Popper and Van Fraassen On Scientific Realism

To Believe in Belief Popper and Van Fraassen on Scientific Realism
Author(s): Herman C. D. G. de Regt

Source: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine
Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 21-39
Published by: Springer
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TO BELIEVE IN BELIEF
POPPER AND VAN FRAASSEN ON SCIENTIFIC REALISM
HERMAN C.D.G. DE REGT
SUMMARY. Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to
believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the
i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons
underlying,
with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper,
the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism
in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs
concerning unobservables. Popper did not
believe in belief. to Van Fraassen,the empiricist, one may yet have a rational
According
existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief.
In this paper I will
investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper's rejection of
the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen's reformulation of the rationality of belief, points
towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the 'problem of scientific realism'.
Key words: belief, constructive empiricism, pragmatism, scientific realism, Van Fraassen,
Peirce, Popper
1. INTRODUCTION
Take the following

version of scientific realism: we have good reason to
believe of the) current scientific
that (some theories tell us something spe
cific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for
instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there
are viruses that cause certain diseases.
Popper argued in his Realism and theAim of Science (1983) that '[we]
cannot justify our theories, or the belief that they are true; nor can we justify
the belief that they are near to the truth. We can, however, rationally defend
a preference - a very strong one - for a certain theory, in the
sometimes
light of the present results of our discussion' (61). This stance is echoed
throughout Popper's work, for instance in his Objective Knowledge (1972):
'critical discussion can (...) establish sufficient reason for the following
claim: "This theory seems at present, in the light of a thorough critical
discussion and of severe and ingenious testing, by far the best (the strongest,
the best tested); and so it seems the one nearest to the truth among the
competing theories'" (82).
Journal forGeneral Philosophy of Science (2006) 37: 21-39

DOI: 10.1007/sl0838-006-0479-z ? Springer 2006

22 H. C. D. G. DE REGT
However, this is notto say that Popper would adhere to the proposed
formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential
beliefs concerning unobservables. In fact, we know that Popper, like E. M.
Forster, did not believe in belief: 'I am not interested in a philosophy of
belief, and I do not believe that beliefs and their justification, or foundation,
or rationality, are the subject-matter of the theory of knowledge' (1956,22).
In earlier publications (De Regt, 1994b, 1996, 2002a) I have tried to
argue, to the contrary, that the current discussion about scientific realism
between realists and Van Fraassen is indeed about the rationality of belief
(cf. also Van Fraassen, 1985).
According to Van Fraassen's empiricism one may very well have a ratio
nal existential belief
concerning unobservables. This is due to his extremely
liberal notionof rationality of belief (Van Fraassen, 1989). Yet, in other
places Van Fraassen explains he is actually in search for a new epistemology
which rejects the idea of 'having good reasons for belief (1989,170).
In this paper I will
investigate to what extent a reassessment of both
Popper's rejection of the rationality of belief as a proper subject-matter

of epistemology, and Van Fraassen's rejection of traditional epistemology,
may point towards a new, and notably a pragmatist, dissolution of the
problem of scientific realism, formulated in terms of the rationality of

belief. First I will show how close Popper, the critical rationalist, and Van
Fraassen, the constructive empiricist, are to one another in this respect1;
my further aim is to contribute to the further dissolution (not: solution)
of the 'problem of scientific realism' by bringing Peircean pragmatism to
the floor, which may combine the best of both worlds (rationalism and
empiricism), and hopefully only the best.
2. SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND EMPIRICISM
My way of introducing the problem of scientific realism owes a great

deal to Bas Van Fraassen's footnoted remark in his almost 20 year old
essay on empiricism in philosophy of science in which he says that 'it is
philosophers, not scientists (as such), who are realists or empiricists, for
the differences in view is not about what exists but about what science is'
(1985, 255). Although I do not agree with Van Fraassen's interpretation
of science, the statement is an apt formulation of the idea that the issue
over scientific realism is not an ontological one. Since Van Fraassen takes
statements literally (1980,11) which is something realists would normally
accept, neither is the dispute a straightforward semantic issue.
Crucial to the contemporary debate on scientific realism is the as
signed role of empirical evidence in science and the answer the empiri
cist offers to the question of its reach. Sometimes we find empiricism

TO BELIEVEINBELIEF 23
interpreted as the claim that empirical evidence only get you to claim
will
ing that some hypothesis (postulating unobservables) may be empirically

adequate.
Some may interpret empiricism as the stronger claim that we have never
reason enough to even believe that some hypothesis (postulating unobserv
ables) is true. We should always remain agnostic with regard to its truth.
Clearly, whatever the details of the discussion, the issue of scientific realism
has turned into an epistemological dispute.
Although these characterizations of empiricism are of course much too
crude, they did captivate the minds of those who wanted to argue that
science takes us beyond the observable. More to the point, scientific realists
thought they had an argument for this by offering an inference to the best
or (even better) only explanation: only if we suppose that our hypotheses
depict the world truthfully can we understand the empirical success of
science at all. If this isn't reason enough to think that science reaches
beyond the empirical evidence, nothing is.Many of us are familiar with the
extensive discussions on the inference-to-the-only-explanation argument
for scientific realism, and I will not repeat them here.
Many realists must have felt confident that on every possible interpre
tation of science one cannot
escape the implication that we hold rational
beliefs with regard to the unobservables postulated by our most successful
scientific theories about the world. Empiricism was understood as denying
just this. Empiricism was of thinking that it is wholly

