FACTS:
01 MABUTAS v. PERELLO
1. Involved here are two administrative complaints against Judge
June 8, 2005 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Rule 114: Bail | Mart Laforteza
Petitioner: In AM No. RTJ-03-1817: P/SR. SUPT. ORLANDO M. MABUTAS. In
AM No. RTJ-04-1820, CITY PROSECUTOR EDWARD M. TAGONONON
Respondent: JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, Presiding Judge, RTC Muntinlupa
Branch 276
Recit-Ready: Two complaints, both involving violations of RA 9165, were filed
against Judge Perello for granting bail. The first complaint involved the accused
possessing 57.78g of shabu while the second complaint involved 4 cases of
selling shabu, each case dealing with a quantity less than a gram of shabu.
Regarding the first complaint, the judge argues that the evidence of guilt was
not strong while in the second complaint, she argues that the quantities were
minimal; and that shabu is not a dangerous drug under RA 9165, but only a mere
precursor, the selling of which is punishable by imprisonment for 12 to 20 years,
and thus bail is a matter of right. Upon investigation by the CA, it recommended
her dismissal. IS SHE ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE UNDER THE COMPLAINTS?
YES. In the first complaint, the offense is punishable by life imprisonment to
death, therefore bail is not a matter of right. Furthermore, under the present
rules, a hearing on the application of bail is mandatory. Regardless of whether
it is a matter of right or of discretion, the prosecution must be notified. (Read
the ratio for duties) She complied with all duties. In the second complaint, a
plain reading of RA 9165 shows that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a
dangerous drug, not merely a controlled precursor. As such, the cases involved,
being the selling and trading of shabu, regardless of quantity, are punishable
by life imprisonment to death. Therefore, a bail hearing should be conducted.
Perello did not conduct a bail hearing in the second complaint. She is therefore,
grossly ignorant of the law and that it cannot be excused by good faith. The
Court suspended her for 6 months.
Doctrine: Rule 114, Section 7: No person charged with the capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
Perello
AM No. RTJ-03-1817 (The first complaint): Mabutas complained of
irregularities by Judge Perello in the granting of bail to accused Aiza
Omadan in Criminal Case No. 03-265 where she was charged with
violation of Section 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (RA 9165) for possession, custody and control of 57.53g of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), with no bail
recommended. Mabutas’ claim was based on the memorandum
submitted by Police Inspector Butuyan, who stated the following:
A colleague notified him (Butuyan) of a scheduled preliminary
investigation of Omalan’s case the following day. He, with PO2
Mayonte and PO2 Lising, went to the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Tuy merely asked them to sign the
minutes of the investigation. The police officers were not furnished
with Omadan’s Counter-Affidavit.
During Omadan’s arraignment, Butuyan learned that Omadan filed a
petition for bail and that it was being heard on the same day. Mayonte
and Lising asked ACP Francisco to reschedule the hearing because
they weren’t prepared. He denied. He also denied Lising’s request to
be presented as witness.
Butuyan went to deliver a communication to Francisco from Manutas
requesting that if bail be granted, its implementation be suspended to
allow the police to file the necessary motion, and to prevent Omadan
from escaping. Francisco was not around, so they went to Branch 276
to secure the copy of the motion for bail. To their surprise, Omadan
had already been granted a P1 million bail and was released on May
9, 2003, a Friday.
AM No. RTJ-04-1820 (The second complaint): Edward accused
Judge Perello of partiality, serious misconduct in office and gross
ignorance of the law, concerning her grant of bail in 4 criminal cases
for Violations of RA 9165.
 In Criminal Case No. 03-065 (People v. Pascual), Pascual was charged
with selling, delivering and giving away .2g of Shabu, no bail
recommended. A motion for bail was filed on the grounds that the
quantity was minimal and that Pascual is 9 months pregnant. Judge
Perello granted it without hearing. In denying Francisco’s MR, she
argued that shabu is never considered a dangerous drug under RA
9165 and that since the quantity is less than a gram, the penalty is only
imprisonment of 12 years, which is not classified by any law as a
capital punishment and non-bailable.
In Criminal Case No. 03-082 (People v. Uy), Uy was charged with
selling to PNP operatives after a buy-bust operation .12g of shabu.
ACP Senson recommended no bail. Uy filed a petition for bail, alleging
that the arrest was illegal because there was no buy-bust operation,
and that the shabu was planted on him. Without hearing, Judge Perello
granted it because the quantity is only .12g.
Criminal Case No. 03-265 was already in the previous complaint.
In Criminal Case No. 03-288 (People v. Regencia), accused Regencia
was charged with selling, delivering, trading, and giving away .07g of
shabu. Likewise, her application was granted because the quantity
was very minimal.
2. The Judge’s contentions
The first complaint: Mabutas’s charges are baseless; PI conducted
was outsider her jurisdiction; She did not have any hand or influence
in Francisco’s handling of the bail hearing; Denies undue haste in the
granting of bail; Bail was granted because the evidence of guilt was
not strong.
The second complaint: The crimes charged are not capital offices as
the quantities were minimal. The 4 cases involved selling less than 5
grams of shabu. Under RA 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but
merely a controlled precursor, the selling of which is punishable by
imprisonment of 12 to 20 years. Such being the case, bail is a matter
of right and a hearing is not necessary.
3. The 2 complaints were consolidated and referred to CA Associate
Justice for investigation. After due proceedings he submitted his
report and recommendation, finding that shabu is a dangerous drug
under RA 9165; that in Case No. 03-265, the penalty imposable is life
imprisonment to death, therefore bail is not a matter of right; that in
the other cases, the imposable penalty is also life imprisonment to
death, therefore bail is not a matter of right, thus a bail hearing should
have been conducted. He recommended that Judge Perello be
dismissed because of gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT JUDGE PERELLO MAY BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR THE GRANT OF BAIL IN THE COMPLAINTS
– YES.
RATIO:
The first complaint involved the possession, custody, and control of 57.78g of
shabu. Under the law, it is punishable by life imprisonment to death, hence a
capital offense. As such, bail is a matter of discretion under Rule 114, Section
7 which provides:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
Whether the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains
with the judge. It must be sound and exercised within reasonable bounds.
Under the present rules, a bail hearing is mandatory. Whether as matter of right
or discretion, the prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of hearing, or at
least his recommendation be sought. In case an application is filed, the judge
should:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.
In this case, Judge Perello complied. A hearing was held; the prosecution was
given the opportunity to present its evidence; the Judge based her findings on
the prosecution’s evidence; the grant contained a summary of the evidence;
and that since the conclusion was that the evidence of guilt was not strong,
the application was granted. She did not violate any procedural requirements.
Thus, there was no irregularity in the grant of bail in the first complaint.
In the second complaint, she granted the applications for bail without hearing
because of her belief that shabu is merely a precursos and therefore the sale
thereof is not a capital offense.
A plain reading of RA 9165 shows that shabu is a dangerous drug and not a
controlled precursor. Dangerous drugs are defined by Section 3 (j) of RA 9165
and are classified as narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention
on Psychotropic Substances, which are considered dangerous drugs. It is not
listed in the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, as Judge Perello stated. On the other hand, under
Section 3(h) of RA 9165, controlled precursors refer to those listed in Tables I
and II of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, which were made integral to RA 9165.
Methamphetamine is not listed as a controlled precursor.
That "methamphetamine" and not "methamphetamine hydrochloride" is the
term specifically listed in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single Convention of
Psychotropic Substances does not detract from the fact that it is a dangerous
drug. Section 3, paragraph (x) of RA 9165, states that methamphetamine
hydrochloride is a drug having such chemical composition, including any of its
isomers or derivatives in any form.
Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug, the
applicable provision in Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 subject
of the second compalint, is Section 5, paragraph 1 of RA 9165, which provides
that regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation of shabu is punishable by life
imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it is incumbent upon
respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the petitions/motions for bail filed by
the accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong. To grant
an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called
for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong
constitutes gross ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence.
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified
as a serious charge and is now punishable with severe sanctions, to wit:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
In this case, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent Judge
be dismissed from the service. The Court finds such penalty to be too harsh.
In similar cases, the Court has imposed only a fine. However, the Court takes
notice that Judge Perello was administratively fined multiple times. Thus, the
Court imposes a penalty of Suspension from office for 6 months in the second
complaint, excluding Case No. 03-265.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint against
respondent Judge; and,

