1. Belyca Corporation vs.

Calleja
Facts:
• Respondent associate Labor Union filed with the Regional office of Ministry of Labor a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of Belyca Corporation
approximately having 205 rank and file employees
• In their CBA, in case of doubt of the union’s majority representation, the issuance of an immediate certification
election is included
• Respondent alleged that there was no CBA, that there was no certification election conducte, that more than a
majority of the rank and file workers consented to the filing of the petition, and that due to the notice of recognition
of being the sole bargaining unite, 119 members were dismissed with some officers
• Petitioner alleged that:
o Due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent an majority of the employees
are seasonal
o That 138 rank and file employees who authorized the filing:
 14 were no longer wrking
 4 resigned
 6 withdrew their membership
 5 were retrenched
 12 dismissed due to malicious insubordination
o That 128 incumbent workers were merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for
those who left
o The statutory requirement of holding a certification election has not been complied with
• LA: granted certification election
• Petitioner appealed to BLR,
ISSUE:
• WON respondent is an appropriate bargaining unit
HELD:
• No. According to Rothberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of employees of a given
employer comprised of all or less than all o the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all
the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law
• Among the factors considered are:
o The will of employees
o Affinity and unity of employee’s interest
o Prior collective bargaining history
o Employment status
• The court took notice of the last factor for this case.
• Employes of the livestock and agro division of petitioner perform work different from supermarts and cinema.
• To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns cannot result in an efficacious
bargaining unit
• These two different employees should have different unions

MECHANICAL DEPARTMENT LABOR UNION SA PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, petitioner, v. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA CALOOCAN SHOPS, respondents.
30 August 1968 | J. J.B.L. Reyes

FACTS: R Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan Shops filed a petition calling attention to the fact that there were
three unions in the Caloocan shops of the PNR (Samahan, Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company,
and Mechanical Department Labor Union), that no certification election had been held in the last 12 months, that both R
Samahan and P had submitted labor demands upon the management for which reason a certification election was
needed to determine the proper collective bargaining agency for the Caloocan shop workers. This was opposed by the
management and P.
- P previously certified as SEBA of EEs & laborers of PNR’s mechanical department
- Negotiated two bargaining agreements with management (1961, 1963)
- Renewal had been negotiated, contract remained to be signed
- Caloocan shops unit was not established nor separated from the Mechanical Department unit
- R composed mainly of supervisors who had filed pending case to be declared non-supervisors
- Purpose of petition was to disturb present smooth working labor management relations

CIR Judge Arsenio Martinez found that R was composed of workers exclusively at Caloocan shops of PNR chanrged with
the maintenance of rolling stocks for repairs - major repair of locomotives, engines, etc. It found that there is a community
of interest among the workers of the Caloocan shops, since they are grouped in one place and work under the same
conditions, and exposed to the same occupational risk. Though evidence on record shows that workers at the Caloocan
Shops perform the same nature of work as their counterparts in the Manila Shed, the difference lies in the fact that
workers at the Caloocan Shops perform major repairs of locomotives, rolling stocks, engines, etc., while those in the
Manila Shed, works on minor repairs. Heavy equipment and machineries are found in the Caloocan Shops.

History of collective bargaining in Manila Railroad Company:

Only one bargaining unit – represented by Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa MRR
Court ordered establishment of two additional units – engine crew (rep: Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudante Y
Motormen) and train crew (rep: Union de Empleados de Trenes)
Three new separate units established after EEs concerned voted in a plebiscite conducted by the court for separation
from existing bargaining units in the company – yard crew unit, station employees unit, and enginnering department
employees unit
First attempt of EEs of Mechanical Department to be separated as a unit was dismissed by SC

In view of its findings and the history of "union representation" in the railway company, indicating that bargaining units had
been formed through separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the workers' desire to
have their own representatives, and relying on the "Globe doctrine" (Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294)
applied in Democratic Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Judge Martinez held that the employees in the Caloocan
Shops should be given a chance to vote on whether their group should be separated from that represented by the
Mechanical Department Labor Union, and ordered a plebiscite held for the purpose.

P Union appealed to SC questioning the applicability under the circumstances of the “Globe doctrine” of considering the
will of the employees in determining what union should represent them.

