POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

GENERAL [PLENARY] LEGISLATIVE POWER

A. Nature

David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a
repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987
Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s
"balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are
dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each
is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times
of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon
the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power,
using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our
Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the
basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges
him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, 2 April
2009

With the issuance of the aforesaid Executive Order, the CHED now is the agency that
is mandated to regulate the establishment and operation of all review centers as
provided for under Section 4 of the Executive Order which provides that "No review
center or similar entities shall be established and/or operate review classes
without the favorable expressed indorsement of the CHED and without the
issuance of the necessary permits or authorizations to conduct review classes. x
xx

To exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of

CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.
566.

ISSUES

1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative

power as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power
Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided
for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not
delegated by the President in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO 292 speaks of other powers vested in the President
under the law.30 The exercise of the President’s residual powers under this provision
requires legislation,31 as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the President’s
other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law." There is no law
granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President may
not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her
such power.

The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them,32 and this power is vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states:

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has
lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern
or common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The
executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.

Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise
of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the

promulgation of rules and regulations. 36 The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power
within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher education nor institutions offering
degree-granting programs

Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, 22 October 1963

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of
the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the
respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that
there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the
Army — not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication
that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to
disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.

And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly
admit — Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the
benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the
people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.

It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws
permit importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be
complied with.

B. Substantive Limitations
 Express Limitations
Bill of Rights
Appropriations
Taxation
Constitutional Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
Non-grant of title of royalty or nobility
C. Legislative Process
General Rule: Non delegation

JAWORSKI

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT PAGCOR IS AUTHORIZED UNDER P.D. NO. 1869 TO

OPERATE GAMBLING ACTIVITIES ON THE INTERNET;

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET
GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING
CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869;

III. WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED AUTHORITY TO SAGE TO OPERATE GAMBLING
ACTIVITIES IN THE INTERNET.

The above-mentioned issues may be summarized into a single pivotal question: Does
PAGCOR’s legislative franchise include the right to vest another entity, SAGE in this case,
with the authority to operate Internet gambling? Otherwise put, does Presidential Decree
No. 1869 authorize PAGCOR to contract any part of its franchise to SAGE by authorizing the
latter to operate Internet gambling.

A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a

privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be
reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on
them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the
grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it
may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the
service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise
are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language

In the case at bar, PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE whereby the former grants
the latter the authority to operate and maintain sports betting stations and Internet gaming
operations. In essence, the grant of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively
participate, partake and share PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant
of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the
grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and whimsically but must
abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and conditionalities.
A corporation as a creature of the State is presumed to exist for the common good. Hence,
the special privileges and franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the State and the
limitations of its charter. There is therefore a reserved right of the State to inquire how
these privileges had been employed, and whether they have been abused.

By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on"
PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.

Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995.

the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it
may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-
alai in the City of Manila."

Jesus Garcia v. Hon. Ray Alan Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as
may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials
to issue protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is
issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of
the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an
ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of
the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay
or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator
to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay." 114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into
the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what
his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do
not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and
impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by
barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Permissible delegation

 Tariff Powers to the President

Article 6, Section 28 (2), 1987 Constitution
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 100883, 2 December 1991.
We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is duty bound to comply
with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below
those mandated by E.O. No. 1088. Finally, the PPA cannot refuse to implement E.O. No. 1088
or alter it as it did in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 43-86. Much less could the
PPA abrogate the rates fixed and leave the fixing of rates for pilotage service to the
contracting parties as it did through A. O. No. 02-88, §3. Theretofore the policy was one of
governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By leaving the matter to the
determination of the parties, the PPA jettisoned this policy and changed it to laissez-faire,
something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with lawmaking authority, could
do.

 Emergency Powers to the President

 Delegation to the People
 Delegation to Local Government Units
 Delegation to Administrative Bodies or Power of Subordinate Legislation

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA, G.R. No.

114714, 21 April 1995.

The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major

powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative
power because of the many instances when delegation is permitted. The occasions
are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative power, however, such occasions
have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-
delegation the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who
are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, G.R. No. 115381, 23

December 1994

Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in

order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for
governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws.
Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of
determining sensitive and delicate matters as
route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory
body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an
administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have
time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of
law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that
power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.

In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal
and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative
authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be
delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening
mind of another.10 A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a
negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to
discharge it directly.11 The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change
and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an
anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport
operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year,
whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.
Pelaez v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825, 24 December 1965.

Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the
present action is premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the
new political subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of
several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders —
because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political
subdivisions — intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.

Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be
created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction
of the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's
argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new
barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be
denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such
manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been brought to our
attention.

The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.

Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying
upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binanñ gonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior
to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of
Binanñ gonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.

It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly
a legislative function"
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete
in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect,
make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with
the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:

... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public
welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted,
but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact
becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of
Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General
the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated
therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to
such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act
No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code —
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred
could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section
referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.

TEST FOR VALID DELEGATION

COMPLETENESS TEST

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. L-17122, 27 February 1922.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is
pointed out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it
may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event,
or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to
delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.

Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating the execution of laws to the
executive and other administrative agencies. Two tests have been developed to determine
whether the delegation of the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the
power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA,22 thus:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.

SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST

Chionbian v. Orbos, G.R. No. 96754, 22 June 1995

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress
has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of
the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the
subject expressed in the title of the law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply
be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 1

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be
found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power
to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals
for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business." 12 Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions
were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing
the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of
the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.

Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 124360 and

127867, 5 November 1997 and 3 December 1997.

Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt of petitioners to strike down section 15
on the ground of undue delegation of legislative power cannot prosper. Section 15 can
hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full
deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President — he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude
oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate
of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, 17 July 2007.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers
is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas
delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based
on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to
be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle.48 Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if
the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the regulation be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These
requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves
the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot

The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards.

The ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal
Charge. Sec. 51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA50 clearly provides:

SECTION 51. Powers. — The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for
the attainment of its objective, have the following powers:

xxxx

(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of
NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the determination of the universal
charge;

(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales
and other property contributed to it, including the proceeds from the universal
charge.

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" 51 "adequate and efficient instruction;"52 "public
interest;"53 "justice and equity;"54 "public convenience and welfare;"55 "simplicity, economy
and efficiency;"56 "standardization and regulation of medical education;" 57 and "fair and
equitable employment practices."58 Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, "to
ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power"59 and "watershed rehabilitation and
management"60 meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.