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CONTRACTS
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(FOR FRIDAY) DEADLINE (7:00 am Friday)
OCTOBER 27, 2017, 5:30-8:00pm
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. (n)
S, a movie actress, has a one-year contract with XYZ Studio. If F, a friend of S induces her,
without any justifiable cause, to break the contract, then XYZ Studio can sue F for damages
(Sample-Mustang)
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. (1258)
(Sample-Yana)
2
On December 14, 1991, petitioner reiterated its desire to complete the 2 projects but the
same was denied by respondent, respondent pointed out that amicable settlement is
impossible.
Hence, the Complaint for Sum of Moneyfiled by respondent against petitioner praying for
the payment of the following: P493,695.00 representing the amount which they owed
respondent from the downpayment and advances made.
Petitioner also insisted that the proximate cause of the delay is the misrepresentation of
the respondent on the extent of the defect o
f the transformer.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of inexcusable delay in the completion of the
projects
Held: No
It explained that its failure to complete the project was due to the misrepresentation of
the respondent. It claimed that more time and money were needed, because the
condition of the subject transformer was worse than the representations of respondent.
Is this defense tenable?
We answer in the negative.
Letters, petitioner justified its inability to complete the projects within the stipulated
period on the alleged unavailability of the materials to be used to perform the projects as
stated in the job orders. Nowhere in said letters did petitioner claim that it could not
finish the projects, particularly the conversion of the transformer unit because the
defects were worse than the representation of respondent.
In other words, there was no allegation of fraud, bad faith, concealment or
misrepresentation on the part of respondent as to the true condition of the subject
transformer.
It can be inferred from the foregoing facts that there was not only a delay but a failure
to complete the projects as stated in the contract; that petitioner could not complete the
projects because it did not have the materials needed; and that it is in need of financial
assistance.
The Court likewise notes that petitioner repeatedly asked for extension allegedly
because it needed to import the materials and that the same could not be delivered on
time. Petitioner also repeatedly requested that respondent make a direct payment to the
suppliers notwithstanding the fact that it contracted with respondent for the supply of
labor, materials, and technical supervision. It is, therefore, expected that petitioner
would be responsible in paying its suppliers because respondent is not privy to their
(petitioner and its suppliers) contract.
This is especially true in this case since respondent had already made advance payments
to petitioner. It appears, therefore, that in offering its bid, the source and cost of
materials were not seriously taken into consideration. It appears, further, that petitioner
had a hard time in fulfilling its obligations under the contract that is why it asked for
financial assistance from respondent. This is contrary to petitioners representation that it
was capable, competent, and duly licensed to handle the projects.
This lack of evidence, coupled with petitioners failure to raise the same at the
earliest opportunity, belies petitioners claim that it could not complete the
projects because the subject transformer could no longer be repaired.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Fraud has been defined to include an inducement through insidious machination.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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Insidious machination refers to a deceitful scheme or plot with an evil or devious
purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with intent to deceive, conceals or omits to state
material facts and, by reason of such omission or concealment, the other party was
induced to give consent that would not otherwise have been given. These are allegations
of fact that demand clear and convincing proof. They are serious accusations that can be
so conveniently and casually invoked, and that is why they are never presumed. In this
case, the evidence presented is insufficient to prove that respondent acted in bad faith or
fraudulently in dealing with petitioner.
FACTS: Spouses Oscar and Gina Gironella obtained two (2) loans from PNB dated 11
November 1991 and 16 January 1992 in the amount of Php 7, 500, 000.00 and Php 2, 000,
000.00 for the construction of Dagupan Village Hotel and Sports Complex. The loans were
co-terminus, both payable on installment and secured by the same real estate mortgage
over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 56059 in favor of PNB.
On May 1992 the spouses applied another loan with PNB amounting Php 5, 800, 000.00 for
the construction of the restaurant and purchase of generator set.
The Spouses Gironella believed that the third loan would be approved and that they used
their generated income for the construction while the loan is still pending, resulting to default
of their previous two (2) loans.
The Spouses proposed a restructuring of the Php 5, 800, 000.00 and maintain payment for
the interests of the previous loans.
By the year 2000 the PNB wrote a letter to the Spouses Gironella for the restructuring of the
said loan and that it will be subject for evaluation and approval of the higher management.
On 7 February 2000, the Spouses Gironella gave a qualified acceptance of PNB’s proposed
restructuring, specifically referring to specific terms in the 25 January 2000 proposal of PNB.
However PNB rejected the counter offer of the Spouses Gironella and later on filed for
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the mortgage property.
