CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN contractor & allotting 65% of excess of all disbursement revenues for said company. In
Petition for Certiorari to review Sandiganbayan (SB) resolution; 1990
FACTS:
• July 29, 1987 – Republic of the Philippines (RP) thru Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) filed a complaint in Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos,
et al. for reconveyance, reversion, restitution & damages.
• Sept. 3, 1987 – before case against Marcos could be set for hearing, Simplicio
Palanca, in his own behalf as stockholder of Bacolod Real Estate Development
Corporation (BREDCO) along w/other stockholders filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene,
praying that they be allowed to intervene in Marcos’ case since they have a legal interest in
the litigation & the properties for disposition in the said case. They claim that lands
involved in the case are not registered in the name of any of the defendants (Marcos, et
al.) but in the name of BREDCO and Marsteel Consolidated, Inc. Marsteel became
involved because BREDCO stockholders transferred their shares (about 70% of
subscribed capital) to help Marsteel finance reclamation & port development project.
• March 23, 1988 – petitioner (PCGG) filed Motion to Dismiss Answer in Intervention
on the ff.grounds: SB lacks jurisdiction & intervenors have no legal interest.
• June 6, 1988 – SB granted motion to intervene. PCGG moved for reconsideration,
denied.
• PCGG filed petition in SC complaining that by granting motion to intervene, SB
violated a national or public policy embedded in EO No. 1, 2, 4 & related issuances
because:
1. Intervention is a suit/counter-suit against the RP which being a sovereign state cannot
be sued w/o its consent.
2. Cause of action of intervenors is not under SB jurisdiction (PD No. 1606 & EO No.
14). It’s under regular courts or other forums since these are claims between and/or
among Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos & their cronies.
3. Intervenors have no legal interest in matter in litigation.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON SB has jurisdiction over action for intervention. – YES
a. All PCGG cases re: funds, moneys, assets, & properties acquired or
misappropriated by Ferdinand & Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees, whether civil or criminal, & all
incidents arising from, incidental to or related to such cases fall under SB’s exclusive &
original jurisdiction. (Sec. 2, Presidential EO No. 14, cited in PCGG vs. Pena)
b. Intervention is not an independent action. It is supplemental to Marcos’
case. Since SB has jurisdiction over such case then it follows that the motion to intervene
is also under its jurisdiction.
2. WON remedy sought (certiorari) is proper. – NO
a. It has jurisdiction over the case thus whatever error or irregularity it might
have committed in its decision is an error of judgment correctible by appeal & not certiorari.
An appeal requests for review of errors of judgment committed by a court of competent
jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari is used to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack/excess of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can only be used for
such purposes.
b. SC can dismiss the case but because it is of public interest & a matter of
public policy, it will still review alleged errors.
3. WON Palanca & company can intervene. – YES
a. Intervention is allowed when a party has (1) a legal interest in the matter of litigation,
(2) in the success of either parties (3) interest against both parties (4) or if it will be
adversely affected by distribution or disposition of property in custody of court or other
officers. (Rules of Court, Rule 12)
b. In 1961, BREDCO was awarded by Bacolod City a contract to undertake reclamation
& port development of city. BREDCO tied-up with Marsteel in 1975, taking it in as a
1977, BREDCO stockholders transferred 70% of BREDCO capital stocks to Marsteel
Consolidated, Inc. (owner of Marsteel) to enable it to expand its base of negotiation for
loans needed in the projects. These stockholders will be entitled to 35% in excess of all
disbursement revenues. Then in Sept. 1986, PCGG sequestered all assets, properties,
records & documents of Marsteel, MCI & BREDCO. Then, case against Marcos was filed
alleging that Marcos & co-defendants amassed ill-gotten wealth among w/c are BREDCO
lots & shares of stock & prayed that such properties be reconveyed to PCGG plus
damages. BREDCO & MCI were never mentioned in the complaints.
c. Palanca, being one of the stockholders of BREDCO who transferred 70% of
BREDCO shares to MCI and is entitled to 35% of disbursement revenue excess, has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation. His co-intervenors have the same standing too.
d. Palanca and company will be adversely affected by the distribution & disposition of
property currently in Court’s custody. The lots & stocks sequestered belong to BREDCO.
They can’t just stand idly & see their property disposed of w/o asserting their rights.
e. Palanca & company have legal interest in the success of either of the parties
involved, thus they can intervene. There is a possibility that the judgment in this case will
reconvey their properties to PCGG thus, they have legal interest in the success of Marcos
& other defendants.
3. WON intervention amounts to a suit against the State. – NO
a. An intervenor may either join plaintiff in claiming what is sought in the
complaint or the defendant in resisting plaintiff’s claims by filing an answer in intervention.
(Rules of Court)
b. By filing its complaint in intervention, the Government in effect waived its
right to non-suability. (Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.)
c. When an intervention merely resists plaintiff’s claims w/o asking for any
affirmative relief against any party, it cannot be a suit against the State. And in the event
that the State intervenes, that is not tantamount to the State waiving its right to be sued.
(Lim vs. Brownell Jr. and Kagawa)
d. Palanca & company are merely uniting with the defendants in resisting
claims against PCGG & are not asking for any relief or damages against the PCGG. They
merely pray that their properties be excluded from the reconveyance of the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of the defendants to the plaintiff. Thus, this is not a suit or counter-suit
against the RP. They don’t appear to have any controversy w/Marcos, et al. either.
HELD: Petition dismissed.
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. [September 20, 1954]
Facts:
 February 3, 1951 Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental alleging that he
purchased from the shipping commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000 and paying
P50,000 downpayment. He executed a chattel mortgage against the vessel in favour of
the Shipping Commission. The Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel due to
non-payment of the instalment. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines and as
a result the Congress restore to him all right under his original contract with the Shipping
Commission. Pan Oriental Shipping Corporation refused to give to Froilan the vessel.
 February 3, 1951 lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan.
 March 1, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co denied the right of Froilan and it alleged that
the action of the Cabinet was null and void.
 November 10, 1951 after obtaining the intervenor-appelle the Government of the
Philippines filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan failed to pay to the
Shipping Commission the balance, interest and the advances on the insurance premium
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co; that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel.
