1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the
BRIONES
G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995
FACTS: On June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father
of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking
liquor with his friends. Appellant joined them but
every now and then would take leave and return.
At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped
drinking and left.
At about 5:30 p.m. of that day; Luisa Rebada who
lives in the Penecilla neighborhood saw the victim
at the window of appellant's house. She offered to
buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window.
Soon she heard the victim crying. She then
approached appellant's house and peeped
through an opening between its floor and door
where she saw the appellant naked, on top of the
victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated
to her house in fright, gathered her children
together and informed her compadre, Ricardo
Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw.
Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily
left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house in the
evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his
wife searched for her, however their effort was
fruitless.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor,
Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to
answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless
body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents
were informed and so was the police.
Thereafter, Rebada suffered a change of heart. She
informed Penecillas, that appellant committed the
crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and
interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of
counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal
confession and follow up interrogations, the police
came to know and recovered from appellant's
house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold
earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained
T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for
the prosecution.
Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide.
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO,
Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
Trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to
death.
Hence this automatic review.
ISSUE: WON the arraignment was valid
RULING: NO. The arraignment of the appellant is null
and void. Under Rule 116, Section (1) (a) which
provides that:
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
—
(a) The accused must be arraigned before
the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses, reading
the same in the language or dialect known
to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may,
however, call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or
information.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that
the Information against the appellant was read in
the language or dialect known to him. The
Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unbeknown whether the
appellant knows the English language. Neither is it
known what dialect is understood by the appellant.
Nor is there any showing that the Information
couched in English was translated to the appellant
in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. Thus it
violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule
implementing the constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. It also denied
appellant his constitutional right to due process of
law. It is urged that we must presume that the
arraignment of the appellant was regularly
conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean
on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume.
We must be sure.
Moreover, the plea of guilt made by the appellant
is likewise null and void. The trial court violated
Section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant.
1 | RULE 116
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 116. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf.
The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt
must be based on a free and informed judgment.
Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be
focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and
(2) the full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to
show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the
appellant nor did the questions demonstrate
appellant's full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea. The records do not
reveal any information about the personality
profile of the appellant which can serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic
status, and educational background of the
appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The
questions were framed in English yet there is no
inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance
of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did
not bother to explain to the appellant the essential
elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
During the verbal hearings, the trial court simply
inquired if appellant had physical marks of
maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he
was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he
was interrogated, whether he was medically
examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It
limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks
of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by
physical abuse alone.
FALLO: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal
Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel
Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
2. Marcos vs Ruiz
G.R. Nos. 70746-47 (213 SCRA 177, September 1,
1992)
Facts:
After conducting the appropriate
preliminary investigation, Acting Assistant City Fiscal
Lorenzo A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol two
information (Criminal Case No. 3892 and 3890)
against Marcos for violating Batas Pambansa Blg.
22.
In the arraignment, Marcos appeared but
asked for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer
had just withdrawn and he had to look for another
lawyer. The court granted his request and the
arraignment was reset. It turned out, however, that
petitioner settled his obligation with Oculam, the
complainant in the criminal case, who executed a
subscribed Affidavit of Desistance in favor of
petitioner. When the cases were called, neither the
petitioner nor his counsel appeared so arraignment
was rescheduled.
At the next arraignment, Petitioner was
arraigned ex parte where he automatically entered
a plea of not guilty. The prosecution then presented
its evidence ex-parte and rested its case. After this,
the court then rendered a decision against the
petitioner, asserting that his absence means that he
will no longer present evidence.
Thereafter, the trial court received an urgent
motion for the resetting of the hearing filed by the
petitioner which explained the non-appearance
but the same does not contain a notice of hearing
to the Prosecuting Fiscal so it was denied. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was likewise
denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his
rights during the course of the trial.
Held: *First case (Crim. Case. 3890) –
Petitioner was not denied of his rights during
the trial. Considering that he had been arraigned,
petitioner was not required to appear at all the
trials. Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 states that while it
may be true that he has the right to be present at
every stage of the proceedings, i.e. from the
arraignment to the promulgation of judgment, he
can also validly waive his presence to be present
after the arraignment.
On the other hand, petitioner was denied
his right to be heard when the respondent Judge
2 | RULE 116
capriciously and arbitrarily considered that the
case was already submitted for decision after the
prosecution rested its case. The Judge blatantly
disregarded Section 1(c) of Rule 115 when he
considered the accused‘s non-appearance during
the first day of trial as a waiver of his right for the
succeeding trial dates, when such should be
construed to mean that he only waived his right to
be present during that day of trial.
*Second case (Crim. Case. 3892)
Be noted that insofar as the second case,
Criminal Case No. 3892, is concerned, the court
made no ruling on, the manifestation and offer by
petitioner’s counsel that the reading of the
information be waived and a plea of not guilty be
entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm
the manifestation nor directed to personally make
the plea. There was, therefore, no valid arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 3892 Section 1(b), Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, requires the
accused to personally enter his plea.
Under the Rules of Court, the accused has
to be present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) at the arraignment pursuant to
paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;
(b) at the promulgation of judgment,
except when conviction is for a light
offense, in which case the judgment
may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative
pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or
unless promulgation in absentia is
allowed under the third paragraph
of said section; and
(c) when the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will identify
the accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanro
DECLARING that there was no valid
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 3892
3. ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO
SOBRIO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his capacity as
presiding judge of Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok,
South Cotabato
The Case
This is a complaint for grave misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law filed by complainants Antonio
Gamas and Florencio Sobrio ("complainants")
against Judge Orlando A. Oco ("respondent
judge"), former1 Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato ("MTC
Polomolok") and SPO4 Willie Adulacion
("respondent Adulacion"), a "police prosecutor" in
the MTC Polomolok.
The Facts
In their Complaint ("Complaint") and supporting
affidavits, complainants allege that they are the
accused in a case for theft2 which, at the time
material to this case, was pending in the sala of
respondent judge. As respondent judge had issued
warrants for their arrest, complainants on 3 October
1996 went to the MTC Polomolok to post bail.
Complainants allege that respondent Adulacion
enticed them to plead guilty to the charge, apply
for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.
Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly
prepared a draft decision embodying his
suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and
handed the draft decision to respondent judge.
After reading the document, respondent judge
signed it, told complainants "O, plead guilty man
kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and handed the
document to a clerk. Respondent judge told the
clerk to read the contents of the decision to
complainants and to instruct them on what to do.
The clerk read the contents of the document to
complainants and asked them to sign it.
Complainants signed the document upon
respondent Adulacion's assurance that once the
police apprehend the rest of the accused,3 the
police will revive the case and respondent
Adulacion will present complainants as "star
witnesses." Complainants later found out that what
they signed was an Order4 ("3 October 1996 Order")
3 | RULE 116
finding them guilty of theft and sentencing them
each to imprisonment for six (6) months and one (1)
day.
Finding the proceedings highly irregular,
complainants sought the assistance of a lawyer.
Upon motion of complainants' counsel, respondent
judge vacated the 3 October 1996 Order,
ostensibly on the ground that complainants had
entered improvident guilty pleas. Respondent
judge scheduled complainants' re-arraignment on
2 February 1997.
In the present complaint, complainants contend
that respondent judge is administratively liable for
rendering judgment against them without the
benefit of an arraignment and in violation of their
right to be represented by counsel.5
In his Answer ("Answer"), respondent judge denied
complainants' allegations regarding the alleged
procedural irregularities in the issuance of the 3
October 1996 Order. According to respondent
judge, the following transpired in his sala on 3
October 1996:
2. On [the] session day [of October 3, 1996,]
prosecutor Willie Adulacion with two men who
turned out to be complainants, Antonio Gamas
and Florencio Sobrio approached me. It was
Adulacion who talked. He stated that these two
have long pending warrants of arrest and they
cannot afford to file P10,000.00 bail. They were
charged of theft of corn worth P4,500.00. x x x They
were caught with two others who are their relatives
hauling 3 or 4 tricycle loads of corn cabs [sic].
Adulacion said that Gamas and Sobrio asked him
to propose to the judge that Sobrio and Gamas
would plead guilty, but be meted the most
minimum penalty, allowed probation and after
which they be released [on] their own
recognizance because they cannot file their
bailbonds.
3. Their predicament at that moment if I cannot
attend to them immediately was that Mr. Adulacion
[would] have to lock them in jail because they
surrendered. Gamas and Sobrio were lucky that
instant because there was a lull in my proceedings
so they were able to see me.
4. As soon as Adulacion ha[d] articulated his piece
of talk, in the hearing distance of Gamas and
Sobrio because we were face to face[,] I asked
them if what Adulacion said was true and they
replied yes.
5. That instant I knew that Sobrio and Gamas
wanted things done instantly so they will not be
locked in jail so I ordered for the records from my
staff. I read thoroughly while the three waited
across the table, seated.
6. I gathered from my readings that [the] tricycle
drivers with their tricycles were apprehended in
flagrante delicto carrying corn cabs [sic] right in the
corn field of Dole. I asked why there were released
with the tricycles inspite of this apprehension but I
did not get satisfactory answer from any of the 3. x
xx
7. For me to instantly respond to their plea that they
be allowed to plead guilty, meted the minimum
sentence, allowed probation and pending
probation they be released on recognizance, they
will solve their very immediate problem of being
locked in jail because they had surrendered to
Adulacion and they had no ready bails. Knowing
the course of action they wanted, I begun
discoursing on their rights as accused. I told them of
their right to counsel, to be given free of charge if
they cannot afford to solicit services of one, to
confront the witnesses and cross examine and
because they had voluntarily articulated the desire
to plead guilty, I estimated to them the probable
penalty. I also told them that they have [a] right to
apply for probation but pending action they may
be required to file bailbonds but they begged that
they be allowed to plead guilty but released
pending probation proceedings.
8. After the discourse I read from them that they
would like to really plead guilty and wanted instant
action so that they will not be in jail. As called for by
the situation I arraigned them. I read to them in the
dialect they understand the accusation and
informed them [of] the nature of the evidence
arrayed but they pleaded guilty, always begging
that they be sentenced with the most minimum
penalty, allowed probation and released
immediately in their recognizance.
4 | RULE 116
11. [Thus], there was arraignment and that their
plea of guilt was voluntary.
12. I wrote the decision in long hand in their very
presence then handed it to the typist who typed it;
then I read silently what the typist typed and
satisfied that what I wrote was correctly typed I
signed [the 3 October 1996 Order], then required
my court interpreter to read the whole decision in
the language they know. I looked while the
interpreter was reading. They looked satisfied that
what the interpreter was reading corresponded
with what they proposed and what we discussed.
After the reading, Gamas and Sobrio signed the
decision.
13. It was I who wrote that decision, Mr. Adulacion
cannot write that.
