RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASE LIST 13. CHUA vs. REPUBLIC | 845 SCRA 407 | 2017 probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis, during his lifetime, contracted
I. PREROGATIVE WRITS purchaser. three marriages, to wit:
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESATE 1. TAPUZ vs. DEL ROSARIO | 554 SCRA
(1) First with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six
1. SILVERIO SR. vs. SILVERIO JR. | 208828-29 | 2014 2. CARAM vs. SEGUI | 2014
3. VIVARES ET AL vs. STC ET AL || 2014 There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare children, one of which is herein petitioner Edgar San
2. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS | 133743 | 2007*
4. RAZON vs. TAGISTIS | 606 SCRA | null and void the disposition of the property under Luis;
3. AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP | 177099 | 2011*
4. SUNTAY III vs. COJUANCO-SUNTAY | 183053 | 2012* 5. ROXAS vs. GMA | 630 SCRA administration, made by private respondent, the same (2) On 1968 he was married to Merry Lee, with whom
5. LEE vs. RTC QC | 146006 | 2004 6. BURGOS vs. ESPERON | 715 SCRA | 2014 having been effected without authority from said court. It he had a son, Tobias; but said marriage was divorced
6. ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. CA & EDMOND RUIZ | 118671 | 1996* 7. DOLOT vs. PAJE | 703 SCRA (CONTINUING MANDAMUS) is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or by virtue of a decree granting said divorce by Family
7. UNION BANK vs. SANTIBANEZ | 149926 | 2005* 8. MERALCO vs. LIM | 632 SCRA | 2010
approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a court of Hawaii; and
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN | 189121 | 2013* 9. LEE vs. ILAGAN | 738 SCRA 59 |
10. ARIGO vs. SWIFT |735 SCRA 102 fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for (3) On 1984, he married Felicidad San Luis with whom
9. PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF BRIONES | 150175 | 2007
11. PAJE vs. CASINO | 749 SCRA 39 as long as the proceedings had not been closed or he had had no children but lived with her for 18
10. SABIDONG vs. SOLAS | P-01-1448 | 2013
11. ARANAS vs. MERCADO | 156407 | 2014* 12. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. REYES | 180771| 2015 terminated. years from the time of their marriage up to his death
12. BUTIONG vs. PLAZO |187524 | 2015 13. WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM vs. PHIL. IND. CORP. | 758 on December 18, 1992.
B. ESCHEATS (RULE 91) SCRA 292 To uphold petitioner’s contention that the probate court
1. ALVARICO vs. SOLA | 138953 | 2002 14. REPUBLIC vs. CAYANAN | 844 SCRA 183 | 2017
cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render Claiming to be the widow of the decedent, herein
2. MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO | 172720 | meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. Our respondent Felicidad San Luis sought the settlement of
2015 CASES PROPER
jurisprudence is therefore clear that: Felicisimo’s estate and filed a petition for letters of
3. NARCISE vs. VALBUECO | 196888 | 2017
4. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA | 218418 |  Any disposition of estate property by an administration before RTC Makati.
A. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
2017 administrator or prospective heir pending final
C. GUARDIANS AND GUADIANSHIP (RULE 92-97) adjudication requires court approval and Herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
1. SILVERIO SR. vs. SILVERIO JR. | 208828-29 | 2014
1. GOYENA vs. LEDESMA | 147148 | 2003  Any unauthorized disposition of estate property can that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
2. CANIZA vs. CA | 110427 | 1997 be annulled by the probate court, there being no because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
3. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY | 194366 | 2012 The probate court having jurisdiction over properties under need for a separate action to annul the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
4. OROPESA vs. OROPESA | 184528 | 2012
administration has the authority not only to approve any unauthorized disposition. Merry Lee.
5. ABAD vs. BIASON | 191993 | 2012
D. TRUSTEES (RULE 98) disposition or conveyance, but also to annul an
1. LAND BANK vs. PEREZ | 166884 | 2012 unauthorized sale by the prospective heirs or administrator. However, while it is true that petitioner was eventually Petitioners also insist that the venue of the subject petition
E. ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS (RULE 99-100) reinstated as Administrator, the SC agree with the CA that for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
1. CASTRO vs. GREGORIO | 188801 | 2014 FACTS: The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a the permanent injunction issued under the said decision, as the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz,
2. CANG vs. CA | 105308 | 1998 will. Having survived by 6 legal heirs (respondent included), explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of Laguna.
3. VDA DE JACOB vs. CA | 135216 | 1999
an intestate proceeding for settlement of her estate was the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant
4. REPUBLIC vs. CA | 103695 | 1996
5. REYES vs. MAURICIO | 175080 | 2010 filed by her husband, Silverio Sr. In the course of the of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray
6. IN RE: STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA | 148311 | proceedings, the parties filed different petitions and appeal administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the “residence” is synonymous with “domicile” which denotes
2005 challenging several orders of the intestate court that went CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
7. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM | all the way up to the Supreme Court. the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject intends to return. They claim that a person can only have
168992-93 | 2009
properties. one domicile at any given time.
8. NERY vs. SAMPANA | 10196 | 2014
Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and
9. BARTOLOME vs. SSS | 192531 | 2014
F. HABEAS CORPUZ (RULE 102) appoint a new administrator ensued between SILVERIO, SR. Therefore, respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should ISSUE: WHETHER VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID?
1. ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER 139789 | 2000 and SILVERIO, JR. The Court of Appeals, then, rendered a not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of
2. SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | 148468 | 2003 decision reinstating SILVERIO, SR. as administrator. Prior to Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* It noted that although
3. LACSON vs. PEREZ | 147780 | 2001 the above proceedings, on October 31, 2006, the intestate faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna,
4. SANGCA vs. CITY PROSECUTOR | 175864 | 2007 court ordered among others, the sale of certain properties of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
5. MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN | 160739 | 2013
belonging to the estate. October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
6. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. CADA-DEAPERA | 210636 | 2014
7. DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO vs. THE WARDEN | 197597 | insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale. Makati City.
2015 By virtue of said order, Silverio Jr., sold the certain
8. PADILLA vs. CONGRESS OF THE PHIL. | 231671 | 2017 properties to respondents Citrine Holdings, Inc., Monica 2. SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS | 133743 | 2007 In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as
9. OSORIO vs. NAVERA | 223272| 2018 Ocampo and ZEE2 Resources, Inc. On the other hand, synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence
G. CHANGE OF NAME VS CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES Silverio Sr., filed for the issuance of TRO to prevent the
It has been held that that for purposes of fixing the venue to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
(RULE 103 vs. RULE 108)
aforementioned sale and transfer of titles. Acting upon
1. ELEOSIDA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF Q.C. | 2002 under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person refers
2. REPUBLIC vs. KHO | 526 SCRA Silverio Sr.’s petition, the intestate court granted the TRO However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
to one’s personal, actual, or physical habitation, or actual
3. PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULAN LIM enjoining the sale and transfer of titles of the properties. Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
CARULASAN WANG | 454 SCRA Hence, this petition. physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode,
4. BRAZA vs. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF NEGROS OCC. | 607 SCRA |
one’s legal residence or domicile PROVIDED one resides
therein with continuity and consistency. which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
2009 ISSUE: WHETHER THE INTESTATE COURT CAN ANNUL THE provided he resides therein with continuity and
5. REPUBLIC vs. SILVERIO | 537 SCRA
SALE CONSIDERING ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION, WHICH consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
6. REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN | 565 SCRA Section 2, Rule 79 provides that an interested person is one
7. REPUBLIC vs. UY | 703 SCRA | 2013 DOES NOT INCLUDE RESOLVING ISSUES ON OWNERSHIP? residence in one place and domicile in another.
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
8. MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARINAY | 2013 one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
9. PEOPLE vs. MERLINDA OLAYBAR | 2014 HELD: YES. The rule that a sale by an administrator of ISSUE: WHETHER A SURVIVING SPOUSE WHOSE
10. ONDE vs. CR OF LAS PINAS | 734 SCRA |2014
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely
property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the MARRIAGE TO THE DECEDENT IS ASSAILED ON THE
11. ALMOJUELA vs. REPUBLIC | 801 SCRA 399 indirect or contingent. Pp. 96
GROUND OF PRIOR MARRIAGE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN
12. GAN vs. REPUBLIC | 803 SCRA 204

E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST. Page 1

INTERESTED PARTY IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
DECEDENT’S ESTATE?
HELD: YES. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. *See Stated Doctrine*
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the
U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating
the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
3. AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP | 177099 | 2011
GR: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.
