(1) DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:

The petitioner in this, a charged in a criminal case, documented a movement with the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for preliminary,
imploring that the record of the case be remanded to the equity of the harmony court of
Masantol, the court of beginning, all together that the applicant may interrogate the complainant
and her observers regarding their declaration, on the quality of which warrant was given for the
capture of the blamed. The movement was denied and that forswearing is the topic of this
procedure.

As indicated by the notice put together by the applicant's lawyer to the Court of First
Instance on the side of his movement, the denounced, helped by guidance, showed up at the
fundamental examination. In that examination, the equity of the harmony educated him regarding
the charges and inquired as to whether he confessed or not liable, whereupon he entered the
request of not blameworthy. "At that point his guidance moved that the complainant present her
proof so she and her observers could be inspected and interviewed in the way and structure gave
by law." The monetary and the private investigator questioned, conjuring segment 11 of principle
108, and the complaint was supported. "In view thereof, the denounced's guidance reported his
aim to repudiate his entitlement to present proof," and the equity of the harmony sent the case to
the court of first case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused, after renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason
of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for trial, is estopped?

HELD:

No. The respondent judge herein did not act in excess of his jurisdiction. As a matter of
right, the defendant cannot compel the complaint and his witnesses to

(2) BILLONES vs CIR

G.R. No. L-17566, July 30, 1965

FACTS:

Petitioners in this were purportedly representatives of the respondent Luzon Stevedoring

Corporation, which expected them to work 18 hours every day without giving them extra pay. In
June 1954, petitioners, together with the team individuals from respondent Luzon Stevedoring's
towing boats and freight boats, shaped a Union, known as the Universal Marine Labor Union. As
a Union, they gave the Wage Administration Service (WAS), Department of Labor, a case for
collected additional time remuneration, covering the period from 1948 to 1954. The case was be
that as it may, dropped by the WAS, it giving the idea that before the meeting could be ended,
the Union, through its officials, went into a neighborly settlement with respondent Luzon
Stevedoring and gave the WAS on November 26, 1954, an appeal, the relevant segments of
which present:

2. That the petitioners and the respondent have gone to a neighborly settlement for the
fulfillment of the petitioners' case by the respondent by method for Collective Bargaining
Contract, which will give money related advantages and financial security to the individuals
from the applicants to such an extent that this Collective Bargaining Contract, a duplicate of
which is herewith appended, has been consistently acknowledged by the petitioners and the
individuals from the Universal Marine Labor Union and that they think about that this Collective
Bargaining Contract is a full, total and last fulfillment of their case;

3. That through this Collective Bargaining Contract the petitioners concurred that the
equivalent is a full and complete fulfillment of all and any cases that they may have against the
respondent and discharges the respondent from any commitment at all ...

Disavowing any information of the request to reject the case; that if there was any, they
didn't approve the recording of the equivalent for their benefit, or agreed thereto, petitioners,
through their officeholder Union President, Bonifacio Reyes, introduced before the Regional
Office No. Branch of Labor, in January, 1958 and on March 27, 1958, grumblings for extra time
remuneration, docketed as RO3 L.S. 1047 and RO3 L.S. 1247, separately, covering the time of
1948 to December 31, 1956. On April 8 and May 3, 1958, these cases were again expelled with
preference.

Under date of April 11, 1960 and February 26, 1959, petitioners in this recorded with the
Court of Industrial Relations Cases Nos. 1328-V (L-17566) and 1183-V (L-17567), individually,
both for additional time pay, cash estimation of their get-away leaves and Christmas rewards,
covering the period from 1948 to 1956, equivalent to those they had displayed and requested to
be expelled before the WAS. Respondent Luzon Stevedoring focuses to the cases gave the WAS,
which were rejected, upon the very example of the in this solicitors, with the exception of a
couple. As to, respondents conjure the arrangements of Section 7-An of Commonwealth Act No.
444, as altered, by Republic Act No. 1993, which states:

Segment 7-A. — Any activity to authorize any reason for activity under this Act will be
initiated inside three years after such reason for activity collected, something else, such activity
will be everlastingly banned: Provided, in any case, That activities previously started before the
successful date of this Act, will not be influenced by the period thus endorsed.

