100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Wong vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 117857. February 2, 2001.

LUIS S. WONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Evidence; Findings of fact of

the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive.—Although Manuel Limtong
was the sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was found sufficient
to prove all the elements of the offense charged. We find no cogent reason to
depart from findings of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases elevated
from the Court of Appeals, our review is confined to alleged errors of law.
Its findings of fact are generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the
findings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any substantiation on
record, the same must stand.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 101

Wong vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; What the law punishes is the issuance of a

bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance; The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.—In Llamado v. Court of Appeals, we held that
“[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes
in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which
it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere
act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.” Nothing herein
persuades us to hold otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Two (2) ways of violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.—There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or
drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the
time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2) by having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but
failing to keep sufficient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the
full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period
of ninety (90) days.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The maker’s knowledge is presumed from
the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds.—As to the second
element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present. Thus, the maker’s knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of
the check for insufficiency of funds.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in Section 2 of the law does it
require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days;
That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the
conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise.—Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, nowhere in said provision does
the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90
days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie
presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the
following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check,
and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after the notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply
one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack
of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense.

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; By current banking practice a check

becomes stale after more than six (6) months or 180 days.—Under Section
186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check must be presented for
payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay.” By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than
six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks
157 days after the date of the check. Hence, said checks cannot be
considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Same; Same; Penalty; Pursuant to the policy guidelines in
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner
should now be modified to a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the checks that were dishonored.—Pursuant to the policy
guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on
November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be
modified to a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the checks that were dishonored.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

          Agapito P. Pagayanan, Jr. and Tañada, Vivo and Tan for
petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of

1
the Court of Appeals in CA. G.R. CR 11856 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 17,
convicting petitioner on three (3) counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(the Bouncing Checks Law) violations, and sentencing him to
imprisonment of four (4) months for each count, and to pay private

________________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Justices

Ricardo P. Galvez and Eugenio S. Labitoria.

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

respondent the amounts of P5,500.00, P6,410.00 and P3,375.00,

respectively, corresponding to the value of the checks involved, with
the legal rate of interest from the time of filing of the criminal
charges, as well as to pay the costs.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press, Inc. (LPI), a
manufacturer of calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then
give them to agents to present to customers. The agents would get
the purchase orders of customers and forward them to LPI. After
printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the
customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the
payments. Petitioner, however, had a history of unremitted
collections, which he duly acknowledged in a confirmation receipt
2
he co-signed with his wife. Hence, petitioner’s customers were
required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their
purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks
totaling P18,025.00, all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn
payable to the order of LPI, as follows:

(1) Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-

C for P6,410.00 (Exh. “B”);
(2) ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P540.00 (Exh. “C”);
(3) ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh.
“D”);
 (4) ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. “E”);
(5) ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. “F”);
(6) ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh.
“G”).

These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders

of customers who failed to issue post-dated checks. However,
following company policy, LPI refused to accept the checks as
guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the
payment of petitioner’s
3
unremitted collections for 1984 amounting
to P18,077.07. LPI waived the P52.07 difference.

_______________

2 Records, p. 119.
3 Id. at 130.

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104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Wong vs. Court of Appeals

Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not
to deposit the checks and promised to replace them within 30 days.
However, petitioner reneged on his promise. Hence, on June 5,
1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason
“account closed.” The dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the
RCBC return slip.
On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel notified the
petitioner of the dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for
payment within five (5) banking days.
On November 6, 1987, petitioner was4 charged with three (3)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 under three separate
Informations for the three 5
checks amounting to P5,500.00,
P3,375.00, and P6,410.00.
The 6Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as
follows:

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time
of issue of the check she/he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then
and there issue, make or draw Allied Banking Corporation Check No.
660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the amount of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel
T. Limtong which check was issued in payment of an obligation of said
accused, but when the said check was presented with said bank, the same
was dishonored for reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ and despite notice and
demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and
refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do

_______________

4 Otherwise known as “An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check
without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes.”
5 As to the three (3) remaining checks, petitioner was also charged with violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 3 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25078-R,
25079-R, and 28440-R. The MTC convicted petitioner but on appeal, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 14, acquitted him for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6 Records, p. 89.

