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LIBUIT v.

PEOPLE Rule 115 – Rights of the Accused


7
G.R. No. 154363 9/13/2005 Quisumbing, J. Borja
Petitioners: Respondents:
Joel P. Libuit People of the Philippines

Recit Ready Summary

Libuit was accused of estafa. On arraignment, assisted by counsel, he pleaded not guilty. During trial, Libuit testified
on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza of De Jesus Linatoc and Associates,
withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. On motion of Libuit, the continuation of his cross-examination
was reset to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. Libuit eventually secured the services of Atty.
Jose Dimayuga. At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order, striking from the records Libuit’s direct testimony and declaring the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

The RTC convicted him of estafa. The CA affirmed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court sustains the conviction, finding proof of Libuit’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On the issue of Libuit’s right to counsel, the Court held that he was not deprived of such. The duty of the court to
appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one
is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment
and then trial with a counsel of his own choice.

In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the
trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-
examination.

At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with
the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse.

Facts

1. An information was filed against Libuit for estafa.


2. On arraignment, Libuit, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.
3. Factual antecedents:
a. Sometime in May 1993, the private complainant, Domingo del Mundo, brought his car for repair at
the Paeng Motorworks operated by Libuit. The car was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in
the presence of Libuit who assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor shop.
b. When private complainant del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by
the roadside while the engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out
because it also needed repairs. Nevertheless, the petitioner and Bautista assured him that they
would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundo's house after two weeks.
c. However, the petitioner failed to deliver the car to the owner. Private complainant gave him another
two weeks to finish the repairs. Thereafter, the private complainant returned to the motor shop and
found that his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that the
petitioner had sold the car's differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.
4. Libuit testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza of De Jesus
Linatoc and Associates, withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination.
5. On motion of Libuit, the continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the
services of another counsel. Libuit eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
6. At the subsequent hearings on October 13, 1997, and November 26, 1997, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear
despite notices.
7. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order dated November 26, 1997, striking from the
records Libuit’s direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
already on record.
8. After further proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on January 27, 1999, finding Libuit guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
9. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
10. The Court of Appeals likewise held that the trial court never deprived Libuit of his right to counsel as he was
represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said counsel withdrew, the trial court
allowed the resetting of Libuit’s cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of another counsel.
It ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed to appear at the
subsequent hearings.

Procedural History

1. This is the petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45) filed by Joel P. Libuit, seeking to reverse and set aside
the CA decision affirming the RTC decision finding him guilty of estafa.

Point/s of Contention

Libuit:
1. On the first issue, that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in convicting him without sufficient
evidence of his guilt. He contends that the trial court gravely misapprehended the facts in finding that the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence, under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, were present.
a. He stresses that the car was not entrusted to him and that he had no duty to deliver it to the private
complainant. He adds that the private complainant did not demand for the return of his car.
2. On the second issue, Libuit contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his
counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

Issues Ruling
1. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the petitioner's conviction? 1. YES
2. Was Libuit deprived of his right to counsel? 2. NO
Rationale
1. The elements of estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
a. that money, goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same;
b. that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt;
c. that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and,
d. that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
2. Based on the evidence, there is no doubt that petitioner operated the Paeng Motorworks. Private complainant
Domingo del Mundo categorically identified Libuit as the owner. There is no denying that Jose Bautista, to
whom the car was entrusted, was a mechanic in Libuit’s shop. Libuit could not disclaim responsibility for the
return of the car simply because it was his mechanic who received it. In fact, when the car was left with
Bautista, Libuit was present, and Libuit even assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor
shop.
a. Even if the Court gives credence to Libuit’s allegation that at the time the car was left, it was Bautista
who operated the motor shop by virtue of a verbal lease with his mother, he is still liable for estafa.
As alleged by Libuit himself, Bautista abandoned the motor shop on October 1993. Yet, he never
denied the fact that when the private complainant returned to the motor shop in January 1994, the
car and its engine were still there. By then, Libuit should have been put on notice as to the car’s
ownership. Notwithstanding this information, however, Libuit still sold its differential and cylinder
head.
b. On the issue of demand, demand was properly made when the private complainant returned to the
motor shop after giving Libuit a two-week extension to complete the car's repair. When the private
complainant went to the motor shop on January 1994, Libuit promised to deliver the car after two
weeks. When he failed in his promise, Libuit was given by the private complainant another two-week
extension. It was only when the car was still not delivered to the private complainant, that he went
back to the motor shop again, and finally discovered that his car was missing there.
c. Given the circumstances on record, Libuit’s acts are inexcusable and his testimony on the witness
stand unconvincing. His allegations now are nothing but a rehash of arguments he unsuccessfully
raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
d. It must be stressed that except for the Libuit’s claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right
to counsel, all the grounds raised by him now involve factual issues already passed upon twice
below, and are inappropriate in a petition for review under Rule 45, which allows only questions of
law to be raised.
e. Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on review by us, in the absence of any clear showing
that the lower courts overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the
disposition of the case. The jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals. The factual findings
of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
3. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and
desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment.
a. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel
of his own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense
arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
4. In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and
trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation
of his cross-examination.
a. Indeed, after his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion to postpone,
giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel. The failure of Atty. Jose
Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony,
and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to
appear of defendant's counsel at the trial may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the
court's proceedings.
5. At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary
with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse.
a. This Court is convinced that the trial court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by Libuit
himself. We think that such liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.

Dispositive Section

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision dated March 11, 2002, of the Court of Appeals upholding
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 85, in Criminal Case No. 972-94 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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