The Spouses filed a Complaint before the RTC with prayer for issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the original
credit agreements, and security therefor, between the parties. The RTC granted the petition.
PNB appealed to the CA questioning the trial court’s decision. CA ruled in favor of PNB, the
appellate court found that there was no final agreement reached by the parties where the
offer was certain and acceptance thereof by the other party was absolute. The appellate
court held that, in this case, a qualified acceptance equated to a counter-offer and, at that
point, there was no absolute and unqualified acceptance which is identical in all respects
with that of the offer so as to produce consent or meeting of the minds.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT there is fraud or gross negligence when the PNB did not
approved their loan application by giving them “false hope or assurances”.
WHETHER OR NOT there is a Perfected Contract or Partial Restructuring of
Loan.
HELD: The Spouses Gironella claim fraud and gross negligence, as plaintiffs, the Spouses
Gironella had the duty, the burden of proof, to present evidence, required by law, on the
facts in issue necessary to establish their claim.
The foregoing statement fails to take into consideration the three (3) distinct stages of a
contract: (1) preparation or negotiation, (2) perfection, and finally, (3) consummation.
Necessarily, the Spouses Gironella as debtors applying for an additional loan, ought to
participate in the negotiations thereof and await PNB’s assessment and processing of their
additional loan application.
A contract is perfected by mere consent. In turn, consent is manifested by the meeting of the
offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract.
The offer must be certain and the acceptance seasonable and absolute. If qualified, the
acceptance would merely constitute a counter-offer as what occurred in this case.
To reach that moment of perfection, the parties must agree on the same thing in the same
sense, so that their minds meet as to all the terms. The minds of parties must meet at every
point; nothing can be left open for further arrangement. So long as there is any uncertainty or
indefiniteness, or future negotiations or considerations to be had between the parties, there
is not a completed contract, and in fact, there is no contract at all.
The Spouses Gironella’s payments under its original loan cannot be considered as partial
execution of the proposed restructuring of loan agreement.
The letter dated 20 January 2000 which qualifiedly accepted by the Spouses on 7 February
2000 and constituted a counter-offer in which PNB ultimately rejected on 8 March 2000,
clearly show that the parties never passed the negotiation stage. There was no meeting of
the minds on the restructuring of the loans. Thus, the Spouses Gironella's original Php
9,500,000.00 loan agreement subsists.
The SC affirmed the CA’s decision and held that PNB is not liable either for fraud, gross
negligence or abuse of right. PNB did not breach any agreement, the restructured loan was
never perfected and PNB was not liable to pay the spouses any forms of damages.
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
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(Sample-Edward)
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon
the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain
and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time
it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been
entered into in the place where the offer was made. (1262a)
(Sample-Erica)
The minds of the parties must meet as to all the terms and nothing is left open for further
arrangement. Similarly, contract changes must be made with the assent or consent of the
contracting parties. If this assent or consent is wanting on the part of one who contracts, his
act has no more efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound
mind. (Phil. National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 20 [1994]; Luxuria Homes, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 315 [1999].)
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Requisites of Consent. — Under the Civil Code, in order that there is consent, the following
requisites must concur: first, the consent must be manifested by the concurrence of the offer
and the acceptance (Arts. 1319-1326); second, the contracting parties must possess the
necessary legal capacity (Arts. 1327-1327); and third, the consent must be intelligent, free,
spontaneous, and real
→S offered to sell his hacienda to B for “P100,000.00, Philippine currency in cash” should
the latter indicate his acceptance on or before a certain date otherwise S would sell the
same to others. B sent a reply stating that “I am very much interested to buy and acquire this
Hacienda of yours in the same price, manner, conditions and considerations of your offer”
The reply of B is an indication that he accepts the offer. (offer certain, acceptance absolute).
But, if B states “I am very much interested to buy and acquire this Hacienda of yours in the
but for a price of PhP 90,000.00-- this is a Counter offer/ qualified acceptance)
The offerer can indicate the manner of acceptance and the time when and the place where it
should be made. The offerer will not be bound by an acceptance made by the acceptor in
any other manner than that specified by the offerer unless the latter acquiesces in the
change.
Art. 1323. An offer becomes ineffective upon the death, civil interdiction, insanity, or
insolvency of either party before acceptance is conveyed. (n)
(Sample-Joy)
Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may
be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except
when the option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised. (n)
(Sample-Jued)
Art. 1325. Unless it appears otherwise, business advertisements of things for sale are not
definite offers, but mere invitations to make an offer. (n)
(1) “For sale: 1,000 square meters lot at Green Plains Village, Quezon City for
P5,000,000.00 — Tel. No. 817-12-84.” This is not a definite offer.