14. So it is clear that before deciding I arraigned
Gamas and Sobrio upon their demand for instant
solution to their predicament. Before arraignment I
counselled them of their rights and I even warned
them the exact penalty I will give them. There was
no lawyer in attendance but the lawyer was their
problem. I heard them saying that since they were
caught carrying the corn, a lawyer would not have
much use, moreover they expressed they have no
money to pay for a lawyer. I argued that I can give
them a PAO lawyer but they insisted they plead
guilty so that all will get done without jailing them
that instant.6
Respondent judge claims that complainants
assailed the validity of the 3 October 1996 Order to
avoid serving their sentences as they had allegedly
violated the terms of their probation by failing to
report to their probation officer. Respondent judge
maintains that there was no irregularity in the
issuance of the 3 October 1996 Order. Respondent
judge adds that he decided to set aside his ruling
merely out of compassion for complainants.7
We referred this matter to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, South
Cotabato ("RTC Polomolok") for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The OCA's Evaluation and Recommendation
In its Memorandum dated 11 May 2001, the OCA,
while agreeing with the findings of Executive Judge
Roxas, finds respondent judge liable not for mere
simple neglect of duty but for gross ignorance of
the law. Accordingly, the OCA recommends that
respondent judge be fined P20,000. The OCA
explains:
[R]espondent judge showed his ignorance not only
of the scope of his authority to arraign the
complainants but also of the procedure to follow in
conducting an arraignment. Moreover, respondent
failed to properly apprise complainants of their right
to counsel and to provide them with counsel de
oficio particularly during the arraignment, if they do
not have a counsel by reason of their poverty. This is
a fundamental constitutional precept which
respondent Judge is expected to know. Where, as
in this case, the law involved is simple and
elementary, lack of conversance therewith
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.9
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA
well-taken.
Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise
Complainants of their Right to Counsel
The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel."10 Indeed, the
accused has a right to representation by counsel
from the custodial investigation all the way up to
the appellate proceedings.11 At the arraignment
stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right
to counsel. — Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask
him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person or has
employed counsel of his choice, the court must
assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 6 of Rule 116 means that:
[W]hen a defendant appears [at the arraignment]
without [an] attorney, the court has four important
duties to comply with: 1 – It must inform the
defendant that it is his right to have [an] attorney
before being arraigned; 2 – After giving him such
information the court must ask him if he desires the
5 | RULE 116
aid of attorney; 3 – If he desires and is unable to
employ attorney, the court must assign [an]
attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 – If the
accused desires to procure an attorney of his own
the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.12
Compliance with these four duties is
mandatory.13 The only instance when the court
can arraign an accused without the benefit of
counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court, finding the accused capable, allows him to
represent himself in person. However, to be a valid
waiver, the accused must make the waiver
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.14 In
determining whether the accused can make a
valid waiver, the court must take into account all
the relevant circumstances, including the
educational attainment of the accused. In the
present case, however, respondent judge contends
that complainants waived their right to counsel and
insisted on their immediate arraignment.
After reviewing the records and taking into account
the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find
that respondent judge did not properly apprise
complainants of their right to counsel prior to their
arraignment. Consequently, there was no basis for
complainants' alleged waiver of such right.
In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that
when he "arraigned" complainants, no lawyer
assisted the complainants. However, respondent
judge asserted that the attendance of a "lawyer
was their (complainants') problem." Respondent
judge stated that before arraigning complainants,
he gave a "discourse [of] their rights as accused."
Respondent judge also stated that since the police
caught complainants in flagrante delicto,
complainants told him "a lawyer would not have
much use." Respondent judge further stated that
complainants "expressed that they have no money
to pay for a lawyer." Respondent judge informed
complainants "he can give them a PAO lawyer" if
they so desired. However, respondent judge did not
appoint a PAO lawyer despite being informed by
complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.
These do not amount to compliance with Section 6
of Rule 116. Respondent judge has the duty to
insure that there is no violation of the constitutional
right of the accused to counsel. Respondent judge
is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a "lawyer
was their (complainants') problem." Once the
accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a
lawyer and the court has not allowed the accused
to represent himself, or the accused is incapable of
representing himself, the judge has the duty to
appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and
substance to the constitutional right of the accused
to counsel.
Respondent judge knew that complainants are
mere tricycle drivers. Respondent judge could not
have expected complainants to be conversant
with the rules on criminal procedure.15 Respondent
judge should not only have followed Section 6 of
Rule 116 to the letter, but should also have
ascertained that complainants understood the
import of the proceedings. Respondent judge
should not have proceeded with complainants'
arraignment until he had ascertained that
complainants' waiver of their right to counsel was
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and
that they were capable of representing themselves.
As well observed by Executive Judge Roxas:
[Respondent judge] is not only duty-bound to tell
the complainants the right to which they are
entitled, he must also explain their effects in
practical terms, and in a language the
complainants fairly understand. In other words, the
right of the complainants to be informed of their
right to have a counsel implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the Respondent Judge to
explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Since the right to be informed implies
comprehension, the degree of explanation
required will necessarily vary, depending upon the
education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the complainants. Suffice it to say
that a simpler and more lucid explanation is
needed when the subject is unlettered as in this
particular case. Short of this, there is a denial of the
right as it cannot truly be said that the herein
complainants have been informed of their rights to
counsel.16 (Emphasis supplied)
The unfortunate but expected result of respondent
judge's failure to comply strictly with Section 6 of
Rule 116 surfaced during the investigation of this
case. Complainants uniformly testified that they
6 | RULE 116
were unaware of the meaning and consequence
of their guilty pleas.
These testimonies underscore the need for trial
court judges to comply strictly with Section 6 of Rule
116. That the accused, like complainants, insist on
their arraignment without representation is no
reason for a judge to accede readily to their wishes.
A judge has the duty to protect the accused in their
rights, even against their wishes, when it is clear, as
in this case, that they are not in a position to validly
exercise or waive those rights. As we had occasion
to observe:
[E]ven the most intelligent or educated man may
have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in
the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own.19 (Emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, by subsequently vacating his 3 October
1996 Order, respondent judge tacitly admits that
complainants were in no position to represent
themselves during their arraignment, causing them
to enter guilty pleas improvidently.
Respondent Judge's Arraignment of Complainants
Highly Irregular
Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
Arraignment and plea; how made. – The accused
must be arraigned before the court where the
complaint or information was filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court
by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with
a copy of the complaint or information, reading the
same in the language or dialect known to him, and
asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other
than those named in the complaint or information.
We have explained the rationale, requirements,
and compliance of this rule in this manner:
[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the
arraignment should be made in open court by the
judge himself or by the clerk of court [1] furnishing
the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein,
then [2] reading the same in the language or
dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him
what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that
the reading be made in a language or dialect that
the accused understands and knows is a
mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts.
This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional
mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue
for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in
rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.20
We subscribe to Executive Judge Roxas' finding that
respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the
requirements of Section 1(a) of Rule 116.
Complainants deny respondent judge's claim that
he arraigned complainants by "read[ing] to them
[the information] in the dialect they understand
and inform[ing] them [of] the nature of the
evidence arrayed [against them].21 However,
there is no disputing that respondent judge failed to
furnish complainants a copy of the information with
the list of the witnesses.
The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of
Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take
lightly. Each step constitutes an integral part of that
crucial stage in criminal litigation "where the issues
are joined x x x and without which the proceedings
cannot advance further."22 Respondent judge may
have genuinely desired to spare complainants the
travails of being detained in jail, thus the rush in
arraigning them, accepting their guilty pleas,
imposing a light sentence, and granting them
probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct
7 | RULE 116
unjustifiably short-circuited the mandatory
arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of Rule 116.
Respondent Judge's Acts and Omissions
Constitute Gross Ignorance of the Law
The rule is that when the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.23 The
provisions of the Constitution on the right of the
accused to counsel, and of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure on the requirements for the
arraignment of an accused, are basic. Every judge
should know the fundamental substantive and
procedural requirements on arraignment and right
to counsel.
By holding complainants' arraignment in the
manner he conducted it, respondent judge is liable
for this administrative transgression. It may very well
be that respondent judge knew the substantive
and procedural rules in question. What renders him
liable is that he acted as if he did not.
On the Appropriate Imposable Penalty
Under Section 11(A), in relation to Section 8(8), of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part
of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that
the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from the office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
This schedule of penalties under A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, which took effect on 1 October 2001, does not
apply retroactively.24 Accordingly, we sustain the
OCA's recommendation that respondent judge be
required to pay a fine of P20,000, a penalty we
have meted in similar administrative cases involving
gross ignorance of the law.25
The Court has no Jurisdiction Over Respondent
Adulacion
We refrain from passing upon the complaint against
respondent Adulacion, as he is neither a member of
the Bar26nor a judiciary employee. This Court's
administrative jurisdiction extends only to members
of the bar and over all courts and their
personnel.27 However, the dismissal is without
prejudice to any action complainants may wish to
file against respondent Adulacion before the
appropriate body.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Orlando A. Oco,
former Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law. Accordingly, we FINE
respondent Orlando A. Oco P20,000, to be taken
from his withheld retirement benefits. The complaint
against respondent Willie Adulacion is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4. People v. De la Cruz
G.R. No. 128362 (January 16, 2001)
FACTS: Accused-appellant Dominador De la Cruz,
alis "Boyet," was charged with murder in the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, in relation
to the death of Manolito Cauba.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded
not guilty whereupon he was tried. Relying on the
eyewitness account of Victorino Castillo who saw
the shooting incident, the RTC convicted De la Cruz
for murder.
ISSUE: Whether a witness who was not included in
the preliminary investigation be presented by the
prosecution during trial?
RULING: YES. The fact that the witness’ s name was
not mentioned during the preliminary investigation
(and therefore not listed in the information) of the
case does not preclude the prosecution from
presenting him as a witness during the trial.
(doctrine)
The fact Victorino Castillo's name was not
mentioned during the preliminary investigation of
the case did not preclude the prosecution from
presenting him as a witness during the trial. The non-
inclusion of some of the names of the eyewitness in
8 | RULE 116
the information filed before the trial court does not
preclude the prosecutor from presenting them
during the trial. There is thus no basis for the
allegation that this fact indicates that Castillo's
presentation as an eyewitness was a mere
"afterthought.
5. People vs Demetrio Cabale
185 SCRA 140 | G.R. Nos. 73249-50 May 8, 1990
FACTS:
The 4 accused in this case are Cabale, Daniel,
Bodoy, and Cualteros. The crime is robbery with
homicide. The 4 accused on June 7, 1968 allegedly
entered the store of Rufina Rosello, an old woman,
fired shots in the air, grabbed her outside, and
failing to produce money, was killed by
strangulation. While outside, the accused also
stopped Ricardo Fernando who was riding on his
motorcycle, took his wallet, and caused him
physical injuries.