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

so, to the damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of
P5,500.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for

ABC Check No. 660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in
Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC Check No. 660143464 for
P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to the same trial court.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testified on behalf
of the company. Limtong averred that he refused to accept the
personal checks of petitioner since it was against company policy to
accept personal checks from agents. Hence, he and petitioner simply
agreed to use the checks to pay petitioner’s unremitted collections to
LPI. According to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the
checks, Wong requested him to defer the deposit of said checks for
lack of funds. Wong promised to replace them within thirty days, but
failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of counsel, he deposited the
checks which were subsequently returned on the ground of “account
closed.”
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6)
checks to guarantee the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers.
According to petitioner, he issued the checks not as payment for any
obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his customers. In fact, the
face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the total
amount of the calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the
accused, namely, Golden Friendship Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00),
New Society Rice and Corn Mill (P5,500.00), Cuesta Enterprises
(P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia Restaurant
(P3,375.00), and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these
customers had already paid their respective orders, petitioner
claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.
On August
7
30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing
as follows:
_______________

7 Rollo, pp. 185-199.

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

“Wherefore, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Luis S. Wong
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violations of Section 1
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3) Counts and is hereby sentenced
to serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS for each count; to pay
Private Complainant Manuel T. Limtong the sums of Five Thousand Five
Hundred (P5,500.00) Pesos, Six Thousand Four Hundred Ten (P6,410.00)
Pesos and Three Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Five (P3,375.00) Pesos
corresponding to the amounts indicated in Allied Banking Checks Nos.
660143451, 66[0] 143464 and 660143463 all issued on December 30, 1985
together with the legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the
8
criminal charges in Court and pay the costs.”

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. 9

On
October 28, 1994, it affirmed the 10
trial court’s decision in toto.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioner raises the following
11
questions of law —

May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22—if there is

no more consideration or price or value—ever the binding tie that it is in
contracts in general and in negotiable instruments in particular—behind the
checks?—if even before he deposits the checks, he has ceased to be a holder
for value because the purchase orders (PO’s) guaranteed by the checks were
already paid?
Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated,
is it not then the duty of complainant—knowing he is no longer a holder for
value—to return the checks and not to deposit them ever? Upon what legal
basis then may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?
Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their
reason for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account long after
90 days from maturity of the checks?
May the prosecution apply the prima facie presumption of “knowledge
of lack of funds” against the drawer if the checks were belatedly deposited
by the complainant 157 days after maturity, or will it be then necessary for
the prosecution to show actual proof of “lack of funds” during the 90-day
term?

_______________

8 Id. at 198-199.
9 Id. at 88-108.
10 Id. at 11-86.
11 Id. at 17.

107
 VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 107
Wong vs. Court of Appeals

Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the
1985 purchase orders (PO’s) of his customers. He contends that
private respondent is not a “holder for value” considering that the
checks were deposited by private respondent after the customers
already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the checks, private
respondent should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner
further assails the credibility of complainant considering that his
answers to cross-examination questions included: “I cannot recall,
anymore” and “We have no more record.”
12
In his Comment, the Solicitor General concedes that the checks
might have been initially intended by petitioner to guarantee
payments due from customers, but upon the refusal of LPI to accept
said personal checks per company policy, the parties had agreed that
the checks would be used to pay off petitioner’s unremitted
collections. Petitioner’s contention that he did not demand the return
of the checks because he trusted LPI’s good faith is contrary to
human nature and sound business practice, according to the Solicitor
General.
The issue as to whatever the checks were issued merely as
guarantee or for payment of petitioner’s unremitted collections is a
factual issue involving as it does the credibility of witnesses. Said
factual issue has been settled by the trial court and Court of Appeals.
Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the purchase
orders of customers, they found the checks were eventually used to
settle the remaining obligations of petitioner with LPI. Although
Manuel Limtong was the sole witness for the prosecution, his
testimony was found sufficient to prove all the elements of the
13
offense charged. We find no cogent reason to depart from findings
of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases elevated from the
Court of Appeals, our review is confined to alleged errors of law. Its
findings of fact are generally conclusive. Absent any showing that
the findings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any
14
substantiation on record, the same must stand. The lack of ac-