(2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge Norma C.

Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of
Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross ignorance of law, and she is hereby
SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.
 2. Leviste  appealed  to  the  CA  and  filed  an  urgent  application  for 
2 LEVISTE v. CA  admission  to  bail  pending  appeal  and  cited  his  advanced  age  and 
health  condition,  and  claiming  the  absence  of  any  risk  or  possibility 
March 17, 2010 | Corona, J. | Bail | Alex  of flight on his part. However, the CA denied his application for bail. 
Petitioner: JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE  3. The  CA  invoked  the  ​bedrock  principle  ​in  the  matter  of  bail  pending 
Respondent: THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  appeal,  that  the  discretion  to  extend  bail during the course of appeal 
  should  be  exercised  “with  grave  caution  and  only  for  strong 
  reasons.”  It  also ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged 
Recit-Ready:    Petitioner  Leviste  was  charged  with  murder  but  was  convicted  detainee  or  prisoner.  Moreso,  it  also  found  that  petitioner  failed  to 
by  the  RTC  for  homicide  and  sentenced  to  suffer the indeterminate penalty of  show  that  he  suffers  from  ailment  of  such gravity that his continued 
6  years  and  1  day  to  12  years  and  1  day.  Leviste  appealed to the CA and filed  confinement  during  trial  will  permanently  impair  his health or put his 
an  application  for  admission  to  bail  pending  appeal  and  cited  his  old age and  life in danger. 
health  condition.  The  CA  denied  his  appeal  and  his  subsequent  MR.  Leviste  4. The  CA  also  made  a  ​prima  facie  ​determination  that  there  was  no 
appealed  to  the SC through Rule 65 alleging GADALEJ on the part of the CA as  reason  substantial  enough  to  overturn  the  evidence  of  petitioner’s 
he  insisted  that  bail  must  be  automatically  granted  to  him,  given  the  duration  guilt. Petitioner submitted an MR, but was subsequently denied. 
of  his  penalty  imposed  is  within  6  years  but  not  more  than  20  years,  and  the  5. Petitioner  insists  that  where  the  penalty  imposed  by the trial court is 
absence  of  any  of  the  circumstances  enumerated  in  Section  5,  Rule  114.  The  more  than  six  years  but  not  more  than  20  years  and  the 
issue  in  this  case  is  whether  or  not  bail  should  automatically  be  granted. The  circumstances  mentioned  in  the  third  paragraph  of  Section  5  are 
SC  held  that  Section  5,  Rule  114  provides  that  bail  is  discretionary  upon  absent,  bail  ​must  automatically  be  granted  to  an  appellant  pending 
conviction  by  the  trial  court;  and  that  the  appellate  court  ruling  on  the  appeal.  He  filed  a  special  civil  action  for  ​certiorari  ​under  Rule  65  for 
application  of  bail  pending  appeal  has  the  authority  to  exercise  grave caution  the alleged GADALEJ of the CA. 
in considering whether or not such bail should be granted. 
  ISSUES:  In  an  application  for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced 
Doctrine:  ​Our  rules  authorize  the  proper  courts  to  exercise  discretion  in  the  by  the  trial  court  to  a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does 
grant  of  bail  pending  appeal  to  those  convicted  by  the  RTC  of  an  offense  not  the  discretionary  nature  of  the  grant  of  bail  pending  appeal  mean  that  the 
punishable  by  death,  ​reclusion  perpetua​,  or  life  imprisonment.  In  the  exercise  bail  should  automatically  be  granted  absent  any  of  the  circumstances 
of  that  discretion,  the  proper  courts  are  to  be  guided  by  the  fundamental  mentioned  in  the  third  paragraph  of  Section  5,  Rule  114  of  the  Rules  of 
principle  that  the  allowance  of  bail  pending  appeal  should  be  exercised  not  Court? — NO 
with  laxity  but  with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that 
RATIO: 
the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. 

