
28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.
Resolution dated 7 November 201238
29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and
(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 201239
30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
(AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.
Resolution dated 7 November 201240
31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and Resolution dated 14 November 201243
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five 34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the (PLM) Brotherhood for accreditation - Failure to show
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector; Active that the
- Failure to prove that its five Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
nominees actively (ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
participated in the claims to represent;
undertakings of the party; and - Failure to show a complete
- Failure to prove that its five track record of its activities
nominees are bona fide since its registration; and
members. - The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
Resolution dated 7 November 201241 the party seeks to represent.

32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and Resolution dated 28 November 201244
(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with 35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and
Federation, Inc. private and government (PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
(COCOFED) agencies and is not Para sa mga - The party receives
marginalized; Magsasaka assistance from the
- The party is assisted by the (BINHI) government through the
government in various Department of Agriculture;
projects; and and
- The nominees are not - Failure to prove that the
members of the marginalized group is marginalized and
sector of coconut farmers and underrepresented.
producers.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245
Resolution dated 7 November 201242
36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and
33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration (PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track - Failure to establish that the
(ABANG record of continuously agriculture and cooperative
LINGKOD) representing the peasant sectors are marginalized and
farmers sector; underrepresented; and
- Failure to show that its - The party’s nominees
members actually belong to neither appear to belong to
the peasant farmers sector; the sectors they seek to
and represent, nor to have
- Failure to show that its actively participated in the
nominees are marginalized undertakings of the party.
and underrepresented, have
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
actively participated in
programs for the 37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and
advancement of farmers, and (PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
adhere to its advocacies. Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
 Ginhawang statements; 203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least (PLM)
(1st one year; and 12-177
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees (PLM)
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor 203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on
indigenous cultural (PLM) Leadership (ARAL)
communities sectors which it
204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
seeks to represent.
(PLM)
Resolution dated 4 December 201247
203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation (PLM) (APEC)
(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
203960 12-260 1st
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
conflicting interests; and
(1-CARE)
- The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized 203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa
and underrepresented sector. (PLM) (AKMA-PTM)
Resolution dated 4 December 201248 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,
(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)
39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election 203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
12-191 in the laws because its nominees (PLM) Inc. (ARARO)
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement. Resolution dated 20 November 2012
CITIZENS)
204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, (PLM) (ANAD)
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A- (PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)
IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-
UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the (PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Resolution dated 27 November 2012
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all 204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country
petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were (PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely: (BANTAY)

204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

G.R. No. SPP No. Group (PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
Resolution dated 13 November 2012 204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(PLM) (COCOFED)
204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc. 204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement
(PLM) (ABROAD) (PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012 204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and
(PLM) Transparency (SMART)
204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS) 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
(PLM)
203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
(PLM) Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation 204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
(PLM) (UNIMAD)
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,
204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List) and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)
204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
(PLM) 204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor
(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)
204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong
(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP) 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
(PLM)
204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa
(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
(AKO-BAHAY) (PLM)

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM) 204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)
204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
(PLM) LINGKOD) 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K) 204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs
(PLM) (PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP) 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,
(PLM) (PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga
(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE) (PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)

204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI) 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)
(PLM)
204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party
204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI) (PLM) (1AAAP)
(PLM)
204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang
204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM) (PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)
(PLM)
 The Party-List System
204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)
(PLM)
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
12-191 elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter
(PLM) elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI) choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
12-165
(PLM)
Section 5, Article VI
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and
Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA) (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB) shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
(PLM) MASDA) elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
The Issues
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of the total number of representatives including those under the party list.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled,
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
and second, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

The Court’s Ruling
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in
this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in
the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming
13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall
be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in
this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-
list system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the
sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list
system should be read in light of the following discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the
party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors
and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the proposal on the
party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by
Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a
sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would
have reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in
those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as
we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic, ethnic
and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here
as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem
we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly was
whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went
through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be included which went
up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the
more limiting the law become because when we make an enumeration we
exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of
who comprise the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These
days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may
be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of
the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral
representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two votes
and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a
party list system. Under the party list system, there are no reserved seats for
sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral
organization that will then register and present candidates of their party. How do
the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of
his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the
Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties, organizations or
coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put
in that list. This can be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to
say that he wants the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any
citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization —
one does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a
party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes
that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the
250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30 percent of
50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats
is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15 names. They have
to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum
qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when
the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10
percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2
1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and
the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency
of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National Assembly. What is the
justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that
any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat. There is no reason why a group
that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group,
should not have a voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say,
there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If
each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not
entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have
a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are
the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation
while at the same time making sure that those who really have a national
constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the
National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not have the constituency
to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on
a district basis but surely, they will have votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide;
have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or
fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But
this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they
would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the
mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we
speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring
to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we
do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in
the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or
proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to
be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within
the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify
for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be
under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system,
they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in
this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and
say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or
not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also
organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can
participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them.
Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung
sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko
lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On
that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party
list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that
answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an
inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO
fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such
is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are to
be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such
sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character.
In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are final and
unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system
to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers
intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as
they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats
to sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve
the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by
Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2),
of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the first headed
by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total
seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the
difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would
stunt their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral
machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The
Villacorta group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the
unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be
like placing babes in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more
established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized
this concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of
party representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the
party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise — that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented and
marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only
half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which
would garner the required number of votes. The majority was unyielding. Voting
19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of
the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was voted down. The only
concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved
seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the
1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and solidify
their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest
with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There
can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly
rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they
cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in
nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates
can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry
point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the
party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional,"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same
time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties."
They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list
system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could
not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups,
and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of
Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are
separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national
parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for
two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the
party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or
type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list
system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-
list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the
region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different
from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that
a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a
"sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they
are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system
to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list
system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot
win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are
excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system
is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart
from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express
wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is
clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as
a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no
requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the
political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or
the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic
status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all
necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are
not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly,
women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize
themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns
of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that
the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral
parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may,
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-
representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A.
No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable Filipinos
belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While
the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the
specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that
the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and
underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable
provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of
the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must
belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is
sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those
who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers,
and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society,
will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win
seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the
opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent,
eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list representatives to
masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they
attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since
they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional
parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not
belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national
and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major
political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’
"However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that
"the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented,"
automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been
compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings officially
organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating
in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May
1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can participate in
subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly
limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political
parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings.
The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a
majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in
extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major
political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as
members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies,"
giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a
major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-
laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of
whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees.
This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the
youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-
five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.1âwphi1
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a
bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector
represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for
qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and
the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA
7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized
or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as
party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write,
a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for
at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.
(Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political
parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service
that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941
that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can
participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority
expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The
experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion
and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an
end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC
could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list
system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of
party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then
prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not
declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even
as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in
determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may
appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who
may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
 "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The
41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission
on Elections for determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under
the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections
may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be ANTONIO T. CARPIO
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they Associate Justice
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
WE CONCUR:
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and
Ang LADLAD v. COMELEC GR No. 190582 (See Declaration of Principles
sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
and State Politices)
underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have
been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they
are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the
sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector.
Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified
nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power
does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which
have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to
include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners are qualified
to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597 specifically enjoins as a duty.” True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No.
7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law
Petitioner, which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City.” These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R.
- versus - No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition
and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS election laws, rules, and regulations.
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents. Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an
x------------------------x express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional
or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.—There is
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628 neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
Petitioner, for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
Present: local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
PUNO, C.J., subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
QUISUMBING, of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city
YNARES-SANTIAGO, and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
CARPIO, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
CORONA, However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can
CARPIO MORALES, create provinces, cities or municipalities.
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA, Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty
CHICO-NAZARIO, thousand, or each province, shall have at least have one representative in the
VELASCO, JR., House of Representatives.—There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts
NACHURA, with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
REYES, municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
LEONARDO-DE followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section
CASTRO, and 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at
BRION, JJ. least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
Respondent. July 16, 2008 than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x.”
x--------------------------------------------------x
Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
test the constitutionality of election laws, rules and regulations.—The Writ of
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.—A province cannot be created without a
Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and
legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
Regulations. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without
functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a
a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the law
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative
district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves
the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches
250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House
of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can
be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus
is vested exclusively in Congress.
Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.—This textual
commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of
legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact
such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create
or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the
membership of the superior legislative body.
Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative
districts for Congress.—Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA
9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may
exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National
elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to
enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law
creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the “next
national elections” from the effectivity of the law.
Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.—Neither the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional
autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these
disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is
axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
constitution.—It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its
territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that
the ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.”
This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the
ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.”
Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.—We
rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution,
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress
can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can
exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates
that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
declared unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities.—Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is VALID.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May
2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part
of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists
of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November
1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao.MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura,
and Upi are hereby separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and
independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall
commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or
election of the governor and majority of the regular members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of
Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the
province that they will choose or where they are
residents:Provided, that where an elective position in both
provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective
provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a
higher elective vacant position and for the time being be
appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until
their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next
local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to
receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval
of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance
with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution
in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing
legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof,
shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of
municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities
constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a
plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City
passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of
Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-
0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law
 Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate
law by Congress, to maintain the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC
promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos
first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment
of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing
of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status
quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive
in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed
that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to
create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema
wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No.
177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen
(respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it
did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the
legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could
not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its
sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively
with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the
creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their
compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds:
(a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462
of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative
district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned
its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and
joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the
following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA
9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative
district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as
the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in
Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
 On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in
oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties
in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the
oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional
(a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous
regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may
be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema
concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to
the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those
mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed
as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create
provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section
20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards
lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces
contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent
Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10
and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces
was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province,
Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they
adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The
COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering
its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the
oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February
2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The
petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC
acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters
of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its
Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure
pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper
to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No.
177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion
by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No.
7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law
which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify
the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed
for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as
proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as
winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case
does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry
into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality
of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of
this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative of the district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in the
canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not
to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in
these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the
other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issue
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within
the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers
because the power to create local government units is not one of the express
legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. [27] In
the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x
x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because
it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or
more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of
a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a
legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it
must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative
district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and
to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided
by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power
to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House
of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can
be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded
as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress
can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies
to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress.
An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its
Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive
authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the
ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
 SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM
Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative
power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections.
x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law
creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next
national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is
a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives,
is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body
like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative
is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national
funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local
or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to
allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial
jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which
expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative
powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,
recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the
existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part
thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one
representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled
to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new
province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment
shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before
the election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created
on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of
Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance,
petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the
apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative,
thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than one hundred and
twenty Members who shall be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but each province shall have at
least one Member. The Congress shall by law
make an apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of Representatives shall
have the same number of Members as that fixed
by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative
district shall comprise as far as practicable,
contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may
come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation
of a province for each province shall have at least one
member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct
creation of several representative districts within a
province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of
representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the
second method of creation of representative districts, and do not
apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the
first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor
of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by
an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district, comes
into existence neither by authority of that statute which
cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of
reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory
of, or other conditions under which a province may be created,
except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the
maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the
Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created
or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation
of additional representative districts, without complying with the
aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts indirectly through a special law enacted by
Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts
will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided
under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because
in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by
Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by
Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative
districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be
created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative
district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs
exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except
Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a
province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative
districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative
district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to
create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district
to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in
2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the
surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and
RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the
ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160,
namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous
territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase
the membership of a superior legislative body, the House
of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House
of Representatives based on one representative for at least every
250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional
Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section
461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a
population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can
become the majority in the House of Representatives through the
ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or
cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R.
No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create
legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own
representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create
and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can
have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House
of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is
that what you are saying? That can be done, under your
theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual
circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create
thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only]
one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x,
and they will each have one representative x x x to
Congress without any national law, is that what you are
saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that
is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new
provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000)
representatives to the House of Representatives
without a national law[,] that is legally possible,
correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in
Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned
or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-
branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create
or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts,
not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which
states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created
by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a
province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an
increase that only Congress can decide.Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress,
there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the
House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of
total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats
available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners.
This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219
incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to
increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress
can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and
national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself
states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the
Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates
that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity
of the Republic of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.
9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that
necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not ANTONIO T. CARPIO
pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that Associate Justice
does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as
mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such
municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative
districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to