(2) “For sale: 1,000 square meters lot at Green Plains Village, Quezon City located at the
corner of Geronimo and Magallanes Streets for P5,000,000.00 cash. — Tel. No. 817-12-84.”
This is a definite offer.
(Sample-Mark)
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
Art. 1326. Advertisements for bidders are simply invitations to make proposals, and the
advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary appears.
(n)
EXAMPLE:
The owner of the property which is advertised for sale, either at public or private auction, has
the right to prescribe the manner, conditions and terms of the sale and anybody participating
in such sale is bound by all the conditions, whether he knew them or not.
(Sample-Yana)
Art. 1320. An acceptance may be express or implied. (n)
(Sample-Edward)
Example: A and B are owner of stalls which sell rice,. C delivers 1000 kilos of rice to
A every Sunday. If A is not there, C just leaves it with A’s assistant. C tries to do business
with B. B is not there though. C leaves rice with B’s assistant. B does not call C. Both A and
B are silent. A accepted the rice because of the arrangement. If A did not want to accept the
rice, then A should have called. B’s silence is not acceptance.
Art. 1322. An offer made through an agent is accepted from the time acceptance is
communicated to him. (n)
(Sample-Erica)
For a contract to arise, the acceptance must be made known to the offeror. By legal fiction,
an agent is considered an extension of the personality of his principal. (Art. 1910, par. 1.) If
duly authorized, the act of the agent is, in law, the act of the principal.
Article 1322 applies only if the offer is made through the agent and the acceptance is
communicated through him. Hence, there would be no meeting of the minds if the principal
himself made the offer and the acceptance is communicated to the agent unless, of course,
the latter is authorized to receive the acceptance.
→ X, through his agent Y, offers Z to buy his (z’s) car for PhP 120,000.00. Acceptance can
be considered when Z communicates through Y (X’s agent) his willingness to accept the
offer.
Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the
thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it
came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into
in the place where the offer was made.
(Sample-Jerald)
Acceptance must be unconditional. It must be identical to the terms of the offer. It must not
vary from the proposal either by way of omission, addition or alteration. If it does, neither
party is bound as the acceptance is qualified. But an acceptance is not conditional because
the acceptor expresses dissatisfaction with the offer, yet nevertheless gives his unqualified
assent, nor because he adds immaterial words. If the acceptance is qualified, it is
considered by the law as a counter-offer
A offers to sell his only car to B for P1M. B accepted the offer by paying the price of the car
at P1M.
Assuming B agreed to buy the car but ask to lower the price to P900K. In this case, B makes
a counter-offer subject to A’s approval.
If A offered to B his car and B, through telegram, sent his acceptance but, before A actually
received the telegram, he informs B of the revocation of his offer, no contract can be
perfected.
SUPRA (27)Capalla v COMELEC, G.R. No. 201112, June 2012 (concurring of J. Sereno)
-Jued
Facts
Del Rosario Realty (represented by Pedro Del Rosario) entered into a Contract to Sell
with spouses Leonardo Faustino and Angelina Lim (“Faustino spouses”) a lot.
Faustino spouses sold their rights over the property to spouses Vicente Padiernos and
Concordia Garcia assume the former's obligations
Pedro Del Rosario executed a deed assigning all of his rights contract to sell to Socorro
A. Ramos.
Vicente Padiernos sold:
(a) sold one-half of the property to petitioner Jose Toledo (Toledo shall “continue
payments until fully paid
(b) the remaining half of the property to spouses Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos.
>>> Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos assigned their rights over the property to their
children, petitioners Glenn and Danilo Padiernos.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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***
spouses Toledo and spouses Virgilio and Leticia Padiernos paid quarterly installments
on the property until full payment sometime in 1971.
When petitioners requested for the release of the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
respondent Antonio A. Ramos, representing the heirs of Socorro Ramos, issued a
Certification stating that while the property “has been paid in full by Mr. Vicente
Padiernos...Title #44436 could not be released pending final decision of the Supreme
Court.”
In 1974, Virgilio Padiernos and petitioner Jose Toledo constructed their houses on the
property
In the meantime, it appears that execution proceedings were taken against the estate of
Socorro Ramos.As a consequence, eighteen (18) parcels of land belonging to the estate,
including the property, were sold in auction to Guillermo N. Pablo and Primitiva C. Cruz,
who thereafter sold said properties to ARC Marketing.
On March 14, 1977, all heirs of Socorro A. Ramos, filed a Complaint for Nullity of
Execution Sale against auction sale winners Guillermo N. Pablo and Primitiva C. Cruz,
and their transferee ARC Marketing.