 November 29, 1951 Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in
intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated
to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option
to purchase.
 November 29, 1951 Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in the
amount of P162,576.93 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration
 February 3, 1952 lower court held that the payment made by Froilan constituted a
payment and a discharge of his obligation to the Government of the Philippines.
 May 10, 1952 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to
dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co., against it on the ground that the
purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government to deliver the vessel to Pan
Oriental in the event that the Government recovers the vessel from Froilan. The motion of
Pan Oriental was dismissed. As a result of the dismissal Pan Oriental appealed the case
Issue: WON the case should be dismissed because the State is immune from suit.
Held: No
Ratio: The Government’s action of filing its complaint in intervention had the effect of waiving its
immunity and right on nonsuability. By taking the initiative in an action against a private party,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The
US SC held that no direct suit can be maintained against the US. But when an action is brought
by the US to recover money in the hands of a party who has legal claim against them, it would
be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in court of justice, and
turn him around to an application to Congress.
MALONG vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS (PNR)
Petition to review order of the CFI of Pangasinan, Branch II, Aug. 7, 1985
FACTS:
• Oct. 30, 1977 – Jaime Aquino, son of petitioners Francisco & Rosalina Malong, was
on board a PNR train. He sat near the door of a coach. The train was overloaded
w/passengers & baggage since All Saints Day was forthcoming. While the train was
between Tarlac & Capas, Jaime fell from the train resulting to his death.
• Malong spouses pray that the PNR be ordered to pay damages amounting to
P136,370.00.
• CFI dismissed complaint saying that it had no jurisdiction over the case because PNR
is a government instrumentality & any action against it is a suit against the State which is
prohibited under Sec. 16, Art. XV, Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the PNR shares the State’s immunity from suit.
HELD: No. CFI dismissal reversed & set aside. Remanded for further proceedings.
RATIO:
1. Manila Railroad Company, PNR’s predecessor, was not immune from suit
under its charter, Act. No. 5440.
2. PNR charter, RA No. 4156 amended by RA No. 6366 & PD No. 741,
provides that PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its
50-year term from 1964-2014. It’s under the Office of the President. Its charter likewise
provides that PNR is to exercise all powers of a railroad corporation under the Corporation
Law, referring to sections 81-102 of the Corporation Law on railroad corporation not
reproduced in the Corporation Code. Sec. 36 of the Corporation Code and Sec. 13(2) of
the Corporation Law state that every corporation has the power to sue & be sued in its
corporate name in every court.
3. State divested itself of sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR w/c is
no different from its predecessor. It did not become immune from suit. Not all government
entities whether corporate or noncorporate are immune from suits. Immunity is determined
by the character of the objects for w/c the entity was organized. (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro & Phil. Airlines, Inc.)
4. When the government enters into a commercial business it abandons its
sovereign capacity & is to be treated like any other private corporation. (Bank of the U.S.
vs. Planters’ Bank) When the State engages in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, it divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character,
subjecting the corporation to rules of law governing private corporations. When the State
acts in its proprietary capacity, it’s bound by rules governing private individuals. When it
contracts with individuals, rules must be adjusted as if both parties are private persons so
that they may both stand on equal grounds. (People vs. Stephens)
5. PNR in this case was not performing any governmental function. It was
engaged in a private enterprise. It does not exercise sovereign functions but it exercises
purely corporate, proprietary or business functions. (National Development Co. vs. Tobias).
Unfair for Jaime’s heirs if they can’t sue negligent PNR employees.
6. Other agencies not immune from suit: SSS & PNB.
ABAD SANTOS, CONCURRING
All corporations organized by the gov’t are its instrumentalities by the very reason of their
creation but that does not automatically immune them from suit. Central Bank is an
instrumentality of the gov’t but it’s not immune from suit for it performs proprietary functions.
*additional notes re reason for State exemption from suit:
1. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical & practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. (Holmes in Kawananakoa vs.
Polyblank)
2. The public service would be hindered & public safety endangered if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen & consequently
controlled in the use & disposition of the means required for the proper administration of
the Government. (The Siren vs. U.S.)
Fontanilla v. Maliaman [February 27, 1991]
Facts:
 Motion for reconsideration of the Court’s Second Division decision in GR no. 61045.
The Solicitor General maintains that NIA on the strength of PD no. 552 and the case of
Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers’ Union that NIA does not perform
solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia,
who was not its special agent.
 Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA. They filed a case for damages
against NIA
Issue: WON the NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary function
Held: Yes NIA is a government agency with juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It can be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who
was not its special agent.
Ratio:
 The irrigation districts in the US are identical with the irrigation system in the
Philippines. As such, it is appropriate to consider certain doctrines from the American
jurisprudence.
o Irrigation district is a public quasi corporation organized however to conduct
a business for the private benefit of the owners of land within its limits. They are
members of the corporation, control its affairs, and alone are benefited by its
operations. It is, in the administration of its business, the owner of its system in a
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must assume and bear the burdens of
proprietary ownership.
o Quasi-public corporation possessed some governmental powers and
exercised some governmental functions, but held that the construction and operation
of its irrigation canals and ditches was a proprietary rather than a governmental
function, and hence the district was responsible in damages for negligent construction
or operation of its canal system.
 Constituent – exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory. Ministrant –
merely the exercise of propriety function and compulsory
 Other corporations that brings public benefit and public welfare are basically
proprietary in nature (telecommunications, electricity)
 NAWASA vs. NWSA Consolidated unions – it was held that NAWASA is not an
agency performing governmental functions rather it performs proprietary functions. The
function of providing water supply and sewerage service are regarded as mere optional
functions of the government even though the service rendered caters to the community as
a whole and the goal is for the general interest of society.
 NIA was not created for the purpose of local government. It is essentially a service
agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact
does not make NIA essentially and purely a “government-function” corporation. NIA was
created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation
project.
 NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government. Also in PD 552 it was provided that NIA can sue and be
sues in court. NIA has its own assets and liabilities and it also has corporate powers to be
exercised by the BOD.
Separate Opinion: Padilla
 NIA is an agency of the government with an original charter. RA 3061 created NIA.
The charter of NIA confers upon it a separate juridical personality to exercise all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. NIA’s primary purpose is to undertake
integrated irrigation projects, by the construction of multiple-purpose water resource
projects to increase agricultural production for the financial uplifting of the people.