ISSUE: W/N a plebiscite election should be held to determine whether EEs at the Caloocan shops desire R Union to be
separated from the P union so that it may be recognized as a separate bargaining unit.

RULING: YES. Under the Globe doctrine, bargaining units may be formed through separation of new units from
existing ones whenever plebiscites had shown the workers’ desire to have their own representatives. Technically,
this appeal is premature, since the result of the ordered plebiscite among the workers of the Caloocan shops may be
adverse to the formation of a separate unit, in which event, as stated in the appealed order, all questions raised in this
case would be rendered moot and academic.

Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the Caloocan
shops do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the Railway Company.
This question is primarily one of facts. The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic difference, in that those in the
Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but perform major repairs of
railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while the others only perform
minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops require special skill in the
use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the workers. In addition, the
record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union have been in existence for more
than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can not constitute a bar to the determination, by proper elections, of a new
bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.)

As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are actually supervisors, it
appears that the question of the status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not
constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question whether the
votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.

Whether or not the agreement negotiated by the appellant union with the employer, during the pendency of the original
petition in the Court of Industrial Relations, should be considered valid and binding on the workers of the Caloocan shops
is a question that should be first passed upon by the Industrial Court.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFLU-TUCP), vs.

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS (BLR) and SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF LABOR (SPFL),
respondents, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC. (PACEMCO), G.R. No. 77818 August 3, 1988

Will the direct certification of a labor union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers preempt and preclude the
calling of a certification election on petition of another labor union in the same establishment?

The direct certification was obtained on Jane 6, 1986, by the petitioner in this case, the National Association of Free Trade
Unions (NAFLU-TUCP), on the strength of its allegation, as confirmed by the med-arbiter, that there was no other labor
union requesting recognition as representative of the workers in their negotiations with the management of the Pacific
Cement Co. (PACEMCO). 1 On June 20, 1986, however, and also within the freedom period, the Southern Philippines
Federation of Labor (SPFL), the private respondent herein, filed a petition for certification election signed by 168 workers,
representing over 60% of the total number of rank-and-filers of the company. 2NAFTU, as forced intervenor, opposed the
petition, invoking its own earlier direct certification, but on August 11, 1986, the med-arbiter who had granted the same
reversed his previous order and authorized the holding of the certification election. 3 On appeal, his order was sustained
by the Bureau of Labor Standards, which held that the certification election was justified under the circumstances, adding
that the workers had the constitutional right to choose the labor union to represent them in negotiating with the
management. 4 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner then came to this Court to ask for the
reversal of the resolution of the public respondent dated October 24, 1986, on the ground that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion correctible by writ of certiorari.

The original Article 257 of the Labor Code provided as follows:

ART. 257. Procedure governing representation issues. — When a question concerning the representation
of employees is submitted to the Ministry, a Med-Arbiter shall hear and decide such controversy and
certify to the parties in writing the name of the labor organization that has been designated or selected by
the majority of the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit as the exclusive bargaining agent. If there is
any reasonable doubt as to which union the employees have chosen as their representative for the
purpose of collective bargaining, the Med-Arbiter shall order an election by secret ballot to be conducted
by the Ministry to ascertain the freely chosen representative of the employees concerned, under such
rules and regulations as the Ministry may prescribe, at which election representatives of the contending
parties shall have the right to act as inspectors. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes
cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers.

The petitioner contends that having been directly certified by the med-arbiter as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the workers, it cannot now be replaced through the certification election, which was not validly called under the above
provision. It stresses that the first method of choosing such representation is by direct certification and, once employed,
can no longer be undone by the certification election which, as the exception to the rule, should be applied only when
there is a reasonable doubt on the real choice of the laborers as their negotiating agent. In the view of the petitioner, there
is no such reasonable doubt to justify reversal of the med-arbiter's order of June 6, 1986.

For its part, the private respondent invokes the support of the 168 workers who had signed the petition for certification
election, including some of those who had earlier supposedly manifested their confidence in the petitioner union, and
argues that such change of support demonstrates the need for the holding of a certification election as required by the
said article. This election will erase once and for all the reasonable doubt as to the real choice of the union that will
represent the workers in the negotiation of the new collective bargaining agreement with PACEMCO, besides giving the
workers the freedom to which they are entitled in making this choice.

