EDILBERTO L. BARCELONA v. DAN JOEL LIM, GR No.

189171, 2014-06-03
Facts:
 Respondent businessman Dan Joel Lim (Lim), the owner of Top Gun Billiards, filed a
Sworn Statement with NBI:
(1) his employees were influenced by petitioner to file a labor complaint against
Lim; and petitioner, then an NLRC officer, demanded 20,000 for the settlement of the labor
case filed against Lim. The NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.
 Lim informed the NBI that petitioner would drop by Top Gun around 7PM, expecting to
receive the 20,000 petitioner was demanding from him; otherwise, petitioner would order
that Top Gun Billiards be closed.
 After Lim handed him the marked bills, petitioner began counting them. The latter was
arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the money in his bag. Petitioner was
brought to the NBI office where he was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted.
Thereafter, he underwent ultraviolet light examination.
 NBI Director Federico M. Opinion, Jr. recommended the prosecution of petitioner for
robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and violation of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 The NBI filed the Complaint. Finding probable cause, the City Prosecutor filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila an Information against petitioner for the crime of
robbery. It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by
the NBI, Richard Tan (Tan), owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, had filed a similar extortion
Complaint against petitioner.
 Finding a prima facie case against petitioner, Chairperson Señeres charged him with
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
 The Order created a panel (the Board) to look into the present case;require petitioner to
file an answer to the charges; conduct an investigation; and thereafter submit its
report/recommendation. The Order also placed petitioner under a 90-day preventive
suspension upon receipt thereof.
 Both the Order and the Summons were served on him, but he refused to receive them.
He never filed an answer. The Board conducted a hearing attended by petitioner with three
of his lawyers. He manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself to its jurisdiction.
Thus, he left without receiving copies of the Order and other documents pertinent to the
case.
 The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. It found that petitioner had been
caught red-handed in the entrapment operation. His guilt having been substantially
established, the Board in its 31 October 2000 Report/Recommendation found him guilty
of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Upon approval of this recommendation by NLRC
Chairperson Señeres on 14 November 2000, petitioner was dismissed from service.
 He filed a Motion for Extension of Time Within Which to File the Proper Responsive
Pleading, but it was denied. Petitioner appealed to the CSC.He claimed to have visited
Lim's establishment to play billiards every now and then. Before going home, he would
supposedly drop by the place, which was a mere5- to 10-minute tricycle ride away from
where he lived. As the former was about to leave the establishment, he discovered that
 his cellular phone and pack of Philip Morris cigarettes were no longer where he left them.
The security guard on duty informed him that a certain Ian Gumban had stolen the
items.Petitioner claims that on 16 August 2000, the day of the alleged entrapment, he
received a call from Lim. The person who had stolen petitioner's cellphone was
supposedly willing to return it at seven that evening at Lim's billiards hall.
 When petitioner arrived, he saw Lim and one of the latter's employees. Lim approached
petitioner and informed him that the thief could no longer return the phone. The thief had
allegedly decided to just pay the value of the phone and entrust the money to Lim. The
latter tried to give the money to petitioner and urged him to count it, as the former was not
sure how much the thief had given. Petitioner supposedly refused to receive and count
the cash and, instead, insisted that Lim arrange a meeting with the thief. Lim inserted the
wad of cash into the open pocket of the former's shoulder bag. Just when petitioner was
about to pull out the money and throw it back to Lim, the NBI agents appeared and
arrested petitioner
 Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum, the CSC dismissed it.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 15 January 2007. He questioned the
validity of his dismissal by asserting that before its implementation, the NLRC had the
legal duty of obtaining its confirmation by the DOLE Secretary. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the CSC through a Resolution.
 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review, but it was dismissed by the CA. The CA issued the
assailed Resolution dated 26 August 2009 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. In spite of his voluntary inhibition, Justice Veloso still signed the herein
questioned Resolution to signify his concurrence. Hence, this Petition praying for the
reversal of the Decision and Resolution of the appellate court and the dismissal of the
administrative Complaint filed against petitioner.
Petitioner’s Arguments:
1. He was denied due process of law due to the partiality of Chairperson Señeres (by issuing
defamatory press releases, Lim never filed a complaint as required by Civil Service Rules
and no Preliminary Investigation was conducted 90-day preventive suspension violated
Civil Service Rule Sec 19), the Board, the CSC (by "curiously amending" Section 43(2)
of the Civil Service Rules only three weeks after he had filed his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution denying his appeal), and the CA (by simply
dismissing the case).
Issues (There were five enumerated issues but focus on Issue # 5 as it is under Article 4
in the syllabus):
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process of law;
2. Whether the factual findings of the CSC are supported by evidence;
3. Whether the CA had the authority to review matters not assigned by the parties as issues;
4. Whether the right of petitioner to the speedy disposition of his case has been violated by
the CSC and;
5. Whether the NLRC violated the Civil Service Rules provision, which allows the
execution of a penalty of removal decreed by a bureau or office head, pending
appeal thereof to the CSC, only when the penalty has been confirmed by the
Secretary of the department concerned. (retroactive application)
Ruling:

1. No. Chairperson Señeres did not act as the former’s accuser, judge and executioner. The
accusers of petitioner were Lim and Tan, while his judge was an independent Board
formed to investigate his case. The remedy to appeal to the proper administrative body—
the CSC in this case—was still made available to him.