the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for
being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation
of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a
power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the
legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule
that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution

Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the

geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE
ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R.
MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH
AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Supreme Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took
original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance.—In
Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 346 SCRA
485 (2000) and Jaworski v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), 419 SCRA 317 (2004), this Court sanctioned momentary deviation
from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of
cases raising issues of paramount public importance.
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the
fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.—Any law duly enacted by
Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a
specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.
When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor
any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
Same; Election Law; Legislative Districts; There is no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.—There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. As already
mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative,
it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district.—The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In
other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does
not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the
creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional
districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a
city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population. Aquino III vs. Commission on
Election, 617 SCRA 623, G.R. No. 189793<br/> April 7, 2010
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of
Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."
Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be
restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to the
implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on
31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila
Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.1 In substance, the said law created
an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to Pamplona Gainza
have a population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in Pasacao Milaor
this wise:
3rd District (formerly 2nd Naga Camaligan 439,043
District) Pili Magarao
District Municipalities/Cities Population
Ocampo Bombon
1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304 Canaman Calabanga
Ragay Minalabac
4th District (formerly 3rd Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Lupi Pamplona
District) Garchitorena San Jose
Sipocot Pasacao
Goa Tigaon
Cabusao San Fernando
Lagonoy Tinamba
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899 Presentacion Siruma
Milaor Camaligan
5th District (formerly 4th Iriga Buhi 429,070
Naga Magarao
District) Baao Bula
Pili Bombon
Balatan Nabua
Ocampo Calabanga
Bato
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548 Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both
Garchitorena San Jose parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of
Goa Tigaon House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in
Lagonoy Tinamba favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public
Presentacion Siruma hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on
the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill
Baao Bula
that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
Balatan Nabua
district.4
Bato
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of
of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third
legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by and fourth districts of the province.
Republic Act No. 9716:
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
District Municipalities/Cities Population 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
1st District Del Gallego 176,383 legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act
Ragay No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional,
Lupi because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
Sipocot 250,000 or only 176,383.
Cabusao

2nd District Libmanan San 276,777 Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for
Minalabac Fernando the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
 Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited
provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative
district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created
province, each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a
minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this view,
existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new
districts, provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least
250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation
of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the
minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000
in the creation of additional legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when
the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the
House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year
1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district
representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population
constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200
legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a
250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned
first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement
for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article
VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation
as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive
grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of
two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing
to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the
petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction
between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population
condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision
will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for
the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716,
which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of
Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of
Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural
lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a
tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial
or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering
that the main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been
ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over which the
Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they
had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of
the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore,
conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted
with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of
the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name
a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial
review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely,
and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been
echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional
by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the
fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a
violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that
there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the
law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of
250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities
was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional
legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts
would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district,
explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least
one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not
required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering
moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
 (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but
is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two
hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI,
proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE
DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000
population benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of
legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put,
the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city,
or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the
purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of
250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative
district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the
precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor
was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally
divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded
to the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed
by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was
given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a
population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then
redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a Member and then
Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats
which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of
at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The
population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as
the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or
less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250,
000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first
allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a
population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number
of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province had
to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the records
show, dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission
narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern
towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa,
Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a
greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether population was
the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the
standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely:
1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be
compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa
was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance
between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480
and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would
result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the
south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern
part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer
to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates
in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and
Coron are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of
whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto
Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in
the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the
City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population of
186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the Second
District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the Constitution
considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second
District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would
only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before
the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by
the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was
decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed
the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of
Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and
Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that,
perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of
the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by
itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second
District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the
population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional
transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than
qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that
are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the
place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact
that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government
offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment
of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none
against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet
with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok,
Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District
shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting
of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into
districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a
city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit
area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters
common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the districting
of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and
common interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and
disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral
leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland
should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner
Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population." 38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To
ensure quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of
access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires
is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand
of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have
at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population
growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities ─ entitled to
two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In
other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does
not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such
as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on
the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population
standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment
or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of
the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the
increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter
absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would
warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of
the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our
ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord
with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly
given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this
petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating
a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the
purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S
Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of
election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a
tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees
that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s
“permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence,
in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such
as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For political
purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what
has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution
speaks of “residence ” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only
“domicile.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
qualification requirement.—It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
would lead to his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of
candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of
residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by
private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and
Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile—
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter in
Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could
be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even
if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.—We have stated,
many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears
repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or
to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute
loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in
the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of
his parents.—A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact
of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the
age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary
to private respondent’s averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile
of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In the
absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of
all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that
the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110
of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of “domicile” and “residence.” The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
“residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.—
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin
in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110
of the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live
together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together.
This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as
in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may
“live together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to “domicile”
and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the
wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically
when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner
was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr.
Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and
Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family’s residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these
places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law
concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result
of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950,
into the New Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law concept of
“matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the
New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted
by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the intervening years
by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses.
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.—Without as much
belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear
is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted to mean
“actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous
civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former
President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled
doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it.”
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity.—The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in
Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory
provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter
of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’S jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections return and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the
House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over
the question.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates
that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."2 The
mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution
— seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter,
from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations
made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate
of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8
of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already
lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate
of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009
was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer,
petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the
town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose
being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill,
along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of
another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of
the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for
the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of
Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections
on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private
respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking
off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995;
and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary
issues, namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy
after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that
the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore,
an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and
physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, to which she always intended to return whenever
absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in
her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she
only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming
to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her
registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for
the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow
respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban.
She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to
it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her
Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation
that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none
in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8
in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in
the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake
or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment
may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA
957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is
misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely
and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that
case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But
in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a
matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in
the number of years of residence in the place where respondent
seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to
suppress, accurate material representation in the original
certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the
amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of
the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month
period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of
candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6
months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates
of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited
period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which
on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion,
it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year
residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been
considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96
Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in
1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a
resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise
constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of
the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for
the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In
1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered
voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was
again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila
and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could
not have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate
of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed
to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact
on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation
of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of
Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many
places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that
prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention
to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in
different places and on several occasions declared that she was
a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place
 when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In
the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court
explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically
be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where
she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of
domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there
must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to
show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed
intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a
resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by
the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa,
Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves
nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of
the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April
24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member
of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in
the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was
the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First
District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the
canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes,
of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time
of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article
78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
 Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for
the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we
laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence.
"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not
by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous
with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving
the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in
these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence
of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for
certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question
is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate
for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members
of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that
is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from
 the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the
definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez
Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the
1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's
Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of
Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied
the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest
mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner
to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period
of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For
instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent
Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the
First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile.
The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This
honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence
in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than
a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in
the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was
also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the
Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the
confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who
has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector
in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating
every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation,
or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional
or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent
himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose
the officials who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin
has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in
the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his
place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of
one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment
for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements
supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In
doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law
and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the
fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second
Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old,
she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City).
She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University
in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband
lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes
during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while
petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of
her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and
eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various
reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos
Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part
of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country.
Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority
of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact
of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency ( sic)
therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought
his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence
of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the
degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this
specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between
domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact
while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family.
But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband
if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin
in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que
fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con
justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido
transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the
aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish
residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover,
this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase " cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband
shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the
family to another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot
be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring
from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem
fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that
the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin).
This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing
the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and
wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual
help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has
many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in
or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with
him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced
with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr.
Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as
used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with
"domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate
decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used
synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one
another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the
physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two
or more residences, such as a country residence and a city
residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the
wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil
Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live
with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence
different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to
her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la
Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the
Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new
domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the
Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is
not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt
to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of
such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process
of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the
purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to
live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries
where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control
the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to
mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case that order would necessarily have been followed by
of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the imprisonment for contempt.
other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to
decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these
the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters,
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an
the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
alimony.
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v.
obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted
Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil
to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states
new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile"
after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain
husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming
de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile,
this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was
and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in
possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family
the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which
to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by
vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations
where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a
new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us
to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her
husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist
within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile
different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by
this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the
parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of
legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-
compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being
that less injury results to the general public by disregarding
than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a
statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a
decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was
held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed
from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time
of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of
the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in
said case, the statute under examination was construed merely
to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-
judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section
78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over
the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law
solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles
of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power
during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the
meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles
of law to deny an individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in
doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and
JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
Election Law; Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.—Petitioner conveniently
confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of
votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; The electoral tribunal assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of
candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives—and, a candidate
who has not been proclaimed and has taken his oath of office cannot be said to
be a member.—Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the
House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not
taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the proclamation of a winning
candidate is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein—even after
the elections the COMELEC is empowered to continue to hear and decide
questions relating to qualifications of candidates.—While the proclamation of a
winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6
of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned
therein. Thus, petitioner’s contention that “after the conduct of the election and
(petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass
upon the question of qualification” finds no basis in law, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of
R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates.
Same; Domicile; Residence; In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for a
district, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.—We agree with COMELEC’s contention that in order that petitioner could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the
latter “must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.”
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Residence, for election law purposes,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—The Constitution requires that a
person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of
the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year
prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home,” i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.—Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community” from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain.
Same; Same; Same; While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the n eeds of a particular
district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify.—While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless
defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if
a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either
had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled
in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative
for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not
petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now
encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his
election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
Same; Same; Same; The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions in the instant case—
sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which a lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.—While property
ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be
voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in
Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of
the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac)
“indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence” is not to acquire a new residence or domicile “but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.” The absence
of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under
the conditions stated above, the lack of identification—sentimental, actual or
otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the
lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the
period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
Same; Same; Same; Domicile of origin is not easily lost—to successfully effect a
change of domicile, a person must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.—Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from
Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the
case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner’s claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of
Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should
be deemed to continue.
Same; Same; Same; Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.—Finally,
petitioner’s submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year
residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks
basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out
from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality
of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed
by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot
be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their
genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in
these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that
petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the
constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could
run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
Same; The second placer is just that, a second placer—he lost the elections, he
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters—he could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates.—To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the
“first” among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological
and psychological underpinnings behind voters’ preferences. The result
suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the
doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a
massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in
favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections.
Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover,
would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which
attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer
Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer
is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a
majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
Same; The Court cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been
disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates
because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions.—This, it bears
repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in
another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in
an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner
among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a
minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state
and English court decisions. These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to
rejection. Theoretically, the “second placer” could receive just one vote. In such
a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’
“choice.”
Same; By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be
construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an
“ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.—
Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second placer may
not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless
so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should
the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner
among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the
second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election
cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where
an “ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
Same; Constitutional Law; Republicanism; As petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
district would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.—A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by
the fundamental law itself.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent
democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a
democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so
vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority, for
sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a
winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility
ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will
of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of
Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the following information in his
certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR.
ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______
Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey
the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion,
and that the facts therein are true to the best of my
knowledge.1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City,
filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino2 on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition
was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed,
petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated
March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he
had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year
and thirteen (13) days.3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the
dismissal of the disqualification case.4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC
wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his
Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor
Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,19957
and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission
(Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition
for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and
declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in
the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3)
candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner
garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as
against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand nine
hundred ten (35,910) votes.10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed
an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division
resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend
Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's
proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election
returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain
the winning number of votes for the position of Representative
of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall
have been resolved by the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause
the immediate implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court
of the Commission is likewise directed to inform the parties by
the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at
10:00 in the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to
lift order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum
and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the
issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after
the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC
en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant
circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to
proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to
accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the
parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction
now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division,
promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito
A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second
Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections,
for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the
respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes,
issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made
permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of
the City of Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of election returns, determine
 the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall
be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15,
1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by
the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors for consideration,
to wit:
A TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND
ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995
ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND
LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS
JURISDICTION, SAID JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT
CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES
AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT
WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION (ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN
RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING
ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND
SERIOUS ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS
THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE
THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM
(PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE
PEOPLE'S WILL.
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING
THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR
LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND
BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S
DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF
CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER
OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER
THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER
IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE
OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A
LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15
I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after
the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House of Representatives. He
claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet
unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed
serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his
proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of
Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed
candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining
the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of
candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be
said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of
the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of
proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's
contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been
established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the
COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to
hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6
states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a
candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in
the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence
of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems
to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to
disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7
of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases
involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881.
Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply
to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter
"must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for
a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for
election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that
the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with " domicile"
not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that
the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident
thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
 was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the
gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter
some difficulty especially considering that the
provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may
vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to
the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence.
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition
given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the
same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in
law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a
given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate
falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That
purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same
area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this
Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner
actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by
the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or
not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for
the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San
Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52
years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated
that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and
Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at
various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion,
Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its
disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City
is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying
one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's
intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original
domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of
two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his
intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other
residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be
a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile
in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his
physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28
The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of
domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second
District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of
Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his
residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement
cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati
is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.30 These
requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's
claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In
the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to
continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of
petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of
Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should
be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the
one year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious
and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is
carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old
Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing
their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions
in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that
petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the
constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could
run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove with
reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order
instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the
candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the
negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among
the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature
of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological
underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private
respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched
in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement
of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they
believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been
disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been
different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign,
would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the
playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our
judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second
placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality
of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under
such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from
one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as
valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided
the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that at the time
of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes
cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next
higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court
in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-
candidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a
ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the canvassing of election
returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in
the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only
candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the
candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event
the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
 [I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency,
the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by
those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling
in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified
candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent votes because a
disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting to
our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec Abella v. Comelec; and
36 37
Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that a
minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these
cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for
a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political
and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible;
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC
that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of
votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was
not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor
in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of
Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the
recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]),
wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the
fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1,
1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for
her in the sincere belief that she was a
qualified candidate for the position of
governor.Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net
effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate. . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an
elected position who is voted for and who
obtains the highest number of votes is
disqualified for not possessing the eligibility,
requirements at the time of the election as
provided by law, the candidate who obtains
the second highest number of votes for the
same position cannot assume the vacated
position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we
see no compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella,
petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed
a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-
029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City
from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by
the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec.
78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not
the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that
as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is
Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed
elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then
(Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two
reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.).
One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that
it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849
(State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has
been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified
candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This
would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom,
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people
of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without
any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be
disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can
or cannot be installed, under no circumstances can a minority or
defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the
12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number
than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by
the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No.
105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We
cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the
runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the
winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents
a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state
and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the
runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to
rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such
a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters'
"choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second
placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified
candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though
ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to
candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the
runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or
plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a
majority or plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion
declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative of
Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that
petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987
Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by
the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Our Order restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate
garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections for the
Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.


EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.
Constitutional law; Libel; Utterances made by Congressmen that are privileged.—
The phrase “speech or debate therein,” used in Article VI, Section 15 of the
Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as Members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at
the time of the performance of the acts in question. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192; Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U.S, 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1.)
Same; Congress; Open letter to the President, when Congress was not in
session, is not covered by constitutional privilege.—An open letter to the
President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines is not a communication which the defendant
published while he was performing his official duty, either as a Member of
Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. Said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Same; Damages; When utterances are not sufficient to support action for
damages.—The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs’ action for
damages, Although the letter says that the plaintiff s are under the control of the
unnamed persons therein alluded to as “planners” of a coup d’ etat, the
defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course possible” that the plaintiffs “are
unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. In
other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans,
and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. This statement is
not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover
damages.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and
Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the
publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said
letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the
lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication,
defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or
debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance
of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at
the time of the performance of the acts in question. 1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According
to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines,
dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the
President, the communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had
nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair
attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the
second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive
political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become
a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have
adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1
in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological
warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and
Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a
political campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following:
(1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3)
Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt.
Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6)
Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS
to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by
Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero
was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners"
wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed.
Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network.
It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting
tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge .
(Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the
heading "other operational technique the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for
Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian
supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters —
"typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and
newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in
1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the
administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff
and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed
Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give
the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the
opposition parties, to undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners"
had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be
held in abeyance and subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage
the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress,
in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular
and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to
resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that
the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man;
(4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be
asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence
agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other
intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned,
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano",
and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all
military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the
AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that
Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an
investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs'
action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control
of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to
the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added
that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of
which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very
document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may
be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by
law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of
Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein
described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written
by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach
plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can
not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too,
when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they
could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage
a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs
were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. November 16, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs., ROMEO G.
JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
Public Officers; The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law.—True, election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve
the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite
of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may
be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
Same; All top officials of Government—executive, legislative and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law; Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from
the duties of a position.—We start with the incontestable proposition that all top
officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that
election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from
the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is
the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
Same; The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.—The immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution.
The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot
be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
Same; Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests.—Because of the broad coverage of felony
and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal, x x x For offenses punishable by more than six
years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
Same; The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.—The accused-appellant has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six
years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Same; One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final
conviction, is public self-defense.—One rationale behind confinement, whether
pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect
itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated
in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal
law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.
Same; Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement.—We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape
is clear and unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in
this case, the offender may be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he
may suffer death. The crime is an assault on human dignity. No legal system
worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic consequences for the
unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.[1]
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the
barrel of moral depravity, when committed against a minor.[2]
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with
extreme caution.[3]
In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to
devote an even more painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on
record and a similarly conscientious evaluation of the arguments of the parties.
The victim of rape in this case is a minor below twelve (12) years of age. As
narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and repulsive. The
victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as
a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were
preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The
accused is also a most unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his
having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, his
constituents liked him so much that they knowingly re-elected him to his
congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.
Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11)
year old commercial sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public
attention. In the words of accused-appellant, he has been demonized in the press
most unfairly, his image transmogrified into that of a dastardly, ogre, out to get
his slimy hands on innocent and nave girls to satiate his lustful desires.[4] This
Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accused-appellants claim that he
suffered invidiously discriminatory treatment. Regarding the above allegation, the
Court has ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the case did not
result in a mistrial; the records show that the accused had ample and free
opportunity to adduce his defenses.
This is an appeal from the decision[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-
appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts of statutory rape, and in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, for six (6)
counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also
known as the Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-
1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted
of the charges of acts of lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape;
and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
were filed against accused-appellant. The accusatory portion of said informations
for the crime of statutory rape state:
In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)
year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of
RAPE defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)
year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of
RAPE defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
For acts of lasciviousness, the informations[8] under which accused-appellant
was convicted were identical except for the different dates of commission on June
14, 1996; June 15, 1996; June 16, 1996; June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June
22, 1996, to wit:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-
year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz
Towers, Makati City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress and fondle said complainant's face, lips,
neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her nipples and insert his finger and
then his tongue into her vagina, place himself on top of her, then insert his penis
in between her thighs until ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct
against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added
averments that on the different dates, the accused gave the complainant
P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00 respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter
a plea. Hence, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the
prosecution presented eight (8) main witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses
as well as documentary evidences marked as Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive of
submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twenty-six (26) witnesses.
Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of submarkings.
The records of the case are extremely voluminous.
The Peoples version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the
victim, are as follows:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight
black hair and almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment
in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own
father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose ostensible source of
income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house. On
the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger
brother, Shandro, who was also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age
of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit
activities. She and her brother would tag along with Simplicio whenever he
delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was offered by
Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus
begun her ordeal as one of the girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February
1996 at his office located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were
brought there and introduced by a talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez.
Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When he saw
Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio answered, 10. She is
going to be 11 on May 11. Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to
sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, Tell Me You Love Me.
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up
to the mid-thighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said
yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When
nobody answered, accused-appellant cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter,
accused-appellant assured them that he would help Rosilyn become an actress as
he was one of the producers of the TV programs, Valiente and Eat Bulaga.
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyns
movie career. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt
Rosilyn and that the latter would have to live with him in his condominium at the
Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went home, accused-appellant gave
Rosilyn P2,000.00.
The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit,
located at Room 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio
discussed the contract and his plan to finance Rosilyns studies. Accused-appellant
gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn, Shandro and Simplicio left.
The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz
Towers to discuss her acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of
Rosilyns contract to his lawyer, who was also present. After the meeting, Simplicio
and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards the elevator, accused-appellant
approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned
to accused-appellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant
came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while
he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while, accused-appellant entered
the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards Rosilyn
and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her
goodbye. Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which
Simplicio replied, Halik lang naman.
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time,
accused-appellant came in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long
white T-shirt on which was printed the word, Dakak. In his hand was a plain white
T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he wanted to change her clothes.
Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but
accused-appellant answered, Daddy mo naman ako. Accused-appellant then took
off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn
said, Huwag po.Again, accused-appellant told her, After all, I am your Daddy.
Accused-appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long white
T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-
appellant turned off the lamp and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed
her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her breasts and inserted his finger into
her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, Tama na po. Accused-appellant
stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-
appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom
she found bent over and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led
her to the bathroom. He removed Rosilyns shirt and gave her a bath. While
accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns body, he caressed her breasts and
inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a
towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and told
her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while
accused-appellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom
watching television. When accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front
of her, removed her panties and placed her legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed
his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn P10,000.00 and told his
housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz
Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn
narrated to Simplicio what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not
to bring her back to the Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright
as long as accused-appellant does not have sexual intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again
brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed
Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with the same long T-shirt. They watched
television for a while, then accused-appellant sat beside Rosilyn and kissed her on
the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her breasts, and inserted
his finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own clothes,
placed his penis between Rosilyns thighs and made thrusting motions until he
ejaculated on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her and told her to
sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and
bathed her. Again, he rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and
thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair. While accused-appellant was bathing
Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate breakfast. He
gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium
unit. On their way home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to
insert his penis into her vagina, she should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz
Towers. They found accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio
told Rosilyn to approach accused-appellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took
off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with a long T-shirt on which was printed a
picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption, Cong. Jalosjos with
his Toy. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay beside
Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs. He
positioned himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held
his penis, and poked and pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused
Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her
breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-
appellant was no longer around but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that
morning, she had felt somebody touching her private parts but she was still too
sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath, then went off to school with
Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996,
at about 9:00 oclock in the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-
appellant stripped her naked and again put on her the long shirt he wanted her to
wear. After watching television for a while, accused-appellant knelt beside Rosilyn,
raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then,
he clipped his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting motions until he
ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant
who was kissing her and fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and
went back to sleep. When she woke up, she found the P5,000.00 which accused-
appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio Delantar, when the latter came to
pick her up.
On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit,
accused-appellant took photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-
shirt pulled down thereby exposing her breasts. He also took her photographs with
her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without showing her pubis, and finally, while
straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke
up and found the P5,000.00 left by accused-appellant on the table. She recalled
that earlier that morning, she felt somebody caressing her breasts and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz
Towers. Rosilyn had to wait for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to
1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with the long white shirt similar to what he was
wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant kissed her lips and inserted
his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into
her vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to
sleep.
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her
body, he fondled her breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain
and shoved his hand away.After bathing her, accused-appellant had breakfast.
Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon as Simplicio arrived, Rosilyn
gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers.
Accused-appellant was waiting in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes,
including her panties, and dressed her with a long T-shirt similar to what he was
wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed Rosilyn on the lips,
inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made Rosilyn
lie on the bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He
inserted his finger in her vagina and mounted himself between her legs with his
hands rested on her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed and pressed
his penis against her vagina. Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which
caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex
organ, but she did not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on
the table, and she gave this to Simplicio when he came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around
7:00 p.m. Accused-appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back
later that evening. The two did not return.
 The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie
Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police,
where she executed a sworn statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was
thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-
appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at
Camp Crame. The examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are
conical with pinkish brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft
GENITAL
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed
laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed laceration at 8 o'clock position.
External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the
examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is
narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.[9]
During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He
claimed that it was his brother, Dominador Jun Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met,
once at accused-appellants Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-
appellant insisted that he was in the province on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have
been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges against him to a small
group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his political
opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly
determined to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on
the Philippine Airlines (PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in
Dipolog until June 18, 1996. He submitted in evidence airline ticket no.
10792424,[10] showing that he was on board Flight PR 165; the said flights
passengers manifest,[11] where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR appears; and
photographs showing accused-appellants constituents welcoming his arrival and
showing accused-appellant talking with former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and
Fiscal Empainado.
Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the
9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando
Nocom of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Upon arrival and after talking to his
representatives, he proceeded to his residence known as Barangay House in
Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San
Pedro. He stayed in the house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then,
together with some friends, he visited the Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak
Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the Barangay House in Taguilon.
On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide
consultation with his political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till
the afternoon. In the evening, he went home and slept in the Barangay House.
On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He
spent the night in the Barangay House.
On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak
Beach Resort. The blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest
Adelmo Laput.
On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering
District of Dapitan City. After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay
Taguilon, Dapitan City.
He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there
was never an instance when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he
attended a conference called by the President of the Philippines.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00
a.m. flight of PAL from Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a
private plane to Dipolog, where he stayed until the President of the Philippines
arrived.
To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador Jun Jalosjos testified that
he was the one, and not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions.
These occurred once during the first week of May 1996, at accused-appellants
Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio Delantar were introduced to him by
Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he interviewed Rosilyn, and
later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of Rosilyn into
the show business.
 Dominadors admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were
limited to interviewing her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His
testimony made no mention of any sexual encounter with Rosilyn.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA,
as principal in the two (2) counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each
of these cases.
2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.
2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-
1993, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. He is
hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;
4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:
4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period,
as maximum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum;
4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases;
5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-
1998, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the accused in
these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND
UNTRUTHS.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN
THE CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.
E.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS
COMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. [13]
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is
scrutinized with utmost caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence
requires no less than moral certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies
with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim
herself that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on
destroying the veracity of private complainants testimony, the errors assigned by
accused-appellant, particularly the first three, are focused on the issue of
credibility.
 Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of
lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that the trial court sustained his defense
of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted her stories and the rest
of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-appellant
urges the application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in
part, false in everything).[14]
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an
absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.[15] Thus,
in People v. Yanson-Dumancas,[16] citing People v. Li Bun Juan,[17] this Court held
that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno
falsus in omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it
with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223,
the following was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on
Facts, p. 23:
18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are
not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some
portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to
them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth Even when witnesses
are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are
not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may
credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief. (p. 945)[18]
Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the
falsehood, the trial court's assignment of values and weight on the testimony of
Rosilyn should be given credence.Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the
issue at hand hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is
best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled opportunity to observe
her demeanor on the witness stand.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the
trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not
believe Rosilyn when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims
especially those who are young and immature deserve full credence (People v.
Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that no woman would concoct a story
of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow
herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. (People v. Buyok, 235
SCRA 622 [1996]).
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate
spontaneously in detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this
regard was firm, candid, clear and straightforward, and it remained to be so
even during the intense and rigid cross-examination made by the defense
counsel.[19]
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect testimonies
were rehearsed and lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and
even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross and re-cross examinations. He added that
she was trained to give answers such as, Ano po?, Parang po, Medyo po, and Sa
tingin ko po.
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the
pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and
consistent on the fact of rape and lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-
appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural words customary of children
of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant as uttered by Rosilyn
are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of child
witnesses like her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the
witness stand, may have given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to
minor and peripheral details which do not in any way detract from her firm and
straightforward declaration that she had been molested and subjected to lascivious
conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that even the
most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At
times, far from eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could,
indeed, constitute signs of veracity.[20]
Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any
allegation of rape in the five (5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as
in the interviews and case study conducted by the representatives of the DSWD.
In particular, accused-appellant points to the following documents:
(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before
SPO5 Milagros A. Carrasco of the Pasay City Police;
(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed
before NBI Agents Cynthia L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent
Arlis E. Vela;
(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;
(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.
It must be stressed that rape is a technical term, the precise and accurate
definition of which could not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without
the assistance of a lawyer, who could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she
expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits and consequently disclose with
proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that under the
contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the
present case where there was no exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and
complete penetration of the victims vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought,
as any layman would probably do, that there must be the fullest penetration of the
victims vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.
In People v. Campuhan,[21] we ruled that rape is consummated by the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the
pudendum by the penis. There need not be full and complete penetration of the
victims vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no showing that the
foregoing technicalities of rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those occasions
that she was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers,
she could not therefore be expected to intelligibly declare that accused-appellants
act of pressing his sex organ against her labia without full entry of the vaginal
canal amounted to rape.
In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited
plus the courts mention of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:
Q: You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your
vagina, your back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread
wide apart, what else did he do?
A: He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again idinikit-dikit niya ang ari
niya sa ari ko. (underscoring supplied)
Q: And, after doing that: Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; what else
did he do?
A: After that, Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa
ari ko. (underscoring supplied)
(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without
full penetration of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough
that there be proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. (People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329; People
vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393). Penetration of the
penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction.
(People vs. Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs.
Abonada, 169 SCRA 530).Hence, with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused
pressed against (idiniin) and pointed to (itinutok) Rosilyns vagina his sexual
organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of rape were consummated.[22]
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyns purpose in executing the
affidavits on August 22 and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge
Simplicio Delantar, not accused-appellant. As aptly pointed out by the trial court,
it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an exhaustive narration of the sexual
abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the said complaint.
Additionally, Rosilyns statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19,
1996, concerned mainly the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion
for her to narrate the details of her sexual encounter with accused-appellant.
As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state
that said meetings with Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and
psychological repercussions of the sexual abuse on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do
with the legal actions being prepared as a consequence thereof. Thus, the
documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be relied upon to
reveal every minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.
At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyns
testimony, if at all they existed, cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyns
declarations on the witness stand. The consistent ruling of this Court is that, if
there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness and her testimonies
given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the former. [23]
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this
Court that Rosilyn gave the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only
because that was the name given to her by the person to whom she was
introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims, was merely picked up by
Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on accused-
appellants office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador Jun
Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt on his culpability. It was Dominador Jun
Jalosjos who allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak office. In
advancement of this theory, accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total of
16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for identification, she picked up only 4, which
depict Dominador Jun Jalosjos. In the same vein, accused-appellant claims that
the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial characteristics given by Rosilyn to
the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of Dominador Jun Jalosjos.
Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state
that he has a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that
Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom.
Such identification during the trial cannot be diminished by the fact that in her
sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as her abuser based on
the name she heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the
name she saw and read in accused-appellants office. Verily, a persons identity
does not depend solely on his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a
victim of a crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing his name.
Similarly, the Court, in People v. Vasquez,[24] ruled that:
It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by
face [the witness] acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out
the name that matched [appellants] face. Significantly, in open court, he
unequivocally identified accused-appellant as their assailant.
Even in the case of People v. Timon,[25] relied upon by accused-appellant to
discredit his identification, this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court
identification of accused-appellant was defective, their subsequent identification in
court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it.
In light of the foregoing, Rosilyns failure to identify accused-appellant out of
the 16 pictures shown to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified
identification of accused-appellant in open court. The same holds true with the
subject cartographic sketch which, incidentally, resembles accused-appellant. As
noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his brother Dominador Jalosjos
have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch looks like
Dominador, it logically follows that the same drawing would definitely look like
accused-appellant.
Likewise, Rosilyns failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-
appellant and to state that he has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the
veracity of accused-appellants identification. At a young age, Rosilyn cannot be
expected to give the accurate age of a 56 year-old person. As to accused-
appellants mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that said mole is not
so distinctive as to capture Rosilyns attention and memory. When she was asked
to give additional information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as
having a prominent belly. This, to our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature
that would naturally catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like Rosilyn.
In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words idinikit,
itinutok, and idiniin-diin, which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant
did to her vagina with his genitals, do not constitute consummated rape. In
addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did not actually see accused-appellants
penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed that Rosilyn declared
that accused-appellants semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex organ.
Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan,
argued that, assuming that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyns external genitals,
the same is not enough to establish the crime of rape.
True, in People v. Campuhan,[26] we explained that the phrase, the mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual
act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge, means that the act of touching
should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the
labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudendum. We further elucidated that:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that
are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the
hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded
eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the
surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the
outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the
inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hairs but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent
any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape;
at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [27]
In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of
accused-appellant went beyond strafing of the citadel of passion or shelling of the
castle of orgasmic potency, as depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed
into bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is invasion enough,[28] there being,
in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition.When the accused-
appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs, unfetteredly
touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position
would then be naturally wide open and ready for copulation, it would require no
fertile imagination to belie the hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant that his
penis or that of someone who looked like him, would under the circumstances
merely touch or brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact
between accused-appellants penis, and at the very least, the labia of the
pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina when
the idiniin part of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.
The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows:
PROS. ZUNO:
Q. And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he
do?
A. After that, he was lifting my shirt.
Q. Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell
the court?
A. I was lying, sir.
Q. Lying on what?
A. On the bed, sir.
Q. And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?
A. He spread my legs sir.
Q. And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do? Will you describe the position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing
that. Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?
A. After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.
A. Ide-demonstrate ko po ba?
Q. And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?
FISCAL ZUNO:
A. He pressed it in my vagina.
Q. Can you demonstrate?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
xxxxxxxxx
May we request that the vernacular be used?
A. He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis
A. Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko. while his other hand, or his free hand was on the bed.
PROS. ZUNO: xxxxxxxxx
May I respectfully move that the word: idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari PROS. ZUNO:
ko, be incorporated?
Now, according to you, you dont know how to say it; or what was done to
Q. And while he was doing that; according to you, idinikit-dikit niya ang ari you. Now, will you tell the Court how can you describe what was done
niya sa ari mo; what did you feel? to you?
A. I was afraid and then, I cried. A. After he dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito.
Q. Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried? Q. O.K. you said itinutok niya ito; what else did he do?
A. Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina. PROS. ZUNO:
Q. And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which She is now trying to describe.
according to you, idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?
COURT:
COURT:
Translate.
Place the Tagalog words, into the records.
A. He seems to be parang idinidiin po niya.
A. Sandali lang po yon.
Q. Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: parang
Q. What part of your vagina, or ari was being touched by the ari or penis? idinidiin niya?
xxxxxxxxx A. Masakit po.
Q. You said that you felt I withdraw that question. How did you know that Q. And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?
Congressman Jalosjos was doing, idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari
ko? COURT:
A. Because I could feel it, sir. Q. Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?
Q. Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina in what part of A. I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.
your vagina was Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, idinikit-dikit
niya yong ari niya sa ari mo? PROS. ZUNO:

A. In front of my vagina, sir. Q. O.K., clarify. You said nakaganuon siya what do you mean by nakaganuon
siya?
Q. In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position?
A. He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa
ari ko.
PROS. ZUNO: Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant
would not tax the sketchy visualization of the nave and uninitiated to conclude that
Q. And, when you said idinidiin po niya; to which you are referring? What is there was indeed penile invasion by accused-appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that
this idinidiin niya? occasion, accused-appellant was similarly ensconced between the parted legs of
A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko. Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and elevated
with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and
Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa pressing his penis against her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed
ari ko? by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no
doubt a consequence of consummated rape.
A. Masakit po.
The pertinent portions of Rosilyns account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as
COURT:
follows:
The answer is masakit po.
PROS. ZUNO:
Proceed.
xxxxxxxxx
PROS. ZUNO:
Q. The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina,
Q. Where did you feel the pain? what was your position?

A. Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.) INTERPRETER:

xxxxxxxxx The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?

PROS. ZUNO: FISCAL ZUNO:

Q. And then, after that, what else did he do Q. Ipaliwanag mo lang?

A. After that, he touched my breast, sir. A. My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.

Q. And, after touching your breast, what did he do?
A. And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with
her index finger, rubbing against her open left palm)
Q. And after doing that, what else did he do?
A. After that, he instructed me to go to sleep.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your
vagina, your back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread
wide apart, what else did he do?
A. He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again idinikit-dikit niya ang ari
niya sa ari ko.
Q. And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and
I would quote in Tagalog: idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?

A. I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir. A. I was afraid sir.

Q. Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting Q. And, after doing that: idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko, what else
down your clothes? did he do?