Assuming that the original provisions of Article 257 are still applicable in this case, the Court inclines to the position taken
by the private respondent as more conformable to the language and spirit of the said law. This rule precisely called for the
holding of a certification election whenever there appeared to be a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the union
directly certified had really been chosen by the majority of the workers as their exclusive bargaining representative. Such
was the situation in the case at bar. Moreover, a certification election is a more acceptable method than direct
certification, which under the provisions of the aforementioned article, should be resorted to only where there was no
doubt that the union so certified had the full or at least the majority support of the workers.

In the instant case, we find that the manifestation made by most of the workers in favor of NAFTU was later questioned on
the ground that it was obtained through the suspicious grant of a food subsidy to the signatories. 5This was denied by the
petitioner, which claimed that the said manifestation was spontaneous and voluntary. At any rate, whether true or not, the
charge generated the reasonable doubt that justified the med-arbiter in reversing his previous direct certification of the
petitioner and in authorizing the holding of a certification election instead.

It is noteworthy that since this case arose in 1986, an important change has been made in Article 257. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4,1987, the direct certification originally allowed in this article
has apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. This
amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which, assuming it was validly
made in favor of the petitioner in 1986, is no longer available to it now under the change in the said provision. The new
rule as amended by the executive order now reads as follows:

ART. 256. Representation issues on organized establishments. — In organized establishments, when a

petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Ministry
within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter
shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit. To have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit
must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified
as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the workers in the unit. When an election which provides for three
or more choices results in no choice receiving a majority of the valid cast, a run-off election shall be
conducted between the choices receiving the two highest number of votes.

Additionally, the record discloses that the certification election ordered by the med-arbiter and sustained by the Bureau of
Labor Relations was actually held on March 9, 1987, resulting in the victory of private respondent SPFL. 6Despite notices
duly received by it, the petitioner did not attend the pre-election conferences and did not participate in the said election
after its motion to reset it was denied. It now says the election should not have been held because this petition was
pending with the Court, although we had not issued any restraining order. It assumes too much, of course. In any event,
after it was ascertained that the SPFL had obtained 201 of the 212 votes cast at the certification election, it was
accordingly certified by the public respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. As such, it thereafter
negotiated and finally concluded a collective bargaining agreement with PACEMCO on September 15, 1987, which
contract is now in force. 7 This is a fait accompli that has rendered this case moot and academic.
It remains to stress, as we have repeatedly declared in earlier decisions, that the certification election is the most
democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their
representation in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. Any union sure of the support of the
workers should have no reason to resist the holding of a certification election where it can expect a vote of confidence
from them for its efforts and ability to improve their interests.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 79526 : December 21, 1990.]

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (NAFTU) vs. MAINIT LUMBER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
WORKERS UNION-UNITED LUMBER AND GENERAL WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES. (MALDECOWU-ULGWP)

FACTS:
On January 28, 1985, private respondent Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union-United Lumber and
General Workers of the Philippines, MALDECOWU-ULGWP (ULGWP, for short), a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment under Registry No. 2944-IP, filed with Regional Office No. 10,
Ministry of Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for certification election to determine the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative among the rank and file workers/employees of Mainit Lumber Development
Company Inc. (MALDECO), a duly organized, registered and existing corporation engaged in the business of logging and
saw-mill operations employing approximately 136 rank and file employees/workers. The case was scheduled for hearing
two (2) times. During the first scheduled hearing on February 20, 1985, the counsel for compulsory intervenor (now
petitioner), National Association of Free Trade Union (NAFTU) requested for postponement on the ground that he was
leaving for abroad. During the scheduled hearing of March 13, 1985, they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their
respective position papers within twenty (20) days.

