Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay
for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as
a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering
that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of
lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section
3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 155051 : May 29, 2007]

RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
LINGAYEN - DAGUPAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution dated
23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.

The Facts

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3.
Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imelda's
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1
of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of
Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure
was already bothering the priests living in the seminary.3 The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736
has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at
any time of the day.4

On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and

approved Resolution Nos. 1045 and 105.6 Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an
institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to enter
into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 with
an area of 252 square meters.7

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the
situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the
Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the
construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to
discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
[Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:

1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;

2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with iron railings, to cause
to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of the defendants, jointly and severally,
and

3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff the amount of
P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 and the costs of
this suit.

SO ORDERED.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards of
litigation expenses, attorney's fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the
Rural Bank of Anda.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of
respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736 is
public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot and
authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural
Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion and
is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are mere
claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of Appeals
held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and cannot be the
object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736 is for public use,
it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private ownership. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural
Bank of Anda is therefore void.

The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of
Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley are valid.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over Lot 736.
The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management Services in
Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office.9

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the witnesses for
respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking space, and
playground.10

On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot 736
based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality of
Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. However,
these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere claimant of Lot 736.
In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey11 of Lot 736, which was
surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been approved.12 The cadastral
survey was based on the Lot Data Computation13 of Lot 736 which was likewise contracted by
the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the
church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.14 Lot 736 was also used for parking
and playground.15 In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since
Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held in
Hong Hok v. David:16

There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion
of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over
the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no
showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain."

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.17 Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the state."

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without

prior grant from the government.18 Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the
Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

#4

Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-
interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the
best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is
there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

#5

CASE DIGEST: PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs LODOVICO,
RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY, Respondents.

FACTS: On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds: (1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2)
res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and (3) the application has no
factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject
property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the land from a certain
Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in
Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in
1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted
and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed the
said land until 1966, whenoppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their
property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against
Zafra.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property.
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through Assistant
Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the trial court's findings
in its Decision dated June 23, 2005.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE:

Is the piece of land in question alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
HELD: Under Rule 45, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and
that only questions of law may be raised. This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions.
One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court.
Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the
facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. Verily, the rules on
the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land subject thereof is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
#6

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

#9

CASE DIGEST: DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. FUNTILAR (G.R. NO. 68533)

FACTS: Where the land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33
years ago, and is no longer a forest land, and the same has been possessed and cultivated by
the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations.

HELD: The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but
should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. (Director of Lands, et al. v. Funtilar, et al. G.R.
68533. May 23, 1986)

#10

Grey Alba vs Dela Cruz, 17 Phil 61; GR No. 5246, September 16, 1910
Pius Morados
8 years ago
(Land Titles and Deeds – Registration under the Torrens system is a proceeding in rem)

Facts: Petitioner heirs sought the registration of two parcels of agricultural land and the court
entered a decree directing the registration in favor of the petitioners, as co-owners subject to the
usufructuary rights if the widower of the petitioner’s sister. Respondent tenant filed a motion for
the revision of the case upon the ground that he is the absolute owner of the disputed lands,
having inherited them from his father, who had a state grant for the same.

Issue: WON modification of the decree as to exclude said land will prosper.

Held: No, the main principle of registration is to make registered titles indefeasible. Upon the
presentation in court if an application for the registration of the title to lands, the theory under the
Torrens system is that all occupants, adjoining owners, adverse claimants, and other interested
persons are notified of the proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to such
application. In other words, the proceeding is against the world.

A proceeding is in rem when the object of the action is to bar indifferently all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if
anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if true, show
an inconsistent interest.