CASE FACTS AND ISSUE
Aldaba v COMELEC FACTS: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the
City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1,
2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4
legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162
(later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to
Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of
NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year
2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the
City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the
City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Aquino III v COMELEC FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the
province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill
No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on
12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716 violates the constitutional standards that requires a minimum population
of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less
than 250,000 or only 176,383.
ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional
for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the
grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at
least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following
statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: The certification on demographic
projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l
Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of
Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in
this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will
grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the
1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution
states that: “ Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is
nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet
a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
Mariano v COMELEC FACTS: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An
Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.
Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the
legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4)
requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within 3
years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional
Tobias v Abalos FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act
Converting the municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong”. Prior to the enactment of the assailed
statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into law. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout
at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA
7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of
Representative may increase.
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special
law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress
in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through
a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province
a particle of their sovereignty.
Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of
the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said
section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have
at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as
of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.
1. No. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a
population of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the
“one city – one representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the
Constitution. The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that general
subject. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence of the proposed
law and its operation.
2. Yes. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided
by law. The present composition of the Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. (I got this from a
different digest, might help - law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by
R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regard to the contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not
met, the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district)
Montejo v COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of
Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736,
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation.The province of Leyte with the cities of
Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is composed
of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan,
Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the
3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No.
2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities
comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba,
Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.
On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of
Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular
province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce
the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population
of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
ISSUE: Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the
legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.
The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows
that COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment
as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the
enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the subsequent
elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the
1987 constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance
states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make
minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within
one hundred and twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district.
Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or
when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the
respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
Sema V COMELEC FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part
of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato
City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has
two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City
and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s
Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly
created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy [MMA] Act 201)
which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with
the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st
district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later
amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the
purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City due to the fact that they are still awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of
S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district).
ISSUE: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional
Marcos v COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez filed Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for the Representative of the 1st District of Leyte on March 1995 stating she
lived in Leyte for 7 months. Montejo candidate of the same position contends
that Mrs. Marcos lacked the one-year residency the Constitution requires the
candidates to the House of Representatives.
In Mrs. Marcos amended CoC, she now claims that she has always
maintained Tacloban as her domicile of residence. On April 24, 1995 –
COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that
found Montejo’s petition for disqualification meritorious, and found Marcos’
corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.
Contending COMELEC’s decision to disqualify Mrs. Marcos for the position of
Representative of 1st district of Leyte. Stating that she has failed to meet the
constitutional requirement of one-year residency set by the law to the
candidates for the House of Representatives. When election came, Marcos
found out that she won by a landslide in the said elections and prayed for her
proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections
No. RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is
governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units: province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the
Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units such as done in the
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201.
Congress cannot delegate the power to create a province or city because
this power inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. A
delegate cannot alter the very composition of the Congress by creating
legislative districts (or cities / provinces which are in turn, entitled to
legislative representation).
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or
mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the
election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued
that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined
that Marcos posses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and
May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to
proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
Aquino v COMELEC FACTS: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
(remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of Palm Village,
Makati for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon (Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City)
filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the
residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for
disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate
of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in
the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco
with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June,
the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2
orders.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC’s finding of noncompliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to
evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
Coquilla v COMELEC FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 ofFilipino parents in Oras, Eastern
Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was subsequently
naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to
the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued
making several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10,
2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On November 21, 2000,
he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which
was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2
years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the
two year residency in Oras was a material representation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could
render a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the
winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered
the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at
least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he
represented in his certificate of candidacy
No. NOT ONLY RESIDENCE BUT DOMICILE (a place where you return)
OF CHOICE OF CANDIDATE MUST BE PROVED. Thus the constitutional
provision that requires that a candidate must “reside” in the Philippines for
a certain time pertain to domicile. Also COMELEC found the following
pieces of evidence to prove his residence is not in Makati:
(1) Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated that
he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52 years. His
certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district.
(2) His birth certificate places Concepcion,Tarlac as the birthplace of both
of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
(3) He has a 2 yr. Lease Agreement of a Condominium in Makati instead
of buying one. (shows his lack of intention to permanent residence)
The COMELEC says that one cannot also claim that he changed his
domicile since changing domicile is hard and absence of any proof, given
the facts does not help the case of Mr. Aquino. Additionally, the claim that
it’s hard to establish the self in a newly created district is absurd since
newly created districts did not present themselves out of thin air so
residence is still important.
