CHAPTER IX CADASTRAL REGISTRATION
G.R. No. 123780. September 24, 2002.*
IN RE: PETITION SEEKING FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO THE VALIDITY AND FORCEFUL
EFFECT OF TWO (2) FINAL AND EXECUTORY BUT CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
GROUP COMMANDER, INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY GROUP, PHILIPPINE ARMY,
represented by Colonel PEDRO R. CABUAY, JR., petitioner, vs. DR. POTENCIANO
MALVAR and MARCELINO LOPEZ, respondents. HEIRS OF ELINO ADIA, represented by
JULIANA ADIA, intervenors.
Civil Law; Property; Possession; The mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public land automatically
transforms the same into private property and vests title on the possessor.—To be more precise,
the property became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as early as 1950, or after the
lapse of 30 years of continued possession by Hermogenes and his father Fermin Lopez that
began in 1920. This is so because jurisprudence consistently declares that the mere lapse of the
statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive possession of disposable public
land automatically transforms the same into private property and vests title on the possessor.
Remedial Law; Judgments; Decision of the Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380 is the
law of the case binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their
authority to reverse.—We stress that the Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No.
90380 is the law of the case binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their
authority to reverse. We, therefore, rule that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
affirming the LMB decision in B.L. Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
90380. The Third Division of this Court was misled, so to speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that
“no reversible error was committed by the Appellate Court.”
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and
unappealable.[1] This is a fundamental and immutable legal principle. For (j)ust as a losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case[2] by the execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which is the life of the law.[3] Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule
and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory, must immediately be
struck down.[4]
For resolution is the motion for reconsideration filed by Dr. Potenciano Malvar and Marcelino
Lopez, respondents, of the Decision of this Court[5] in the instant case clarifying that the ruling of
the Third Division of this Court in G.R. No. 110900[6] prevails over the Decision rendered by the
First Division in G.R. No. 90380.[7]
The heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, the heirs of Elino Adia, Ambrosio Aguilar and Eduardo V.
Santos were engaged in a legal tug-of-war over the ownership of a parcel of land located in
Barrio De la Paz, Antipolo City with an area of 19 hectares, 48 ares and 88 centares more or
less, described and delineated in Plan H-138612.[8]
I Gorospe took possession and began to work on the property, introduced improvements thereon,
Records show that as early as 1920, Fermin Lopez was in possession of the land. He had it
declared in his name for taxation purposes and in 1928, filed a homestead application therefor.
After his death in 1943, his son Hermogenes Lopez continued occupying and cultivating the
land. In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes inquired from the Bureau of Lands about the status
of his late fathers homestead application. He learned that it was not acted upon. He then filed his
homestead application over the same land, docketed as Homestead Application No. 138612.
After he had shown full compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Act, the Director of
Lands, on February 7, 1939, approved Plan No. H-138612 in the name of Hermogenes Lopez.
Thereafter, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent to him.[9]
Hermogenes continued to occupy the land as its recognized owner until he transferred his rights
thereto in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar through a deed of sale executed on July 31, 1959.[10]
Records also show that on August 24, 1944, the land was registered in the name of Fernando
Gorospe under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 537, pursuant to Free Patent No. 54072
based on the same Homestead Application No. 138612 (of Hermogenes Lopez) but in Gorospes
name.[11] Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario de Tagle. Thus, OCT
No. 537 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 46580 was
issued in their names on August 17, 1944.[12] On December 9, 1947, spouses Tagle sold the
land to Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., who was then issued TCT No. 7375 after TCT No. 46580
was cancelled. Upon Zuzuarreguis death, the property was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui, who, on December 17, 1959, obtained TCT No. 72438 upon cancellation of TCT
No. 7375. On December 16, 1959, the widow sold the land to Eduardo Santos. Thus, TCT No.
72438 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 72439 was issued in his name.[13]
Since no certificate of title was yet issued to Hermogenes Lopez, on July 16, 1959, he filed with
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application for registration of the land, docketed
as General Land Registration Commission Records No. 2531. This was opposed by Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui and Eduardo Santos, claiming that the land was already registered under TCT No.
7375 in the name of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.. Thus, the proceedings were suspended.[14]
On December 21, 1959, Hermogenes Lopez filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint for
annulment of OCT 537 and all TCTs derived therefrom against Fernando Gorospe, spouses
Tagle, Beatriz de Zuzuarregui and Eduardo Santos. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
5957. However, the CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that Hermogenes Lopez was not
the real party-in-interest since he had sold the property to Ambrosio Aguilar in December of
1959.[15] This prompted Ambrosio Aguilar to file with the same CFI a similar action against the
same defendants, including the Director of Lands, docketed as Civil Case No. 24873. On April
15, 1981, the court rendered judgment in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar, declaring him the true and
lawful owner of the land in question and nullifying, for being void ab initio, OCT No. 537 in the
name of Fernando Gorospe and all subsequent Transfer Certificates of Title emanating
therefrom.[16]
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07475, the Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto the trial
courts judgment and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.[17]
Eduardo Santos then filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
90380. In a Decision[18] dated September 13, 1990, this Court (First Division) denied the
petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. Speaking through Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco, with Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Jutices Isagani A. Cruz, Carolina C. Grio-
Aquino and Leo D. Medialdea,[19] concurring, this Court ruled that Ambrosio Aguilar, successor-
in-interest of Hermogenes Lopez, is the lawful owner of the property and that with respect to
Eduardo Santos, successor-in-interest of Fernando Gorospe, the land in dispute was not
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, thus:
1. Records do not indicate that Fernando Gorospe (Eduardo Santos predecessor-in-interest)
filed any application for the parcel of land in question.[20] No evidence was submitted to prove
that the registration in Gorospes name was made pursuant to a satisfactory showing of his
compliance with the requirements for homestead application under the Public Land Act, i.e., that
and cultivated the same, etc..
2. Formidable pieces of evidence[21] were presented to support the claim of ownership of
Hermogenes Lopez, Ambrosio Aguilars predecessor-in-interest, over the property, to wit: (a) the
original tracing cloth of Plan H-138612 (Exhibit A-3) which was surveyed for Hermogenes Lopez;
(b) the Microfilm of Plan H-138612 bearing the corresponding Accession No. 103378 (Exhibit D-
1); (c) the Whiteprint of Plan H-138612, also bearing the same Accession No. 103378 (Exhibit
D); (d) the Inventory Book prepared in the year 1951 by the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit XX)
containing a list of salvaged plans, among which was Plan H-138612 as surveyed for
Hermogenes Lopez; (e) the Index Card of the Bureau of Lands (Exhibit XX-2) showing that Plan
H-138612 is one of the salvaged plans and that the same is in the name of Hermogenes Lopez;
(f) the consolidated Plan AP-6450 (Exhibit X) prepared by the Bureau of Lands which shows that
Hermogenes Lopez is the owner of the parcel of land covered by Plan H-138612; (g) Plans H-
147383, Psu-146727 and F 1543 showing the boundary of the land owned by Hermogenes
Lopez; and (h) testimonies of persons in the Bureau of Lands which proved that Hermogenes
Lopez filed a homestead application bearing No. H-138612 covering the property and that the
same was duly processed by the Bureau after he had complied with all the requirements of the
law.
3. Contrary to Eduardo Santos claim, he cannot be considered an innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value. He made admissions indicating previous knowledge of the status of the
property. Neither he nor his predecessor-in-interest, Fernando Gorospe, had been in possession
of the property. He also admitted his prior conviction for illegal construction for fencing the
property and constructing a hut thereon. Most telling was his opposition to the application for
registration of Hermogenes Lopez in General Land Registration Commission Records No. 2531
filed with the then CFI of Rizal on July 16, 1959. In other words, Eduardo Santos already knew
of the existence of Hermogenes claim on the property and yet, he persisted in acquiring the
same.
4. As an applicant-possessor who complied with all the necessary requirements for the grant by
the Government under the Public Land Act through actual, open, continuous and public
possession, Hermogenes Lopez, predecessor-in-interest of Ambrosio Aguilar, is deemed to
have already acquired by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but the grant itself by the
government for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued to Hermogenes in order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts - an application therefor being sufficient under the
law.
5. There were some irregularities in the issuance of OCT No. 537 in Fernando Gorospes name,
to wit: (a) although it appears on the very face of OCT No. 537 that it was issued because of
Homestead Plan H-138612, approved in the name of Hermogenes Lopez, the form used for
OCT No. 537 is for a free patent and not for a homestead patent; and (b) OCT No. 537 was
issued on August 24, 1944, while TCT No. 46580 derived therefrom, in the names of spouses
Tagle who bought the property from Fernando Gorospe, appears to have been issued ahead, or
on August 17, 1944, which means that OCT No. 537 was cancelled even before it was issued.
