1.
VERGARA VS COURT OF APPEALS
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176
of the Civil Code) was filed by private respondent
against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular
accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a
cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on"
the store-residence of the private respondent, causing
damages thereto which were inventoried and assessed
at P 53,024.22.
Petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver Martin
Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent
(and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused
to respond to his effort and as a result of a blown-out
tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo
truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private
respondent) and that the said accident was an act of
God for which he cannot be held liable.' Petitioner also
filed a third party complaint against Travellers
Insurance and Surety Corporation, alleging that said
cargo truck involved in the vehicular accident,
belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third
party defendant insurance company.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the
latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court, which ordered petitioner to pay, jointly and
severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety
Corporation, to the private respondent.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF FAULT OR
NEGLIGENT.
HELD:
Torts; Damages; Quasi-delict; Requisites of a quasi-
delict— These requisites of a quasi-delict are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages.
Same; Same; Negligence; Common Carriers; Defective
brakes cannot be considered fortuitous in character.—
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be
considered as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the
defects were curable and the accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any
evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of
negligence on his part.
2. FGU INSURANCE VS CA
At around 3 o’clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles,
both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising northward along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City,
figured in a traffic accident. The car bearing Plate No.
PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at
the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone,
while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by
respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven
by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane,
left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner
of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to
the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At
that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess
a Philippine driver’s license.
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance
Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with
Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of
subrogation,2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent
FILCAR As well as respondent Fortune Insurance delict
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl
Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given
address; in fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was
dropped from the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether an action based on quasi-delict prosper
against a rent-a-car company and, consequently, its
insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving
the rented vehicle.
HELD:
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on
another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of
Dahl- Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of
respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner failed to
establish its cause of action for sum of money based on
quasi- delict.
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
which states: “Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict …”
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed
to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault
or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the
fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that
the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was
brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was
driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the
negligence was solely attributable to Dahl- Jensen thus
making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his
personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the persons made responsible thereunder, derived
from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance
over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by
respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable
because none of the circumstances mentioned therein
obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent
FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only
the owner of the car leased to Dahl- Jensen. As such,
there was no vinculum juris between them as employer
and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the
former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of
the same Code which provides: “In motor vehicle
mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if
the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the
use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If
the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of article 2180 are applicable.” Obviously, this provision
of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the
absence of master-driver relationship between
respondent FILCAR and Dahl- Jensen. Clearly, petitioner
has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on
the basis of quasi- delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
3. SINGSON VS BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in
which judgment had been rendered sentencing him
and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille
& Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein.
Said judgment became final and executory as only
against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A
writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI
— in which the Singsons had a current account —
insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the Bank were
concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of
the bank, upon reading the name of the Singson in the
title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
without further reading the body and informing himself
that said garnishment was merely intended for the
deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared
a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his
deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian
C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and
another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote
to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI
because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close
his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not
included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had
been inadvertently committed.
ISSUE: Whether the existence of a contract between
the parties bars a plaintiff’s claim for damages based on
torts?
HELD:
Existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar
to the commission of a, tort by the one against the
other.—It has been repeatedly held: that the existence
of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and
the consequent recovery damages therefor. Indeed,
this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso, L- 21438, Sept. 28, 1966, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between
a passenger and a carrier is “contractual both in origin
and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be
a tort.”
4. CITY OF MANILA VS MERALCO
On June 8, 1925, in the City of Manila, there occurred a
collision between a street car of the Manila Electric
Company, of which Sixto Eustaquio was the motorman,
and a truck belonging to the City of Manila. As a result
of the collision, the truck was damaged in the sum of
P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio was prosecuted for the
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through
reckless imprudence. He was convicted by final
judgment and was sentenced to pay a fine P900, to
indemnify the offended party, the City of Manila, in the
sum of P1,788.27, with subsidary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not being able to
collect the indemnity from the accused, the City of
Manila began an action to obtained payment from the
Manila Electric Company. An allegation of the
complaint was "That the defendant Manila Electric
Company as master of the said agent and servant, Sixto
Eustaquio, by virtue of its relation with the latter and by
express provisions of law, is subsidiarily liable to the
herein plaintiff for the sum of P1,788.27, representing
the damages caused by its agent and servant, the said
Sixto Eustaquio, in the discharge of his duties as
motorman of the defendant's electric car."
ISSUES: (1) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RELY ON
RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL CASE TO RENDER
JUDGEMENT ON THE CIVIL CASE; (2) WHETHER
MERALCO SHOULD BE ABSOLVED FROM LIABIITY.
HELD:
The first error plainly has merit. As a general rule, a
record in a criminal action cannot be admitted in
evidence in a civil action except by way of inducement
or to show a collateral fact. The very obvious reason is
that the parties and the issues in a criminal action and
a civil action are not the same. It is rudimentary that
due process must be followed in the trial of all causes.
No man or entity may be condemmed without a day in
court. It is our ruling that prejudicial error was
committed in the admission by the trial court of Exhibits
A to F, but that since the plaintiff made the proper offer
to present its witnesses, the case should be remanded
for a new trial.
The Penal Code authorizes the imposition of subsidiary
liability in default of the persons criminally liable.
Article 20 of the Penal Code provides that this
subsidiary liability shall "apply to masters, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies and misdemeanors committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties." It is under
this provision that the City of Manila is attempting to
collect damages from the Manila Electric Company. In
connection with the Penal Code, there must be taken
into view certain provisions of the Civil Code. It is
provided in article 1903 that the obligation imposed for
the damage to another caused by fault or negligence is
enforcible against those persons for whom another is
responsible. But it is added that "The liability imposed
by this article shall cease in case the persons subject
thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage." Art.
1902 provides "Civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
the Penal Code."
While the Civil Code, in its article 1092, simply makes
reference to the Penal Code, yet, it is beyond doubt that
by this reference it means those rules of a general
nature which regulate the civil liability arising from the
particular crimes or misdemeanors therein mentioned,
and that, in connection therewith, they shall have the
preferential application which this article recognizes in
favor of the Penal Code.