Petitioner ULGWP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper alleged, among others: (1) that there was
no certification election conducted within 12 months prior to the filing of the petition; (2) that the petition was filed within
the 60 day freedom period, i.e. CBA expired on February 28, 1985; (3) that the petition is supported by the signatures of
101 rank and file employees out of a total of 201 employees of the employer or more than thirty percent (30%) than that
required by law

On April 11, 1985, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election. On April 26, 1985, NAFTU appealed the
decision of the Med-Arbiter on the ground that MALDECO was composed of two (2) bargaining units, the Sawmill Division
and the Logging Division, but both the petition and decision treated these separate and distinct units only as one

On April 28, 1986, the Bureau of Labor Relations affirmed the decision. Thus, a certification election was held on separate
dates at the employer’s sawmill division and logging area respectively. In said election MALDECOWU-ULGWP garnered
a total vote of 146 while NAFTU garnered a total of 2 votes

On July 26, 1986, NAFTU filed an election protest alleging massive vote buying accompanied with grave and serious
threat force and intimidation on the lives of 25 applicants as stated in a Joint Affidavit attached thereto

MALDECO filed its Manifestation on August 3, 1986, which corroborated petitioner’s stand. Attached to the said
Manifestation was a joint affidavit executed by thirty five (35) of its employees/workers

On September 3, 1986, private respondent filed its position paper. On September 8, 1986 petitioner filed its opposition to
private respondent’s position paper. On September 24, 1986, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the election protest.

On October 10, 1986, petitioner NAFTU appealed the order of the Med-Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila
which denied the appeal and the two motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

HELD:
In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the employer MALDECO was composed of two bargaining units, the Sawmill
Division in Butuan City and the Logging Division, in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan Norte, about 80 kilometers distant
from each other and in fact, had then two separate CBA’s, one for the Sawmill Division and another for the Logging
Division, both the petition and decision referred only to one bargaining unit; that from 1979 to 1985, the Ministry of Labor
and Employment recognized the existence of two (2) separate bargaining units at MALDECO, one for its Logging Division
and another for its Sawmill Division.
Significantly, out of two hundred and one (201) employees of MALDECO, one hundred seventy five (175) consented and
supported the petition for certification election, thereby confirming their desire for one bargaining representative

Moreover, while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate
bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of grouping is
community or mutuality of interests. This is so because “the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.” (Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., et al., 103 Phil. 1103 [1958]).

Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their
functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the same way that the company needs them both. There
may be difference as to the nature of their individual assignments but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the
formation of a separate bargaining unit.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107792. March 2, 1998
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-TUCP), Petitioners, v. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer
and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the elections were as follows:
National Federation of Labor (NFL) – 235, No Union – 466, Spoiled Ballots – 18, Marked Ballots – 9, Challenged Ballots –
7
However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa
Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later
affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).
On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU),
wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees
at the Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of
the rank and file employees of Permex Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE
On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter in
an order on August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On
October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-
Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer
ISSUE: WON the order of the Public Respondent of the conduct of certification election valid.
HELD: Yes, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED. Certification
election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company. But it is not enough that a union has the support of the
majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express
himself
The Contract Bar Rule is not applicable in this case. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of
the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier
entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex
Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees had not been established yet.

SAN MIGUEL CORP V. LAGUESMA GR NO. 110399

Topic: Determination of Appropriate bargain unit

FACTS:
On October 5, 1990, petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for District
Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry
Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante issued an Order ordering the conduct of certification among the supervisors and exempt
employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.

San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the Med-
Arbiters error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis, Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining
unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.

Respondent, Undersecretary Laguesma, granted respondent companys Appeal and ordered the remand of the case to
the Med-Arbiter of origin for determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as
supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and
Otis.

ISSUE/S:
1.WON Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential
employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining
unit?

RULING:
1. NO, the said employees do not fall within the term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a union.

There is no question that the said employees, supervisors and the exempt employees, are not vested with the powers and
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge or
dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of
the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not
allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. The only question that need be addressed is whether these employees are properly classified
as confidential employees or not.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if
an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the
employees and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business standpoint, such as financial
informationor technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a confidential employee.
Herein listed are the functions of supervisors 3 and higher:
1. To undertake decisions to discontinue/temporarily stop shift operations when situations require.
2. To effectively oversee the quality control function at the processing lines in the storage of chicken and other products.
3. To administer efficient system of evaluation of products in the outlets.
4. To be directly responsible for the recall, holding and rejection of direct manufacturing materials.
5. To recommend and initiate actions in the maintenance of sanitation and hygiene throughout the plant.
It is evident that whatever confidential data the questioned employees may handle will have to relate to their functions.
From the foregoing functions, it can be gleaned that the confidential information said employees have access to concern
the employers internal business operations.