The above Decision in G.R. No. 90380 (rendered by the First Division) became final and
executory on November 29, 1990.[22]
III
It appears that the heirs of the late Elino Adia began pursuing their adverse claim of ownership
over the same property only in the early part of the 1980s.
In 1983, the Adia heirs filed protests with the Bureau of Lands, now known as Lands
Management Bureau (LMB), questioning the authenticity of the approved homestead patent of
Hermogenes Lopez. The then Regional Director Rodolfo A. Paelmo dismissed the protests,[23]
prompting the Adia heirs to charge him before the Tanodbayan with grave misconduct, abuse of
discretion and violation of Republic Act No. 3019. On February 14, 1983, these charges were
dismissed by the Tanodbayan.[24]
For their part, the Lopez heirs, on July 16, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 71, Antipolo City, a complaint for cancellation of the 1959 deed of sale executed
between their predecessor-in-interest, Hermogenes Lopez, and Ambrosio Aguilar over the
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A. The Lopez heirs alleged that the sale was made by
Hermogenes Lopez who was unsufficiently educated.[25] After hearing, the trial court rendered
its decision (a) declaring void ab initio the 1959 Lopez-Aguilar deed of sale, (b) decreeing the
Lopez heirs as the true and Absolute owners of the said parcel of land, and (c) restoring to the
Lopez heirs possession thereof.[26] The trial court found that Hermogenes sold the land to
Aguilar before the issuance of the corresponding homestead patent or title in his name.
Ambrosio Aguilar interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. CV No.
06242. During the pendency of this appeal, the Appellate Court issued an order of execution
pending appeal in favor of the Lopez heirs. On August 18, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC assailed decision.[27]
On March 28, 1985, the Adia heirs filed with the same RTC a separate action for partial quashal
of the writ of execution with application for preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.
613-A, against the Lopez heirs.
When the trial court did not take any action on their application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, the Adia heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as AC-
G.R. SP No. 05942. In a Decision dated July 15, 1985, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, holding that:
3. More importantly, the filing of the instant petition appears to be a last-ditched effort on
petitioners (Adia) part to prevent execution of two judgments confirming the validity of the
ownership of private respondents, through their predecessors-in-interest.
The due approval of the homestead application of Hermogenes Lopez in 1939 (in reiteration of
the application of his father Fermin) was confirmed in Civil Case No. 24873. Later, the alleged
sale of the property by the uneducated Hermogenes to the Aguilars was set aside in Civil Case
No. 463-A. In fine, it is now beyond dispute that private respondents (Heirs of Lopez) are the
judicially acknowledged and recognized owners of the property.
But this is not all. The authenticity of the title based on the homestead application of
Hermogenes Lopez was the subject of protests filed by herein petitioners with the Bureau of
Lands. These protests were, however, dismissed by Regional Director Rodolfo A. Paelmo, and
for such action the poor Director was even charged by petitioners before the Tanodbayan for
grave misconduct, abuse of discretion and violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The complaint
was dismissed on February 14, 1983 with the Tanodbayan observing that the action of Director
Paelmo was in consonance with the decision in Civil Case No. 25875 wherein Ambrosio Aguilar
was declared the owner of the property on the basis of the approved application and decree in
favor of Hermogenes Lopez, and also in view of the documents presented by Director Paelmo
consisting of the approved plan in the name of Hermogenes Lopez.[28]
On July 8, 1985, the Adia heirs filed another protest with the LMB, docketed as B.L. Claim 653,
assailing Plan H-138612 issued to Hermogenes Lopez and praying that the property be titled in
their names.
On December 10, 1990, then LMB Director Abelardo Palad rendered a decision in B.L. Claim
653 totally at variance with and virtually disregarding the final Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
90380. Director Palad dismissed the claim of Hermogenes Lopez and those claiming rights
under him, and ordered the reconstitution of the homestead application of Elino Adia, or in lieu
thereof, the filing of a new application by his heirs, thus:
WHEREFORE, Plan H-138612 appearing in the records of this Office in the name of the heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez is hereby as it is, corrected and amended, in that it shall thereafter be
considered to be recorded in the name of Elino Adia, now his heirs, represented by Emiliano and
Juliana Adia. The claims of Hermogenes Lopez and all those claiming under him, Francisco R.
Cruz and the Overlooking Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc. are hereby dismissed and
this case dropped from the records. The homestead application of Elino Adia, covering plan H-
138612 shall be reconstituted or in lieu thereof, a new application may be filed by the Heirs of
Elino Adia, which shall thereafter be given due course. Within the period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of this order, the O.S. & P.A. shall vacate and remove whatever improvements they have
in the premises.[29]
On January 23, 1991, the Lopez heirs filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the LMB
decision, contending that the LMB has no more jurisdiction to entertain, investigate and decide
questions of ownership over the property considering this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 90380
declaring Hermogenes Lopez and his heirs the lawful owners of the land.
Meanwhile, on February 8, 1991, the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, pursuant to the
Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380, issued TCT No. 196256 in favor of the
Lopez heirs. The following annotation appears at the back of said title:
Entry No. 252049/T. No. 196256 ORDER by virtue of an order issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in Civil Case No. 463-A, the 2nd par. On the face of this
certificate of title has been cancelled and superseded in view of the nullification of Original
Certificate of Title No. 537 and all titles emanating therefrom up to Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 117266. This certificate of title is hereby amended as Issued by virtue of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 90380 on September 13, 1990 (in relation to the Decision in Civil
Case No. 463-A as affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 06242 and the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 81092) which declared that Hermogenes Lopez, now his heirs, as
the true and rightful owner by virtue of Homestead Patent Application No. 138612 and the
corresponding homestead patent issued in his favor in June 1939, after complying with the
requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Going back to the Adia heirs protest before the LMB, it appears that on January 29, 1992, then
LMB Director Palad denied the Lopez heirss urgent motion for reconsideration of the LMBs
decision in favor of the Adia heirs. Forthwith, the Lopez heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27602) assailing the LMBs decision and the
order denying their motion for reconsideration.
Surprisingly, on February 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27602, rendered
judgment denying the petition of the Lopez heirs and affirming the LMBs decision. It held that
this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government, thus:
1. Other than the Lopez heirs claim that they are the heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, there is no
concrete evidence that the property ceased to become part of the public domain;
2. The Supreme Court Decision in G.R. No. 90380 did not bind the government, particularly the
LMB, since the latter agency was not impleaded as a party in Civil Case No. 2473 (Ambrosio
Aguilar vs. Fernando Gorospe, et al.) for annulment of OCT No. 537 and all titles emanating
therefrom, which case eventually reached the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 90380;
3. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable; and
4. The Lopez heirs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
From this adverse judgment, the Lopez heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 110900. The Third Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated
August 11, 1993, denied the petition on two (2) grounds: (a) petitioners failed to attach to the
petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision, as
required by this Courts Revised Circular 1-88 (which took effect on July 1, 1991); and (b) even if
there was no violation of the Circular, no reversible error was committed by the appellate court.
In effect, this Court (Third Division) recognized the Adia heirs claim over the land as valid and,
therefore, dismissed the claim of the Lopez heirs. By this ruling, the Third Division reversed and
set aside the previous Decision of the First Division in G. R. No. 90380 declaring Hermogenes
Lopez and his heirs the lawful owners of the land. Thus, on December 27, 1994, the OIC of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer of Antipolo City issued eight (8) free
patents, in the names of all the Adia heirs. On January 26, 1995, the Register of Deeds of
Marikina City issued the corresponding eight (8) Original Certificates of Title, also in their names.
IV
On October 6, 1995, the Lopez heirs, joined by Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who, on April 20, 1995,
bought a portion of the land from the former, filed with the trial court (RTC, Branch 71, Antipolo
City) a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 463-
A pursuant to the Decision of this Court in G. R. No. 90380 in favor of the Lopez heirs. It must be
remembered that in Civil Case No. 463-A, the said trial court annulled the 1959 sale between
Hermogenes Lopez and Ambrosio Aguilar and restored to the Lopez heirs possession of the
property.
