Adoption To Summary Procedure

XI.
ADOPTION
Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250 (NARAG)
Facts: Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate, survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters, respondents Nora and Irma. One month after: Margarita de Asis commenced an intestate proceeding. April 11,
1974: Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will. Nov 22, 1974: pettioner intervened for the first time in the
proceedings to settle the estate of Dr. Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child. Aug. 20, 1975: petitioner filed a
motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de ASis as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit o executed by
Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was an ―illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin
and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by
both Mariano and o Margarita. Respondent court heart petitioner‘s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of o
Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption hi his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to
prove, over o private respondents‘ objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses as his parents; he had been
supported by them until their death; formerly he was known as ―Renato Lazatin but was compelled to change his
surname to ―Sta. Clara when the deceased spouses refused to give consent to his marriage to his present wife. March 4,
1976: Respondent Court barred the introduction of petitioner‘s evidence. March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to
declare as established the fact of adoption. Court denied the motion.
Issue: WON the respondent Court erred in not allowing petitioner to introduce new evidence. NO
Ruling: Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise,
the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence. The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if
existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an adoption proceeding to
be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a presumption of its non-
existence. Where, under the provisions of the state, an adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court
constitute the evidence by which such adoption may be established.
The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol
evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption.
Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended to adopt a child as his heir, and that he
had adopted him, and of the fact that the child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he
attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. Nor does the fact that the deceased spouses fed,
clothed, educated, recognized and referred to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the
child. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and declarations of deceased do not discharge the
mandatory presentation of the judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner’s evidence is rather to establish his
status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child—which statuts of an admitted illegitimate child was the very
basis of his petition for intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 (NARAG)

Facts: Petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino
was born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‘s sister and brother in law, the petitioners. Petitioner spouses
took care and custody of the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina.
Adoption to Summary Procedure | Page 1 of 75

The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child. RTC rendered a decision granting the
petition: Angelie Anne Fajardo to Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from
respondents demanding to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to
the demand Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child from her yaya at the petitioner‘s residence on the pretext that
she was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her house Petitioners demanded the return of the
child but Gina refused.
Issue: WON the writ should be granted. YES.
Ruling: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is
the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. Is it undisputed that respondent
Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is
a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the
minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides,
respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for
almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up
with a sister whose “father” is not her true father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the
other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is
not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her. Besides, the minor has
been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the
adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
 
R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)
A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)
A. Requisites to be an adopter
1. Age and capacity required – Sec. 7
Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The requirement of 16 year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent
2. Husband and wife jointly – Sec. 7

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

Michelle Lim, GR 168992, May 21, 2009 (ODRONIA)
Facts: The petitioner, Monina Lim is married Primo Lim. She is an optometrist by profession, and they are childless.
They were entrusted with 2 children in the year 1983 by a certain lucia Abuyan. The 2 children were named Michelle and
Michael Lim (the surname “lim” was given to them by the spouses). They took care of the 2 children and even let them
attend school. Subsequently, in the year 1998, Primo died and in the year 2000, Monina remarried with Angel Olario who
is an American citizen. In 2002, the petitioner filed for separate petitions for the adoption by virtue of R.A 8552 of the 2
children who at the time, is already 25 and 18 yrs old respectively. The 2 of them have given their consent. The new
husband of the petitioner executed an affidavit of consent however, despite this, the petitions were dismissed by the lower
court. The lower court held that the 2 of them should file jointly for the adoption of the 2 children because the 2 of them is
not among the exclusions provided for by law.
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signed his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other
Hence this petition. The petitioner argues that the law should be relaxed because adoption laws should be liberally
construed in favor of the children to be adopted. Further, she argues that
Issue: Whether the spouses are among the exceptions provided for by the law thereby allowing them to adopt the 2
children even without jointly filing for it. – No!
Ruling: The Court ruled that the spouses are not among those enumerated in the exemptions. First, the 2 children is not
the legitimate son of an of the spouses. Second, they are also not their illegitimate children. And lastly, the petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
Court ruled that before they can adopt the 2 children, they SHALL jointly file for it and should include and prove
the following in the trial (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the 1ling of the application for
adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter's country as the latter's adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
In the absence of an ambiguity, the law shall be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of
the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. 18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates
parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as support 21 and successional rights
3. Need for consent – Sec. 9

After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the
written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which
has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter's
spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
Landingin vs. RP, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006 (ODRONIA)
Facts: In the case at bar, the petitioner filed for a petition invoking R.A 8552 to adopt the children of her brother,
Manuel and Amelia Ramos. The petitioner argues that after the death of Manuel in 1990, Amelia, the biological mother of
Elaine and Elma have left the country to go to Italy and since then, has not communicated her 2 children. She argues that
this constitutes abandonment. The lower court ordered the DSWD to investigate regarding the matter. Subsequently, the
representative for the DSWD testified that (1), the 2 children are available for adoption and (2), and that the consent was
tried to be acquired from their biological mother however, to no avail because she already has a second family and is
currently residing in Italy. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petition however, upon appeal by the OSG,
this was reversed by the CA ruling that the petitioner failed to obtain the consent of the biological parents of the 2 children
which is required by R.A 8552, that she also failed to obtain the written consent of the 2 children, and she has failed to
prove whether she is financially able to support them. An appeal was made however, was dismissed. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may adopt the 2 children. – No!
Ruling: The Court ruled that no, the petitioner can’t adopt the 2 children as the abandonment she alleges is not proved
properly. It was held that adoption statutes should indeed be liberally construed in favor of the children to be adopted
however, this doesn’t necessarily mean that it should prejudice the parental rights that their biological parents have over
them. Sec. 9 of the law provides that the consent of the biological parents is required before an adoption petition may push
through. In the case at bar, it was admitted by the 2 children that their biological mother didn’t really sever their
connection with them. It was proven that since their mother left, they are being sent 15,000 every month for their
necessities. Further, there are no clear manifestations that what she did constitutes abandonment because she only
permitted her child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others.
Furthermore, it was revealed that the main reason for Amelia’s departure was financial constraints. Hence, it can
be deduced that when she left for Italy, she didn’t mean to abandon her children nor relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations. Allowing the petitioner to adopt the 2 children even with the absence of clear evidence proving abandonment
would disregard the intent of the law. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children,
and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Again, it is the best
interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption.
4. Aliens as adopters – Sec. 7 (b)

Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three
(3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to
enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse;

Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 (ODRONIA)
Facts: The private respondent spouses in the case at bar had filed for a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala who is the
younger brother of one of the respondents, Evelyn. Alvin is an American Citizen while Evelyn was originally a Filipino
citizen however, lost his nationality when she became a naturalized citizen of U.S.A after getting married with Alvin. As
alleged in the lower court, they have proven that they are qualified and financially capacitated to adopt the 12-year-old
Solomon. Furthermore, the biological mother has consented it citing poverty. She alleges that this is for the best interest of
Solomon. For this reason, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of them however, an appeal was made by the OSG
arguing that under the Philippine law, they are prohibited to adopt. This is by virtue of Section 184 and section 185 of E.O
No. 209 otherwise known as the Family code of the Philippines. The CA reversed the decision siding with the OSG hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether the Clouse spouses are can be allowed to adopt Solomon. -No
Ruling: Under Article 184 of the Family code, the spouses can not be allowed to adopt Solomon.
Art 184, par (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of
the latter.
Alvin is not allowed first because he is not a relative of Solomon. Secondly, the child is not the legitimate child of Evelyn
and Lastly, when they pursued for the adoption of Solomon, Evelyn is no longer a Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
although it can be established that Evelyn falls under one of the Exceptions (a) for being a former Filipino citizen, their
petition is still without merits because this Article must be read together with Article 185 of the same code which requires
the joint adoption. Hence, since Alvin is not qualified to file for an adoption, the spouses Clouse can’t be allowed to adopt
Solomon.
R.A. 8043, “The Law on Inter-Country Adoption”

A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)
B. Who may not adopt, Sec. 7

The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of
the latter.
C. Who may be adopted, Sec. 8

The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for
adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the
adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6)
months from the time of death of said parent(s).
D. Who may not be adopted

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption,
said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.
E. Effect of death, Sec. 13

In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage
of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to
be the guardian of the person or property of the childrenIn case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority
over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children
F. Procedure in adoption
1. Hurried Decisions. – In all proceedings for adoption, the court shall require proof that the biological parent(s) has
been properly counseled to prevent him/her from making hurried decisions caused by strain or anxiety to give up
the child, and to sustain that all measures to strengthen the family have been exhausted and that any prolonged
stay of the child in his/her own home will be inimical to his/her welfare and interest.
2. Case Study. – No petition for adoption shall be set for hearing unless a licensed social worker of the Department,
the social service office of the local government unit, or any child-placing or child-caring agency has made a case
study of the adoptee, his/her biological parent(s), as well as the adopter(s), and has submitted the report and
recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition.
At the time of preparation of the adoptee's case study, the concerned social worker shall confirm with the Civil
Registry the real identity and registered name of the adoptee. If the birth of the adoptee was not registered with
the Civil Registry, it shall be the responsibility of the concerned social worker to ensure that the adoptee is
registered.
The case study on the adoptee shall establish that he/she is legally available for adoption and that the documents
to support this fact are valid and authentic. Further, the case study of the adopter(s) shall ascertain his/her genuine
intentions and that the adoption is in the best interest of the child.
The Department shall intervene on behalf of the adoptee if it finds, after the conduct of the case studies, that the
petition should be denied. The case studies and other relevant documents and records pertaining to the adoptee
and the adoption shall be preserved by the Department.
3. Supervised Trial Custody. – No petition for adoption shall be finally granted until the adopter(s) has been given
by the court a supervised trial custody period for at least six (6) months within which the parties are expected to
adjust psychologically and emotionally to each other and establish a bonding relationship. During said period,
temporary parental authority shall be vested in the adopter(s).
The court may motu proprio or upon motion of any party reduce the trial period if it finds the same to be in the best
interest of the adoptee, stating the reasons for the reduction of the period. However, for alien adopter(s), he/she must
complete the six (6)-month trial custody except for those enumerated in Sec. 7 (b) (i) (ii) (iii).