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal
Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of
the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
negligent act or ommision not punishable by law.
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction
while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability
arises and not a case of civil negligence. Indeed, as
pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling
would premit the master to escape scot-free by allging
and proving that the master had exercised all diligence
in the selection and training of its servants to prevent
the damage. That would be good defense to a strictly
civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action
or misdemeanor.
5. UNITED STATES VS BARIAS
Defendant was charged with a violation of paragraphs
70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of
Customs, duly published in the Official Gazette and
approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. After
a demurrer to the complaint was overruled, it was
proved that, being the captain of the lighter Maude, he
was moving her and directing her movement, when
heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the
hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other
external power.
Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:
‘ "No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft
shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without
being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power."
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:
"For the violation of any of the foregoing regulations,
the person offending shall be liable to a fine of not less
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of
the court."
In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the
validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First, that it is
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second,
that if the Acts of the Philippine Commission bear the
interpretation of authorizing the Collector to
promulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an
illegal delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE: WHETHER DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF
MISDEMEANOR.
HELD:
By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29,
1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to license
craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively
harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with
certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are
required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as
follows:
"SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly
make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this
law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
"SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this
Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the
Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of
not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of
the court: Provided, That violations of law may be punished
either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or
by that prescribed in this section, or by both."
Under this statute, which was not referred to on the
argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty
in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming
within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in
the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was
engaged, and when heavily laden with hemp she was
navigating the Pasig River below the Bridge of Spain, in
the city of Manila. This spot is near the mouth of the
river, the docks whereof are used for the purpose of
taking on and discharging freight, and we entertain no
doubt that it was in a right sense a part of the harbor
6. GAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of
Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Hedy Gan was
driving a Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a
jeepney parked on one side of the road, one following
the other about two to three meters from each other.
To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle,
the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota Crown
Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the
rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact
caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the
rear of the parked truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was
injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
jeep suffered damages on its rear and front parts, and
the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of
its rear. The body of the old man who was later
identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was
(pronounced) dead on arrival.
ISSUE: WHETHER HEDY GAN IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF HOMICIDE THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.
HELD:
The test for determining whether or not a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty on the doer to take
precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
emergency rule. “Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the
petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was
presented by the prosecution with respect to the
relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney
and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend
to prove that petitioner did have sufficient time to
reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to
swerve her car to the right without stepping on her
brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the
prosecution on this point is the petitioner’s statement
to the police.
7.PEOPLE VS DE LOS SANTOS
Glenn was charged with crimes of Multiple Murder,
Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted
Murder in an Information filed in RTC of Cagayan de
Oro.
On October 5, 1995, at Maitum Highway, within
Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill,
taking advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu
Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds
from . . . behind in a sudden and unexpected manner
with the use of said vehicle . . . members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special
Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-
shirts and black short pants, performing an “Endurance
Run” of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training
Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City,
running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet,
more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming
a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50
meters from the 1st man to the last man, unable to
defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved
his driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the
PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals
made by six of the joggers who were at the rear
echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously
waving their hands at the accused for him to take the
left lane of the highway, going to the City proper, from
a distance of 100 meters away from the jogger’s rear
portion, but which accused failed and refused to heed;
instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an
Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers,
thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw themselves to
[a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting,
bumping, or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing
the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of
said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being
aware that bodies of the victims flew on the windshield
of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake,
continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting
off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on
said 1st line,
While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino,
died few days after the incident, while the following
eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously
wounded, the accused thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of Murder as
a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of some cause other than said accused’s
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered on the following victims
which prevented their death.
After which said accused thereafter escaped from the
scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims afore-
enumerated helpless. Contrary to Article 248, in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Immediately after receiving the report, he and two
other policemen proceeded to the traffic scene to
conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and
broken particles of the hit-and-run vehicle remained on
the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the
highway, which led him to conclude that the brakes of
the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen
measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft.
long.
ISSUE: WHETEHER GLENN IS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES
FILED AGAINST HIM.
HELD:
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was
in light of the number of persons killed and seriously
injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony.
It is significant to note that there is no shred of evidence
that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police
trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting
them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a
conviction especially where the assailant is positively
identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in
determining which of two conflicting theories of the
incident is more likely to be true. Thus, in People v.
Godinez this Court said that the existence of a motive
on the part of the accused becomes decisive in
determining the probability or credibility of his version
that the shooting was purely accidental.
A man must use common sense, and exercise due
reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for such
results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no
one would have performed except through culpable
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be
exposed to all manner of danger and injury
The test for determining whether a person is negligent
in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: Could a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence
is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code states that
reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1)
his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of
intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3) other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an
experienced driver, should have known to apply the
brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon
hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting
the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly going
downward; and, worse, the place of the incident was
foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in
accordance with the conduct of a reasonably prudent
man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his
brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean
entering the opposite lane (there being no evidence
that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction).
It is highly probable that he was driving at high speed at
the time. And even if he was driving within the speed
limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care
under the existing circumstances and conditions at the
time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a
malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of
reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when
the single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of
felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as “acts or
omissions punishable by law” committed either by
means of deceit or (dolo) or fault (culpa) In Reodica v.
Court of Appeals We ruled that if a reckless, imprudent,
or negligent act results in two or more grave or less
grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in
Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, the accused was convicted,
in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
of the complex crime of “homicide with serious physical
injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence,” and was sentenced to a single penalty of
imprisonment, instead of the two penalties imposed by
the trial court.
8. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS CARBONEL
had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from
his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation)
suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright"
and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some
2-½ meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right
hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right
hand side of a person facing in the same direction
toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the
oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew
(not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier
that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando
U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of
his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be
carried out early the following morning, Dionisio
claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his
car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed
into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered
that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his
own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
accident, while under the influence of liquor, without
his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
also sought to establish that it had exercised due care
in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made
fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the manner in
which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna
Street on the basis of which both courts drew the
inference that there was negligence on the part of
Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and
Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both courts
failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and
Phoenix that the true legal and proximate cause of the
accident was not the way in which the dump truck had
been parked but rather the reckless way in which
Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed
into the dump truck.