There was settled, and the parties entered into a Final Compromise Agreement
(“Compromise Agreement”). Under the Compromise Agreement, then sole plaintiff
Lourdes A. Ramos agreed to settle the case for the total compromise amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to be paid by ARC Marketing to the former in installments.
Petitioners Jose Toledo, Glenn Padiernos and Danilo Padiernos filed a complaint for
reconveyance and damages.
ARC Marketing argues that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations:L
25. Plaintiffs waited for more than ten (10) years from the issuance of the …
certification, more than ten (10) [sic] after title over the subject property was issued in
favor of Guillermo Pablo, more than ten (10) years … after title over the subject property
was issued in favor of ARC and, for more than four (4) years from the rendition of the
Decision dated January 13, 1993, before they instituted the present action.
26. Clearly, plaintiffs’' cause of action, if there was any, prescribed or was barred by the
statute of limitation a long, long time ago. Perforce, this a
ction should be dismissed.51
Issue: WON petition cause of action is barred by the by the statute of limitations
Held: NO
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud
becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real
owner of the property. The presence of fraud in this case, as shown by the disposition of
the property to ARC Marketing by Lourdes Ramos despite knowledge of petitioners' title
over the same, created an implied trust in favor of petitioners Toledo, et al. This gives
petitioners the right to seek reconveyance of the property from the subsequent buyers.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the
reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. However, if the plaintiff also remains in
possession of the same, as in this case, the prescriptive period to recover title and
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for
reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title,
an action that is imprescriptible:
Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land
because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the
nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
Here, petitioners' undisturbed possession of the property is uncontroverted. Petitioners
have alleged that they have been in “continued, open and uninterrupted possession of
the property for over forty (40) years,” as evidenced not only by their payment of real
property taxes but also the construction of their house thereon. This was notably never
disputed by ARC Marketing. As plaintiffs in possession of the disputed property,
petitioners are not barred from seeking relief from the court via an action for
reconveyance.
Neither can petitioners be considered to have slept on their rights for laches to operate
against them. Petitioners have clearly taken steps to protect their interests in the
property. While respondents correctly point out that the sale of the property between the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and respondents was not registered, the records
show that petitioners (and/or their predecessors-in-interest) have registered their
adverse claim over the property as early as October 20, 1960. Petitioners also previously
requested for the release of the owner's duplicate certificate of title sometime in 1973
but was given a Certification/Acknowledgment of Full Payment instead as the title then
could not be released due to a pending case involving the property.
More importantly, petitioners were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-22850 between
respondents Ramos, Cruz and ARC Marketing. They cannot therefore be presumed to be
aware of the January 13, 1993 decision in said case for their action for reconveyance
filed four years after (or in 1997) to be barred by laches.
SUPRA (30) Talampas vs. Moldex Realty, G.R. No. 170134, June 17, 2015 -Yana
We’ve discussed this case already. But for our ref, here’s the digest. © Jerald.
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things,
may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the
object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
(Sample-Joy)
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy
may likewise be the object of a contract. (1271a)
D entered into a contract with C, Where D will supply illegal firearms or ammunitions to C for
1 year in the condition that C will have to pay D 10,000 per month. Since firearms are not
legal without proper license and is contrary to law it cannot be an object in the contract.
(Sample-Mark)
Art. 1348. Impossible things or services cannot be the object of contracts. (1272)
Requisites of things as object of contract. In order that things may be the object of a
contract, the following requisites must be present:
(1) The thing must be within the commerce of men, that is, it can
legally be the subject of commercial transaction
(2) It must not be impossible, legally or physically (Art. 1348.);
(3) It must be in existence or capable of coming into existence (see
Arts. 1461, 1493, 1494.); and
(4) It must be determinate or determinable without the need of a
new contract between the parties. (Arts. 1349, 1460, par. 2.)
(Sample-Mustang)
Art. 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the
quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided
it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.
(1273)
EXAMPLE:
(1) S sold to B all the chickens in his poultry. Here, the object itself (chickens) is determinate
but the quantity though not yet determined can be ascertained without the necessity of
entering into a new contract.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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(2) S agreed to deliver one of his carabaos to B. Here, the object is determinable without the
need of a new contract between the parties. It becomes determinate the moment it is
delivered.
(3) If the subject matter of the agreement is a parcel of agricultural land owned by S and S
happens to own many agricultural lands, the contract is void, if the particular land sold
cannot be determined without a new or further agreement between the parties.
(4) S obligates himself to sell to B for a price certain (P3,000.00) a specified quantity of
sugar (200 kilos) of a given quality (of the first grade and second grade) without designating
a particular lot of sugar.