accused irrational
to hold an existential belief about some unobservables. Sure, scientists are
excused for their irrational beliefs because they are "immersed in the scien
tific world but if they step back for a moment
picture", and reflect on their
beliefs (become philosophers of science as it were) they would, according
to empiricists, easily admit that their beliefs are not backed up by good
reasons and they would equally easily refrain from belief and confess to
a mea culpa. Scientific realists exposed a strong aversion against blaming
scientists of being irrational in their beliefs. They thought that we have good
reasons, indeed, to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell
us (something specific) about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures
of the world.
However, and to the realist's surprise, Van Fraassen, arguably the most
prominent empiricist philosopher of science of our times, claimed that
empiricism does not imply that to believe in unobservables is (always)
irrational. 'It is not irrational to "go beyond the evidence", and belief in
angels or electrons or the truth of theories in molecular biology does not
ipso facto make one irrational' (Van Fraassen, 1985, 248). Arguing for
permission rather than obligation when concerned with the rationality of
beliefs, the empiricist is able to admit that scientists are not irrational in
believing that unobservables exist. As long as they do not sabotage the

possibilities of vindication of their hypotheses beforehand (by their own

lights) they are not irrational.
We must conclude that the debate over scientific realism has become a
dispute overthe rationality of beliefs (cf. De Regt, 1996; Van Fraassen,
2001, Section 3). In the case of both parties arguing that existential beliefs
concerning unobservables may be rational, it might help to redefine the
respective positions, so as to bring out the difference that remains.
The remaining seems to lie in the fact that to the realist
difference
only epistemic reasons
are good reasons to believe unobservables exist
(epistemic reasons being reasons to think that the hypothesis is true), while
the empiricist seems to claim that all reasons to believe in unobservables
are, in essence and in exactly this sense, (mere) pragmatic reasons (that
is, reasons not concerned with the truth of the hypothesis). So the obvious
critique of the realist then is to accuse the empiricist of thinking that prag
matic reasons can be reason for belief, which is clearly wrong.2 The equally
obvious answer of the empiricist while admitting this, is to claim that 'a
belief held for ulterior motives is still a belief
(Van Fraassen, 2001,167).
In his latest work The Empirical Stance (2002), Van Fraassen argues
just this. He acknowledges the distinction between belief in a wide sense
and belief in the strict sense. Belief in the strict sense is a belief for which
one may ask reasons pertaining to the truth of the hypothesis (reasons that
make the theory more likely to be true). Reasons for belief in the wide sense
include all that may have been reasons/cause why one came to believe the
hypothesis (cf. De Regt, 2002a). Van Fraassen says:
A belief is still a belief if it is held for ulterior motives. But in such a case we have to say
something like: "I realize that this was not a reason for belief; it did not make the matter
anymore likely to be true, but still, that is how or why I came to believe it" (2002, 89).
My point will be that this distinction between belief in the strict sense and
belief in the wide sense makes only sense given a specific idea about the
nature of belief. But before addressing the question of the nature of belief
in Section 5 let me make room for a Popperian view on the current dispute
on realism. Given recent developments in empiricism, we might wonder
how close, prima facie, Van Fraassen's position is to Popper's.
3. THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTIC STANCE
In this section I will not discuss Popper's view on scientific realism as

such but will rather try to see how Popper's critical rationalism might be
of relevance given the shift in the realism debate towards the question of
belief.
Popper's understanding of realism is quite concise: 'realism [is] the
thesis of the reality of the world' (1972, 33). Arguing against idealism

Popper points to the fact that 'my own existence will come to an end
without the world's corning to an end too. This is a common sense view,
and it is the central tenet of what may be termed 'realism' (ibid., 31). Popper
readily admits that realism as such is not a scientific hypothesis. It can't be
falsified.However, it is a thesis that can be argued and 'the weight of the
arguments is overwhelmingly in its favour' (38).
We sometimes tend to forget that Popper in his criticism on logical posi
tivism actually made room again for discussion of metaphysical problems.
In his Conjectures and Refutations (1963) Popper argues that 'if a philo
sophical theory [like realism] were no more than an isolated assertion about
the world(...) then itwould indeed be beyond discussion' (198). He contin
ues to point out that 'every rational theory [like realism] (...) tries to solve
certain problems [and] it can be rationally discussed only by discussing
this relation' (199). As long as realism is (1) not an isolated statement and
as long as realism is (2) a suggested solutionto a specific problem it can
be rationally discussed. In the case of realism the doctrine is intimately
linked, according to Popper, to the world via science, and it offers general
guidance in methodological heuristics:
almost all, if not all, physical, chemical, or biological theories imply realism, in the sense
that if they are true realism must also be true. This is one of the reasons why some people
speak of 'scientific realism'. It is quite a good reason. Because of its apparent lack of
testability, I myself happen to prefer to call realism 'metaphysical' rather then scientific
(...) the whole question of the truth and falsity of our opinions and theories clearly becomes
pointless if there is no reality, only dreams or illusions (1972,40, 42, cf. 290).
Read with a contemporary eye this approach to the problem of scientific

