Lagcao vs Labra GR 155746 Topic: Legislation of LGU

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must
be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property
should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled
out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a
socialized housing project [Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004].

In Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004, the Supreme Court said that
condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion, or the random expropriation of
small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters, is certainly not the condemnation
for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This deprives a citizen of his property for the
convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. Moreover, prior to the passage of
Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’ property, as
required by Sec. 19, R.A. 7160.

Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. R.A. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — the governing law which
deals with the subject of urban land reform and housing — provides the order in which lands may be
acquired for socialized housing, and very explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privately-
owned lands rank last (6th) in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. Expropriation
proceedings may, therefore, be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because they are the only
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is
expropriated for public use. This was reiterated in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October
13, 2004].

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can exercise the power only
when expressly authorized by the Legislature. Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code confers such
power to local governments, but the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory requirements
[Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006; Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No.
155746, October 3, 2004].
Gonzales vs Macaraig GR 87636 Topic: Statutes Proper

APPROVAL OF BILLS Art VI, Sec 27.

The President’s item-veto power in an appropriation bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion.

However, “inappropriate provisions” have no place in an appropriations bill; it can thus be vetoed
separately from an item [without doing violence to the limitation on the President’s item-veto power]

Facts. Petitioners assail the validity of the presidential vetoes on Sec 55 of the GAA of 1989 and the
substantially similar provision in the GAA of 1990, Sec 16. Said Sec 55 provides that appropriations
items recommended by the President in the budget submitted to Congress which has been reduced
or disapproved shall not be restored or increased using appropriations authorized for other purposes
by augmentation. Notwithstanding being previously vetoed, Sec 55 was subsequently substantially
reproduced in Sec 16 for FY ’90 but was attached as a condition for some other item.

Issue. Did the President exceed her item-veto power accorded by the Constitution (Art VI, Sec 27(2))?

Held. No. Veto is valid where the provision in the Appropriations bill is deemed inappropriate pursuant
to Art VI, Sec 25(2). Sec 55 (FY ’89) and Sec 16 (FY ’90) were deemed inappropriate and are thus
validly subject to veto for the following reasons: (1) does not “relate to any particular appropriation”
but applies more to a general policy in respect to augmentation from savings, and (2) it is repugnant to
Art VI, sec 25(5), impairing the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item
from savings xxx. Concededly, the Congress may attach conditions in an appropriation (as in Sec 16
for FY ’90) and the presidential veto power may not strike these out while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand; however, for the rule to apply, these should be appropriate. The conditions must exhibit
a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. The vetoed
provisions are actually general law measures more apt for substantive and, therefore, separate
legislation. Presidential vetoes upheld.
Gonzales v. Macaraig G.R. No. 87636 November 19, 1990

FACTS: Ponente: Melencio‐Herrera, J.

December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 or the General Approprations Bill for
the Fiscal Year of 1989. December 29, 1988 President signed the bill into law (R.A. No. 6688). Seven
(7) Special Provisions and Section 55 a “General Provision” were vetoed. A substantially similar
provision as the vetoed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations Act of 1990, particularly Section 16.

ISSUES:

(i) Whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY’89) and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16
FY’90) is unconstitutional and without effect

(ii) Whether or not the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of the nature of legislative
powers

HELD:

(i) The veto is upheld because the sections are considered as items and not some general provision of
law, which is within the veto power of the President under Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution.

(ii) The exercise of veto power by the President was not in the nature of legislative powers as there are
constitutional laws that allow for the augmentation from savings.

RATIONALE:

(i) “Item” in a bill refers to the particulars the details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill.

> The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in
the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein.

> Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90 are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, as
inferred from Section 25(2) of 1987 Constitution: The provision should relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein.(1) The vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive
appropriation, they apply to generally all the items.

(2) The disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the fact of the Bill.

(3) The vetoed Sections are more of an expression of the Congressional policy in respect of
augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.

(ii) There is a rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation
while allowing the appropriation itself to stand. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be
such in the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate
legislation. Section 55 FY’89 and Section 16 FY’90 partake more of a curtailment on the power to
augment from savings.

> The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law (Article VI Section 25(5)),
and it has been so authorized by law through Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989.

> The doctrine of separation of powers is not way endangered because the transfer is made within a
department

Agustin vs Court of Appeal GR 107846 Topic: Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, Law of the
Case

LAW OF THE CASE

Stare decisis is also often confused with the doctrine of "law of the case." The doctrine of "law of the
case" provides that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or
decision, continues to be the law of the case between the same parties in the same case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.5 2 As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal
of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, and the
remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved is to seek a rehearing.

The principle of the law of the case is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to

pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows...

In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 54

Under the doctrine, "when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the cause to the
lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal."55

Lee vs Lui Man Chong GR 209535 Topic: Stare Decisis, Res Judicata, Law of the
Case

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata means “a
matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.”—
Res judicata means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.” It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction,
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of Res Judicata.—Significantly, the elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a “bar by prior
judgment” would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not
identical causes of action, then res judicata as “conclusiveness of judgment” applies.

Velarde vs School of Social Justice GR 159357 Topic: The Decision

Same; Same; Same; Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are
a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.—Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction
is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in
careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.

Same; Same; Same; Essential Parts of a Good Decision.—In general, the essential parts of a good
decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or
assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and
resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a
prologue as well as an epilogue, especially, in cases in which controversial or novel issues are
involved.