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
DIONISIO HAD A CURFEW PASS
Private respondent Dionisio was not able to
produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead,
he offered the explanation that his family may have
misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a
certification (dated two years after the accident)
issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the
Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to
have authority to issue curfew passes for
Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was
to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a
valid curfew pass. The relevance of possession or
non-possession curfew pass that night lies in the
light it tends to shed on the other related issues:
whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether
he had indeed purposely put out his headlights
before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police
station for travelling after the onset of curfew
without a valid curfew pass.
B. WHETHER DIONISIO WAS DRIVING FAST OR
SPEEDING JUST BEFORE THE COLLISION WITH THE
DUMP TRUCK
We think that an automobile speeding down a
street and suddenly smashing into a stationary
object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling
event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than
reflective, reactions from observers who happened
to be around at that time. The testimony of
Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part
of the res gestae and should have been considered
by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should
have been ascribed to such testimony, even though
it did not, as it could not, have purported to
describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
which Dionisio was travelling just before impact
with the Phoenix dump truck.
C. WHETHER DIONISIO HAD PURPOSELY TURNED OFF
HIS CAR’S HEADLIGHTS BEFORE CONTACT WITH
THE DUMP TRUCK OR WHETHER THOSE
HEADLIGHTS MALFUNCTIONED MOMENTS BEFORE
COLLISION
The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found
that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he
crossed the intersection but was non-committal as
to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention
that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even
before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which
he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far
away from the intersection. We believe that the
petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation
than that offered by private respondent Dionisio—
i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the
crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off,
although he succeeded in switching his lights on
again at "bright" split seconds before contact with
the dump truck.
D. WHETHER DIONISIO WAS INTOXICATED AT THE
TIME OF ACCIDENT.
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to
show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a
motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence.
There simply is not enough evidence to show how
much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of
that upon his physical faculties or upon his
judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware
that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect
different people differently.
The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable
risk for anyone driving on that street for which the truck
driver should be held responsible as the negligence of a
car driver bumping that truck was no more than a
forseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck
driver.—We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's
negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The collision between the dump truck and the
private respondent's car would in all probability not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked
askew without any warning lights or reflector devices.
The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this
risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our
view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of
time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore
closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as
an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable
consequence of the risk created by the negligent
manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed
a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others
similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk
the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was
not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between
the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. We
hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article
2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Same; Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law
theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the
"contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under
which in common-law countries plaintiff is barred from
any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil
Code expressly states that it will merely reduce the
amount to be recovered.—Petitioners also ask us to
apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while
the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private
respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that
Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance"
must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance
doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for
debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way
into theCivil Code of the Philippines. The historical
function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law
doctrine or rule—that of contributory negligence. The
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented
any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent,
even if the plaintiff s negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who
had also been negligent provided that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine
has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar
to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as
it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
9. RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC CO.
The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in
the employment of the defendant, was at work
transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the
company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff
claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so
that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or
sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to
the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in
the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by
a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the
track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the
knee.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking
of the tie, which was the immediate occasion of the
accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by
the trial court and is admitted in the briefs and in the
argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece
or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay
raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the
company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid
in the sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at
the time of the occurrence
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was
necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing
either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles
transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to
maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect
and repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it
became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant
to repair the weakened track, after notice of its
condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE BY THE PLAINTIFF
HELD:
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only
were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both
the officers of the company and three of the workmen
testify that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all the gang against walking by the side
of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which
acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction
must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been
no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering
into it, independent of it, but contributing under review
was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. this produced the event giving occasion for
damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the
plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of
place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of
duty, the last would have been one of the determining
causes of the event or accident, for which he would
have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,
he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence.
10. ALBA VS BULAONG
Petitioners Gregorio de la Cruz, Pedro C. Bulaong and
Pacifico Bulaong were employees of Dr. Horacio
Bulaong in his business of threshing palay. Other
employees were Engracio Alba (husband of petitioner
Maria Paz S. Alba) and Vicente A. Sebastian (husband of
petitioner Elisea S. Sebastian). Early in the morning of
that day said five employees were, upon specific orders
of Dr. Bulaong, on their way to Barrio Baringan,
Malolos, Bulacan, to thresh palay, riding on a tractor
which was pulling a threshing machine. Suddenly a
speeding bus of the Victory Liner Inc. collided with the
thresher which in turn hit the tractor, and as a result
those on board were violently thrown out. Engracio
Alba and Vicente Sebastian died; Gregorio de la Cruz,
Pedro C. Bulaong and Pacifica Bulaong sustained
physical injuries.
Five separate claims were filed before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission against the employer Dr.
Bulaong. Three defenses were set up by him: (a)
claimants were not his employees, but industrial
partners, (b) the injuries were not sustained in the
course of employment and (c) the claims, if any, had
been extinguished by virtue of the monetary
settlements which petitioners had concluded with the
Victory Liner Inc.
The referee overruled the defenses, having found the
five men to be employees who had died or were injured
in the course of employment. Consequently he
required the employer to make compensation in the
amounts specified in his award. However on appeal, the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner absolved Dr.
Bulaong from all liability, because he found that the
claimants had received, after the mishap, various
amounts of money from the owner of the colliding bus,
the Victory Liner Inc., each of them having executed a
written release or waiver in favor of said Liner.
Claimants, the Commissioner declared, had elected to
hold the Liner responsible for the accident, and could
not thereafter turn around to recover their employer.