_______________

12 Id. at 290-321.
13 Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744, 749 (1998).
14 Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 440, 447-448 (1992); Morales vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., 197 SCRA 391, 401 (1991).

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

counting between the parties is not the issue in15 this case. As
repeatedly held, this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, in
16
 16
Llamado v. Court of Appeals, we held that “[t]o determine the
reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for
their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and
bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the
law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum.” Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22.
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making
or drawing and issuing, a check to apply on account or for value
knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded;
and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient funds therein or
credit with said bank to cover the full amount of the check when 17
presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the first situation, pertinent to
18
the present case, are:

“(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply

for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and

________________

15 Aleria v. Velez, 298 SCRA 611, 618 (1998).

16 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).
17 Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22.
18 Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 7, 340 SCRA 497.

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VOL. 351, FEBRUARY 2, 2001 109

Wong vs. Court of Appeals

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank

for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.”

Petitioner contends that the first element does not exist because the
checks were not issued to apply for account or for value. He
attempts to distinguish his situation from the usual “cut-and-dried”
B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee
and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already
paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA
having both ruled that the checks were in payment for unremitted
collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument has no
legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which 19
it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second element prima facie20exists when the first
and third elements of the offense are present. Thus, the maker’s
knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for
21
insufficiency of funds.
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks
on June 5, 1986, or 157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity
date, the presumption of knowledge of lack of funds under Section 2
of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that he
should not be expected to keep his bank account active and funded
beyond the ninety-day period.
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:

Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and

issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety
(90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such

______________

19 Dichaves v. Apalit, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000, p. 6, 333 SCRA 54.
20 Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125059, March 17, 2000, p. 8, 328 SCRA 447.
21 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 657, 661 (1998).

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110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Wong vs. Court of Appeals

maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
(5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by
the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is “knowledge” on the part of the

maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or
credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since
this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself
creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check “is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check.” To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes
arrangements for payment of 22 the check by the bank or pays the
holder the amount of the check.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, nowhere in said provision
does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account
for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of the law is to establish a
prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of
funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days
from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure
of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5
banking days after the notice thereof. That the check must be
deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise.
It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge
petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account
within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check must be presented for
payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by
the delay.” By current banking practice, a check becomes stale

_______________

22 Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323, 330-331 (1986).

111

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Wong vs. Court of Appeals

23
after more than six (6) months, or 180 days. Private respondent
herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check.
Hence, said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but
such knowledge could still be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not
deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was
constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were
dishonored, petitioner was duly notified of such fact but failed to
make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days
thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the
drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite
petitioner’s insistent plea of innocence, we find no error in the
respondent court’s affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000, which took effect on November 21, 2000, the
penalty imposed on petitioner should now be modified to a fine of
not less than but not more than double the amount of the checks that
were dishonored.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong
is found liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the
penalty imposed on him is hereby MODIFIED so that the sentence
of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay a FINE
of (1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check
involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00,
equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal
Case No. CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double the
amount of the check involved24in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the
aforesaid fines. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered
to pay to LPI

_______________

23 Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126670, December 2, 1999, p. 9, 319

SCRA 595.
24 Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 11, 340 SCRA 497.

112

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Seville vs. National Development Company

the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest
thereon from the time of filing the criminal charges in court, as well
as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

      Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied but judgment modified.

Note.—The gravamen of the offense of violating Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks. (Diongzon vs.
Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 477 [1999])

——o0o——

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