A. Because I felt pity for myself. A. After that, itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa
ari ko.
(Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)
Q. You said: Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at
x x x x x x x x x. idiniin-diin niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; Now, while he was doing that
act, what was the position of Congressman Jalosjos?
(Emphasis supplied.)[29]
 A. His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart;
he was in-between them, and doing an upward and downward
movement.
(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)
Q. For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or
pumping movement while his penis, or ang ari niya ay nakatutok at
idinidiin-diin yong ari niya sa ari mo?
A. I dont know.
Q. And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that
movement, pushing, or pumping?
A. I felt pain and then I cried.
Q. Where did you feel the pain?
A. Inside my vagina, sir.
x x x x x x x x x.[30]
The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of idinikit-dikit
niya was followed by itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya. The idiniin-diin niya was
succeeded by Masakit po.Pain inside her ari is indicative of consummated
penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what
took place at the appellants room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June
22, 1996 are consistent with the complainants testimony which shows that rape
was legally consummated.
In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by
putting her legs close together --- which, although futile, somehow made it
inconvenient, if not difficult, for the accused-appellant to attempt penetration. On
the other hand, the ease with which accused-appellant herein perpetrated the
sexual abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint, totally distinguishes
the instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even
submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-appellant. Thus, even assuming that
his penis then was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting his penis with
his one hand, while touching, poking and pressing the same against Rosilyn's
vagina, would surely result in even the slightest contact between the labia of the
pudendum and accused-appellant's sex organ.
Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the
circumstances of the alleged sexual assault at bar, the defense argued that it is
highly improbable and contrary to human experience that accused-appellant
exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from fully consummating
the sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the same
light, the defense likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that
accused-appellant contented himself with rubbing his penis clipped between her
thighs until he reached orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when
Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when
it comes to gratifying ones basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is
far too intricate for the defense to prescribe certain forms of conduct. Even the
word perverse is not entirely precise, as what may be perverse to one may not be
to another. Using a child of tender years who could even pass as ones
granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may be
utterly nauseating and repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive
celebration of salacious fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant
may have found a distinct and complete sexual gratification in such kind of
libidinous stunts and maneuvers.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period
penetrated Rosilyn for fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the
womb of a minor; or because of his previous agreement with his suking bugaw,
Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no penetration, otherwise the latter would
demand a higher price. This may be the reason why Simplicio Delantar gave his
mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant inserts his
penis into her sex organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accused-
appellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt
Simplicio to demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls
it, the peculiarity of prostitution.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant
ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape.
It should be noted that this portion of Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and
21, 1996 charges of acts of lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event,
granting that it occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18 and July 20,
1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see
the penis of accused-appellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions
of the transcripts, Rosilyn unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his
penis then poked her vagina with it. And even if she did not actually see accused-
appellants penis go inside her, surely she could have felt whether it was his penis
or just his finger.
We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12)
years of age at the time the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the
declaration of Rosilyn that she was then eleven years old, the prosecution
presented the following documents:
(1) Rosilyns birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;[31]
(2) Rosilyns baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11,
1985;[32]
 (3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born
on May 11, 1985 to Librada Telen as the mother;[33]
(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;[34]
(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May
11, 1985 and her parents (Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar)
patient file number (39-10-71);[35]
(6) Record of admission showing her parents patient number (39-10-
71) and confinement at the Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May
5-14, 1985.[36]
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be
proved by the presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-
appellant contends that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been
considered by the trial court because said birth certificate has already been ordered
cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997.[37] However,
it appears that the said decision has been annulled and set aside by the Court of
Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was appealed to this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
140305. Pending the final outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is presumed valid and can be invoked as prima facie basis for holding that
Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time she was abused by accused-
appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is
sufficient and ample proof of the complainants age in the records.
Rosilyns Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In
People v. Liban,[38] we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other
documentary evidence that can help establish the age of the victim, such as the
baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, can be
presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal
certificates of Rosilyn are inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live
Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where
Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her date of birth was May
11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records, admissible
as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyns testimony
as to her age.
Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:
Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty especially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,[39] the Court laid down the
requisites for the application of the foregoing rule, thus:
(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and
(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in
evidence, it is not necessary that it be required by an express statute to be kept,
nor that the nature of the office should render the book indispensable; it is
sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to be kept. Thus, official
registers, though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes
of discharging official duties, are admissible.[40]
Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production
of the books or records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper
thereof.[41] It is not necessary to show that the person making the entry is
unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order that the entry may be
admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in order that
public business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the
hearsay rule.[42]
Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No.
766,[43] mandates hospitals to report and register with the local civil registrar the
fact of birth, among others, of babies born under their care. Said Decree imposes
a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6) months, or
both, in the discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report
to the local civil registrar.
Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule
30, Section 44, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book
where the fact of birth, name of the mother and other related entries are initially
recorded, as well as the Master List of Live Births of the hospital, are considered
entries in official record, being indispensable to and appropriate modes of
recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries with the
local civil registrar, in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
 It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records
was not the person who actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita
Avenante, the records custodian of the hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records
may be proved by the presentation of the record itself or by a certified copy or the
legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the person who made those
entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that the entries
testified to by Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were
accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births
of the hospital are admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.
The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and
baptismal certificates of Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts
prepared by unbiased and disinterested persons under environmental
circumstances apart from those that may have attended the preparation of the
birth and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are
sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth
certificate of Rosilyn are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her
date of birth, was correctly disregarded by the trial court. It should be noted that
the criminal charges for child abuse filed by Rosilyn against him was the direct
cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that Simplicio falsely testified in
the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.
Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay
and Angelito Intruzo because the defense failed to prove that they were
knowledgeable as to the circumstances of Rosilyns birth. Their testimonies consist
mainly of observations tending to show that Rosilyns appearance belie her claim
that she was born on May 11, 1985.
In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June
29, June 30, July 2, and July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-
1996, and 96-1997, respectively), the trial court acquitted accused-appellant on
the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was able to prove that accused-
appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at the time the
lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense
established that accused-appellant flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed
there until July 9, 1996.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of
lasciviousness allegedly committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July
21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that she felt somebody touching her private part
but failed to identify the person who was performing those lecherous acts as she
was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise acquitted in
these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning
of June 15 and 22, 1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as
well as the rape perpetrated on June 18, 1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-
appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful review of the pertinent
transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not give any
testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly,
therefore, the trial court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of
denial, which cannot prevail over his positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.
As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of
June 16, 1996, accused-appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have
committed the same because he flew to Dipolog on that day. The records disclose,
however, that accused-appellants flight was at 9:40 a.m. The possibility, therefore,
of accused-appellants having performed the lascivious acts on the victim before
he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove the physical
impossibility of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996,
when the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female,
who for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x . (Emphasis supplied.)
In People v. Optana,[44] the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,[45]
explained the elements of the offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or
the Child Abuse Law, as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse,
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money,
profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are persons below eighteen
years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of
their age or mental disability or condition.
Lascivious conduct is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips,
fondling her breast, inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis
between her thighs, all constitute lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify
his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of
violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him
with the above-described lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse
Law, where the victim is below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-
appellant inserted his finger into the complainants vagina. These insertions took
place in 1996. A year later, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-
Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it indicates state policy on
rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of
1997 now classifies the crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor,
not necessarily the victim or her parents, can prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which
are now set forth and contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have
also been increased.
Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
the trial court correctly imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal,
which is within the medium period of reclusion temporal medium, pursuant to our
ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.[46] Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special
law, accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code.[47]However, the trial court erroneously fixed the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
prision mayor in its medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,[48] we held that
the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal medium is reclusion
temporal minimum, the range of which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, for violation of Article III,
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum,
to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996,
statutory rape was penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation; sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is
AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and Branch 62 in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992,
and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified,
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness,
the indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx. temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil
age consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally, the
or lack of it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess award of moral damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is increased to
discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, P50,000.00.
it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is
engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force SO ORDERED.
and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The Davide, Jr., CJ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and
sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.[49] Carpio, JJ., concur.
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution
successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she was
sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter
of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was
of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven
year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded
by the trial court for each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. 7610 should be increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.[50] On the other
hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count
of statutory rape was correct.
In People v. Lor,[51] citing the cases of People v. Victor,[52] and People v.
Gementiza,[53] we held that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil
indemnity ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil indemnity is
mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations
and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. [54] Hence,
accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the offended party another
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62,
in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo
Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape, and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN.
BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.
Criminal Law; Equal Protection; Congress; Election to Con-gress is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement—it cannot be gainsaid that
a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice.—The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental
in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. It cannot be
gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of
the administration of justice.
Bail; The Rules of Court state that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, and within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.—The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état
cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the
class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved
in the crime charged.
Same; The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty, which justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners or convicted prisoners.—It is uncontroverted that petitioner’s
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The
determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right
to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to
bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos. As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay, 468 SCRA
188 (2005), it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-
trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of
their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
Same; Flight; Circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a
factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a
discretionary grant of bail.—Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however.
The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went
past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh
hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the “Manila
Pen Incident,” proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for
foreboding became real. Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight
find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in
canceling a discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses,
what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of
right nor of discretion.
Same; Same; If denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the
theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the
opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.—Petitioner cannot find
solace in Montano v. Ocampo, 49 O.G. No. 5 (May 1953), 1855, to buttress his
plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator
Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution.
Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that “if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong,
the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict
of the jury.” At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were
non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong, the Court noted the obvious
reason that “one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee.” Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he
cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him
out.
Same; The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized
as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions
of pre-trial detention—the officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee
may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the
safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.—The effective management of
the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify
the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. The officer
with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of
the detainee. Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide
guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the
same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Same; Election Law; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Condonation; The doctrine
of condonation does not apply to criminal cases—election, or more precisely, re-
election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge.—The case against
petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-
election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
“they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and]
x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison.”
Same; Same; It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call
of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful
restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence—the
mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law.—In once more debunking the
disenfranchisement argument, it is opportune to wipe out the lingering
misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder
than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people
themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
Same; Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.—Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the
trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006,
file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007,
be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In
a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused
of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants
to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
Same; Congress; Allowing a detained member of Congress to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position—such an aberrant situation not only elevates his status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.—Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his
requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable
leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds: x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system. Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, Sr., 556 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 179817
June 27, 2008
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed
soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming
tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant
soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident,"
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his
hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term
commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with
the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion).
Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of
the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the
Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of
the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff
meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines
located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays
to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at
the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,
with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications
equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he
may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or
hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs
of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility
costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the
accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working
area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks
Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day
particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings,
consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to
assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a
Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions
and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues
affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in
the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and
in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system
of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of
Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his
custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters
and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or
to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of
confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or
hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of
officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning
(9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines
located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City. 5
By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus
Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in
paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7 The trial court just
the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007. 8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial
court, and for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning
the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or
transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct
respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate.
Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of
having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at
the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff,
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-
Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant,
Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding
Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the
day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as
against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in
relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile,
against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from
this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers
currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily
show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in
his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS
CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE
WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS
MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS
NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED
WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6)
COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS
CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A CHARGE
WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE
PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER
VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND
AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT
OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
MARINE BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO
ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE,
IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF
SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE
AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL
TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT
BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP"
ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,
petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was
already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere
detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights
since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in
expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference
between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the
stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the
inapplicability of Jalosjos.14
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement.15
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody
for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
 bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.18
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction
as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of
guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or
imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of
an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line
between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their
rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he
is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 26 (Underscoring
supplied)
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the
extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical
movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one
month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow
accomplish legislative results.27
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does
not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their
respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption
of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on
appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation
of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate ofpresumption of
innocence prevails.28
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither
denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media
access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on
Elections.29
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he
is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his
place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured
well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain
statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," 30 proves
that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased
to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor
in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary
grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established
that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.32
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for
leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano
Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu
dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized
in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the
defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of
the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were
non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious
reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee."37Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he
cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him
out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did
not overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions.
Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such
request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-
Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of
petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only
disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation
owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a
valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of
pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may
undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety
and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of
the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not
binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions
upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow
him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected
him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to
removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying
the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of
the people.
Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public
official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor."42
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in
nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases, 43 the
Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently
that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison."44
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to
wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to
the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the
rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like
former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were
allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of
the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on
an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention
prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek
preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or
house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house
arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial
court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file
his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests

alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and

committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
 office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present
EN BANC petition.
Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC); Public Officers; Constitutional
DANTE V. LIBAN, G.R. No. 175352
REYNALDO M. Law; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an official or
BERNARDO, Present: employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under
and SALVADOR M.
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; Not being a government official or
VIARI, PUNO, C.J.,
Petitioners QUISUMBING, employee, the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman, as such, does not
, YNARES-SANTIAGO, hold a government office or employment.—The President does not appoint the
CARPIO, Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency,
CORONA,
commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO, an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
VELASCO, JR., under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is
NACHURA,
not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION, obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
PERALTA, and Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-
Promulgated: owned but privately owned.—The PNRC is not government-owned but privately
July 15, 2009
owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private
RICHARD J.
GORDON, individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to
Respondent. the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for

x--------------------------------------------------x one year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member
Special Proceedings; Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is generally commenced by the
for one year upon contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year. Even
Government as the proper party plaintiff; An individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC.
in which case he can bring the action in his own name.—Quo warranto is generally
commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under DECISION
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another,
in which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo CARPIO, J.:
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any
stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate The Case
 In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges
forfeited his seat in the Senate. that respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground
for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the
The Facts Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or
unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name.
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari
If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by prescription since
(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors
commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture of
of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the
office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
past 40 years. Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1]
and re-elected in 2005.
he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the
PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship
Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers
of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the
suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence
Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
of any claim that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed
may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or that
government-owned or controlled corporations or their public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of
or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
public funds.
he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory
and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory
has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v.
Drilon,[3]which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.
upon their appointment to another government office.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled

corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution
does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither
an office nor an employment.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo
warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present
petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds,
considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation
as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that
this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional
issue which is of transcendental importance.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a
government- owned or controlled corporation;
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the
PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;
3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as
a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution; and
4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition
against respondent.[4]
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition without merit.
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action
for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise
may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law,
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was
elected as such during the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February 23, 2006, the
minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex A.
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, during his incumbency as a Member of the House of
Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, having been elected as
such during the national elections last May 2004.
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position
he duly accepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the
functions and duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the
chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has
ceased to be a Member of the House of Senate as provided in Section 13,
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent
has automatically forfeited his seat in the House of Senate and,
therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this
Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON, G.R.
No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as
such and still performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to
the constitution, law and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and
represent himself as a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the
salaries, emoluments and other compensations, benefits and privileges
appertaining and due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and
irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people. [5] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the
PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against
respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo
warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party
plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the public office
allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in his own
name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must
claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the
action may be dismissed at any stage.[6] In the present case, petitioners do not
claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have
no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a
taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, [7]
otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation.[8] The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and
Voluntary Service.[9]
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established
the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929.[10] The Whereas clauses of the PNRC Charter read:
WHEREAS, there was developed at Geneva, Switzerland, on
August 22, 1864, a convention by which the nations of the world
were invited to join together in diminishing, so far lies within their
power, the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the world have ratified or
adhered to the subsequent revision of said convention, namely
the Convention of Geneva of July 29 [sic], 1929 for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies
in the Field (referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Red Cross
Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages the
establishment in each country of a voluntary organization to assist in
caring for the wounded and sick of the armed forces and to furnish
supplies for that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines became an
independent nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its
adherence to the Geneva Red Cross Convention on
February 14, 1947, and by that action indicated its desire
to participate with the nations of the world in mitigating
the suffering caused by war and to establish in the
Philippines a voluntary organization for that purpose as
contemplated by the Geneva Red Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a Charter
of the American National Red Cross which must be terminated in
view of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in the other
countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross
Convention assist in promoting the health and welfare of their
people in peace and in war, and through their mutual assistance
and cooperation directly and through their international
organizations promote better understanding and sympathy
among the peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement (Movement), which is composed of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (National Societies). The Movement is united and guided
by its seven Fundamental Principles:
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without
discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors,
in its international and national capacity, to prevent and
alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its
purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for
the human being. It promotes mutual understanding,
friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all
peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious
beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of
individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most
urgent cases of distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to enjoy the
confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in
hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a
political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is independent. The
National Societies, while auxiliaries in the
humanitarian services of their governments and
subject to the laws of their respective countries, must
always maintain their autonomy so that they may be
able at all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary relief movement not
prompted in any manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red Crescent Society in any one
country. It must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout
its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in
which all Societies have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in
helping each other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all
members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the
Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the
Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be
autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of
the Movement.[11]
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring
belligerents as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the
PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict.
In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist
rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and
neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as
instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will
treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in
the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous,
neutral and independent in order to conduct its activities in accordance with the
Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency
that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and
cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society.[12] It is
imperative that the PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in
relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC
cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine
government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as
provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary organization, the
Philippine National Red Cross shall be financed primarily
 by contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns
throughout the year which shall be organized by the
Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in
their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns
shall be conducted independently of other fund drives by other
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended,
only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are
appointed by the President of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members,
or four-fifths (4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by the
President.Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, provides:
SECTION 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested
in a Board of Governors composed of thirty members, six of
whom shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines,
eighteen shall be elected by chapter delegates in biennial
conventions and the remaining six shall be selected by the
twenty-four members of the Board already chosen.x x x.
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board, eighteen are elected by the
chapter delegates of the PNRC, and six are elected by the twenty-four members
already chosen a select group where the private sector members have three-
fourths majority. Clearly, an overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the
PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the
PNRC.
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC,
elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent
Chairman of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen
are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC Board four-fifths of whom
are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by
the President or by any subordinate government official.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution,[14] the President appoints all
officials and employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under this Section 16, the
law may also authorize the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint officers lower in rank than such heads of departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.[15] In Rufino v. Endriga,[16] the Court explained
appointments under Section 16 in this wise:
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers
to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The
second group refers to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. x x x
xxx
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may
not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-
ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in
the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself.
In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the
head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may
not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or
board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
xxx
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked
officers specifically in the heads of the specified offices, and in no other person.
The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not
to their members, for several reasons.

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head
of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman.Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not being
a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does
not hold a government office or employment.
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,[17] the President exercises control
over all government offices in the Executive branch. If an office is legally not
under the control of the President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,[18] the Court explained the Presidents
power of control over all government offices as follows:
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the
Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one
of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-
judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such
government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government.
The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the
CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall
under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any
agency not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department
falls under the Office of the President.
Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices, the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an
office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have control
of all executive . . . offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does
not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the
independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is
no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all
officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise
or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the
exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. There can be no
instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside
the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only
one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire
Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control
of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or
constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector
individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the private sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is
controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are
not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the
decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. It is the
PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a
private office, not a government office.
Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies of a National
Society, this can be justified by the need for proper coordination with the public
authorities, and the government representatives may take part in decision-making
within a National Society. However, the freely-elected representatives of a National
Societys active members must remain in a large majority in a National Societys
governing bodies.[19]
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of
the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund

campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one year. Thus,
any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.[20] Even foreigners,
whether residents or not, can be members of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264,[21] reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross shall be
open to the entire population in the Philippines regardless of
citizenship. Any contribution to the Philippine National Red Cross
Annual Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor to
membership for one year and said contribution shall be
deductible in full for taxation purposes.
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable
organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case of Camporedondo v. NLRC,[22]
which ruled that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. In
ruling that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the simple
test used was whether the corporation was created by its own special charter for
the exercise of a public function or by incorporation under the general corporation
law. Since the PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then ruled that
it is a government corporation. However, the Camporedondo ruling failed to
consider the definition of a government-owned or controlled corporation as
provided under Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers
to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature,
and owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least
fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations may be further
categorized by the Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit for purposes of the
exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.(Boldfacing and
underscoring supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital
stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation,
by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials
holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government.
Under this criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not own or
control PNRC.
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against
the Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by
special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution,
as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled
by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar provisions prohibiting
Congress from creating private corporations except by general law. Section 1
of the PNRC Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a body corporate and
politic, thus:
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the
 voluntary organization officially designated to assist the
Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations
set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
other duties as are inherent upon a National Red Cross
Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation shall be
located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[23] the Court explained the constitutional
provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations in this wise:
We begin by explaining the general framework under the
fundamental law. The Constitution recognizes two classes of
corporations. The first refers to private corporations created
under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16,
Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common
good and subject to the test of economic
viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private
corporations except by general law applicable to all citizens. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban private
corporations created by special charters, which historically gave
certain individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to
other citizens.
In short, Congress cannot enact a law creating a private
corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only
under a general law. If the corporation is private, it must
necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently,
only corporations created under a general law can qualify as
private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the
Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-
owned or controlled corporations through special charters. Since
private corporations cannot have special charters, it follows that
Congress can create corporations with special charters only if
such corporations are government-owned or controlled.[24]
(Emphasis supplied)
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are government-owned
or controlled corporations since they exist by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198,
which constitutes their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local Water
Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities, were public property which
were managed, operated by or under the control of the city, municipality or
province before the assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local
Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009 General Appropriations Act,[25] the
LWUA has a budget amounting to P400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.[26]
There is no private capital invested in the Local Water Districts. The
capital assets and operating funds of the Local Water Districts all come from the
government, either through transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from
such assets or funds.
The government also controls the Local Water Districts because the municipal or
city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local
Water Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel of the Local
Water Districts are government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-
graft laws. Clearly, the Local Water Districts are considered government-owned or
controlled corporations not only because of their creation by special charter but
also because the government in fact owns and controls the Local Water Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter.
However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government
ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the
PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned
or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides
no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants
it corporate powers,[27] is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,[28] 2,[29]
3,[30] 4(a),[31] 5,[32] 6,[33] 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, are void.
The other provisions[41] of the PNRC Charter remain valid as they can be considered
as a recognition by the State that the unincorporated PNRC is the local National
Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and thus
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter.
The other provisions of the PNRC Charter implement the Philippine Governments
treaty obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, which provides that to be recognized as a National
Society, the Society must be duly recognized by the legal government of its country
on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the national legislation as a
voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field.

In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the
PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the
PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine

National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned
or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID
because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.

SO ORDERED.
 Corporation Law; Philippine National Red Cross; A closer look at the nature of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) would show that there is none like it not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
status.—The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence
Republic of the Philippines notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation
of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
Supreme Court nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
Manila A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not
just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official
EN BANC status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is
merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis.

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO G. R. No. 175352 Same; Same; The sui generis character of Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
and SALVADOR M. VIARI, requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
Petitioners, Present: basis.—Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a government-owned or controlled corporation or a subsidiary
CORONA, C.J., thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that
CARPIO, respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
CARPIO MORALES, Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
VELASCO, JR., does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the
NACHURA, contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui
BRION, generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the
PERALTA, PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, Same; Same; The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) has responded to almost
ABAD, all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial
VILLARAMA, JR., portion of the country’s blood requirements.—It bears emphasizing that the
RICHARD J. GORDON, PEREZ, PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely
Respondent. MENDOZA, and known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its
SERENO, JJ. humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
Intervenor. Promulgated: consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
January 18, 2011 international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared
void must therefore stay. Liban vs. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709, G.R. No. 175352
January 18, 2011

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

x--------------------------------------------------x
This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration[1] filed
on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the
Decisionpromulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision), the Motion
for Partial Reconsideration[2] filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters Manifestation and
Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper [3]
filed on December 23, 2009.
In the Decision, [4]
the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat
in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. [5]
The Decision, however, further
declared void the PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation.[6] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are
VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or
grant it corporate powers.[7]
In his Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration, respondent
raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in
deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that Petitioners did not have
standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity
of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.[8]
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue;
therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide on that question. Respondent
cites Laurel v. Garcia,[9] wherein the Court said that it will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can
be disposed of on some other ground and goes on to claim that since this Court,
in the Decision, disposed of the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of
standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve into the validity of R.A.
No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.
In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court
sustain the constitutionality of its Charter on the following grounds:
A. THE ASSAILED DECISION DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95 AS
AMENDED DEPRIVED INTERVENOR PNRC OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
1. INTERVENOR PNRC WAS NEVER A PARTY TO THE
INSTANT CONTROVERSY.
2. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95,
AS AMENDED WAS NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
B. THE CURRENT CHARTER OF PNRC IS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 1264 AND NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 95. PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1264 WAS NOT A CREATION OF CONGRESS.
C. PNRCS STRUCTURE IS SUI GENERIS; IT IS A CLASS OF ITS
OWN. WHILE IT IS PERFORMING HUMANITARIAN
FUNCTIONS AS AN AUXILIARY TO GOVERNMENT, IT IS A
NEUTRAL ENTITY SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT OF
GOVERNMENT CONTROL, YET IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS
STRICTLY PRIVATE IN CHARACTER.
 In his Comment and Manifestation[10] filed on November 9, 2009,
respondent manifests: (1) that he agrees with the position taken by the PNRC in
its Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated August 27, 2009; and (2) as of the
writing of said Comment and Manifestation, there was pending before the
Congress of the Philippines a proposed bill entitled An Act Recognizing the PNRC
as an Independent, Autonomous, Non-Governmental Organization Auxiliary to the
Authorities of the Republic of the Philippines in the Humanitarian Field, to be
Known as The Philippine Red Cross. [11]
After a thorough study of the arguments and points raised by the respondent as
well as those of movant-intervenor in their respective motions, we have
reconsidered our pronouncements in our Decision dated July 15, 2009 with regard
to the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter, R.A. No. 95, as amended.
As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined
in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality
in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[12] thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule
that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until such question will be unavoidable.[13]
Under the rule quoted above, therefore, this Court should not have declared void
certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos.
1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised
judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon
which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity
most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not
even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code,
after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Its existence as a chartered corporation remained unchallenged on ground of
unconstitutionality notwithstanding that R.A. No. 95 was enacted on March 22,
1947 during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, which provided for a
proscription against the creation of private corporations by special law, to wit:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law,
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless such corporations are owned and controlled
by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
(Art. XIV, 1935 Constitution.)
Similar provisions are found in Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution and
Article XII, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution. The latter reads:
SECTION 16. The Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on
June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by

virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence
notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of
private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like
it not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and
official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There
is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.
The PNRC succeeded the chapter of the American Red Cross which was
in existence in the Philippines since 1917. It was created by an Act of Congress
after the Republic of the Philippines became an independent nation on July 6, 1946
and proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the Convention of Geneva
of July 29, 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field (the Geneva Red Cross Convention). By that action the
Philippines indicated its desire to participate with the nations of the world in
mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish in the Philippines a
voluntary organization for that purpose and like other volunteer organizations
established in other countries which have ratified the Geneva Conventions, to
promote the health and welfare of the people in peace and in war. [14]
The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373,
and further amended by P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background
and legal basis of the creation of the PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary
organization impressed with public interest. Pertinently R.A. No. 95, as amended
by P.D. 1264, provides:
WHEREAS, during the meeting in Geneva, Switzerland,
on 22 August 1894, the nations of the world unanimously agreed
to diminish within their power the evils inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than one hundred forty nations of the
world have ratified or adhered to the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the Field and at Sea, The
Prisoners of War, and The Civilian Population in Time of War
referred to in this Charter as the Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines
became an independent nation on July 4, 1946, and
proclaimed on February 14, 1947 its adherence to the
Geneva Conventions of 1929, and by the action, indicated
its desire to participate with the nations of the world in
mitigating the suffering caused by war and to establish
in the Philippines a voluntary organization for that
purpose as contemplated by the Geneva Conventions;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines since 1917 a
chapter of the American National Red Cross which was
terminated in view of the independence of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations established in
other countries which have ratified or adhered to the Geneva
Conventions assist in promoting the health and welfare of
their people in peace and in war, and through their mutual
assistance and cooperation directly and through their
international organizations promote better understanding and
sympathy among the people of the world;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated
September 22, 1972, do hereby decree and order that Republic
Act No. 95, Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
as amended by Republic Acts No. 855 and 6373, be further
amended as follows:
Section 1. There is hereby created in the Republic
of the Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the
voluntary organization officially designated to assist the
Republic of the Philippines in discharging the obligations
set forth in the Geneva Conventions and to perform such
 other duties as are inherent upon a national Red Cross
Society. The national headquarters of this Corporation
shall be located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The significant public service rendered by the PNRC can be gleaned from
Section 3 of its Charter, which provides:
Section 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall
be as follows:
(a) To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of
armed forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit of and
under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to
which the Republic of the Philippines proclaimed its adherence;
(b) For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-
section, to perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as
a result of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to the
said Convention;
(c) To act in matters of voluntary relief and in
accordance with the authorities of the armed forces as a medium
of communication between people of the Republic of the
Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in time
of war, and to act in such matters between similar national
societies of other governments and the Governments and people
and the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines;
(d) To establish and maintain a system of national and
international relief in time of peace and in time of war and apply
the same in meeting and emergency needs caused by typhoons,
flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural disasters and to
devise and carry on measures for minimizing the suffering caused
by such disasters;
(e) To devise and promote such other services in time of
peace and in time of war as may be found desirable in improving
the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
(f) To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or
resident of the Philippines a member of the Red Cross.
The PNRC is one of the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,
which, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the
IFRC and RCS, make up the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(the Movement). They constitute a worldwide humanitarian movement, whose
mission is:
[T]o prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be
found, to protect life and health and ensure respect for the
human being, in particular in times of armed conflict and other
emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the
promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary
service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of
the Movement, and a universal sense of solidarity towards all
those in need of its protection and assistance.[15]
The PNRC works closely with the ICRC and has been involved in
humanitarian activities in the Philippines since 1982. Among others, these activities
in the country include:
1. Giving protection and assistance to civilians displaced or otherwise
affected by armed clashes between the government and armed
opposition groups, primarily in Mindanao;
2. Working to minimize the effects of armed hostilities and violence on
the population;
3. Visiting detainees; and
4. Promoting awareness of international humanitarian law in the public
and private sectors.[16]
National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public
authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of
services including disaster relief and health and social programmes.

The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent
Societies (RCS) Position Paper,[17] submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard
to the elements of the specific nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC,
to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red
Cross and its sister Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, have
certain specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva Convention
and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.
A National Society partakes of a sui generis
character. It is a protected component of the Red Cross
movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva
Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These
provisions require that the staff of a National Society shall be
respected and protected in all circumstances. Such protection is
not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary
private entities or even non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
This sui generis character is also emphasized by the Fourth
Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying Power cannot
require any change in the personnel or structure of a National
Society. National societies are therefore organizations
that are directly regulated by international humanitarian
law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities,
including NGOs.
xxxx
In addition, National Societies are not only officially
recognized by their public authorities as voluntary aid societies,
auxiliary to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, but
also benefit from recognition at the International level. This is
considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies
from other organisations (mainly NGOs) and other forms of
humanitarian response.
x x x. No other organisation belongs to a world-wide
Movement in which all Societies have equal status and share
equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other.This is
considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle of
Universality.
Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be
auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field. x
x x.
The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means
that it is at one and the same time a private institution
and a public service organization because the very nature
of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a
link with the State. In carrying out their major functions, Red
Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies,
in general having larger resources than the Societies, working
towards comparable ends in a given sector.
x x x No other organization has a duty to be its
governments humanitarian partner while remaining
independent.[18] (Emphases ours.)
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947
under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
In the Decision, the Court, citing Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[19] explained
that the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain
individuals, families, or groups, which were denied to other groups. Based on the
above discussion, it can be seen that the PNRC Charter does not come within the
spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a
particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve
the common good.
Furthermore, a strict and mechanical interpretation of Article XII, Section 16 of the
1987 Constitution will hinder the State in adopting measures that will serve the
public good or national interest. It should be noted that a special law, R.A. No.
9520, the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008, and not the general corporation
code, vests corporate power and capacities upon cooperatives which are private
corporations, in order to implement the States avowed policy.
In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service
rendered by the PNRC as the governments partner in the observance of its
international commitments, to wit:
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian
organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable
without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social
status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major
services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety Services,
Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary
Service.
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization
for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27
July 1929. x x x.[20] (Citations omitted.)
So must this Court recognize too the countrys adherence to the
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in
consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force
and effect of law.[21] Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. [22] This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII,
Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former.
By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like
any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State,
designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.Although the PNRC is called to be independent under its Fundamental
Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the
governments humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International
Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous status, and carry out its
humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.
However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary
Service of National Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished
from private and profit-making entities. It is the main characteristic of National
Societies that they are not inspired by the desire for financial gain but by individual
commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as
part of the service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or members
render to the Community.[23]
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State,
so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly
as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and
is treated as an auxiliary of the State.[24]
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently
established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the
government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary
thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that
respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as
Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does notipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation within the

contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under
the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the
PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary
of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter
was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded
to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a
substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely
and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects
on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of
the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordons

Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration and movant-intervenor
PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95,
as amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by
the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by this Court. The
structure of the PNRC is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in
nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive
portion of the Decision should therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second
sentence, to now read as follows:

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
Constitutional Law; Election Law; A governor who later ran for the Batasan and
took his oath can no longer exercise the functions of governor.—A public office is
a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As
such, a holder thereof “is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law
may impose” and “he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his holding of more than one office.” It is therefore of no avail to
petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local elective
official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The
dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. It provides no
exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted
constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the purely
parliamentary system of government no Incompatibility exists in the nature of
the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common
law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the
constitution itself, In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has
taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been
discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional
provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now
continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
Same; Same; A vice-governor who later ran for the Batasan and lost can
continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed as governor once
said office is vacated.—The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that
respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the Batasan Pambansa. He
maintains that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or
resigned from the vice-governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa
on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon
filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from
office.'' Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code.
Same; Same; Same.—Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-
governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His
succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in
accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which
reads as follows: x x x.
ESCOLIN, J.:
The issues posed for determination in this petition for prohibition with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order are: [1] whether or not a
provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices
simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position
of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and
subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
The factual background of the present controversy is as follows:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-
governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando
Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980.
Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on
April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among
the candidates, while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1
and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.
On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis
Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the
duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has
brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was
elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor
of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and
that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain
and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had
been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have
abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since
respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in
the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-
governor, much less assume the office of governor.
1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa
from holding any other office or employment in the government during his
tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet. ...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from
ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime
minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is
a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of
3 officials?
the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office." 4 It is
therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states
allows a local elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at
the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is
explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the
above-quoted constitutional provision. Thus, while it may be said that within the
purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility exists in the
nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in
common law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than
the constitution itself. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has
taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been
discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional
provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now
continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a
mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent
should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-
governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa
elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law
governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984,
Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of
the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election
he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204
and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor was not included in
Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is explained by the following interchange between
Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation:
MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed
amendment it would cover only governors and members of the
different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various
sanggunian or barangay officials. A vice-governor is a member
of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local
MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation
...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-
governor, the vice-mayors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians,
Mr. Speaker. They are covered by the provision on members of
sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings, February 20, 1984, p. 92,
Rollo]
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas
Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the
governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with
Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads as follows:

SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:

1] x x x

2] He shall:

a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of

the latter in the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 16
of this Code;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova,

Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES,
ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and
REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the
Securities & Exchange Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G.
VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO
DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Attorneys; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Corporations Act; An
assemblyman cannot indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not to
appear as counsel before an administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a
nominal amount of share of one of the shareholders after his appearance as
counsel therein was contested.—Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for
Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is
joining the cause of the private respondents His appearance could theoretically
be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the
matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents
who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—However, certain salient circumstances militate
against the intervention of Assemblyman Fer-nandez in the SEC Case. He had
acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact”, that is, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the
quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day
before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And
what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C Acero, but which was objected
to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to “intervene” on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-
defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Under those facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find that there has been an indirect “appearance as counsel
before x x x an administrative body” and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition. The “intervention” was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To
believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be
elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case
would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. Puyat vs. De
Guzman, Jr., 113 SCRA 31, No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and
allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe
Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge
ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right,
the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of
the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the
SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed
that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties
with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected
on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then
in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the
same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited
Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue
his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of
IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify
him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30,
1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of
Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an
Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of
ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty.
Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken
Excelsior — De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul
the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No. 33739). In
that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior
In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel
in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the
Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation
as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports
the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November
6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a
then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section
11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or
matter where he may be called to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case,
Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly,
before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez
cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on
behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents.
His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten
(10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection
of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and
respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of No costs.
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00
worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. SO ORDERED.
He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero,
on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the
Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, Aquino, J., took no part.
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and,
in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision

ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No.

1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII
of the Constitution.

Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of
the constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any
stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any
controversy before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution of
that question is not necessary in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A.

Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set
aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.