ART.
40 – The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may HELD:
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
ABUNDADO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Salvador Abunado married Narcissa Arceno in 1967. In 1988,
Narcissa went to Japan to work and returned in 1992. She
discovered that Salvador married Zenaida in 1989. Salva filed
an annulment case in 1995, Narcissa filed bigamy.
TC convicted Salva, acquitted Zenaida.
CA affirmed with modification (76y/o Salva)
*Pet contend that Narcissa consented to the marriage.
*Pet also said that annulment of marriage was a prejudicial
question – annulment case first
ISSUE:
WON Pet committed bigamy
HELD:
Yes. A pardon by an offended party does not extinguish
criminal action because the crime of bigamy is an offense
against the State and is a public offense.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
If the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration
of nullity of his previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy. (ART
40)
SC affirms CA
MORIGO v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete are a couple. Lucia works in
Canada, went home to the PH and proposed to petition Lucio
to join her in CA. both agreed to get married. Married in 1990.
Lucia went back to CA leaving Lucio behind.
1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for divorce which
was granted.
1992, Lucio married Maria Lumbago.
1993, Lucio filed for annulment on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Same year, Lucio was charged
with bigamy.
Lucio moved for suspension on the ground of prejudicial
question – denied upon MR
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy
1997 Annulment case was granted.
ISSUE:
WON Lucio is guilty of bigamy
No. Elements of bigamy:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not
been for the existence of the first.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. No
marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed
a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid
marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute
an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
SC: Reversed CA’s decision, acquitted
WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DY
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Wiegel (resp) asked for the declaration of nullity of
marriage with pet Lilia Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previous
existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion.
Lilia claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced
to enter said marital union.
ISSUE:
WON first marriage of Lilia is void/voidable
HELD:
Voidable. Valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she
was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her
marriage to respondent is VOID.
DOMINGO v. CA
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976,
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had
been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She
came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit
of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home
from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and
had been disposing some of her properties which is
administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is
unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the
separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be
filed for purposes of remarriage.
RULING:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the
protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith
that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the
same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged
with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final
judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Other specific
effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children
of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in
bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in
bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations
by reason of marriage and testamentary disposition made by
one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that
for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them.
VALDES v. RTC
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971.
They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition,
thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It also directed
the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage.
In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was
denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the
Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the
disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3)
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages
declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with
Article 129.
ISSUE:
Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
disposition of property in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or
Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-
ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment
to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other
(as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted
neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in
ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family
home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well
as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the
property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in
relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains,
the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13 relates only,
by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a
spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially
declared void.
PEOPLE v. ARAGON
FACTS:
Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with a certain Maria
Gorrea in Cebu . While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was
subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon,
contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio
Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a
clerk in the said office. After the said marriage, the accused
and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the
accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted
between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu
where he maintained his first wife. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu
City. After Maria Gorrea’s death, and seeing that the coast was
clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City
in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse. It would seem
that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital
life in Cebu, for Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. On January
22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for
the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During
her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a
certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa
C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Although the accused made
an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the
Court, however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of
the said second marriage was fully established not only by the
certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of
Maria Faicol and of EulogioGiroy, one of the sponsors of the
wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria
Faicol.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the
absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing
the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a
marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of
his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or
by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the
instance of the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
RULING:
No. Third marriage is valid. The action was instituted upon the
complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima was
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third
marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a
valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting
marriage cannot prosper.
Aragon is acquitted.
MERCADO v. TAN
FACTS:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma.
Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10,
1976, despite the prior marriage with complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-
complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel
with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court
against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1,
1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November
13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993
the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court
charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still
subsisting at the time he had contracted his second marriage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage
came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but
after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the
act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
*Requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
REPUBLIC v NOLASCO
Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before
the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through
the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized
to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic
argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second,
Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same
proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that
he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar
in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance
meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to
respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique,
in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the
Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and
left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a
letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had
given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet
Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met,
were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from
among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the
presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without
prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that
the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a
basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead.
RULING:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to
Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any
person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine,
respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead
that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
reversed and both Decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
LUKBAN v. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933
and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been
heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the
parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She
believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for
more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again,
she desires to have her civil status put in order to be relieved
on any liability under the law.