realism shows that what we are looking for in the debate on scientific
realism are indeed the reasons we may cite to believe that our scientific
theories are true. Realism means
nothing over and above the statement that
if we think that our theoriesare true, so is realism.
Is this not a refreshing return to basics? Well, itmight have been if Popper
actually thought we have indeed reasons to believe our scientific theories to
be true. However, as we all know, Popper thought otherwise. Just to remind
ourselves let me briefly Popper's view on reasons for belief.
summarize
Popper distinguished positive reasons (reasons offered with the
between
intention of justifying a theory), and critical reasons (reasons used to defend
our preference for a theory (i.e. our deciding to use it)), and we cannot give
reason for our theories and beliefs - we can give critical reasons
positive
for regarding one theory as preferable to another (1983, 19-20). In his
Conjectures and Refutations he states:
critical discussion can (...) establish sufficient reason for the following claim: "This theory
seems at present, in the light of a thorough critical discussion and of severe and ingenious
testing, by far the best (the strongest, the best tested); and so it seems the one nearest to the
truth among the competing theories" (1972, 82).

This difference between the justification of our belief that a theory is true
or near to the truth and the rational defence of our preference for a theory
is, of course essential to Popper's view on science (1983, 61). In the light
of our discussion of the present clash between empiricism and scientific
realism it is the distinction between belief and preference that we are most
interested in. Recall that my
expose of the issue of scientific realism ended
in claiming that we are mainly concerned with the rationality of belief. Here
is Popper, the scientific realist, explicitly stating that he is 'not interested
a
in philosophy of belief, that he does not 'believe that beliefs and their
justification, or foundation, or rationality, are the subject-matter of the
theory of knowledge' (1983, 22). Even if one would argue that saying
that we have reasons to prefer one theory over another is just another way
of saying that we have reasons to believe one theory rather than another,
Popper sharply replies that he never quarrels over words (23, cf. 1972,18).
See where we have arrived: Popper seems to claim that there is belief
"in the wide sense" and belief "in the strict sense". We never have reasons
that make a theory more likely to be true, so we never believe in a strict
sense that a theory is true. However a belief is still a belief even if it is held
for ulterior motives, but in such a case we have to say something like: "I
realize that this was not a reason
for belief; it did not make the matter any
more likely to be true, but still, that is how or why I came to believe it".
Popper would then welcome us to the realm of rational discussion and we
would presumably come to rational preferences for theories.
I used Van Fraassen's quotes to illustrate
that Popper's critical rational
ism and constructive empiricism are actually quite close to one another, or
so it seems. Both Van Fraassen and Popper think that our best theories may
be true but that we will never know whether they are in fact true; both think
that one may believe a theory to be true (or closer to the truth), yet only in
a wide sense of believing, not in a strict sense. But more importantly, we
would nowadays not call their position a scientific realist position. Before
we probe further into their ideas of the nature of belief (Sections 5 and
6), let me first offer a feedback of all this to the present-day problem of
scientific realism.
4. THE SPIRIT OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM
Remember what a scientific realist would like to claim:
SR = we have good reasons to believe that (some of the) current scientific

theories tell us (something specific) about the underlying, i.e. unobservable,
structures of the world.
Weak as this thesis is, it was long held to be unacceptable to the empiri
cist. But now we face an empiricist attitude according to which (roughly3)

one is free to believe

any scientific theory to be true, except when the
theory is excluded
by the empirical data. Moreover, this seems compat
ible with Popper's critical rationalist view. Not quarrelling about words,
Popper would accept that one is indeed free to believe anything that is
not refuted by the (accepted) empirical data. However, the critical ratio
nalist would add that, since rationality is synonymous with critical dis
cussion, the belief must also be admitted by the current state of critical
discussion. His scientific realism would in present-day terms sound like
this:
= we have found some critical reasons to believe some

SRcr specific
theory over its rivals, even where we are concerned with the underlying,
i.e. unobservable, structures of the world.
Van Fraassen seems to propose a more radical attitude, at least in this

respect: even given the current discussion one is free to believe anything
that is not refuted by accepted empirical data.4 Scientific realism may be
"reformulated" in such a way that it becomes almost acceptable even to the
empiricist:
= we art
SRemp free to believe any empirically acceptable scientific theory
which postulates unobservables.
I hope that itmay be clear that, using the terms of the present debate, both
Popper and Van Fraassen would accept the most general claim that it is
rational to think that (for instance) viruses exist. Both would also defend
the more stringent claim that it is rational to believe that (for instance)
viruses exist. Van Fraassen suggest that we take belief here in the
would
wide sense, Popper would suggest it's ok as long as we dont quarrel
over words. However I also hope it is equally clear that even these weak
"reformulations" of SR are indeed too weak to count as scientific realist
doctrines today.
In order to show what is at stake we may bring in the problem of under
determination (for which I will not argue here (cf. De Regt, 1994b, ch. 3).
Suppose we accept the idea that for any hypothesis (postulating unobserv
ables) there is in principle an infinite number of empirically equivalent but
ontologically incompatible alternatives. Suppose this argument is part and
parcel of current critical discussion (which it is not, I presume5). In that
case both the empiricist and the critical rationalist would argue that, given
the virus theory and its empirical success, whatever the empirical evidence,
as long as it does not contradict the virus theory, it is always rational to
believe that there are no viruses.6
The realist must, tomy mind, point out that this latter statement is against
the very spirit of scientific realism. It is in the spirit of scientific realism
to hold that, in science, it is (now) simply irrational to not believe in the