COMELEC says that residence is an aspect required since it allows the
voters to exclude those who are not sensitive to the needs of the
community and prevents those who only want to take advantage of
circumstances in a certain locality
No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal
residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the
place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming
a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and
until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship,
petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save
as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United
States by virtue of a “greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently

Atong Paglaum v FACTS: The issue started when 52 party-list groups and organizations filed
COMELEC separate petitions totaling 54 to the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to
reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race.
The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and
December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented
sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and
underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not
truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. In
Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012, Atong Paaglaum Inc. (Atong
Paglaum) had its accreditation and registration cancelled due to the fact that
its nominees do not belong to the sectors which the party represents; and the
party failed to file its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.
ISSUE: Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ph Guardians FACTS: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELECen banc
Brotherhood v issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
COMELEC groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its
Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading,
the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied PGBIs
motion/opposition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.-NO
in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
No. In the discussion of Mr. Monsod with other framers of the Constitution,
it was clarified that political parties such as Social Democrats may field a
candidate under legislative districts and the party-list system. They are
allowed under the party-list system “For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate
in this Constitution.”
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in
the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: “a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.”
The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national
and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties.”
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure by the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. Additionally, R.A.
No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to
support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-
list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood to mean
failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941
should be understood and applied.PGBIs situation a party list group or
organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective, it may be
an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to
address.The Court cannot and do not address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do
so will offend the principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed exists,
then the present case should bring this concern to the legislatures notice.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party FACTS: Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who
v COMELEC identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under
Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds.
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list
organization under RA 7941-YES
ANAD v COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner seeks to compel COMELEC to canvass the votes cast for
it in the held 2013 elections. On Nov. 7, 2012, COMELEC En Banc cancelled
petitioner’s Certificate of Registration/Accreditation on three grounds: it does
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented under Section 5 of the
law; no proof showing its nominees, Tariman and Labandria, are actually
nominated by ANAD itself and it failed to follow procedural requirements on
nominees; and it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local Elections.
Following the decision of Atong Paglaum and the remand of cases,
COMELEC still denied ANAD’s qualification asserting that while it can be
considered a sectoral party, it nonetheless failed to comply with the second
and third points in the assailed resolutions.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only three
nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures in the 2007 elections- NO
Bello v COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Bayan Muna Party-List, represented by Neri Colmenares,
filed with the COMELEC another petition for disqualification against Arroyo. It
alleged that Arroyo is not qualified to be a party-list nominee because he (a)
does not represent or belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector; (b) has not been a bona fide member of AGPP ninety (90) days prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections; (c) is a member of the House of
Representatives; and that (d) AGPP is not a legitimate and qualified party-list
group and has no authority to nominate him.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET has the jurisdiction over Arroyo’s qualification
following his proclamation? -YES
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of
the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation. The enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941. Our
Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”Laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. The principle of non-
discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections
be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
ANAD violated Section 8of RA 7941 when it submitted only three and not
five nominees. Compliance with Section 8 is essential as the said provision
is a safeguard against arbitrariness. It rids a party-list organization of the
prerogative to substitute and replace its nominees, or even to switch the
order of nominees, after submission of the list to COMELEC. Its failure to
submit said Statements as found by the COMELEC was also affirmed by
the Court reiterating the well-established principle that findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed except in particular cases.
Nonetheless, even if petitioner is qualified it still failed to obtain enough
votes to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees
after their proclamation and assumption of office; they are, for all intents
and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives
although the entity directly voted upon was their party.
In the present case, it is not disputed that Arroyo, AGPPs first nominee,
has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a Member of
the House of Representatives. We take judicial notice, too, of the filing of
two (2) petitions for quo warranto against Arroyo, now pending before the
HRET. Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the
Court has no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now
has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyos
qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. In light of
these conclusions, we see no need to further discuss the other issues
raised in the certiorari petitions.
ABC v COMELEC FACTS: Respondent Mauricio filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking the
cancellation of the petitioner's registration as party-list on the ground that
petitioner was merely a front for the religious organization “Ang Dating Daan.”
