Case D:

FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29

Facts:

The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter.

Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court
in the

Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

Issues:

Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision

Ruling:

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for... the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs."

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance"
to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore,
petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has
been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

Held:

The ruling in the Habaluyas case should be made to apply to the case at bar, notwithstanding the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.

There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which are published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

The ruling in the Habaluyas case was that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended. Such motion may be filed only in cases pending in the Supreme
Court as the court of last resort, which in its discretion may grant or deny the extension requested. Such
decision was given prospective application to subsequent cases like Lacsamana vs Second Special
Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and Bacaya vs Intermediate Appellate Court.
Case G.

DM Consunji v. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001

FACTS:
A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which he was on board fell from
the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened
because the pin inserted to the platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with
RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the widow
already availed benefits from the State Insurance Fund and that she cannot recover civil damages from
the company anymore.

ISSUE:
W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she already
availed damages under the Labor Code

HELD:
Although SC ruled that recovery of damages under the Worker’s Compensation Act is a bar to recover
under a civil action, the CA ruled that in this case, the widow had a right to file an ordinary action for
civil actions because she was not aware and ignorant of her rights and courses of action. She was not
aware of her rights and remedies. Thus, her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not waive
her claim from the petitioner company. The argument that ignorance of the law excuses no one is not
applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and prohibitory laws.
Case J
vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest
therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Case K
TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became
a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had
always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California
law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends
that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California
law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed
by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and
the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict
rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to
follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.” Christensen being domiciled
outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back
to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both countries back and forth,
Case N
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
REGALADO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila
and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in
Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on January
23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a
certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter,
petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez
issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

Held:
The law provides that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private respondent
is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Case O

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely:
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The
second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure
to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On
September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity
of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings
Case P

Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815

Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Ruling
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
vs.
Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:
On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later confirmed and revealed to
have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search
warrant) in the boarding house of his children. They pointed their guns on him and tied him and pulled
him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Later, an
operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The firearm according to the
petitioner was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing
a revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing the necessary license/permit. The petitioner
through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

HELD/DECISION:
Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested
lawfully may be searched so that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to
resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and to make sure that the arrest will happen.
This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid arrest
allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate
control. Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and
placed outside the room where the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could
not be “in his immediate control.” Incidental searches without a warrant states that officers are
permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the arrest under the “plain view
doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore not
incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.
 Case R
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. G.R. No. 168129. April 24, 2007
FACTS:

On 1987, CIR issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth, as a provider of medical services, is
exempt from the VAT coverage. When RA 8424 or the new Tax Code was implemented it adopted the
provisions of VAT and E-VAT. On 1999, the BIR sent Philhealth an assessment notice for deficiency VAT
and documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and 1997. After CIR did not act on it, Philhealth filed
a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA withdrew the VAT assessment. The CIR then filed an appeal
with the CA which was denied.
ISSUES:

1. Whether Philhealth is subject to VAT.

2. Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting Philhealth from payment of VAT has retroactive application.
RULING:

YES. Section 103 of the NIRC exempts taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital,
and veterinary services from VAT. But, in Philhealth's letter requesting of its VAT-exempt status, it was held
that it showed Philhealth provides medical service only between their members and their accredited
hospitals, that it only provides for the provision of pre-need health care services, it contracts the services of
medical practitioners and establishments for their members in the delivery of health services.
Thus, Philhealth does not fall under the exemptions provided in Section 103, but merely arranges for such,
making Philhealth not VAT-exempt. YES. Generally, the NIRC has no retroactive application except when:

1. where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document
required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the
facts on which the ruling is based, or
3. where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.

The Court held that Philhealth acted in good faith. The term health maintenance organization was first
recorded in the Philippine statute books in 1995. It is apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was
issued in Philhealth's favor, the term health maintenance organization was unknown and had no
significance for taxation purposes. Philhealth, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for
the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No. 231-88. The rule is that the BIR rulings
have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of the taxpayer.