Miranda v. Sandiganbayan | G.R. No. 154098 | July 27, 2005 | Puno, J.

Petitioner: Jose C. Miranda

Respondents: Sandiganbayan, Office of the Ombudsman, DILG Sec. Jose Lina, and Isabela Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr.

SUMMARY: Petitioner Miranda, Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, was placed under preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman for 6 months for alleged violations of the Code of Conduct for Public Officials. Despite this preventive
suspension, he still reassumed his position as Mayor. An information for usurpation of authority was then filed before the
Sandiganbayan. The SB issued a preventive suspension order, which petitioner now contests before the SC. The SC
upheld the propriety of the suspension order of the SB. In an obiter, the ponencia also addressed the concern of the
dissenting opinion that the Ombudsman’s power to issue preventive suspension orders is limited to 60 days, as per the
LGC (obiter because the Mayor assails the order of the SB, not the Ombudsman). The ponencia held the Ombudsman
was not limited by the LGC.

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman’s power to issue preventive suspension orders is not limited to 60 days as stated in Sec.
63 of the LGC. The Ombudsman was not mentioned under Sec. 63 and was not meant to be governed by that provision.
The provision was meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor, and mayor to impose
excessively long preventive suspensions. Since they are political personages, the possibility of extraneous factors
influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not
subject to political pressure because of its constitutionally-mandated independence.

FACTS:

 The Ombudsman placed petitioner Miranda, Mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six
months for alleged violations of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
 A complaint for violation of Article 177 of the RPC (usurpation of authority or official functions) was later filed with
the Ombudsman, alleging that during the time of his preventive suspension, he:
o Issued a memorandum addressed to the Vice Mayor, adivisng her that he was assuming his position as City
Mayor;
o Gave directives to heads of offices and other employees;
o Issued an order authorizing certain persons to start work;
o Insisted on performing the functions and duties of Mayor despite the Vice Mayor’s requests to desist from doing
so, without a valid court order, and in spite of the order of the DILG Undersec directing him to cease from
reassuming the position.
 Petitioner argued that:
o He reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer, in good faith;
o Under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period
beyond 60 days; and
o He immediately complied with the DILG USec.’s directive.
 The Ombudsman then filed an information against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC before the
Sandiganbayan (SB).
 The prosecution filed before the SB a motion to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite.
 The SB preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days.
o It held that a violation of Art. 177 of the RPC involves fraud which in a general comprises anything calculated
to deceive.
o This includes all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is
taken of another.
o Miranda’s act also fell within the catch-all provision “any offense involving fraud upon government.”
 Hence this present petition before the SC, assailing the preventive suspension orders. Miranda argues that:
o The offense of usurpation of authority/official functions under Art. 177 of the RPC is not embraced by Sec. 13
of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which only contemplates offenses enumerated under RA
3019, or which involve fraud upon government or public funds or property.
o Usurpation of authority is not fraud upon government or public funds or property.

ISSUES + RULING:

1. (RELEVANT TO THE LESSON) W/N the Ombudsman has the authority to preventively suspend local
elective officials for 6 months. YES.

 Firstly, the issue in this case is the propriety of the preventive suspension of the SB, not the Ombudsman’s.
 In any case, the Ombudsman is not mentioned in Section 63 of the LGC and was not meant to be governed
 by that provision.
o The provision was meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor
to impose excessively long preventive suspensions. They are political personages. The possibility of
extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote.
o The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of
the office which is protected by the Constitution.
 The 6-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman was within the limit provided by
RA 6770 (i.e. not more than 6 months).
o Contrary to the dissent, giving a 6 month limit for the Ombudsman but only giving 60 day limit for
executive officials does not violate the Equal Protection clause.
o As pointed out, there is a substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the
Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials.
o The Constitution has given the Ombudsman unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political
pressure (e.g. fiscal autonomy, fixed term of office, classification as an impeachable officer).
o The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) also requires stricter safeguards for the imposition of
preventive suspension. The Ombudsman must determine:
1. That the evidence of guilt is strong
2. That any of the following circumstances are present:
a. Charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty;
b. The charges would warrant removal from service; or
c. Continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
 Yes, there is possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman, as the dissenting opinion fears, but all powers are
susceptible of abuse. That is no reason to strike down the grant of power.
o The proper remedies against the abuse of this power are a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 or
amendment of RA 6770 by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by the
Court.

2. W/N Sec. 131 of RA 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property. NO.
 Sec. 13 of RA 3019 covers two types of offenses:
o Any offense involving fraud on the government; and
o Any offense involving public funds or property.
 Nothing in RA 3019 limits Sec. 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase “any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property” is clear and categorical.
 The interpretation of Miranda that “government” only serves to qualify the nature of the funds or property is
erroneous.
o A statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions
should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object.

3. W/N the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves fraud upon government or public
funds or property, found in Sec. 13 of RA 3019. YES.
 The phrase “fraud upon government” means any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government.
 It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is already covered by the
preceding phrase “any offense involving . . . public funds or property.”
 Assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his suspension from said office resulted in
a clear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the employees, as
well as the public, suffered confusion as to who was the head of the office.

4. W/N petitioner reassumed office under the honest belief that he was no longer subject to preventive
suspension. NO.
 He refused to leave his position despite the DILG USec.’s memorandum, and left only due to coercion of the
PNP. This is contrary to his claim that he immediately complied with the memorandum.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

1
Sec. 13, RA 3019. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment,
he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the
same to the Government.