Based  on  Section  5,  Rule  114  of  the Rules of Court, it cannot be said that the 

FACTS:  CA issued the resolution without or in excess of jurisdiction because:  

1. Petitioner  Leviste  was  charged  with  the murder of Rafael de las Alas  (1)  ​pending  appeal  of  a  ​conviction  by  the  RTC  of  an  offence  NOT 
and  was  convicted  by  the  RTC  of  Makati  for  the  lesser  crime  of  punishable  by  death,  reclusion  perpetua,  or  life  imprisonment,  admission  to 
homicide  and  sentenced  to  suffer  an  indeterminate  penalty  of  six  bail is expressly declared to be ​discretionary​; and  
years  and  one  day  of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one 
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.  (​2)  the  discretion  to  allow  or  disallow  bail  pending  appeal  in  a  case 
such  as  this  where  the  decision  of  the  trial  court  convicting  the  accused 
changed  the  nature  of  the  offense  from  non-bailable  to  bailable  is ​exclusive  the  court  should  consider  ​whether  or  not,  under  all  circumstances,  the 
lodged by the rules with the appellate court.  accused  will  be  present  to  abide  by  his  punishment  if  his  conviction  is 
  affirmed. 
Petitioner  never  alleged  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  exercised  its  judgement   
capriciously  and  whimsically.  The  denial  of  petitioner’s  application  for  bail  Although Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides that: 
pending  appeal  was  NOT  unreasonable  but  was  the  result  of  a  thorough   
assessment  of  petitioner’s  claim  of  ill  health.  The  appellate  court  did  not  Section  13.  All  persons,  except  those  charged  with  offenses  punishable  by 
exercise  its  discretion  in  a  careless  manner  but  followed  doctrinal rulings of  reclusion  perpetua  ​when  evidence  of  guilt  is strong, shall, ​before conviction, 
this Court.  be  bailable  by  sufficient  sureties,  or  be  released on recognizance as may be 
  provided by law. 
Contrary  to  petitioner’s  interpretation  that  where  the  penalty  imposed  by the   
trial  court  is  more  than  six  years  but  not  more  than  20  years  and  the  After  conviction  by  the  trial  court,  the  presumption  of  innocence  terminates 
circumstances  mentioned  in  the  third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail  and,  accordingly,  the  constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant 
must  automatically  be  granted  to  an  appellant  pending  appeal;  the  third  of  bail  is  subject  to  judicial  discretion.  At  the  risk  of  being  repetitious,  such 
paragraph  of  Section  5,  Rule  114  applies  to  ​two scenarios ​where the penalty  discretion  must  be  exercised  with grave caution and only for strong reasons. 
imposed  on  the  appellant  applying  for  bail  is  imprisonment  exceeding  six  Considering  that  the  accused  was  in  fact  convicted  by  the  trial  court, 
years:  allowance  of  bail  pending  appeal  should  be  guided  by  a  stringent-standards 
(1) Circumstances  enumerated  in  the  said  paragraph  are  ​NOT  present  approach.  It  is  likewise  consistent  with  the  trial  court’s  initial  determination 
(court exercises sound discretion); and  that the accused should be in prison.  
(2) The  existence  of  ​at  least  one  ​of  the  said  circumstances  (court   
exercises stringent discretion)  Furthermore,  letting  the  accused  out  on  bail  despite  his  conviction  may 
  destroy  the  deterrent  effect  of  our  criminal  laws.  In  addition,  at  the 
In  the  first  scenario,  bail  is  a  matter  of  sound judicial discretion. This means  post-conviction  stage,  the  accused  faces  a  certain  prison sentence and thus 
that if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section  may  be  more  likely  to  flee  regardless  of  bail  bonds  or  other  release 
5,  Rule  114  is  present, the appellate court has the ​discretion to grant or deny  conditions.  Finally,  permitting  bail  too  freely  in  spire  of  conviction  invites 
bail.   frivolous and time-wasting appeals. 
   
In  the  second  scenario,  the  appellate  court  exercises  a  more  stringent  WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. 
discretion,  that  is,  to  carefully  ascertain  whether  any  of  the  enumerated 
circumstances  in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except 
to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.  
 