On December 11, 1995, the RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution which would
call for the demolition of the communication facilities and other structures belonging to the
Intelligence and Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army which also purchased a portion of
the property from the Adia heirs. This prompted Col. Pedro R. Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander
of the ISG, to file with this Court on February 27, 1996 the present Petition Seeking for
Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Exceutory but Conflicting
Decisions (in G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. 110900) of the Honorable Supreme Court. The petition
was assigned to the Third Division of this Court.
In a Resolution dated January 20, 1997, the Third Division dismissed Col. Cabuay, Jr.s Petition
for Clarification as it does not raise any justiciable issue. Forthwith, Col. Pedro R. Cabuay, Jr.
and the Adia heirs (intervenors) filed separate motions for reconsideration.
The case remained dormant for over two (2) years. On June 9, 1999, acting upon the said
motions, the Third Division issued a Resolution treating the Petition for Clarification as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issue raised,
therefore, is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the LMB decision in B.L. Claim 653 and disregarding the Decision of this Court (First Division) in
G.R. No. 90380.
Six (6) months after, or on December 17, 1999, the Third Division rendered the instant Decision
holding, in effect, that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion; and
clarifying that the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 110900 issued by the Third Division
prevails over the Decision in G.R. No. 90380[31] rendered by the First Division and declaring
that the Adia heirs titles are valid, while those of the Lopez heirs are void. The dispositive portion
of the instant Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, 1. The validity of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820, P-821, P-822,
P-823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, registered in the name of Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by
Juliana Adia, is UPHELD;
2. All certificates of title issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and successors-in-interest,
and all titles originating from any of the certificates of title so issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes
Lopez, including Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 207990, 207991, 207992, 207993, 207994,
207995, 207996, 207997, 207998, 207999, 208000, 208001, 208002, 208358, over subject tract
of land, as well as TCT No. 216876 issued to Primex Corporation, and any other title derived
therefrom are declared null and void;
3. The Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and all persons claiming any right under them, including but
not limited to Primex Corporation, and Dr. Potenciano Malvar, as well as all members of the
Overlooking Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc., their assignees and successors-in-
interest, are ordered to remove all their improvements on the areas covered by the Original
Certificates of Title Nos. P-819 to P-826 aforementioned and to surrender possession thereof to
the Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia; and
4. The writ of demolition, issued by Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, in Civil
Case No. 463-A, is SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The above Decision was penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima.
Thereupon, Dr. Potenciano Malvar and Marcelino Lopez seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Alternative Prayer for Referral to the Court En Banc.
The Adia heirs filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On August 15, 2000, the Court En Banc resolved to accept the present case which was referred
to it en consulta by the Third Division.
On May 24, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its comment on the motion for
reconsideration. The OSG submits that the right of the Lopezes over the land in question is
superior to that of the Adias.[33]
V\Considering the conflicting rulings rendered by the First and Third Divisions, the Court En
Banc, therefore, has to break the impasse and must now resolve, once and for all, this basic
issue: As between the Lopez heirs and the Adia heirs, who lawfully own the subject property?
THE EN BANC RULING
The weight of evidence and jurisprudence shows that the Lopez heirs are the lawful owners of
the land in controversy.
To recall, G.R. No. 90380 rendered by the First Division, through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
recognizes the right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez (predecessor-in-interest of the Lopez
heirs) over the property by reason of his continuous possession since 1920 and his full
compliance with the requirements by the Public Land Act for the issuance of a homestead
patent. Upon the other hand, G.R. No. 110900 of the Third Division affirmed, in a Resolution, the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 27602 sustaining the LMB decision in B.L. CLAIM
653 dismissing Hermogenes Lopez claim over the property and ordering the reconstitution of the
homestead application of the Adia heirs predecessor-in-interest, Elino Adia, or in lieu thereof, the
filing of a new application by the heirs of Elino Adia.
In justifying the adjudication of the property to the Adia heirs, the Court of Appeals held:
Now, while it is true that Hermogenes Lopez had filed an application for a Homestead Patent
over the subject land, and his application was determined as superior to the claims of other
persons by the courts, such determination in the cases that finally reached the Supreme Court
did not bind the government, particularly the Lands Management Bureau. The cases cited by
petitioners as having declared the subject land as private property because the homestead
patent thereon was confirmed by the Supreme Court did not bind the LMB for two reasons: (1) it
was not, and was not impleaded as, a party to said cases, and (2) the cases were in personam
in nature, in which while the subject thereof was a right over a piece of land, the controversy was
in essence between different persons asserting conflicting claims.
The subject property being part of the public domain is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Lands Management Bureau. It is not only mandated by the Public Land Act but the Supreme
Court itself has decreed it to be so x x x.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the reason why the Court of Appeals set aside the claim of the Lopez heirs is because
they did not implead the Director of Lands in their case challenging the validity of the Adia heirs
titles.
It appears from the very caption of the complaint in Civil Case No. 24873[35] the case that
reached this Court as G.R. No. 90380 that the Director of Lands was impleaded as co-defendant
by plaintiff Ambrosio Aguilar (successor-in-interest of Hermogenes Lopez) who sought the
nullification of OCT No. 537 in the name of Fernando Gorospe (the Adia heirs predecessor-in-
interest) and all TCTs emanating therefrom. The Director of Lands even filed his ANSWER[36]
through his Counsel and Special Attorney, Irineo C. Alday. In fact, the decision of the trial court
in the same Civil Case No. 24873 also mentioned that the Director of Lands filed his
ANSWER.[37]
The participation of the Director of Lands in Civil Case No. 24873 having been incontrovertibly
established, the Government and the Adia heirs are bound by the decision therein. We reiterate
that this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07475 and by this
Court in G.R. No. 90380, holding that Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements of the
Public Land Act. Having been issued the corresponding Homestead Patent, he is recognized as
the owner of the land, thus:
In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes Lopez went to the Bureau of Lands and inquired about his
fathers homestead application. He was informed that said application was still unacted upon and
was advised to apply in his own name. He complied and his application was docketed as
homestead application No. 138612. Subsequently, he was able to prove compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and, as a matter of course, the land was surveyed by a
government surveyor and on 7 February 1939 the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the
Director of Lands. The latter thereafter ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent in the
name of Hermogenes Lopez (page 33, Rollo). He has been in actual and continuous possession
thereof and was recognized as its owner until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar,
private respondent herein, on 31 July 1959.[38] (Emphasis supplied)
With the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380 that Hermogenes Lopez is the lawful owner, LMB
Director Abelardo Palad should have refrained from adjudicating the property to the Adia heirs
since it ceased to be of the public domain and beyond his authority to dispose of.
To be more precise, the property became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as early as
1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of continued possession by Hermogenes and his father
Fermin Lopez that began in 1920. This is so because jurisprudence consistently declares that
the mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of disposable public land automatically transforms the same into private property and vests title
on the possessor. Thus:
x x x [U]nder the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioners case, with the latters proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. x x x.
As interpreted in several cases (Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Mesina vs. Pineda
Vda. De Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, [May 25, 1960]), when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. The land, therefore, ceased to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the
Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.[39]
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act)
that the possessor(s) x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x. No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be
little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is
of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title,
but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land
from public to private land, but only to confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. x x x[40]
[A]lienable public land by a possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso
jure.[41]
In the Acme decision, this Court upheld the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without need of judicial
or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.[42]
[O]pen, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso
jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands vs. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]).
This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass
of public land (NPC vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]).[43]
To be sure, the LMB, beginning 1950, no longer had the authority to dispose of the area in favor
of the Adia heirs. The same had been segregated from the mass of public land in that year and
converted to Hermogenes Lopez private property over which the government had lost
jurisdiction. We advert to a few more pertinent pronouncements by this Court, thus:
Under the provisions of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents
predecessor-in-interest was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director
of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and
has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises, not
from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover
lands privately owned. The purpose of the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act,
Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in
private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever
thereby. Land held in freehold or free title, or of private ownership, constitutes no part of the
public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No.2874, inasmuch as
the subject of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act
and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof.[44]
Following the Susi doctrine (48 Phil. 424), therefore, private respondents are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but also a grant of the Government over
the controversial land. By such grant, the property in litigation is segregated from the public
domain; and becomes private property, over which necessarily, the Director of Lands no longer
has jurisdiction.
x x x x x x x x x.
Private ownership of land (as when there is prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information) is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land,
because the Public Land Act applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands
has no authority to grant to another a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and
has passed to private ownership.[45]
Another reason why the Lopez heirs claim of ownership must be upheld is the applicability of the
law of the case doctrine. We explained this doctrine as follows:
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of
all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes
the law of that particular case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on all inferior courts,
and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify.[46]
xxxxxxxxx
Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of
litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the
solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. There can be no
question that such reasons apply with greater force on final judgments of the highest Court of
the land.[47]
We stress that the Decision of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 90380 is the law of the case
binding upon the LMB and the Court of Appeals and is beyond their authority to reverse.