He cited section 6 of the Workmen's Compensation
Law, which for convenience is quoted:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties. — In case an employee
suffers an injury for which compensation is due under
this Act by any other person besides his employer, it
shall be optional with such injured employee either to
claim compensation from his employer, under this Act,
or sue such other person for damages in accordance
with law; and in case compensation is claimed and
allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who
paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the
same, shall succeed the injured employee to the right
of recovering from such person what he paid: Provided,
That in case the employer recovers from such third
person damages in excess of those paid or allowed
under this Act, such excess shall be delivered to the
injured employee or any other person entitled thereto,
after deduction of at the expenses of the employer and
the costs of the proceedings .The sum paid by the
employer for compensation to which the employee or
his dependents are entitled of this Act, shall not be
admissible as evidence in any damage suit or action.
ISSUE: WHETHER DR. BULAONG WAS FREE FROM
LIABILITIES
HELD:
There is no question that the Liner was a "third party"
within the meaning of section 6. There is also no
question that petitioner have not sued the Liner for
damages. Wherefore they are not deemed to have
made the election specified in section 6. However, the
plain intent of the law is that they shall not receive
payment twice for the same injuries (from the third
party and from the employer). Hence if without suing
they receive full damages from the third party, they
should be deemed to have practically made the election
under the law, and should be prevented from
thereafter suing the employer. Full damages means, of
course what they would have demanded in a suit
against the third party or what they would receive in a
compensation as complete settlement. Needless to say,
where the injured employee is offered, by the third
party, compensation which he deems insufficient, he
may reject it and thereafter litigate with such third
party. Or choose instead to complain against his
employer.
If the third party agrees to the reservation, such partial
payment may legally be made and accepted. We say
"if", because the reservation necessarily entails some
disadvantage to the third party, inasmuch as pursuant
to legal principles when the employer subsequently
pays, he may in turn recover from the third party (See
sec. 6). The employer can not validly object to such
reservation by the employee, because in effect the
settlement helps to reduce the amount he will
afterwards have to disgorge.
As we see it, the five employees' acceptance of the
Victory Liner's offer of compensation, under the
circumstances disclosed by this record, especially the
written acknowledgments, showed they were not
content with the amount received — they did not
consider it sufficient — so they reserved their right to
require additional compensation from their employer.
Hence their action against Dr. Bulaong is not barred by
section 6. He may in turn demand reimbursement from
Victory Liner Inc.
The implied reservation of Dr. Bulaong's right against
Victory Liner Inc. is not unprecedented in the roam of
jurisprudence. When a promissory note is dishonored
for non-payment, the holder may recover its value
either from the maker or from the indorser. If he sues
the indorser and recovers, the latter may in turn recoup
from the maker. The statute expressly permits him to
renounce his right against the maker and reserve his
right to recover from the indorser (Sec. 120 (e)
Negotiable Instruments Law). When that happens, the
courts say the indorser's right to recover from the
maker is also reserved. (Bootman's Sav. vs. Johnson, 24
Mo. App. 317; Tolentino Commercial Laws Vol. I (7th
Ed.)p. 361.1)
In the situation resulting after the collision, we could
regard the five employees, the Victory Liner and Dr.
Bulaong in the same juridical position, respectively, of
holder, maker and indorser. The release with express
reservation produced the implied reservation already
stated.
It is therefore our view that the moneys received from
Victory Liner Inc. did not necessarily have the effect of
releasing Dr. Bulaong. Inasmuch as the five men were
his employees, and they were injured by reason of and
in the course of their employment, he must pay
compensation to be fixed in accordance with law.
Bearing in mind, however, the law's intention not to
give double compensation, the amounts they have
received from the Victory Liner shall be deducted from
the sums so determined.
In this connection we notice that the referee who has
investigated the matter has made some calculations of
monetary award. However they were not passed upon
by the Commissioner.
11. CALALAS VS CA
At 10 o’clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney
was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga
was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of
the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off.
As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned
by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the
jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained
a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula with
severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Closed
reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging were done under sedation.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for
damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise
the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as
thirdparty defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident
Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action
was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict,
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third party complaint against Salva
and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
ISSUES:
A. WHETHER SALVA AND HIS DRIVER VERENA WERE
LIABLE FOR QUASIDELICT FOR YJE DAMAGE
CAUSED TO PETITIONER’S JEEPNEY.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden
of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the
ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner’s
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there
is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects
regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the
diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the
presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers.
B. WHETHER PETITIONER IS LIABLE ON HIS
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of
Negligence; Upon the happening of the
accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arises, and it becomes the duty of a
common carrier to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.—In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the
duty of petitioner to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. Now, did the driver of jeepney
carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances” as required by
Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioner’s contention.
Same; Same; Fortuitous Event; Words and
Phrases; The taking of an “extension seat” is
not an implied assumption of risk on the part of
the passenger; A caso fortuito is an event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable; Requisites.—We find
it hard to give serious thought to petitioner’s
contention that Sunga’s taking an “extension
seat” amounted to an implied assumption of
risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because
those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This
is also true of petitioner’s contention that the
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito
is an event which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This
requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor’s will; (b) the event
is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event
is such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the debtor did not take part in causing the
injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with
its body protruding two meters into the
highway.
C. MORAL DAMAGES
 As a general rule, moral damages are not
recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As
an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in
cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to
Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in
which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art.2220
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral
damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga’s
contention that petitioner’s admission in open court
that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an
admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not
imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely
implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at
fault for the accident.
*12. PCIB VS CA
13. PICART VS SMITH
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this
action took place on December 12, 1912, on the
Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears
that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten half way across, the defendant approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the
rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming
and heard the warning signals. However, being
perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to
get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have
a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it
toward his left, that being the proper side of the road
for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed
that the horseman would move to the other side. The
pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had
made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that
the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead
of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward
the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the
horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape
hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with
its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and
the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence.