(Sample-Yana)
Facts:
Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He also
had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blas married
Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired during the
first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other
half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this,
Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband;
that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring
to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of them
depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of her
estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with
three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill
her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she
acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property precisely because
Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her death.
Issue:
Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.
Held:
Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the
formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid
litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a compromise.
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that
the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise
made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her
husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the
husband.
And also…
They can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with them because it was stated in Art. 1347
that “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.”. In this case the contract was authorized by law because the promised made by
Maxima to their heirs before she died is a valid reason and it should be enforceable upon her death
and her heirs can now acquire the succession of the properties in issue.
FACTS:
Petitioners Belinda Tanedo, et al are the children of deceased Lorenzo Tanedo. Respondent
Ricardo Tanedo, on the other hand, is the brother of the deceased.
In 1962, Lorenzo sold to his brother Ricardo one hectare of his share in a parcel of land
located in Tarlac which was owned by his parents. Said property, therefore, is Lorenzo’s
“future inheritance” from his parents.
On February 28, 1980, Lorenzo and Ricardo’s sole living parent, their father Matias, died. On
the same day, Lorenzo executed an Affidavit of Conformity re-affirming the sale he executed
in 1962.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed another Deed of Sale in favor of Ricardo covering his “undivided
ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191”. However, Belinda told Ricardo
via a telephone conversation that Lorenzo sold the same parcel of land to her and the other
petitioners (Belinda et al) on December 29, 1980. Ricardo hastily recorded his Deed of Sale
with the Registry of Deeds.
Thus, in 1982, the petitioners, children of Lorenzo, filed a complaint for rescission (plus
damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lorenzo in favor of private respondents covering
the property inherited by Lorenzo from his father.
Both the RTC and the CA upheld the validity of the 1981 sale and ruled in favor of Ricardo.
ISSUES:
1. Is the 1962 sale valid? Otherwise stated, is the sale of future inheritance valid?
2. Is the 1981 sale valid? Otherwise stated, when is ownership vested upon the successor?
HELD:
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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The 1962 sale is VOID while the 1981 sale is VALID.
Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future
inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.” Lorenzo was not the owner of the
property that he sold in 1962 as it was at that time only his future inheritance from his father,
Matias. He had therefore no right to transfer the ownership thereof. The Affidavit of
Conformity that he executed in 1980 upon his father’s death did not cure the defect because
there was nothing to re-affirm – the 1962 sale having been void.
On the other hand, the 1981 sale of Lazaro’s undivided share to Ricardo is valid because
ownership passes to the heir at the very moment of death who from that moment acquires
the right to dispose of his share.
Further, following Article 1544 of the Civil Code, because Ricardo was the first to register his
right, he is now deemed the owner of the property in question.
Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the
prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or
benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere liberality of the
benefactor. (1274)
Art. 1351. The particular motives of the parties in entering into a contract are different from
the cause thereof. (n)
(Sample-Edward)
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatever. The
cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
(1275a)
(Sample-Erica)
Since cause is one of the essential elements of a contract, its absence does not create a
contract as there can be no meeting of the minds. This is also true if the cause is unlawful.
→ a contract to engage a party to steal is unlawful as it is against the law.
→ a contract between a husband and wife to have their respective paramours is contrary to
morals.
→ A contract to foment riots is contrary to public order and
→ a contract waiving the right of an employee to receive what is due him under the law is
contrary to public policy.
Art. 1353. The statement of a false cause in contracts shall render them void, if it should not
be proved that they were founded upon another cause which is true and lawful. (1276)
(Sample-Jerald)
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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Art. 1354. Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is
lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (1277)
(Sample-Joy)
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (n)
(Sample-Jued)
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired
the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
(1) D borrowed from C P50,000.00. C, on the other hand, borrowed D’s car. The
performance by D of his obligation to C is not conditioned upon the performance by C of his
obligation and vice versa.
Although D and C are debtors and creditors of each other, their obligations are not
reciprocal. The obligation of D arises from the contract of loan, while that of C, from the
contract of commodatum. The obligations are not dependent upon each other and are not
simultaneous. Article 1191 applies only if the reciprocity arises from the same cause.
(Sample-Mark)
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
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consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. (1258)
(Sample-Mustang)
Art. 1316. Real contracts, such as deposit, pledge and Commodatum, are not perfected until
the delivery of the object of the obligation. (n)
EXAMPLE:
X borrowed from Y P5,000. As X’s security for the debt, X promised to pledge his diamond
ring to Y.