If the child is below seven (7) years of age and is placed with the prospective adopter(s) through a pre-adoption placement
authority issued by the Department, the prospective adopter(s) shall enjoy all the benefits to which biological parent(s) is
entitled from the date the adoptee is placed with the prospective adopter(s).
Section 13. Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no
opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the qualifications of the
adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced that the petitioners are qualified to
adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which
shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies
before the issuance of the decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by
which the child is to be known.
Section 14. Civil Registry Record. – An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry, as required by
the Rules of Court, attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being registered with his/her
surname. The original certificate of birth shall be stamped "cancelled" with the annotation of the issuance of an amended
birth certificate in its place and shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be issued to the
adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue.
Section 15. Confidential Nature of Proceedings and Records. – All hearings in adoption cases shall be confidential and
shall not be open to the public. All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department, or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.
If the court finds that the disclosure of the information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or
arising out of the adoption and will be for the best interest of the adoptee, the court may merit the necessary information to
be released, restricting the purposes for which it may be used.
Republic Act No. 9253, March 12, 2009 - AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT (DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY
AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
G. Effects of a decree of adoption

1. On status
2. On parental authority,
Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518 (TAN)
FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the
natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on
November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological
parents.
HELD: NO. Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting
incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code”.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity
may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the
shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 (TAN)

FACTS: Angelie Anne Fajardo was born on February 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child for adoption to petitioner spouses Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes (Gina’s sister and brother-in-law). An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by herein
petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987.
The petition for adoption was granted by the RTC of Rizal. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental
authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and maintenance to them and that from now on shall be,
for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein petitioners and capable of
inheriting their estate.”
Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. As a result,
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners’ residence in Angono, Rizal and brought the
child to her house in Parañaque. Gina refused to return the child, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for
adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her; that she will
only return the child if she were paid the amount of P150,000.
The spouses filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court to compel Gina to return custody of Angelie to them.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who conducted the case study on the adoption testified that Gina manifested to the
social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the adoptive parents/petitioners have rightful custody over Angelie.
RULING: Yes. It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than respondent
Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation
with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop
into an upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child
by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and vanished. For a
minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the
moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better than what the natural
mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man,
can most likely give her.  Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and
consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in
which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the
right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
2. On hereditary rights, Sec. 18; FC 189-190; Art. 39, PD 603, Rule 99, Section 5
See: Balane, Ruben, Jottings in Succession, [2006 ed.]
3. On name

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 (TAN)
Doctrine: Exception to adoption statutes should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.
Facts: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
that Stephanie’s mother was Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname He prayed that the child's middle name ‘Astorga’ be changed to ‘Garcia’, her mother's surname, and that her
surname ‘Garcia’ be changed to ‘Catindig’, his surname. The trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his
legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the FC, she was now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Thereafter, Honorato filed a motion for clarification/reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name. RTC denied the motion holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted
child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, this petition. The OSG agrees with
Honorato that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother arguing that
(1) it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother as she remains to be an intestate
heir; (2) there is no law expressly prohibiting her to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name; and (3) it
is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling: NO. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry
out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This provision is
necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the
law. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Additional Notes:
1. The law is silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
2. The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name.
3. The Underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child. It is defined as the process of making a child,
whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
4. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother.
5. Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552, the law on adoption, provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
H. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19

Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003 (WENCESLAO)
Doctrine: Republic Act No. 8552 affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child not only in his new family but also in
the society as well; The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted
child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Issue: Whether or not the adopting mother can rescind the decree of adoption of her adopted son? NO because of Section
19 of RA 8522.
Facts:
Dr. Lahom and Mrs. Lahom adopted the latter’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo. The couple then instituted a petition
for adoption which was subsequently granted by the court on 1972. The trial court ordered that in accordance to the said
adoption, the name of Jose Sibulo be changed to Jose Lahom in the Civil Register of Naga City. Unfortunately in
December 1999, Mrs. Lahom initiated a petition to rescind the decree of adoption of Jose in the RTC based on the
following grounds: (a) Jose refuses to use the surname Lahom and (b) Jose was indifferent and was not capable of
showing affection towards Mrs. Lahom (became a widow and also had a leg ailment) even though the latter needed him.
Consequently, prior to the institution of the case RA 8522 was enacted on March 22, 1998 which removed the
right of the adopted to rescind the decree of adoption. Mrs. Lahom stated that the law cannot be applied retroactively
because it will prejudice her vested right under the Civil Code and Family Code. Likewise, Jose Sibulo argues that the
said petition lacks cause of action due to the enactment of RA 8522. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of Jose. Hence, the
said petition of Mrs. Lahom.
SC:
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court stated that it was months after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of
adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer, could be pursued.
Likewise, the said action was already prescribed because it was instituted beyond the prescriptive period (5 years from the
cause of action) under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court.
However, Mrs. Lahom while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause
the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
1. by the adopted
2. by the adopter/s
3. effects of rescission, Sec. 20
XII. SUPPORT
A. What comprises support, FC 194
B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC 195, 196
Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453 (WENCESLAO)
Doctrine: Where a husband whom the law compels to support his wife is living, the father and mother- in-law of the latter
are under no liability to provide for her
Issue: Whether or not the physician can compel the father and mother-in-law to pay for his services? NO
Facts:
Arturo Pelayo (physician) filed a complain against Marcelo and Juana (in laws) because they contacted and
contracted the services of the former to help in the delivery of their daughter in law, who was about to give birth. Pelayo
visited the patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500, which
Marcelo and Juana refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that judgment
be entered in his favor as against the them. Marcelo and Juana contends that their daughter in law lived with her husband

and thus they should be absolved from the said complaint. The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of action. Thus,
the said petition by Pelayo.
SC:
The Court stated that the rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. Thus, the party bound to furnish such support is
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability
originates from the above-cited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
Likewise, within the meaning of the law, the father and mother- in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation
that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at the
time of her confinement.
Therefore, in view of the considerations hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110 (WENCESLAO)

Doctrine: Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support. Consequently, as to the child, it
is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the' child of the defendant
and, hence, would not be entitled to support as such.
Issue: Whether or not the husband entitled to support his wife and child? Case was remanded for proper appreciation
of evidence for the alleged adultery.
Facts:
Josefa (wife) and Mario (son) filed a case for support against Feliciano (husband) in the CFI. Josefa stated that the
husband refused to support them and the former has no means of livelihood while Feliciano receives a pension from the
US Army worth P174.20. Likewise, Josefa stated that Feliciano left them without justifiable cause. Feliciano contends and
presents that Josefa committed adultery with a certain Macario Sanchez. Also, Mario is not his son and the son of Macario
and Josefa. The CFI and CA provided support pendente lite of P50 to Josefa. Thus, the said petition of Feliciano.
SC:
The Court stated that the lower court erred in not allowing Feliciano to present his evidence for the purpose of
determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid
defense against an action for support. Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such
adulterous relations, for in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to support
as such. The case was remanded to the lower court for proper appreciation of evidence.
The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed, and it is ordered that the petitioner be given an
opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense against the application for support pendente lite, to the extent
which the court may determine, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999 (BARRETTO)
Rondina v People, GR 179059, June 13, 2012 (BARRETTO)
Gotardo v Buling, GR 165166, August 15, 2012 (BARRETTO)

Perla v Baring, GR 172471, November 12, 2012 (EVANGELISTA)
Facts: Mirasol Baring and her minor son Randy filed before the RTC a complaint for support against Antonia Perla. They
alleged that Mirasol and Antonio were common-law spouses for 2 years and bore a child together(Randy - Nov 11, 1983)
however when Antonio landed a job as a seaman, he abandoned them and failed to give any support to his son. Thus they
prayed that Antonio be ordered to support Randy. She presented Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal
Certificate indicating her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she and Antonio supplied the
information in the said certificates. Randy testified that he stayed with his father’s family for a week and at that time
asked Randy for support which Antonio promised he would give.
Antonio contended that he is now married and has a family of his own and denied having fathered Randy but admitted to
knowing Mirasol though she was never his common-law wife. He admitted to having sexual intercourse with Mirasol but
denied participating in the preparation of Randy’s Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate. He added that the
Certificate of live birth had inaccuracies in the entries on his name with the wrong middle initial and the wrong
occupation. Antonio also alleged that Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits
by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages by way of counterclaim from
respondents.
The RTC ordered Antonio to support Randy and held that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since
Antonio himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old Randy testified, he
categorically declared Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of
exposing herself to humiliation, shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonio’s counterclaim
was denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and Randy. The CA upheld Randy’s
illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying
Antonio as his father. According to the appellate court, while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they
are proof that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy.
Issue: WON the lower courts correctly ordered Antonio to support randy? - NO
Ruling: Respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for
Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the
RTC would show that it is bereft of any discussion regarding Randy’s filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part,
cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the certified true copies of Randy’s birth
certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and
nothing more. This is despite the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature. Randy’s baptismal
certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth
certificate, the lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this
document incompetent to prove paternity. It is settled that "a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate."
The testimony of Randy which states that he stayed with his father for one-week cannot be considered as open and
continuous possession of the child as under the second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously." Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support
him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child.