We, therefore, rule that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in affirming the LMB
decision in B.L. Claim 653 and ignoring the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The Third
Division of this Court was misled, so to speak, in resolving in G.R. 110900 that no reversible
error was committed by the Appellate Court.
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions
may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
A Decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of the above constitutional provision
would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.[48]
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and the instant Decision is
RECONSIDERED. The Resolution dated August 11, 1993 of the Third Division in G.R. No.
110900 upholding the validity of the land titles in the names of the Adia heirs is SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated September 13, 1990 of the First Division in G.R. No. 90380 declaring the LOPEZ
HEIRS the lawful owners of the land in question is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE PADACA, oppositors-appellants, vs. ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO
ALBANO, ENCARNACION ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her
husband, JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her husband,
ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO ALBANO, and PEDRO
ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as
Judge of Sala I, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent.Case Nature :
APPEAL from the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte and Laoag City.
Navarro, J.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|LandRegistration|Property|Writ of
Possession|Judgment|Res Judicata
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; A party in whose
favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the
Torrens Act, or his successors-in-interest, has “a perfect right not only to the title of
the land, but also to its possession.”-
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v.
Llorente, etc., et al., ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is
issued by a cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his
successor-in-interest, has “a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its
possession;” (2) he has the right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of
possession as against any “party to the registration proceeding and who is directly
and personally affected and reached by the decree” (or “who had been served with
process therein but had not appeared nor answered); and (3) his right to obtain a writ
of possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding
execution of judgments, since the decree “is to exist forever
2. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; A writ of
possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land
registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest but also against
any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at anytime before and up to
the issuance of the final decree; Neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies in
case at bar.-
“The fundamental rule,” the Court said some forty-three years later, “is that a writ of
possession can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land
registration case and their representatives and successors-in-interest, but also
against any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at anytime before and
up to the issuance of the final decree.” It also pointed out that neither laches nor the
statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v.
Menla, et al.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property; Writ of Possession; If the writ of
possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of possession
of the land to the successful litigant, a writ of demolition must also issue.-
The Court restated those same principles of Lucero v. Loot some months later and
took occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had
gone “so far as to hold that ‘if the writ of possession issued in a land registration
proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant
therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that the
latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
would be ineffective.’”
4. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Suit for recovery of title
to a lot barred by prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding.-
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The
familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of
Barroga’s and Padaca’s suit for recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly
barred by the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino’s
ownership over the property, and in which proceeding the former’s predecessor-in-
interest, RupertaPascual, had taken part as oppositor but had been declared in
default.
5. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Judgment of the
cadastral court which was against a specific thing was a judgment in rem and binding
upon the whole world.-
The judgment of the cadastral court was one “against a specific thing” and therefore
“conclusive upon the title to the thing.” It was a judgment in rem, binding generally
upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto, and particularly upon
those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the appellants’ predecessor,
RupertaPascual, who had intervened therein as an oppositor) as well as “their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity.”
6. Civil Law; Land Registration; Judgment; Res Judicata; Petitioners-appellees
are entitled to the writ of possession over the lot despite the lapse of many years,
their rights thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were
parties in the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest.-
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established
axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel
Albano, et al. must be declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No.
9821 in enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the title issued in
favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q. Aquino; the writ may correctly be
enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of
RupertaPascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which resulted in the
declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the
appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many
years, their right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who
were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. The appellants, it
must be said, have succeeded in prolonging the controversy long enough. They
should no longer be allowed to continue doing so.
Docket Number: No. L-43445
NARVASA, J.:
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente,
etc., et al., 1 ruling that: (1) a party in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a
cadastral court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his successor-in-interest,
has "a perfect right not only to the title of the land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the
right, too, under Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any "party to the
registration proceeding and who is directly and personally affected and reached by the decree"
(or who had been served with process therein but had not appeared nor answered); 2 and (3) his
right to obtain a writ of possession is not subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
regarding execution of judgments, 3since the decree "is to exist forever." These doctrines have
since been reiterated and reaffirmed.
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years later, 4 "is that a writ of possession
can be issued not only against the original oppositors in a land registration case and their
representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any person unlawfully and adversely
occupying said lot at any time before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed
out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration
case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 5 to the following effect:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his theory
that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. ... (Sec. 6,
Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel
of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceedings to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case,
unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action,
upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. ...
... There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a
decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need
to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a
ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or
of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.
The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some months later and took
occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to
hold that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the delivery of
possession of the land to the successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise,
issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without
said writ of demolition, would be ineffective."
The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of these established jurisprudential
precepts to the undisputed facts.
In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, a decision was rendered on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No.
9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. 7One of the oppositors was RupertaPascual, who was declared
in default. 8 However, for reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or
prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of registration did not issue except
until after the lapse of fourteen (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after
twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that an original certificate of title
(No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina Aquino's name. 9
On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been handed down but before title
issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the children and heirs of RupertaPascual — appellants
EufemiaBarroga and SaturninaPadaca-brought suit in the same Court of First Instance against
the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino — appellees Angel Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants
alleged that they, and their mother, RupertaPascual, had been in possession of Lot 9821 since
1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and
cancelled, that the defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that a new title
be made out in their names. 11
It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached upon a 4-square-meter portion
of an adjoining lot, No. 9822, belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court, a
complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery thereof.
After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the Barroga's and Padaca's
complaint, and declaring intervenor Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by
Delfina Aquino's title. 12
The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the recorded facts. The familiar
doctrine of res adjudicata operated to blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's
suit for recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by the prior judgment in the
cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which
proceeding the former's predecessor-in-interest, RupertaPascual, had taken part as oppositor
but had been declared in default. The judgment of the cadastral court was one "against a
specific thing" and therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing." 13 It was a judgment in rem,
binding generally upon the whole world, inclusive of persons not parties thereto, 14 and
particularly upon those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the appellants'
predecessor, RupertaPascual, who had intervened therein as an oppositor) as well as "their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. 15
The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken therefrom to the Court of appeals
by Barroga and Padaca having been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this
Court having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal on certiorari. Thereafter, at the
instance of defendants Angel Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the
judgment on December 6, 1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca - moved to quash the writ of
execution, on December 22, 1973. They argued that there was nothing to execute since the
verdict was simply one of dismiss of the complaint; they moreover invoked Section 11, Rule 51
of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the matter apparently ended. No further development anent
this case appears in the record.
What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Cadastral Court promulgated an
Order in Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ
of possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ of possession dated August
28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by
Angel Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of Execution Issued and to
Revoke Writ of Possession Issued" under date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was
that as possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected therefrom by a mere motion
for writ of possession.
The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the parties and their counsel
stipulated upon the following facts, to wit:
1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia
Albano, Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and Pedrito
Albano are the children-heirs and successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the registered owner of
Lot No. 9821 covered by O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on July 31, 1941, marked
Exh. A for the petitioners-claimants;
2. That movants-oppositorsEufemia Villanueva de Barroga and SaturninaVda. de Pacada are
the children-heirs and successors of RupertaPascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821,
Cad. Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and
decided on July 31, 1941 as follows:
Lote No. 9821 — Porincomparecenciainjustificada de la opositoraRupertaPascual, se
desestimasucontestacion. Se adjudicaestelote No. 9821, con las mejorasen el existentes,
ennombre de Delfina Q. Aquino, filipina, major de edad, viuda y residents del municipio de
Lauag de la provincia de Ilocos Norte.
3. That the heirs of RupertaPascual, namely, Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and SaturninaVda.
de Padaca , are in possession of the lot in question since 1941 up to the present time. 18
The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order dated September 22, 1975. The
Court stated that the writ of possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable
period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration decree, since the right to the
same does not prescribe pursuant to the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar and Lucero v. Loot, 19 It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square meter
portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on
the Albanos' right to the writ of possession, which was the appropriate process for the
enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and Padaca moved for
reconsideration. When this proved unavailing, they appealed to this Court.
The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably with the established axioms set
out in the opening paragraphs of this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be
declared to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in enforcement of the decree of
registration and vindication of the title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q.
Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants, Barroga and Padaca, as
successors-in-interest of RupertaPascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which
resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of the land subject thereof; and the
appellees are entitled to said writ of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their
right thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who were parties to the
cadastral case or their successors-in-interest. 20 The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded
in prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer be allowed to continue doing
so.
WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and
Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated
August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are AFFIRMED, as being in accord
with the facts and the law. This decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON.
JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for certiorari to review the orders of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Br. II. Plan, J.
Syllabi Class : Land Registration|Actions|Practice&Pleadings|Judgments
Syllabi:
1. Land Registration; Actions; Practice Pleadings; In land registration cases, an
opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with counterclaim and a motion to
dismiss the opposition is not unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely suppletory to
such proceedings.-
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 4961 does not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows
the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a
suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the
expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3
SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein
appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been
indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the
lands sought to be registered in appellants’ name had previously been registered in
the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to ran its
usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration
applies to the case at bar.
2. Land Registration; Actions; Practice Pleadings; Same.-
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a
complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original
plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the
counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The
latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier
said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity
that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to
dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized.
3. Land Registration; Actions; Judgments; The doctrine in Abellera vs. Farol 74
Phil. 284, needs re-evaluation; A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining
ownership of a certain land is res judicata in the kind registration case where the
parties and the property are identical including the addition of a party in the
registration case where he claims co-ownership.-
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For
said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it
must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v.
Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration
and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba’s co-owner,
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in
court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-
ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to
prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano
in his and Bienvenido Noriega’s favor. With respect to the subject matter, there can
be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same
parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba’s and Noriega’s names.
4. Land Registration; Actions; Same, Caption of the complaint, as action to recover
possession, does not control where same is really an accionreinvidicatoria.-
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the
allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is
in the nature of an accionreinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title.
Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in
accionreinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is
true in registration cases. Registration of title in one’s name is based on ownership. In
both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the
exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the
exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action
remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz,
[51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to
recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is
different. “But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated.”
Docket Number: No. L-55152
FERNAN, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order
are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration Case No. Branch
11-N-204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch,
entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs.
FlordelizaValisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2, 1980,
dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the
order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and HonorioValisno purchased
from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel
and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as
follows:
[a] a tract of land situated at SitioSisim Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan,
Province of Isabela, having an area of Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty
(50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded
on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East
by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno del Estado, now Matias del
Rosario;
and,
[c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela,
having an area of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50)
meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and
South; bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto
Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west by Cauayan Diversion
Road and Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for
taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in the concept of
owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built
thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the
owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and one
Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q.
Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He subsequently erected
a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of
Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of said
parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time
resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal,
however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the appellate court in a decision promulgated on
January 19, 1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
complaint of petitioners on a finding that:
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by
Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from the land appearing in the
Subdivision Plan of the appelles appellant, their respective area and boundaries being
completely dissimilar.
Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their
property encroaches, much less covers that of the property presently occupied by the
appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr.
Blanco. We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was
prepared by someone who' has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v.
Wisona Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully Identified
with that described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed
outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be Identified, and the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim' as
well as the doctrine enunciated in a long line of decision [sic] starting from Lim vs.
Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since
he purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano on June 30, 1967, having
constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and
residents of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore,
possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he is possessing the
same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We
unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of Identifying the property in question
because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not
only to the properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and
landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees' evidence, particularly the
description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries
of the property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-work. [Smith Bell & Co.
vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment, one noted
authority states:
The proposition that in Identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the
area are the main factors to be considered holds true only when the boundaries given
are sufficiently certain and the Identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly
indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.'
[Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced
Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30,
19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court
was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of
First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of the title of the
lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale
as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A",
Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B",
Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for the dismissal of said
opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the
appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the opposition of
petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed
orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E",
Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners
filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the following:
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS'
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE,
WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT
OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND
REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES
FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER
IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN
SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN
OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS,
ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY
TRYING TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE
PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF
JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19,
Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the
other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9,
1981. Thus, the case was consider submitted for decision without the brief of private
respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed
by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying
that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation
obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to dismiss the opposition having been filed
and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be
so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows
the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a
suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the
expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3
SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein
appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been
indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the
lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in
the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its
usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration
applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a
complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original
plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the
counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The
latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier
said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity
that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to
dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorize.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs
re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the Court, ruled that
"while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the
alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a
motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and
Associate Justices Moran and Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my
opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of
prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral
proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or
prescription. Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or
automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will
certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested.
Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main purpose of said rules. Let there
be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-
287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56
Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619,
wherein the Court invariably ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case
determining the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case when
the parties and the property are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v.
Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For
said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been'
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it
must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second
actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v.
Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final
judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration
and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner,
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in
court the interests of the co-ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-
ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to
prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano
is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be
recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being sought to be
registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the
allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is
in the nature of an accionreinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title.
Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in
accionreinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is
true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In
both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the
exclusion is directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the
exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action
remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of
Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action
to recover title, as real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is
different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong HingLian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690;
Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21
SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al.,
106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. Cardona,
et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction,
while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a
registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits
had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both
courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to
defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by
allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be
registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had
set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds
that the party against whom the principle of res judicata operates does have a better
right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court
sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of
general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to
grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or the opposition thereto,
once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is
barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it
is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied
them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had their day in court
in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim
over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-
ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to rest in CA-
G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of
the case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing
petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, ANDREA GABRIEL, ISABEL GABRIEL, ESTER GABRIEL,
BENJAMIM GABRIEL, SALUD GABRIEL, VICTORIA GABRIEL, RIZALINA
GABRIEL AND ANDRES GABRIEL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, PETRITA PASCUAL and RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, respondents.Case
Nature : PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Esguerra, J.
Syllabi Class : Land Registration|Courts|CadastralProceedings|Laches
Syllabi:
1. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; In cadastral cases, the
jurisdiction of the court over registered lands is limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the land.-
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands
already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the
description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights
of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title.
2. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Court has the power to
determine the priority of overlapping or over-laying registered titles.-
In a later case. such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect
that the above proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of the court the
power to determine the priority of over-lapping or over-lying registered titles. There is
nothing in this proposition which militates against allowing the court in a cadastral
case to determine which one of several conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This
power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the
express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as
within the jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed
that in such proceedings no final decree or registration was reopened or set aside.
3. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Action of the lower court in
correcting the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. is
well within its jurisdiction.-
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not order the
reopening of the decree of registration for the land covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 1264 in the name of Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a
new registration in favor of the estate of Eligio Naval because said estate has a title
that embraces actually the portion in dispute, although it is also included in the
Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower court did
was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-
9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No.
557 of the Hermosa Cadastre and Lot No, 363 of OraniCadastre which lots embody
the correct technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court
stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of registration for the land covered
by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that title stands and its
existence remains unaffected. The action therefore of the trial court is well within its
jurisdiction.
4. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Title and possession of
registered owners cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated
and contradicted.-
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the late
Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by the Hermosa and OraniCadastre but by
the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the original owner. He did not take
the necessary action to recover said lot during his lifetime but after the discovery of its
occupation in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued
use and occupation of the same, In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval and his
successorsin-interest have always been in possession of said property since that
date. As previously stated, petitioners’ claim that such occupation was by virtue of a
loan or accommodation, was not suported by evidence. As held by this court, title and
possession of registered owners, cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can
easily be fabricated and contradicted.
5. Land Registration; Courts; Cadastral Proceedings; Laches; For failure to
prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years, petitioners have lost by laches their right
to recover their property.-
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute
their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to recover their
property, In a similar case, this Court ruled that failure of the deceased or his
predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights over the disputed land for
20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action ground of
laches.
Docket Number: No, L-26348
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse: (a) the
Decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 31, 1966 in
CA-G.R. No. 25418-R affirming the Decision 2 of the then Court of First
Instance of Bataan in Civil Case No. 2283 which dismissed the complaint for
recovery of land clue to, laches and prescription and required complainants
herein petitioners) to surrender their certificates of title, and b) the
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1966 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court.. the factual background
of this case is as follows:
On April 12, 1909, a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of
land located in Barrio Totopiac, Orani, Bataan, containing an area of 687,360
square meters, more or less, the survey plan being designated as 1-1 054.
This parcel of land was registered on September 18, 1909, and Original
Certificate of Title No, 46 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan was issued in
favor of Quimson. Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made from
February, 1919 to March, 1920 which resulted in the increase of the area of
the land by 17,053 square meters and the designation of the land as Lot No.