Petitioners contradicted the Motions to Dismiss. They asserted that their reasons for
activity were neither discharged nor banned by earlier judgment since the expulsion of
their grievance with the Regional Office was without their insight and assent; and that on
the off chance that they at any point exhibited their individual movements to reject, it was
on the grounds that they were scared and pressured into marking them. With respect to of
activity, petitioners claimed that the amendatory arrangement of Republic Act No. 1993
 can't be made retroactive, in order to influence their case. To make a retroactive use of
the law would render the equivalent illegal for being against the convention of imminent
utilization of laws, all the more so when a retroactive application influences vested rights.

ISSUE:
Whether Republic Act No. 1993 is a valid exercise of legislative power and should be
given a retroactive effect.

HELD:

G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO,
in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the significant investor and leader of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which took an interest in the offering for government
development tasks including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and
private respondent Nestor V. Agustin, occupant District Engineer, supposedly exploiting his
official position, inveigled candidate into a loving relationship. After false impressions and
horrendous episodes, Fabian in the long run documented the previously mentioned regulatory
argument against Agustin in a letter-grievance. The Graft Investigator of the Ombudsman gave a
goals seeing private respondent as liable of grave wrongdoing and requesting his expulsion from
the administration with relinquishment of all advantages under the law. On a movement for
reexamination, Agustin was absolved of the managerial charges.

In the present intrigue, candidate contends that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) appropriately gives that —

In all authoritative disciplinary cases, requests, orders or choices of the Office of the
Ombudsman might be spoke to the Supreme Court by recording an appeal for certiorari inside
ten (10) days from receipt of the composed notice of the request, mandate or choice or
forswearing of the movement for reexamination as per Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770 not raised in the trial.
2. Whether or not Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional.

Held:

G.R. No. L-49187 December 18, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO SUMILANG, petitioner-appellant.
Facts:
The petitioner for this situation was indicted by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of
the wrongdoing of pyromania and condemned to the vague punishment of from 5 years 4 months
and 21 days of presidio correccional to 10 years and 1 day of prision city hall leader. On claim,
the Court of Appeals insisted the sentence of the lower court. The candidate recorded on June 14,
1944, a request for certiorari with the Supreme Court for the audit of the choice of the Court of
Appeals, and the request was denied on July 5, 1944. A movement for reevaluation of the request
denying the appeal for certiorari was documented by the applicant on July 17, 1944, and
furthermore denied.

From the records it gives the idea that a duplicate of a goals of the Supreme Court denying the
movement for reexamination was sent to the applicant's lawyer at his location 307 Palma,
Quiapo, Manila, on July 17, 1944. However, the lawyer for the candidate asserts now, in his
appeal, that he didn't get the notice since then "he was at that point stowing away in the
mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla official of the Markings guerrilla," and "goes to the Supreme
 Court that the perusing of the sentence of the denounced be suspended and that said charged be
allowed or permit to record whatever arguing that might be permitted by this Honorable Tribunal
essential for the security of the privileges of the blamed." And the request depends on the goals
of this Court of October 1, 1945, which suspends, until further notice, segment 8 of Rule 53, and
gives that judgment will be entered, not upon the termination of the fifteen days after the
declaration thereof, yet upon the lapse of fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the
gatherings as per the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion should be granted.

Held:

G.R. No. L-286 March 29, 1946

FREDESVINDO S. ALVERO, petitioner,
vs.
M.L. DE LA ROSA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, JOSE R. VICTORIANO, and
MARGARITA VILLARICA, respondents.

Facts:
The record demonstrates that, on June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R. Victoriano had
recorded an objection, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica, charging two reasons for activity, indeed, (1)
 to proclaim in power the agreement of offer, made on October 1, 1940, between said Jose R.
Victoriano and Margarita Villarica, of two (2) bundles of land in the Manotoc subdivision,
Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan, region of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, with a joined
territory of 480 square meters, which land was in this way sold by said Villarica, for solicitor
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December 31, 1944, for the entirety of P100,000 in Japanese military
notes; and (2) to pronounce said resulting deal invalid and void.