existence of viruses! So here is my suggested redefinition of scientific

realism (cf.Miller, 1987; De Regt, 1996, 2002a):
SR = given scientific inquiry, it is irrational to not believe what (some of
the)7 current scientific theories tell us about the underlying, i.e. unobserv
able, structures of the world.
To see whether this thesis of scientific realism clashes with empiricism

and rationalism where itmatters we must say more about the nature and
rationality of belief in Sections 5 and 6.
5. thoughts: opinions and beliefs
In an earlier attempt to clarify the contemporary discussion on scien

tific realism I tried to make a distinction betweenopinions and beliefs
(De Regt, 2002a). In fact it is the same distinction Van Fraassen seems to
have in mind. When we distinguish between two kinds of questions, we
must distinguish between (at least) two kinds of thoughts.
Ifwe ask someone how he came to think that viruses exist we are satisfied
with the answer that he
(for instance) read about Andrewes, Smith, and
Laidlaw isolating the first human influenza virus in 1933, or that he read a
children's encyclopedia at primary school, or that he spoke to his parents
and high-school teachers who told him that there are viruses, or that he
recently saw a fascinating Discovery Channel program about viruses, etc.

We tend to count such a thought as a mere opinion bestowed upon someone
by a complex social learning process.
But when we ask the same person
why he thinks everyone ought to
think that there are viruses, we ask for evidence that would drive anyone
- as -
(ultimately) to the same conclusion (viz. that far as we now know
viruses exist). This means entering the ongoing critical discussion on the
status of viruses - but not in terms of mere Popperian preferences. In this
case we ask for reasons of belief.
What is that there are different reasons on the basis of which one
Imean
judges some thought to be a rational opinion or a rational belief. Opinions
we could characterize as historically (ir)rational thoughts: we understand
(or fail to understand) why someone came to think that viruses exist. Beliefs
we could characterize as systematically (ir)rational thoughts: we under
stand (or fail to understand) that anyone presented with the same evidence
ought to think that viruses exist.
On this reconstruction empiricism implies that scientists (grosso modo
and normally) entertain historically rational thoughts, yet most of the time
these are systematically irrational thoughts (in the case of postulating un
observables). Empiricists may see a task for themselves here: to educate

scientists. Critical rationalism seems to imply the same if we accept that the

underdetermination argument is part of the current discussion: there is no

reason why one ought to think that viruses exist, although we may under
stand how (a personal) history led to thinking viruses exist. The scientific
realist challenge, then, is to argue that the thought scientists entertain about
the existence of viruses (namely that they exist) is a systematically rational
thought, i.e. a rational belief.

But what is a belief? Is a belief itself of such a nature that one can
intelligibly ask what one ought to believe? What if having a believe is

rather a question of fact? If as a matter of fact I believe it to be true that
p, is it then appropriate for someone to point out to me what I ought to
believe? I think that the empiricist and rationalist both offer a notion of
belief it very difficult
that makes to the realist to maintain that scientists
entertain beliefs one ought to have, given the accepted empirical data. So
let us now see what they say about the nature of belief.
6. belief: what is it?
My suggestion is that both Popper and Van Fraassen accept a notion of

belief according to which having a belief (amongst other things) is basi
cally a matter of fact. As I will point out, this has consequences for the
contemporary debate on scientific realism.
6.1. Popper on Belief
If my intuition about belief in the preceding section is correct, having a

belief is foremost to entertain a certain subjective thought for reasons the
person thinks should drive anyone to his thought. Nevertheless, a belief in
this sense is a subjective thought. But if it is a subjective thought (not yet
part of the realm of objective thought), a Popperian will argue, it belongs
to world 2.
The present discussion of scientific realism in terms of the rationality
of belief is, therefore, from a Popperian perspective, part of traditional
epistemology 'with its concentration on the second world, or on knowledge
in the subjective sense', and this kind of epistemology 'is irrelevant to the
study of scientific knowledge' tout court (1972, 111, 122).Having a belief
in this sense (as scientist, philosopher or layman) is simply amatter of fact!
To believe something is to think it is true that p. To the extent that this is a
subjective state (and not yet a critically discussed linguistic expression of
a hypothesis about the world) it is a matter of 'certain inborn dispositions
to act, and of their acquired modifications'8 (121).
If having a belief is a matter of fact, what must we understand by the
'rationality of belief? Popper addresses this question (again) in the first
volume of his Postscript (1983, 58-59). Is it rational to believe in the

Copernican model of the solar system? This is transformed into the question
what our reasons are for believing in the truthlikeness of the theory:
they consist in the story of the critical discussion (...) which ultimately persuaded everybody
that a great step had been made towards the truth (1983, 59)
But here Popper talks of belief as it is already (capable of) being criti
cized, that is, as already part of world 3 of objective thought. Belief is
already taken to be more than just a subjective thought. That is why Popper
concludes:
This persuasion, this belief, this preference, is reasonable because it is based upon the result
of the present state of the critical discussion; and a preference for a theory may be called
'reasonable' if it is arguable, and if it withstands searching critical argument. (59)
This is, of course, a familiar statement of critical rationalism.