363 of OraniCadastre with an area of 704,413 square meters. After hearing,
the Cadastral Court confirmed the title of Quimson and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 723 was issued in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 46. The lot
was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A with an area of 209,250 square meters for
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 760 was issued, and Lot No. 363-B
with an area of 495,163 square meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 759 was issued. Lot No. 363-B was subsequently acquired by Eligio
Naval and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in his name on
July 6,1926.
In December, 1916, a parcel of land located in Barrio Bagumbayan,
Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu-
9742 was prepared and approved by the Director of Lands, with an area of
2,729,712 square meters. This plan was subsequently amended because it
was found that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the
name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The
undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu-
9742 was amended (Plan Psu-9742-Amd) with an area of 2,436,280 or a
reduction of 293,432 square meters. The Original Certificate of Title No. 1264
issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained
the reduced area.
A cadastral survey was also made of the Municipality of Hermosa, Bataan
and the land of Potenciano Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became
Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433 square meters, or a further
reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new certificate of title was issued for
Cadastral Lot No. 557 showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate
of Title No. 1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under
Plan Psu-9742 Amd. Accordingly the partition of the estate of Potenciano
Gabriel by his heirs on August 28, 1947 was based on plan Psu-9742 Amd.
under Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 with an area of 2,436,280 square
meters, instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square
meters.
Petitioners who are the heirs of the late Potenciano Gabriel and alleged joint
co-owners of 1,196 square meters of a fishpond situated in Hermoso, Bataan
by virtue of an agreement of partition of the estate of Don Potenciano, flied a
complaint, Civil Case No. 2283 at the Court of First Instance of Bataan
against PetritaPascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and
administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law of Don Potenciano.
They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval who was also
an adjoining owner; that said land was only loaned to the latter for dike and
water control purposes of the latter's fishpond and that after the death of Don
Potenciano on February 17, 1943, private respondents continued to possess,
occupy and use said property and notwithstanding repeated demands
refused to vacate and to return the possession thereof, to the petitioners.
Hence, it was prayed that the defendants, private respondents herein, be
ordered to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay
damages (Rollo, pp. 18-20; Record on Appeal, p. 96). The records show that
the portion of 1,196 square meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is
included in Lot No. 363-B of the OraniCadastre and in amended plan Psu-
9742, mentioned above, which shall hereafter be referred to as Psu-9742
Amd. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said portion always remained in the
possession of the late Eligio Naval because as above stated, it was included
in Lot 363, which was subdivided into Lot 363-A and Lot 363-B. The latter,
acquired by Naval with TCT No. 787 in his name, embraces the portion in
question (Rollo, pp, 22-23).
There appears to be no controversy that aforesaid lot had always been in the
possession of Naval in the concept of owner, as petitioners' claim that the
same was merely loaned to Naval, was not properly supported by evidence,
as found both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
After trial, the court rendered its decision on August 29, 1958 dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the right of the plaintiffs to the land in question,
if any, was lost by prescription, and that the plaintiff are also guilty of laches
in failing to prosecute their claim within a reasonable time.
Specifically, the dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
renders judgment:
(1) Dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs;
(2) Ordering the plaintiffs to surrender the owners' copies of the
certificates of title issued pursuant to the subdivision of Plan Psu-9742-
Amd. to the Register of Deeds for safekeeping until the plaintiffs could
submit a new subdivision plan based on the technical description of Lot
No. 557 of the HermosoCadastre; and
(3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Balanga, Bataan, August 29, 1958.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 127 -1 28; Rollo, p. 11 3)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in its Decision
promulgated on May 31, 1966, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, pp. 18-31).
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 7, 1966.
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of December 19, 1966, the petition for review on certiorari
was given due course (Rollo, p. 166). In the notice of January 5, 1967 (Rollo,
p. 169) petitioners were required to file brief Meanwhile, private respondent
PetritaPascual in a manifestation and motion dated January 10, 1967 (Rollo,
p. 170) informed this Court that the property in litigation was transferred by
absolute sale to the spouses Morencio Lucio and ConchitaGandan and she
prayed that said spouses be substituted in this action in her capacity of
PetritaPascual in her capacity as co-administratrix.
In the resolution of January 23, 1967 (Rollo, p. 1 72), petitioners were
required to comment on aforesaid motion for substitution of parties. Said
comment was filed by the petitioners on February 8, 1967 (Rollo, p. 176)
opposing said motion as improper and praying instead that said parties be
joined as additional respondents. Thus in the resolution of March 7, 1967
(Rollo, p. 184), this court authorized the inclusion of new parties, Florencio
Lucio and Constancio Lucio. Petitioners submitted their Brief (Rollo, p. 177)
on February 9, 1967 while respondents PetritaPascual, Florencio Lucio and
Constancio Lucio submitted their Brief on May 2,1967 (Reno, p. 195). For
failure to file petitioner's Reply Brief, the court considered the case submitted
for decision without the Reply Brief on November 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 211).
The grounds relied upon for the petition are as follows:
1. PLAN PSU-9742-AMD. COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE NO. 1264 WITH AN AREA OF 2,436,280 SQUARE METERS, WHICH
AREA WAS REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF ORANI AND
FURTHER REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA OR
A LOSS OF 336,901 SQUARE METERS TO CONFORM WITH LOT 557 OF
THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA IMPAIRS GRAVELY THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNER AND IS IN
CONFLICT WITH AND CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES
AND DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, NOTABLY THE
DECISIONS IN THE CASES ENTITLED P.I. VS. ARIAS, CABALLERO, 34
PHIL. 541.
2. THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE LOWER COURT, AN ACTION
PUBLICIANA OR TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF A CERTAIN PARCEL
OF LAND WITHHELD FROM PLAINTIFFS' POSSESSION, IS IT NOT A
GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO HAVE THE
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTERED PROPERTY
CORRECTED SO AS TO CONFORM TO CADASTRAL LOT AND,
THEREFORE, A COMPOUNDED GRAVE ERROR FOR THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN SUCH CORRECTION?
3. IS IT NOT THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POSSESSION OF A
REGISTERED OWNER UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT ARE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER THE PROVISION
OF SECTION 46 OF ACT NO. 496 AS AMENDED? (Rollo pp. 8-9).
The main issue in this case is whether or not courts have the authority to
order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and
make it conform to the correct area.
Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made to conform
with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557 which contains an area very
much less than that covered by said title, the trial court and later the Court of
Appeals deprived them of their property as registered owners. Such act,
petitioners insist, would amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the
lapse of the one-year statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new
decree to a land already registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529.
Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack on the title.
This contention is untenable.
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court
over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of
technical errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do
not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such
jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title.
(Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 561 [1922]).
In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to
the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of
the court the power to determine the priority of over-lapping or over- lying
registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which militates against
allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several
conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This power is necessary for a
complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as within the
jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed
that in such proceedings no final decree or registration was reopened or set
aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not
order the reopening of the decree of registration for the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name of Potenciano Gabriel.
Neither did the lower court decree a new registration in favor of the estate of
Eligio Naval because said estate has a title that embraces actually the
portion in dispute, although it is also included in the Original Certificate of
Title No. 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower court did was merely to
correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742
Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot
No. 557 of the HermosoCadastre and Lot No. 363 of OraniCadastre which
lots embody the correct technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent
appellate court stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of
registration for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano
Gabriel because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected. The
action therefore of the trial court is well within its jurisdiction (Reno, pp. 40-
41).
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the
late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by the Hermoso and
OraniCadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the
original owner. He did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during
his lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the
late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and occupation of the
same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval and his successors-in-
interest have always been in possession of said property since that date. As
previously stated, petitioners' claim that such occupation was by virtue of a
loan or accommodation, was not supported by evidence. As held by this
court, title and possession of registered owners, cannot be defeated by oral
evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted Sinoan v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both parties were in
occupation of their respective properties within the correct areas and
boundaries sought to be adjusted in this case. More than that, it was also
found that there is no impairment of substantial right or the deprivation of the
title of a registered owner, sought to be guarded against. The heirs of
Potenciano Gabriel are not deprived of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of the portion in
question because on the basis of the correct technical description, that
portion is not a part of their property but a part of the property of the late
Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. Hence, this Court has held that the Land
Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to
the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. More
specifically the decision reads:
... The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only
the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provisions to be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich
himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442;
Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 838). The above- stated Acts do
not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than
he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to
secure, to the prejudice of Ms neighbor, more land than he really owns,
with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may
have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be
cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590).