After the preliminary of the case before the Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, one of the respondents for this situation, on November 16,
1945, said respondent judge rendered his choice, wherein it was announced that the two (2)
packages of land being referred to, with a consolidated territory of 480 square meters had been
sold by Margarita Villarica to Jose R. Victoriano, since October 1, 1940, for the aggregate of
P6,000, depending on the prerequisite that the buyer should make an up front installment of
P1,700, and a regularly scheduled installment of P76.86 in 120 equivalent regularly scheduled
payments; that Jose R. Victoriano kept making said regularly scheduled installments until
December, 1941, however that inferable from the war-time conditions at that point existing,
Margarita Villarica concurred verbally to suspend such installments until the reclamation of
harmony; that following said closeout of said land to him, Jose R. Victoriano took ownership
thereof and made upgrades subsequently to the measure of P800, and kept possessing said
property until December, 1944, when he surrendered the equivalent to go to departure places,
however returned thereto in February, 1945; that Margarita Villarica, having overlooked the
closeout of said land to Jose R. Victoriano, sold the equivalent for P100,000 in Japanese military
notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S. Alvero, however subsequently offered to
repurchase said property from him, for the total of P8,000 in certified Philippine cash, after
freedom; that Fredesvindo S. Alvero exhibited the deed of offer, executed in support of him, to
the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, on January 3, 1945, and claimed said property in
December, 1944, however a short time later discovered Jose R. Victoriano in the premises in
February, 1945; that in the agreement of offer executed by Margarita Villarica, for Jose R.
Victoriano, it was concurred, endless supply of the buyer to make installments of three (3)
progressive regularly scheduled payments, the seller would be allowed to sell the property once
more, relinquishing the installments made, aside from on account of power majeure; that there
was extremely a verbal understanding between Margarita Villarica and Jose Victoriano, made in
February, 1942, for the suspension of the installment of the regularly scheduled payments until
the rebuilding of harmony; and that despite the fact that Jose R. Victoriano had displayed the
deed of offer, executed in support of him, to the Register of Deeds, in Pasig, Rizal, as
Fredesvindo S. Alvero, he had additionally neglected to tie down the exchange of title to his
name. Furthermore, taking into account that Jose R. Victoriano's archive was more established
than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that he had claimed said property, since October 1, 1940,
the respondent judge rendered his ruling for Jose R. Victoriano, declaring to him the title over
the property being referred to, including every one of the enhancements existing subsequently,
and rejected the counterclaim.

On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was advised of said choice; and on December 27,
1945, he recorded an appeal for reevaluation and new preliminary, which was denied on January
3, 1946; and of said request he was told on January 7, 1946. On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero documented his notice of offer and record on bid all the while in the lower court, without
documenting the P60-claim bond. On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano recorded a request to
expel the intrigue, and simultaneously, requested the execution of the judgment. On January 15,
1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero recorded a resistance to said movement to expel, claiming that
around the same time, January 15, 1946, said offer bond for P60 had been really documented,
and assert as a reason, for not documenting the said intrigue bond, in due time, the sickness of
his legal counselor's better half,
who passed on January 10, 1946, and covered the next day. On January 17, 1946, the respondent
judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, requested the rejection of the intrigue, pronouncing that,
despite the fact that the notice of offer and record on bid had been documented in due time, the
P60-advance bond was recorded past the point of no return. On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S.
Alvero documented a request for the reexamination of the said request dated January 17, 1946,
rejecting his intrigue; and said appeal for reevaluation was denied on January 29, 1946.
Henceforth, this appeal for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the filling of the appeal was perfected.