 NIA is maintained and operated by the government in the performance of its
governmental function of providing the Filipino people, particularly, the farmers nationwide,
improved irrigation systems to increase the country’s agricultural production. Only the
government has the capacity and facilities to successfully undertake a project or venture of
such magnitude. Fees collected are for cost of operation, maintenance, insurance and
rehabilitation of the irrigation systems.
 The fact that the charter treats NIA as incorporated under the Corporation law and
confers upon it a separate judicial personality is not the test in determining whether it is
performing a governmental or proprietary function. It was held that were the nature of the
duties imposed on an agency and performed by it does not reveal that it was intended to
bring any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit to the government, said agency is
deemed to be exercising a governmental function.
 The charter of NIA provides that it may sue and be sue, thus, the consent of NIA to be
sued has been given. The rule of immunity no longer applies. Is the State liable for
damages? No. The State would be liable for damages when it acts through a special
agent. The Hugo Garcia was not a special agent rather he was NIA”s regular driver. For
the State to be liable Congress should enact an appropriate legislation to compensate the
petitioners and to appropriate the necessary fund for it.
SANTIAGO vs. REPUBLIC
Petition for Certiorari from order of dismissal of CFI Zamboanga, 1978
FACTS:
• Jan. 1971 - Ildefonso Santiago & his wife donated a land to the Bureau of Plant
Industry on the condition that lighting & water facilities will be installed and an office
building & parking lot will be built on said land which should be ready for occupancy on or
before Dec. 7, 1974.
• Bureau failed to meet the conditions thus, Santiago filed this case against the RP thru
the Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of the deed of donation.
• CFI – granted RP’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the state can’t be sued w/o
its consent.
ISSUE: WON Santiago can sue the Bureau of Plant Industry.
HELD: Yes. Petition granted. CFI ordered to proceed with case.
RATIO:
1. Admittedly, state cannot be sued w/o its consent. Government departments, bureaus,
agencies, offices or instrumentalities cannot be sued either if the suit would result in
adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in disbursements of funds/loss of
property. (Del Mar vs. Philippine Veterans Administration) This principle has been implicit
in the 1935 Constitution (Republic vs. Purisima) thus, issue of its retroactivity as raised by
the petitioner is immaterial.
2. However, it would be unfair to cloak the State with immunity when it has violated an
agreement wherein it has received gratuitously a certain property w/o fulfilling the terms of
the agreement. This is offensive to one’s sense of justice. The government should set the
example. Since the State can waive its immunity from suit impliedly, the case at bar should
prosper. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen (Ministerio vs. CFI Cebu). Thus when the State commits an
injustice against a citizen, it implies waiver of its immunity. Bureau of Plant Industry’s
failure to abide by the conditions under w/c the donation was given presumes that it gave
its consent to be sued. There being no money claim, it will not affect the State’s treasury. A
donor, w/ RP as donee, is entitled to go to court when there is a breach of the conditions of
such donation. The State benefited from the contract and when it ignores its obligations,
the people might lose its confidence on the State.
*additional notes:
1. The doctrine of the non-suability of the State is a corollary of the positivist concept of
law w/c according to Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state,
in itself the source of the law on w/c such a right may be predicated. It is in consideration of
the vastly expanded role of the government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to
promote general welfare. (Mobile Phil. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service).
2. A government-owned & controlled corporation has a personality of its own distinct &
separate from that of the government. It may sue & be sued & may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation. (National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR).
3. An action against the government officials is essentially one against the government.
(Araneta vs. Gatmaitan)
4. Basic & fundamental principle of the law that the gov’t can’t be sued before courts of
justice w/o its consent covers with the mantle of its protection an entity such as the Angat
River Irrigation System. (Angat River Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers Union)
5. Bureau of Cusotms acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability of
the State. The claimant’s remedy to recover the loss or damage to the goods under the
custody of such service is to file a claim w/ the Commission on Audit as contemplated in
Act No. 3803 & Commonwealth Act No. 327.
Amigable vs. Cuenca [February 29, 1972]
Appeal from a decision of the COFI of Cebu
Facts:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
 Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 630 of Banilad Estate in Cebu
City. There is no annotation (appearing at the back of the certificate) in favour of the
government of any right or interest in the property in the property . Without any
expropriation proceeding the government used a portion of his property to widen the
Mango and Gorordo Avenues. These two avenues were already existing since 1921.
 March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting
payment for his lot. His claim was indorsed to the Auditor Genral who disallowed it.
 February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint. The complaint was
amended in April 17, 1959. Defendants – Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,
in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highway. Amigable wanted to recover his
property from the Government.
 Defendant denied the allegations on the following grounds:
o Action was premature because the claim was not filed with the Office of the
Auditor General
o Right of action for recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff,
if any, had already prescribed
o Suit against the government and the government has not given its consent
for the suit
o It was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in
the Construction of Mango Avenue.
 Court’s decision: no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action and that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. The government in this case did not give
its consent for the suit. Also, the claim for moral damages gas already prescribed.
Issue: WON the Victoria Amable may properly sue the government?
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu – Where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against
the government without thereby violating the doctrine of immunity from suit without its
consent. If the constitutional mandate that the owner is compensated for property taken
for public use is to be respected. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. When the government
takes any property for public use which is conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits jurisdiction of a
court.
 As registered owner she could bring an action to recover possession of the property
in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
 The property cannot be recovered by Amigable. The only relief that is available is for
the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years
ago.
 With regards to damages she is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. Government
should also pay for attorney’s fees.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES
Petition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993
FACTS:
• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US
Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in
Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine Bradford is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG
headquarters as the activity exchange manager.
• Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed,
where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the
parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she
needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to
protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on
that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of
Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to
leave afterwards.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day &
she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are
not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing.
Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her
part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting.
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken.
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive &
discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager.
She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue
embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other
reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride &
dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k.
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing
an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1)
this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2)
Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions
under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the
establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in
bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees,
equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine
procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash &
equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1.
• July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that
Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties
w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.
• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1)
search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-
discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since
her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was
committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the
Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted
w/in or outside her authority.
• RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present
evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of
Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against
Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages,
P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for
Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing
governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not
be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She
claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act
was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under
offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not
possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court
(something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it
should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed
to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have
subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to
dismiss. - NO
Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16,
Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that
Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.
A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for
lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this
petition to the SC.
3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO
Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This
immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an
affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a
case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing.
It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers.
Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against
the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot
be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested
in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred
with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they
have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford
was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official
function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953
Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who
enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations).
HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals[February 23, 2000]
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was allegedly awarded a “verbal contract
of lease” in 1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). NPDC is a
government initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks including
Rizal Park. There was no document or instrument in record to show the grantor of the
verbal license to GABI.
 GABI was given office and library space as well as kiosks area selling food and
drinks. GABI was to remit to NPDC, 40% of the profits derived from operating the kiosks.
(No written proof for this)
 February 29, 1988 Lansang (Chairman of NPDC) terminated the verbal agreement
with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks it ran privately
within the public park. GABI was given until March 8, 1988 to vacate the area. The notice
was signed by the president of GABI – Iglesias (totally blind and he claims that he was
deceived when he signed the document)
 March 8, 1988 GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC and the
court issued a TRO. The TRO expired on March 28, 1988 and the following day GABO
was evicted.
 The RTC dismissed the claim for damages by because the complaint was actually
directed against the state which could not be sued without its consent. GABI cannot claim
damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since it was a mere accommodation
concessionaire. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. The CA
ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity
is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his
authority. The CA observed that the eviction of GABI came at the heels of 2 significant
incidents. (1) Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of NPDC (2) Iglesias
sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and
corruption in NPDC.
Issues:
 WON the CA erred in not holding that private respondents’ complaint against
petitioner, as chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which cannot be sued
without its consent.
 WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner’s act of terminating respondent GABI’s
concession is valid and done in the lawful performance of official duty.
Held:
(1) NO
 The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public
officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. RULE: Suit must be regarded as
one against the state where satisfaction of the judgement against the state where the
satisfaction of the judgement against public official concerned will require the state itself to
perform positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages
awarded to the plaintiff.
 The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for
acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt,
in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also
does not apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
 Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity.
This is evident in paragraph 4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued
allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
(2) NO
There was no evidence of any abuse of authority on the part of Lansang. Public streets, Public
parks are beyond the commerce of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus,
could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in
the park was a matter of accommodation by previous administrators. Lansang may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be ejected from the
park when necessary.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
SHAUF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA
FACTS:
• 1990: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is
a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the
Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and
being a qualified dependent locally available.
• By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal
employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian
personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by
reason of her sex (female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).
• Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser
for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically
selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released
but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer.
During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs.
Abalateo’s appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position.
She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment
as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He
claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the
applicable regulation.
• Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service
Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine Regional Trial Court, etc.
• RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual
damages + 20% of such amount as attorney’s fees + P100k as moral & exemplary
damages.
• Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be
collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that
they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their
official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They
claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under
the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to
exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC
decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
• Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is
not a suit against the US government w/c would require consent.
• Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule
allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is
applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law.
ISSUE: WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces
HELD: Respondents ordered, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100K as
moral damages, P20K for atty’s fees.
RATIO: No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts
or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying
petitioner Shauf.
While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only
contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law &
injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates
the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit
will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen)
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his
private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was
previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an
interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept
the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of
Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly
qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff
Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur
whereas respondents merely denied allegations.
The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities
regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi &
Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to
life. Thus, they should be accountable. Though Shauf is entitled to damages, she should not be
paid for the supposedly unearned income had she been hired as a Guidance Counselor. She
never acquired rights over that amount because she was never appointed.
Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts.
The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to
file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the
initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been
decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise
prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.
Republic vs. Sandoval [March 19, 1993]
Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 9
Facts:
 This case deals with the tragedy that transpired on January 22, 1987. Popularly
known as the Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre. Twelve people died and the
heirs of these people are seeking for retribution. (Girls d ko naisasama ang details ng
massacre… the gist is that the people marched to Mendiola because of failed agrarian
reforms and the police and military were there to defend the palace. There were shooting
and no one knows who started it. End result = some people were killed.)
 Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this case for damages.
 President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission
and in their report the recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified,
uniformed individuals. The most significant recommendation that they made was that the
deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident be compensated by the
government. This recommendation of the commission was the basis of the claim for
damages by the petitioners.
 February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the State cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner maintained that the State has
waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is contrary to both
the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.
Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from suit
Held: No
Ratio
 Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based
on the very essence of sovereignty and on the practical ground that there can be no legal
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests
on reason of public policy – that public policy would be hindered and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and disposition of the means
required for the proper administration of the government.
 Recommendation made by the commission does not in any way mean that liability
automatically attaches to the State. The purpose of the commission as provided for in AO
11 was to have a body that will conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths and
casualties that took place. The findings of the commission shall only serve as the cause of
action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim
 Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it cannot be maintained that such consent
was given in this case. The commission was a fact finding body. The commission was
merely a preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself.
 The case does not qualify as a suit against the state. Some instances when a suit
against the State is proper are
o When the Republic is sued by name
o When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
o When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
 The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain to the government. Based on the
investigation the military officials acted beyond their authority and there was lack of
jurisdiction by the government forces in the use of firearms. The committed a prohibited
act under BP 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers
 The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter himself by plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority.
PNB vs. PABALAN
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari & Mandamus w/ Preliminary Injunction
FACTS:
• Dec. 17, 1970 – writ of execution was issued w/ a notice of garnishment for the sum
of P12,724.66. Said amount belongs to the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration &
deposited with PNB’s La Union branch.
• Execution of writ & garnishment was delayed since PNB objected to the garnishment
& questioned WON Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration really had funds deposited w/
PNB La Union.
• Jan. 25, 1971 – execution of writs & garnishment. It ordered that Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration Funds deposited w/ PNB shall be garnished & delivered to plaintiff
immediately to satisfy Writ of Execution for ½ of the amount awarded in the decision of
Nov. 16, 1970.