This Court cannot likewise agree with the RTC’s conclusion that Antonio fathered Randy merely on the basis of his
admission that he had sexual encounters with Mirasol. It is well to stress that as plaintiff, Mirasol has the burden of
proving her affirmative allegation that Antonio is the father of her son Randy. She must rely on the strength of her
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. As Randy was born on November 11, 1983, it was incumbent upon
Mirasol to prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual period of pregnancy or nine months
before the birth of Randy. This crucial period therefore is during the early part of the first quarter of 1983. However,
nothing from Mirasol’s testimony indicates that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio during that time. All told, it is
clear that respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, the order for Antonio to support
Randy has no basis.
Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013 (EVANGELISTA)

Facts: Ma. Carminia Calderon and Jose Antonio Roxas were married on Dec 4, 1985 and their union produced 4 children.
On Jan 16, 1998, Calderon filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under ART 36 of the FC. The RTC granted Calderon’s petition for support pendente lite of 50% of their schooling funds
and a sum of P42, 292.50 a month for support of the children against Roxas. On Feb 11, 2003, Roxas filed a Motion to
Reduce Support citing that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children is higher than his P20,800 month salary as a
city councilor and so the trial court granted the motion to reduce support on the ground that Roxas had been providing
support for the children and that he had no other source of income except his salary as a City Councilor. Calderon filed for
partial reconsideration but this was denied
On May 16, 2005, the trial court declared the marriage of the spouses null and void and awarded the custody of the minor
children to Calderon with visitation and custodial rights to Roxas while ordering Roxas to provide support for the children
amounting to P30k a month along with the schooling funds of the children and dissolving the conjugal partnership
property of the two.
Calderon later filed a Notice of Appeal for the previous case on support pendente lite prior to the RTC ruling on the
marriage however the CA dismissed this appeal on the ground that this would disturb the RTC decision that had become
final and executory.
Issue: WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the matter of support pendente lite after the declaration of nullity
had been final and executory? - NO
Ruling: Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to
by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during
the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of
the main action. The subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from interlocutory orders is
not allowed. Said provision reads:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the
RTC, petitioner's appeal was correctly dismissed by the CA.
C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440 (EVANGELISTA)
Facts: Teodoro Lerma and Conception Diaz married on May 19, 1951 however on Aug 22, 1969, Lerma filed a complaint
for adultery against Diaz and a certain Teodoro Ramirez. On Nov 19,1969, Diaz filed with the lower court a complaint
against Lerma for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of their children and support, with an urgent
petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who was then and until now is in her custody.
Diaz’s complaint for separation was on the grounds of concubinage and attempt against her life. Lerma opposed the
application for support pendente lite because of the adultery charge he had earlier filed against Lerma however the
application for support was granted and Lerma was declared entitled to a monthly amount of P2,250 to P1,820. On Mar
12, 1970, Lerma filed with the CA to annul the grant of support pendente lite and the CA set aside the decision and
granted Lerma the opportunity to present evidence against the application of support pendente lite. This was assailed by
Diaz on the ground that Lerma had not asked that he be allowed to present evidence in the lower court thus the CA
reversed its earlier decision to set aside the earlier resolution.
Issue: WON Conception Diaz is entitled to support pendente lite? - NO
Ruling: In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable failure of the respondent's
suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the
Court of First Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same
undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed
by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be
used as a means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the
decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an
erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless.
Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 5 thereof, which partly provides:
The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as equity and justice may
require, having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable
outcome of the case, and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the questions involved.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code,
which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a
ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law

granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the
recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921
one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the
substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803 (JIMENEA)

Facts: Celia Illustre Reyes (private respondent) filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a
complaint against her husband Manuel for legal separation on the ground that Manuel had attempted to kill Celia on two
separate occasions.
On March 10, 1976, Manuel went to V. Ilustre and attacked Celia. He pummelled her with fist blows that floored her and
then held her head, with intent to kill, bumped it several times against the cement floor. She ran upstairs to her father for
protection but he pushed her at the stairway of 13 flights and she fell sliding on the ground floor. Determined to finish her
off, he gave a strong swing at her abdomen rendering her half unconscious and if not for Celia’s father, she would have
died.
On May 26, 1976, Celia went to their office at Bel-Air apartments to get her overnight bag. Manuel, upon seeing her,
yelled to get out of the office. When she didn’t mind him, he suddenly doused her with a glass of grape juice, kicked her
several times on the back and nape and was about to hit her with a steel tray until her driver, Ricardo Mancera, came due
to her screams for help. For fear of further injury and for her life, she went to the police for assistance and protection.
RTC ruled in favor of Celia and granted alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month starting from June
1976. Manuel filed a motion reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case and that
even if she was entitled, the amount awarded was excessive so the Ines-Luciano(respondent judge) reduced the amount
from P5,000.00 to P4,000.00 a month in an order on June 17, 1977. Still, he went up to the CA and asked the decision to
be annulled as respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion on said order.
CA also ruled in favor of Celia as it appears that Manuel is financially capable of giving support and that he did not
present a clear case of abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the wife is still entitled to support from the husband despite the fact that a case of adultery has
been filed against her. YES.
2. Whether or not the Court erred in basing the amount of support pendente lite by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the records. NO.
Ruling:
1. While it is true that adultery of the wife is a valid defense in an action for support, the alleged adultery must be
established by competent evidence. The mere allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her
from right to receive support pendente lite. In this case, since Manuel failed to provide evidence that Celia had
committed adultery, it is doubtful that this will affect her entitlement to support.
2. The amount of pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 by the respondent judge. The SC ruled that in determining
the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite, it is not necessary to go full merits of the case because it is
already sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable
it to justly resolve the application in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution. Mere affidavits
may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. In this case, Celia submitted
documents showing the corporations controlled by Manuel have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of
the Ministry of Public Highways. Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of
Manuel as shown by the documents submitted by Celia, the amount of P4,000.00 a month granted by respondent
Judge as alimony pendente lite is not excessive.
D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204

Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006 (JIMENEA)
Facts: On 17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition
for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said
petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then
City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent
Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New
Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March
1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as
private respondents had totally abandoned them.
At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America
(USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
admitted to Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget of $12,500.00 while Rina entered CW Post, Long Island
University were she was expected to spend $20,000.00. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina pursuant to Article 199. YES.
2. Whether or not Francisco can avail Article 204 concerning his obligation. NO.
Ruling:
1. Yes, Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina pursuant to Article 199. Francisco is the father of Federico
whose twin daughters are Rica and Rina. In Francisco’s statement he had admitted that he kept in touch with the
twins who called him ‘Lolo Paco’ or ‘Daddy Paco’ and that he recognized the twins as his grandchildren.
Article 199 states that whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the
following persons in the order herein provided:
1) The spouse
2) The descendants in the nearest degree
3) The ascendants in the nearest degree
4) The brothers and sisters
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient however, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant
prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. There being prima facie evidence
showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are
primarily charged to support their children’s college education. Considering that Federico, who has no steady income
cannot support his kids and pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code, Francisco as grandfather is the next immediate
relative of the twins, he must support them.
2. No, Francisco cannot avail of Article 204 concerning his obligation.
Article 204 of the Family Code provides that the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who
has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Though Federico and Francisco claims that they have the option under the law as to how to perform their obligation to
support the twins, Francisco insist they move back to the Philippines as the quality of education is at par with the United
States. In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With the
filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had
certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and
claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given the moral obstacle, the Court could not see
Rica and Rina moving back to the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
Guided by this principle, we hold Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by the twins as

support pendente lite as he has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. The court
also deems it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they
had finished their respective studies.
Spouses Lim v Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009 (JIMENEA)
Facts: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore
Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards. Edwards family business, which
provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the trial court
described a very compromising situation. Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and
Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.
In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to
respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary
liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration,
clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s inability to give
sufficient support. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support
respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing
that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).
In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to
provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim
(respondents).
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents. YES.
Ruling: Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of
familial obligation to give support. The governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as
amended, on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. Petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children’s
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her
children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents,
P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently
provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners
theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental
inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood
to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family
extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of
monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the
case to the trial court for this limited purpose.
E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-204

Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the
support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it,
should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be
followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the
child shall be preferred. (295a)
Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)
Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish
the same. (297a)
Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall
not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter
alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a)
Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013 (LABRADOR)

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, were married on December 4,
1985 and their union produced four children. On January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued an Order4 granting petitioner’s application for support pendente lite.
“…Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to contribute to the support of the above-named minors, (aside
from 50% of their school tuition fees which the defendant has agreed to defray, plus expenses for books and other
school supplies), the sum of P42,292.50 per month, effective May 1, 1998, as his share in the monthly support of
the children, until further orders from this Court” (May 19 Order)
On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trial court issued an Order dated October 11, 2002 directing private
respondent to give support in the amount of P42,292.50 per month starting April 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19,
1998 Order. On February 11, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support citing, among other
grounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly support for the children as fixed by the court was even higher than his then
P20,800.00 monthly salary as city councilor.8
After hearing, the trial court issued an Order9 dated March 7, 2005 granting the motion to reduce support and
denying petitioner’s motion for spousal support, increase of the children’s monthly support pendente lite and

support-in-arrears. Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect of the assailed
orders pertains only to private respondent’s motion to reduce support which was granted, and to her own motion to
increase support, which was denied.
Petitioner points out that the ruling on support in arrears which have remained unpaid, as well as her prayer for
reimbursement/payment under the May 19, 1998 Order and related orders were in the nature of final orders
assailable by ordinary appeal considering that the orders referred to under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 61 of the Rules
of Court can apply only prospectively.
Thus, from the moment the accrued amounts became due and demandable, the orders under which the amounts
were made payable by private respondent have ceased to be provisional and have become final.
Issue: Whether the March 7, 2005 and May 4, 2005 Orders on the matter of support pendente lite are interlocutory or
final.
Ruling: The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. An interlocutory order merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case. Examples: an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, an "interlocutory" order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in
the case.
A “final” judgment or order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the
same action. It is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto.
Examples: an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an
action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription.
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests,
were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the
merits of petitioner’s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite which may be availed of at the
commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order. Clearly, whether an
order or resolution is final or interlocutory is not dependent on compliance or non-compliance by a party to its directive,
as what petitioner suggests. It is also important to emphasize the temporary or provisional nature of the assailed orders.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case.
They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they
are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. 20 The subject orders
on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appeal from interlocutory
orders is not allowed. In the instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner's appeal was
correctly dismissed by the CA.
F. Amount of support, FC 200-208
Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not
be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)
Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have
a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)
Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the
latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged
to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority
unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)
Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support
shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
Lacson vs. Lacson, G.R.No. 150644, August 28, 2006 (LABRADOR)