ISSUE:
Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive
death before she can remarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure
declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil
Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that
“for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions
of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking
of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
ARMAS v. CALISTERIO
FACTS:
Teodorico Calistero died intestate, leaving several parcels of
land. He was survived by his wife, Marietta. Teodorico was the
second husband of Marietta who was previously married to
William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared
without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the
disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico got married
without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’
presumptive death.
Antonia Armas, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition
claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that the
marriage between Marietta and her brother, being allegedly
bigamous is by itself null and void. She prayed that her son be
appointed as administrator of the estate of the decedent and
inheritance be adjudicated to her.
ISSUE:
WON Marietta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the
absence of the declaration of presumptive death
RULING:
No. The marriage between the respondent and decedent was
solemnized in 1958 where the law in force at the time was the
Civil Code and not the Family Code. Article 256 of the Family
Code limits its retroactive effect only to cases where it would
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code and other laws. Since the Civil Code
provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential
before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years
of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry, then Marietta’s
marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right
to claim a portion of Teodorico’s estate.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such
party freely cohabited with the other and both lived
together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such
party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the
other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the
facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to
be incurable.
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final
judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease,
regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or
homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud
as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
ANAYA v. PALAROAN
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953.
Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954
on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to their
marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative
of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such
pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
She prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando
on such ground.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for
annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does
not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.
BUCCAT v. BUCCAT
FACTS:
It was established before the trial court: The Plaintiff met the
defendant in March 1938. After several interviews, both were
committed on September 19 of that year. On November 26 the
same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic
Cathedral in Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about eighty-
nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on
February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and
Defendant separated. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an
action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Baguio City.
The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the marriage
because the defendant assured him that she was virgin. The
trial court dismissed the complaint.
Hence, this appeal. Basically, Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and
Luida Mangonon (Defendant) got married on November 26,
1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939
Godofredo filed for annulment of marriage before the CFI
because he was led to believe by Luida that she was a virgin.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo
appealed.
ISSUE:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be
granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?
RULING:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law
student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy
(highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach
) when they got married. As she gave birth less than 3 months
after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant
even before they were married. Thus, consent freely given:
ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision.
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the
ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date of her
marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the
fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to
a child. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the
parties. Delizo did not appear nor present any evidence. The
trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any
birth certificate to show the child was born within 180 days
after the marriage between the parties. Later on Aquino
presented evidence to show proof of the child’s birth but still
his petition was denied. The CA denied Aquino’s appeal on the
theory that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex
during their engagement so that the child could be their own
and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or suspect that
Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for
reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not
file an answer thus the motion for reconsideration was denied.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of
marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by
Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.
HELD:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the
marriage she was pregnant by a man other than his husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally plump” or
fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of
pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman’s abdomen is still
below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to
the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable
and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the
lower part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of
pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen
reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness
of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case
for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
MENCIANO vs. SAN JOSE
FACTS:
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs,
alleging that she is the widow of the deceased Faustino Neri
San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944.
Before the marriage they lived together as husband and wife,
there having been no impediment to their marriage. As a result
of their cohabitation the child Carlo Magno Neri was born,
baptized and was legitimized by the subsequent matrimony of
his parents. The second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on
April 24, 1945 is a legitimate child.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo Pelaez,
designated universal heir in the will of the deceased filed a
motion to question the declaration of heirs.
They alleged that marriage between said deceased and
Matilde Menciano was in violation of the legal provisions and
requisites, because he was deprived of free will due to his age
and sickness. Accordingly, Matilde Menciano took advantage
of his condition, by intrigue, deceit and threat of abandoning
him, forced Neri to marry her. The deceased was impotent and
congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and sister
Conchita, who had no children therefore it would have been
impossible for him to have fathered the children
Defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of P286, 000
in cash, and for jewels and certain properties, which, as
alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde
Menciano.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San
Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?
Are the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the
legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose
and Matilde Menciano?
Did Matilde Menciano illegally dispose the cash, jewels, and
certain properties above mentioned?
HELD:
The marriage of Matilde and Faustino was evidenced by a
valid Marriage License and Marriage Certificate both of which
were signed by the parties and properly recorded at the Office
of the Civil Registrar. Being official and public documents, their
validity can be successfully assailed only by strong, clear, and
convincing oral testimony.
