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G.R. No.

80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,


vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed
by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional
rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived
together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,
1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de
facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No.
83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the
applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,
petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for
adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and
William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent
judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua,
her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the
accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-
52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and
for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia.
The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner
being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not
guilty. 14

1
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-
52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions
for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to
move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by
the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that
complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage
by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the
prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant
that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same
requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal
actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the
offended party being merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344
of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of
the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but
ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We
would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal
capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when
precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be
commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with
reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal
action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

2
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields
the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to
institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or
wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here
alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting
and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack
of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated
the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect
once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into
the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since
there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be
made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom
that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is
void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where

3
the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate
of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably
filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of
the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of
the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

4
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as
co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.3

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. 4

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.6

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and
was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo
Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left
blank.9

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s
salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.10

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.11

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. 14

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16

5
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In
the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;

"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente
and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically
my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines
Sur;

"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;

"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not
be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
disposed of by and among themselves;

"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;

"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed,
or published, by me;

"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real
or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.18

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. 19

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. 20

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property
were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.24

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s
petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star". 26

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente
is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January
16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

6
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.

"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As
such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to
the possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and
charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and
just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the
court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

"SO ORDERED."27

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of
the estate.30

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. 31

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as
co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.

"SO ORDERED."32

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. 33

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.35

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, 36 the issue is simple. Who
are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

7
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court
of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law
of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath
it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’
hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. 38

First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a
resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New
York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed
in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal
circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 43 We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.

"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution." (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in
the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
"family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44

8
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. 45

Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated
on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree
of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

9
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van
Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known
as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland
on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem,
who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age. 3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate
Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. 5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son
came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less). 7 However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located
at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to
the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition. 18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the
application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case against
respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to
the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.

10
SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support
their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the
prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is
conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding
that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on
appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case
only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in
when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under
Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability
of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically
in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore,
dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources
of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice
should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

11
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree
with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support. 33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent
is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws
of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of
the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean
that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our
courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law
of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the
second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which
was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to wit:

12
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be
applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his
child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in
consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in,
or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family,
or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.

13
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim
that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations."
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu
City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise
irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts
falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner


vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the
September 18, 2014 Decision 1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012,
affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines
authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and
Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which
captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer
living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage
was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO. 4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the
documents that were offered and admitted were:

15
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine
law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another
country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control
over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this
case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed
abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

16
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It
authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce
case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of
the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the
absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer
married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are
still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their
(the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in
this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of
enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she]
decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her
maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter.
Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only
the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void,

17
but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction
or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to
support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino
is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband ,
who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal
property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the
trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond.
The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former
marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and
given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment
from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese
national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of
his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by

18
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the
ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This
Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree
and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA
for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of
child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation
to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine
law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot
be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a
contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems
it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed
as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v.
COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties
to their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City
Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament
that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must

19
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights
are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The
deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional
limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic
liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political
expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and
calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must
give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially involves a
public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of
the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is
based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign
citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national
who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad
by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of
the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be
recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to
insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the
dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry
foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating
divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to
prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is
disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from
a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting

20
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just
because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are
entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more
often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind
Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce
because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point. 65 Their exchange reveal
as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to the
proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention
is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage
the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of
divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could
grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the
husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. 67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the
approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New
Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional
or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a
spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. 69 From August 30, 1950, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether
here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute
absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and
602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was
submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor,
57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner;

21
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or


abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner;
and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can
petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or
over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents
guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge of
the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such incapacity
continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be
incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after
the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the
other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-
versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

22
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a
law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines
as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry
nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for
country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the
Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and
interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively
promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the
women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No
10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in
Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the
Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full
respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. 81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen
who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or
her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she
would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born
out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a
few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2,
Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed
according to indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost
instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it
is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that
some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

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As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought
to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. 87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. 88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to
recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will
not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing
the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written
act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither
was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as
her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations
are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12,
2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case

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is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese
law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

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