Nonetheless,  a  finding  that  none  of  the  said  circumstances  is  present  will 
NOT  automatically  result  in  the  grant  of  bail.  Such  finding  will  simply 
authorize  the  court  to  use  the  less  stringent  sound  discretion approach. The 
judicial  discretion  granted  to  the  proper  court  to  rule  on  applications  on  bail 
pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part 
of  the  court.  The  court  must  be  allowed  reasonable  latitude  to  express  its 
own  view  of  the  case,  its  appreciation  of  the  facts  and  its  understanding  of 
the  applicable  law  on  the  matter.  In  view  of  the  grave  caution  required  of  it, 
 FACTS:
Domingo v Pagayatan
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751June 10, 2003 | Rule 114 | Wayne Novera
Petitioner: COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO
Respondents: JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN
Recit-Ready:
A letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by
Commissioner of Bureau of Immigration Domingo charging Judge Pagayatan
with Gross Ignorance of Law relative to the criminal case of Estafa where
Peñaflorida, an alien, is the accused. BOI issued a Summary Deportation Order
against the accused for overstaying in violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act. SDO became final and executory on October 15, 2001. In the arraignment
of the accused on November 19 and 20, 2001, , respondent denied the P40,000
bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of
the accused on the ground that the crime Peñaflorida was charged with
involved large scale estafa – a nonbailable offense. Thus, Respondent
ordered the commitment of Peñaflorida. However, later on that same day, the
BOI received information that respondent had allowed the release from
detention of Peñaforida, without the interdepartmental courtesy of
affording prior notice to the BOI of such action.
ISSUE: WoN the approval of bail by respondent judge was proper? NO
HELD/DOCTRINE:
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is
a matter of right or discretion.
A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which
it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the
accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment.
After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.
A hearing is necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines in
fixing the amount of bail 13 set forth in Section 9, Rule 114.
• In a letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of
Immigration (BOI) charged Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of
the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46)
with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case for Estafa,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M. Peñaflorida.
• COMPLAINANT ALLEGED: a (BOI) Board of Commissioners (BOC)
issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Ernesto M.
Peñaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and
undocumented alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940.
o No appeal was filed with the Office of the President
o SDO became final and executory on October 15, 2001
• On the same date, Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice of Arraignment
of the accused on November 19 and 20, 2001.
o On the scheduled hearing, respondent denied the P40,000
bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the
provisional release of the accused on the ground that the
crime Peñaflorida was charged with involved large scale
estafa – a nonbailable offense.
• Respondent ordered the commitment of Peñaflorida to the Provincial
Jail
• However, later on that same day, the BOI received information that
respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peñaforida, who
is an alien federal fugitive, without the interdepartmental courtesy of
affording prior notice to the BOI of such action.
• She is appalled not only by the respondent's employment of legal
subterfuges in ordering the release of Peñaforida whose Summary
Deportation Order had already become final and executory, but also
by the respondent's bad faith in deceiving them into surrendering the
custody of an undesirable alien federal fugitive
• RESPONDENT: On November 20, 2001, Peñaflorida filed an urgent
motion to fix bail.
o When the prosecution and the defense jointly manifested that
it would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for
the provisional release of the accused Peñaflorida at
P250,000.00,
▪ he granted the motion to fix bail on November 21,
2001;
▪ and, at the time he issued the Order fixing the bail
bond of the accused at P250,000.00, he was not
aware that a deportation order had already been
issued by the BOI against the latter
• OCA:
 o Judge acted with undue haste in issuing the order granting
bail considering the fact that in his earlier Order dated
November 19, 2001, he did not grant a bail of P40,000.00
which the Provincial Prosecutor had previously recommended
for the provisional release of the accused.
▪ Denial was based on the ground that large scale
Estafa is an unbailable offense
▪ Should not have granted the bail simply because of
lack of readiness on the part of the prosecution to
present any witness to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused was strong.
o Under the present rule, a hearing is required before
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.
The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to
present within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the Court may resolve the
motion for bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion
for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions.
ISSUE:
(1) WoN the approval of bail by respondent judge was proper? NO
HELD: Court agrees with the finding of the OCA
• Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail
whether it is a matter of right or discretion.
• A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions
from which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack
of it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
• After hearing, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the
judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused.
• Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may
be invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution
which contains the judge's evaluation of the evidence may be
considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.
o The herein respondent granted bail to the accused
Peñaflorida without conducting a hearing despite his earlier
pronouncement in the Order dated November 19, 2001
denying bail as he considered the crime the accused
Peñaflorida was charged with to be a non- bailable offense
• The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense that it would
be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused at P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of
bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense.
o A hearing is necessary for the court to take into
consideration the guidelines in fixing the amount of bail
13 set forth in Section 9, Rule 114:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines. — The judge who issued
the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to the
following factors:
a. Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
b. Nature and circumstance of the offense;
c. Penalty for the offense charged;
d. Character and reputation of the accused;
e. Age and health of the accused;
f. Weight of the evidence against the accused;
g. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; \
h. Forfeiture of other bail;
i. The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
j. Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required
• There is no evidence of malice or bad faith on the part of
respondent when he granted bail to Peñaforida.
• Complainant failed to prove that respondent had prior
knowledge of the existence of a deportation order or that
the latter was informed by the BOI of the deportation
order dated September 14, 2001.
• The deportation order became final only on October 15,
2001.
o Prior thereto, respondent issued on September
18, 2001 a hold-departure order against
Peñaflorida. Respondent directed the BOI not to
allow Peñaflorida from leaving the country since
a warrant for his arrest was already issued by
the court.
o On October 15, 2001, the Notice of Arraignment
was served to Peñaflorida through the BOI.
o In the hearing of November 19, 2001, the
personnel of the BOI escorted Peñaflorida by
 reason of the warrant of arrest and hold
departure order issued by the court
• From these facts, we cannot simply conclude that Judge
had prior knowledge of the deportation order and
maliciously thwarted its effect by granting bail to
Peñaflorida.
• However, respondent cannot escape administrative
liability by invoking unawareness of the deportation
order.
• Absent evidence of malice, respondent's lack of
knowledge of the deportation order will only free him
from administrative liability for gross misconduct but not
for gross ignorance of the law for disregarding the rules
on bail.