Held:

(7) DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later,
in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3,
1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which
petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice
of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion
for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had
elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the
CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned
from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the
Rules.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period
to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
(2) Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:
(1) The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as
the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner
non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-
day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing
his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15
days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under
the Rules. The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was
what ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of
Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
(2) YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall
also apply to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion
for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules
which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies.
Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened
the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period
of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still
applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period
may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners
here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the
fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

(8) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IMPERIAL

G.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999

FACTS:
 On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No.
55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are
now the subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on
which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation conducted
by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of
Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500),
to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar
and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial,
Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They
contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including
the Republic since the cadastral proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the
Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the motion to dismiss.
After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the
petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408
(500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief
within the extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD:
Yes. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore
lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of
only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high
and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land
that lies between the high and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the
flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government,
specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision
of the director of lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle
behind this ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must
therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the decision of the
director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR Secretary.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR,
Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's
land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of
the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the
DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from
whence the titles were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of
the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which
contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the premise of any
conclusive classification of the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's
reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural
rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's
appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given
due course.
Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds.
Petitioner also alleged that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down
before the proper Court, will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as
the Government would lose its opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands
of the public domain.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what
constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
the court. It has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation
when compelling reasons so warrants or when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar,
the need to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and granting
the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner Republics appeal
presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest which in the Courts
discretion must be given due course.

(9) LABAO vs. FLORES

G.R. No. 187894, November 15, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of a licensed security-service contractor.
Respondents were security guards assigned to the National Power Corporation (NPC-Mindanao).
Petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated personal
data files, security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents. When respondents
failed to comply with the petitioner’s directive, despite several notices to do so, the petitioner
relieved them. Respondents filed individual complaints with Labor Arbiter (LA) for illegal
dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not
given new assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite their repeated requests. Petitioner
countered that the respondents’ relief from duty was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative. Furthermore, petitioner issued a notice directing the respondents to report to
SMPSA’s main office for new assignments, but the latter failed or refused to comply without any
valid reasons. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA
decision. Counsel for the respondents appealed with the Court of Appeals (CA) outside the
reglementary period, yet the ruling was in favor of respondents. The petitioner and SMPSA moved
for reconsideration, arguing that the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for late filing,
and that there was no compelling reason for the reversal of the LA and the NLRC’s factual
findings. CA considered the respondents’ petition as timely filed and also opined that disregarding
any procedural lapses best served substantial justice.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in acting on the respondents’ petition despite
of its late filing.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the LA and NLRC decisions.

HELD:
(1) Yes. Late filing should not be allowed. Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid
any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules
were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our judicial system.
While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a
jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with.
(2) Yes. The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the
respondents’ failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it impervious
to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise jurisdiction to
review the resolution. A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or
by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to
rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter
of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality
of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to
a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught
the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance
of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. Petition was granted and the
decision of Labor Arbiter is reinstated.

(10) ABC DAVAO AUTO SUPPLY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113296, January 16, 1998

FACTS:
On October 6, 1980, a complaint for a sum of money, attorney’s fees and damages1 was
filed by petitioner before the CFI of Davao City which was raffled to Branch XVI. The case was
proceedings were conducted by several judges until cross examination on August 28, 1985 and the
presentation of the parties’ rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidences were heard by Judge Roque Agton,
having assumed office on August 1, 1985. When the judiciary was reorganized under the Aquino
administration, Judge Agton was transferred to another branch of the RTC but within the same
Judicial Region. Meanwhile, Judge Romeo Marasigan, who assumed office on February 3, 1987,
was assigned to Branch XVI.
Sometime on May 1987, Judge Marasigan acted on private respondent’s motion for
extension of time to file memorandum. On June 9, 1987 a decision penned by Judge Agton was
rendered in favor of petitioner. Private respondent moved to reconsider said decision, but the same
was denied in an order dated March 1, 1988, issued by Judge Marasigan. Private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified Judge Agton’s decision on the ground that
at the time he rendered the judgment, he was neither the judge de jure nor the judge de facto of
RTC Branch XVI, and correspondingly remanded the case to the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of Judge Agton is valid.

HELD:
Branches of the trial court are not distinct and separate tribunals from each other;
Jurisdiction does not attach to the judge but to the court.—Moreover, for a judgment to be binding,
it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge whose signature
appears thereon. This is in line with the Court’s En Banc Resolution of February 10, 1983
implementing B.P. 129 which “merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an
incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different
branch, at the time the decision is promulgated.” Branches of the trial court are not distinct and
separate tribunals from each other. Hence, contrary to private respondent’s allegation, Judge Agton
could not have possibly lost jurisdiction over the case, because jurisdiction does not attach to the
judge but to the court. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected
by the death, resignation, or cessation from the service of the judge presiding over it. To remand a
validly decided case to the incumbent Presiding Judge of Branch XVI, as what the CA suggests,
would only prolong this rather simple collection suit and would run counter to the avowed policy
of the Court to accord a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition for every action.