Faustino’s meticulous signature cannot be signed by one who
is not of sound mind and of fair physical condition. He may
have been sick at that time, but not to such a degree as to
render him unconscious of what he was doing.
Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse.
The presumption is in favor of potency. The fact that the
deceased was able to produce the specimen as what was
instructed by his doctor shows that he was potent. The
necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri, Jr., is
conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the
deceased Faustino Neri with Matilde Menciano in lawful
wedlock.
The trial court, after a careful and exhaustive review of the
evidence, correctly reached the conclusion that allegation of
illegally disposing money and jewelry has not been
substantiated.
JIMENEZ vs. CANIZARES
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez filed a petition for a decree annulling his marriage
to the defendant Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August
1950 upon the ground that the condition of her genitals is
incapable of copulation and it existed at the time of marriage
and continues to exist. For that reason he left the conjugal
home two nights and one day after they had been married.
On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy
of the complaint. She did not file an answer so the court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether
there was collusion.
On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring
the defendant to submit to a physical exam to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, in ten days a
medical certificate on the result which she did not comply with.
The Court entered a decree annulling the marriage which
prompted the city attorney to file a motion for reconsideration
upon the ground that the defendant’s impotency has not been
satisfactorily established as required by law; because the wife
refused to be examined.
Instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have
punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to
undergo a physical examination and submit a medical
certificate. The decree sought to be reconsidered would open
the door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to
collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of
one of them.
ISSUE:
May the marriage in question be annulled on the strength of
the lone testimony of the husband?
HELD:
The annulment cannot be decreed upon the sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony which is
aimed at securing the annulment he seeks. Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained
from taking part therein. Her refusal to be examined and failure
to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could
not be inferred because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
Impotency should not be presumed. The presumption is
always in favor of potency.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with
this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the
absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of
their common children. The Court shall give paramount
consideration to the moral and material welfare of said
children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also
provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent.
SIN v. SIN
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity.
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a
Portuguese citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in
September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June
1995, trial court dismissed Florence’s petition and throughout
its trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While
Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the
parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other than
having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was
heard of him.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with
the absence of the participation of the State in the
proceedings.
RULING:
No. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to the petition.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to
it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed”. A declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the
application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While
compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon the
petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene
in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State
with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to
the lower court for proper trial.
In this case, it can be argued that since the lower court
dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e.,
dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the
lack of participation of the State was not preserved. The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.The records are bereft of
evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the
case thus; the case is remanded for proper trial.
LEGAL SEPARATION
OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
FACTS:
On July 5, 1955, petition for legal separation was filed by Jose
De Ocampo. It described their marriage performed in 1938,
and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951
with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.
The defendant made no answer so the court defaulted her, and
directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not
collusion existed between the parties. There was none. The
plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of several
testimonies which established that they were married in April 5,
1938 and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They
begot several children who are now living with plaintiff.
Plaintiff discovered on several occasions illicit relations with
one Jose Arcalas. He sent Serafina to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again,
plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was
going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June, 1952 she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately.
The night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon discovering the
illicit connection with Nelson Orzame, expressed his wish to file
a petition for legal separation and defendant readily agreed.
Her conformity to the legal separation was treated a confession
of judgment by the Appellate Court and declared that under
Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
ISSUE:
DOes the defendant’s conformity to the legal separation
constitute a confession of judgment that proves collusion?
HELD:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement
between husband and wife as having committed, a matrimonial
offense or to suppress evidence of a valid defense for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This
agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. Collusion may
not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party
confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to
procure evidence necessary to prove it
What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the
action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation
will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.
Collusion implies more than consent or lack of opposition.
LAPUZ vs. EUFEMIO
FACTS:
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio and he should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits. They were married
civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September
1934. They lived together as husband until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her. They had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on
or about March 1949.
Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses,
and, along with several other claims involving money and other
properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground
of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on. Counsel for petitioner
duly notified the court of her death and moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUES:
What is the effect of death of either party to a legal separation
case?
HELD:
The Article 100 of Civil Code allows only the innocent spouse
to claim legal separation; and in Article 108, provides that the
spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that
the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated
by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved,
is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of
a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
Property rights acquired by either party could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
As to the petition of Eufemio for a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmen Lapuz, such action became moot and
academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no
further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union.