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on procedural and
substantive grounds, but upon Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC en
banc reinstated the petition and directed the scheduling of a hearing. The
petitioner assailed the decision, arguing that since the party-list group has
been proclaimed a winner and its nominee has taken his
oath, jurisdiction over the case has been transferred from the COMELEC to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC had jurisdiction over a petition for
cancellation of a party-list group's registration after said group has been voted
for and its nominee has taken oath
- YES
Abang Lingkod Partylist FACTS: ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the
v COMELEC interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the
party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of
votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of
Representatives. On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with
the COMELEC August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent
documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under
R.A. No. 7941.
In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled
ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of
the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of
some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013,
ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court, alleging
that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits
of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were
already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether the registration of Abang-Lingkod under the party-list system
should be cancelled.
Yes. According to Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the
COMELEC hasjurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of registration of
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions. On the
other hand, Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides for
the jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge on the qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives. A party-list group is not elected into
the House of Representatives. The party-list nominee is elected through a
party-list system and occupies a seat as member of the House of
Representatives. While the HRET has the jurisdiction over party-
list nominee, the COMELEC has a distinct jurisdiction over the cancellation
on legal grounds of parties' registration.
No. Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list
system. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration on the ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for
accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out
that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to
make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was
cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-
list system to submit proof of their track record as a group. The track
record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the
Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their,
inter alia, track record that they truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the
jurisprudential doctrines on who may register under the party-list system
and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For
purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional
parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector; that representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations that represent
the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such
as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to
further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by
the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent.
COCOFED v COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party whose membership comes
from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and producers.On
May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its intent to
participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the
names of only two nominees Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee) and
Atty. Domingo P. Espina.On August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a
summary hearing, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513, to determine
whether COCOFED, among several party-list groups that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had
continuously complied with the legal requirements.In its November 7, 2012
resolution, the COMELEC cancelled COCOFEDs registration and
accreditation as a party-list organization on several grounds.
ISSUE: Whether or not COCOFEDS registration can be cancelled?
Amores v HRET FACTS: Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as
representative of Cirizens Battle Against Corruption(CIBAC) for being
overage to represent youth. Change of affiliation must be made six months
before elections. Youth sector is represented by 25 – 30. On 14 May 2009:
Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel
Joel Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the HoR. Petitioner argues that
Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of
30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector". Villanueva's
change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six
months prior to elections. Respondent argues that RA 7941 requirement for
"age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first three elections
after the party list act. There was no resultant change in affiliation.
ISSUE: Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to
respondent Villanueva
Yes. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants
the cancellation of its registrationThe law expressly requires the
submission of a list containing at least five qualified nominees. Section 8 of
RA No. 7941 reads.Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.
Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of
names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be
chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.As early as
February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed, through Resolution No.
9359,all registered parties who wished to participate in the May 2013
party-list elections that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation
of Intent to participate in the part-list election together with its list of at least
five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012." Under Section 6(5) of RA
No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration.
However, not every kind of violation automatically warrants the
cancellation of a party-list groups registration. Since a reading of the entire
Section 6 shows that all thegrounds for cancellation actually pertain to the
party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations violated to warrant
cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily imputable to
the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member
or its nominee. COCOFEDs failure to submit a list of five nominees,
despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation
imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941. The language of
Section 8 of RA No. 7941 does not only use the word "shall" in connection
with the requirement of submitting a list of nominees; it uses this
mandatory term in conjunction with the number of names to be submitted
that is couched negatively, i.e., "not less than five." The use of these terms
together is a plainindication of legislative intent to make the statutory
requirement mandatory for the party to undertake.With the date and
manner of submissionof the list having been determined by law a condition
precedent for the registration of new party-list groups or for participation in
the party-list elections in case of previously registered party-listgroups,and
was in fact reiterated by the COMELEC through its resolutions COCOFED
cannot now claim good faith, much less dictate its own terms of
compliance.
Yes. Villauneva is ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR
representing CIBAC. The law is clear. The representative of youth sector
should be between 25 to 30. Villanueva is also ineligible to represent OFW
because sectoral representation should be changed SIX MONTHS prior to
elections and he failed to do it.
Bantay Republic Act v FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
COMELEC mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and
subsequently were accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007
elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations.
Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has
yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the
Director of the Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that groups’
nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007
virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.