In conclusion, having a belief, belief as belonging to world 2, is just
a matter of fact. It is just a subjective thought and to demand of it to be
rational is an ill-posed demand. Reasonable or rational belief can only be
interpreted as a reasonable preference for a theory, as an objective thought,

as belonging to world 3.
This Popperian notion of belief and having a belief has (at least) two
consequences:
(1) it places the present-day discussion on scientific

clearly into realism
the domain of 'belief philosophy' so that
or traditional
philosophy,9
on a Popperian account the debate is crucially ill-conceived; and
as the 'only sensible hypothesis - as
(2) (scientific) realism is accepted
a conjecture to which no sensible alternative has ever been offered'
(1972,42, my italics, cf. also 1963, ch. 3).
I would like to object to both (1) and (2). I will play the empiricist card
against (2) and the pragmatist card against (1) and empiricism.
6.2. Van Fraassen on Belief
The point of the present debate on the status of scientific

of departure
knowledge is (as I see
it) fixed by Van Fraassen's empiricist critique on
realism as the allegedly sole candidate for an explanation of the empirical
success of science (Van Fraassen, 1980). It is his claim that empiricism can
also explain the empirical success of science (Van Fraassen, 1980, ch. 4,
De Regt, 1994b, ch. 4, Van Fraassen, 2001, Section 2). And this instigated
a renewed and fierce discussion on realism in the last couple of decades of
the 20th century.
Because of the fact that empiricism explains the empirical success of
science, realists sought refuge in the claim that only according to realism
is it rational to believe what scientists tell us about the unobservable world.

to believe in belief 31
Since we want to save the rationality beliefs, we ought to

of scientific
be realists. Yet empiricism that it may be rational to believe
also claims
what scientists tell us, even when they talk about unobservables. And so we
plunged ourselves into a debate on the rationality of belief!10 The Popperian
thing to do, I reckon, is to acknowledge that the critical discussion on the
interpretation of science is, at this very moment, undecided (statement

(2) needs further criticizing). But does this mean that, according to the
empiricist, we are back into anti-Popperian 'belief philosophy'? Well, that

depends on the empiricist's notion of belief.
To Van Fraassen, as far as I can see, having a belief is indeed, as Popper
held, nothing but a matter of fact:
the very point of belief is to have something, some picture of what are like, of which
things
we can say: that is how I think it is, period (Van Fraassen, 2002, 89).
To have a belief
is to think of a (partial) model of the world that it is true
(or: to believe that p means that one thinks that the world is such that p
is true). How one acquired the belief is quite irrelevant; to have it is what
counts. What distinguishes a belief from mere acceptance is the attitude
we have towards what we think11:
The distinction between what a person believes and what s/he merely accepts is not made
on the basis of why s/he has that attitude, but only on the basis of what that attitude is (Van
Fraassen, 2001, 167).
If having a belief is just a matter of fact, a state one finds oneself to be

in, what can we say about the rationality of belief within empiricism? The
important thing to emphasize here is that in epistemology, according to
empiricism, we are concerned with belief revision (Van Fraassen, 1985).
Rationality has therefore to do with the way in which we revise our beliefs
if need be. As long as we do not manoeuvre ourselves wilfully into a "sure
loss" situation (for instance Dutch Book situations), and as long as we do
not wilfully contradict ourselves in a more direct way by claiming that we
hold beliefs for reasons that do not make what we believe more likely to
be true, we are free to revise our beliefs as we wish.
Thus, empiricism wants to keep away from 'belief philosophy' by argu
ing that belief is in an important sense simply amatter of fact and that belief
revision has nothing to do with good reasons for belief. But the distinction
between belief in the strict sense and belief in the wide sense shows the
empiricist's true colours.
To ask of belief in the wide sense whether it is rational is to a large
extent nonsensical.
Having a belief in the wide sense is simply a matter
of fact. Rationality of belief in the wide sense refers to our understanding
of (or failure to understand) the process which led to the beliefformation.
On Van Fraassen's account, belief in the strict sense has everything to do

with offering reasons for belief, although we may think differently about
what reasons may account for what beliefs on which grounds. It is here that
we pose the question of the rationality of belief. Here is where empiricists
and realists quarrel. Here is where scientific realists want to argue that
it is (sometimes) irrational to not believe in science; here is where the
empiricist argues that the constraints of coherence are actually amazingly
weak. However, this is also the point where we hear an echo of Musgrave's
critique (1988, 249): are already a realist you will now, given the
if you
present empirical evidence, judge it irrational to not believe in viruses,
yet if you are already an empiricist you will always judge it rational (for
yourself) to not believe in viruses.12
The realist cannot compel the empiricist to believe in viruses. The reason
is that the empiricist accepts the argument from underdetermination13 (in
other words, the real problem for realism is underdetermination). That is
why I would like to suggest the pragmatist stance in the closing section:
pragmatism may be interpreted as one long argument against underdeter
mination. But let me first summarize the consequences of all this for the
present debate on scientific realism in terms of the rationality of belief.
My conclusions are, of course, very tentative but I would nevertheless
like to suggest that:
(1) in contrast to Popper, belief is a crucial concept in the discussion on