• PNB claims that since funds are public in character, a prohibition must be issued
against Pabalan’s orders based on the doctrine of the non-suability of the state.
ISSUE: WON funds of public corporations w/c can sue & be sued are exempt from
garnishment.
HELD: No. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
1. When the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity & is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States vs.
Planters’ Bank) By engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character so as to
render the corporation subject to the rules governing private corporations (Manila Hotel
Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Company). Thus, the doctrine of non-suability
cannot bar or impede a notice of garnishment.
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge. Several cases have
ruled that funds of government-owned entities are not exempt from garnishment (PNB vs.
CIR, National Shipyard & Steel Corporation vs. CIR).
Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals [October 1, 1990]
Petition for review of the decision of the court of appeals
Facts
 Off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by the petitioner Municipal of Makati
against Admiral Finance Creditor Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and Arceli P. Jo.
 June 4, 1987 – The RTC judge fixed the appraised value of the property at
P5,291,666 and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of
P338,160 which was earlier received. The decision became final and executory.
 A notice of garnishment was served upon the PNB Buendia branch but the sheriff
was informed that a hold code was placed on the account of the petitioner
 The City of Makati filed a motion to lift the garnishment on the ground that the manner
of payment should be done in instalment. Also the City of Makati filed a Manifestation that
the private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject property
because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of Philippine
Savings Bank, Inc.
 PSB and the private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they
agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation
proceedings.
 Trial judge issued an order approving the compromise agreement, ordered PNB
Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 and ordered
PSB and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the
subject property in favour of the petitioner
 PNB Buendia branch failed to comply with the order of the court because according to
the branch manager he was still waiting for proper authorization from PNB Head Office.
Issue: WON the account of the City of Makati with PNB can be levied for a money judgement
against the City.
Held: No
Ratio:
 The petitioner alleges for the first time that they have 2 accounts with PNB. Account
no. 265-537154-3 for expropriation of the property with a balance of P99,743.94 and
Account no. 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes with a balance of
P170,098,421.72
 Petitioner contends that amount involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the fund
garnished by the sheriff over P99,743.94 are public funds earmarked for the municipal
government’s other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required by law.
 Account no. 263-530850-7 are public funds and are not subject to levy and execution
unless otherwise provided for by the statute. The properties of a municipality whether real
or personal cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgement
against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fee,
and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution.
 There was no Municipal Ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision. No levy under execution may
be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account no. 263-530850-7.
The remedy for the respondents is a petition for mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Jose Nessia v. Jesus Fermin
Petition for review of the decision of CA, 1993
FACTS:
• 1993: Respondent Mayor Fermin of Victorias, Negros Occidental, ignored deliberately
and refused incessantly to reimburse travel expenses incurred by petitioner Nessia, then
Deputy Municipal Assessor of Victorias. Hence, the latter filed this complaint to recover
damages and reimbursement of expenses. Petitioner further asserts that vouchers were
ignored because he defied the Mayor’s request to register and vote in Victorias in the 1980
local elections.
• Respondent claims that he never received any vouchers indicating expenses. And
even if he did, they wouldn’t be approved for payment because they were submitted late
and was in excess of the budgetary appropriations. Municipality of Victorias sided with
Fermin.
• Nessia filed a complaint against Fermin & Municipality of Victorias. Trial court ruled in
favor of Nessia. According to the RTC, Fermin’s secretary received the vouchers & even if
he did not actually receive them, he would still be liable because he should have made
inquiries upon receipt of Nessia’s follow-up letters.
• Municipality of Victorias did not appeal while Fermin & Nessia appealed to the CA.
Nessia prayed for an increase in the award of moral & exemplary damages while Fermin
sought to be absolved from liability. CA dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
According to the CA, Fermin acted on the vouchers as proven by his denial/refusal of
Nessia’s claims. No proof that he actually received the vouchers and even if he did, he
could have not acted on them because they were submitted late & not supported by an
appropriation.
ISSUE: WON respondent’s inaction on Nessia’s claim is punishable
HELD: Petition granted. Trial court’s decision granted and reaffirmed.
RATIO: Yes, respondent Mayor may be held liable for damages under Art.27 for malicious and
unjust inaction because he did not act on the vouchers. This is in lieu of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which penalizes neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, w/ o
sufficient justification, to act w/in a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the
purpose of discriminating against any interested party. Public officials are called upon to act
expeditiously on matters pending before them. Even if he could have not possibly paid for the
claims due to lack of appropriation, he should have done something about it.
CA did not exactly absolve the Municipality of Victorias. It should be noted that a non-appellant
cannot, on appeal, seek an affirmative relief. Its exoneration was a mere consequence of the
dismissal of the case. Besides, this is immaterial at this point due to the SC’s decision.
City of Caloocan vs. Allarde [September 10, 2003]
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 In 1972 Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant City
Administrator and 17 other positions via the ordinace no. 1749. The affected employees
assailed the legality of the abolition and in 1973 the CFI declared that it was illegal and
ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their back
salaries and other emoluments. The City government appealed the decision but it was
also dismissed.
 During 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 in partial payment of her backwages.
Remaining balance = P530,761.91 The others were paid in full.
 In 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental
budget #3) but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan
were arguing that Santiago was not entitled to back wages.
 On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at a public auction one of the motor
vehicles of the City Government for 100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The
City Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle maintaining that the
properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles.
 October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed ordinance no. 0134 which
included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back salaries, plus interest.
Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City
Treasurer can’t release it because the Mayor refuses to sign the check.
 May 7, 1993 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of
the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
garnishment was forwarded to PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB
that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which
may be caused by the withholding the funds of the city. PNB decided to follow the order of
Judge Allarde.
Issues and Ratio
1. WON the garnishment of the funds of the City if Caloocan still needed authority of the
Mayor to be released – NO
 Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff
seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a 3rd person., or
money owed by such 3rd person or garnishee to the defendant.
 RULE: All government funds deposited in PNB or any other official depositary of the
Philippine Government remains government funds and may not be subject to garnishment
or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Based on
consideration of Public Policy. State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
EXCEPTION: When there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. In such a
case monetary judgement may be legally enforced by judicial process.
 Pasay City Government vs. CFI of Manila – government funds deposited in the PNB
are exempt from execution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has
already been enacted for the payment of the City’s obligation.