XPNs: As justified by expediency and convenience:
 First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon
in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
E.Я.RE: CASE DIGESTS ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. READ THE FULL TEXT FIRST. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. THE SAME IS MERELY A COMPILATION OF DIGESTS. ALEA JACTA EST.
RE: SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES 2019
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.
 Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the
estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.
The jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each
heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Pp. 16
FACTS: On September 15, 1994, herein petitioner Eduardo
(son from 2nd marriage) filed with RTC Pasay a verified
petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin. It alleged that he died intestate
without debts or obligations.
The grandchildren of Joaquin from the first marriage filed
their opposition alleging that the 2 subject lots belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia, and that,
upon Lucia’s death, they became pro indiviso owners of the
subject properties. They prayed that Joseph be appointed
as special or regular administrator.
RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator. It also allocated the greater part of the
estate in favor of the children of the second marriage
considering that the bulk of the estate property were
acquired during the existence of the second marriage. The
RTC dismissed respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence this
case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC, AS AN INTESTATE COURT, HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUE ON OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* The general rule does not
apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all
heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be
impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More
importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate
court’s jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his
verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquin’s estate,
he alleged that the subject properties were owned by
Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that
Joaquin, prior to contracting marriage with Caridad,
contracted a first marriage with Lucia.
Oppositors to the petition, grandchildren from first
marriage, however, were able to present proof before the
RTC that TCT were derived from a mother title in the name
of their grandfather married to their grandmother.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the
wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the
properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal
partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In
fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a settlement
proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same
should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of
Joaquin, being Lucia’s spouse.
4. SUNTAY III vs. COJUANCO-SUNTAY | 183053 | 2012
In determining who should be appointed as administrator,
the principal consideration of the court is the interest in the
estate od the one to be appointed as such administrator. Pp.
92
The Supreme Court have upheld the appointment of co-
administrators for the benefit of the estate:
(1) To have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps
at all times to have different interests represented;
(2) Where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased;
(3) Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;
(4) To have all interested persons satisfied and the
representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate; and
(5) When a person entitled to the administration of an
estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office. Pp. 93-94
As owner of one-half of the conjugal properties and at the
same time a compulsory, it would be unfair if the surviving
spouse be deprived of any hand in the administration
deceased-spouse’s estate. Pp. 94
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an
administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.
But since the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
appointee must demonstrate not only an interest in the
estate, but also an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.
FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate and was
survived by her widower Dr. Federico Suntay, 3 legitimate
grandchildren including Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, and 2
illegitimate grandchildren including Emilio A.M. Suntay III,
both of whom were later adopted by Dr. Federico.
Isabel filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Cristina. Dr.
Federico opposed the petition and manifested that he will
nominate Emilio III as administrator.
The RTC appointed Emilio III, but the same was revoked by
the CA, which appointed Isabel as administratrix instead.
The SC ordered both Isabel and Emilio III to be joint
administrators. Isabel filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said order.
ISSUE: WHETHER EMILIO III SHOULD BE EXCLUDED IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF CRISTINA
AGUINALDO-SUNTAY?
HELD: YES. The paramount consideration in the
appointment of an administrator over the estate of a
decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. The reason is that those who will reap the benefits
and suffer the consequences of management or
mismanagement have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
But given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the
person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s
estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate,
but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
Mere interest in the estate does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration; nor does adverse
interests among the heirs necessitate the discounting of the
order of preference set forth in the Rules.
Here, Emilio III’s appointment as co-administrator is not a
demandable right. In fact, his appointment should be
revoked in view of his inactions and hostility towards Isabel,
which may even prove prejudicial to the disposition of the
estate of the deceased.
5. LEE vs. RTC QC | 146006 | 2004
Where the appropriation of estate properties is invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof to a third party without court
approval is likewise invalid.
An heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may
be alloted to him in the division of the estate by the probate
or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees
shall have been given their shares.
The sale of the property of the estate by an administrator
without the order of the probate court is void and passes no
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title to the purchaser, and any unauthorized disposition of
estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there
being no need for a separate action to annul the
unauthorized disposition.
The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or
fraudulent disposition of estate property would be
meaningless.
Where the issue is the effect of the sale made by the
decedent's heirs without the required approval of the
intestate court, not with the issue of inclusion or exclusion
of properties in the inventory of the estate, the
determination thereon by the intestate court is not merely
provisional.
The title of a purchaser of an estate property can be struck
down by the intestate court after a clear showing of the
nullity of the alienation.
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on 1956. At the
time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned
ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind his wife
Juliana Salgado Ortañez, three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by
Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico
Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).
Special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted
an inventory of the estate of their father which included
2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company, representing 50.725% of the
company’s outstanding capital stock.
The legal family entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate
among themselves. Juliana and Jose then sold 1,014 and
1,011 shares respectively to FLAG. The lower court declared
the shares of stock as null and void. CA affirmed. Hence this
case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE SALE IS NULL AND VOID?
HELD: YES. The rule is clear that any disposition of estate
property by an administrator or prospective heir pending
final adjudication requires court approval and any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled
by the probate court, there being no need for a separate
action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil
Code which provides that possession of hereditary property
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is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the moment of death of the decedent.
However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the
estate that may be allotted to him in the division of the
estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid
or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares.
This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided
share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the
present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in
Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG.
This they could not lawfully do pending the final
adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of
the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to
the estate, as what happened in the present case.
NOTE: The same case was tried again in 2005, this time for
indirect contempt of the Court and for the disbarment
and/or imposition of disciplinary sanctions on petitioners’
counsel for their refusal to comply with the final and
executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
Petitioners were found guilty.
6. ESTATE OF RUIZ vs. CA & EDMOND RUIZ | 118671 | 1996
The right of an executor or administrator to the possession
and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so long
as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses
of administration.” Pp. 119
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned forthe payment of
said obligations within such time as the court directs. Pp.
177-178
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named
Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
Immediately after Hilario died, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. The
letters testamentary was issued to Edmond Ruiz
conditioned upon payment of the bond amounting to
P50,000.
The court then issued an order in favour of Edmond to take
possession of the rental payments of the properties it
leased out to third persons but only such amount as may be
necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for the support of Hilario’s grandchildren.
It also ordered the release of the titles of the properties to
certain heirs and granted possession of all properties of the
estate to the executor of the will.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PROBATE COURT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE BEFORE PAYING
THE DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* In settlement of estate
proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can
only be made:
 After all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and estate
tax have been paid; or
 Before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of
said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of
the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six
months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the
taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate.
If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a
bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax
obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.
Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
Therefore, no distribution of the estate should be made yet.
7. UNION BANK vs. SANTIBANEZ | 149926 | 2005
As soon as the probate court acquires jurisdiction over all
the properties of the deceased, no other court can dispose
of such such properties without the probate court’s
approval, for that would be tantamount to divesting the
latter with jurisdiction. Pp. 11.
A probate court acting as such exercises limited jurisdiction.
The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation, and distribution of the estate.
Pp. 15
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. Thus, in executing
any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extrajudicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval
is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of
its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Pp. 51
Claims mut be made within the time prescribed in the
notice, otherwise, they are barred forever. The exception to
this rule is when the claim is set up as a counterclaim in an
action brought by the executor or administrator of the
estate. The law imposes a time limit for the filing of the
claims for the following reasons:
(1) To protect the state of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should
be allowed;
(2) For the speedy settlement of affairs of the deceased;
and
(3) The early delivery of property to distributes,
legatees, and heirs. Pp. 136
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased,
to determine whether they should or should not be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated.
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise or any other transaction.
FACTS: First Countryside Credit Corporation and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into two loan agreements. Efraim died,
leaving a holographic will, testate proceedings commenced
before the Regional Trial Court. Edmund, son of Efraim and
as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez
Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC.
Meanwhile, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the
assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities
to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Page 3

Hence UnionBank sent demand letter to Edmund which was
unheeded. UnionBank filed action for sum of money against
the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence
before the RTC Makati.
Florence filed an answer alleging that the loan documents
did not bind her since she was not a party thereto,
considering that the joint agreement xxx was not approved
by the probate court, it was null and void hence she was not
liable to the UBP. RTC dismissed the case. Union Bank
appealed to CA which affirmed RTC. Hence this case.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CLAIM OF UNION BANK SHOULD
HAVE BEEN FILED WITH THE PROBATE COURT?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by
informing the executor or administrator of the claims
against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EDMUND
AND FLORENCE WAS VOID CONSIDERING THAT IT HAD
NOT BEEN APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT?
HELD: YES. The Court held that there could be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The Court added that the filing of a money claim
against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
8. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN | 189121 | 2013
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. Pp. 12
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Pp. 93
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers
to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees. Pp.