This is permitted by section 112 of Act. No. 496, which is applicable to
the Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the provisions of
Section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in
the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil 361),
errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the registry and
reproduced in the certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree
of registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which
is registered in the registry. ... (Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. pp. 449450
[1938]).
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to
prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to
recover their property. In a similar case, this Court ruled that failure of the
deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights
over the disputed land for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to
their cause of action ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
718 [1984]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and
the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD L. DIOCTON,
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. MONSANTO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar,
and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA, represented by Tito V. Tizon,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the order of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar. Monsanto, J.
Syllabi Class : Appeals|
1. Appeals; Appeals from cadastral proceedings may be taken by a simple notice of
appeal within 15 days under the Interim Rules and Guidelines of the Supreme Court
relative to the implementation of the 1981 Judiciary Reorganization Act.-
The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning conflicting claims of
the parties to a specific lot clearly falls under this general rule. Therefore, petitioners’
appeal must be given due course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the
corresponding certificate of title were prematurely and baselessly ordered by
respondent court and must be set aside. All that respondent trial court had to do was
to transmit the original record consisting of the pleadings of the parties and its
decision and orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their petition at
bar as per Annexes “A” to “I” of their petition, together with the transcripts and
exhibits.
2. Appeals; Objective of mere simple procedure in the appeal of certain cases.-
It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this innovative Rule which
dispenses with the filing of a record on appeal and the filing of an appeal bond was
and is to simplify appellate court procedure by doing away with the tedious and
expensive requirement of reproducing practically the entire original record of the case
in the record on appeal in the trial court. This old requirement of a record on appeal
by itself laid the appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing
questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and orders which in turn
required the filing of an amended record on appeal. Such record on appeal under the
Rules still had to be printed, mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many
times in typographical errors and adding needless expense and additional burden on
litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the Court sought to simplify the Rules to
assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every
court case, as well as decongesting judicial dockets.
3. Appeals; The exceptions under the Interim Rules for appeal wherein a record of
appeal to be filed within 30 days is still required must be strictly construed. They cover
only cases under Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals in different stages of a special
proceedings is allowed and, therefore, case record still has to remain with the trial
court.-
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for specific exceptions
with respect to “appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court,” wherein multiple appeals at different stages of the case are allowed
such as when the order or judgment on appeal refers to. (a) the allowance or
disallowance of a will; (b) determination of the lawful heirs of a deceased person or
their distributive shares in the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole or in
part, of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in
offset to a claim against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian; and (f) the final order
or judgment rendered in the case. In these cases, therefore, since the original record
has to remain with the probate court in connection with the other various pending
matters, a party appealing from a specific order is required to file the corresponding
record on appeal.
4. Appeals; Appeals from cadastral proceedings require a simple notice of appeal
filed within 15 days even if there are several contested lots involves. A separate
record for each contested lot could be kept.-
This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral proceedings involve contest
over specific lots which may be claimed by parties who have timely filed their
respective answers, failing which the land is declared to belong to the State. In all
such cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of each lot or lots so
contested by the same parties and the State, and given a separate subnumber
corresponding to each contested lot. Upon the trial court’s rendering of its judgment
as to such specific lot(s), then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be
readily elevated, leaving with the lower court the records or pleadings referring to
disputed lots not covered by said court’s adjudication. In this particular cadastral
proceeding, as stated by respondent court itself in its questioned order, there remain
only “around 8 contested ones [lots] which have not yet been adjudicated not counting
the 180 lots which were ‘archived’ by a predecessor of the presiding judge.” This
readily shows the lack of any difficulty to keep separate records for specific lots
claimed by conflicting parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific
lot, subject of judgment and appeal.
Docket Number: No. L-66242
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.:
The procedural issue at bar is whether an appeal by a conflicting claimant to
a specific lot of cadastral survey proceedings from the adverse decision of
the regional trial court in favor of another conflicting claimant may be taken
by filing a simple notice of appeal within the reglementary 15-day period, as
provided in the Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (Batas PambansaBlg. 129),
adopted by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983. Or does such appeal
fall within the exception provided by the same interim rules for special
proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, in which case an appeal must still be filed by
the filing of a record on appeal within a period of 30 days provided for the
purpose. The Court rules that appeals in cadastral proceedings may be taken
by a simple notice of appeal.
The lot involved is Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral Survey. It is
contested by the claimants, petitioners-heirs of Cornelio Labrada, on one
hand, and by respondents-heirs of Isabel Yboa on the other. Said
predecessors-in-interest had filed their respective answers in the cadastral
proceedings in June, 1932.
Petitioners thus state their claim to the lot, as follows: "Cornelio Labrada who
had previously deforested the area which is now the disputed Lot No. 1910,
had already been in continuous possession of said lot for more than forty-
three (43) years when he filed his answer in 1932, or at least from 1894; and
that he continued his possession until 1943 when he died. His son, Meliton,
succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his demise,
MelitonLabrada was succeeded in the possession of said land until he
himself died sometime in 1976; and that subsequent thereto, possession of
the property in issue passed to Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present
are still in possession thereof, (Decision, p.1 ). None of the heirs of Isabel
Iboa is in possession of any portion of the questioned lot." 1 Petitioners had
moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct Court of First
Instance of Samar. The conflicting parties presented both their oral and
documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the lot. On
July 11, 1983, the respondent regional trial court rendered its decision in
favor of respondents-claimants. Within 2 days from receipt of the adverse
decision, petitioners filed their appeal on August 6, 1983 by filing a notice of
appeal with a prayer that the records be elevated to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, pursuant to the new Interim Rules of Court. Over a month
later, on September 14, 1983, respondents-claimants filed their motion for
the issuance of a decree contending that petitioners had failed to perfect their
appeal because they failed to file a record on appeal. Respondent court
granted respondents' motion for the issuance of a decree on the theory that
an appeal taken in a cadastral case involves "multiple appeals," for which the
filing of the record on appeal was required. The decree for the registration
was accordingly ordered by respondent court. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration having failed, they have now filed the petition at bar for the
setting aside of respondent court's questioned orders denying due course to
their appeal and ordering the issuance of a decree of registration on the lot in
question in favor of respondents.
The pertinent provisions of Appellate Procedure on appeals are contained in
sections 18 and 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, as follows:
18. Elimination of record on appeal and appeal bond. — The filing of a record
on appeal shall be dispensed with, except in the cases referred to in sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 19 hereof.
No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.
19. Period of Appeal. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the
period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.
These rules were issued pursuant to the provisions of Batas PambansaBlg.
129, particularly section 39 thereof which provides for a 15-day period within
which to take an appeal and expressly abolished the need of a record on
appeal, as follows:
SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen days
counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
decision appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu therefor, the
entire original record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently
numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning conflicting
claims of the parties to a specific lot clearly falls under this general rule.
Therefore, petitioners' appeal must be given due course and the issuance of
a decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title were
prematurely and baselessly ordered by respondent court and must be set
aside. All that respondent trial court had to do was to transmit the original
record consisting of the pleadings of the parties and its decision and orders,
which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their petition at bar as per
Annexes "A" to "I" of their petition, 2 together with the transcripts and
exhibits. 3
It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this innovative Rule
which dispenses with the filing of a record on appeal and the filing of an
appeal bond was and is to simplify appellate court procedure by doing away
with the tedious and expensive requirement of reproducing practically the
entire original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial court.
This old requirement of a record on appeal by itself laid the appellate
procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing questions of clerical
errors and claims of omitted pleadings and orders which in tum required the
filing of an amended record on appeal. Such record on appeal under the
Rules still had to be printed, mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting
many times in typographical errors 4 and adding needless expense and
additional burden on litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the Court
sought to simplify the rules to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination of every court case, as well as decongesting
judicial dockets.
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for specific
exceptions with respect to "appeals in special proceedings in accordance
with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court," wherein multiple appeals at different
stages of the case are allowed such as when the order or judgment on
appeal refers to: (a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b) determination
of the lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in the
estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole or in part, of any claim
against the estate or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it; (d) the settlement of the accounts of an executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of
the estate of a deceased person or the administration of a trustee or
guardian; and (f) the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these
cases, therefore, since the original record has to remain with the probate
court in connection with the other various pending matters, a party appealing
from a specific order is required to file the corresponding record on appeal.