 Ordinance no. 0143 was the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
sum that was indicated in the ordinance was deemed automatically segregated from other
budgetary allocation of the City of Caloocan and earmarked solely for the City’s monetary
obligation to her. A valid appropriation lifts its exemption from execution. The
appropriation was duly signed and approved by the council and the mayor.
2. WON the levy and sale at public auction of 3 motor vehicles owned by the City cannot
be attached nor sold in an execution sale to satisfy a money judgement against the
City of Caloocan. – MOOT CASE
Judge Allarde already the levy on the three vehicles thereby formally discharging them from the
jurisdiction of this court.
3. WON the auction of the vehicle was valid. YES
Sheriff complied with the rules on public auction and the administrative complaint acknowledges
that fact. Petitioner cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
13 Republic v. Feliciano
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30,
1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated
August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.
On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area
of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola
by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on
October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria
that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced
various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was
approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started
sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located
within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of
Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the
rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his
title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared
legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the
settlers.
ISSUE: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
RULING: NO
RATIONALE:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative
act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Addt’l: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion
posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23,
1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of
proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances
raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon
by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by
respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares.
Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other
purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
14 Phil Agila Satellite v. Lichauco
FACTS:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of
private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite,
Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official
government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE to PASI
for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28, 1996.
When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital,
conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial payment. When they
requested the Land bank’s confirmation of its participation in a club loan for the government’s
assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T.
Lichauco sent a letter to the bank controverting the said assignment, clearly stating that orbital
slot 153°E can no longer be assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for
several orbital slots including 153ºE in December 1997.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn
that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the
award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint7 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction
to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, declare its nullity, and for damages.
PASI filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco
with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
Because a prejudicial question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed and reconsideration was denied by Order dated
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman
erred in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: WON there exists a prejudicial question, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order
RULING: Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder
of the orbital lot 153°E is, in the civil case declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of
authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of
nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner.
No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that “the
proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon
petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer.” It would sanction
the extiguishment of the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89
vis a vis Article 90 and 91 of the RPC.
The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set
aside. The Ombudsman was Ordered to reinstate the case for further proceedings.
RATIONALE: When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused
by him is his own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34, Political Law,
Isagani Cruz)
15 SAYSON v. SINGSON
FACTS: "In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned various items of
spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District Engineer, Adventor
Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... It was
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is
noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the telegram dated Feb.
21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." ... So, a canvass or public
bidding was conducted on May 5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the
Singkier Motor Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a
letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately deliver
the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00. ...
It would appear that a purchase order signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer
and the Procurement Officer, was addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the
Voucher No. 07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then made
inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding from the indorsements of
the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various
spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M. Secarro a
representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he approved it for payment in the
sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher
with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on
June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967, Highway Auditor
Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of
the General Auditing Office which states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of
spare parts and equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway
auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate action." ... In the interim it
would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass
was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is
the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus
submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price of the
Singkier. ... In view of the overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public
Works in a third indorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a telegram
holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is more, charges for
malversation were filed against the district engineer and the civil engineer involved. It was the
failure of the Highways Auditor, one of the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the
mandamus suit below, with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor
Service, being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract in question
having been upheld. Hence this appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a money claim against
the government, predicated on a contract is valid
RULING: No.
RATIONALE: the claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but
a ordinary action for specific performance. the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel
the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot
prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... . In other words,
the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the
provisions of Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the
government may be
filed:
"In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of
Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to
other persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him."
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the final decision of
the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt
of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the
final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of
the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant is a private
person or entity."
Once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and
be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an
appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General.
Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this
Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.
16 Republic v. Purisima
Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration
in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising
from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs
Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on
the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
WON the respondent’s decision is valid
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Ruling: No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision
of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent."
"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase
Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the
law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give
rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in
business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of
thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private
parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the
statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial
tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited
Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge
that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of
state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still
exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the
public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing
recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance
Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute
as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and
Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
17 E. Meritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands
Facts: This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
cause.
The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura,
passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing
Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the
General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south,
after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is
prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and
long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet
from the southwestern point or from the post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital,
he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in
the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. The plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and
that after having received the injuries, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed
before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now
earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent
of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders
and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for
permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the
time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. Nothing was found in the
record which would justify increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record
shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth
P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days,
which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this the Court thinks there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six
months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty-one days
while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the
whole time. The Court, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,
without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
The petitioner vis-à-vis Act No. 2457 effective February 3, 1915 was authorized to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General to
appear in said suit.
Issue: WON the scope of the Act authorizes the Court to hold that the Government is legally
liable for the said amount
Ruling: No
Rationale: Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on
the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand
between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than
remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the
purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper
or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled.
The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability,
but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the
Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare
liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference,
but would have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in
the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore,
no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the
state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme
Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
According to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a
decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the
state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives
rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial
court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by
an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
18 PNB v. CIR
Rationale:
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations 6 is squarely in point. As
was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The
allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and
that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government owned and controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may
sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation
(Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended."
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 8 this Court,
through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government
enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any
other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations."

Facts:
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate
Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of merit. What was
the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that
sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different matter if, according
deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which
to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed
had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
of a separate and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
funds may be levied upon or garnished.
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged
19 SSS v. CA
on two grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy
Facts:
sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
Sometime in March, 1963 the spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and
garnishment "may be public in character."
were granted a real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Rizal covered by
The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this
TCT No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as collateral. Pursuant to this real estate ban
certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves to quash the
said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage originally in
notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of
the amount of P39,500.00 which was later increased to P48,000.00 covering the
this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court
aforementioned property as shown in their mortgage contract. The plaintiffs complied with their
contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and
monthly payments although there were times when delays were incurred in their monthly
processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial or city
payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month. On July 9, 1968, defendant
sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes
SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate
of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon
mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground that the conditions of the mortgage have
City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve
been broken since October, 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor to pay in full the
the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of said notice is
installments then due and payable on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and, all of the
therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has,
monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the present date.
since June 19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is
Pursuant to this application for foreclosure, the notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio
property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14, 1968 announcing
Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices
the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property. After this first publication of the notice,
of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since
and before the second publication of the notice, plaintiff herein thru counsel formally wrote
his area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At
defendant SSS, a letter dated July 19, 1968 and received on the same date by said entity
this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual
demanding, among others, for SSS to withdraw the foreclosure and discontinue the publication
employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V.
of the notice of sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to-date in the payment of
Manansala, has already been dismissed and that the same became final and executory on
their monthly amortizations. Nothing came out of the telegraphic communications between the
August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case.
parties and the second and third publications of the notice of foreclosure were published
[Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit.
successively in the Sunday Chronicle in its issues of July 21 and 28, 1968.