93
FACTS: Petitioner Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo
Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen, who are common-law
partners. When Eliseo died instestate, Elise through her
mother filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before
the RTC of Las Piñas City., claiming that she is a natural child
of Eliseo having conceived at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other.
Respondent Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration asserting that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Elise. On appeal, the deicison was affirmed.
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The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of
Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
ISSUE: WHETHER VENUE WAS PROPERLY LAID?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine.* It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may
be laid in the said city.
ISSUE: WHETHER ELISE HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The Court ruled that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be
the source of right, such that any interested party may
attach the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.
Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death
of her father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing
an action attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as
an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse.
As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action for the
declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia. Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be an interested
part.
An interested part is one who would be benefited in the
estate. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party.
9. PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF BRIONES | 150175 | 2007
It should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and
that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the
application and of the date set for the hearing of the same,
in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole
world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing
on the date and time indicated in the publication.
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union
did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle
her husband’s estate. CFI issued Letters of Administration
appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino’s
estate.
Subsequently, CFI issue an Order, awarding ownership of
the aforementioned real properties to Donata. Donata died
on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces,
instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of
the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of
Donata’s intestate estate.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint
with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition,
annulment, and recovery of possession of real property on
the ground that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of
Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach
of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs,
succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. After trial in
due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, in favor of the
heirs of Maximino.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. SC reversed the
decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for
partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property filed by the heirs of Maximino. Hence this motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD?
HELD: NO. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name.
Donata was able to register the real properties in her name,
not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order,
dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.
The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the
entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties,
and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her
deceased husband.
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled the intestate
estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband.
The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its
conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy
the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m)
and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court,
reproduced below –
 (m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
 (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in
the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that
Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, *See Stated Doctrine.*
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties
in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were
not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless
of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
10. SABIDONG vs. SOLAS | P-01-1448 | 2013
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is Lot No. 11 which is
part of the Hodges Estate. Hodges Estate is the subject of a
pending intestate proceedings. Herein complainant is the
son of Trinidad Sabidong, one of the longtime occupants of
Lot 11. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by
the Hodges Estate, docketed at the MTCC Iloilo City.
On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case
ordering the occupants to immediately vacate the portion
of Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due,
attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time,
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3,
Iloilo City.
On January 8, 1986, respondent submitted an Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
amount of P35,100. Under the Order dated November 18,
1986 issued by the probate court, respondent’s Offer to
Purchase Lot 11 was approved. A year later, the probate
court issued another Order granting respondent’s motion
for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of
possession over Lot 11 was issued thereafter.
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage
covering Lot 11 was executed. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed
to respondent on installment for the total purchase price of
P50,000. Thus, a new certificate of title in the name of
respondent was issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-
complaint asserting that as court employee respondent
cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a
buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty,
oppression and grave abuse of authority.
Page 4

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN ESTATE PROCEEDING MAY
BE CONSIDERED A PENDING LITIGATION IN RELATION TO
THE PROPERTY INCLUDED IS SUCH ESTATE WHICH
DISALLOWS A COURT OFFICIAL FROM PURCHASING THE
SAME ON THE GROUND OF ART. 1491 OF THE CIVIL CODE?
HELD: YES. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code provides that
he following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property
is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it
was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated.
The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same.
Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672
in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and
terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale
With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still
deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
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This notwithstanding, it was held that the sale of Lot 11 in
favor of respondent did not violate the rule on
disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No.
1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not
MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
11. ARANAS vs. MERCADO | 156407 | 2014
Questions of title may be passed on provisionally, but the
final determination of the ownership of the property must
be threshed out in a separate civil action and not in probate
court. Pp. 19
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of
ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Pp. 24
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified
by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory
implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person or entity. Pp.
116
FACTS: Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties
during his lifetime. He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his
real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty. Emigdio died
intestate survived by: 1st family: 2 children (Franklin L.
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas) and 2nd family:
Wife (Teresita V. Mercado) and their 5 children (Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland,
Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson).
Teresita was the appointed administrator of the estate.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that
were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory. The RTC ruled
in favor of Thelma and ordered Teresita to redo the
inventory of properties by including therein the properties.
Hence, Teresita et al filed petition for certiorari against the
RTC. CA ruled in favor of Teresita et al (Hindi na si Emigdio
ang owner dahil sa sold and assigned na ang properties kay
Mervir – w/c has separate and distinct personality from its
stockholders, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is NOT
warranted because the wrongdoing cannot be presumed –
it must be clearly and convincingly established). Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER PROBATE COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO
DETERMINE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES
FOR PURPOSES OF THEIR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION FROM
THE INVENTORY TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE
ADMINISTRATOR?
HELD: YES. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator.
If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title. However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
12. BUTIONG vs. PLAZO |187524 | 2015
Where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there
is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the estate for him and to deprive the real owners
of their possession to which they are immediately entitled.
FACTS: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs,
including his children with his first wife, respondents Ma.
Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, his second wife Benita
Tenorio and other children, as well as several properties
including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square
meters, and a family home, the land on which it stands is
covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in
Nasugbu, Batangas.
Respondents Plazo filed an action for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession dated
September 15, 1993, on the ground their co-heirs, Pedro's
second wife, Benita Tenorio and other children, had sold
Pedro’s resort and family home to petitioners, spouses
Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are now
deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria,
without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the
same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however,
did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. Subsequently,
respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita.
Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse
claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among
others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the
subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title
issued pursuant thereto.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents due to the
irregularities irregularities in the documents of conveyance
offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public
who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed.
The Deed of Sale was undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the
typewritten name "Pedro Riñoza, Husband" on the left side
of the document was not signed. The CA affirmed RTC’s
decision. Before the SC, petitioners contended that the RTC
had no jurisdiction. According to them, the allegations in
the complaint filed by the respondents show that the cause
of action is actually one for settlement of estate of
decedent Pedro.
Considering that settlement of estate is a special
proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
jurisdiction, while judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions
cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court
Page 5

exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the respondent’s
complaint.
ISSUE: WON THE RTC HAD NO JURISDICTION ON THE
GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IS FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF PEDRO AND NOT OF
PARTITION?
HELD: NO. The RTC had jurisdiction. Petitioner is mistaken.
It is true that some of respondents' causes of action
pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon, may fall under an action for settlement
of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would
readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the
allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is
clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.
— A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
Here, the complaint alleged:
(1) That Pedro died intestate;
(2) That respondents, together with their co-heirs, are
all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly
authorized for the purpose;
(3) That the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs
of Pedro;
(4) That there is an account and description of all real
properties left by Pedro;
(5) That Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness;
and
(6) That respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's
estate, pray for the partition of the same in
accordance with the laws of intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of
the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement
of estate.
MATTER OF ADMINISTRATOR: The general rule is that
when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name
an executor in his will or the executor so named is
incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the
bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s
estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
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court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a
decedent, who left no will and no debts due from his estate,
may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary
action for partition without submitting the same for judicial
administration nor applying for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.
The reason is that where the deceased dies without
pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate
for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession
to which they are immediately entitled.
B. ESCHEATS
1. ALVARICO vs. SOLA | 138953 | 2002
Only the State can institute reversion proceedings under
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
A private individual may not bring an action for reversion or
any action which would have the effect of canceling a free
patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on
the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will
again form part of the public domain.
FACTS: Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of
respondent Amelita Sola while Fermina Lopez is petitioner's
aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother. Bureau of Lands
approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application
of Fermina over the subject land in Waterfront, Cebut City.
Fermina executed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of
Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume
all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon
Fermina under the MSA. Amelita then paid to the Bureau of
Lands the amount of P283 thousand.
The BL issued an order approving the transfer of rights and
granting the amendment of the application from Fermina
to Amelita. OCT was issued. Castorio filed an action for
reconveyance against Amelita, claiming that Fermina
donated the land to him. Amelita filed an answer
maintaining that the donation to him is void because
Fermina was no longer the owner of the property when it
was allegedly donated to him, the property having
transferred earlier to her.
She added that the donation was void because of lack of
approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. RTC ruled in
favor of Castorio, CA reversed RTC. Hence Castorio filed
Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE: WHETHER AMELITA HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO THE
LAND?
HELD: YES. Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad
faith when she registered the land in her name and, based
on Article 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, he has a
better right over the property because he was first in
material possession in good faith. However, this allegation
of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title
is devoid of evidentiary support.
For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case
of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail
and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No.
3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita.
It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat
the Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the
legal presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title,
once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All
persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance
of its registration.
ISSUE: WHETHER CASTORIO CORRECTLY RESORTED TO AN
ACTION FOR REVERSION?