ISSUE: Whether the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec
to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that
these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified
Ang Bagong Bayani - FACTS: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the
OFW Labor Party v COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein
COMELEC respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the
May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended."
It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents
not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also
filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some
of herein respondents.
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered
the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named
in the second Petition to file their respective Comments on or before noon of
May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It
added that the COMELEC may proceed with the counting and canvassing of
votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any
winner therein, until further orders of the Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list
elections
No. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA
7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus
advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a
factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review
by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the
Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be
decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of
certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the
evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with
the accreditation of an organization.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the
point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of
securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office."
In 2001, COMELEC listed particular party-lists participants who fulfilled the
8 point guidelines to qualify, including the petitioner party. Also mentioned
are those disqualified. Question is, aside from those validly proclaimed,
are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners?
Like Veterans, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are
NOT to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party-list
system. They should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of
votes cast.
This case also established the 8-point rule with regard to the Party-list
System:
1) The parties must represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
2) Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy
3) Religious sects are prohibited by the Constitution
4) The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941
5) The part must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the
government
6) The party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the
law
7) The members must come from the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors
8) The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation.
BANAT v COMELEC FACTS: The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation
as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2%
rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it
is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances
when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2),
Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11
(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the
party-list elections?
Lozada v COMELEC FACTS: Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition
for mandamus compelling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold
an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP).
They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to
file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the
action; 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and
3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the
Interim Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special
election to fill vacancies in the legislature.
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of
the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress.
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2),
Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in
party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7,
the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or
indirectly.
HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by
certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided
in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is
sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as
provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known
provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the
COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional
districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money.
Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation
for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to
mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to
exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the
holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the

PHILCONSA v Mathay FACTS: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General
of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking
to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment
of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker
and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just
the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is
violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason
given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part
in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969;
while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval
of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only
the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who
approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes
effective?
Ligot v Mathay FACTS: Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-
year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic
Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government” was enacted into law and took effect on
July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and
congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00
per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take
effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed
on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of
Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such
increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to
serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for
members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was
already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must
come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would
occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and
exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not
be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to
apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the
IBP.
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional
provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction
or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the
fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent
to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the
House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec.
10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislaturethat enacted the measure must have expired
before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided
by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of
all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he
could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he
and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office
ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a
retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview
of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other
emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement
gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted
by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the
Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-
Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”
People v Jalosjos FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense.
Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that
the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose
him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He
calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention
of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City
Jail, for official or medical reasons. Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that
since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the
latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge
mandate as member of House of Representatives
NO. The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to
be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx The immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives,
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions
if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases
The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in
the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed
by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate
even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of
the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Trillanes IV v Pimentel FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to
allow him to work and serve his mandate as senator
Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal
treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail
Osmena v Pendatun FACTS: In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech
entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then
President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the
charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the
Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada
Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has not
jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case. The
distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in
Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted
in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail
and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right
to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are
allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to
establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as
a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February
2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and
take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or
twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and
insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct
are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore,
Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.
Jimenez v Cabangbang FACTS: Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In
November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists
have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,
Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The
“planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise
and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as
a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to
be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is
immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule
and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: WON the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed
to members of Congress
Adaza v Pacana FACTS: Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis
Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and
started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.
Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the
same elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire
on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit
on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first
among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged
the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office
as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to
perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful
occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude
Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of
six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term
expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of
the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
ISSUE: WON Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a
governor of the province simultaneously.
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides
“The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other
acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized
to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts
in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published
and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published,
he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or
as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan
Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except
that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza
cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the
Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office.
Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not
tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of
members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically
provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he
was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections
204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.
Liban v Gordon (2009) FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M.
Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon
as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the
Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February
2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held
that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners
claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the
Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case
since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUE: WON Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to
the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a
Member of the Senate;
Liban v Gordon (2011) FACTS: This case resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard J. Gordon
(respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the
Decision), the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by
movant-intervenor Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), and the latter’s
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on
December 23, 2009.
In the Decision, the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." The Decision,
however, further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the
PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation."
ISSUE: WON the SC erred in ruling PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
if it wants to be a private corporation.
NO. A position held in an ex officio capacity does not violate the
constitutional proscription on the holding of multiple offices.The prohibition
against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is
that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."
Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority
other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without
further warrant or appointment.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However,
since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code
and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be
a private corporation.
The PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments
under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to
recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of
the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing
that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947,
and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not
shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that
would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in
times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the
image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of
the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The office of the Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in
a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Avelino v Cuenco FACTS: On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to
speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21,
1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the
session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open
session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying
tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by
Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even
ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s
camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad
however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in
voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he
was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood
up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the
deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon
Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members
of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of
the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech.
Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was
even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo
warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.
ISSUE: Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the
morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day?
Was there a quorum constituting such session?
Arroyo v De Venecia FACTS: Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Courts
(1998) decision dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition. Basically,
their contention is that when the Majority Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano)
moved for the approval of the conference committee report on the bill
that became R.A. No. 8240, leading the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza) to ask if there was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P.
Arroyo asked, What is that, Mr. Speaker?, the Chair allegedly ignored
him and instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the
question What is that, Mr. Speaker? was a privileged question or a point
of order which, under the rules of the House, has precedence over other
matters, with the exception of motions to adjourn. Questions of privilege
are those affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity
or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.
While a point of order is defined as follows Points of order or questions of
order are legislative devices used in requiring the House or any of its
Members to observe its own rules and to follow regular or established
parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either objections to pending
proceedings as violative of some of those rules or demands for
immediate return to the aforementioned parliamentary procedure.
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule XIX, 112
and Rule XVII, 103 of the Rules of the House which require that the Chair
should state a motion and ask for the individual votes of the members
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced
by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators
considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor).
Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House”
shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a
majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members;
if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have the
floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply stood
up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear him and
proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority Leaders
motion. Hearing none, he declared the report approved. Rule XVI, 96
of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides: 96. Manner of
Addressing the Chair.- When a member desires to speak, he shall rise
and respectfully address the Chair Mr. Speaker. The Rules of the
Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI, 59 says: 59. Whenever a
Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and request the President or
the Presiding Officer to allow him to have the floor which consent shall
be necessary before he may proceed. If various Senators wish to have
the floor, the President or Presiding Officer shall recognize the one
who first made the request. As explained already in the decision in this
case, the practice in cases involving the approval of a conference
committee report is for the Chair simply to ask if there are objections to
the motion for approval of the report. This practice is well-established
and is as much a part of parliamentary law as the formal rules of the
House. Finally, petitioners take exception to the following statement in
the decision that The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
 instead of merely asking whether there was any objection to the motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the approval of the conference committee report
on what later became R.A. No. 8240 was railroaded through the House
of Representatives.
Pacete v Secretary of FACTS:: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the
Commission on then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of
Appointments Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and
discharged his duties as such. As his appointment, was made during the
recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at
its next session in 1965.
Respondent Secretary of the Commission on Appointments thus was led to
notify the then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered
to be the prevailing practice of such body that the mere presentation of such
letter "automatically vacated the confirmation of the appointment in question .
. ." Respondent Secretary of Justice through the Judicial Superintendent
then advised petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge,
as he had not been duly confirmed. The Disbursing Officer of the Department
of Justice was likewise named respondent as he had, as a consequence,
withheld petitioner's salaries.
ISSUE: Whether the confirmation of his appointment had become final and
executory upon the adjournment of the fourth regular session of the Fifth
Congress at midnight of May 21, 1965
delaying the business of the House. They contend that, following this
ruling, even if only 10 members of the House remain in the session
hall because the others have gone home, the quorum may not be
questioned. That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted
in the decision, at 11:48 a.m. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo
questioned the existence of a quorum, but after a roll call, it was found
that there was one. After that, he announced he would again question
the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the conference report.
Hence, the statement in the decision that the question of quorum
cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House.
As was noted, the controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which
interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments,
which reads: "Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be
reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day
after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the
Commission. Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be
laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion."
1. In Altarejos v. Molo this Court gave full attention to the argument that the
motion for reconsideration of Congressman Aldeguer on May 19, 1965 had the
effect of recalling the confirmation of petitioner's appointment and that,
accordingly, it should be considered non-existent. His opinion continued:
"Pursuant to this provision, the vote of a majority of the members present in
favor of the motion for reconsideration is necessary to 'reopen' the appointment
— and, hence, to 'recall' its confirmation — and to require a resubmission of the
appointment for confirmation."