Initial investigations revealed that one of the
robbers was Florencio Daniel. When questioned,
Daniel admitted that he participated in the
commission of the robberies and pointed to the
other 3 accused as his companions in the crime.
The 4 accused were then charged with 2
informations, one for Robbery in band with less
serious physical injuries, and the other for Robbery in
band with homicide.
The 3 accused, except for Cualteros, were duly
convicted and sentenced to death penalty which
was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Cualteros was acquitted of both charges on
reasonable doubt, but was ordered to indemnify,
jointly with his co-accused, the offended parties
Fernando and Rosello.
Accused Daniel informed that he was no longer
interested in pursuing an appeal, and he was willing
to serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accordingly, judgment against him was considered
final.
Judgment against Cabale has also become final
due to his escape from detention.
Only the appeal of accused Bodoy was left for
consideration. He denies having participated in the
crime, and interposed the defense of alibi. He
claims that there was an irregularity in his
arraignment since it was done after the cases had
been submitted for decision, so that he was not
afforded the chance to prepare properly for his
defense.
ISSUE: W/N the arraignment done was irregular.
HELD:
The Court found that while the arraignment was
done after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been
fully cured.
In this case, counsel for the appellant entered into
trial without objecting that his client, the appellant
herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel
had also the full opportunity of cross-examining the
witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases
were being retried after the appellant had been
arraigned, appellant’s counsel filed a joint
manifestation with the prosecution, adopting all
proceedings prior to the arraignment of the
appellant.
There was, therefor, no violation of the appellant’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
6. Francisco Larranaga vs CA
G.R. No. 130644 (March 13, 1998)
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga is charged with
two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention docketed as CBU-45303 and CBU-45304
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 7, Cebu City. He is presently detained at the
Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center.
On October 1, 1997, petitioner, represented by his
mother, Margarita G. Larranaga, filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction. Petitioner alleged that
he was denied the right to preliminary investigation
and sought to annul the informations as well as the
warrant of arrest issued in consequence thereof. In
the alternative, petitioner prayed that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and that he be
released from detention pending the
9 | RULE 116
investigation. Petitioner filed a supplemental
petition for habeas corpus or bail on October 6,
1997.
On October 30, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC of
Cebu an urgent ex parte motion praying for his
immediate release pursuant to our October 27
resolution.
The following day, on October 31, 1997, Judge
Martin A. Ocampo, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
7, Cebu City, issued an order deferring the
resolution of petitioner's motion. It stated that it
would be premature to act on the motion since the
trial court has not yet received an official copy of
our October 27 resolution and that said resolution
has not yet attained finality. Furthermore, Judge
Ocampo called the Court's attention to the fact
that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14,
1997 and waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
On November 17, 1997, the counsels for the
prosecution in Crim. Case No. CBU-45303 and 45304
filed a motion for reconsideration of our October 27
resolution. They raised the following arguments:
1. Petitioner is charged with a continuing offense;
hence, his arrest and detention about two months
after the abduction of the victims was lawful;
2. Since petitioner was arrested without a warrant,
his case comes within the purview of Section 7 of
Rule 112, not under Section 3 thereof;
3. The filing of the informations in court and the
issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest by
Executive Judge Priscila S. Agana cured whatever
defect there was in petitioner's arrest and
detention;
4. Petitioner was validly arraigned on October 14,
1997 and the validity of such arraignment was not
set aside by this tribunal;
The Solicitor General, meanwhile, in its comment to
petitioner's urgent motion for release, modified its
stance regarding the validity of petitioner's
detention. It stated:
Considering that petitioner was arraigned (a
supervening event after the filing of the petition
and before the issuance of the TRO), petitioner
should be kept in detention without prejudice to his
right to preliminary investigation.
Issue/s: Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular
preliminary investigation
Ruling:YES.
The prosecutors argue that petitioner is entitled only
to an inquest investigation under Section 7 of Rule
112 since he was lawfully arrested without a warrant
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The prosecutors' argument is bereft of merit. Section
7 of Rule 112 applies only to persons lawfully
arrested without a warrant. Petitioner in this case
was, in the first place, not arrested either by a
peace officer or a private person. The facts show
that on September 15, 1997, some members of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary
Arts in Quezon City to arrest
petitioner, albeit without warrant.
An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense. It is made by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by
his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest. The foregoing facts show no restraint
upon the person of petitioner. Neither do they show
that petitioner was deprived of his own will and
liberty. Hence, Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply
to petitioner. To be sure, even if petitioner were
arrested by the PNP CIG personnel, such arrest
would still be illegal because of the absence of a
warrant.
Judge Martin Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City,
and the state prosecutors assert that petitioner is no
longer entitled to a preliminary investigation
because he had previously waived his right to such
investigation. Judge Ocampo held that petitioner
waived his right to preliminary investigation when
he failed to appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor in the
afternoon of September 17, 1997, despite the
express warning that "failure of the counsel (to
present the petitioner to the Cebu City Prosecutor
on said time and date) would be treated as a
waiver of his client's right to preliminary
investigation."
We disagree. A waiver, whether express or implied,
must be made in clear and unequivocal manner.
Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear
before the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of
September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a
waiver of his right to preliminary investigation,
considering that petitioner has been vigorously
10 | RULE 116
invoking his right to a regular preliminary
investigation since the start of the proceedings
before the City Prosecutor.
Furthermore, petitioner and his counsel cannot be
faulted for their refusal to comply with the City
Prosecutor's directive to appear before him in the
afternoon of September 17, 1997 for preliminary
investigation. As stated above, petitioner's counsel
appeared before the City Prosecutor earlier that
day and specifically demanded a regular
preliminary investigation for his client. The City
Prosecutor, however, insisted that petitioner was
entitled only to an inquest investigation which he
scheduled in the afternoon of the same day.
Petitioner and his counsel refused to submit to such
investigation as it might be construed as a waiver of
petitioner's right to a regular preliminary
investigation.
Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner
has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is
that the right to preliminary investigation is waived
when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in
this case, has been actively and consistently
demanding a regular preliminary investigation even
before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner
refused to enter a plea during the arraignment
because there was a pending case in this Court
regarding his right to avail of a regular preliminary
investigation. 19 Clearly, the acts of petitioner and
his counsel are inconsistent with a waiver.
Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due
process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver
appears to be clear and informed.
7. HONORATO GALVEZ and GODOFREDO DIEGO
vs
COURT OF APPEALS (17TH DIVISION), First Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor. DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO of
Pasig, Rizal; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and PNP
P/SR. SUPT. RICARDO F. DE LEON, Camp
Commander and Head of the PNP Custodial Group,
Camp Crame, Cubao, Quezon City, respondents
G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994
FACTS:
On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato
Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged
in three separate informations with homicide and
two counts of frustrated homicide.
On November 15, 1993, Bulacan Provincial
Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings to
enable him "to review the evidence on record and
determine once more the proper crimes
chargeable against the accused," which was
granted by Judge Villajuan. Thereafter, respondent
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio was instructed to
conduct a re-investigation of the aforesaid criminal
cases filed against herein petitioners.8
By virtue of a Manifestation with Ex-parte Motion
dated November 23, 1993 filed by respondent
prosecutor, the proceedings were again ordered
suspended by Judge Villajuan until after the
prosecution's request for change of venue shall
have been resolved by the Supreme Court, and the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the
former shall have been terminated.
On December 27, 1993, the scheduled arraignment
before Judge Pornillos were reset due to the
absence of respondent prosecutor.
At the court session set for the arraignment of
petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos
issued an order denying the motion to quash (the
new informations) filed by petitioners and, at the
same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for petitioners when the latter refused to
enter their plea.
Petitioners dispute the legality of their arraignment
on January 24, 1994, when Judge Pornillos entered
a plea of not guilty for them after they refused to
plead, without furnishing them copies of the
information with the list of witnesses, after merely
reading the informations against them and asking
whether they understood the same, which were
allegedly in palpable violation of Section 1, Rule
116. Petitioners aver that they were requesting for
the suspension of the arraignment as they wanted
to have a final copy of the order of January 24,
1994 which was merely read in open court, and to
take the necessary steps to question the same by
way of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the arraignment proceeding held on
January 24, 1994 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-M-93
to 4007-M-93 was valid.
RULING:
YES
In criminal cases, it is the duty of the accused, in
addition to the other pleas authorized by law, to
plead whether he is guilty or not of the crime
charged. In that way only can an issue be created
11 | RULE 116
upon which the trial shall proceed. Section 1 (c) of
Rule 116 is quite explicit that where the accused
refuses to plead, a plea of not guilty shall be
entered for him. Hence, under such mandatory
language, if the accused refuses to plead, the
court must enter a plea of not guilty. The words are
so plain and unambiguous that no construction is
necessary. It actually calls for a literal application
thereof. Any explanation or defense which
petitioners would want to invoke can be properly
raised during the trial, but they cannot refuse to
enter their plea. Nonetheless, the alleged defect in
their arraignment on January 24, 1994 is deemed to
have been cured when they were again arraigned
on February 18, 1994 with the assistance of
counsel de oficio, and the information was read to
them in the vernacular.
In conclusion, considering that Branch 10 of the
same trial court handling Criminal Cases Nos. 4004-
M-93 to 4007-M-93 legally acquired jurisdiction over
the new informations which we have likewise
declared valid, petitioners may be prosecuted
thereunder.
8. G.R. No. 140863 August 22, 2000
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of
Parañaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO, respondents.
FACTS
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque
filed an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe
Barreiro (private respondent) based on the
complaint2 filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
(petitioner).
On May 28, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque
filed an Information1 for estafa against Ma. Fe
Barreiro (private respondent) based on the
complaint2 filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc.
(petitioner). The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-536 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Ma. Fe F. Barreiro" before the Regional Trial Court
of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided by public
respondent Judge Rolando G. How.
Before the scheduled arraignment of private
respondent on August 5, 1999 could take place,
respondent court issued an Order3 dated June 29,
1999, resetting the arraignment of private
respondent on September 2, 1999 on the ground
that private respondent had "filed an appeal with
the Department of Justice (DOJ)".4 Private
respondent manifested in the same Order that she
would submit a certification from the DOJ granting
due course to her appeal on or before the second
scheduled arraignment.5 On September 24, 1999,
respondent court issued an Order6denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order
that previously reset the arraignment of private
respondent. Said order further rescheduled the
arraignment of private respondent to November 18,
1999.