HELD: NO, Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola
acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the
State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of
the Public Land Act. Thus: Sec. 101.—All actions for
reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain
or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
*See Stated Doctrine* Since Amelita Sola's title originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then,
petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of
Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot "recover" the
property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he
is the rightful owner thereof.
2. MALTOS vs. HEIRS OF BORROMEO | 172720 | 2015
The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general
rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to
file an action for reversion.
FACTS: Eusebio Borromeo wasgranted a Free Patent over a
piece of agriculturalland. Eusebio soldthe land to Eliseo
Maltos during the five-yearprohibitory.Eusebio died and his
heirs claimed that priorto his death, heallegedly told his
wife,Norberta and his children to nullify the salemade
toEliseo and have the TransferCertificate of Title No. T-
5477cancelled because the sale was within the five-
yearprohibitoryperiod.
Norberta and her children filed a Complaint for Nullity of
TitleandReconveyance of Title against Eliseo and
theRegister of Deeds. Eliseofiled his Answer,arguing that
the sale was made in good faithand that inpurchasing the
property, he reliedon Eusebio's title.
Further, the partieswere inpari delicto. Since the sale was
made duringthe five-year prohibitoryperiod, the landwould
revert to the public domain and theproper party toinstitute
reversion proceedingswas the Office of the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF AN AGRICULTURAL
LAND BY A FREE PATENT DURING THEFIVE-YEAR
PROHIBITED PERIOD WILL RESULT TO ITS AUTOMATIC
REVERSION AS PART OFTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
HELD: NO. The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered
by a free patent during thefive-year prohibitory period
under the Public Land Act is void. Reversion of the parcel of
land is proper. *See Stated Doctrine*
The contention that pari delict shall apply is untenable. The
doctrine of in pari delicto nonorituractio isinapplicable
when public policy will be violated (the sale of an
agriculturalland covered by a free patent during the five-
year prohibited period isagainst public policy because the
main purpose in the grant of a free patentof homestead is
to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
thatportion of public land which the State has given to him
so he may have aplace to live with his family and become a
happy citizen and a usefulmember of the society)
3. NARCISE vs. VALBUECO | 196888 | 2017
An action for reversion can only be brought by the osg
because if successful, the land will revert to the state while
an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of
title may be brought by persons who have interest in the
subject property
FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the CA’s order reversing the earlier decision of the RTC
which dismissed the case. Respondent Valbueco Inc.
alleged that it peacefully possessed the subject land since
1970 and that its presence along with that of its
predecessors-in-interest was never disturbed until 2000.
In 2005, respondent filed an action for annulment of free
patent and certificate against petitioners Narcise, et al., the
DENR and the Register of Deeds of Bataan. A reading of the
complaint reveals that respondent claims acquisitive
prescription as its basis for the annulment of patents and
titles.
Page 6

From 1977 until 1999, petitioners Aurelia Narcise et.al.
were named as the beneficiaries of free patents, OCTs, and
TCTs covering the same lot. Instead of filing an Answer,
petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of cause of action, failure to state cause of action,
defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and
prescription.
The trial court dismissed the case holding that only the OSG
has the standing to file the case but the CA reversed the trial
court. Petitioner interposed whether the respondent is the
real party-in-interest.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAVE THE PROPER
LEGAL STANDING TO FILE A CASE FOR THE ANNULMENT
OF THE FREE PATENTS AND THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE?
HELD: YES, the respondent has the proper legal standing to
file a case for the annulment of the free patents and the
certificate of title.
An action for reversion, a remedy provided under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original
certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate
of title, including the transfer of certificate of title of the
successors-in-interest because the same were all procured
through fraud and misrepresentation.
In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the public
land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain.
Such action is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority
under the Administrative Code.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents
and certificates of title also seeks for the cancellation and
nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is
granted, it does not operate to revert the property back to
the State, but to its lawful owner.
In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit,
but from the fact that the director of the Land Management
Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued
patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as
to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is
sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the
pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for
annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent
allegations deal with plaintiff's ownership of the contested
land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant's
fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents
of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
Here, the action is one of annulment of patents and titles.
The allegations in the complaint show that respondent
asserts its ownership over the subject properties by
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acquisitive prescription. Thus, being an action for
annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is
the real party-in-interest for it is the one claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.
4. REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF CABRERA | 218418 | 2017
The Supreme Court held that public land fraudulently or
erroneously included in the scope of patents or certificates
of title may be recovered by the State through reversion
proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 (2006), instructs that in
the absence of any prior classification by the State,
unclassified lands of the public domain assume the category
of forest lands not open to disposition.
The classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and is
exercised by the latter through the President, or such other
persons vested with authority to exercise the same on his
behalf.
The applicant is bound to establish, through
incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be
registered had been declared alienable or disposable
through a positive act of the State.
Reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State
seeks to revert land to the mass of the public domain. It is
proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and
disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, or
when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act
which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the
public domain.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision rendered by
the CA affirming the Decision of the RTC ruling that the
Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas properties
have been reclassified as forest land.
Sometime in 1971, Meynardo filed an Application for Free
Patent concerning an 8,072 square-meter parcel of land. In
said application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in
possession of such parcel of land since 1936, through his
predecessor-in interest Marcelo Cabrera. The Bureau of
Lands issued Free Patent No. 516197 in favor of Meynardo,
covering the lots.
A portion of Lot 1 was transferred to Consolacion, who sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers. Jose and Leticia
De Castro, claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A,
filed before the DENR a petition urging the department to
conduct an investigation to determine Lot 1- A's land
classification status. In the DENR Final Report, Free Patent
No. 516197 covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas
Properties) was declared null and void for having been
issued over land forming part of the public domain.
The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report;
and (ii) NAMRIA certifications, all stating that the Roxas
Properties had been reclassified as forest land as early as
November 24, 1949.
ISSUE: WHETHER A POSITIVE ACT OF GOVERNMENT
NECESSARY TO EVINCE THE RECLASSIFICATION OF LAND
FROM ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE TO FOREST?
HELD: YES, a positive act of government is necessary for the
reclassification of land. Pursuant to Sections 6 and 7 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, the classification and reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, and
is exercised by the latter through the President, or such
other persons vested with authority to exercise the same
on his behalf.
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive
in nature, such acts, effected without executive authority,
are void, and essentially ultra vires. The Republic presented
the following pieces of evidence to support its complaint for
reversion:
o DENR Final Report;
o NAMRIA certifications; and
o LC Map 209.
However, these documents, whether taken individually or
collectively, do not evince a positive act of reclassification
by the Executive Department. Engineer Mendez admitted
that there was no presidential order or act reverting the
classification of the subject property from alienable and
disposable to forest land.
The foregoing testimony confirms that the alleged
reclassification of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as
it was done by Engineer Mendez on his sole account,
without any prior directive from the President, or a duly
authorized officer from the Executive Department.
In fact, the annotation appearing on LC Map 209 upon
which the Republic relies does not even state upon whose
authority the alleged reclassification had been made,
placing the annotation's validity, veracity and worth in
serious doubt.
C. GUARDIANS AND GUADIANSHIP
1. GOYENA vs. LEDESMA | 147148 | 2003
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be
allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties.
FACTS: Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters
of Guardianship over the person and property of her sister
Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of herself
anymore due to her old age, general weakness, and
suffering from a mini-stroke thereby requiring the
assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in various
enterprises.
Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta‘s close friend for more than six
decades, opposed the petition. She claims that Julieta is
competent and sane enough to manage her person and
property. The Regional Trial Court declared Julieta to be
incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her
property, and Gustilo was appointed to be her guardian.
The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING JULIETA
TO BE INCOMPETENT AND INCAPABLE OF TAKING CARE OF
HERSELF?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* As the Court said in
Feliciano v. Comahort: “As a rule, when it appears that the
judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the
guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons
for and against his action which are urged by the interested
parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is made
very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.”
In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower
courts committed any error. Goyena‘s assertion that
Amparo‘s intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings
is to take control of Julieta‘s properties and use them for
her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support
from the records.
2. CANIZA vs. CA | 110427 | 1997
By the appointment, it became the guardian’s duty to care
for her aunt’s person, to attend to her physical and spiritual
needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her
person in preference to relatives and friends. It also became
the guardian’s right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over her ward’s property, both real and
personal, it being recognized that the ward has no right to
possession or control of her property during her
incompetency Pp. 226
FACTS: Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist,
and former professor of the College of Chemistry and
Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared
incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.
She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes
and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed
legal guardian of her person and estate.