􏰆

[05] SERAPIO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 148468 | January 28, 2003 | RULE 114 - Bail | Jan Harrley Pandy
Petitioner: ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
LEANDRO MENDOZA
Recit-Ready: (haba nito peace)
The Ombudsman charged Atty. Serapio, in conspiracy with former Pres. Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada for plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional
release of all of the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the accused. Atty.
Serapio voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, pursuant to the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of all of the accused. Atty. Serapio filed an
Urgent Petition for Bail. Jinggoy Estrada also filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right. The prosecution moved for
the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than scheduled.
Sandiganbayan denied the prosecution’s motion, and issued an order declaring that
the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioner’s arraignment and
even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail. Later on, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motions of the accused.
Sandiganbayan reset the bail hearing because the petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan, a motion to quash the Information. Later on, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion.
Sandiganbayan, again, reset the bail hearing because the petitioner filed with the
Supreme Court a writ of habeas corpus and certiorari.
The Court ruled that a person is allowed to petition for bail as soon he is deprived of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait
for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. For bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence
against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the
circumstances. The Sandiganbayan exceeded jurisdiction when it ordered the
arraignment of the petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for
bail.
The Court also ruled that A person may file a motion to quash the Information during
the pendency of his petition for bail. For a bail is the security given for the release of
a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee
his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under
the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged
with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance
at the trial. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed
against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information.
The Court also ruled that it is a matter of discretion on the trial court whether or not
to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with 2 or more other petitions filed by 2
or more different co-accused. The court must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and
the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of the accused
to a speedy trial. It must also consider complexities of the cases and of the factual
and legal issues involving the petitioner and the other accused. In this case,
however, the joint hearing of the petition for bail of all of the accused would work
injustice to the petitioner due to the fact that he is co-accused with the former Pres.
Estrada. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against the former Pres.
Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature
of the bail hearing. The joinder of the hearing of the petitioner’s bail petition with the
trial of the former Pres. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay
the determination of the issue of the right of the petitioner to obtain provisional liberty
and seek relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court.
Lastly, the Court ruled that as a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under
a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus, may be granted by the courts even when the person
concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this
writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut
through the barriers of form and procedural mazes.” The Court, in this case, found
no basis for the issuance of issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of the
petitioner. It applied the general rule that habeas corpus does not lie when the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to order the arrest. After the
Sandiganbayan issued the order of arrest of the petitioner, he voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities.
Doctrine:
A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment
before filing a petition for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. Further, if the court finds in
such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is
not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in
such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances.
A person may file a motion to quash the Information during the pendency of his
petition for bail. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody
of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until
his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. On the
other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face
of the Information.
The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of 2 or more petitions for bail
filed by 2 different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the
trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
The court must take into account not only the convenience of the State, including
the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the
prosecution and the accused and the right of the accused to a speedy trial. It must
also consider complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
the petitioner and the other accused.
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the
court which has jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus,
may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant
to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
“the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut through the barriers of form and
procedural mazes.” A petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting one’s right to bail. It cannot be availed of where the accused is entitled to
bail as not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the court has
not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said
discretion.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Edward Serapio: member of the Board of Trustees & Legal
Council of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
a. Non-stock, non-profit foundation established for the purpose of
providing educational opportunities for the poor and
underprevileged Muslim youth & students; support to research
and advance studies of Muslim educators & scientists
2. Petitioner received, as trustee of the Foundation, a donation of P200M
from Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson.
3. Gov. Singson publicly accused Pres. Estrada and his cohorts for engaging
in several illegal activities, including its operations on jueteng.
4. Several criminal complaints were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, petitioner, etc.
5. Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit.
6. Office of the OMB conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints
and issued a joint resolution recommending that Joseph, petitioner, and
others be charged with plunder.
7. OMB filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against Pres.
Estrada. One of these Informations, charged him with plunder.
8. OMB filed an amended Information charging Estrada and several co-
accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended
for the provisional release of all the accused.
9. Petitioner obtained a copy of the OMB’s Joint Resolution finding probable
cause against him for plunder. The next day, he filed with the Office of the
OMB:
a. MR and/or Reinvestigation.
b. Urgent Omnibus Motion:
i. To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
and Further Proceedings
ii. To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause
iii. For Leave to File Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation
 iv. To Direct the OMB to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against accused
10. OMB issued an order denying petitioner’s MR and/or reinvestigation for
lack of jurisdiction since the amended Info charging petitioner with plunder
had already been filed with the SB.
11. PARALLEL DEVELELOPMENT – SB issued Resolution finding probable
cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused. SB
issued an Order for the arrest of the petitioner.
12. Petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45PM on the same day to PNP
Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. He was detained at Camp Crame.
13. Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused.
a. Petitioner filed an Urgent Petition for Bail
b. Jinggoy Estrada filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that
he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
14. Sandiganbayan issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and
should be heard before petitioner’s arraignment and even before the
other accused in Criminal Case filed their respective petitions for bail. SB
set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner’s petition for
bail.
15. 4 days before the hearing on petitioner’s petition for bail, OMB filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment and motion for joint bail hearings of
the accused.
16. SB issued a Resolution denying the Urgent Omnibus Motion. It ruled that
the issues posed by petitioner had already been resolved in the Reso
finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-accused for trial.
Petitioner filed MR of this Resolution.
17. SB issued a resolution requiring the attendance of the accused during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-
examination.
a. It directed the accused to participate in the bail hearing
considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of Revised Rules of
Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing be
automatically reproduced at the trial.
18. HOWEVER, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing, SB issued an
Order canceling the said bail hearing due to pending incidents yet to be
resolved. The hearing was again reset.
19. On the eve of the hearing, SB issued a reso denying petitioner’s MR. Bail
hearing did not again proceed.
20. Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari
a. Prayer #1: Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions,
and actions of the SB on the ground of denial of his right to due
process.
b. Prayer #2: Issuance of writ of habeas corpus, that the People be
declared to have waived their right to present evidence in
popposition to his petition for bail; and premised on the failure of
the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt of
plunder, that he be granted provisional liberty on bail after due
proceedings.
21. Jinggoy Estrada filed with SB a motion to resolve his motion to fix his bail.
22. SB issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash the amended
Information. Jinggoy’s motion to fix bail was resolved by the SB.
ISSUES: (all related to bail L-O-L)
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before the hearing of his
petition for bail may be conducted.
(2) Whether the petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information
during the pendency of his petition for bail.
(3) Whether a joint hearing for bail is mandatory.
(4) Whether the petitioner was deprived of his due process and should thus be
released from detention via writ of habeas corpus.
RATIO:
(1) No. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon he is deprived of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused
need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean
that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede
arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is
filed against him. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment.
The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may
also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court
finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
“authorized” under the circumstances.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment
of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
(2) Yes. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth
under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty
of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial. A person may apply for
bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An
accused may file a Motion to Quash the Information, as a general rule,
before arraignment. These 2 reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused
to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with
an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing,
evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his
right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such
offense.
It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal
complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not charge
any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is
ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot
and academic.
(3) No. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of 2 or
more petitions for bail filed by 2 different accused or to conduct a
hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its
discretion. Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the
convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused
and the right of the accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must
also consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal
issues involving the petitioner and the other accused.
In this case, although a joint hearing of 2 separate petitions for bail by
2 accused will result to avoid duplication of time and effort to both
prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused,
the joinder of the hearing of the petition for bail of the petitioner with the
trial case of Pres. Estrada is an entirely different matter. The proceeding
assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will no
longer be summary. As against the former Pres. Estrada, the
proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature
of the bail hearing. The joinder of the hearing of the petitioner’s bail
petition with the trial of the former Pres. Estrada will be prejudicial to
petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the
right of the petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from
this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. The Court
finds that Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering that
the petition for bail by the petitioner and the trial of former Pres. Estrada
be held jointly.
(4) No. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In
exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus, may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as
“the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut
through the barriers of form and procedural mazes.” A petition for
habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right
to bail. It cannot be availed of where the accused is entitled to bail as
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the court
has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion.