(11) ALONZO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987

FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered
in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of
absolute sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By virtue of
such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths
of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same
with a fence. with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house
on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed
when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the
sales. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil
Code.

HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated. The co-
heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given
them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless
have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the
letter that killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.

(12) SANTIAGO vs. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 99289-90, January 27, 1993

FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at
Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed
in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of
her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan
deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard.
In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.

HELD:
The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she
he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the
course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go
abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of
respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over
the case and the person of the accused.
Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)

(20) MARIQUITA LUNA vs. GERONIMO CARANDANG

 G.R. No. L-27145. November 29, 1968

FACTS:
On March 6, 1962, Mariquita Luna and Geronimo Carandang entered into a contract of
lease for a period of 10 years involving a parcel of agricultural land containing an area of 158.7713
hectares situated at Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The stipulated rent was P4,500 a year payable
semi-annually for the first five years and P5,000 yearly beginning January, 1967, to the end of the
period of the lease. The lessee, Carandang, failed or refused to pay in full the stipulated rent during
the first two years of the contract such that as of March 26, 1964, he owed the lessor unpaid rents
in the amount of P4,156.63.
On May 26, 1964, the plaintiff-lessor commenced an action in the Court of First Instance
of Batangas against the defendant-lessee for rescission, with damages, of the contract of lease
above referred to. The rescissory action was grounded, principally, on the failure or refusal of the
lessee to pay in full the stipulated rent for about two years. After trial, the lower court rendered its
decision holding that plaintiff has made out a case for rescission with damages, but that the court
could not order the defendant to vacate the leased premises because the land is situated at Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, where it had no jurisdiction. Accordingly, judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff granting rescission of the contract of lease, with damages, consisting of unpaid rents
as well as future rents. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of law and in due time
filed her brief as appellant. No brief was filed for the defendant- appellee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, it had no jurisdiction to order the defendant, appellee here, to vacate the
leased premises.

HELD:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower court granting
rescission of the contract of lease is affirmed with the following modifications: 1. The appellee is
ordered to vacate and return the leased premises to the appellant; 2. The appellee is ordered to pay
the appellant the unpaid rents from January 1, 1962, to May 26, 1964, in the sum of P4,156.63
with legal interest from the time of judicial demand until fully paid and, thereafter, the sum of
P4,500 annually as reasonable rental value of the land up to the time the land is vacated by the
appellee and returned to the Appellant.

(21) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PILAR ESTIPULAR

G.R. No. 136588 July 20, 2000
FACTS:
"In her Petition for Reconstitution of Title, the petitioner, Pilar Estipular, declared that she
[was] the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died intestate in Caba, La
Union. During his lifetime, Fermin was issued Certificate of Title No. 154 duly registered in his
own name by the Register of Deeds of La Union covering a parcel of land located at Barrio
Liquicia, Caba, La Union, with an area of 6.1253 hectares. The said Certificate of Title was either
destroyed or burned as a result of the burning of the Register of Deeds of La Union during the last
World War. Further, it was alleged that the aforesaid parcel of land was declared for taxation
purposes by Fermin and his heirs; that said estate is not mortgaged to any financial institution; nor
is there any document pending registration affecting the said land. As the land was already declared
and distributed to ten persons who have succeeded him, the petitioner prayed that the said
Certificate of Title be reconstituted in accordance with law.
"On June 15, 1994, the court a quo ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two
successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal
Building of Caba, La Union at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing set for September 8,
1994 (Records, p. 8). A Certificate of Posting was submitted by Branch Sheriff Romeo Obiena
proving that copies of the Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted at the main entrance of
Municipal Building of Caba, La Union (Records, p. 9). However, the National Printing Office
advised the lower court to reschedule its original date of hearing as it could not meet the schedule
of publication (Records, p. 11). On August 12, 1994, another Notice of Hearing was issued by the
trial court, resetting the initial hearing to December 7, 1994. (Records, p. 13). In view thereof, a
second Certificate of Posting was issued by Branch Sheriff concerning the administrative case
(Records, p.16). In the same manner, the National Printing Office issued a Certificate of
Publication showing that the said petition for reconstitution was published in the Official Gazette
for two successive weeks on October 17 and 24, 1994.
ISSUE:
"The sole issue for resolution is whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act No. 26 is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the
case."9
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired,
waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) conferred by the
acquiescence of the courts.10 Republic Act No. 2611 lays down the special requirements and
procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be acquired over a petition for
reconstitution of title. In Section 13 of said Act, these requirements and procedure are provided as
follows:

(22) OMICTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

 GR NO. 148004, January 22, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed
a complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private
respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that private respondent, despite... repeated demands,
refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the president of
Saag Phils., Inc.
public prosecutor Alex G. Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private respondent,
and on the same day, respondent was charged with the crime of estafa... private respondent filed a
motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.
It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for
the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as President
Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of... dividends,
recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, recovery
of damages and an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction against Saag
(S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.
ISSUES:
whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed with
the SEC.
HELD:
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.[14] Here, the case which was lodged originally before... the SEC and which is now
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts
that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine
the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner
before the RTC of Makati.
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues raised by
petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the
question regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a... demand on behalf of the
company, are proper subjects for the determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case
which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred
to the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the doctrine... of primary jurisdiction had the case
not been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.
 (23) RAMOS ET. AL vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-29352, October 4, 1971

FACTS:
The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) is a commercial banking corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at Rosario Street, Manila.
Ramos et. al are the majority and controlling stockholders of Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM).
Pursuant to a resolution from the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, the operation of for
various violations of the banking laws and implementing regulations. Because the financial
situation of the OBM had caused mounting concern in the Central Bank, petitioner Ramos and the
OBM management met with respondent Central Bank on the necessity and urgency of
rehabilitating the OBM through the extension of necessary financial assistance.
However, after 8 months, the Central Bank did not make any positive action to reorganize
and resume OBM’s normal operations. Instead, Central Bank issued a resolution excluding OBM
from clearing with it and authorizing the nominee board of directors to suspend operations. Worse,
Central Bank Monetary Board issued a resolution ordering the liquidation the bank. Hence this
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Central Bank of the Philippines from enforcing and
implementing the Monetary Board Resolutions. Petitioners charged that the OBM became
financially distressed because of this suspension and the deprivation by the Central Bank of all the
usual credit facilities and accommodations accorded to the other banks. Central Bank contended
that to assail Resolution of the Monetary Board ordering the liquidation of the Overseas Bank, an
action must be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the Bank itself, and not by
petitioning stockholders
Issue: Whether or not the CB had agreed to rehabilitate, normalize and stabilize OBM
and whether or not the Central Bank resolutions were adopted in abuse of discretion.
Held: If jurisdiction was already acquired ito delve into the validity of Resolutions 1263
and 1290 (and this the Central Bank admits), there is no cogent reason why, after such jurisdiction
had been acquired, the Court should be deprived thereof by the subsequent adoption of Resolution
1333, particularly because the latter, in relation to the antecedent facts, appears to be no more than
a deliberate effort to evade the jurisdiction of this Court, and have the case thrown back to the
Court of First Instance. The Central Bank, by promising to rehabilitate the bank, is estopped from
closing it down. The conduct of the Central Bank reveals a calculated attempt to evade
rehabilitating OBM despite its promises. Hence, respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is
directed to comply with it obligations under the voting trust agreement, and to desist from taking
action in violation thereof.

(24) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHENG

G.R. No. 120158-59, September 15, 1997
FACTS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 89-73804 the accused, ELESEO CHENG and SALVADOR
SIOCO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, as defined and penalized under
Article 248, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, and as charged in the aforequoted information and,
accordingly, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law, both to pay, subsidiarily and jointly; to the heirs of Esperanza
Viterbo represented by her mother, Esperanza Viterbo, Sr., the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnification and the additional amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and each to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 89-73805 the accused, ELESEO CHENG and SALVADOR
SIOCO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, as defined and penalized under
Article 248, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, and as charged in the aforequoted information and,
accordingly, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties provided by law and each to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs.