scientific realism; it needs further elucidation since it is the nature
of belief that determines whether itmakes sense to speak of reasons
for beliefand belief revision, and of rationality of belief and belief
revision, including scientific beliefs and revision of scientific beliefs;
(2) only if scientific realism is described as the rather strong thesis that,
accepting all currently available results of scientific inquiry, it is irra
tional to not believe in the presently sole survivors of science, does it
contrast with Van Fraassen's well-developed empiricism (for instance,
it is now irrational to not believe in the existence of viruses); and
(3) the problem of underdetermination is the only problem for scientific
realism.
In the last section Iwill only sketch the underestimated classical pragmatist
stance, which may offer comfort to the scientific realist, as it is in fact one
long argument against underdetermination.
7. THE PRAGMATIST STANCE
When I speak of pragmatism Imean to refer to the work of Peirce, rather

than the work of James or Dewey. Recently Rorty picked up especially
on Dewey's pragmatism (1980,1991), and Putnam focused on the work of

James, more specifically his natural realism in his Threefold Cord (1999)14.
Here is not the place to argue in detail how a reevaluation of Peirce's original
depiction of pragmatism might shed some light on the obscure discussion
of realism in philosophy of science (cf. De Regt, 1999, 2002a,b), so Iwill
only offer a broad outline of the argument.

A pragmatic dissolution (not solution) of the problem of scientific real
ism uses the pragmatic maxim15 and the doubt/inquiry notion of belief to
come to a clarification of the status of scientific knowledge. In brief, the
(admittedly elliptical) argument runs as follows:
(a) humans are such that the irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain
a state of belief
(b) the object of any inquiry is the fixation of our beliefs
(c) belief involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action
(Peirce, 1878,129)
(d) application of the pragmatic maxim shows that 'the opinion which
is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real'
(Peirce, 1878,139)16
(e) therefore we will (naturally) fail to understand anyone who, accepting
all presently available scientific data, acts against an established rule
of action in the community of investigators, except those who accept
the argument from underdetermination
(f) given the pragmatic maxim, the concept of underdetermination (in the
sense that itmust be understood by the empiricist) is radically unclear
(g) therefore we will (naturally) fail to understand anyone who, accepting
all presently available scientific data, acts against an established rule
of action in the community of investigators.
A couple of remarks are needed

to bring out the underlying idea of this
sketchy argument. First of all Peirce endorses the idea, defended by many,
that to have a belief is to have a disposition to feel or act.17 However,
Peirce is more radical. In his many attempts to elucidate the concept of
pragmatism he states:
WTiat the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say, here is a definition and
it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended conception because there is
no practical difference. But what is to prevent his opponent from that there is a
replying
practical difference which consists in his recognizing one as his conception and not the
other, that is, one is expressible in a way in which the other is not expressible? Pragmatism
is completely volatilized if you admit that sort of practicality. (1903, 141)
I interpret Peirce's point of view as stating that belief is a disposition to act

rather than a disposition to feel. Of course, dispositions to act are accom
panied by many feelings but a mere feeling does not constitute a practical

difference. maxim
Peirce's is a suggestion how we may clarify the con
cepts we use and we have learned that the scientific method helps clarifying
our concepts most efficiently. The result is the fixation of belief, i.e. the
establishment of rules of actions or habits. This method of science, it is apt
to notice, is very generally stated as the postulation of an external perma
nency. In Peirce's anthropology we are craving for the elimination of the
contingency of our opinions, and this postulate is extremely instrumental
in fulfilling that desire.18
Given this sketch of pragmatism, are the implications
what for the dis
cussion of scientific realism, belief, and the rationality of belief? According
to the pragmatist anthropology we have many beliefs, namely in all those
cases we do not manifest a living doubt about the world. To say of beliefs
that they are rational is a bit awkward to say the least. If we understand the
rationality of belief in terms of good reasons for belief what good reasons
can there be to be in a state as amatter of fact? We do not have good reasons
for our beliefs except that our social learning has led us to act in certain
ways in certain circumstances, and away from irritating states of doubt. We
might want to recall Peirce's remark (1877, 111) that 'each chief step in
science has been a lesson in logic' (as reasoning).
This is not to say that there is no room for reasons in pragmatism. In
case of a living doubt reasons do matter. Reasons play a role in the process
of fixing our beliefs, to come to a state of thought at rest. However, the
reasons that may play this role will have to be concerned with explicating
practical differences between hypotheses (the concept of 'a reason' must

of course also be made as clear as possible using the pragmatic maxim).
So rationality of belief might refer to nothing over and above our under
standing or lack of understanding why someone acts the way he or she acts.
Let us now, by way of conclusion, return to our example of our belief in
viruses.
8. CONCLUSION
What does itmean

to have the belief that viruses exist? It means that we
have acquired a disposition to act in a certain way in certain circumstances
(we have acquired a habit). We might want to avoid contact with those who
have the flu, we claim that viruses are the cause of several diseases and we
prepare medicines and probe the world for viruses.
If someone, familiar with and accepting all the results of our inquiry,
would act a
in such way that it violates an established rule of action in the
community of investigators, we would classify his behaviour as unreason

able. That is, to not think, under these conditions, that viruses exist is taken
to be unreasonable.