Facts:
1. The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V.
Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson.
2. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother
and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else.
3. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18)
years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own.
4. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying
initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As
things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea’s efforts towards having him
fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for
school expenses.
5. Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City,
6. Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and
owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing
to years of Edward’s failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother
Noel Daban.
7. As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite
at P12,000.00 per month. The court also ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum which
represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the grant of support in arrears? NO.
Ruling: : Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his
threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous
extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the
Family Code to complete his point:
Article 203 – The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995,
since only from that moment can it be said that an effective demand for support was made upon him.
Petitioner’s above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably
abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure,
petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding
support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in
touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be
that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor
commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however,
definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a
demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award
of support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision
CA: We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioner’s] posture of trying to evade his responsibility to give support
to his daughters simply because their mother did not make a "formal" demand therefor from him. [Petitioner’s] insistence
on requiring a formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and commitment to
comply with such obligation through a note in his own handwriting. Said note [stating that he will "sustain his two
daughters Maowee and Maonaa"] also stated "as requested by their mother" thus practically confirming the fact of such
demand having been made by [respondents’] mother.
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court
respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons
G. Renunciation and Termination, NCC 2035; FC 194; NCC 152 (read Tolentino)
H. Support pendente lite, FC 198; Rules of Court, Rule 61
I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61
XIII. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A. Concept of parental authority, Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution, FC 209, 211, NCC 356-363
Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution, “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the government.”

FC. Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)
FC. Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the
children are under parental authority. (311a)
NCC. Article 356. Every child:
(1) Is entitled to parental care;
(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;
(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;
(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.
NCC. Article 357. Every child shall:

(1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian;
(2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority;
(3) Exert his utmost for his education and training;
(4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same.
NCC. Article 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the
child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with
highmindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment
to the ideal of permanent world peace.
NCC. Article 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the
government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the
curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian;
(2) Puericulture and similar centers;
(3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and
(4) Juvenile courts.
NCC. Article 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality.
It shall, among other functions:
(1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality;
(2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents;
(3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans;
(4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency;
(5) Adopt measures for the health of children;
(6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds;
(7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.
NCC. Article 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
NCC. Article 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper
case be judicially admonished.

NCC. Article 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure.
Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969 (LABRADOR)
Facts:
1. Appellant's claim for custody of a minor boy, Joseph Casero, was sought to be enforced by habeas corpus
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. After hearing, the writ was denied by the Court, and
the case was appealed directly to this Supreme Court.
2. Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave birth to a baby boy named Joseph Casero in the Makabali Clinic in San
Fernando, Pampanga, owned and operated by respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, single, who assisted at the
delivery. The boy was Zenaida's third, had with a married man, Feliciano Casero.
3. The mother left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The latter took care and reared Joseph as her
own son; had him treated at her expense for poliomyelitis by Dra. Fe del Mundo, in Manila, until he
recovered his health; and sent him to school. From birth until August 1966, the real mother never visited her
child, and never paid for his expenses.
4. After extracting from Dra. Makabali a promise to allow the minor a free choice with whom to live when he
reaches the age of 14, the Court held that it was for the child's best interest to be left with his foster mother
and denied the writ prayed for. The real mother appealed, as already stated.
Issue: Whether or not Zenaida’s claim for custody of a minor boy can be enforced by habeas corpus proceedings? NO.
Ruling:
1. We see no reason to disturb the order appealed from. While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother (Do.)
2. This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring
was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian
faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Peña, now "there is no
power, but a task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor."
3. As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356). As remarked by the Court
below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide
the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his tenderest years, when
he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child could derive from being
coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his mother and witness her
irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.
4. No abuse of discretion being shown, but on the contrary, the appealed order being justified in fact and law, we
hold that said order should be, and hereby is, affirmed. Costs against appellant.
Unson vs. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980 (RUZOL)

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari from the order of Judge Navarro, ordering petitioner to produce the child, Maria
Teresa Unson, his daughter (8 years old) with Edita Araneta and return her to the custody of Araneta and to continue his
support of said daughter by providing her for education and medical needs.
Miguel Unson and Edita Araneta were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage, Teresa was on born December
1, 1971. Unson and Araneta have been separated in fact since June 1972 and have executed an agreement for the
separation of their properties and to live separately on July 13, 1974.
The parties agreed that no specific provision was contained in said agreement about the custody of the child because the
husband and wife would have their own private arrangement in that respect.
According to Unson, Maria Teresa went to school in Assumption College, Makati and she would stay with Unson during
school days and spend weekends with Edita but there were times when Edita would not bother to pick her up during non-
school days.
In 1978, Unson found out that Araneta was living with her brother-in-law Agustin Reyes and that Reyes was confined in
Makati Med for being “Manic Depressive” and that Araneta and Reyes had a child together (September 24, 1978).
Araneta had another child with Reyes (May 21, 1980).
Custody of Maria Teresa should be with Unson because Reyes is her godfather and that Reyes and Araneta have left the
Roman Catholic Church for a protestant sect, Maria Teresa reared under the Roman Catholic faith should not be exposed
to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life.
Araneta contends that she has never spoken ill about Unson to Maria Teresa, that Unson was never barred from seeing
Maria Teresa, that Maria Teresa and her family knew about Araneta’s relationship with Reyes and that her circumstances
might not look morally acceptable but her daughter was brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection, and
honesty.
Issue: Whether or not Unson should be granted custody of Maria Teresa? - yes
Ruling: The court held that in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the contending parents.
The court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of Teresa to be freed from the unwholesome
and immoral influence in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and
social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life.
The court finds no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitorial rights over Maria Teresa.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge is hereby set aside, the restraining order heretofore issued is made
permanent and the parties are ordered to submit to this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice hereof their own
agreement as to the visitorial rights of private respondent, otherwise, the Court will take it upon itself to fix the terms and
conditions thereof. No costs.
B. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234, 217
Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317 (RUZOL)

Facts: This is a petition for review wherein Teresita seeks the reversal of the CA decision which affirmed the trial court
judgement granting the petition of Paz to recover custody of her minor daughter from her mother-in-law Teresita.
On June 11, 1984, Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed
with Teresita Eslao (mother of Reynaldo). They had 2 children namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the
care of Paz’s mother in Pampanga while Angelica stayed with her parents.
On August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died thus Paz wanted to bring Angelica to Pampanga but Teresita wanted her to entrust the
custody of Angelica to her reasoning that she needed company to grieve the loss of his son.
Paz was introduced by her aunt to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist practicing in the US. They
eventually got married on March 18, 1992 and hence, Paz migrated to the US on January 15, 1993.
On June 24, 1993, Paz went back to the Philippines to bring her children with her abroad. There was willingness to adopt
Leslie and Angelica by Dr. James however Teresita resisted as she claims that Paz abandoned Angelica.
The lower court gave custody to Paz.
Issue: Whether or not the custody of Angelica should be transferred to Paz - no
Ruling: Child’s welfare is always paramount consideration hence the court decides in favor of Paz.
Paz is married to an Orthodontist in the US. They can provide a better future for Leslie and Angelica than Teresita.
Regarding the issue of abandonment, Paz did not abandon Angelica.
It was held in Santos, Sr. v CA:
[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens
physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by
law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law
still disallows the same. The parents of emancipated children are duty-bound and entitled to their custody.
In this case, when Paz entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution
which do not appear in the case at bar.
The right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right
supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of
the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
Dispositive:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25, 1994 being in accordance with law and the evidence,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
C. Who exercises Parental Authority,

FC 211-213 cf.
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children,
unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
FC 49, 102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 129 (9)

Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written
agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and
support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and
material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. (n)
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children. (n)
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the
following effects:
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in
default of children, the innocent spouse;
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate

child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)
Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
Unson v. Navarro 101 SCRA 183 (RUZOL)

Espiritu & Layug v. CA, G.R. No. 115640 (1995) (MARAVILLAS)
Doctrine:
Facts: Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In
1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime
later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On
August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in
the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son,
this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for
the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that
Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls
to keep in constant touch with her children. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita granting it, she
left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought the children in the Philippines and left them
with his sister. When Teresita returned in the Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against Reynaldo and his sister to gain custody of the children.
Issue: Whether the custody of the 2 children be awarded to the mother.
Ruling: No, in ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the
circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their
choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person,
thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under
the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption
should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody
of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special pronouncement is
made as to costs.
Santos Sr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 113054 (1995) (MARAVILLAS)
Doctrine: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a
parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Facts: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City
in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his
maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter
alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not
afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not
aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner (Dad, Santos Sr.) along with his two brothers visited the Bedia household, where three-
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner (Dad,
Santos Sr.) abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent.
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the
child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court
affirmed the trial court's
order. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a
reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner. He contends that since private respondents have failed to show that
petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of
the Family Code is inappropriate.

Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having custody over the boy, are flimsy and
insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner
would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. When the boy was about
to be released from the hospital, they were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no money.
Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to them before she left for the United States.
Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated by private
respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately the primary
consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply
demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the
child's welfare.
Issue: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Ruling: From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel
Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care, custody, and control of his maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The
petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and devotion to their grandson while the natural father, respondent herein,
has shown little interest in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover, the fact that petitioners are well-
off financially, should be carefully considered in awarding to them the custody of the minor herein, lest the breaking of
such ties with his maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college education and other material
advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688). Respondent had never given any previous financial support to his son,
while, upon the other hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal grandparents and his mother as well,
who is now gainfully employed in the United States. Moreover, the fact that respondent, as a military personnel, who has
to shuttle from one assignment to another, and, in these troubled times, may have pressing and compelling military duties
which may prevent him from attending to his son at times when the latter needs him most, militates strongly against said
respondent. Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of those who can provide
for it. We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant
right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and
unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at
the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support
for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not
be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is
inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his
past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father
a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30,
1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the
minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
David vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 82, November 16, 1995 (MARAVILLAS)

Doctrine: Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto."
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David, secretary of private respondent had a relationship Ramon R. Villar, a married
businessman in Angeles City with four children. Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was
followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April24, 1988.The
relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa
in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked
Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next
school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. RTC ruled in favor of
Petitioner and gave Christopher J.’s custody to her. CA reversed RTC ruling and stated that it is for the best interest of
Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and
support shall have been determined in a proper case. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should have custody of Christoper J.
Ruling: Yes. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of
the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for
some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For
example, in the case of Salvaña v Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents
to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter being the custody of a third person of her free will
because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an
illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent,
she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child
may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner
of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since
they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor and a secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly
income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She
works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents
and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for
every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what
it is. Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with
him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her
means. In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the
time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven
years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to
live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of

age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody
of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the
award of his custody to him (private respondent).
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to
deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
Tonog vs. CA, 376 SCRA 642 (DELOCARIO)

Doctrine: The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority or
patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law
grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
Petitioner: Dinah B. Tonog (mother in the case)

Respondent: Court of Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol (father)
Facts: On September 23, 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with
private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Dinah Tonog was then a nursing student while Edgar Gaguimol was a licensed
physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with Daguimol’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in Quezon City
where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year after their daughter’s birth, Dinah went to
the United States to work as a nurse, and Gardin was left to Edgar and her grandparents to be taken care of. On January
10, 1992, Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith. The RTC of Quezon City appointed Edgar as legal
guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Dinah avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on
May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed
petitioner to file her opposition to private respondent’s petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a
related incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin Faith to her.Edgar filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, questioning the actuations of the trial court. The CA dismissed Edgar’s
petition for its lack of merit.
After Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration, the CA ruled that Gardin should remain with her paternal
grandparents, hence this petition. While it is understandable for Dinaht, as mother, to assert and seek enforcement of her
legal and natural rights as the natural guardian of her child, the emotional and psychological effects upon the latter of a
change in custody should be considered. To be sure, transfer of custody of the child from Edgar to Dinah will be painful
for the child who, all her life, has been in the company of Edgar and her paternal grandparents. Subjecting the child to
emotional seesaw should be avoided. It is thus more prudent to let physical custody of the child in question be with Edgar
until the matter of her custody shall have been determined by final judgment.
Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the
mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second,
Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple
arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue: Whether or not Dinah Tonog should be granted parental authority over Gardin Faith (currently residing with her
father and paternal grandparents.
Ruling: No, Gardin Faith should remain with her paternal grandparents and father. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that
the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child.

Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned,
Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." It will be observed that in both provisions,
a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code Commission:
The general rule is that mothers should be granted custody of her children. The exception allowed by the rule
has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart
is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree
(relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the
child which is the paramount consideration.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for
"compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than
seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it
appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare
of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father
(private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not
be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed
with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
Repeated: Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004 (DELOCARIO)
Doctrine: An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is
entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any imperative cause showing
her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Petitioner: Joey D. Briones

Respondent: Maricel Miguel, Francis Miguel and Loreta Miguel (mother of Michael)
Facts: On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel
Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. A Writ of
Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the
living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002.
Briones alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He
was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now
married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. Briones caused the minor child to be brought to the
Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled
him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.

On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in
Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said
child for recreation at the SM Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to
which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. The petitioner went
several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the
latter’s mother at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there, respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that
Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
Issue: Whether or not Briones, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the
absence of the mother who is away. Yes, because Michael is an illegitimate child and he should be always with his mother
unless it is proven that his mother had become unfit to fulfill her duties.
Ruling: Briones concedes that Loreta has preferential right over their minor child. He insists, however, that custody
should be awarded to him whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there. In other words, he
wants joint custody over the minor, such that the mother would have custody when she is in the country. But when she is
abroad, he -- as the biological father -- should have custody.
At present, however, the child is already with his mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus rendering petitioner’s
argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an
"Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"10 alleging therein that respondents were preparing the travel papers of the
minor so the child could join his mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion for lack of merit.
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the disposition allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to live with is
DELETED for lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
Gualberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005 (DELOCARIO)
Facts: On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto filed before [the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City] a
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody
pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity), whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away
with her from the conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddler's Discovery Center in Parañaque City) when [she]
decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early February 2002[.] [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort]
heard the ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. Because [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to appear despite
notice, [Crisanto], a certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x x Judge; x x x
documentary evidence [was] also presented.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct
surveillance on [Joycelyn] and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay
Cuidadano in Cebu City.
'The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the
mother] does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she saw [Joycelyn]
slapping the child.

Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto filed before the RTC of Paranaque City[1] a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with an ancillary prayer for the custody pendente lite of their 4-year old son,
Rafaello. Crisanto alleged thaJoycelyn took away their child from their conjugal home and his school when she decided to
abandon Crisanto. Despite efforts of Crisanto, he failed to seehis child. During the hearing on the custody pendente lite,
the private investigator hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn testified that Joycelyn was having lesbian
relations with a certain Noreen in Cebu City. This was corroborated by the househelper of the spouses who stated that
Joycelyn often leaves the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slap the child. The trial court awarded the custody
of the minor pendente lite to Crisanto. After hearing, the trial court awarded the custody Crisanto, but it was reversed
later, awarding the custody to Joycelyn. The CA reversed the Order of the trial court and awarded custody to the father
pendente lite,hence, the mother brought the matter to the Supreme Court raising the issue whether lesbianism may warrant
the separation of a child below the age of seven (7) from the mother
Issue: Whether or not Joycelyn may be deprived of her custody on her kid on the grounds of her lesbian sexual relations.
Ruling:No, Jocelyn still has the right to maintain custody over kid. When love is lost between spouses and the marriage
inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to
settle the opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years old.30 On the
one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her.
On the other hand, the father argues that she is "unfit" to take care of their son; hence, for "compelling reasons," he must
be awarded custody of the child.
Article 213 of the Family Code31 provides:
"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It
has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the mother's immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason
to deprive her of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a
mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.To
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR No. 156254
is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
D. Substitute Parental Authority, FC 214-216, FC 217, 233

Rep. Act No. 10165, Foster Care Act of 2012.
Vancil vs Belmes, 358 SCRA 707 (NAVAS)
Doctrine:
"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the custody of
their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound

public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
Facts: Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in 1986. During his lifetime,
Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. The RTC appointed
Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.
Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings arguing that she had already filed a similar petition
for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of
Guardian and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states
that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A., being a naturalized American citizen.
The trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of
Valerie and Vincent Jr. The CA reversed the RTC decision. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue: Should Belmes be declared the sole guardian of Vincent?
Ruling: YES. Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over
that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order
to the contrary. xxx."
Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and legal right to his
custody.
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can ONLY exercise substitute parental authority in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian,
Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not
suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age,
is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot qualify as a substitute
guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform
the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty
of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those
duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators or guardians.
However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the courts,
charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will
find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.

.
E. Special PA
FC 218-219, FC 233
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons
exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised
the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as
the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)
cf. FC 221 in rel. to NCC 2180
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
St. Mary’s Academy vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES
DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA , G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
|||
(NAVAS)
Doctrine: for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused by the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.
Facts: "From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary's Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary's Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same
school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle and causing the death

of Sherwin.
Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages against petitioner and the other respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of
Sherwin's parents ordering petitioner to pay civil indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin, actual and moral damages, and
attorney's fees under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, and declared respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable.
Respondent Villanueva was absolved from any liability. |||
Issue: Whether the School should be held liable for the accidental death of a student riding a private vehicle?
Ruling: NO.
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned
by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed
that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that
there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva. Hence, the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but
the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the
case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.
Child Learning Centre & Spouses Limon vs. Timothy Tagorio (assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO and
HERMINIA TAGORIO
Doctrine:
Facts: Timothy Tagoria (Timothy) was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and

maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the boy’s comfort room
in Marymount. He started to panic so he banged and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then decided
to open the window to call for help. As he opened the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. He, assisted by his parents,
filed a civil action against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses Limon. They claim
that the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window of the boy’s comfort room.
CLC, in its defense, maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the door and that the fall
of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence
of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students. The trial court ruled in favor
of the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in
toto.
Issue: Should the school be held liable for the falling of Tagorio?
Ruling: YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond;
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.
In this case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances:
(1) failure to fix a defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and
(2) failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from. During trial, it was found that the lock was
defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in place. Further,
the fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That
sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa
loquitor.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it
would not have happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working
condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door, shows that something was wrong
with the door. As to the absence of grills, petitioners contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the
floor, so that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the
toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part. Petitioners’ argument
that CLC exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees is not
decisive.
Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being held responsible
for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176
of the Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
The Court’s pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates
petitioners’ other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he
sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that
originated from CLC’s own negligence.