GANDIONCO vs. PENARANDA
FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco respondent and legal wife of the petitioner,
filed a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the
ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment
of damages presided over by respondent Judge. The wife also
filed a separate concubinage case. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite,
pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed
by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The
respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986,
ordered payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner Froilan Gandionco contends that the civil action for
legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, application for support pendente lite should be suspended
in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him
the private respondent. He also argues that his conviction for
concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for
legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the
action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordered support arising from a legal
separation case should be suspended until the pending
criminal case of concubinage is decided upon.
HELD:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain
the right to live separately, with the legal consequences
thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains, custody of off springs, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage,
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the
action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to
modify or reduce the same.
BUGAYONG vs. GINEZ
FACTS
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant,
the case was dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed
to the Court of Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to
the Court on the ground that there is absolutely no question of
fact involved.
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949 while
on furlough leave. Immediately after their marriage, the couple
lived with his sisters in Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or
about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-
in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which
place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local
college there.
Benjamin received several information from different people
about his wife’s infidelity. This prompted him to go home and
confront his wife. They stayed together in his cousin’s house
as husband and wife for a few days. Instead of answering his
questions, she left which made him assume that it was an
admission of guilt. He filed for legal separation on the ground
of adultery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not his assumption of his wife’s guilt is enough
basis for a legal separation to be granted.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting
a ground for legal separation or “conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which
the latter has committed”.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him,
and the fact that she went with him to the house of his cousin
and slept as husband and wife for one day and two nights;
these facts show reconciliation between them was effected and
that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to
know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by
the wife, the conduct of the husband despite his belief that his
wife was unfaithful, deprives him of the right of any action for
legal separation against the offending wife, because his said
conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil
Code.
PACETE vs. CARIAGA
FACTS:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the CFI
of Cotabato, Branch I, gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision of which, among other things, decreed the legal
separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private
respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab
initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la
Concepcion.
Concepcion Alanis filed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and
one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation
and accounting and separation of property. She averred that
she was married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 and they had a
child named Consuelo. She learned that Pacete subsequently
contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion.
She and Pacete acquired vast property that he fraudulently
placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other
“dummies;”
After having been summoned, the defendants repeatedly
asked the court for extension of filing for an answer which
eventually resulted to being declared in default. Five months
after the petition was filed the court granted the issuance of a
Decree of Legal Separation and declared the properties in
question as conjugal properties of Alanis and Pacete which
were ordered forfeited in favor of Alanis. The court also
nullified his marriage to Clarita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion in
deciding the case.
HELD:
No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal
separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family
Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the
parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The decision of the lower court was nullified.
No action was made on Antonio’s petition. In spite of that, the
court granted the legal separation with all its legal effects
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the community
property. Pending the inventory and dissolution of property,
Antonio was ordered to pay support to Filomena.
Filomena filed for another motion for administration to impede
unlawful sequestration of some conjugal assets and
clandestine transfers by Antonio. Antonio opposed the move
and filed a motion to stop the court from executing orders for
administration and to null the legal separation. CA upheld the
decision of the lower court. Antonio appealed but he
unexpected died on November 30, 1979.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of Antonio’s death to the legal separation
case and the dissolution of conjugal properties?
HELD:
Upon finality, legal separation shall have the following effects:
1.) Spouses shall be entitled to live separately, but the
marriage bond shall be severed; 2.) Conjugal properties shall
be liquidated and dissolved but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community.
The decision of the trial court on Jan 4, 1973 finding Antonio
guilty of concubinage and granting the legal separation and all
its legal effects along with the division of conjugal property had
long been final and executory.
Upon the death of the guilty party, the liquidation of the
conjugal property can be resolved by the application of the
rules on intestate succession with respect to the exclusive
property of the deceased petitioner. Thus, the process be:
1. Liquidation and distribution governing the effects of
the final decree of legal separation;
2. Whatever remaining properties allocated to the
deceased petitioner shall be governed by intestate
succession.

MACADANGDANG vs. CA

FACTS:
Filomena and Antonio contracted marriage in 1946. From
humble beginnings they slowly expanded their business and
wealth. They had six children. After several setbacks in their
relationship, each accusing the other of infidelity, they
separated in 1965.

Filomena left and resided in Cebu. When she returned, she

learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She
initiated a legal separation against Antonio and later filed for a
petition for the appointment of an administrator for their
properties. Antonio opposed the appointment of an
administrator.