On November 10, 1999, private respondent filed
another "Motion to Defer Arraignment".7 On
November 15, 1999, before the scheduled date of
the arraignment of private respondent and before
the date set for the hearing of private respondent’s
"Motion to Defer Arraignment", respondent court
issued an Order8 further deferring the arraignment
of private respondent "until such time that the
appeal with the said office (SOJ) is
resolved".9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the order was denied by respondent court on
November 22, 1999.10
Petitioner bewails the fact that six months have
elapsed since private respondent appeared or
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent
court and up to now she still has to be
arraigned.11 Respondent court allegedly violated
due process when it issued the assailed order
before petitioner received a copy of the "Motion to
Defer Arraignment" of private respondent and
before the hearing for the same motion could be
conducted.12 Petitioner points out that despite the
order of respondent court dated September 26,
1999 which stated that the arraignment of private
respondent on November 18, 1999 is
"intransferable", respondent court, in utter disregard
of its own order, issued the now assailed order
indefinitely suspending the arraignment of private
respondent.13
Petitioner is convinced that the twin orders further
delaying the arraignment of private respondent
and denying the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner violate Section 7, of the Speedy Trial Act
of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner further submits that this instant petition
raises "a pure question of law of first
impression"14 since "it involves the application and
interpretation of a law of very recent vintage,
namely Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as
12 | RULE 116
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998".15 Petitioner mainly
relies on Section 7 of said law that states that:
"Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information
and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and
Trial. – The arraignment of an accused shall be held
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has
appeared before the justice, judge or court in
which the charge is pending, whichever date last
occurs. xxx"
By issuing the assailed order, respondent court
allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court can indefinitely
suspend the arraignment of the accused until the
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice
(SOJ) has been resolved.
HELD
YES. The power of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after the
information has already been filed in court is well
settled. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals,18 reiterated
in Roberts vs. Court of Appeals,19 we clarified that
nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul20 forecloses the power
or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review
resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases
despite an information already having been filed in
court.21
The nature of the Justice Secretary’s power of
control over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma
vs. Court of Appeals 22 in this wise:
"Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject
to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code,23 exercises the power
of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of
supervision and control by the justice secretary over
the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence
committed in the initial steps of an administrative
activity or by an administrative agency should be
corrected by higher administrative authorities, and
not directly by courts. As a rule, only after
administrative remedies are exhausted may judicial
recourse be allowed."24
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the
information, the court is in complete control of the
case and any disposition therein is subject to its
sound discretion.25 The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal
with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise of such
discretion. Consistent with our ruling
in Marcelo,26 we have since then held in a number
of cases that a court can defer to the authority of
the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all, the
issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to
file the information.27 This is in line with our general
pronouncement in Crespo28 that courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion over
criminal prosecution.29 Thus, public respondent did
not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
suspended the arraignment of private respondent
to await the resolution of her petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice.
It bears stressing that the court is however not
bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice since the court is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case, and may either agree or disagree with the
recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the
trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.35
Petitioner insists that in view of the passage of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, the review authority of the
Secretary of Justice after an information has been
already filed in court may possibly transgress the
right of a party to a speedy disposition of his case,
in light of the mandatory tenor of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 requiring that the accused must be
arraigned within thirty (30) days from the filing of an
information against him. Petitioner then impresses
upon this Court that there is a need to reconcile the
review authority of the Secretary of Justice and the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and submits that "the
Secretary of Justice must review the appeal and
rule thereon within a period of thirty (30) days from
the date the information was filed or from the date
the accused appeared in court (surrendered or
arrested)"36 if only to give meaning to the Speedy
Trial Act.
We are not persuaded. The authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after an information has already
been filed in court does not present an
13 | RULE 116
irreconcilable conflict with the thirty-day period
prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act.
Contrary to the urgings of petitioner, Section 7 of
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the thirty-
day period for the arraignment of the accused is
not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the same law
enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded
in computing the time within which trial must
commence
As stated earlier, prudence and wisdom dictate that
the court should hold in abeyance the proceedings
while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition
for review questioning the resolution of the
prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified
because the determination of whether the delay is
unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of
the right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply
reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the
length of delay is not the lone criterion to be
considered, several factors must be taken into
account in determining whether or not the
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated. The factors to consider and balance are
the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion
of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice
caused by such delay.38
The importance of the review authority of the
Secretary of Justice cannot be overemphasized; as
earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies that holds
that "mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in
the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an
administrative agency should be corrected by
higher administrative authorities, and not directly by
courts."39
We are not unmindful of the principle that while the
right to a speedy trial secures rights to the
defendant, it does not preclude the rights of public
justice.40 However, in this case, petitioner as private
complainant in the criminal case, cannot deprive
private respondent, accused therein, of her right to
avail of a remedy afforded to an accused in a
criminal case. The immediate arraignment of
private respondent would have then proscribed her
right as accused to appeal the resolution of the
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice since Section
4 of DOJ Order No. 223 of June 30, 1993 forestalls an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice if the
accused/appellant has already been
arraigned.41 Hence, in this case, the order
suspending the arraignment of private respondent
merely allowed private respondent to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to her as
accused in the criminal case before the court
could proceed to a full-blown trial.
The fact that public respondent issued the assailed
order suspending the arraignment of private
respondent before the "Motion to Defer
Arraignment" of private respondent could be heard
is not tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. It
was well within the power of public respondent to
grant the continuance since Section 10 (f) of the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 clearly confers this
authority.
Public respondent substantially complied with the
requirement of Section 10 (f) of the Speedy Trial Act
when it stated its reasons for the deferment and
eventual suspension of the arraignment of private
respondent in its orders dated September 24,
199944 and November 22, 199945 . In said orders,
public respondent reasoned that the suspension of
the arraignment of private respondent was to give
the opportunity to the accused to exhaust the
procedural remedies available,46 to allow the
Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of the
City Prosecutor47 so as not to deprive the former of
his power to review the action of the latter by a
precipitate trial of the case,48 and based on the
discretionary power of the trial judge to grant or
deny the motion to suspend the arraignment of the
accused pending determination of her petition for
review at the Department of Justice.
9. [G.R. No. L-26734. September 5, 1967.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
PANFILO PADERNAL, Defendant-Appellee.
Solicitor General, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Benjamin Pongos, for Defendant-Appellee.
Facts:
On January 4, 1961, Panfilo Padernal was charged
by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Eleodoro G. Alvero in the
CFI of Ormoc City with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of Brigido Rodila thru
stabbing which took place in the Municipality of
Kananga, Province of Leyte, on December 3, 1960.
On January 12, 1961, the CFI presided over by Hon.
Numeriano G. Estenzo reduced the bail bond of
accused Panfilo Padernal to P8,000.00 and set the
arraignment and trial for January 26, 1961 at 7:30
a.m. with notice to Fiscal Eleodoro G. Alvero and to
defense counsel Atty. Benjamin T. Pongos.
14 | RULE 116
The case was called for arraignment and trial on
January 26, 1961. The accused pleaded guilty,
Meanwhile, the defense counsel invoked the
presence of mitigating circumstances in favor of
the accused for the imposition of the penalty.
When the case was called for continuation on
January 27, 1961, upon realizing from accused’s
testimony given on January 26, 1961, that he
(accused) was invoking complete self-defense,
what the trial Judge did was to make the accused
entered into aplea of not guilty.
Right after the statements had been given by the
prosecution and the defense, the trial Judge
dictated in open court on January 31, 1961 a
decision acquitting accused Panfilo Padernal of
the crime of homicide with which he was charged
‘on the ground of reasonable doubt’.
Issue:Whether the principle of double jeopardy bars
the appeal.
Ruling: YES
Where the accused pleads guilty and proceeds, in
a hearing to prove the mitigating circumstance of
incomplete self-defense, to state facts constituting
full and complete self-defense. The trial judge
should declare his plea of guilty thereby withdrawn,
order that a plea of not guilty be entered and
proceed to trial on the merits.
The court a quo caused a plea of not guilty to be
entered in place of the plea of guilty considered
withdrawn by the exculpatory testimony of the
accused and re-set the case for hearing on the
merits four days thereafter, giving the prosecution
and the defense sufficient opportunity to prepare.
On the date of the trial itself, the prosecution and
the defense chose to adopt the testimonies
adduced during the previous hearing as their
evidence on the merits, to save the trouble of re-
taking them. Accordingly, the case was duly
submitted for decision upon evidence on the merits
after the requisite trial providing fair opportunity to
the prosecution and the defense to adduce
evidence in chief and rebuttal evidence. The
decision of acquittal, therefore, can no longer be
reviewed herein, since the appeal is barred by the
principle of double jeopardy, the requisites, among
others, of a plea and due process, not to mention
trial on the merits, being attendant herein.
10. People vs. Judge Villarama, 210 SCRA 246
(1992)
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with
violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
During the arraignment, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. After the
prosecution rested its case, counsel for private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that
private respondent was willing to change his former
plea of “not guilty” to that of “guilty” to the lesser
offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425.
Respondent Judge issued an order directing private
respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor
to the change of plea.
The prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense.
Accused filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of
Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging
that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a
specific period within which an accused is allowed
to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Respondent
judge granted accused’s motion and convicted
him guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425 thus
this instant petition for review.
Counsel for the private respondent maintains that
the private respondent’s change of plea and his
conviction to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer
open to review otherwise his constitutional right
against double jeopardy will be violated.
ISSUE: W/N accused can invoke double jeopardy?
HELD: NO. The right against double jeopardy given
to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent’s
change of plea. Since this is not the situation here,
the private respondent cannot claim this privilege
Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which
states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
jeopardy-
15 | RULE 116
…….
However, the conviction of the accused shall not
be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of
the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
without the consent of the Fiscal and of the
offended party;
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be
prosecuted under the original charge of violation of
Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the
lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the
trial court’s approval of his change of plea was
irregular and improper.
11. A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995
PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
FACTS:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad,
alias "Meon" of the crime of murder by the
Philippine National Police Station Commander in
Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip
in the afternoon of September 14, 1987. After
preliminary investigation by the office of the
provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad
with the crime of Homicide.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the
acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the
consent of the offended party, entered into plea
bargaining where it was agreed that the accused
would plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as
originally charged in the information, and would
incur the penalty of "four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) year of prision correccional maximum as
maximum."2 Consequently, in his decision
promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent
judge found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of
Attempted Homicide and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional maximum, as minimum
to six years of prision correccional maximum, as the
maximum period, exactly in accordance with the
plea bargaining agreement.
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed
to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S.
Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased,
accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim.
Case No. H-223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad
alias "Meon." In said letter-complaint, complainant
contends that the sentence of respondent judge
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide
and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative,
"on its face, of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law or gross misconduct.
Respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused
individual — with the consent of the offended party
— to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not such offense is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction. He explains that during the May 3,
1990 hearing, accused and his counsel, with the
acquiescence and in the presence of the
prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's
desire to plea bargain pursuant to the aforestated
rule. Moreover, he avers that in a conference on
June 27, 1990, the wife of the victim herself agreed
to the accused's plea of guilty to attempted
homicide, instead of homicide as she needed the
monetary indemnity to raise her two orphaned
children.