2. The other provision is worded thus: "The President shall have the power to
make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress."
That would be moreover tantamount to imparting to a move of a single member
of a collective body a decisive weight. It is bad enough if the minority were to
prevail. A one-man rule, which is the effect of what respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments contends, is infinitely worse.
3. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded.
Thus even legislative acts and executive orders are not beyond the pale of
judicial scrutiny. Certainly, there is nothing sacrosanct about a rule of the
Commission on Appointments, especially so, when as in this case, a
construction sought to be fastened on it would defeat the right of an individual
to a public office. The task becomes unavoidable when claims arising from the
express language of the Constitution are pressed upon the judiciary. So it is in
this case. It is a truism that under the circumstances, what cannot be ignored is
the primacy of what the fundamental law ordains.
As due process is impressed with both substantive and procedural significance,
the scope of judicial inquiry is thus not unduly limited.
Santiago v FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then
Sandiganbayan Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID),
approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her
act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The
legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which
prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by
Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of
arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she
was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a
motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who
was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate
President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of
the Senate without violating the Constitution.
Mabanag v Lopez Vito FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8
representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except
in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and
House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each
house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective
House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been
otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.
Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house
may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the
Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the
fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID
commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to
have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has
been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the
journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in
the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one
had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule
such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with
each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two
documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that
if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by
both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the
president and filed by the secretary of state.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an
enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
Arroyo v De Venecia FACTS: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
(1997) amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that
there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of
the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it
with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to
reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the
bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for
lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a
quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation
of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called
out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was
asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Casco Philippine FACTS:
Chemical v Gimenez Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production
of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main
components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being
imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the
required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however
paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt
transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The
said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General,
who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde,
as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax
exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea
and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic
Act No. 2609 which provides:
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as
“urea and formaldehyde”.
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government. It would be an
unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court
thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court
has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints,
real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of
its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be
made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal
or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just.
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin
formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and
formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product,
which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the
deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the
Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be
conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term
“urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Astorga v Villegas FACTS: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to
the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as
to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police
force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal
of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further
maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a hbill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
Morales v Subido FACTS: Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a
city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree.
Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department
and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of
the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position
by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service,
approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his
appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service
eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other
persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act
of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No
person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who
has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby
inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
Tanada v Cuenco FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado
Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the
No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal
is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely
asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and
resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked
to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare
that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As
done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when
they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill
intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making
body.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the
President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the
statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC
cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the
SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches
attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the
SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters
which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of
each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected
by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the
case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that
with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal,
the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part
neither of Congress nor of the Senate.
The Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the
Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be
 SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator
the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled
in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of
the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the
members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the senate has the power to appoint members of the
SET.
Bondoc v Pineda FACTS: Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a
Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of
the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as
the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr.
who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s
leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the
NP. He confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won
the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda
then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further
prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be
appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in
the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by
HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc
questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress
and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of
the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.
exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-
limitation has aptly put it: "The courts are called upon to say, on the one
hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand,
to determine whether the powers thus possessed have been validly
exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the
powers of a coordinate branch of the government, since the determination
of the validity of an act is not the same thing as the performance of the act.
In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty
of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to
determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or
attempted by either an executive official or the legislative."
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively
in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress
And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality
of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the
Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said
Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be
determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so- called
"judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct
National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution.
The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching
upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The
issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being
complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress
MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ENJOY SECURITY OF
TENURE. The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously
guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and
its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority
party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished
from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests
of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP,
because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work
of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for
the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of
the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold
of the tribunal.
Abbas v Senate FACTS: In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an
Electoral Tribunal election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by
the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of
the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election
protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play
and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To
accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of
five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a
proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no
abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution
of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of
this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight.
Pimentel v House of FACTS: On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect.
Representatives
Electoral Tribunal On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national
elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through
popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would
become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo
Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M.
Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka,
Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse!
Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to
various political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and
CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional
bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on
Appointments (CA).
ISSUE: Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal
violates the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because
there are no party-list representatives in the HRET
THE MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL REPRESENTING
THE CONGRESS CANNOT BE DISQUALIFIED TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL MERELY BECAUSE THEY
ARE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THE PETITION.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of
the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both
those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and
authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators.