Page 7

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian
Amparo commenced a suit to eject the spouses Estrada
from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City.
Complaint pertinently alleged:
 That plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the
property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147;
that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada
Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-
law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free;
 That Cañiza already had urgent need of the house
on account of her advanced age and failing health,
"so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;"
 That through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the
Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house
but they had refused to do so;
 That "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving
plaintiff of the possession of the house in question,
they were enriching themselves at the expense of
the incompetent, because, while they were saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the
incompetent was losing much money as her house
could not be rented by others."; and
 That the complaint was "filed within one year from
the date of first letter of demand dated February 3,
1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had
been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been
considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had
in fact executed a holographic will by which she
"bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza
but it was reversed on appeal by the Quezon City RTC.
Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the
decision but failed in that attempt.
ISSUE: WHETHER EVANGELISTA, AS CAÑIZA'S LEGAL
GUARDIAN HAD AUTHORITY TO BRING SAID ACTION?
HELD: The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to
them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they
remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with
the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court"
(ART. 838,id.).
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An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent
with the former's taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income
from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court
the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship
clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full
authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may
be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the
management of her properties."
*See Stated Doctrine* That right to manage the ward's
estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof
and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and
defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
ISSUE: WHETHER EVANGELISTA MAY CONTINUE TO
REPRESENT CAÑIZA AFTER THE LATTER'S DEATH?
HELD: As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during
the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon
moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death
automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo
Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and
ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the
present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death
of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no
advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of
Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving
heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado.
On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were
in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of
the deceased.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within
such time as may be granted.
If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased.”
The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
3. NERI vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY | 194366 | 2012
Parents should apply for judicial guardianship in order for
them to sell properties of their children. Exception:
Ratification
FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari by
petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Rosa, Douglas,
Eutropia, and Victoria seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the CA which annulled the Decision of the RTC
of Davao del Norte, and entered a new one dismissing P’s
complaint for annulment of sale and damages against
herein respondent.
During the lifetime of Ps’ mother, Anunciacion, she and her
2nd husband, Enrique, acquired several homestead
properties. When Anunciacion died, however, Enrique in his
personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, together with, Napoleon, Alicia
and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale (1979) adjudicating
among themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, sold the properties to the late spouses Uy for a
consideration of 80,000.
On 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for
annulment of the said sale against spouses Uy, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. And, also, for having been executed
without the consent or approval of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa
and Douglas; thus, depriving the latter siblings of their
legitime.
Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5 year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead
patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria were
excluded from the Extra-judicial settlement and sale of the
subject properties, and interposed further the defense of
prescription and laches.
RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial
settlement of estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled
that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no
judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children,
Rosa and Douglas.
On appeal, however, CA reserved and set aside RTC
decision. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER ENRIQUE, AS GUARDIAN OF HIS
CHILDREN AND CO-OWNER WITH HIS CHILDREN, SELL
THEIR CO-OWNED PROPERTY?
HELD: NO, as to the shares of the minor children because as
a natural guardian, he is merely clothed with powers of
administration. *See Stated Doctrine* Even the parents of
their minor children are bound to post bond.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the
time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
NATURAL GUARDIAN and father, Enrique, represented
them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION and bereft of any authority
to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
Anunciacion.
Power of dominion, is granted by law only to a JUDICIAL
GUARDIAN of the ward’s property and even then only with
court’s prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in
behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Art. 1317 and
1403(1) of the Civil Code.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of
sale. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas
for lack of evidence showing ratification.
THEREFORE, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid
and not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became
pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their
respective shares.
4. OROPESA vs. OROPESA | 184528 | 2012
A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored
on clear, positive and definite evidence.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred
character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for
another called the "ward" whom the law regards as
incapable of managing his own affairs.
A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being,
not that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the
ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the
ward may personally require. It has been stated that while
custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship
indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in
loco parentis as well. Pp. 209
Page 8

A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored
on clear, positive and definitive evidence. Where the sanity
of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and
that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity
will suffice. Pp. 214
FACTS: Nilo Oropesa and his sister Louie Ginez filed a
petition to be appointed as guardians over the property of
his father Cirilo Oropesa. He conteded that Cirilo has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
10 years already having suffered a stroke and his judgment
and memory were impaired and even before his
hospitalization he already had lapses in memory and
judgment showing signs of failure to manage his property.
Nilo presented evidence which consists of his testimony,
and that of his sister the Cirilo’s former nurse and
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his
fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties. However these were
not formally offered. Cirilo filed Demurrer to evidence
which the case was granted by the trial court and dismissed
the case.
ISSUE: WHETHER CIRILO IS CONSIDERED AN
INCOMPETENT PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2,
RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT?
HELD: NO. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but
by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship.
The Supreme Court have held in the past that *See Stated
Doctrine.* With the failure of Nilo to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by
himself and his sister and their fathers former nurse.
These testimonies, which did not include any expert
medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial
court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to
grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by Cirilo.
Even if the Court were to overlook petitioners procedural
lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates
of title over real properties registered in his, his fathers and
his sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations, and
receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-
owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his
fathers alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself.
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In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness
of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, the Supreme
Court had the occasion to rule that where the sanity of a
person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence
establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice.
5. ABAD vs. BIASON | 191993 | 2012
It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian
and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward.
FACTS: Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over
the person and properties of Maura B. Abad. In support
thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14
B St. Paul Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that
he is Maura’s nephew.
He averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety
years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who
will look after her and her business affairs.
Due to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can
no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties
unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and
exploitation. Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of
Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of the
petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian.
He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as
Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties
as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura
maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason
prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he
was previously granted by the latter with a power of
attorney to manage her properties.
RTC and CA disqualified Abad due to his residency and
Biason was assigned as the guardian. However pending the
resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11,
2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion, informing
this Court that Biason passed away.
Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed
that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship be
terminated.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING MUST
BE TERMINATED?
HELD: YES. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that
a determination of the issue would be without practical use
and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief
to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would
be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Abad was challenging Biason’s qualifications
and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has
become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the
merits of the petition.
*See Stated Doctrine* The supervening event of death
rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s
appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura
has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that
matter, any substantial relief.
D. TRUSTEES
1. LAND BANK vs. PEREZ | 166884 | 2012
In concluding that the transaction was a loan and not a trust
receipt, it must be noted that the industry or line of work
that the borrowers were engaged in was construction. The
borrowers were not importers acquiring goods for resale.
The goods must be intended for sale or resale, otherwise, it
is a simple loan.
FACTS: Perez et al were officers of Asian Construction and
Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation engaged
in the construction business. On several occasions,
respondents executed in favor of Land Bank of the
Philippines trust receipts to secure the purchase of
construction materials that they will need in their
construction projects.
When the trust receipts matured, ACDC failed to return to
LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the
construction materials subject of the trust receipts.
After several demands went unheeded, LBP filed a
complaint for Estafa or violation of Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the
RPC, in relation to PD 115, against the respondent officers
of ACDC. The respondents allege that on what was really
intended was a simple contract of loan and not a trust
receipts transaction.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN LBP AND
THE RESPONDENTS IS A SIMPLE CONTRACT OF LOAN AND
NOT A TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION?
HELD: YES. When both parties enter into an agreement
knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust
receipt is not possible even without any fault on the part of
the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized
under Section 13 of PD 115; the only obligation actually
agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the
proceeds of the sale transaction.
This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower
is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the
purchase of the goods. Thus, in concluding that the
transaction was a loan and not a trust receipt, it must be
noted that the industry or line of work that the borrowers
were engaged in was construction.
The borrowers were not importers acquiring goods for
resale. Indeed, goods sold in retail are often within the
custody or control of the trustee until they are purchased.
In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished
products, these finished products – if not the raw materials
or their components – similarly remain in the possession of
the trustee until they are sold.
But the goods and the materials that are used for a
construction project are often placed under the control and
custody of the clients employing the contractor, who can
only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay
the contractor and often only after the requisite legal
proceedings.
The contractor’s difficulty and uncertainty in claiming these
materials (or the buildings and structures which they
become part of), as soon as the bank demands them,
disqualify them from being covered by trust receipt
agreements.
LBP knew that ACDC was in the construction business and
that the materials that it sought to buy under the letters of
credit were to be used for the following projects: the Metro
Rail Transit Project and the Clark Centennial Exposition
Project.
Clearly, they were aware of the fact that there was no way
they could recover the buildings or constructions for which
the materials subject of the alleged trust receipts had been
used. The goods must be intended for sale or resale,
otherwise, it is a simple loan.
E. ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
1. CASTRO vs. GREGORIO | 188801 | 2014
The provision on joint adoption by spouses is mandatory. As
a general rule, the husband and wife must file a joint
petition for adoption. This is consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level
of legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the
spouses. Pp. 317
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony,
there must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot
be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out
of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate children
must be personally notified through personal service of
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified
through constructive service.
Page 9

FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing
the decision of the CA which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition
before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro
(Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due to
their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose
Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth
due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was
instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed
and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth
Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study
Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC,
the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by
Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing
support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that
she single-handedly raised and provided financial support
to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her
and Joanne knowledge and consent.
Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his
fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered
help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why he adopted
them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC approving
Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained
and the document purporting as Rosario’s affidavit of
consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s
birth certificates shows disparity.
One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set
of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further
alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth
and Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA
denied the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER CONSENT OF THE SPOUSE AND
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN 10 YEARS OR OVER OF THE
ADOPTER IS REQUIRED?
HELD: YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father
of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent
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of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
(Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for
adoption. The law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of
wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or
annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to
adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent
to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose
was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s
children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA
8552). For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent
was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
2. CANG vs. CA | 105308 | 1998
The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to
adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of
the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted
child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context
and perspective.
The Courts position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.46 The discretion to
approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely
on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard
to the natural rights of the parents over the child. Pp. 264
The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child. Pp. 322
In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of
whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue
for determination.
FACTS: Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are the
natural children of Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano.
Later due to the extramarital affairs of Herbert, Anna filed
a petition for legal separation which was granted.
The decree of legal separation conferred Anna the custody
of the children. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano and Maria
Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-
law of Anna Marie, filed a petition for adoption the three
children before the Branch 14 of RTC Cebu City.
This petition was accompanied by an affidavit of consent
executed by Anna. The affidavit further alleged that Herbert
had long forfeited his parental rights over their children.
Herbert, upon knowing the institution of such petition for
adoption, went home to the Philippines and interposed his
opposition to the adoption claiming that the petition was
defective since it lacks his consent.
He also moved for the reacquisition of his custody over his
children and the same was later granted by Branch 19 of
RTC Cebu City. Later, the RTC Branch 14, issued a decree
granting the petition for adoption and in doing so, the RTC
ruled that Herbert has abandoned his children and such
abandonment is a ground for dispensing with his consent to
the adoption.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption. Motion
for reconsideration filed by Herbert was
likewise denied. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION WAS
DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF HERBERT’S CONSENT?
HELD: YES. Based on Article 188 of the Family Code, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption is a
requisite for its validity. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate."
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption
primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a
proper issue for determination.
The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent
is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first
confront.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the
act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties
and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means
"neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe their
children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical
estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment.
3. VDA DE JACOB vs. CA | 135216 | 1999
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship.
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Alfredo. During the pendency of the
said proceedings, Respondent sought to intervene therein
claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's
adopted son and as his sole surviving heir.
Respndent presented the Order in Special Proceedings No.
192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which
declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of
Alfredo.
As the presiding judge was already 79 years old and was
suffering from "glaucoma", his deposition was taken at his
residence. During the taking of the deposition, when asked
to identify his signature on the alleged adoption decree, he
said: “I do not remember having issued such an order and
the signature reading Jose; I can’t make out clearly what
comes after the name; Jose Moya is not my signature.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts
to test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moya's
signature. Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the
trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the
signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine
and authentic.
ISSUE: WHETHER ADOPTION OF RESPONDENT PEDRO
PILAPIL EXISTS?
HELD: NO. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is
upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is
a sham. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court.
In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he
did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in
which the accused pleaded guilty.
Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he
was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and
orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information.
Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the
Page 10

documents that he signed and other acts that he performed
thereafter.
In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau
of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil
had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent.
4. REPUBLIC vs. CA | 103695 | 1996
The court acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
adoption even if the given name of the child to be adopted
was published as “Michael” instead of “Midael,” which is
the name appearing in the birth certificate— changing the
name of the child from “Midael” to “Michael” cannot
possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be
read and pronounced with the same rhyme and tone.
FACTS: Carantos filed petition to adopt Midael with prayer
for the correction of his first name to Michael before the
RTC (adoptee is 15 y/o who had been living with Caranto
since he was 7 y/o).
SolGen filed an opposition arguing that although the
correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous
error, it could not be granted because the petition was
basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RTC ruled in favor of Carantos (and held that the error could
be corrected in the same proceeding for adoption to
prevent multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the
petitioners). SolGen appealed to CA, the CA affirmed RTC in
toto. SolGen filed Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE:WHETHER THE RTC HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE?
HELD: YES, this case involves an obvious clerical error in the
name of the child sought to be adopted.
In this case the correction involves merely the substitution
of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears as
Midael as given name would read Michael. Even the
Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical
one. The RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of
the minor Midael C. Mazon.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC CORRECTLY GRANTED THE
PRAYER TO CHANGE THE NAME OF SAID PROSPECTIVE
ADOPTEE?
HELD: NO, Rule 108 (entries subject to cancellation or
correction) also applies to change of name (including those
correction of name that is clearly misspelled).
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Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding. Now 3 of
this Rule provides: 3. Parties. – When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding. The local civil registrar is thus required to
be made a party to the proceeding.
He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not
impleaded in this case much less given notice of the
proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all the proceeding subsequent to the filling of
the complaint including the judgment.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the
civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to
render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
5. REYES vs. MAURICIO | 175080 | 2010
Legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack. The same rule is applied to adoption such
that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack.
FACTS: Eugenio is the registered owner of the subject
property located in Bulacan, which has been adjudicated to
him by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs
following the death of his parents.
Mauricios filed a complaint before the DARAB, alleging that
they were the legal heirs of one Godofredo Mauricio, the
lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land and contended
that Eugenio caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to
eject respondents from the subject property but such
Kasunduan was void, considering that Librada was illiterate
and said Kasunduan was neither read nor explained to her.
Eugenio countered that no tenancy relationship existed
between him and respondents and that Leonida had no
legal personality to file the present suit. Provincial
Adjudicator ruled in favor of the MAURICIOS (concluded
that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada,
being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in
peaceful possession of the subject land).
The DARAB also ruled in favor of the MAURICIOS (banked
on the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan or the leasehold
contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to
support the tenancy relationship.
Furthermore, the DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as
void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial
Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of Librada to enter
into such a contract.
Eugenio appealed to CA, CA affirmed DARAB, hence he filed
a Rule 45 before the SC, contending that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE: WHETHER EUGENIO CORRECTLY QUESTIONED
LEONIDA’S STATUS AS AN ADOPTIVE CHILD OF
GODOFREDO IN THE PRESENT RULE 45 PETITION THAT
STEMMED FROM A PROCEEDING ON TENANCY BEFORE
THE DARAB?
HELD: NO. As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing
as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted
that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of
Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio
contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled
that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida
in the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book
“Civil Code of the , Commentaries and Jurisprudence,”
noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the
provisions of the Civil Code of the. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning
the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
code (article 335) which provides: “The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be
made by proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void.”
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170
and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer
to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental, the
Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also
be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,
this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate.
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that
the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and
cannot be subject to collateral attack.
6. IN RE: STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA | 148311 |
2005
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general,
the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status.
This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines,
as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that
adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child. Pp. 262
For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters. Pp. 329
The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent.
FACTS: Petitioner Honorato-Catindig filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to her
adopting parent.
He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
ISSUE: WHETHER AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, UPON
ADOPTION BY HER NATURAL FATHER, USE THE SURNAME
OF HER NATURAL MOTHER AS HER MIDDLE NAME?
HELD: YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the
rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
surname of her father and her mother.
Page 11

Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
*See Stated Doctrine* Hence, Stephanie can assert her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
7. IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM |
168992-93 | 2009
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (SGD)
(1) Sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s)
and the adoptee, except when the biological parent
is the spouse of the adopter;
(2) Deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and
(3) Give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to:
(i) The right of the adopter to choose the name the
child is to be known; and
(ii) The right of the adopter and adoptee to be
legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child
of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such
as: (BRE)
(1) To bear the surname of the father and the mother;
(2) To receive support from their parents; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional
rights. Pp. 330
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the
adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological
parents are entitled such as support and successional rights.
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to
a decree of dissolution of marriage.
Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution
of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the
marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. Pp. 318
FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist
was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.
The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.
She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in
December 2000.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated
the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for
adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
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Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and
Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and
her husband including Michael and Olario gave their
consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER WHO HAS REMARRIED CAN
SINGLY ADOPT?
HELD: NO. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt
except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar.