16 | RULE 116

ISSUE: Whether or not the sentence of Judge Aujero
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide
and not Homicide as charged, due to the
accused’s plea of guilty to attempted homicide
instead of homicide, is proof indicative of gross
ignorance of the law.
HELD:
Yes.
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the
accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser
offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged." The fact of death
of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad
was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and
plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of
guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.
The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces
death; attempted homicide does not. . case.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists which could
either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of
Rule 116 or to outright confusion.
In instances where a literal application of a
provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result
so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic
and everyday common sense as to be
unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges
to take principles of right and justice at heart. In
case of doubt the intent is to promote right and
justice. When a provision of law is silent or
ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution
responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
The fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of
frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have
alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent
result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize
such principles so cardinal to our body of laws
amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects
respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not
competence, in the performance of his duties.
While it is true, as respondent judge contends, that
he merely applied the rule to the letter, the
palpably incongruous result ought to have been a
"red flag" alerting him of the possibility of injustice.
The death of an identified individual, the gravamen
of the charge against the defendant in the criminal
case, cannot and should not be ignored in favor of
a more expedient plea of either attempted or
frustrated homicide. We have held before that if
the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as
if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance
of the law.
12. People v Magat
GR 130026, (May 31, 2000)
FACTS:
RTC QC found accused-appellant Magat guilty of
raping his daughter twice and sentenced him to
death and to pay damages worth 750T pesos.
Upon arraignment on Jan 10, 1997, Magat pleaded
guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each
RTC acknowledged and approved the lowering of
penalty, and sentenced Magat to suffer a jail term
of ten (10) years imprisonment for each case. After
three months, Magat was rearraigned because the
complainant said that the penalty imposed was
“too light.”
Magat initially entered a plea of not guilty but
eventually changed to guilty. The court read to him
the Informations in English and Tagalog and
repeatedly asked whether he understood his
change of plea and propounded questions as to
his understanding of the consequences of his plea.
RTC – Magat guilty of rape (2 informations), pay
220k damages, sentenced to death by lethal
injection. SC automatic review.
17 | RULE 116
ISSUE: WONtrial court erred in rearraigning and
proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was
already convicted per Order of the trial court
dated January 10, 1997 based on his plea of guilt
RULING:The January 10, 1997 order of the trial court
convicting the accused-appellant on his own plea
of guilt is void ab initio on the ground that accused-
appellant’s plea is not the plea bargaining
contemplated and allowed by law and the rules of
procedure. The only instance where a plea
bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when an
accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense.
By pleading guilty to the offense charged, the
accused should be sentenced to the penalty to
which he pleaded. An accused may not foist a
conditional plea of guilty on the court by admitting
his guilt provided that a certain penalty be meted
unto him.
It must be emphasized that accused-appellant did
not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to
the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser
penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, he did not plea bargain but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is
erroneous because by pleading guilty to the
offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
A judgment rendered by the trial court which was
based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab
initio and cannot be considered to have attained
finality for the simple reason that a void judgment
has no legality from its inception, and double
jeopardy will not lie. Also, when the accused failed
to question the procedural errors in the first
arraignment, he is deemed to have abandoned his
right to question the same and waived the errors in
procedure.
ESCRA NOTES:
Criminal Procedure; Plea of Guilty; By pleading
guilty to the offense charged, the accused should
be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded.
An accused may not foist a conditional plea of
guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided
that a certain penalty be meted unto him.—It must
be emphasized that accused-appellant did not
plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the
rape charges and only bargained for a lesser
penalty. In short, as aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, he did not plea bargain but made
conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is
erroneous because by pleading guilty to the
offense charged, accused-appellant should be
sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is
the essence of a plea of guilty that the accused
admits absolutely and unconditionally his guilt and
responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence,
an accused may not foist a conditional plea of
guilty on the court by admitting his guilt provided
that a certain penalty will be meted unto him.
Where accused’s plea of guilty is a conditional
plea, the trial court should vacate such a plea and
enter a plea of not guilty.—Accused-appellant’s
plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea.
Hence, the trial court should have vacated such a
plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a
conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the
proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon
him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would,
therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment
may be rendered.
Plea Bargaining; A judgment rendered by the
trial court which was based on a void plea
bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be
considered to have attained finality for the simple
reason that a void judgment has no legality from its
inception, and double jeopardy will not lie.— Thus,
since the judgment of conviction rendered against
accused-appellant is void, double jeopardy will not
lie.
Arraignment; Waiver; When the accused failed
to question the procedural errors in the first
arraignment, he is deemed to have abandoned his
right to question the same and waived the errors in
procedure.—Nonetheless, whatever procedural
infirmity in the arraignment of the accused-
appellant was rectified when he was re-arraigned
and entered a new plea. Accused-appellant did
not question the procedural errors in the first
arraignment and having failed to do so, he is
deemed to have abandoned his right to question
the same and waived the errors in procedure.
Plea of Guilty to a Capital Offense; Trial judges
must comply with the procedure laid down in the
rules of arraignment, particularly the rules
governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in
order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in
18 | RULE 116
the mind of either the trial court or of the Supreme
Court.—Under the present rule, if the accused
pleads guilty to capital offense, trial courts are now
enjoined:
(a) to conduct searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
(b) to require the prosecution to present evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability; and
(c) to ask the accused if he so desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
This Court, in a long line of decisions imposed upon
trial judges to comply with the procedure laid down
in the rules of arraignment, particularly the rules
governing a plea of guilty to a capital offense in
order to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in
the mind of either the trial court or of this Court, on
review, as to the possibility that there might have
been some misunderstanding on the part of the
accused as to the nature of the charges to which
he pleaded guilty and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the
crime which justify or require the exercise of a
greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition
of the prescribed penalties. Apart from the
circumstances that such procedure may remove
any doubt that the accused fully understood the
consequences of his plea is the fact that the
evidence taken thereon is essential to the fulfillment
by this Court of its duty of review of automatic
appeals from death sentences.
The absence of the transcript of stenographic
notes of the proceedings during the arraignment
does not make the procedure flawed.—We have
carefully reviewed the record of this case and are
convinced that the trial judge has faithfully
discharged his bounden duty as minister of the law
to determine the voluntariness and full
understanding of accused-appellants’ plea of
guilty.
The minutes of the proceedings indubitably
show that the judge read the Informations to the
accused-appellant both in English and Tagalog,
asked him questions as to his understanding of the
consequences of his plea, his educational
attainment and occupation. Accused-appellant
could have known of the consequence of his plea
having pleaded twice to the charges against him.
In fact, in the two (2) letters sent to the trial court
judge, accused-appellant not only admitted his
“sins” but also asked for forgiveness and prayed for
a chance to reform.
When the trial court, in obedience to the
Supreme Court’s injunction, receives evidence to
determine precisely whether or not the accused
has erred in admitting guilt, the manner in which the
plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, for
the simple reason that the conviction is predicated
not on the plea but on the evidence proving the
commission by the accused of the offense
charged.—While we have in a catena of cases set
aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital
offenses because of the improvidence of the plea,
we did so only when such plea is the sole basis of
the judgment of the condemnatory judgment.
In such case, it cannot be claimed that
defendant was sentenced to death without having
been previously informed of the nature of the
charges against him and of the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances recited in the
information, as he is fully apprised not only of the
allegations in the information but of the entire
evidence of the prosecution.
13. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. CARLOS PATROLLA, JR. y VEGA,
accused-appellant
G.R. No. 112445 (March 7, 1996)
FACTS:
Appellant Carlos Patrolla, Jr. and his brother Alex
were charged with murder with less serious physical
injuries in the following amended information:
That on or about 5:40 in the afternoon of
September 28, 1991 at Burgos Street, San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and helping
one another, armed with bolos, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation, and with
the use of superior strength, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of
said weapons, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the persons of the spouses NIDO
PANOGALINOG and BELINDA PANOGALINOG by
striking and stabbing the former and the latter,
thereby inflicting upon them physical injuries which
19 | RULE 116
injuries caused shock secondary to severe
hemorrhage which resulted in the death of said
NIDO PANOGALINOG and an injury which requires
a period of from ten (10) to fourteen (14) days,
more or less of treatment and healing barring
complication upon the person of BELINDA
PANOGALINOG.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not
guilty.
At the pre-trial of the case on November 26, 1991,
however, Alex Patrolla, assisted by counsel,
pleaded guilty to homicide. Accordingly, the trial
court rendered a decision finding Alex guilty of
homicide with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, and sentencing him to an
indeterminate sentence of twelve years and one
day to fourteen years, to indemnify the heirs of Nido
Panogalinog in the amount of P30,000.00 and to
pay costs.
Trial proceeded against appellant, CARLOS
PATROLLA, JR. y VEGA.
In a decision dated August 26, 1993, the trial court
convicted appellant and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in regard
to his participation on the murder of the late Nido
Panogalinog and to suffer the penalty of ONE
MONTH AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR in its
minimum period of said penalty for the Less Serious
Physical Injuries he has inflicted upon the person of
Mrs. Belinda Panogalinog.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred when it held the
appellant guilty notwithstanding the assertion of
Alex Patrolla, appellant’s brother, that he alone
killed Nido.
RULING:
NO.
A co-accused’s plea of guilty to a felony does not
carry with it an admission of sole authorship of the
crime so as to exonerate the other accused from
criminal liability.
The Court first consider the effect on the culpability
of appellant of Alex Patrolla’s plea of guilt to and
conviction of the crime of homicide. Appellant
posits that Alex’s plea was an admission that he
alone committed the crime and that there was no
conspiracy between him and appellant, and by
such plea, appellant’s criminal liability was
extinguished. Corollarily, appellant argues that Alex
Patrolla’s conviction of homicide had the effect of
“extinguishing” the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. We disagree. The plea was the result of
bargaining, which involves the defendant’s
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge. Alex’s plea of guilty to homicide did not
carry with it an admission of sole authorship of the
crime, so as to exonerate appellant from criminal
liability. “To uphold the argument of appellant
would leave at the hands of the one accused, who
elects to plead guilty, the automatic exemption of
his co-accused from all criminal responsibility.
Plainly, this should not be allowed.”
In the instant case, the evidence for the
prosecution clearly established that appellant and
his brother conspired to commit the crime. Each
brother performed specific acts—stabbing Nido
and blocking his path to ensure no escape from
their blows—with such closeness and coordination
as to indicate beyond doubt a common purpose or
design.15 Both were thus principals in committing
the crime charged.
Nor did Alex’s plea of guilty to homicide mean that
the killing of the victim was not attended by the
circumstance of treachery. Treachery was not
appreciated against Alex obviously as a result of
plea bargaining, and not because the same was
not proven to have attended the killing of the
victim. This circumstance, alleged in the information
as qualifying the killing to murder, as shall be
discussed later, was duly proven by the prosecution
in the trial against appellant.