Suppose next that there actually is someone who, familiar with and ac
cepting all the results of our inquiry, would act in such a way that it violates
an established rule of action in the community of investigators. How would
such a person get us in a state of irritating doubt? At this moment, not hav
ing available an alternative hypothesis to explain flu phenomena, there is
but one possibility: to try to convince us of the argument of underdetermi
nation. The pragmatic point is that it is not clear to us at all (although it
may feel to some) what we could possibly mean by underdetermination in
this sense (cf. Quine, 1975).
I accept Van Fraassen's distinction between observables and unobserv
ables19, and I accept that there is an epistemic relevance to the distinction.
But Popper, not surprisingly20, is much closer to the Peircean pragmatic
treatment of the problem of scientific realism I suggest. Yet, Popper's crit
ical rationalism is unacceptable to the extent that he seems to hold mean
ingfully that we will never, not even if all the information is in, know the
truth.21 My stance would be: let's just wait and see what happens in the
history of our inquiries and meanwhile debunk the argument from under
determination by arguing from the pragmatic maxim and the doubt/inquiry
model of belief.
I know that this means that I put my money on the Enlightenment, the
scientific method, and on modernity.22 John Searle rhetorically said in a
lecture on the future of philosophy: "We do not live in a post-modernist
era, we live in a post-sceptical era: modernity is just starting up!". Charles
S. Peirce, at the end of the 19th century, would, in this context and more
humanely, repeat his adagium (1868, 29): 'Let us not pretend to doubt in
philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts'.
Notes
1
Of course there are many differences between critical rationalism and constructive
empiricism. These differences (like their interpretations of probability, of quantum

mechanics, and their account of explanation for instance) stem from the obvious fact
that Popper tried to defend a scientific realistic stance whereas Van Fraassen defends
an anti-scientific realistic stance. What interests me is the very fact that, as I will show,
both accept the idea that it is (sometimes) 'rational to believe' that unobservables exist,
that this is prima facie the right way to formulate the scientific realist stance the
(given
discussion that followed Van Fraassen's The Scientific Image), but that Popper glosses
'reasons to believe' in a different way the present-day scientific realist would do, while
Van - a
Fraassen introduces his voluntarist notion of
rationality notion present-day
scientific realists would not accept. The result
is paradoxical: both Popper and Van
Fraassen turn out to be scientific realists (they both think it is rational to believe certain
unobservables exist), yet neither of them resonate with scientific realism ('sometimes
we have epistemic reasons to believe unobservables exist')! Below I'd like to clear up
the confusion, without introducing new ones.

2In his (2000) Van Fraassen thinks that I tried to argue that 'besides coherence, ratio
nality requires that we have pragmatic reasons for belief (277), but I did not. What
I tried to point out inmy (1996) is that to believe that p means to think that p is true
and that this forces one to offer reasons that bear on the truth of p whenever one is
being asked why one believes that p. Later I tried to distinguish between opinions and
beliefs (asmodes of thought) (2002a) which suggests the same sort of distinction Van
Fraassen has in mind when he speaks of belief in the wide sense and belief in the strict
sense (Van Fraassen, 2001, 2002).
3We need the further assumption that there is no self-sabotage (cf. Van Fraassen, 1989,
2000, 2001).
4I already assume that we do not sabotage ourselves (by our own lights).
5
That is why Popperians may not be worried too much.
6
Again: assuming that we do not sabotage ourselves.
7Namely those that currently have no competitors and satisfy scientists.
8Popper:' it isquestionable whether theword 'belief is used by philosophers todescribe

psychological states in this sense as expectations].
[viz. It seems that they more often
use it to denote not momentary states
but what may be called 'settled' beliefs, including
those countless unconscious expectations which make up our horizon of expectations.
It is a far cry from these to formulated hypotheses, and therefore also to statements
of the form T believe that ...'. Now almost all such formulated statements can be
considered critically (1972, 25-26).
Copper: 'Iused to take pride in the fact that I am not a belief philosopher: I am primarily
interested in ideas, in theories, and I find it comparatively unimportant whether or not
anybody 'believes' in them. And I suspect that the interest of philosophers in belief
results from that mistaken which I call 'inductivism'. They are theorists of
philosophy
knowledge, and starting from subjective experiences they fail to distinguish between
and This leads them to believe in belief as the genus
objective subjective knowledge.
of which knowledge is a species (.. .) This is why, like E.M. Forster, I do not believe
in belief.'(1972, 25).
10The current discussion on structural realism (as a specific form of scientific realism)
doesn't change the issue.
II
Van Fraassen: 'A typical object of [epistemic or at least doxastic] attitudes is a
or a set of propositions, or more generally a body of putative information
proposition,
about what the world is like, what the facts are' (1989, 190).
12Notice that an empiricist may accept the rationality of the realist's beliefs (if coherence
conditions are being satisfied), but that a realist does not have the resources to judge
empiricist beliefs in the strict sense as being rational. I accept this asymmetry but do
not consider it to be an argument for empiricism.
13Either as a technical argument or as the more informal and familiar as //"argument.
14
But also on Dewey (Putnam, 2001, 2002) and Peirce (Putnam and Ketner's intro
duction toReasoning and theLogic of Things (1992)).
15
My reformulation: 'concepts can only be clear to us to the extent that they refer to
some context of action'. This may relate pragmatism to Hacking's entity realism, but
see my (1994a) for a criticism on Hacking's entity realism.
16In L.ScD. Popper rejects those who define 'true' as 'useful' or else as
pragmatists
'successful' or 'confirmed' or 'corroborated' (1959, 276). Peirce is not one of those
pragmatists, but I will leave that issue aside here, although it is a widespread belief
that Peirce does not offer a timeless concept of truth.
17For instance Russell
(1948, 161-164), Ryle (1949, 129), Cohen (1992, 4), Baker
(1995, 154, 171) and more recently Schwitzgebel (2002, 253).

