Judiciary- Section 1

Aquino & Floralde

LIMKAICHONG V. COMELEC

[GR Nos 178831-32, July 30 2009]

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks a
reconsideration of the Court's April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong's petition for certiorari which
dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogo's petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on
Election's (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from
running as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
FACTS: The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to,
and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the
parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement
in Section 6, 1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros
Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties
and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
RATIO: Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which the court
have all considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. (The ff. issues were discussed by the Court
to revalidate its Decision by ruling on his motion)
1.) The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents
were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of
Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
 The Court held that in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance
with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. — Upon motion made in the
proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in
the Civil Register:

 Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election
case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant. Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or
lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any
tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under
the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair
play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as
a Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom
they have put their trust on through their votes.

2.) Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of the
substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not suspend the
execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should not have
proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.
 Events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution. Limkaichong was proclaimed
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the
office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichong's proclamation
was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.
 The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted
with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. Any allegations as to the
  In the Court’s Decision, it ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply
to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged.

3.) Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the
Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14)
Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in
the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said departure or turn-around.
 The Court in Belac v. Commission on Elections, 14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who
took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision. An unpromulgated decision
is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must
not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. 15 Until such operative
act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already affixed their
signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, any
one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote,
thereby preserving one's freedom of action. ECaHSI
DISPOSITIVE: In sum, we hold that Biraogo's Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied.
This Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based on
citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in
G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.