This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral proceedings involve
contest over specific lots which may be claimed by parties who have timely
filed their respective answers, failing which the land is declared to belong to
the State. In all such cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of
each lot or lots so contested by the same parties and the State, and given a
separate sub-number corresponding to each contested lot. Upon the trial
court's rendering of its judgment as to such specific lot(s), then the original
records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily elevated, leaving with the
lower court the records or pleadings referring to disputed lots not covered by
said court's adjudication. In this particular cadastral proceeding, as stated by
respondent court itself in its questioned order, there remain only "around 8
contested ones [lots] which have not yet been adjudicated not counting the
180 lots which were 'archived' by a predecessor of the presiding
judge." 5 This readily shows the lack of any difficulty to keep separate records
for specific lots claimed by conflicting parties, and elevating only the
particular record for the specific lot, subject of judgment and appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. Dispensing with briefs or
memoranda, judgment is hereby rendered (a) setting aside the questioned
orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal and ordered the
issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling any certificate of title which
may have been issued to respondents pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering
respondent court to give due course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of
July 11, 1983 and to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records
of the case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan
Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary evidence as
hereinabove indicated. No costs.
CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO VILLASIN, ET AL., respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Land registration|Cadastralproceedings|Due Process|Procedural due
process|Appeal
Syllabi:
1. Land registration; Cadastral proceedings; Cadastral court may issue a writ of
possession.-
In Abellera vs. De Guzman (85 Phil. 738), the Supreme Court left no doubt about the
power of the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: “After hearing, the
cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of the lots and entitled .to their
possession and may issue a writ directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof,
but it cannot award damages to the plaintiff.” As a matter of fact, the Abellera doctrine
has its roots in the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered 22 years earlier in 1928 in
Director of Lands vs. Court of First Instance of Tarlac (51 Phil. 805). The Court of First
Instance, sitting as a land registration court, has jurisdiction to order, as a
consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition of improvements
introduced by the successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land registration
case. (Marcelo vs. Mencias, 58 O.G. 3349.)
2. Land registration; Due process; Procedural due process; Requirements of.-
A plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting of
an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party
having had the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. “What the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and
lack of opportunity to be heard.”
3. Land registration; Appeal; Factual question should be raised in the Court of
Appeals, not in the Supreme Court.-
The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of possession cannot
affect parties who enter the land after ,the issuance of a decree of registration is
equally devoid of merit. This is a factual matter, the determination of which was
properly within the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It should there have been
raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this particular issue at
this stage cannot be characterized as other than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to
impute an aspect of vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there
is none.
Docket Number: No. L-23973
f or mandamus and certiorari, is affirmed. With costs against petitioners.
FERNANDO, J.:
A point of jurisdiction as to the power of a court of first instance
sitting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession was raised
and an issue of due process invoked in this petition for the review
of a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari. As will hereafter be made
apparent, neither is sufficiently persuasive to call for a reversal. We
affirm.
The principal question raised in the Court of Appeals according to
the decision sought to be reviewed "is whether as claimed by the
petitioners, 'the respondent Court has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in trying the oft-stated cadastral case for
re-opening and review, on account of its special and limited
jurisdiction, because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 211-G
before it, between the same parties and over the same land, where
the issue of ownership and possession is involved.'" 1
The question was disposed of in the Court of Appeals decision
thus: "Upon careful consideration, we arrived at the conclusion that
said question should be answered in the negative. Inasmuch as it
was the respondent Court, sitting as Cadastral Court, that handed
down the decision sought to be reviewed in the Petition for Review
abovementioned, it is unquestionable that said Court did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it entertained said
petition for review based upon the ground that said Court did not
have legal authority to award and adjudicate privately owned lands
already covered by Torrens Title. We are satisfied, under the facts
hereinabove mentioned, that the respondent Court was right in
reconsidering and setting aside its said decision and declaring null
and void the decrees as well as the certificates of title issued in
accordance therewith, it appearing that although given a chance to
do so, the herein petitioners had not presented evidence to show,
or had not succeeded in showing, that Certificate of Title No. 75
issued in favor of Andres Villasin of Parafina on September 15,
1914 did not include Lot No. 5387. In view hereof, it would appear
that the appeal sought to be taken by the herein petitioners from
the aforementioned orders of the Cadastral Court, even granting
that the steps towards that end were taken within the reglementary
period, would not serve any benefit." 2
Petitioners thus disputed the right of respondents to the
aforementioned lot, but without success. They ought to have taken
the proper steps to appeal; they failed to do so within the
reglementary period. They would then rely on the special civil
action for mandamus and certiorari as a substitute measure,
having lost the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals saw through
their scheme and dismissed their petition.
More specifically, insofar as the issue of the writ of possession is
concerned, the version in the brief of petitioners t follows: "After the
appeal was dismissed the private respondents moved for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of
the land in controversy. The said Motion was heard on 27 March,
1961 and was, with, undue haste, granted on the same day but a
copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March
1961, or the following day after it had heard and granted. After their
Motion to reconsider the Order of 27 March 1961, granting the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, was denied in the Order of 27
September 1961, the Trial Court issued such writ. (Actually the
herein petitioners, however, still remain in possession of the land.)
Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was
dismissed by the principal respondent." 3
It is in the light of the above facts thus presented that they would
raise the aforementioned jurisdictional and due process questions.
Their contention, as set forth in their lone assignment of error is
that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring null and void the
aforesaid orders with particular emphasis on the writ of possession
thereafter issued. In their effort to lend substance to the above
allegation, petitioners stressed the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
court of first instance acting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of
possession and the alleged denial of procedural due process.
As already indicated, their plea is futile and unavailing, running
counter as it does to controlling decisions of this Court. The court
of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to
issue a writ of possession. Nor was there a failure to accord
petitioners procedural due process.
1. In Abellera v. De Guzman, 4 we left no doubt about the power of
the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: "After
hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of
the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ
directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot
award damages to the plaintiff." As a matter of fact, the Abellera
doctrine has its roots in our opinion rendered 22 years earlier in
1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac. 5 The
language used by Justice Laurel in Corders v. Court of First
Instance of Laguna, 6 a 1939 decision, would, if carefully analyzed,
likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of whether or
not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.
In a recent decision, less than three years ago, where the party
adversely affected did not even bother to assail the legality of an
order of a writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we
pointed out, in an opinion through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, how broad
and extensive is the scope of such an authority. Thus: "Neither do
respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the order of the
cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in favor of
petitioners as well as its enforcement. Under these circumstances,
we hold that the Order, dated March 20, 1962, of the cadastral
court, granting petitioners' motion to compel respondents to
remove their respective houses from the disputed lot, is valid and
enforceable against respondents. In the case of Marcelo v.
Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58 O.G. 3349, this
Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or authority of the court of
first instance, sitting as a land registration court, to order, as a
consequence of the writ of possession issued by it, the demolition
of improvements introduced by the successor-in-interest of a
defeated oppositor in the land registration case." 7 The confidence
with which therefore petitioners asserted such lack of jurisdiction in
a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession is clearly unjustified.
2. The due process question is just as easily disposed of.
Petitioners in their brief would argue thus: "The herein petitioners
had no chance to object to the private respondents' Motion for Writ
of Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they received
a copy thereof only on 28 March 1961, or on the following day that
it was heard and granted by the Court on 27 March 1961." 8
In an earlier page of their brief, they did admit, that they had a
motion to reconsider such order of March 27, 1961 which was
denied in an order of September 27 of the same year. Only then,
as admitted by them likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ
of possession. Where then is the denial of due process?
Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Cadiao 9 would
dispel any doubt that the answer to the above due process
question must be in the negative. Thus: "While it is true then that
the order of November 2, 1967 was issued ex parte, it is equally
true that whatever objections could have been raised by petitioner
were in fact set forth in its petition to set aside and to reconsider
and were inquired into in a hearing held on January 24, 1968. As
far back as 1935, it has already been a settled doctrine that a plea
of denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect
consisting of an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured
by the alleged aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be
heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.' There is then no
occasion to impute deprivation of property without due process
where the adverse party was heard on a motion for reconsideration
constituting as it does 'sufficient opportunity' for him to inform the
Tribunal concerned of his side of the controversy. As was stated in
a recent decision, what 'due process contemplates is freedom from
arbitrariness and what it requires is fairness or justice, the
substance rather than the form being paramount', the conclusion
being that the hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the
strict requirement of due process."
3. The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of
possession cannot affect parties who enter the land after the
issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid of merit. This
is a factual matter, the determination of which was properly within
the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It should there have been
raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this
particular issue at this stage cannot be characterized as other than
a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute an aspect of
vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there is
none.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 28,
1964, dismissing the petition for mandamus and certiorari, is
affirmed. With costs against petitioners.