School of the Holy Spirit vs. Taguiam, GR 165565, July 14, 2008 (ALEJAGA)
Facts: Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the
Holy Spirit of Quezon City. The class had a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the
activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection, Corazon distributed the parent's/guardian's
permit forms to the pupils.
Corazon admitted that Chiara Mae Federico's permit form was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae
was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit.
Before the activity started, Corazon warned the pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area.
However, while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Corazon went after them to verify where they
were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned and eventually died.
Thereafter the school dismissed Corazon on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence.
However, Corazon in turn filed a complaint against the school for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for reinstatement with
full backwages and other money claims, damages and attorney's fees.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty.
He opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils without any adult supervision. He also noted
that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the pupils to use the swimming
pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded that although respondent's negligence was not habitual, the same warranted
her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.
Issue: Whether Corazon’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was
valid.|||
Ruling: Yes, Corazon had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was unsigned.
Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it
by personally bringing her to the school. Second, it was respondent's responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her
class in all activities sanctioned by the school. Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards.
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, Corazon should have made sure that the children were protected
from all harm while in her company. She should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by
themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to
cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when Corazon knew that Chiara
Mae cannot swim. Dismally, Corazon created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to
real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but
of the school itself.|||
All told, there being a clear showing that Corazon was culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal.|||
Aquinas School v Inton, GR 184202, January 26, 2011 (ALEJAGA)

Facts: This case is about the private school's liability for the outside catechist's act of shoving a student and kicking him
on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.

In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year,
taught Jose Luis' grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while,
Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, unable to tolerate the child's behavior,
Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the
classmate's seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on
the blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of
their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas School – that Aquinas School is solidarily liable with Yamyamin. |||
Issue: Whether or not Aquinas School is solidarily liable with Yamyamin
Ruling: No. In this case, Aquinas School had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to
fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students.
Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin's religious congregation that chose her for the task of
catechizing the school's grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach
religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over
Yamyamin's teaching methods. |||
F. Filial privilege, FC 215
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents,
except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the
other. (315a)
ROC Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants. (20a)
Section 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. — Parties or assignor of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
Lee v CA, GR 177861, July 13, 2010 (ALEJAGA)

Lee vs CA
Facts: This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent's right not to testify in a
case against his children.
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from
China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee,
Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee
(collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby,
and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu's children with Lee (collectively, the Lee's other
children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI
concluded in its report: “It is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but
a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN.”
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them for the deletion
from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee's other children, the name Keh and replace the
same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother's name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee's presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu
moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee's stepmother.
Issue: Whether or not Tiu may be compelled to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children
filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Keh's daughter.|||
Ruling: No. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee,
invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No
person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege
cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a
common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
G. Effects of PA over the child’s person,

FC 220-222
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children
on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance,
industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies
and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject
to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )

Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires.
FC 223-224
Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over
the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when
the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such
other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a)
Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than
thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government
agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall
provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child
whenever just and proper.(391a)
Cuadra v. Monfort, 35 SCRA 160 (DIMEN)

Facts: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
School in Bacolod City. In 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly
worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit
her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of
which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost
the sight of her right eye.
Because of the said incident, a civil suit was filed against Alfonso Monfort (father of Maria Teresa Monfort) by the
parents of Maria Teresa Cuadra (on behalf of their minor child) for damages based on quasi delict.
CFI: CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff (Cuadra) and ordered defendant (Monfort) to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not Alfonso Monfort is liable for the act of his minor child which causes damage to another. No
Ruling: No, Alfonso Monfort is not liable for the act of his minor child. Under Articles 2176 and 2180 which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the
omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in different cases enumerated

therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of
in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by
the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee
such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect
her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special
reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
R.A. 7610, The Child Abuse Law

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions,
prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene
on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to
protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances
which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent
with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy
life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children" include,
but are not limited to, the following;
(1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with their normal
development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas without the care of parents or a
guardian or basic services needed for a good quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of extreme poverty or
in an area which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic services needed for a good
quality of life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those above stated which endanger the life, safety or normal development of
children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers to the coordinated program
of services and facilities to protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.1awphi1Ÿ
ARTICLE II
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. – There shall be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development in coordination with other government agencies and
private sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution
and other sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances
which endanger child survival and normal development.
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other
similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such
child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the
prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or
which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. – There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the
room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or
any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is
about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is
receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A
penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case,
under the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not
limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this
Act:
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal
guardian;
(b) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children for
the purpose of child trafficking; or
(c) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person
simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(d) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries,
day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLE V
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. – Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or
coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene
publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such
child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this
section shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or
massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any
person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom
and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his
company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine of not less than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an
ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation,
whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with
him to such place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or
establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;

(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and
263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the
consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher
than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities Constituting
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts
of Abuse. – All establishments and enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child
trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their
authority or license to operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted under this
Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously
displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period
which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of such sign shall
be punishable by prision correccional.

An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises of
said establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna,
travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists;
exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and said
services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or activities constituting the
aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children
Section 12. Employment of Children. – Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and where only
members of the employer's family are employed: Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life,
safety and health and morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian
shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or information through cinema, theater,
radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the
express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment:
Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into
account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing program for training and skill acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging
such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation
of this Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such
course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances.
Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. – No person shall employ child
models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its
byproducts and violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. – Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of
repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities

Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. – In addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act and
other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and development
consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and
institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific and
relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports
shall also accredit and support non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government
organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. – The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition to children of indigenous
cultural communities shall be given priority by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution
shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention. In the provision of health and
nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and
recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. – Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and all forms of
discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000).
Section 21. Participation. – Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or appointed representatives
shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and evaluation of all government programs affecting
children of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. – Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility of
the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to promote the goal of children as zones of
peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be observed.
(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected from any
form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of its civilian units or
other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency relief services shall be kept
unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in fact-finding missions from
both government and non-government institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be subjected to undue harassment in
the performance of their work;
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be utilized for military purposes
such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated due to armed
conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. – Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a
result of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped to look after the safety and well-being of
children during evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by
persons responsible for their safety and well-being.

Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. – Whenever possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the
same premises and given separate accommodation from other evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal
family life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in
proportion to their physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise,
sports and outdoor games.
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. – Any child who has been arrested for
reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts
charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such child to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had reached eighteen
(18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has
been committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it
may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in
criminal cases.
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. – The chairman of the barangay
affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare
and development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.

Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. – The offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the
regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from
any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Section 29. Confidentiality. – At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the public until the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer
in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause
undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and
suffering of the offended party.Lawphi1@alf
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. – Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the
judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and
cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the
hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. –
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender has been previously
convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or employee thereof who is responsible
for the violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its maximum period;
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of
an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and forever barred
from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or
employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is
prision correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of
his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. – Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in coordination
with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the effective
implementation of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 34. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.
Section 35. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
H. Effects of PA over the child’s property,

FC 225-227, RA 9231, Secs. 12-B and 12-C
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the
child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority,
or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
(320a)
Art. 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education,
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support
and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.(321a, 323a)
Art. 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the
net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an
amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants
the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's
legitime.
RA 9231 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR AND
AFFORDING STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “SPECIAL PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT)
SEC. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working Child’s Income. – The wages, salaries, earnings and
other income of the working child shall belong to him/her in ownership and shall be set aside primarily for his/her
support, education or skills acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs of the family: Provided, That not more than
twenty percent (20%) of the child’s income may be used for the collective needs of the family.
“The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through the work of the child shall be administered by
both parents. In the absence or incapacity of either of the parents, the other parent shall administer the same. In case both
parents are absent or incapacitated, the order of preference on parental authority as provided for under the Family Code
shall apply.

“SEC. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child’s Income. – The parent or legal guardian of a working
child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the earnings of the child
whose wages and salaries from work and other income amount to at least two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00)
annually, for which he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the fund to the Department of Labor and
Employment, in compliance with the provisions of this Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon
reaching the age of majority.
Hebron vs. Loyola, G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010 (DIMEN)

Facts: Lot No. 730 was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to Januario Loyola. Lot No. 879 was owned by
Januario Loyola, the husband of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven children, namely Conrado, Jose,
Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion, all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the heirs of Januario and Remigia
received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties during Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's
death in 1969, administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia Bautista-Hebron, who, after
some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties
was formally demanded in 1990, Candida was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia. The
rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants and children.
For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed before the RTC the complaint for partition and
damages from which the instant suit stemmed. Petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of
Conrado have already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them by her mother,
Encarnacion. She further contends that ownership of inherited properties does not fall under Articles 321 and 323 of the
Civil Code and thus, the properties inherited by the children of Conrado can be alienated by their mother, Victorina, in
favor of petitioner's mother.
On the other hand, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate recompense had been effectively made
when they worked without pay at the former's rice mill and household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo,
when she subsequently surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt.
Issue: Whether or not CA erred in affirming RTCs Decision that a spouse present cannot relinquish the shares in the
parcels of land if it will deprive minor child of their hereditary rights.
Ruling: No. The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents Remigia
and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited properties. Victorina had no
authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioner’s mother the undivided
share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural
guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured
the permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor children."
In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court approval of the sale of properties
of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void.
Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its conclusion that Victorina had no capacity
to relinquish her children's shares in the inherited properties was, nevertheless, correct.
In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts of some heirs of their shares, has repeated entries
in Amelia's handwriting that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are no longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the
properties in litigation because they have sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These entries only
prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of Candida and the heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. It
is relevant to note however that the entries in the book of accounts started only on July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite

proof of non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares in the subject properties
starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time, during the administration of the properties by Encarnacion Loyola-
Bautista and some undetermined number of years after her death, Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have
been receiving their shares in the fruits of the subject properties.
Neri v Heirs, GR 194366, October 10, 2012