The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of
Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner,
but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition. On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted
Issue: WON the funds mentioned may be garnished before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney's fees against the
Ruling: No
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, that they had fully and
religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs[(a) P2,500.00 as actual damage;(b)
P35,000.00 as moral damage;(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages; and(d)
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees]. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court’s judgment but
modified it by deducting P5000 to total damages. SSS then filed a petition for review on
certiorari alleging:
I. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that under Condition No. 10 of the Mortgage
contract, which is a self-executing, automatic acceleration clause, all amortizations and
obligations of the mortgagors become ipso jure due and demandable if they at any time fail to
pay any of the amortizations or interest when due;
II. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that a previous notice to the mortgagor was
necessary before the mortgage could be foreclosed;
III. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, assuming that there was negligence
committed by subordinate employees of the SSS in staking 'Socorro C. Cruz' for 'Socorro J.
Cruz' as the defaulting borrower, the fault cannot be attributed to the SSS, much less should the
SSS be made liable for their acts done without its knowledge and authority;
IV. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no extenuating circumstance to
mitigate the liability of petitioner;
V. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioner is not liable for damages not
being a profit-oriented governmental institution but one performing governmental functions
petitions.
Issue: WON SSS can be held liable for damages
Ruling: Yes
Rationale: The amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts
have come to the courts, there should be no question considering that the SSS is a juridical
entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the
Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court.
These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that,
even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing
governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the
Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does
not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for
the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the
SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For
by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this
case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.
As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-
17874, August 31, 1963). Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in
any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort
claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and
that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when
it arises from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the
System.
Under the circumstances of the case, the SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as
awarded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Tribunal nor can the SSS be held liable for moral
and temperate damages. The filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a ground
for an award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil action is not
among the grounds for moral damages. With the ruling out of compensatory, moral and
temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or corrective damages should also be set aside.
However, as found by both the Trial and Appellate Courts, there was clear negligence on the
part of SSS when they mistook the loan account of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private
respondent Socorro C. Cruz. Its attention was called to the error, but it adamantly refused to
acknowledge its mistake. The SSS can be held liable for nominal damages. This type of
damages is not for the purpose of indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by
them but to vindicate or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner
SSS.
20. BENITO E. LIM, as administrator of the Intestate Estate of Arsenia Enriquez, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., Attorney General of the United States, and ASAICHI
KAGAWA, defendants-appellee, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.
FACTS:
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila. The
lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States
to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. Alien
Property Custodian, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots
Nos. 1 and 2.
On July, 6, 1948 The Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien Property
Custodian) under the authority of the same statute, issued a supplemental vesting order,
vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
The Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the United
States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two formal agreements, one referring to
Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said Administrator transferred all the
said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines .The transfer agreements were executed.
On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito
E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator. The notice was subsequently amended to permit Lim to prosecute the claim as
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Arsenia Enriquez, thus, in effect,
substituting the intestate estate as the claimant, it being alleged that the lots were once the
property of Arsenia Enriquez. The claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims
Committee of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator.
The claimant Benito E. Lim filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United
States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The complaint was later
amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant. As amended, it alleged that the lands in
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
question formerly belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. He stated some reasons in his allegations to Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach.
prove that Arsenia is the owner of the property. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints
Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that the sheriff's sale to Kagawa and the vesting of the properties in Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages.
the Philippine Alien Property Administrator and the transfer thereof by the United States to the
Republic of the Philippines be declared null and void; that Arsenia Enriquez be adjudged owner
Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that it had
of the said properties and the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to issue the
no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a suit
corresponding transfer certificates of title to her.
against the State. The Malong spouses appealed to the Court .

The court ordered the complaint dismissed on the ground — as stated in the dispositive part of
ISSUE:
the order — that the "court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action,

Whether or not the PNR is cannot be sue or sued because it’s a governmental instrument?
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lim has the right to sue or claim for damages against the Republic and Attorney
General of the United States. RULING:
RULING:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a common carrier, was not immune
The immunity of the state from suit, however, cannot be invoked where the action, as in the from suit.The PNR is a government instrumentality under government ownership during its 50-
present case, is instituted by a person who is neither an enemy or ally of an enemy for the year term.
purpose of establishing his right, title or interest in vested property, and of recovering his
ownership and possession. Congressional consent to such suit has expressly been given by the
The Corporation Code provides that every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
United States. (Sec. 3, Philippine Property Act of 1946; Philippine Alien Property Administration
corporate name. The Corporation Law provides that every corporation has the power to sue and
vs. Castelo, et al., 89 Phil., 568.)
be sued in any court.

The order of dismissal, however, with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages against the
We hold that in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it
defendant Attorney General of the United States must be upheld. The relief available to a
organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company.
person claiming enemy property which has been vested by the Philippines Alien Property
The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles
Custodian is limited to those expressly provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act, which
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
does not include a suit for damages for the use of such vested property. That action, as held by
this Court in the Castelo case just cited, is not one of those authorized under the Act which may
be instituted in the appropriate courts of the Philippines under the provisions of section 3 of the But the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
Philippine Property Act of 1946. Congressional consent to such suit has not been granted. immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which
the entity was organized."
The claim for damages for the use of the property against the intervenor defendant Republic of
the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, cannot be maintained because of the Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
immunity of the state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or financial private or non-governmental capacity are not suits against the State.
liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be entertained by the courts except with
the consent of said government.