Before the delivery of the ring to Y, the contract of pledge is not yet perfected. If X later on
refuses to pledge the ring, Y can demand the payment of the obligation although it is with a
period. (Art. 1198[2].) But Y cannot require X to deliver the ring as security because there is
no real contract of pledge yet. There is merely a consensual contract to constitute a pledge.
What exists, is a personal right, the right of action on the part of Y to demand the constitution
of the pledge. (see Art. 2092.)
(Sample-Yana)
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(Sample-Edward)
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Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the
thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the
acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.
Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it
came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into
in the place where the offer was made. (1262a)
(Sample-Jerald)
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract.
(Sample-Joy)
Mistake as to the identity or qualifications of one of the parties will vitiate consent only when
such identity or qualifications have been the principal cause of the contract.
A simple mistake of account shall give rise to its correction. (1266a)
Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. (n)
(Sample-Jued)
Art. 1333. There is no mistake if the party alleging it knew the doubt, contingency or risk
affecting the object of the contract. (n)
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B bought a parcel of land from S who informed him before the contract was perfected that
the land was involved in a litigation in which C is the claimant.
In case the land is recovered later on by C, B cannot allege mistake in his contract because
he knew the risk that the land might later on be recovered by C.
(Sample-Mark)
Art. 1334. Mutual error as to the legal effect of an agreement when the real purpose of the
parties is frustrated, may vitiate consent.
EXAMPLES:
(1) D borrows P10,000.00 from C. As security for the debt, it was agreed that D should
mortgage his parcel of land in favor of C. However, the document as written is one of
antichresis,18 the parties erroneously believing that it has the same effect as a mortgage.
In this case, the contract of antichresis is voidable because there is no
meeting of the minds. (Art. 1359, par. 2.)
(2) In the same example, if the parties really agreed on a sale, but the document as written
discloses a mortgage, there is a meeting of the minds but the document does not show their
true intention. In this case, the remedy is reformation. (see Art. 1359.)
(35)Sps. Theis v. CA, GR No. L-126013, February 12, 1997 -Yana
FACTS: Calson’s Development owned three lots in Tagaytay – Parcels Nos. 1, 2, and 3.
Adjacent to parcel no. 3 was parcel no. 4, which was not owned by Calson’s. Calson’s built a
house on Parcel No. 3. In a subsequent survey, parcel no. 3, where the house was built, was
erroneously indicated to be covered by the title to parcel no. 1. Parcel nos. 2 and 3 were
mistakenly surveyed to be located where parcel no. 4 was located.
Unaware of this mistake by which Calson’s appeared to be the owner of parcel no. 4,
Calson’s sold what it thought was parcel nos. 2 and 3 (but what was actually parcel no. 4) to
the Theis spouses.
Upon execution of the deed of sale in favor of Their spouses, Calson’s delivered the
certificates of title to parcel nos. 2 and 3 to the spouses. The spouses then went to
Germany. About three years later, they returned to Tagaytay to plan the construction of their
house. It was then that they discovered that parcel no. 4, which was sold to them, was
owned by someone else, and that what was actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3.
The real parcel no. 3, however, could not have been sold to them since a house had already
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been built thereon by Calson’s even before the execution of the contract, and its construction
cost far exceeded the price paid by the spouses for the two parcels of land.
The spouses insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, but this was impossible, since Calson’s
did not own it. Calson’s offered them the real parcel nos. 1 and 2 instead since these were
really what it intended to sell to the spouses. The spouses refused and insisted that they
wanted parcel nos. 2 and 3 since the TCTs to these lots were the ones that had been issued
in their name.
Calson’s then offered to return double the amount already paid by the spouses. The spouses
still refused. Calson’s filed an action to annul the contract of sale.
HELD: Yes, the contract can be annulled on the ground of mistake.
A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was
procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence, or undue influence. Article 1390 of
the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent is vitiated by mistake are
annullable. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. The concept of error includes: (1)
ignorance, which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing; and (2) mistake, which
is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some fact,
circumstance, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of full
and correct knowledge about the thing.
In the case at bar, the private respondent obviously committed an honest mistake in selling
parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, it is quite impossible for said private
respondent to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good faith of the
private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it
immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them with twice
the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no
other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of
mistake.
● Violence shall annul the obligation, although it may not been employed by a 3rd
person who did not take part in the contract (Art.1336).
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● A threat to enforce one’s claim through competent authority, if the claim is just
or legal, does not vitiate consent (Art.1335,4th)
● Thus, the rule is, generally, a threat to do something lawful does not
constitute intimidation.
● Example: If you don’t marry my daughter, I’ll report you to the IBP (in case the
daughter of the person got pregnant out of wedlock). This is not unlawful
because the person did commit immorality.