ISSUE:
Because no heir/relative of the deceased, Yehia Aburawash Mohammed was presented to
testify on the civil aspect of the case, the Court reserves to his heirs the right to file suit for civil
indemnification and/or damages.

HELD:
Finally, in the service of their sentences, the two accused aforenamed shall be credited with
the full time during which they underwent preventive imprisonment provided they voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners;
otherwise, they shall be credited to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof (Article 29, Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6127).
In both Criminal Cases Nos. 89-73804 & 89-73805 the Court finds the accused,
ALEJANDRO MALUBAY, NOT GUILTY of the crime of MURDER, as defined and penalized
under Article 248, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, and as charged in the aforequoted two
informations and, accordingly, hereby ACQUITS him thereof for insufficiency of evidence, with
one-third (1/3) costs de oficio in these two cases.
The Prison Officer, City Jail of Manila is ordered immediately upon receipt of a copy of
this Decision, to release from his custody the person of accused Alejandro Malubay unless there
is other legal ground or cause for his further detention.
SO ORDERED.
 (25) TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

FACTS:
The spouses Tijam filed a case against the spouses Sibonghanoy to recover the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution against the Surety’s bond. The Surety filed its opposition on these grounds: (1) Failure
to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due
under the judgment.
Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the order appealed from.
Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for
extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
The CA required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal.

HELD:
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are of the
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
The Court frowns upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse.

(26) LA’O v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

 G.R. No. 160719, January 23, 2006

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Emilio Gonzales La’O seeks to reverse
the June 27, 20032 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62580, affirming
in toto the decision3 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and the CA’s
November 10, 2003 resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On June 22, 1978,
the GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement (first contract). GSIS agreed to
transfer the property to the OGCC for a consideration of P1.5 million, payable in equal yearly
amortization-lease rentals of P100,000 for a period of 15 years.
On May 10, 1982, GSIS and petitioner executed a "lease-purchase" agreement (second
contract). GSIS agreed to sell the same property to petitioner for P2,000,000, with a down payment
of P200,000 and the balance payable within a period of 15 years at 12% interest per annum,
compounded yearly.
ISSUE:
Was the second contract valid as claimed by petitioner or null and void as decided by the
courts below?
HELD:
Before we delve into the merits, we shall first dispose of the question of jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that it is the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this "ill-
gotten wealth" case because the complaint involved the annulment of a fraudulent conveyance of
government property to a Marcos crony and the recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" by the
government.20 Furthermore, for failure to consolidate this civil case with the criminal case in the
Sandiganbayan [charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019], this case should
be considered abandoned.21
Petitioner argued and discussed this particular issue for the first time in his memorandum
before this Court. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party
may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to
question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a
particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
courts below.

(27) MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO v. ANTONIO S. GO,

GR No. 167988, February 6, 2007
FACTS:
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), EHSI, Kunack and Barin
employed the legal services of De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices
where herein petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate.
On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the
receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a
Release Waiver and Quitclaim[10] with the... approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the
amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order[11] dismissing the illegal
dismissal case with prejudice
After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through
counsel, filed, on 29 July 2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion[13] seeking to nullify the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated 16 July 2003 on the ground of fraud,... mistake or undue
influence. In the same motion, respondent Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty.
Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go
without the knowledge of his counsel.
On 30 August 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[19] disregarding petitioner
Atty. Regalado's defenses and adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court of appeals totally disregarded the mandatory provision of rule 71
of the 1997 rules of civil procedure.
HELD:
Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect contempt
should be commenced
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition
with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for... civil actions in the
court concerned.
Clearly, respondent Go's Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the catalyst which set
everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It was respondent Go
who brought to the attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior committed by...
petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on the part of respondent Go, no indirect
contempt charge could have been initiated at all.
Having painstakingly laid down that the instant case was not initiated by the court motu
proprio necessitates us to look into the second mode of filing indirect contempt proceedings.