In this case, the Court found no basis for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas
corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because the petitioner
is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan after the filing of the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against the petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities
upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.

06 ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 213847 | August 18, 2015 | Rule 114, Sec. 4, 5, 7, 18, 19 | Nicole
Petitioner: JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Respondents: SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Recit-Ready: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their alleged involvement in the misappropriation of
PDAF. Enrile filed his Omnibus Motion to allow him to post bail should there be probable
cause, which the SB denied for being filed prematurely as Enrile has not been arrested
nor has voluntarily surrendered. Consequently, the SB ordered his arrest. Enrile
voluntarily surrendered to CIDG Director Magalong in Camp Crame and was then
confined in PNP General Hospital.
Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail arguing that he should be allowed to post bail as the
prosecution has not yet established that his guilt was strong, and he was not a flight risk,
due to his age and physical condition. However, SB denied both his Motion and
consequent MR ruling that it is only after the prosecution has presented its evidence and
the Court shall have made a determination that evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Thus, Enrile filed this Petition for
Certiorari.
w/n the SB committed GADALEJ in denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail? YES
The Court held that the SB committed GADALEJ when it ignored the objective of bail
which is to ensure the appearance of the accused during trial; and disregarded the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. Further, with his solid reputation in both his public
and private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake alongside fragile state of health present compelling justifications to grant bail. This
FACTS:
is to enable him to have his medical condition properly addressed which would then aid
him in preparing for his defense, and more importantly, guarantee his appearance in
court.
Doctrine: (there’s a lot so pls refer to ratio for other details)
Purpose of Bail: to guarantee the appearance of accused at trial, or when required
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or discretion
GR: Prior to conviction, matter of right
XPN: Charged with crime punishable by death, life imprisonment, or RP and evidence
of guilt is strong, not bailable
Matter of Right Matter of Discretion
1. All those within MTC, MCTC, MeTC UPON CONVICTION by RTC
2. PRIOR TO CONVICTION - Offense NOT punishable by D,L,RP or
- RTC for any offense NOT D,L,RP or - Has imposed penalty of imprisonment
- RTC for offense D,L,RP AND evidence of exceeding 6y provided NONE OF
guilt is not strong CIRCUMSTANCES in Sec 5(3) is present
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or endanger his life. (Dela Rama v. People’s Court)
Admission to bail in offenses punished by D,L,RP is subject to judicial discretion
- May be exercised only after hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt
- Bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion unless there has
been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution (REQUIRED).
- To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution
must be consulted or heard as it is equally entitled as the accused to due
process.
- Certain guidelines in fixing of bail call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for prosecution to refute it: nature and circumstances
of crime, character and reputation of accused, weight of evidence against him,
probability of accused appearing in trial
Guidelines for Resolving Bail Applications (Cortes v. Catral)
1. In all cases, matter of right or discretion, notify prosecutor of the hearing or
require him to submit his recommendation (Sec. 18, Rule 114)
2. When matter of discretion, conduct a hearing regardless w/n prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that guilt of accused is strong to enable
court to exercise sound discretion (Sec. 7-8, Rule 114)
3. Decide whether guilt of accused is strong based on summary evidence of
prosecution
4. If guilt is not strong, discharge accused upon approval of bail bond (Sec. 19,
Rule 114). Otherwise, deny petition.
1. On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
2. On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him.
3. The motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.
4. The Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly
on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile
had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.
5. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
 6. On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following
his medical examination.
7. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital,
and his Motion to Fix Bail. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he
should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was
charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal,
not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
8. Sandiganbayan issued both assailed resolutions denying Enrile’s Motion to
Fix Bail and Motion for Reconsideration ruling that it is only after the
prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made
a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile
can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be
duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
9. SC PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65.
ISSUE: w/n the SB committed GADALEJ in denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail? YES
RATIO: Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the
court.
▪ The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the fundamental human
rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
▪ In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that
the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
▪ His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country.
▪ We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had
been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk.
▪ With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years
of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
Discussion on Bail
1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent
▪ The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail.
2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
▪ Section 7, Rule 114
▪ From the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or
restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the gua rantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right
to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with RP or life, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
▪ CIRCUMSTANCES: Sec. 5(3), Rule 114
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or
reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
▪ Discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain
the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of w/n he should
be granted provisional liberty.
▪ The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine w/n the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong.