The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of
management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the confidential
employee rule. The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a
potential conflict of interests. Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees
who are represented by the union with the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties
may obtain advance information of the company’s position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of
grievances, or other labor relations matters

2. YES, it can be a single bargaining unit.

An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than
all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining
provisions of the law.
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have community or mutuality of interest, which is the standard in
determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia
Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform
work of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in
concerted activities.

Toyota Motors Phil. Corp. vs. TMPC Labor Union

Facts:
On May 2000, Med-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the said order. Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the
DOLE Secretary. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota but the
latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The Union then filed a notice of strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation
considering that the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyota’s appeal. In relation to Toyota’s appeal, the parties
were invited to a hearing. Union members were not allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the
Union. But despite this, many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day which
caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and assembled before the Bureau of
Labor Relations.

Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly abandoned their work.
This resulted to another rally within Toyota’s premises as the strikers barricaded the entrances of Toyota preventing non-
strikers from going to work. On April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a
return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and June 2001, union members still
conducted rallies and pickets.

Issue:
Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.
Held:
Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227 employees were
terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said
that the strike conducted before the BLR is beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union
argues that the “strike” is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument
because the Union failed to provide evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this were the
kind of protest they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case involves a labor dispute.
The employees may shroud their “strike” as mere demonstrations covered by the constitution but in reality these are
temporary work stoppages.
The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute are illegal for they violated
the return-to-work order.

The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:

1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or

2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid
strike]; or

3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against
non-union employees; or

4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for
example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE
Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or

6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.

University of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja (1992)

Narvasa, C.J.:
FACTS:

 The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election
with the BLR.
o It claimed to have a membership of 3,236 members—more than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting
the non-academic personnel of four UP campuses (Diliman, Manila, Los Baños, and Visayas).
o UP did not object to the petition.
 Another labor union, the All UP Workers’ Union (All UP) filed a motion for intervention.
o It alleged that its membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel, and that it aims to
unite all rank-and-file employees in one union.
o It assented to the holding of the certification election provided the appropriate organizational unit was first
clearly defined.
o It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professorial Staff (REPS), who are
academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part of the organizational unit.
 UP’s General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions—one for the non-
academic/administrative, and one for the academic personnel.
 BLR Director Calleja: The appropriate organizational unit should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees.
o No evidence to justify the grouping of non-academic personnel separate from academic personnel.
o The Director quoted the pertinent provisions of EO 180 and its IRRs:

Section 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting of rank-and-file
employees, unless circumstances otherwise require.

Sec. 1, Rule IV. For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit may refer to:

xxx

d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

o General intent of the EO is not to “fragmentize” the employer unit, as can be gleaned from the definition
of the term “accredited employees’ organization,” which refers to:

“x x x a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in these rules recognized to

negotiate for the employees in an organizational unit headed by an officer with sufficient authority to bind
the agency, such as x x x state colleges and universities.”

o She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-
teaching.
 At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term “rank-and-file.” It claimed that there were some
teaching and non-teaching employees whose functions were in fact managerial and policy-determining.
 It sought the exclusion of high-level employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 180:

SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-making or managerial or whose
duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government
employees;
 It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:
o Those with the rank of Assistant Professor or higher;
o Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or higher.
 The University claims that these employees perform supervisory functions and are vested with effective
recommendatory powers. As to the professors, UP notes that these academic staff are members of the University
Council, a policy-making body.
 ONAPUP did not oppose UP’s classification. All UP remained firm in its stance to unite all the rank-and-file
employees under a single organizational unit.
 BLR Director Calleja (Second Order): Declared that the professors are rank-and-file employees.
o Sec. 1, Rule I, IRRs of EO 180:

High Level Employee — is one whose functions are normally considered policy determining, managerial
or one whose duties are highly confidential in nature. A managerial function refers to the exercise of
powers such as:

1. To effectively recommend such managerial actions;

 2. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or
3. To hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees.

o A careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy- making powers of the Council are limited
to academic matters, namely, prescribing courses of study and rules of discipline, fixing student
admission and graduation requirements, recommending to the Board of Regents the conferment of
degrees, and disciplinary power over students.
o On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level employees refers to labor-related
policies like hiring, firing, discipline, labor standards and benefits, and terms and conditions of
employment.
o MR filed by UP was denied.