In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised
parental authority. The use of the word “shall” signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt
jointly.
The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since
there are certain requirements that he must comply as an
American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.
Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal
adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their
moral mental and physical character and well-being.
8. NERY vs. SAMPANA | 10196 | 2014
FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R.
Nery against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana for failing to file the
petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for
making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT VIOLATED CANON
16 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
FAILING TO FILE THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE
RECEIVING HIS LEGAL FEES AND FOR MAKING NERY
BELIEVE THAT THE PETITION WAS ALREADY FILED?
HELD: YES. The recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors is well-taken. Acceptance of money from a client
establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the duty of fidelity to the client's cause.
Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.
A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other
lawyers to be candid and fair.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received
"one package fee" for both cases of annulment and
adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed
to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of
due diligence and candor to his client. Sampana's proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the
petition for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy.
In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if the alien
adopter would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible.
Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption,
Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He
then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption.
Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to
him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the
Code's mandate to deliver the client's funds upon demand.
A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.
9. BARTOLOME vs. SSS | 192531 | 2014
The death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority
results to the restoration of the parental authority to the
biological parents of the latter.
FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program.
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John
was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no
longer considered as the parent of John since the latter was
legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio
who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s
minority.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DEATH OF THE ADOPTER
DURING THE ADOPTEE’S MINORITY RESULTS TO THE
RESTORATION OF THE PARENTAL AUTHORITY TO THE
BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THE LATTER?
HELD: YES. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time
of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at
bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account the Superme Court’s
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship
and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted
child if the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration
of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on rescission
of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a
minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological
parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption.
While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted
child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the
biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right
to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority,
in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT BERNARDINA IS CONSIDERED AS
A LEGAL BENEFICIARY OF JOHN?
HELD: YES. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John,
without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a
dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
John’s minority.
Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole
remaining beneficiary.
F. HABEAS CORPUZ (RULE 102)
Page 12

1. ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER | 139789 | 2000
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal
dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus. Pp. 388
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced
by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
woman’s free choice.
FACTS: Erlinda and Potenciano were once married but were
separated for undisclosed reasons. When Potenciano
returned from the US, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo
where their children claimed that Erlinda gave Potenciano
an overdose of his antidepressant drug which caused
Potenciano’s health to deteriorate.
Erlinda filed with the RTC for guardianship over Potenciano
due to his failing health. After a meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo and lived in Makati
thus Erlinda filed for a petition for habeas corpus to have
the custody of Potenciano. She alleged that the other
respondents refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibit Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: WHETHER SPOUSES CAN FURNISH A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS TO COMPEL ONE ANOTHER TO LIVE
WITH EACH OTHER?
HELD: NO. *See Stated Doctrine* The essential object and
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty
must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective
detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ.
The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge
on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions.
2. SERAPIO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN | 148468 | 2003
A person may apply for bail from the moment that he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
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FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Petition for Bail, and a petition for habeas corpus. The bail
hearing did not proceed because on said date petitioner
filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash. The
prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash.
The prosecution contended that petitioner’s motion to
quash the amended information was antithetical to his
petition for bail. Petitioner maintained that a motion to
quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may
proceed independently of each other.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER MAY FILE A MOTION TO
QUASH DURING THE PENDENCY OF HIS PETITION FOR
BAIL?
HELD: YES. No inconsistency exists between an application
of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.
Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial.
A person may apply for bail from the moment that he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an
information is the mode by which an accused assails the
validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information.
An accused may file a motion to quash the information, as
a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have
objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each
other.
The right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged
with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due
hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does
not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
information charging him with such offense.
However, if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
information on the ground that the same does not charge
any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an
accused may become moot and academic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS BE
GRANTED?
HELD: NO. The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the
appropriate remedy for asserting one's right to bail. It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as
a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the
latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant
bail, or has not even exercised said discretion.
The proper recourse is to file an application for bail with the
court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be
unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan's
resolution of the pending application for bail of Serapio. The
recourse of Serapio is to forthwith proceed with the hearing
on his application for bail
3. LACSON vs. PEREZ | 147780 | 2001
An individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, The application for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus is not proper since its purpose is to relieve
petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which remains
speculative up to this very day.
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of
rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress
the rebellion in the National Capital Region.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of
a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance of
legality to the arrests, a petition for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application
for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M. Lacson,
Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao. They alleged
that they are under imminent danger of being arrested.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MAY BE
AVAILED OF AGAINST AN IMMINENT DANGER FROM
WARRANTLESS ARREST?
HELD: petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson
Petition), 147781 (Defensor- Santiago Petition), and 147799
(Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of
being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to
the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition,
since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not
without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation
under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce
evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to
inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should
remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in
court.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay
in the delivery of detained persons.
Should the detention be without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary
detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action
for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of
the Civil Code.
Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which
they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for
prohibition and mandamus improper at this time The
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is not
proper since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from
unlawful restraint a matter which remains speculative up to
this very day.
4. SANGCA vs. CITY PROSECUTOR | 175864 | 2007
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it.
Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such
restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for
habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of
physical liberty.
FACTS: PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of
RA 9165. The inquest prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City
Prosecutor. Consequently, an information charging Adam
with violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was
filed before RTC.
On petition for review before the Department of Justice,
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to
hold Adam liable for the offense charged The Justice
Secretary directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the information. PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on
December 8, 2006.
Page 13

On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the
instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam.
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime
charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering
the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for
another valid ground.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MAY BE
AVAILED OF IN CASE OF WARRANTLESS ARRESTS WHERE
THERE IS PENDING MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine*
5. MANGILA vs. PANGILINAN | 160739 | 2013
Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process
cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus.
FACTS: Anita Mangila, petitioner, was charged with seven
of syndicated estafa. The complaint against her arose from
recruiting and promising employment to private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto,
Canada without lawful authority from POEA.
By reason of the charged against petitioner, a warrant of
arrest was issued against her. She was arrested. She then
filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA alleging that
she is deprived of the remedy of a motion to quash or a
motion to recall the warrant of arrest because Judge
Pangilinan (Judge who issued the warrant) had already
forwarded the entire records of the case to the City
Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the
warrant. CA denied the petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT HABEAS
CORPUS WAS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY TO OBTAIN THE
RELEASE OF MANGILA FROM DETENTION?
HELD: NO. Habeas corpus is a speedy and effective remedy
devised to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
Petitioner’s restraint in this case in NOT unlawful. She had
been arrested and detained by virtue of the valid warrant
issued for her arrest.
The objective of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found
to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee.
Equally well-settled, however, is that the writ will not issue
where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out
on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record.
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Her proper remedy was to bring the supposed irregularities
attending the conduct of the (preliminary investigation) and
the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention
of the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.
6. TUJAN-MILITANTE vs. CADA-DEAPERA | 210636 | 2014
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a
judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC, may therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which contains the
enumeration of judicial regions in the country, states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are
hereby created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each
of the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities
of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and
the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati,
Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas,
Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela.
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that
the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated
is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within
the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the
family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ
issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the
latter is immaterial in view of the above rule. Pp. 424
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall
be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. Pp. 426
A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable
to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before
the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas
corpus. In the said petition, Raquel demanded the
immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner
Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
Raquel’s biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada, and
to return to her the custody over the child.
Additionally, Raquel indicated that Hazelina has three (3)
known addresses where she can be served with summons
and other court processes, to wit:
(1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches,
Caloocan City;
(2) 118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and
(3) Her office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special
Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial
Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan
Road, Quezon City.
RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering
petitioner to bring the child to court. Despite diligent efforts
and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was
unsuccessful in personally serving petitioner copies of the
habeas corpus petition and of the writ.
Instead, the Sheriff left copies of the court processes at
petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by
respondent’s counsel and barangay officials.
Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings before the RTC-Caloocan. Raquel moved for the ex
parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the
RTC-Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court.
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special
appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed
before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition claiming, among others, that she was not
personally served with summons.
Thus, as argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and
Criselda’sperson was not acquired by the RTC-Caloocan.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE RTC CALOOCAN HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT AND, ASSUMING ARGUENDO IT DOES,
WHETHER OR NOT IT VALIDLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER PETITIONER AND THE PERSON OF CRISELDA?
HELD: YES. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of
the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served with
a copy of the writ in Quezon City. The RTC-Caloocan has
jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding.
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a
judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-
04-SC, may therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs
within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the
family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the
writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or
the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons
was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of
summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus
petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role
somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
7. DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO vs. THE WARDEN | 197597
| 2015
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived
of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person
is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained.