ISSUE: whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to
repair the damage
HELD:
we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the
defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to
assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to
the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of
the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of
things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this
moment it was not longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place
of greater safety. The control of the situation had then
passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty
either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing
that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take
the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing
this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing
this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited
fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there
was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question
was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get
exited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. When the defendant exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but
this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are
not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence
they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given
case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a
prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct
or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the
present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with
risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that
course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on
the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
14. DEL PRADO VS MERALCO
The appellant, the Manila Electric Company, is engaged
in operating street cars in the City for the conveyance
of passengers; and on the morning of November 18,
1925, one Teodorico Florenciano, as appellant's
motorman, was in charge of car No. 74 running from
east to west on R. Hidalgo Street, the scene of the
accident being at a point near the intersection of said
street and Mendoza Street. After the car had stopped
at its appointed place for taking on and letting off
passengers, just east of the intersection, it resumed its
course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the
motorman. The car had proceeded only a short
distance, however, when the plaintiff, Ignacio del
Prado, ran across the street to catch the car, his
approach being made from the left. The car was of the
kind having entrance and exist at either end, and the
movement of the plaintiff was so timed that he arrived
at the front entrance of the car at the moment when
the car was passing.
ISSUES:
a. WHETHER THE MOTORMAN WAS NEGLIGENT
With respect to the legal aspects of the case we
may observe at the outset that there is no
obligation on the part of a street railway
company to stop its cars to let on intending
passengers at other points than those
appointed for stoppage. In fact it would be
impossible to operate a system of street cars if
a company engage in this business were
required to stop any and everywhere to take on
people who were too indolent, or who imagine
themselves to be in too great a hurry, to go to
the proper places for boarding the cars.
Nevertheless, although the motorman of this
car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on,
it was his duty to do act that would have the
effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he
was attempting to board the car. The
premature acceleration of the car was, in our
opinion, a breach of this duty.
b. WHETHER MERALCO IS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
The relation between a carrier of passengers
for hire and its patrons is of a contractual
nature; and in failure on the part of the carrier
to use due care in carrying its passengers safely
is a breach of duty (culpa contructual) under
articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of
passengers owes to its patrons extends to
persons boarding the cars as well as to those
alighting therefrom. The case of Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad Co. (38 Phil., 768), supplies an
instance of the violation of this duty with
respect to a passenger who was getting off of a
 train. In that case the plaintiff stepped off of a
moving train, while it was slowing down in a
station, and at the time when it was too dark
for him to see clearly where he was putting his
feet. The employees of the company had
carelessly left watermelons on the platform at
the place where the plaintiff alighted, with the
result that his feet slipped and he fell under the
car, where his right arm badly injured. This
court held that the railroad company was liable
for breach positive duty (culpa contractual),
and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the
amount of P2,500 for the loss of his arm. In the
opinion in that case the distinction is clearly
drawn between a liability for negligence arising
from breach of contructual duty and that
arising articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
(culpa aquiliana).
The distiction between these two sorts of
negligence is important in this jurisdiction, for
the reason that where liability arises from a
mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a
breach of positive obligation, an employer, or
master, may exculpate himself, under the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, by
providing that he had exercised due degligence
to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is
not available if the liability of the master arises
from a breach of contrauctual duty (culpa
contractual). In the case bfore us the company
pleaded as a special defense that it had used all
the deligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff;
and to establish this contention the company
introduced testimony showing that due care
had been used in training and instructing the
motorman in charge of this car in his art. But
this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that
the liability involved was derived from a breach
of obligation under article 1101 of the Civil
Code and related provisions. (Manila Railroad
Co. vs. Compana Transatlantica and Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875, 887; De Guia vs.
Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil.,
706, 710.)
*15. TAYLOR VS MERALCO
16. NAPOCOR VS CA
“On August 4, 1964, plaintiff Engineering Construction,
Inc., being a successful bidder, executed a contract in
Manila with the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), whereby the former undertook to
furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and materials (not
furnished by Owner), and to construct the proposed
2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet Structures, and
Appurtenant Structures, and Appurtenant Features, at
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to complete said works
within eight hundred (800) calendar days from the date
the Contractor receives the formal notice to proceed.
“The project involved two (2) major phases: the first
phase comprising the tunnel work covering a distance
of seven (7) kilometers, passing through the mountain,
from the Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where
the Ipo Dam of the defendant National Power
Corporation is located, to Bicti; the other phase
consisting of the outworks at both ends of the tunnel.
“The record shows that on November 4, 1967, typhoon
‘Welming’ hit Central Luzon, passing through
defendant’s Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at
Ipo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the
project area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to
the heavy downpour, the water in the reservoir of the
Angat Dam was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60)
centimeters per hour. To prevent an overflow of water
from the dam, since the water level had reached the
danger height of 212 meters above sea level, the
defendant corporation caused the opening of the
spillway gates.”
The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial
court that the evidence preponderantly established the
fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an
extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the
gates, and hit the installations and construction works
of ECI at the Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of
which the latter’s stockpile of materials and supplies,
camp facilities and permanent structures and
accessories were either washed away, lost or
destroyed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF ECI’S
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES WERE DUE TO FORCE
MAJEURE WHICH EXEMPTS NPC FROM LIABLITY
HELD:
NPC cannot escape liability because its negligence was
the proximate cause of the loss and damage even
though the typhoon was an act of God.— It is clear from
the appellate court’s decision that based on its findings
of fact and that of the trial court’s, petitioner NPC was
undoubtedly negligent because it opened the spillway
gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of typhoon
“Welming” when it knew very well that it was safer to
have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it was
also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming typhoon
at least four days before it actually struck. And even
though the typhoon was an act of God or what we may
call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability because
its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage. As we have ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v.
Court of Appeals: Thus, if upon the happening of a
fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor
cannot escape liability. The principle embodied in the
act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must
be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature
and human agencies are to be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the
effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found
to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby
humanized, as it was, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God. Thus, it has been held that
when the negligence of a person concur s with an act of
God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from
liability by showing that the immediate cause of the
damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability
for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from
any previous negligence or misconduct by which the
loss or damage may have been occasioned.
17. LBC AIR CARGO VS CA
The case arose from a vehicular collision which
occurred at about 11:30 in the morning of 15 November
1987. Rogelio Monterola, a licensed driver, was
traveling on board his Suzuki motorcycle towards
Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road
in Bislig, Surigao del Sur. At about the same time, a
cargo van of the LBC Air Cargo Incorporated, driven by
defendant Jaime Tano, Jr., was coming from the
opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. On
board were passengers Fernando Yu, Manager of LBC
Air Cargo, and his son who was seated beside Tano.