 5.  Cubillas,  the  driver  of  Villaver’s  group  became  a  state  witness.  He  executed  an 
[07] PEOPLE v. ESCOBAR  extrajudicial  confession and implicated respondent Escobar as an adviser for Villaver. 
Cubillas believed that Escobar was involved after he saw Escobar talk to Villaver while 
GR No. 214300 | July 26, 2017 | Rule 114 | Ellyssa  they  were  in  Club  Solvento.  In  his  extrajudicial  confession, Cubillas also claimed that 
Petitioner: ​People of the Philippines  Escobar received a portion of the ransom money from Villaver. 
Respondents: ​Manuel Escobar  6.  An  Amended  Information  was  filed  charging  Escobar  as  a  co-conspirator    in  the 
Recit-Ready:  ​Escobar   was  suspected  of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary  kidnapping for ransom. 
Grace,  daughter  of  Filipino-Chinese  businessman  Robert  Cheng  and  2  other  victims.  7. Escobar was arrested. 
Escobar  was  the  resort  owner  where  the  suspects  stayed  and  Escobar  personally  8. Escobar filed the ​First Bail Petition before the RTC. During the hearing on Escobar's 
served  them  food.  The state witness implicated Escobar as an adviser for the leader of  bail  application,  Cubillas  testified  that  Escobar  and  the  Fajardo  brothers  were 
the  suspects.  An  Amended  Info  was  filed  charging  Escobar  as  a  co-conspirator.  Villaver's advisers. The RTC denied the First Bail Petition. 
Escobar  was  arrested.  Escobar  filed  the  First  Bail  Petition.  During  the  hearing  for  bail  9.  Escobar  appealed  before  the  Court  of  Appeals.  ​The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  ​the 
application,  the  state  witness  testified  that  Escobar  and  Fajardo  brothers  were  denial of the First Bail Petition. 
advisers.  The  RTC  denied  bail,  as  well  as  the  CA.  Pending  Escobar’s  MR  of  the  CA  10. Escobar moved to reconsider the Court of Appeals Decision. 
Decision,  Rolando  Fajardo  was  arrested.  Fajardo’s  bail  application  was  initially  denied  11.  Pending  the  proceedings  on  Escobar's  case,  the  police  arrested  1  of  the 
relying  on  the  statements  of  the  state  witness,  but  the  RTC  reversed  and  granted  the  co-accused  Fajardo  brothers,  Rolando,  who  applied  for  bail  before  the  RTC.  As  in 
bail  application.  The  reversal  came  about  after  RTC  considered  that  accdg  to  state  Escobar's  bail  hearing,  the  prosecution  relied  solely  on  Cubillas'  statements  to 
witness,  Fajardo  was  not  present  before,  during  and  after  the  kidnapping.  The  CA  establish  the  strength  of  Fajardo's  guilt.  The  RTC  denied  Rolando's  petition  for  bail. 
denied  Escobar’s  MR.  Only  Escobar  was  detained  as  all  the  other  accused  had  been  However,  later  on,  the  RTC  reversed  its  previous  order  and  ​granted  Rolando's  bail 
granted  bail.  Escobar  saw  Fajardo’s  release  as  a  new  "development which warrant[ed]  application.  The  reversal  came  about  after  the  trial  court  considered  that,  ​according 
a  different  view"  on  his  own  bail  application.  The  RTC  denied  on  the  ground  of  res  to Cubillas, "[Rolando] was not present before, during and after the kidnapping.​" 
judicata  and  also  denied  the  MR.  Escobar  appealed  before  the  CA,  and  was  granted  12.  Meanwhile,  on  October  27,  2011,  the  Court  of  Appeals  denied  Escobar's  motion 
bail. The SC held that Second Bail Petition is not barred by res judicata.   for  reconsideration.  He no longer appealed before this Court. Only Escobar was left in 
Doctrine:  ​Res  judicata  applies  only  in  a  ​final  judgment  in  a  civil  case​,  not  in  an  detention  pending  the  final  judgment  on  the  merits  of  the  case  as  all  the  other 
interlocutory  order  in  a  criminal  case.  An  order  disposing  a  petition  for  bail  is  accused who had active participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail. 
interlocutory.  This  order  does  not  attain  finality  when  a  new  matter  warrants  a  13.  Escobar  saw  Rolando's  release  on  bail  as  a  new "development which warrant[ed] 
second look on the application for bail.  a different view" on his own bail application. 
14.  Escobar  filed  another  petition  for  bail  (​Second  Bail  Petition​)  before  the  RTC.  He 
FACTS:  noted  that  Cubillas  could  not  explain  how  either  Rolando  or  Escobar advised Villaver 
1.  ​Mary  Grace,  her  bodyguard  Torres,  and  her  driver  Burca were blocked by a vehicle,  and  that  both  Rolando  and  Escobar  were  absent  before,  during,  and  after  the 
and 4 armed men forced them inside the vehicle.  kidnapping.  Hence, if Rolando's petition for bail was granted based on the unreliability 
2. Alleged group leader Villaver  and some of the suspects then travelled and detained  of  Cubillas'  testimony,  Escobar reasoned that the trial court should likewise grant him 
Mary Grace, Burca, and Torres in an undisclosed location in Batangas. Afterwards, the  provisional release. 
group  headed  to  Club  Solvento,  a  resort  in  Calamba,  Laguna  owned by Escobar, who  15.  RTC  denied Second Bail Petition on the ground of res judicata. Escobar moved for 
personally served them food.  reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC. 
3.  Villaver  and  others  left  to  negotiate  the  price  for  the  victims'  release.  Cheng  paid  16.  Escobar  appealed  before  the  CA  via  Rule  65,  arguing  that  the  trial  court 
the ransom of P15,000,000.00.  committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Second Bail Petition. 
4.  At  7:00  p.m.  on  the  same  day,  Villaver's  group  returned  to  Club Solvento, followed  17.  The  CA  granted  the  petition  for  certiorari  and  ordered  the  RTC  to  determine  the 
by  co-accused  brothers  Rolando  and Harold Fajardo (the Fajardo brothers), who were  appropriate  bail  for  Escobar's  provisional  liberty.  The  CA  denied  the  prosecution's 
alleged  advisers  of  Villaver​.  The  group  then  locked  themselves  in  a  room  where  Motion for Reconsideration. 
Villaver  partitioned  the  ransom  money.  At  10:30  p.m.  on  the  same  day,  Mary  Grace,  18.  The  prosecution,  through  the  Office  of  the  Solicitor  General,  filed  a  Petition  for 
Burca, and Torres were finally released.   Review​ ​via Rule 45 before the SC. 
ISSUES: ​whether or not the Second Bail Petition is barred by r​ es judicata? ​NO  Rolando Fajardo’s release on bail is a new development in Escobar’s case 
RATIO:  - Other  alleged  co-conspirators  are  already  out  on  bail:  Rolando  was 
Escobar’s  bail  is  a  matter  of judicial discretion ​provided that evidence of his guilt  granted bail because Cubillas’ testimony against him was weak 
is not strong  - Escobar  and  Rolando  participated  in  the  same  way,  but  Escobar’s  bail 
- If  accused  is  charged  with  an  offense  the  penalty  of  which  is  death,  was denied 
reclusion  perpetua,  or  life  imprisonment  ​and  when  evidence  of  one’s  - The  same  evidence  used  by  the  trial  court  to  grant  bail  to  Rolando  was 
guilt  is  NOT  strong,  then  the  accused’s  prayer  for  bail  is  subject  to  the  not used similarly in Escobar’s favor 
discretion of the trial court   
- Imposable  penalty  for  kidnapping  for  ransom  is  death,  reduced  to 
reclusion perpetua. 
- Escobar’s  bail  is  a  matter  of judicial discretion ​provided that evidence of 
his guilt is not strong 
 