● Example: A saw B commit murder. A threatened B that he will report him to
the police unless B gives his house. This is intimidation because there is no
connection between the crime and the contract.
Art. 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is
employed.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be
borne in mind.
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does
not vitiate consent. (1267a)
EXAMPLE:
Got this from De Leon ha :-)
Facts: H, an insured under a life insurance policy, died leaving his widow, W, a
beneficiary. C, a creditor of H, threatened W that if the latter would not pay the
indebtedness of H, C would institute suit and allege not only fraud but that H met his
death through other than accidental means.
Upon receipt of the insurance money, W paid C. It appeared that she paid C his
credit upon the advice of her lawyers who assisted her throughout the negotiations
because she wanted to obtain the release of the balance of the insurance money, as
she was then in dire need.
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Issue: Has W the right to recover the payment made on the ground that she did so
on by reason of C’s intimidation?
Held: No. Article 1335 is not applicable. She made the payment not because of the
fear of litigation threatened by C but in order to obtain the release of the insurance.
(Tapia Vda. de Jones vs. Carmen and Elser, 60 Phil. 756 [1954].)
(Sample-Yana)
Art. 1336. Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, although it may have been
employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract. (1268)
(Sample-Edward)
Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power
over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following
circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other relations
between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly influenced was
suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
(Sample-Erica)
Meaning-- there is undue in uence when a person takes improper advantage of his power
over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.
Illustrative case:
In Marubeni Corporation vs. Lirag,70 where a consultancy agreement was obtained from a
government agency because of the use of in uence of executive of cials, the Supreme Court
declared the contract not only voidable but null and void, thus:
Any agreement entered into because of the actual or supposed influence which the party
has, engaging him to in uence executive of cials in the discharge of their duties, which
contemplates the use of personal in uence and solicitation rather than an appeal to the
judgment of the of cial on the merits of the object sought is contrary to public policy.
Consequently, the agreement, assuming that the parties agreed to the consultancy, is null
and void as against public policy. Therefore, it is unenforceable before a court of justice.
(35)Martinez v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, 15 Phil. 252 (1910) - Erica
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FACTS:
1. Alejandro S. Macleod (husband of Mercedes) was for many years the
managing partner of the house of Aldecoa & Co. in the city of Manila.
2. He withdrew from the management when Aldecoa & Co. went into liquidation.
3. Hongkong & Shanghai banking Corporation was a creditor of that firm to the
extent of several hundred thousand pesos and claimed to have a creditor's lien in the nature
of a pledge over certain properties of the debtor.
4. Bank began a civil action against Alejandro, Mercedes, Aldecoa & Co., and
the firm known as Viuda e Hijos de Escaño.
• A certain undertaking in favor of Aldecoa & Co. had been pledged to the bank
to secure the indebtedness of Aldecoa & Co., but that this obligation had been wrongfully
transferred by Alejandro into an obligation in favor of Mercedes to the prejudice of the bank.
• Aldecoa & Co. began a civil action against Alejandro S. Macleod and others
for the recovery of certain shares of stock basing its right to recover upon alleged criminal
misconduct of Alejandro in his management of the firm's affairs.
1. Knowing that criminal complaints would be filed against him, Alejandro went
to Macao (Portuguese colony) a territory not covered by the extradition treaty between US
and Portuguese.
2. Aldecoa filed a complaint against Alejandro for
• Falsification of commercial document. The GPR requested the Portuguese
government for extradition but this was denied
• Embezzlement
1. Aldecoa & Co. and the bank, on the settlement, insisted upon the conveyance
not only of all the property of Alejandro but also of at least a portion of the property claimed
by Mercedes.
• Alejandro's representative did not resist but Mercedes resisted with respect to
her properties alleging that these were exclusively hers.
1. They met again to try and settle the case
• The conditions and terms were to be explained to Mr. Kingcome (son-in-law
of Mercedes and businessman)
• The explanation was made by Mr. Stephen, the manager of the bank (one of
the friends of Mr. Kingcome) but it is contested whether Kingcome communicated such
substance to Mercedes before she signed the document
• Reference was made to the British Colony in Manila where Kingcome,
Stephen, Alejandro were prominent members and scandal and disgrace will ensure if
settlement is not made.
• Mr. Kingcome got the impression from that interview that Mr. Stephen thought
unless the settlement were consummated additional and mortifying misfortunes would fall
upon Alejandro's family.
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• She refused and it was evident no settlement or compromise can be arrived
at and just do the best to defend Alejandro.