14. PEOPLE v.LAKINDANUM
G.R. No. 127123. March 10, 1999
FACTS:
On or about the 8th day of September, 1996, in the
City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-
named accused, JOSEPH LAKINDANUM y Calma,
by means of intimidation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, have carnal
knowledge upon the person of one CATHERINE
CALAGUIN who is under 12 years of age, to her
damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded "not guilty" to
the offense charged. On October 2, 1996, however,
20 | RULE 116
just before the direct examination of the victim
started, the defense counsel manifested that the
accused wanted to withdraw his original plea of
"not guilty" and replace it with a "guilty" plea. The
Court gave defense counsel time to confer with his
client and apprise him of the consequences of
entering a guilty plea. läwvirtualibrär
At the next hearing, the trial court judge examined
the accused to determine the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the plea he was about to make.
Thereafter, Lakindanum was rearraigned and he
pleaded "guilty" to the charge.
The trial court then proceeded to hear the
evidence of the prosecution to establish
Lakindanum's guilt and the precise degree of his
culpability. Since the defense already admitted the
genuineness and authenticity of the victim's birth
certificate and the medical certificate issued by the
doctor who examined her, only the victim,
Catherine Calaguin, was presented as the lone
prosecution witness
Based on Catherine's testimony, it appears that at
around ten o'clock in the morning of September 8,
1996, she rode with the accused in the latter's
tricycle together with her grandmothers Sion, Anit,
and Coring. The three, however, alighted at
Banaoang, leaving Catherine alone with the
accused in the tricycle.
Instead of heading home to Malued, Lakindanum
drove toward Bonuan and, upon reaching a
secluded place concealed from the highway by
milly mounds, parked his tricycle and joined
Catherine in the passenger cab. He removed his
pants and underwear and proceeded to take off
Catherine's short pants and panty. Thereafter,
Lakindanum placed the girl on top of his lap and
inserted his penis into her vagina, accomplishing full
penetration and causing her to cry from
excruciating pain. Not satisfied, he then inserted his
finger into Catherine's vagina. Before taking her
home, Lakindanum threatened to kill Catherine if
she told anyone about the incident.
Upon reaching home, Catherine did not tell her
parents about what happened. However, her
mother noticed that her shorts were bloodied and
immediately brought her to the hospital for
examination. It was there that Catherine revealed
her ordeal to the doctor. According to the medical
certificate which was admitted as evidence,
Catherine's vagina bore lacerations and had traces
of spermatozoa.
ISSUE:
Whether the Trial Court erred in accepting the plea
of guilt of the accused
RULING:
Yes. The Court observes that indeed, the manner
by which the trial court judge conducted the
inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the accused-appellant's plea of
guilty leaves much to be desired.
The rule is that where the accused desires to plead
guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to
observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires
to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires.5
From the foregoing, it is clear that the judge can
hardly be said to have satisfied the requirement of
conducting a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the
accused of entering a guilty plea. Worse, the judge
erroneously informed Lakindanum that by pleading
guilty, the latter forfeited his right to testify and to
adduce evidence in his defense. Section 4, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter:
"Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception
of evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty to
a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf."
In People vs. Alicando,6 the Court stressed that the
plea of guilty to a capital offense is null and void
where the trial court inadequately discharged the
duty of conducting a "searching inquiry." In that
case, the Court remanded the case to the trial
court for rearraignment and trial on the merits.
Considering that Lakindanum stands accused of a
capital offense for which he may be put to death,
21 | RULE 116
the trial judge should have been more vigilant and
solicitous in making sure that the accused-
appellant clearly understood the legal
consequences of the plea he was about to make.
16.People vs Toncayao
G.R. Nos. 134531-32
July 7, 2004
FACTS:
Accused was charged with 2 counts of rape.
After he manifested that he was pleading guilty,
the court simply asked him whether he knew that
the possible penalty for both crimes is death. When
he answered affirmatively, the court directed the
prosecution to adduce evidence.Thereafter, the
court sentenced accused to death.
ISSUE:
Was there sufficient compliance with Section 3,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure?
HELD:
No. A mere warning that the accused faces the
supreme penalty of death is insufficient.20 Such
procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in
the conduct of a "searching inquiry", as follows:
(1) Ascertain from the accused
himself (a) how he was brought into
the custody of the law; (b) whether
he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what
conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule
out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under
a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming
from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge's intimidating
robes.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series
of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the
meaning and consequences of a
plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the
personality profile of the accused,
such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational
background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
(4) Inform the accused of the exact
length of imprisonment or nature of
the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of
the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the
judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission
of authorship of the crime proper but
also of the aggravating
circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the
crime with which he is charged and
to fully explain to him the elements
of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do
so would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right
to due process.
(6) All questions posed to the
accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself
that the accused, in pleading guilty,
is truly guilty. The accused must be
required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.21
17. People v Ulit
22 | RULE 116
G. R. Nos. 131799-801
February 23, 2004
Facts:
Victim Lucelle Serrano filed 2 complaints for
rape and 2 complaints for acts of lasciviousness
against her uncle alleging that he took advantage
of her when she was still 11. Pleaded not guilty.
Lucelle was undergoing psychiatric treatment at
the Philippine General Hospital. The prosecution
presented her as the first witness. The trial was reset
4 times as she refused to answer certain questions
and ended up crying. Upon examination, it was
discovered that she is suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder.
During the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle
refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset
to July 21, 1997. Finally on October 20, 1997, she
declared that the appellant raped her in
November 1996 and many other times thereafter in
her residence at No. 7104 San Maximo Street,
Makati City. Instead of asking questions to elicit the
facts and circumstances before and during the
commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked
Lucelle to identify her signature in her sworn
statement and to affirm the truth of its contents. She
did so. He then declared the he had no more
questions to ask for direct examination. The sworn
statement contained the manner as to how the
accused violated the victim (with balisong,
happened several times etc)
On clarificatory question by the Court,
appellant testified as to the manner of commission
of the crime. On re-direct examination, when asked
why she did not respond to the questions
propounded to her during the previous hearings
and why she had been crying in open court,
Lucelle replied that she was afraid of her uncle, the
appellant.
Father testified that she saw blood on the
underwear of the victim. When asked, she merely
said that it was menstruation so he gave her money
to buy napkin. Mother testified that one night, she
was surprised that her daughter is not sleeping
beside her. When she went to her other daughter’s
room, she was surprised to see her daughter
sleeping beside the accused. She wanted to talk
with accused but failed when she saw him playing
with his balisong. Lastly, she was surprised to see
accused leaving the bathroom sweaty before her
daughter left the same bathroom, pale and afraid.
This prompted her to go to the Barangay where
victim told the sexual abuse.
The barangay chairman asked the
appellant if he raped Lucelle and the latter replied
that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared
in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which
the appellant admitted that he raped Lucelle in
February 1997, and on March 2, 1997. Such was
signed by the accused. In the Makati Police Head
Quarters, a police conducted a custodial
investigation of the appellant who was without
counsel during which the latter admitted having
raped the victim.
However, when prosecution offered in
evidence the appellants Sinumpaang
Salaysay before the barangay chairman the
appellant objected to its admission on the ground
that the appellant was not assisted by counsel and
that, he was forced and coerced into signing the
same. The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to
the admissibility of Lucelles sworn statement on the
ground that she was incompetent to give the same
23 | RULE 116
because of her mental illness. However, both were
admitted by Trial Court.
After the prosecution had rested its case,
the trial court reset the hearing to November 5,
1997 for the appellant to adduce his evidence.
When the case was called for trial on that date, his
counsel manifested to the court that the appellant
was changing his plea from not guilty to guilty in the
rape cases. As to the acts of lasciviousness cases,
he manifested that he would no longer adduce
any evidence in his defense because
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein.
The trial court suspended the proceedings
and gave the appellant forty-five minutes to confer
with his counsel. When trial resumed, the appellant
reiterated his earlier manifestation. When told by
the court that he could be sentenced to death for
the rape charges, the appellant stood pat on his
decision. Hence, convicted of death for rape and
8-15 years of prison for acts of lasciviousness.
The trial court declared that
prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the
prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the appellant for qualified
rape. Appellant does not contest his conviction for
rape but merely wishes that he be not sanctioned
death penalty due to his remorse as shown in his
plea of guilt.
Issue: Whether or not the plead of guilty of the
accused was properly made.
Held:
Appellants plea of guilty was not properly
made. He was charged with a criminal offense.
When the appellant informed the trial court of his
decision to change his plea of not guilty to guilty, it
behooved the trial court to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
Courts must proceed with extreme care where the
imposable penalty is death, considering that the
execution of such sentence is irrevocable. There is
no hard and fast rule as to how the trial judge may
conduct a searching inquiry. It has been held,
however, that the focus of the inquiry must be on
the
the voluntariness of the plea and the full or
complete comprehension by the accused of his
plea of guilty.
However, In People vs. Aranzado, we
formulated the following guidelines as to how the
trial court may conduct its searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he
was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
even
was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. These the court shall do in order to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent or avenging quarters.
(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as
to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed plea of guilty.
24 | RULE 116
(4) Inform the accused the exact length
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. Not infrequently indeed an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or
upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he
admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the
judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
(5) Require the accused to fully narrate the incident
that spawned the charges against him or make him
reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the
crime, or cause him to supply missing details or
significance
In People v Ostia, it was also held that also
required to probe thoroughly into the reasons or
motivations, as well as the facts and circumstances
for a change of plea of the accused and his
comprehension of his plea; explain to him the
elements of the crime for which he is charged as
well as the nature and effect of any modifying
circumstances attendant to the commission of the
offense, inclusive of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, as well as the qualifying and special
qualifying circumstances, and inform him of the
imposable penalty and his civil liabilities for the
crime for which he would plead guilty to.
In this case, the trial court failed to make a
searching inquiry into the appellants voluntariness
and full comprehension of his plea of guilty
First. The trial court did not ask the appellant
his reasons for changing his plea, from not guilty to
that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that
led him to decide to do so. Second. It appears in
the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that
the appellant opted not to avail himself of his right
of to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to
execute a waiver. However, the trial court did not
ask the appellant whether he was assisted by
counsel when he was brought to the Office of the
Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Third. The
trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant
whether he was assisted by counsel when he
executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained
at the barangay hall. Fourth. The trial court failed to
ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a
rape committed in November 1996, when in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he confessed to having
raped the victim only in February 1997 and March
2, 1997. Fifth., the Court did not discuss the elements
of the crime and aggravating circumstances in
clear terms. Sixth, it was not explained to him that
his conviction carries with it civil liability. Seventh.