Res judicata​ is not recognized in criminal proceedings. 
- “A matter adjudged” 
- “Res  judicata  is  a  doctrine  of  civil  law  and  thus  has  no  bearing  on 
criminal proceedings.” (Trinidad v. Office of the Ombudsman) 
- While certain provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in 
criminal  cases,  Rule  39  (which  is  res  judicata)  is  excluded  from  the 
enumeration under Rule 124 of Rule of Crim Pro 
 
Even  if  we  are  to  expand  the  argument  of  prosecution  to  contemplate  ​“res 
judicata ​in prison grey” or double jeopardy, the same will still not apply. 
- Double  jeopardy  requires  that  the  accused  has  been  convicted  or 
acquitted  or  that  the  case  against  him  or  her  has  been  dismissed  or 
terminated without his express consent 
- While  there  was  an  initial  ruling  on  First  Bail  Petition,  Escobar  has  not 
been convicted, acquitted, or has had his case dismissed or terminated. 
 
Even  assuming  that  this  case  allows  for ​res judicata as applied in civil cases, not 
barred as there is no final judgment on the merits. 
- Res  judicata  applies  only  if  there  is  a  final  judgment  on  the  merits  of  a 
case 
- It  cannot  be  availed  of  in  an  interlocutory  order  even  if  this  order  is  not 
appealed 
- A decision denying bail application settles only a collateral matter 
 
 
   
 each] Further, accused Oliver Buclao is ordered to pay the victim child the amount
[8] PEOPLE v. BUCLAO of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and another
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two counts of Rape.
GR No. 2014 | Leonen J. | June 11, 2014 | Rule 114 | Jonathan
On review, CA affirmed w/ modification. From RAPE to QUALIFIED RAPE, and
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, in lieu of death, without eligibility for parole, for
Respondents: Oliver A. Buclao
each case. [Same lang civil indemnities]
Recit-Ready: Buclao was charged with two counts of rape (Article 266-A, par. 1 (a
On September 11, 2013, SC issued a resolution which noted the records forwarded
& c)). Buclao pleaded not guilty. trial court rendered judgment finding accused-
by the Court of Appeals, notified the parties that they may file their respective
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for 2 counts of rape. CA affirmed w/
supplemental briefs if they so desire, and required the Chief Superintendent of the
modification. From RAPE to QUALIFIED RAPE, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
New Bilibid Prison (NBP) to confirm the confinement of accused-appellant. NBP
in lieu of death, without eligibility for parole, for each case. In the SC, they said that
confirmed the confinement. PAO signified that they would no longer file a
all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the Court of Appeals was
supplemental brief
correct in modifying the trial court’s decision. Doctrine: Under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the
In his brief, Buclao argued that examination of private complainant resulted in a
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of death was prohibited, and the
possibility that no penis entered private complainant’s vagina. Moreover he
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed
questioned the delay in AAA’s reporting of the incident, and the motive of the
instead. The suspension of the death penalty in cases where the father rapes his
grandmother for filling charges.
daughter should not, however, be misinterpreted as reducing the heinous nature of
this crime. No matter how high the penalty, our legal system cannot assuage the
The OSG, argued that AAA’s positive identification of Buclao and her categorical
deepest injuries caused by the abuse of trust committed by the father.
testimony of the circumstances during the two rape incidents cannot be easily
overcome by bare assertions of alibi and denial. Moreover, absence of lacerations
FACTS: Buclao was charged with two counts of rape (Article 266-A, par. 1 (a & c)). in the victim’s genitals does not negate the commission of rape. Rape is also not
Buclao pleaded not guilty. negated by the delay in the reporting of the incident, particularly when the delay
was founded on the threats by the accused-appellant to the victim’s life.
During trial, private complainant AAA testified that was sexually assaulted twice.
AAA was afraid so she kept the incident a secret. It was in 2006 when AAA told ISSUES: whether the accused-appellant is guilty of two counts of rape beyond
her maternal grandmother about the rape. They reported the incident to the police reasonable doubt. - YES
on April 4, 2006.
RATIO: [Walang bail na nadiscuss sa case, obiter lang itong na sa baba pero siya
The prosecution also presented a doctor that testified he found no injuries to AAA. na yung pinaka malapit sa 114, kasi may discussion ng penalty at capital
However, he clarified that lack of evident injuries in the genitalia does not negate punishment.]
the possibility of sexual abuse.
With all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the CA was correct
Buclao denied the allegations. During trial, he admitted that he was convicted for in modifying the trial court’s decision. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
a previous case of child abuse. His daughters testified for the defense and claimed Code, the proper penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of
there was no truth to AAA’s stories. Republic Act No. 9346, the imposition of death was prohibited, and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed instead.
On August 17, 2011 the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, FOR 2 COUNTS OF RAPE [Reclusion Perpetua
The suspension of the death penalty in cases where the father rapes his daughter
should not, however, be misinterpreted as reducing the heinous nature of this
crime. No matter how high the penalty, our legal system cannot assuage the
deepest injuries caused by the abuse of trust committed by the father.

In rape cases, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the
commission of rape, whereas moral damages are automatically awarded without
the need to prove mental and physical suffering. Exemplary damages are also
imposed, as example for the public good and to protect minors from all forms of
sexual abuse.

In People v. Gambao, we increased the amounts of indemnity and damages where

the proper penalty for the crime committed by the accused is death but where it
cannot be imposed because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. We
imposed as a minimum the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In view of the depravity of the acts in this crime committed in this case — multiple
rape of a minor by her father — we further increase the amounts awarded to private
complainant, AAA. Hence, we modify the award of civil indemnity from 75,000.00)
to ₱150,000.00; moral damages from 50,000.00 to ₱150,000.00; and exemplary
damages from ₱30,000.00 to ₱100,000.00.