I. Suspension or termination of PA
1. permanent termination, FC 228, 232, cf. RA 6809
RA 6809 AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences
at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then
be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children
and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar
instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
2. non-permanent termination, FC 229 cf. FC 193
Secs. 16 and 19, RA 8552 re parental authority and revocation of adoption
RA 8552 AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE RULES AND POLICIES ON THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION OF FILIPINO
CHILDREN AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
Section 16. Parental Authority. – Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Section 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the
means of the family.
Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
ARTICLE VI
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a
minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any
of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s)

despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d)
abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
3. suspension of PA, FC 231-230, 233
Chua v. Cabangbang, 27 SCRA 791 (DIMEN)
Facts: Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth, supported herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess. And sexual
liaison she had with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom
she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named
Robert and Betty Chua Sy. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no one to fall
back on after their separation, Pacita Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor
Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when
this last child was still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave
her away to a comadre (midwife) in Cebu.
Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty
who was then barely four months old. There is some testimonial conflict on how the Cabangbang spouses acquired
custody of the girl Betty (or Grace Cabangbang), Pacita Chua avers that in October 1958, while she and Villareal were
still living together, the latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in
recompense for favors received. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child,
wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that
nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of age.
By letter addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the
surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua (petitioner) filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her
parental authority over the girl.
Issue: Whether or not Chua was illegally deprived of parental authority over her daughter.
Ruling: No. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge
and consent of the petitioner. In support of this finding, it cited the facts that the petitioner did not at all — not ever —
report to the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when she
allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that she did not
make any move to recover the child because the Cabangbangs are powerful and influential. The petitioner is bound by the
foregoing findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to this Court, she is deemed to have waived the right to
dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court.
Art. 332 of the Civil Code which provides that:
The courts may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if they should treat their children
with excessive harshness or should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make them beg or
abandon them.
Hence, abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority over their children. In this
case, mere acquiescence (giving Betty to Villareal) is not sufficient to constitute abandonment. But the record yields a
host of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to the child.
She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period
of five long years, before she brought an action to recover custody. Her claim that she did not take any steps to recover her

child because the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who
really loves her child would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner
once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbang should have been to move heaven and
earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, does nothing but confirm her intention to abandon the child, from the very outset when
she allowed Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that the abandonment took place when the
child, barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of her mother.
And for five long years thereafter she did not once move to recover the child. She continuously shunned the natural and
legal obligations which she owed to the child; completely withheld her presence, her love, her care, and the opportunity to
display maternal affection; and totally denied her support and maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been prolonged
to such a point that her abandonment of the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim over her, can and should
be inferred as a matter of law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
De Guzman vs Perez, 496 SCRA 474 (UY)

Doctrine: Liability for the crime does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to
punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the child education which the family’s
station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of
his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance with his or her parental duties.
Issue: May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in providing his child the education his station in life and financial
condition permit be charged for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD603? YES
Facts: Roberto Guzman and Shirley Aberde became sweethearts while studying law in UST. Their studies were
interrupted when Shirley became pregnant. She gave birth to Roberto’s son, Robby in 1987. Roberto and Shirley never
got married. In 1991, Roberto married another woman with whom he begot two children.
Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice – in 1992 and in 1993. While in 1994, when Robby fell
seriously ill, Roberto gave P7k to help in the costs of the child’s hospitalization and medical expenses. Other than these
instances, he never provided any other financial support.
In 1994, in order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby’s needs, Shirley accepted a job as a factory worker
in Taiwan where she worked for 2 years. It was only because of her short stint overseas that she was able to support
Robby and send him to school. However, she reached the point where she had spent all her savings to support herself and
her son.
While Roberto manages the de Guzman family corporations, and apparently did well as he led a luxurious
lifestyle. He owned 5 luxury cars, lived in a palatial home in the exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision, built a
bigger and more extravagant house in the same subdivision and sent his children which was allegedly paid for by his wife,
to expensive schools in Metro Manila. Also regularly traveled abroad with his family. Despite of this, was unable to
provide support to his son.
In 2000, Shirley demanded support for Robby who was then entering high school where she explained that given
her financial problems, it was extremely difficult for her to send him to a good school. He ignored the demands, thus
Shirley was forced to rely on the charity of her relatives so that she could enroll her son in De La Salle High School in
Lipa City.

Then, Shirley filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child u under Article 59 (2) and (4) of
PD603 with the Office of the City Prosecutor. On Roberto’s counter-affidavit, he stated that he never abandoned Robby
whom he readily acknowledged as his son. Also, expressed the instances in which he provided support when he
shouldered the expenses of the birth of Robby and when he was in the hospital he gave P7k. That these acts does not
constitute abandonment or neglect.
Further, he stated that he had no fix job and merely depended on the charity of his father. However, it was seen
that Roberto has P750k worth of paid-up corporate shares in RNCD Development Corp.
City Prosecutor of Lipa City Ruling: dismissed the complaint for abandonment but found probable cause to charge
Roberto with neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD603 in relation to Sec. 10(a) of RA7610.
However, he filed a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice – which denied the petition and affirmed the City
Prosecutor’s decision.
Ruling: Under Article 59(4) of PD603, (4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the family’s station
in life and financial conditions permit.
The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and
(4) the offender’s station in life and financial condition permit him to give an appropriate education to the child.
In this case, Roberto acknowledged Robby as his son; neither did he deny not contributing for his education
except in the two instances states in 1992 and ’93; admitted that his education was supported by Shirley and her relatives;
and that the last time he provided support was when he was hospitalized.
The prima facie evidence of Roberto’s financial capability is his P750k paid-up shares in the notarized GIS
(General Information Sheet) of the RNCD Development Corp.
The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime does not depend on whether
the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to
the failure to give the child education which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible
parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful compliance
with his or her parental duties.
Dispostive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
4. revival
See: R.A. 8369, “An Act Establishing Family Courts, Granting Them Exclusive Original Jurisdiction Over Child
and Family Cases.”
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997".
Section 2. Statement of National Policies. - The State shall protect the rights and promote the welfare of children in
keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the rights of the
Child. The State shall provide a system of adjudication for youthful offenders which takes into account their peculiar
circumstances.

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. The courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family, provide procedures for the reconciliation of spouses and
the amicable settlement of family controversy.
Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the
country. In case where the city is the capital of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality
which has the highest population.
Section 4. Qualification and Training of Family Court Judges. - Sec. 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 15. (a) Qualification. - No person shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge or Presiding Judge of the Family Court
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five (35) years of age, and, for at least ten (10) years,
has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring
admission to the practice of law as indispensable requisite.
"(b) Training of Family Court Judges. - The Presiding Judge, as well as the court personnel of the Family Courts, shall
undergo training and must have the experience and demonstrated ability in dealing with child and family cases.
"The Supreme Court shall provide a continuing education program on child and family laws, procedure and other related
disciplines to judges and personnel of such courts."
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of
age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil
liability which the accused may have incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code";
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and
property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code of the Philippines";

g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or
involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases
cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;
i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence against:
1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a
woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.
If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the
corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts,
said incident shall be determined in that court.
Section 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use of ten per cent (10%) of their income derived from
filing and other court fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court for research and other operating expenses including
capital outlay: Provided, That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice.
The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to effectively implement the provisions of this Sec.
Section 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of violence among immediate family members living in the same
domicile or household, the Family Court may issue a restraining order against the accused of defendant upon verified
application by the complainant or the victim for relief from abuse.
The court may order the temporary custody of children in all civil actions for their custody. The court may also order
support pendente lite, including deduction from the salary and use of conjugal home and other properties in all civil
actions for support.
Section 8. Supervision of Youth Detention Homes. - The judge of the Family Court shall have direct control and
supervision of the youth detention home which the local government unit shall establish to separate the youth offenders
from adult criminals: Provided, however, That alternatives to detention and institutional care shall be made available to
the accused including counseling, recognizance, bail, community continuum, or diversions from the justice system:
Provided, further, That the human rights of the accused are fully respected in a manner appropriate to their well-being.
Section 9. Social Services and Counseling Division. - Under the guidance ofthe Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), a Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) shall be established in each judicial region as
the Supreme Court shall deem necessary based on the number of juvenile and family cases existing in such jurisdiction. It

shall provide appropriate social services to all juvenile and family cases filed with the court and recommend the proper
social action. It shall also develop programs, formulate uniform policies and procedures, and provide technical
supervision and monitoring of all SSCD in coordination with the judge.
Section 10. Social Services and Counseling Division Staff. - The SSCD shall have a staff composed of qualified social
workers and other personnel with academic preparation in behavioral sciences to carry out the duties'of conducting intake
assessment, social case studies, casework and counseling, and othersocial services that may be needed in connection with
cases filed with the court: Provided, however, That in adoption cases and in petitions for declaration of abandonment, the
case studies may be prepared by social workers of duly licensed child caring or child placement agencies, or the DSWD.
When warranted, the division shall recommend that the court avail itself of consultative services of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and other qualified specialists presently employed in other departments of the government in connection
with its cases.
The position of Social Work Adviser shall be created under the Office of the Court Administrator, who shall monitor and
supervise the SSCD ofthe Regional Trial Court.
Section 11. Alternative Social Services. - In accordance with Sec. 17 of this Act, in areas where no Family Court has been
established or no Regional Trial Court was designated by the Supreme Court due to the limited number of cases, the
DSWD shall designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD accredited social workers of the local government units
to handle juvenile and family cases filed in the designated Regional Trial Court of the place.
Section 12. Privacy and Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All hearings and conciliation of the child and family cases shall
be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's and the family's dignity and worth, and shall respect
their privacy at all stages of the proceedings. Records of the cases shall be dealt with utmost confidentiality and the
identity of parties shall not be divulged unless necessary and with authority of the judge.
Section 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate special rules of procedure for the transfer
of cases to the new courts during the transition period and for the disposition of family cases with the best interests of the
child and the protection of the family as primary consideration taking into account the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
Section 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall be appealed in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as appeals from the ordinary Regional Trial Courts.
Section 15. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following in its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court, in coordination with the DSWD, shall formulate
the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the social aspects of this Act.
Section 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate
from among the branches ofthe Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan,
San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu,
Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog,
Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary.
Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned to the Family Courts when their dockets permit:
Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are heard.