When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport
road entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing
against each other from the opposite direction. Tano
stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing
vehicles to pass by. The stirred cloud of dust made
visibility extremely bad. Instead of waiting for the dust
to settle, Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards
the airport road. When he was about to reach the
center of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by
Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and
smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van.
Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE NEGLIGENCE OF MONTEROLA IS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.
HELD:
Under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the driver of any vehicle upon a highway, before
starting, stopping or turning from a direct line, is called
upon to first see that such movement can be made in
safety, and whenever the operation of any other
vehicle approaching may be affected by such
movement, shall give a signal plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicles of the intention to make
such movement (Sec. 44, R.A. 4136, as amended). This
means that before a driver turns from a direct line, in
this case to the left, the driver must first see to it that
there are no approaching vehicles and, if there are, to
make the turn only if it can be made in safety, or at the
very least give a signal that is plainly visible to the driver
of such other vehicle. Tano did neither in this case, for
he recklessly made a left turn even as visibility was still
very poor, and thus failed to see the approaching
motorcycle and warn the latter of his intention to make
a left turn. This is plain and simple negligence.
"Rogelio Monterola's motorcycle would not have hit
the cargo van had Tano, in operating it, not recklessly
turned left when visibility was still poor, and instead
observed the directive of the Land Transportation Code
that before doing so, he should first see to it that such
movement can be made in safety, and that whenever
any other vehicle approaching may be affected by such
movement, should give a signal plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicle of the intention to make
such movement.
"That Rogelio Monterola was running fast despite poor
visibility as evidenced by the magnitude of the damage
to the vehicles is no defense. His negligence would at
most be contributory (Article 2179, N.C.C.). Having
negligently createdthe condition of danger, defendants
fail to see Fernando Yu's liability as Manager of LBC-
Mangagoy Branch Office, there being no employer-
employee relationship between him and Jaime Tano
who is a driver of the LBC Air Cargo, Inc. It was held in
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc., et al. vs. Phil. American
Forwarders, Inc., 63 SCRA 231, that the term 'Manager'
in Article 2180 is used in the sense of 'employer.' Hence,
no tortuous or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened
on Fernando Yu as branch manager of LBC Air Cargo,
Inc.
"Considering, however, the contributory negligence of
Rogelio Monterola in driving at a fast clip despite the
fact that the road was dusty, we reduce the aggregate
amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled by
twenty per cent (Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, Supra).
From every indication, the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of Tano who, despite
extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left turn
(towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first
waiting for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of
Tano, which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on
the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite
direction, that almost instantaneously caused the
collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to
attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have
been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle.
Doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at
times, as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered
peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other,
or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof (see Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil.
809). Stated differently, the rule would also mean that
an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought
by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise
of due diligence (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs.
Baesa, 179 SCRA 384; Glan People's Lumber and
Hardware vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 173 SCRA
464). In the case at bench, the victim was traveling
along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.
The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable
time had elapsed, from the moment Tano swerved to
his left to the actual impact, that could have afforded
the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision.
18. CHINA AIRLINES VS CA
Jose E. Pagsibigan, then vice-president and general
manager of Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., a local firm dealing in
insecticides, pesticides and related services
appurtenant thereto, purchased a plane ticket for a
Manila-Taipei-Hongkong- Manila flight from the
Transaire Travel Agency. The said agency, through its
Cecille Baron, contacted the Manila Hotel branch of
defendant Philippine Air Lines which at that time was a
sales and ticketing agent of defendant China Air Lines.
On June 6, 1968, PAL, through its ticketing clerk
defendant Roberto Espiritu, cut and issued CAL Ticket
No. 017991 for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong- Manila
flight. According to the plane ticket, the plaintiff was
booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila
for Taipei on June 10, 1968 at 1720 hours (5:20 p.m.),
Exhibit A.
Upon arriving at the airport, the plaintiff was informed
that the plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had
left at 10:20 in the morning of that day. The PAL
employees at the airport made appropriate
arrangements for the plaintiff to take PAL’s flight to
Taipei the following day, June 11, 1968. The plaintiff
took said flight and arrived in Taipei around noontime
of the said date.
“On July 8, 1968, the plaintiff, through counsel, made
formal demand on defendant PAL for moral damages in
not less than P125,000.00 for what the plaintiff
allegedly suffered as a result of his failure to take the
flight as stated in his plane ticket. (Exhibit E) After a
series of negotiations among the plaintiff,
In his complaint, plaintiff prays for the recovery of
P125,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 for and
as attorney’s fees. The moral damages allegedly arose
from the gross negligence of defendant Roberto
Espiritu in stating on the plane ticket that the time of
departure was 1720 hours, instead of 1020 hours which
was the correct time of departure in the revised
summer schedule of CAL. Plaintiff claims that by reason
of his failure to take the plane, he suffered besmirched
reputation, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights, inasmuch as when he
went to the airport, he was accompanied by his
business associates, close friends and relatives. He
further averred that his trip to Taipei was for the
purpose of conferring with a certain Peng Siong Lim,
president of the Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation,
scheduled at :00 a.m. on June 11, 1968.
“Defendant Philippine Air Lines alleges in its answer
that the departure time indicated by Espiritu in the
ticket was furnished and confirmed by the reservation
office of defendant China Air Lines. It further avers that
CAL had not informed PAL’s Manila Hotel Branch of the
revised schedule of its flight, nor provided it with
revised timetable; that when the travel agency sought
to purchase the ticket for the plaintiff on CAL CI Flight
No. 812 for June 10, 1968, Espiritu who was then the
ticketing clerk on duty, checked with the reservation
office of CAL on the availability of space, the date and
the time of said flight; that CAL’s Dory Chan informed
Espiritu that the departure time of Flight No. 812 on
June 10, 1968 was at 5:20 in the afternoon of said date.
“Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims
liability for the negligence and incompetence of the
employees of PAL. It avers that it had revised its
schedule since April 1, 1968, the same to be effective
on April 20, 1968, and the said revised schedule was
adopted only after proper petition with and approval of
the Civil Aeronautics Board of which all airlines,
including defendant PAL, were notified.
ISSUE: WHETHER CAL IS LIABLE TO PAGSIBAGAN.
HELD:
CAL had no share in the error committed by Espiritu in
indicating the time of departure of Flight No. 812. PAL
had shown through the testimony of Carmen Ibazeta
Gallaga, ticket representative of PAL at the Manila
Hotel Office, that they received circulars and timetables
of airlines in the PAL main office. It further appears that
on two occasions, defendant PAL cut and issued tickets
for CAL based on the new schedule even before June
10, 1968. As a matter of fact, the other entries of time
departures in the ticket issued to the plaintiff are in
accordance with the revised schedule, and that the only
error therein was with respect to the departure from
Manila on June 10, 1968.
in proving that the fault lied with Espiritu, defendant
CAL derives no solace nor gains an advantage. It may
not claim exemption from liability by reason thereof.
Espiritu was an employee of PAL and whatever
negligence was committed by him is attributable to
PAL. It is an admitted fact that PAL is an authorized
agent of CAL. In this relationship, the responsibility of
defendant PAL for the tortious act of its agent or
representative is inescapable
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the employer
either in the selection of the employee or in the
supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that it has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Hence, to escape solidary liability for the quasi-delict
committed by Espiritu, it is imperative that PAL must
adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care. PAL failed to overcome the presumption. As found
by respondent court, CAL had revised its schedule of
flights since April 1, 1968; that after the Civil
Aeronautics Board had approved the revised schedule
of flights, PAL was duly informed thereof and, in fact,
PAL’s Manila Hotel branch office had been issuing and
selling tickets based on the revised time schedule
before June 10, 1968.
The respondent court found that the mistake
committed by Espiritu was done in good faith. While
there is no evidence that he acted with malice, we can
not entirely condone his actuations. As an employee of
PAL, the nature of his functions requires him to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand. He committed a clear
neglect of duty. Ergo, for his negligence, Espiritu is
primarily liable to respondent Pagsibigan under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. For the failure of PAL to rebut
the legal presumption of negligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, it is also primarily
liable under Article 2180 of the same code which
explicitly provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
Under the aforesaid provision, all that is required is that
the employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi-
delict which caused damage to another, and this
suffices to hold the employer primarily and solidarily
responsible for the tortious act of the employee. PAL,
however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of
the amount which it will a have to pay the offended
party’s claim
19. EXCONDE VS CAPUNO
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of
double homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Isidoro Caperiña and Amado Ticzon on March
31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
(Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña,
reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for
damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno
was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante
Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he
committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the
present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of
P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperiña.
Defendants set up the defense that if any one should
be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperiña, he is
Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the
time of the accident, the former was not under the
control, supervision 'and custody of the latter. This
defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a
consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint. From this
decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the case was certified to us on the ground that the
appeal only involves questions of law.
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts
Organization. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. José
Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he
took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat
on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence. Delfin
Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the
time of the accident, nor did he know that his ,son was
going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when
his son told him after the accident that he attended the
parade upon instruction of his teacher.
ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held
civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante,
for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro
Caperiña caused by the negligentact of minor Dante
Capuno.
HELD:
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and
5, which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next
preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal
acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with
them. Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for
any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices
while they are under their custody", but this provision
only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil
Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p, 841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed.,
p. 557). Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-
curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of
Dr. José Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade
that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the
circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not
then a student of an institution of arts and trades as
provided for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father,
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children
who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way
by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is
if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This
defendants failed to prove.
20. FIRST MALAYAN VS CA
On June 26, 1984, Crisostomo B. Vitug filed Civil Case
No. 84-25186 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XLIII, against the defendant. First Malayan
Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC for short), to
recover damages for physical injuries, loss of personal
effects, and the wreck of his car as a result of a three-
vehicle collision on December 14, 1983, involving his
car, another car, and an Isuzu cargo truck registered in
the name of FMLFC and driven by one Crispin Sicat. The
evidence shows that while Vitug's car was at a full stop
at the intersection of New York Street and Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Cubao, Quezon City,
northward bound, the on-coming Isuzu cargo truck
bumped a Ford Granada car behind him with such force
that the Ford car was thrown on top of Vitug's car
crushing its roof. The cargo truck thereafter struck
Vitug's car in the rear causing the gas tank to explode
and setting the car ablaze.
Stunned by the impact, Vitug was fortunately extricated
from his car by solicitous bystanders before the vehicle
exploded. However, two of his passengers were burned
to death. Vitug's car, valued at P70,000, was a total loss.
When he regained consciousness in the hospital, Vitug
discovered that he had lost various personal articles
valued at P48,950, namely a necklace with a diamond
pendant, a GP watch, a pair of Christian Dior eyeglasses,
a gold Cross pen and a pair of Bally shoes. Vitug also
suffered injuries producing recurring pains in his neck
and back. Upon his physician's advice, he received
further medical treatment in the United States which
cost him US$2,373.64 for his first trip, and US$5,596.64
for the second.
At the time of the accident on December 14, 1983, the
Isuzu cargo truck was registered in the name of the First
Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (FMLFC).
However, FMLFC denied any liability, alleging that it
was not the owner of the truck, neither the employer
of the driver Crispin Sicat, because it had sold the truck
to Vicente Trinidad on September 24,1980, after the
latter had paid all his monthly amortizations under the
financing lease agreement between FMLFC and
Trinidad.
On FMLFC's motion, the lower court granted FMLFC's
leave to file a third-party complaint against Trinidad
and admitted the third-party complaint filed therewith.
Answering the third-party complaint, the Estate of
Vicente Trinidad admitted that the truck was operated
by the deceased during his lifetime. Nevertheless, it
raised the defense that the estate of Vicente Trinidad
was no longer existing because the same had long
On August 25, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision
sentencing FMLFC to pay Vitug the sum of P 133,950
with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid, plus the sum of P10,000 as
attorneys fees and costs.