The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing
violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be
misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said
Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates,
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer
on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate
and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who
would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would
occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the
1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is
not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.
However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the
doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be
left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions
are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the
HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available
facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained
from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives did

Sampayan v Daza FACTS: On February 18, 1992, Petitioners filed the instant petition for
prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent, Raul Daza, then incumbent
congressman of, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the
ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident
of the United States of America. Moreover, petitioners alleged that Mr. Daza
has not by any act or declaration renounced his status as permanent
resident. Petitioners manifested on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before
the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May
11, 1992 elections on the basis of violating the Omnibus Election Code:
Section 68 and the 1987 Constitution: Section 18, Article XI.
ISSUE: Whether or not Raul Daza should be disqualified as a member of the
House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Aquino v COMELEC FACTS: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he
was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a
petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8
May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the
proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June,
the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a “Motion to File Supplemental
Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift
Suspension of Proclamation” wherein he manifested his intention to raise,
among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the
qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has lost jurisdiction over the case of
Aquino.
not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse
of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
HELD: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case
Ratio:
(1.) the case is moot and academic for it is
evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that
they seek to unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for
the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending
June 30, 1992.
(2.) Jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the
House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its
members.
(3.) a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since
his term has already expired.
(4.) as a de facto public officer, respondent cannotbe made to reimburse
funds disbursed during his term of office.
HELD: No.
Ratio: The electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either
the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of
either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to
Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning
candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of
R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances
mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of
the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the
electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is
automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A.
6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates.
Not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue
after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but
his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension
or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Vinzons-Chato v FACTS: Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a
COMELEC Member of the HOR, hence,Comelec ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction
overpetitioner Chato’s election protest against Unicoregarding canvassing of
returns and alleged invalidityof Unico’s proclamation. He then filed a special
civilaction for certiorari in the SC.
ISSUE: WON the court should take cognizance of Chato’s election protest. If
not, to who is this issue best addressed to?
Bello v COMELEC FACTS: AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its
Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Subsequently, It filed its Certificate of Nomination together with the
Certificates of Acceptance of its nominees wherein the first nominee is Mike
Arroyo.
Several petitions for disqualification of Arroyo emerged but have been
dismissed both by Comelec Second division and Comelec en banc. In the
interim, AGPP obtained in the May 10, 2010 elections the required
percentage of votes sufficient to secure a single seat. This entitled Arroyo, as
AGPP’s first nominee, to sit in the House of Representatives. He was
proclaimed as AGPP’s duly-elected party-list representative in the House of
Representatives. On the same day, Arroyo took his oath of office, as AGPP’s
Representative. And, his name was, thereafter, entered in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives.
Thereafter two (2) separate petitions for quo warranto were filed with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) questioning Arroyo’s
eligibility as AGPP’s representative in the House of Representatives. The
HRET took cognizance of the petitions by issuing a Summons directing
Arroyo to file his Answer to the two petitions.
ISSUE: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s
qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and assumption to
office as a member of the House of Representatives.
HELD: The court should not take cognizance of Chato’selection protest for
it would amount to usurpation of the constitutionally mandated functions of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Ratio: In an electoral contest where the validity of theproclamation of a
winning candidate who has taken hisoath of office and assumed his post
as Congressman israised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. It
avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies with due regard to the people’s mandate. In this case,
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued a
resolution holding that ithad lost jurisdiction upon Unico’s proclamation.
HELD: Yes,
Ratio: The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to
pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation
and assumption of office; they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected
members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly
voted upon was their party. Hence, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins
Since Arroyo, AGPP’s first nominee, has already been proclaimed and
taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
Thus, following the lead of Abayon and Perez, we hold that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the present petitions and that the HRET now has the
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and rule upon Arroyo’s qualifications
as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Villando v House of Facts: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros
Representatives Oriental. Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned
Electoral Tribunal citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when
she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her
Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichong’s father. During
the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the COMELEC,
Election day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong
won over her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong
as disqualified. Few days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared
Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On the following days however,
notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC
issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently
conducted elections. This is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting
the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved
cases. Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ petition arguing that since she is now
the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over
the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
Issue: WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case.
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the
Philippines
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed
with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for
the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution
of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint
Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s
proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning
his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before
the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a
case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to
the latter’s election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word
“sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members.