FACTS: From November 7 to December 19, 2009, Datukan
Malang Salibo were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage. When he returned in the Philippines, he learned
that he was being suspected to be Butukan Malang, one of
the accused who allegedly participated in the Maguindanao
Massacre.
Salibo presented himself before the police officers and
explained that he was not Malang. The police assured him
that they would not arrest him, however, he was still
apprehended afterwards. The police tore off two pages of
his passport evidencing his departure for Saudi. He was
detained and transferred to the Quezon City Jail.
Salibo filed before the CA the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty. When the Return was heard,
Assistant Solicitors argued that the petition should be
dismissed because Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest. However, Salibo
countered that the information referred to Malang and not
him.
ISSUE: WHETHER SALIBO’S PROPER REMEDY IS TO FILE A
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS?
HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* The writ of habeas corpus
"was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
Page 14

and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The
remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in
nature, consistent with the law’s "zealous regard for
personal liberty."
The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The nature of the restraint
of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle
a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus.
It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when
there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode. It is true
that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court.
The restraint then has become legal, and the remedy of
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. However,
petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense.
He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of
a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas
Corpus. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest
charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo. Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not
validly arrested without a warrant.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to
arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived
him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for
which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
8. PADILLA vs. CONGRESS OF THE PHIL. | 231671 | 2017
Congress is not mandated to convene in joint session to
deliberate martial law proclamation.
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for Mandamus and
Certiorari under consideration essentially assail the failure
and/or refusal of respondent the Congress, to convene in
joint session and therein deliberate on Proclamation No.
216 issued on May 23, 2017 by President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte.
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Mindanao on the grounds of rebellion
and necessity of public safety pursuant to Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution.
The Senate and the House of Representative independently
deliberated on the proclamation which secured majority
vote. They also deliberated for a joint session of the
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Congress to vote upon the proclamation which was Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio was by virtue of a valid judicial 5.
rejected. process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Issuance
of a Writ of habeas corpus.
6.
Congress asserts firmly that there is no mandatory duty on 7.
their part to "vote jointly," except in cases of revocation or SSgt. Osorio, together with his superior officer, Major
extension of the proclamation of martial law or the General Jovito Palparan was charged in two (2) 8.
9.
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Informations before RTC Malolos City for allegedly
kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E. 10.
11.
The group of petitioners claim that a plain reading of Article Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan. SSgt. Osorio was arrested 12.
VII, Section 18 of the Constitution shows that the Congress by Col. Herbert Yambing, the Provost Marshall General of 13.
is required to convene in joint session to review the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
14.
Proclamation No. 216 and vote as a single deliberative 15.
body. The performance of the constitutional obligation is SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the 16.
17.
allegedly mandatory, not discretionary. CA contending that he was being illegally deprived of his
liberty and mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil 18.
ISSUE: WHETHER IT IS A A MANDATORY DUTY FOR THE court had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering 19.
20.
CONGRESS TO CONVENE JOINTLY UPON THE PRESIDENT'S that he was a soldier on active duty and that the offense
PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW OR THE SUSPENSION charged was allegedly "service-connected.” 21.
22.
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 23.
UNDER ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987 The CA held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by virtue
CONSTITUTION? of a valid judgment or a judicial process.” The crime of 24.
25.
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is punished under 26.
HELD: No, the Congress is not constitutionally mandated to the Revised Penal Code and is not "service-connected."
27.
convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke the Thus, the RTC properly took cognizance of the case and, 28.
President's declaration or suspension. consequently, the warrants of arrest were issued under a 29.
valid judicial process. 30.
31.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 32.
reveal the framers’ specific intentions to: ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS THE 33.
34.
(a) Remove the requirement of prior concurrence of PROPER REMEDY?
the Congress for the effectivity of the President's 35.
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of HELD: No, the petition for habeas corpus is not the proper
36.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and remedy for a person who has been deprived of liberty but 37.
(b) rant to the Congress the discretionary power to thereafter was restrained under a lawful order of the Court. 38.
revoke the President's proclamation and/or 39.
suspension by a vote of at least a majority of its A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
Members, voting jointly. person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a 40.
lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has 41.
As seen in the deliberations the underlying reason for the become legal. Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is 42.
43.
requirement that the two Houses of the Congress will vote rendered moot and academic. 44.
jointly is to avoid the possibility of a deadlock and to 45.
facilitate the process of revocation of the President's In this case, SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the 46.
proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the 47.
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. first of which would be a motion to quash, filed before 48.
49.
arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged 50.
Hence, the plain language of the subject constitutional do not constitute an offense; the court trying the case has 51.
provision does not support the petitioners’ argument that no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer 52.
53.
it is obligatory for the Congress to convene in joint session who filed the information had no authority to do so. SSgt. 54.
following the President's proclamation of martial law Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable
and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas under Article 267 of the RPC. 55.
corpus, under all circumstances. 56.
Applying R.A. No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by 57.
58.
9. OSORIO vs. NAVERA | 223272| 2018 a civil court, specifically by the RTC, which has jurisdiction 59.
over the crime of kidnapping. Therefore, the petition for 60.
A writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued if the person habeas corpus is not the proper remedy anymore. 61.
allegedly Deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful
RECITATION/QUIZZER 62.
process or order of the court. 63.
1. What is a Civil Action? 64.
2. What is a Special Proceeding? 65.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing 3. What is the difference between the two? 66.
the Resolutions of CA. The CA found that custody over Staff 4. Which Court has Jurisdiction?
An estate with the gross value of 500K was filed witht the RTC in Manila.
A creditor opposed the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the
estate has a debt in favor of him in the amount of 300k. Does the RTC
retain jurisdiction?
What is the equivalent of the CFI then?
Supposing that BP 129 was enacted before the Rules of Court, which will
prevail?
Where is the Venue?
What is the meaning of the term “Residence” as contemplated in Estate
proceedings?
San Luis vs San Luis Ruling.
What is the Exclusionary Rule?
What is the Rule on Preference?
Supposing that a Court has no jurisdiction over the case, what will
happen?
Garcia-Belen Ruling.
What is the exclusionary rule if it will not apply?
Exclusionary Rule; is it possible that two Courts will have jurisdiction?
X is a resident of the US and has properties in the Philippines, which Court
has jurisdiction?
How does the Court acquire jurisdiction?
What if a will was discovered after an intestate proceeding?
X and Y are married. X died. Z who has a claim against X, sued Y. Is the
action of Z proper?
What is the extent of the Jurisdiction of a Probate Court?
Agtarap vs Agtarap Ruling.
What are the primary concerns of the Probate Court? Aranas vs Mercado
Ruling.
When is extrajudicial settlement proper; When there is only one heir?
Is a bond always required in Extradudicial Settlement of Estates?
Why does the value of the bond in ESE equivalent only to the personal
properties of the estate?
What is Summary Settlement of Estates of Small Value; Requisites?
What is the purpose of publication?
Extrajudicial Settlement vs Summary Settlement.
Registration date; Reckoning date for prescription?
Reconveyance? – 10 years
Property bought by a buyer in good faith – Value of the property.
Possessor? – Imprescriptible
Not PH resident, minor, etc? – 1 year period after the removal of
disability
Extrinsic validity of wills? Compliance to form, no duress or undure
influence; Forgery?
Why is probate mandatory?
What is the effect of probate?
Unionbank vs Santibanez; No valid partition until the will has been
probated.
If properties has been sold, what is the remedy? – Annul the same. Lee
vs RTC Ruling.
Executor vs Custodian; What is the penalty of the Custodian if he does
not deliver the will?
Who may file for the allowance of the will?
When may a will be probated?
What are the contents of the petition?
What are being refered to as Jurisdictional Facts?
How the probate court acquire jurisdiction? A/D
Is mere delivery of the will sufficient for the Court to act upon the will
despite the lack of petition for its allowance?
What are the duties of the Court after receiving the will?
Who are those required to be notified by the Court?
What is an Administrator?
What is an Executor?
What are required to be validly considered as the same?
Why is it a requirement to be a resident?
Who are not allowed?
Suppose that the person appointed is considered as of legal age in a
foreign country despite being a minor in Philippine law, is the
appointment valid?
What is the drunkenness refered to in the Rules?
What is improvidence?
What is lack of understanding?
What is lack of integritiy?
What is considered as a crime involving moral turpitude?
Letters Testamentary vs Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed
vs Letters of Adminitration
Is the executor of an executor allowed to administer the estate of the
first testator?
Can there be more than one executor?
What is the nature of the bond required?
When is a Special Administrator appointed?
What are the general obligations of the Executor/Adminitrator?
What are the instances that warrants the removal of the Executor?
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