FMLFC appealed in due time to the Court of Appeals
which rendered a decision on November 27, 1989
modifying the appealed judgment by ordering the
third-party defendant-appellee (Estate of Vicente
Trinidad) to indemnify the appellant, FMLFC, for
whatever amount the atter may pay Vitug under the
judgment. In all other respects, the trial court's decision
was affirmed
ISSUE: WHETHER FMLFC IS LIABLE FOR THE MISHAP.
HELD:
In the first place, the factual finding of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the Isuzu vehicle which
figured in the mishap was still registered in the name of
FMLFC at the time of the accident, is not reviewable by
this Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
Rules of Court.
This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who
the actual owner of a motor vehicle might be, the
registered owner is the operator of the same with
respect to the public and third persons, and as such,
directly and primarily responsible for the consequences
of its operation. In contemplation of law, the
owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver,
the actual operator and employer being considered
merely as his agent (MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation
vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 10, citing Vargas vs.
Langcay, 6 SCRA 174; Tamayo vs. Aguino, 105 Phil. 949).
Were the registered owner allowed to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee
or owner is, it would be easy for him by collusion with
others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who
possesses no property with which to respond financially
for the dam age or injury done," (Erezo vs. Jepte, 102
Phil. 103.)
"x x x The registered owner or operator of record is the
one liable for damages caused by a vehicle regardless
of any alleged sale or lease made thereon." (MYC-Agro-
Industrial Corp. vs. Vda. de Caldo, 132 SCRA 11.)
In order for a transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle
to be valid against third persons, it must be recorded in
the Land Transportation Office. For, although valid
between the parties, the sale cannot affect third
persons who rely on the public registration of the
motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. In
law, FMLFC was the owner and operator of the Isuzu
cargo truck, hence, fully liable to third parties injured by
its operation due to the fault or negligence of the driver
thereof.
21. GELISAN VS ALDAY
"Defendant Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight
truck bearing plate No. TH-2377. On January 31, 1962,
defendant Bienvenido Gelisan and Roberto Espiritu
entered into a contract marked Exhibit 3-Gelisan under
which Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan
for the purpose of hauling rice, sugar, flour and fertilizer
at an agreed price of P18.00 per trip within the limits of
the City of Manila provided the loads shall not exceed
200 sacks. It is also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and
pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the
goods to be hauled by him. The track was taken by a
driver of Roberto Espiritu on February 1,1962. Plaintiff
Benito Alday, a trucking operator, and who owns about
15 freight trucks, had known the defendant Roberto
Espiritu since 1948 as a truck operator. Plaintiff had a
contract to haul the fertilizers of the Atlas Fertilizer
Corporation from Pier 4, North Harbor, to its
Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Alday met Espiritu at the
gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck
with the driver and helper at 9 centavos per bag of
fertilizer. The offer was accepted by plaintiff Alday and
he instructed his checker Celso Henson to let Roberto
Espiritu haul the fertilizer. Espiritu made two hauls of
200 bags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was
delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the
necessary way bill receipts, Exhibits A and B. Espiritu,
however, did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas
Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. The signatures
appearing in the way bill receipts Exhibits A and B of the
Alday Transportation admittedly not the signature of
any representative or employee of the Atlas Fertilizer
Corporation. Roberto Espiritu could not be found, and
plaintiff reported the loss to the Manila Police
Department. Roberto Espiritu was later arrested and
booked for theft
It was claimed by Bienvenido Gelisan from the Police
Department after he had been notified by his
employees that the truck had been impounded by the
police; but as he could not produce at the time the
registration papers, the police would not release the
truck to Gelisan. As a result of the impounding of the
truck according to Gelisan, x x x and that for the release
of the truck he paid the premium of P300 to the surety
company.
The defendant, Bienvenido Gelisan, upon the other
hand, disowned responsibility. He claimed that he had
no contractual relations with the plaintiff Benito Alday
as regards the hauling and/or delivery of the 400 bags
of fertilizer mentioned in the complaint; that the
alleged misappropriation or nondelivery by defendant
Roberto Espiritu of plaintiff's 400 bags of fertilizer, was
entirely beyond his (Gelisan's) control and knowledge,
and which fact became known to him, for the first time.
on 8 February 1962 when his freight truck, with plate
No. TH-2377, was impounded by the Manila Police
Department, at the instance of the plaintiff; and that in
his written contract of hire with Roberto Espiritu, it was
expressly provided that the latter will bear and pay all
losses and damages attending the carriage of goods to
be hauled by said Roberto Espiritu.
ISSUE: (1). WHETHER GELISAN IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
TO ALDAY FOR THE NON-DELIVERY OF FERTILIZER
The Court citing Montoya vs. Ignacio, thus:
"There is merit in this contention. The law really
requires the approval of the Public Service Commission
in order that a franchise. or any privilege pertaining
thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the
certificate issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious.
Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or
lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service
Commission so that the latter may take proper
safeguards to protect the interest of the public x x x
there should be a public hearing, with notice to all
interested parties, in order that the Commission may
determine if there are good and reasonable grounds
justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered
by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to
public interest. Such being the reason and philosophy
behind this requirement, it follows that if the property
covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to
another without obtaining the requisite approval, the
transfer is not binding against the Public Service
Commission and in contemplation of law thegrantee
continues to be responsible under the franchise in
relation to the Commission and to the Public

(2) WHETHER GELISAN IS LIABLE FOR THE ACT

COMMITTED BY ESPIRITU
The Court has invariably held in several decisions that
the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
responsible for damages that may arise from
consequences incident to its operation or that may be
caused to any of the passengers therein. The claim of
the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease
contract executed by and between him and Roberto
Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third
persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that
the lease contract, adverted to, had not been approved
by the Public Service Commission. It Is settled in our
jurisprudence that if the property covered by a
franchise is transferred or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not
binding upon the public and third persons