1. Mercedes and Mr. William (nephew and close friend of Mercedes and
Alejandro), now her attorney, talked wherein Mercedes agreed to the terms and authorized
William to execute the contract of settlement on her behalf, and after corrections, it was
signed.
ISSUE1: WON the contract can be annulled since Mercedes' consent was obtained due to
violence and intimidation?
HELD 1: Valid, no duress.
Discussion
• Contracts which are declared void and of no force upon the ground that they
were obtained by fraud, duress, or undue influence are so declared for the reason that the
complaining party never really gave his consent thereto. The consent in such case is not in
the eye of the law a consent at all. The person has not acted. He has done nothing he was in
vinculis(in chains).
Real Duress-- Consent given against his wishes or judgment or reluctantly or without hope of
profit
Void
Valid
Example: A person settles since he injured another. He must make reparation or face the
consequences.
No difference between one choosing which gives him greater profit and one choosing the
lesser evil
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ISSUE2: WON the cases cited by plaintiff is applicable?
HELD2: NO, not applicable.
1. In those cases there was no time within which to deliberate the matter as it
should have been deliberated or take the advice of others or counsel.
2. The threats made to secure the performance of the acts complained of were
made directly to the complaining party by the person directly interested or by someone in his
behalf who was working in his interest and who had no interest whatever in the welfare of
the complaining party.
3. There was no consideration for the performance of the act complained of
except immunity from the prosecution threatened.
4. The property transferred or encumbered by the act complained of was the
separate property of the person performing the act in which the person for whom the act was
performed claimed no interest whatever.
5. There was no dispute as to the title of the property transferred or
encumbered, no claim made to it by anybody, no suits pending to recover it or any portion of
it, and no pretension that it could be taken for the debts of the husband or of any other
person.
The 2 other cases had the benefit of legal advice or friend but none of the other
circumstances listed above were present.
Basically, the cases cited had material differences with the instant case.
Usual exaggerations in trade; opportunity to know facts – Article 1340
● This is known as deceit or dolo causante. This is different from dolo incidente which
means fraud on things which would not prevent you from entering into a contract but
may hold the other liable for damages.
1. Fraud is employed by 1 party on the other (Art.1342,1344)
2. The other party was induced to enter into the contract (Art.1338)
3. The fraud must be serious (1344)
4. There is damage or injury caused
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he
would not have agreed to. (1269)
(Sample-Jerald)
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when the parties
are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n)
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(Sample-Joy)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an opportunity to
know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
(Sample-Mark)
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made by an expert
and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge. (n)
EXAMPLE:
F, a farmer, found a ring. He does not know anything about precious
stones. He sells the ring to B honestly believing, and telling B, that it is a
diamond ring.
In this case, there is no fraud even if it turned out that the ring is not
diamond because his statement is merely an expression of an opinion.
(see Art. 1343.)
However, if F is an expert on precious stones and he sells the ring
to B saying, “I believe this is a diamond ring,’’ and B, knowing that F
is an expert, relies on his special knowledge, the contract is voidable
on the ground of fraud. Actually, F, being an expert, is making a
misrepresentation of fact and he cannot escape liability by expressing it
in the form of an opinion.
(Sample-Mustang)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such
misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual. (n)
EXAMPLE:
S bought the land of B for P2,000.00 per square meter. The reasonable price of
lands in the same vicinity is P3,000.00 per square meter but B sold it only for
P2,000.00 per square meter because C had deceived him regarding its market
value.
In this case, the contract cannot be annulled unless it can be shown that S was a
party to the fraud.
(Sample-Yana)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may constitute error. (n)
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and should
not have been employed by both contracting parties.
(Sample-Erica)
Pokemon Digest - Oblicon
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A unilateral mistake of law as to the legal effect of an agreement is generally not a ground to
annul a contract. This is so because, in such a situation, the document embodying the
agreement is drafted the way the parties have intended it to be such that only its legal effect
is different from what the parties have assumed. However, a mistake of law may vitiate
consent if the following requisites are present: rst, the mistake as to the legal effect of the
agreement must be mutual and, second, such mutual mistake frustrates the real purpose of
the parties. Hence, if A leases to B a property where the latter will construct a four-story
building but it turned out that such building cannot be erected in the said city because of an
ordinance prohibiting the same, the contract can be annulled.
--
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270)
xxx
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when
the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true
agreement. (n)
(Sample-Jerald)
Absolute simulation (simulados) – In a sale of a car, it was made to appear that the price
was paid when actually it was not. The sale being without any consideration is fictitious.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
(n)
(Sample-Joy)
(36)International Corporate Bank v. Gueco, 351 SCRA 516 - Charry