Neither did the trial court inquire from the
appellants counsel whether the meaning and the
consequences of a guilty plea were explained to
the appellant in a language or dialect known to
and understood by him. Eight. The trial court failed
to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his
age, educational attainment and socio-economic
status. Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the
appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances
surrounding the incident of qualified rape Tenth.
The appellant was not asked if he desired to
adduce evidence.
As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions
based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when
such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory
judgment. However, where the trial court receives,
independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to
determine whether the accused committed the
crimes charged he may still be convicted if there is
25 | RULE 116
ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea
of guilty, on which to predicate conviction
However, upon review of the evidence on
record, Court is convinced that the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The
victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct
examination and her testimony on clarificatory
questions that accused raped her.
By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of
evidence which does not derive its value solely
from the credence to be attributed to the witness
herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and
competence of some persons from whom the
witness has received the information. The basis for
the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such
testimony is not subject to the test which can
ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth
of testimony, since the declarant is not present and
available for cross-examination. In criminal cases,
the admission of hearsay evidence would be a
violation of the constitutional provision while the
accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-
examine the witness testifying against him. In this
case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of
the contents of her sworn statement which she
herself had given.
Also, although the appellant was not
assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he
signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence
against him because he was not under arrest nor
under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement.
18. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PAULINO SEVILLENO y
VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused
-appellant.
G.R. No. 129058 March 29, 1999
FACTS:
On July 25, 1995, appellant Paulino Sevilleno y
Villanueva alias Tamayo was charged with rape
with homicide in an Information which reads:
That on or about 10:00 o’clock a.m., July 22, 1995 at
Hacienda San Antonio, Barangay Guadalupe, San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of one VIRGINIA BAKIA, a minor, 9 years
of age, against the latter’s will and consent; and
after attaining his purpose of ravishing said Virginia
Bakia, accused, did, then and there, with intent to
hide his identity and to prevent discovery thereof,
with intent to kill, strangled said Virginia Bakia which
directly resulted to her death
On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea.
Trial proceeded to determine the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the plea. However, during the
pendency of the proceedings, appellant escaped
from prison but he was recaptured several months
later.
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a nine
(9)-year old girl the Regional Trial Court of San
Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Br. 57, on 6 March
1997, rendered its Decision finding accused guilty of
rape with homicide and sentenced him to death.
This case is now on automatic review. The defense
contends that the court a quo erred in convicting
the accused and imposing upon him the penalty of
death as it failed to observe the required
procedure for cases where the accused pleads
26 | RULE 116
guilty to a capital offense when arraigned. 12 The
defense also argues that the arraignment
conducted by the trial court was null and void as it
did not conduct a "searching inquiry" before
accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the
accused to death. It concludes that since the
arraignment was fatally defective and not in
accordance with law, the case must be remanded
to the court of origin for the proper arraignment of
the accused before the capital punishment may
be imposed.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in
conducting a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of the accused
Held: YES
Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea. It
must also require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of his culpability. If the
accused so desires he may also present evidence
in his behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a
judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse
of discretion. 13
The questions propounded by the trial judge during
arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite searching
inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2)
questions propounded to the accused: First. Do you
understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you
know that your plea of guilt could bring death
penalty?
In every case where the accused enters a plea of
guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an
ignorant person with little or no education, the
proper and prudent course to follow is to take such
evidence as are available and necessary in support
of the material allegations of the information,
including the aggravating circumstances therein
enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea. 14
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to
explain the essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide with which the accused was
charged. On the same note, the trial judge also
failed to inform the accused the certainty by which
the death penalty would be imposed on him and
the fact that he would also be made to indemnify
the heirs of his victim. As a result, the accused was
not properly accorded his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled against him. 15 Thus, it is with apprehension
that ruling for the affirmance of the decision in this
case will prejudice the due observance of the
fundamental requirements of fairness and due
process. 16 The constitutional rights of the accused
are for the protection of the guilty and of the
innocent alike. Only with the assurance that even
the guilty shall be given the benefit of every
constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure
in the same rights.
19. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ERNESTO M.
MENDOZA G.R. No. L-80845 March 14, 1994
FACTS:
This is a petition assailing the judgment of
respondent Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim.
Case No. 4264 acquitting accused Juan Magalop y
Salvacion, private respondent herein, of the crime
of robbery with force upon things notwithstanding
his plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that respondent
Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment
exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose upon
him the proper penalty for the offense to which he
pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the
storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was
ransacked. After an on-the-spot investigation, the
police found themselves at a loss as to the identity
of the culprit or culprits. The value of the missing
articles was estimated at P15,298.15.
27 | RULE 116
 that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie
Tan, which the prosecution could have proved to
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force
show that the possessors of the stolen things could
upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y
have been identified as the thief or thieves; hence,
Salvacion, Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte
the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of
Dahilan alias Ricky. All three (3) were represented
the accused beyond doubt (emphasis supplied).
by District Citizens Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the
arraignment on 23 June 1987, Magalop pleaded
"guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty." The
Petitioner interposed the decision and submits that
arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not
the accused Magalop, who was assisted by
mentally well."
counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery
with force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the
alternative but to pronounce judgment and impose
court a quo conducted trial. The prosecution
the proper penalty.
presented Pat. Jakosalem, INP, who investigated
the break-in, as well as a clerk and a storekeeper of
the BNSHI. The prosecution likewise offered in
ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of Magalop was
evidence colored pictures of the ransacked
intelligently made
storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue, a
pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping
saw. The last three items were said to have been
recovered by the police. HELD: NO

On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted
accused Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier
pleaded guilty to the charge.
The trial court ruled that:
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some
of the stolen things were in the possession of a
certain Babie Tan, consisting of two pliers and a
saw, and these were all allegedly sold to said Babie
Tan who refused to testify on the matter.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused
admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full
knowledge and understanding of the precise
nature of the crime charged in the information as
well as the consequences of his plea.4 It is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the
offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend
oneself from said charge and leaves the court with
no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by
law under the circumstances.5 Thus, under the 1985
New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital
offense, the court may receive evidence from the
parties to determine the penalty to be imposed.6

The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove

that the three accused were responsible for
stealing these three articles or tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not
shown who (how?) they conspired and helped
each other in the commission of the crime
charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan Magalop
was not intelligently done. In the course of the
proceedings, it was not established how Juan
Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez participated in
the looting. No evidence was introduced to show
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a
clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to
persist in holding the accused bound to his
admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly
when the totality of the evidence points to his
acquittal. There is no rule which provides that simply
because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge
that his conviction automatically follows. Additional
evidence independent of the plea may be
considered to convince the judge that it was
intelligently made.

28 | RULE 116
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case
of the prosecution against the three (3) accused
was virtually non-existent as the asported articles
were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan
and yet, quite inexplicably, the prosecution did not
summon him to the witness stand. Babie Tan could
have positively identified those who sold him the
stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very
well have been the perpetrator of the crime
himself. In the absence of an explanation of how
one has come into possession of stolen effects, the
possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime
of robbery.
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute
exhibits introduced during the trial could breathe
life into the moribund state of the case for the
prosecution. While the loss of articles in the
storeroom of the BNSHI was established, there was
nothing, independent of the acknowledgment of
guilt, which could link accused Magalop to the
robbery. As the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea
of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."
20. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-2809 March 22, 1950
FACTS
Frisco Holgado was charged with slight illegal
detention because according to the information,
being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one
Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado
for about eight hours thereby depriving said
Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty."
Upon arraignment, the accused, who was unaided
by counsel, pleaded guilty to the information.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the accused; without any evidence to
determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
ISSUE
WON the proceedings in the trial court were in
accordance with the Rules of Court?
RULING
NO. When a defendant appears without attorney,
the court has four important duties to comply with:
1 — It must inform the defendant that it is his right to
have attorney before being arraigned; 2 — After
giving him such information the court must ask him if
he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 — If he desires
and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 — If
the accused desires to procure an attorney of his
own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by
the trial court. The record discloses that said court
did not inform the accused of his right to have an
attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of
one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not
the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant
him reasonable time to procure or assign an
attorney de oficio. The question asked by the court
to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or
are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a
question fail to inform the accused that it was his
right to have an attorney before arraignment, but,
what is worse, the question was so framed that it
could have been construed by the accused as a
suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he
had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing
in violation of the due process clause contained in
our Constitution.
21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-
appellant.
G.R. No. 122770 January 16, 1998
FACTS
The PNP endorsed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor the complaint of Eden Agbayani
(hereafter EDEN) for rape against her father, herein
accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza.
After appropriate preliminary investigation, a
complaint for rape was filed against appellant. At
his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the
merits immediately followed.
The defense presented EDEN’s affidavit of
desistance. On rebuttal, however, the prosecution
had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted
her affidavit of desistance and claimed that she
had signed it under coercion by her mother and
elder sister.
29 | RULE 116
The trial court ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily
execute the affidavit of desistance, as it was
procured "at the behest of her mother and sister for
whom the sanctity of the family and the family's
good name were more important than demanding
punishment for whatever injury the complainant
might have suffered in the hands of the accused."
Besides, even assuming arguendo that no such
pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the
trial court declared that it understood EDEN's moral
predicament, viz., for a child like EDEN, it was
difficult to charge her own father with rape; insist on
his punishment; and thereby inflict emotional stress
and financial strain upon the members of her
family, particularly her mother. Accordingly, the trial
courtrendered judgment against appellant.
Appellant, through his new counsel de
parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and Domingo
Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground
that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial
rights were committed during the trial. The trial court
denied the motion for new trial for being devoid of
merit and for not being within the purview of
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.
In his Appellant's Brief, he contends thatthe lower
court failed to apprise him of his right to have
counsel of his own choice; and the lower court did
not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial,
despite the mandated period of two days
prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of their right to
have counsel is sufficient ground to
reverse the judgment of conviction and
to send the case back for a new trial.
(2) Whether the 2-day period to prepare for
trial provided in Sec. 9 of Rule 116 is
mandatory.
RULING
(1)
NO. It is settled that the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised
the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient
ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that
the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been
held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court
failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel,
it will be presumed that the accused was informed
by the court of such right. If we should insist on
finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen
can be punished for an offense against the laws,
we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled
license to crime. Much must be left to intendment
and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do
things correctly than to describe them correctly."
(2)
The 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in
Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and does
not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial
after arraignment, especially if the defense, as
here, consented thereto. It would have been
entirely different if the defense did not agree, in
which case the court would have no other
alternative but to grant him the period.
Also, it must be pointed out that the right must be
expressly demanded. Only when so demanded
does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a
ground for new trial. Further, such right may be
waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case,
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial,
hence, he effectively waived such right.
22. G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Appellant was charged with murder in an
Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-
Ata.
In view of appellant's allegation that he was denied
his right to counsel, a narration of the proceedings
before the trial court is now in order. Arraignment
was set by the trial court on January 8, 1991, during
which appellant appeared without counsel.
Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty.
Wilfredo Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the
arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that
the arraignment be reset and that he be given time
30 | RULE 116
to engage a counsel of his own choice, which the
trial court granted.
On February 11, 1991, appellant appeared without
a counsel de parte. He was nonetheless arraigned
with the assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo
Lina-ac. He pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial was
waived and trial was set on April 22, May 6 and 13,
1991 for the reception of the prosecution evidence
and June 3 and 17, 1991 for the defense.
The hearings scheduled on April 22, 1991 and May
6, 1991 were cancelled on motion of Public
Prosecutor Robert H. Tobia. 7 On both dates,
appellant appeared with Atty. Lina-ac. On May 13
and June 3, 1991, trial proceeded with the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses. On behalf of
appellant, Atty. Lina-ac cross-examined the said
witnesses.
On June 17, 1991, trial was again cancelled as
appellant appeared without counsel. 8 On August
13, 1991, the prosecution rested its case.
On November 4 and 11, 1991, presentation of
evidence for the defense was reset as appellant
was not ready to testify and he manifested his
intention to secure the services of a counsel de
parte. On March 3, 1992, Atty. Lina-ac was relieved
as counsel de oficio in view of appellant's
manifestation and refusal to cooperate with said
counsel. On April 6, 1992 appellant appeared
without counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint
another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano.
Counsels for both parties agreed to reset the trial,
but appellant refused to sign the minutes of the
proceedings.
On April 27, 1992, over vehement objection from
the prosecution, hearing was reset for the last time
as appellant was still looking for a counsel de
parte. On August 25, 1992, appellant appeared
without counsel; thus, the trial court appointed Atty.
Bonifacia Garcia of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO) as appellant's counsel de oficio. Again, trial
was postponed. On September 1 and October 19,
1992, trial was postponed on motion of Atty.
Garcia. Appellant again refused to sign the minutes
of the proceedings for both trial dates. On
November 5, 1992, appellant refused to cooperate
with Atty. Garcia by declining to take the witness
stand, forcing the defense to rest its case. Both
parties were ordered to submit their respective
memoranda in ten days, after which the case
would be submitted for decision. Atty. Garcia was
further ordered to manifest within the same period
whether appellant would change his mind and
cooperate with her. No memorandum or
manifestation was ever filed by appellant.
Appellant wrote Judge Angeles three times within
the period beginning December 16, 1992 until April
2, 1993, seeking legal advice and the early
resolution of the case. Branch Clerk of Court
Melchisedek A. Guan replied to him twice,
informing him that Judge Angeles was prohibited
by law from giving legal advice to litigants in cases
pending in his court and that a decision was
forthcoming. On July 13, 1994, appellant wrote
Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez,
asking for the early resolution of his case. The latter
referred said letter to Judge Angeles for
appropriate action.
Thereafter, the assailed Decision convicting
appellant of murder was promulgated on August
23, 1994.
Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant
on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. Appellant was positively identified as
the assailant by the widow, Adelaida Alcantara,
who survived his attack. In her distinct and vivid
narration of the sequence of events leading to the
murder, she showed that the attack was
treacherous as the victim was stabbed at the back
and without warning.
Issue: whether the defendant-appellant was not
given time to engage counsel of his own choice
and the chance to present evidence for his
defense.
Ruling: NO
Appellant had been given ample time to secure
the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such
counsel and his act of allowing this situation to
continue until the presentation of his evidence
betrays his lack of intention to do so. It even
appears that he was merely delaying his own
presentation of evidence on purpose to the
prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and
the orderly administration of justice.
Furthermore, appellant did not demonstrate in what
way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance
substantiating his claim that he was not effectively
represented. In short, he was afforded a chance to
be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by his
own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such
right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two
31 | RULE 116
years 37 since appellant first invoked his right to be
represented by counsel de parte, he still could not
find one who would suit his needs and desires.
Neither did he cooperate with his court-named
lawyers.
The facts of this case do not constitute a
deprivation of appellant's constitutional right to
counsel because he was adequately represented
by three court-appointed lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac,
Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not
required to await indefinitely the pleasure and
convenience of the accused as they are also
mandated to promote the speedy and orderly
administration of justice. Nor should they
countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules.
Indeed, public policy requires that the trial continue
as scheduled, considering that appellant was
adequately represented by counsels who were not
shown to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise
unable to represent him.
In spite of appellant's failure, either through
negligence or unreasonable refusal, to impute
errors to the assailed Decision — other than the
alleged violation of his right to counsel — this Court
nonetheless scoured the records of the trial,
perused the transcripts of the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution, evaluated the
evidence and examined the applicable laws and
jurisprudence to determine the correctness of the
trial court's Decision. We, however, find no cogent
reason to reverse the conviction of appellant. In a
case of murder or homicide, it is enough that the
death of the victim and the responsibility of the
person who caused such death are
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Both elements
38
were duly established by the prosecution witnesses.
Dr. Gajardo testified to the fact of death while
Widow Adelaida Alcantara positively identified the
appellant as the assailant.
(we must know ) x x x x x x x x x x x The right
of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the
Constitution, the supreme law of the land. This right
is granted to minimize the imbalance in the
adversarial system where the accused is pitted
against the awesome prosecutory machinery of the
state.
The right covers the period beginning from
custodial investigation, well into the rendition of
judgment, and even on appeal. Section 12 and 14
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right
to an accused not only during trial but even before
an information is filed.
With these precepts as springboard, the Rules of
Court grants an accused the right to counsel under
section 7 Rule 112, Section 14 Rule 113, and Section
1 Rule 115.
Section 6 and 7 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
makes it compulsory that the trial court inform the
accused of his right to counsel prior to arraignment.
Even on appeal, the accused is still afforded the
right to counsel under Sec 13 Rule 122.
The foregoing is buttressed by another provision in
Section 2 Rule 124.
Recently, Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted
providing, inter alia, that any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
Accordingly, an accused may exercise his right to
counsel by electing to be represented either by a
court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own
choice. While his right to be represented by counsel
is immutable, his option to secure the services of
counsel de parte, however, is not absolute. The
court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain a
counsel of choice against the states's and the
offended party's equally important right to speedy
and adequate justice. Thus, the court may restrict
the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte if
the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or the chosen counsel is not a member of
the bar, or the attorney declines to represent the
accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest
and the like.
Also, the right to counsel de parte is, like other
personal rights, waivable so long as (1) the waiver is
not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs; or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law and (2) the
waiver is unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently
made. xxxxxxxxxxxx
23. G.R. No. 72994 January 23, 1991
FELICISIMO ROCABERTE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. ANDRES S.
32 | RULE 116
SANTOS, Judge, RTC, Tagbilaran,
Bohol, respondents.
Lilio L. Amora for petitioner.
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:
The case at bar treats of the sufficiency of the
averment in the information of the time of the
commission of the felony of theft ascribed to
petitioner Felicisimo Rocaberte and two (2) others.
The accused, thru counsel de officio, Atty. Lilio L.
Amora, moved to quash the information,3 alleging
that the statement of the time of commission of the
felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, . . .
a period of seven years," or "about 2,551 days," was
fatally defective: there was "so great a gap as to
defy approximation in the commission of one and
the same offense" (citing Peo. v. Reyes, 108 SCRA
203); "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused
for it violates their constitutional right to be informed
before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves . . ." (invoking Peo. v. Openia, 98 Phil.
698).
Issue:Whether the statement of the time of
commission of the felony charged, "from 1977 to
December 1983, . . . a period of seven years," or
"about 2,551 days," was fatally defective.
Ruling: Yes
The statement of the time of the commission of the
offense which is so general as to span a number of
yearshas been held to be fatally defective because
it deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare
his defense.
A defect in the averment as to the time of the
commission of the crime charged is not, however, a
ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for quashal
on that account will be denied since the defect is
one that can be cured by amendment; instead,
the court shall order the amendment to be made
by stating the time with particularity.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to
allege the time of the commission of the offense
with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of
particulars, provided for in Section 6, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court of 1964.
Bill of particulars. — Defendant may, at the
time of or before arraignment, move for or
demand a more definite statement or a bill
of particulars of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to plead
or prepare for trial. The motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the
details desired.
From all that has been said, the conclusion should
be clear. The information against petitioner
Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on
him and his co-accused the unfair and
unreasonable burden of having to recall their
activities over a span of more than 2,500 days. It is a
burden nobody should be made to bear. The
public prosecutor must make more definite and
particular the time of the commission of the crime
of theft attributed to Rocaberte and his co-
defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot
be maintained, the case must be dismissed.
26. People vs Alcalde
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL ALCALDE y
PASCASIO
G.R. Nos. 139225-28 ; May 29, 2002
Facts:
ARNEL convicted of two counts of parricide
committed against his wife and his 11-month-old
son and two counts of frustrated parricide
committed against his two daughters.
Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by
a counsel de parte, acted strangely in a manner as
if he [was] out of touch with the world and would
not utter any word. The trial court entered for him a
plea of not guilty in each of the cases. On the same
occasion, the defense waived pre-trial. The cases
were then consolidated and jointly tried.
After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense
counsel for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the
33 | RULE 116
trial court of his inability to communicate with
ARNEL because of ARNEL’s “out of touch of the
world” behavior. Atty. Vasquez manifested that the
defense was constrained to submit the case for
decision.
In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de
parte asked for the suspension of the arraignment
on the ground of mental incapacity. The OSG
maintains that such failure was tantamount to an
admission that ARNEL was not suffering from any
mental disorder or to a waiver of the right to move
for suspension of arraignment.
the trial court must be fully satisfied that the
accused would have a fair trial with the assistance
the law secures or gives
Even if Atty. Vasquez’s zeal for ARNEL’s cause fell
short of that required of him, that is, for him to have
asked the court to suspend the arraignment of
ARNEL on the ground of the latter’s unsound mental
health, the greater demand of due process
overwhelms such inadequate zeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not ARNEL’s arraignment was

valid (as he was in a questionable mental state).

Held: Invalid.

It must be recalled that ARNEL’s arraignment was

on 22 October 1997. At the time, what was
applicable was Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Nowhere in that
Section was it required that a motion by the
accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment.
Hence, the absence of such motion could not be
considered a waiver of the right to a suspension of
arraignment.

Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, which was invoked by the OSG, requires
a motion by the proper party. This new requirement
of “motion by the proper party” could not be
applied to these cases because the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such
requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000.

Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and

intelligently made by the person possessing such
right. Unfortunately, ARNEL was apparently
deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no waiver,
impliedly or expressly, could have been made by
ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason of
his mental condition.

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature

and cause of the accusation against him under the
Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation
to effectively convey to the accused the
information to enable him to effectively prepare for
his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial.
While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition
of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is
sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings,
34 | RULE 116