In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec. 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional
Trial Court.
Section 18. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall
remain in effect.
Section 19. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national
Approved October 28, 1997.
See: R.A. 7610, “Child Abuse Act” –

ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions,
prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene
on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to
protect the child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.1awphi1@alf
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances
which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent
with the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy
life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children" include,
but are not limited to, the following;
(1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with their normal
development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas without the care of parents or a guardian
or basic services needed for a good quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of extreme poverty or in an
area which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic services needed for a good quality of life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those abovestated which endanger the life, safety or normal development of children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers to the coordinated program
of services and facilities to protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.1awphi1Ÿ
ARTICLE II
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. – There shall be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development in coordination with other government agencies and
private sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution
and other sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances
which endanger child survival and normal development.

ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar
means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in
prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the
prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or
which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. – There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the
room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or
any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is
about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is
receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A
penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case,
under the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking

Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not
limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this
Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal
guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children for
the purpose of child trafficking; or
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person
simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries,
day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLE V
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. – Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or
coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene
publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in
its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such
child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this
section shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as

amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or
massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any
person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom
and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his
company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine of not less than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an
ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation,
whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with
him to such place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or
establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;
(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and
263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the
consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher
than that imposed by law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities Constituting
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts
of Abuse. – All establishments and enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child
trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their

authority or license to operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted under this
Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously
displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period
which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of such sign shall
be punishable by prision correccional.
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises of
said establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna,
travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists;
exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and said
services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or activities constituting the
aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children
Section 12. Employment of Children. – Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and where only
members of the employer's family are employed: Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life,
safety and health and morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian
shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or information through cinema, theater,
radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the
express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment:
Provided, That the following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into account the
system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of competent authorities, a
continuing program for training and skill acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging
such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation
of this Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such
course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances.

Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. – No person shall employ child
models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its
byproducts and violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. – Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of
Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of
repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. – In addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act and
other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and development
consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and
institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific and
relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports
shall also accredit and support non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government
organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. – The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition to children of indigenous
cultural communities shall be given priority by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution
shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention. In the provision of health and
nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and
recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. – Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and all forms of
discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000).
Section 21. Participation. – Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or appointed representatives
shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and evaluation of all government programs affecting
children of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. – Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility of
the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to promote the goal of children as zones of
peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be observed.

(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected from any
form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of its civilian units or
other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency relief services shall be kept
unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in fact-finding missions from
both government and non-government institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be subjected to undue harassment in
the performance of their work;
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be utilized for military purposes
such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated due to armed
conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. – Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a
result of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped to look after the safety and well-being of
children during evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by
persons responsible for their safety and well-being.
Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. – Whenever possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the
same premises and given separate accommodation from other evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal
family life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in
proportion to their physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise,
sports and outdoor games.
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. – Any child who has been arrested for
reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts
charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such child to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had reached eighteen
(18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations

of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has
been committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it
may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in
criminal cases.
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. – The chairman of the barangay
affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare
and development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. – The offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the
regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from
any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Section 29. Confidentiality. – At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the public until the
court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer
in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause
undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and
suffering of the offended party.Lawphi1@alf

Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. – Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the
judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and
cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the
hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. –
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender has been previously
convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or employee thereof who is responsible
for the violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its maximum period;
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of
an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and forever barred
from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or
employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is
prision correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of
his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. – Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in coordination
with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the effective
implementation of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 34. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.

Section 35. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) national
XIV. EMANCIPATION
RA 6809
A. Cause of emancipation, FC 234 as amended
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years."
B. Effect of emancipation, FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
"Art. 236.Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who
shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in
special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and
guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
XV. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER FC

Arts. 238-253
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW
CHAPTER 1. PREFATORY PROVISIONS
FC238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards
separation in fact between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority.
(n)
Chapter 2. Separation in Fact
FC239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial
authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail
the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed
duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)
FC240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be litigated only in a separate action.
(n)
FC241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be exercised by the proper court
authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either
of the spouses resides. (n)

FC242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is
required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date
set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served
at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n)
FC243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without the parties being assisted by
counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding
conferences and hearings. (n)
FC244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his
failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)
FC245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not secured, the court may proceed ex parte
and render judgment as the facts and circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the
interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)
FC246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the
basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed,
the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present
said witnesses. (n)
FC247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n)
FC248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate property of the abandoning spouse
and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the support of the family shall also be governed by these rules. (n)
Chapter 3. Incidents Involving Parental Authority
FC249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be verified. (n)
FC250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides. (n)
FC251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals,
entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child. (n)
FC252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are
applicable. (n)
Chapter 4. Other Matters Subject to Summary Proceedings
FC253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles
41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar as they are applicable. (n)
FC 100(2) -ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said
assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.

FC127(2) The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except
that:
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding;
FC41 - A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
FC51 - In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the
final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of
the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)
FC69 - The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (110a)
FC73 - Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper; and

(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the
resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. (117a)
FC96 - ENJOYMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or

encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (206a)
FC124 - Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
FC217 - In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children’s homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
FC225 - Chapter 4. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Property of the Children
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the
child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the
performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority,
or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
(320a)
Francisco Jison v. CA and Monina Jison, GR No. 124853, Oct. 24, 1998 (UY)
Doctrine: In the lack of a high standard proof, open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity
Issue: Whether or not the lack of sufficient evidence could still grant Monina’s prayer for support as an illegitimate child
of Francisco? YES

Facts: Monina alleged that Francisco had been married to a certain Lilia Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start
of 1946, Francisco impregnated Esperanza Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of Francisco’s daughter,
Lourdes. As a result, Monina was born on August 6, 1946 and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family. Monina further alleged that Francisco
gave her support and spend for her education, such that she obtained a Master’s degree, became a CPA and eventually, a
Central Bank examiner. In view of Francisco’s refusal to expressly recognize her, Monina prayed for a judicial declaration
of her illegitimate status and that Francisco support and treat her as such.
RTC: Monina presented 11 witnesses; however, ruled that Monina was barred by estoppel by deed because of the
affidavit which she signed “when she was already 22-years, a professional and under the able guidance of counsel”; while
denied Francisco’s claim for damages, finding that Monina did not file the complaint with malice, she having been
“propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause.”
CA: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby
entered for appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to
all rights and privileges granted by law.
Francisco filed for an MR but was denied.
SC Ruling: Under FC175, The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
For success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Par. 2, which Monina relies upon given that she
has none of the evidence mentioned in the Par. 1, “a high standard of proof” is required. To prove open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care,
which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously. By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular
length of time.
The standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is founded on the principle that an order for recognition
and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence
It is to be concluded that Francisco had carnal knowledge of Pansay at the end of 1945 which is broad enough to
cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on August 6, 1946 could still be attributed to sexual relations
between Francsico and Monina’s mother. Since it was established that her mother was still in the employ of Francisco at
the time Monina was conceived as determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between Francisco and Monina’s
mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming evidence, that Francisco father Monina, has
recognized her as his daughter and that has been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as the
illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.

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XI.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 (NARAG)

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Issue: WON the writ should be granted. YES.

2. Husband and wife jointly – Sec. 7

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3. Need for consent – Sec. 9

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Issue: Whether the petitioner may adopt the 2 children. – No!

4. Aliens as adopters – Sec. 7 (b)

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R.A. 8043, “The Law on Inter-Country Adoption”

B. Who may not adopt, Sec. 7

C. Who may be adopted, Sec. 8

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D. Who may not be adopted

E. Effect of death, Sec. 13

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G. Effects of a decree of adoption

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Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575 (TAN)

See: Balane, Ruben, Jottings in Succession, [2006 ed.]

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H. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19

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Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil 110 (WENCESLAO)

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Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013 (EVANGELISTA)

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C. Source of support, FC 197-198, cf. FC 49, 70, 94, 121, 122

Issue: WON Conception Diaz is entitled to support pendente lite? - NO

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Reyes vs Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803 (JIMENEA)

D. Order of support, FC 199, 200, 204

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E. Manner and time of payment, FC 200-204

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Calderon vs Roxas, G.R. No. 185595, Jan. 09, 2013 (LABRADOR)

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F. Amount of support, FC 200-208

Lacson vs. Lacson, G.R.No. 150644, August 28, 2006 (LABRADOR)

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I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61

XIII. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

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NCC. Article 357. Every child shall:

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Medina vs. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969 (LABRADOR)

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B. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234, 217

Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317 (RUZOL)

The lower court gave custody to Paz.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of Angelica should be transferred to Paz - no

Regarding the issue of abandonment, Paz did not abandon Angelica.

It was held in Santos, Sr. v CA:

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C. Who exercises Parental Authority,

FC 49, 102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 129 (9)

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