18
It is therefore method that has priority, not content, and this has implications for the
image of science as I discussed inmy 2002b.

19See Muller
(2004, 2005) for a recent clarification of the notion of observability in
the debate on realism.
20
See Popper's reference to Peirce in the preface to his L.ScD. (1959, 22). Yet, his
aversion to subjective belief distinguishes his rationalism from Peirce's pragmatism.
See also Gadenne (1998) for the pragmatic turn in relation to critical rationalism.
Wendel (1998) comes
very close to Peirce's which I conjecture can be
pragmatism
usedto classify underdetermination as an inconceivable option, but in the end he
says: '1st Ubereinstimmung in der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft erreicht, so konnen

wir mit Peirce sagen: "wird die Frage nach der Gewifiheit uberflussig, denn es bleibt
niemand iibrig, der sie in Zweifel zieht." Suchen wir daher, was wir nicht mehr ernsthaft
bezweifeln konnen, was nicht heiBt, dass es damit nicht mehr bezweifelbar ware'
(159). Yet, the Peircean concept of truth points toward an (ideal) situation in which the
community of scientists can't even imagine to doubt certain "conjectures" (cf. Peirce's
distinction between paper doubt and living doubt).
21
In an important footnote Popper states: 'It cannot be too strongly emphasized that
Tarski's idea of truth (for whose definition with respect to formalized languages Tarski
gave amethod) is the same ideawhich Aristotle had inmind and indeedmost people
(except pragmatists): the idea that truth is correspondence with the facts (or with
reality). But what can we possibly mean if we say of a statement that it corresponds
with the facts (or with reality)? Once we realize that this correspondence cannot be one
of structural similarity, the task of elucidating this correspondence seems hopeless;'
(1959, 274). My interpretation of the concept of truth as given by Peirce does not
contradict anything in this statement by Popper.
22Cf. Putnam's Spinoza Lecture I, 'The Three Enlightenments' (Putnam, 2001).
References
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159.
Faculty of Philosophy
Tilburg University
5000 LE Tilburg
The Netherlands
(herman.deregt@ uvt.nl)


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To Believe in Belief Popper and Van Fraassen on Scientific Realism

Author(s): Herman C. D. G. de Regt

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HERMAN C.D.G. DE REGT

Take the following

competing theories'" (82).

Journal forGeneral Philosophy of Science (2006) 37: 21-39

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Popper's rejection of the rationality of belief as a proper subject-matter

problem of scientific realism, formulated in terms of the rationality of

empiricism), and hopefully only the best.

2. SCIENTIFIC REALISM AND EMPIRICISM

My way of introducing the problem of scientific realism owes a great

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ing that some hypothesis (postulating unobservables) may be empirically

just this. Empiricism was of thinking that it is wholly

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possibilities of vindication of their hypotheses beforehand (by their own

3. THE CRITICAL RATIONALISTIC STANCE

In this section I will not discuss Popper's view on scientific realism as

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Read with a contemporary eye this approach to the problem of scientific

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4. THE SPIRIT OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM

Remember what a scientific realist would like to claim:

SR = we have good reasons to believe that (some of the) current scientific

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one is free to believe

= we have found some critical reasons to believe some

Van Fraassen seems to propose a more radical attitude, at least in this

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existence of viruses! So here is my suggested redefinition of scientific

To see whether this thesis of scientific realism clashes with empiricism

5. thoughts: opinions and beliefs

In an earlier attempt to clarify the contemporary discussion on scien

recently saw a fascinating Discovery Channel program about viruses, etc.

observables). Empiricists may see a task for themselves here: to educate

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underdetermination argument is part of the current discussion: there is no

thought, i.e. a rational belief.

intelligibly ask what one ought to believe? What if having a believe is

6. belief: what is it?

My suggestion is that both Popper and Van Fraassen accept a notion of

6.1. Popper on Belief

If my intuition about belief in the preceding section is correct, having a

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This is, of course, a familiar statement of critical rationalism.

interpreted as a reasonable preference for a theory, as an objective thought,

(1) it places the present-day discussion on scientific

6.2. Van Fraassen on Belief

The point of the present debate on the status of scientific

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Since we want to save the rationality beliefs, we ought to

interpretation of science is, at this very moment, undecided (statement

empiricist, we are back into anti-Popperian 'belief philosophy'? Well, that

If having a belief is just a matter of fact, a state one finds oneself to be

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(1) in contrast to Popper, belief is a crucial concept in the discussion on

7. THE PRAGMATIST STANCE

When I speak of pragmatism Imean to refer to the work of Peirce, rather

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only offer a broad outline of the argument.

A couple of remarks are needed