 The Report/Recommendation of the Board shows that both complainant and

respondent were given the opportunity to be heard by the Board and to adduce
their respective sets of evidence, which were duly considered and taken into
account in its Decision. Sworn Statements were submitted by Lim and Board
charged him with dishonesty and grave misconduct but he waived his right and
refused to receive them.
 Chairperson Seneres didn’t violate Sec 12 of Civil Service Rule:

Preliminary investigation required by Section 12 of the Civil Service Rules is

not the same as that required in criminal cases. Section 12 defines a
preliminary investigation of administrative cases in the Civil Service as an "ex parte
examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the
person complained of, as well as documents readily available from other
government offices." Petitioner presents no evidence to prove that either
Chairperson Señeres or the Board failed to examine these records. In fact, the
records show that, on 28 September 2000, Lim and Tan appeared in the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Board to confirm their sworn statements
and the criminal cases they had filed against petitioner. That he submitted no
documents for consideration in the preliminary investigation was his choice.

 Chairperson issuance of suspension is valid: because Section 19 of the Civil

Service Rules requires that a formal charge be served on petitioner before an order
of preventive suspension may be issued. An order of preventive suspension may
be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene of his misfeasance
or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence or
pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary evidence on
file with his Office especially since he was charged with dishonesty grave
misconduct.

2. Yes. Petitioner presents no proof that the CSC "blindly" affirmed the NLRC’s ruling just to
get rid of the case. A reading of the Resolutions of the CSC reveals otherwise. They
thoroughly discussed the factual circumstances surrounding this case, the evidence, and
why and how the conclusion was reached. In order to overcome the validity of these
Resolutions, petitioner must present evidence to prove that the evidence relied on by the
CSC was unsubstantial.

Factual findings of administrative bodies like the CSC are binding on this Court, unless
these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. In this case, we rule that the
findings of fact and conclusions of the CSC have passed the test of substantiality. It is
sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by the evidence on record; or,
stated negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by
 evidence.The absence of substantial evidence is not shown by stressing that there is
contrary evidence on record, whether direct or circumstantial.

3. Yes. [A]n appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and
that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as
error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the
case.
4. No. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is guaranteed by the Constitution. The
concept of speedy disposition is flexible. The fact that it took the CSC six years to resolve
the appeal of petitioner does not, by itself, automatically prove that he was denied his right
to the speedy disposition of his case.
5. No. On 7 February 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07-0244, which amended the
provision of the Civil Service Rules:

It appears that Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules is self-contradicting. While the second
paragraph provides that a penalty of removal "shall be executory only after confirmation
by the Secretary concerned," the third paragraph states: "Pending appeal, the penalty
imposed shall be executory, including the penalty of removal from the service without need
for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is attached." The
CSC should look into the implication and/or consequence of its amendment of the rules
and should clarify how the newly enacted paragraph can operate, without conflict, with the
reenacted provisions of the old Section 43.

In any case, even if we were to assume that the new rules now declare that a penalty of
removal shall be executory pending appeal, without need for confirmation by the secretary
of the Department to which the agency is attached, this rule cannot and should not be
applied to petitioner’s case.

Resolution No. 07-0244 became effective 15 days after 21 March 2007, the day it was
published, or a few months before the CSC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This Court cannot declare that the amendment of the Civil Service Rules while the case
of petitioner was pending proves the lack of impartiality on the CSC’s part as petitioner
claims. However, it can and does now declare that the CSC had no right to
retroactively apply the amended provision to petitioner’s case.

Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. When petitioner was
dismissed, the old Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules was still in effect. The aforecited
provision clearly states that the penalty of removal is not executory, pending appeal,
unless the penalty is confirmed by Secretary of the Department where the dismissed
employee works. However, the Court is convinced that petitioner was never actually
barred from returning to work after the 90-day period lapsed. The records disclose
that he made no attempt to return to work after the expiration of the suspension
period. Thus, he was never prevented from returning to work—he just chose not to
go back.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 26
September 2008 and its Resolution dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100595, as well as
the Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission dated 18 December 2006 and 28August 2007
are AFFIRMED.
Principle:
Article 4 of the Civil Code. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.