3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on
November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship provision of the
1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the
presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders
of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the
petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to
the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those
persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article
IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of
transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the
respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy
and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in
1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate
and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These
are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In
re:Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in
actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had
informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the
1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all those who
elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms
the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is
not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing
the First District, Negros Oriental.
Angara v Electoral Facts: In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Commission Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935,
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On
November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far
been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC
adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara
filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua
can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation
governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that
the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The government established by the Constitution follows the theory
of separation of powers of the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of
functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers
granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and
among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty
to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional
creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer
for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935)
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of
their elective members.
(h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral
Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate
rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission
was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which
object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of
filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and
to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
Pena v House of Facts: Pena and Abueg were rivals for the Congressional seat in Palawan
Representatives during the May 8, 1995 elections. Apparently, Abueg was proclaimed winner.
Electoral Tribunal On May 22, Pena filed a petition AD CAUTELAM with the HRET, claiming
that the elections in the 2nd district of Palawan were tainted with massive
fraud, widespread vote--‐buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious
irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the
counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of
canvass which affected the results of the election. Because of these
irregularities, Pena stated that he lost the election by almost 7k votes. He
then assailed Abueg’s proclamation. Abueg filed an answer and a motion to
dismiss on June 23, averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over
the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. In essence,
the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition failed
to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of
voters occurred, nor did it point out how many votes would be gained by the
protestant as a result of the same. Pena later submitted a list of specific
contested precincts on July 10, or 17 days after Abueg’s answer. In October,
the HRET ruled that while it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to
state a cause of action, and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance,
meriting its dismissal. Pena filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issue: WON the HRET committed GAOD in dismissing Pena’s petition ad
cuatelam for lack of substance (which Pena later cured)? NO.
Daza v Singson Facts: After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of
Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the
Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of
the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was
listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and
including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from
the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his
removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his
seat by the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of
the Commission on Appointments
Pena’s petition lacking substance, dismissal proper
A perusal of the petition Ad Cuatelam, reveals that petitioner makes no
specific mention of the precincts where widespread election, fraud and
irregularities occurred. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very
substance of the protest.
The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance
means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the
allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper
of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss
the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may,
and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.
The defect in the instant case arises from the failure to allege the
contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of “massive fraud, widespread
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities,” without
specification and substantiation of where and how these occurrences took
place, appears in the petition. We cannot allow an election protest based
on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election
process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each
other, racing to disembark from the water.
Substantial amendments may be allowed but must be within time
period (10 days after winner’s proclamation)
The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET, that substantial
amendments to the protest may be allowed only within the same period for
filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of
Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner.
HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation
in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood
that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties
or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political
party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member
of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in
that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Coseteng v Mitra FACTS: Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a
Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto
and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent
Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory
that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and
members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged
that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political
question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with
the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the
Coalesced Majority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the House in the Commission on
Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
Guingona v Gonzales FACTS: After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15
LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-
LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula:
(No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators
elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP,
2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for
LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators
from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-
PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that
the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-
NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is
against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Wheter or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s
representation in the Commission on Appointments
HELD: No
Ratio: The composition of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House.
They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out
to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten
(10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to
the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the
Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the
principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this
apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done “on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein.” There is no merit in the petitioner’s contention that
the House members in the Commission on Appointments should have
been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The
petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor
leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by their party)
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their
election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled
to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving
the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than
their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one
political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should
have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one
member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve
such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations
with the other party.
Drilon v De Venecia & FACTS: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled
Madrigal v Villar to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section
18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5
to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation
in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because
it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP
and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD
or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected
senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in
Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally
claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since
one party may have affiliations with the other party.
HELD: The first petition, (Drilon v De Venecia), has thus indeed been
rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party member of the
House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is
withdrawn. As for the second petition, (Madrigal v Villar), dismissed.
Ratio: Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained direct injury as a
result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that she
or her political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, or that
she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to confer
on her/it locus standi. Senator Madrigal‘s primary recourse rests with the
respective Houses of Congress and not with this Court. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction dictates that prior recourse to the House is necessary
before she may bring her petition to court. Senator Villar‘s invocation of
said doctrine is thus well-taken.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recourse was initiated in the proper venue