ISSUES + RULING:
Are the professors, associate professors and assistant professors high-level employees? NO.

 The matter was correctly resolved by respondent Director.

 The College Academic Personnel Committee, through which the academic personnel purportedly perform their
supervisory functions, is actually tasked to:
1. Assist the Dean in setting up the details for the implementation of policies, rules, standards or general
guidelines as formulated by the University Academic Personnel Board;
2. Review the recommendations submitted by the DAPCs with regard to recruitment, selection, performance
evaluation, tenure, staff development, and promotion of the faculty and other academic personnel of the
College;
3. Establish departmental priorities in the allocation of available funds for promotion;
4. Act on cases of disagreement between the Chairman and the members of the DAPC particularly on personnel
matters covered by this Order;
5. Act on complaints and/or protests against personnel actions made by the Department Chairman and/or the
DAPC (Department Academic Personnel Committee).
 On the other hand, the University Academic Personnel Board performs the following functions:
1. Assist the Chancellor in the review of the recommendations of the CAPC'S.
2. Act on cases of disagreement between the Dean and the CAPC.
3. Formulate policies, rules, and standards with respect to the selection, compensation, and promotion of
members of the academic staff.
4. Assist the Chancellor in the review of recommendations on academic promotions and on other matters
affecting faculty status and welfare.
 It is clear that the high-level employees are those who comprise the UAPB. These would refer to the deans,
assistants for academic affairs, and the chief of personnel. They formulate rules, polices and standards respecting
selection, compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff.
 The functions of the DAPC and UAPB are merely recommendatory.
 Ultimately, the power to hire, fire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline employees rests
with the Board of Regents.
 It is also clear that ALL academic personnel cannot be considered high-level employees, because not all of them
are members of the DAPC/UAPB. They must be appointed or elected.
 Neither can membership in the University Council elevate the professors to the status of high-level employees.
o The actions of such council are always subject to the approval of the Board of Regents.
o In addition, the policy-determining functions of the University Council refer to academic matters, i.e. those
governing the relationship between the University and its students, and not the University as an employer
and the professors as employees. It is thus evident that no conflict of interest results in the professors
being members of the University Council and being classified as rank-and-file employees.

Should the academic employees comprise a bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the non-academic
employees of UP? YES.

 Bargaining unit – a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to
be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law.
 Labor laws do not provide criteria for determining the proper collective bargaining unit.
 Sec. 12 of RA 875 merely required an “appropriate bargaining unit.” This was retained in the Labor Code.
 Thus, the Court turned to American jurisprudence for guidance.
o Rothenberg:
1. Will of the employees (Globe doctrine);
2. Affinity and unit of employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity
of compensation and working conditions;
3. Prior collective bargaining history; and
4. Employment status, such as temporary, seasonal, and probationary employees.
o 10th Annual Report of the NLRB:
1. History, extent and type of organization of employees;
2. History of their collective bargaining;
3. History, extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same employer, or other
employers in the same industry;
4. The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees;
 5. The desires of the employees;
6. The eligibility of the employees for membership in the union/s involved; and
7. The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the employer’s organization, management and
operation.
o BASIC TEST: “A unit, to be appropriate, must affect a grouping of employees who have substantial,
mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.”
 Test applied: “community or mutuality of interests” test.
 In the case at bar, the employees can easily be categorized into two general classes:
o First—non-academic—janitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians,
ground-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and
o Second—academic—full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, research,
extension and professorial staff.
 It would seem obvious that teachers would find very little in common with the University clerks and other non-
academic employees as regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social life
and interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc.
 On the contrary, the dichotomy of interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the
compensation and working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of
these two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining.

DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.