Republic intervened in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney General of the It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could
United States in resisting plaintiff's claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief against not sue the PNR for damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the
any party in the answer in intervention it filed. On the other hand, plaintiff in his original obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It is not performing any governmental
complaint made no claim against the Republic and only asked for damages against it for the function.
use of the property when the complaint was amended.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar as it dismisses the complaint with WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the
respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the Attorney General of the United trial court for further proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways.
States and the Republic of the Philippines, is affirmed,
22. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,
21. FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINOMALONG petitioners, vs.
vs. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, respondents
Lingayen Branch 11, respondents
FACTS: FACTS:
The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime
Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986
then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped Ed. ).
a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the 15ortuous
Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
acts or conduct of its special agent.
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital
where he died.
Under the aforequoted 15ortuous15 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for
acts done through special agents. The State’s agent, if a public official, must not only be
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the
specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said
time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as
official’s usual governmental functions. If the State’s agent is not a public official, and is
such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on
commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent’s tort. Where the government
commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special
The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by agent within the meaning of the provision.
petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or
of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.
less generally agreed to be “governmental” in character, and so the State is immune from tort
liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation,
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a “proprietary” one,
National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary
. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to functions,
pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00
which the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere
Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4;
agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions,
Rollo, p. 132)
it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the 15ortuous act
of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages.
reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June
13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part
Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its
of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
position.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the
issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government
instant petition with this Court.
agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary
employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its
ISSUE: employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the driver.
Whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees? Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses
the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization
and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00
RULING:
as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award.

The liability of the State has two aspects. Namely:

23. Santiago vs Republic

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the 15ortuous acts of special agents Facts:
only.
January 1971 – plaintiff Ildefonso Santiago executed a deed of donation to the Bureau of Plant
Industry with terms of the donation, to “install lighting facilities and water system on the property
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974.
August 9, 1976 – Plaintiff Santiago filed a petition with the Court of first instance of Zamboanga
for revocation of the property donated because the 16one failed to comply with the terms and
conditions aforementioned.
Respondents asked for the dismissal of the case in lieu with the principle that the state may not
be sued without its consent. The court decided in favor of the accused and dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether or not state can claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation.
Ruling:
No, the state cannot claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation.
Rationale:
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating
an injustice on a citizen. Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a
donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent
likewise being presumed.
Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the
Republic or any of its agency being the 16one, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged
breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the
circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to
accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby
manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk
of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power.
Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside.
24. Amigable vs Cuenca
Facts:
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad
Estate in Cebu City. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale,
the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues.
said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very
narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said
roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925."
March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment
of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was
indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9,
1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the
President on January 7, 1959.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways. The lower court decided in favor of the
defendant and further stated that It did not have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued.
Issue:
Whether or not the state is immune from the suit charged.
Ruling:
No, the state is not immune with regards to the suit charged.
Rationale:
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,
…where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without
going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of
said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now
and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make
due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due
compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the
taking.
Judgement is set reversed and set aside.
25. Torio vs Fontanilla
Facts:
Municipality of Malasiqui passed resolution number 159 to manage the 1959 town fiesta. Jose
macaraeg was appointed as chairman of the committee concerning the entertainment and
construction of stage for the said event. The committee constructed two stages for the event,
one for the sarzuela and the other for cancionan, bamboo were used for the construction of
both.
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui
employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe for the performance
and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about
10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The
"zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed
and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was
taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day.
Heirs of the deceased filed a complaint against the municipality of malasiqui, municipal council
and all the members thereof. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia
the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
Trial court ruled that the defendants exercised diligence of a good father of a family and
therefore they are not liable for damages as the undertaking was not for profit. Appellate court
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilo and assigned his rights over the property
severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanill. to Star Bright Sales Enterprises, inc and informed the sellers of the said assignment. Thereafter,
private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and
Issue: clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the
Whether or not the municipality and its councilors are liable for damages for the death squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake
of Fontanilla. the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter.

Ruling:
Private respondent counter proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the
The municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla, however the councilors acted as
squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per
mere agents of the municipality thus are not liable.
square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private
respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in
Rationale:
cash.

We hold that of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan
Private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered
was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. It follows that under the
that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the
doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the
lots to Tropicana.
death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers,
employees, or agents.
Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself
at the expense of private respondent. Private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale
“The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for
to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and private respondent is willing and
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by
able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the
which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the
lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than
conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly,
P30,000.000.00.
to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. “

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . .
When it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or
agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the
corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can
continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their
trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the
corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants,
and the maxim of respondent superior applies."
26. The Holy See vs Hon. Rosario Jr.
Facts:
Parcel of Land was donated by the archdiocese of Manila to the Holy See for the
Construction of a residence of the Pope located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila
and registered in the name of petitioner. The said parcel of land was adjacent to the parcel of
lands registered to the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and asserts its sovereign immunity from suit but
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in
question"
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in claiming sovereign immunity being a foreign
state and on behalf of the Papal Nuncio.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit.
Rationale:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the
generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles
of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of nations
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis

April 17, 1988 - Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon
Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters with the condition that This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said parties as acts jure imperii:
lots of squatters who were then occupying the same.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
(1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers
(Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]
(2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station
(United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); (3) the change of employment status of base
employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).
This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private
parties as acts jure gestionis:
(1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a
bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to
cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182
SCRA 644 [1990])
(2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United
States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).
- The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is
undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering
into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function,
the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suit.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether
the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state
is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be
tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is
an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The land in question was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of
Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign
sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation
and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the land for profit or gain. It merely
wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible
for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and
are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been
admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Petition is granted and decision of the lower court is set aside. The Petitioner has
sovereign immunity.
27. U.S.A vs Ruiz
Facts:
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following
projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline
revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,
Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the
requests.
The company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts
Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of
the United States, who is one of the petitioners stating that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a
repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The
letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties
The said company filed a suit against United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the
U.S. Navy to order the latter to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in
the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
Herein petitioner raised the question of jurisdiction for the subject matter of the complaint being
acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for
the causes of action asserted in the complaint. They also filed a motion to dismiss the case.
The lower court denied the motion and issued the writ prayed by edigio de Guzman & Co., inc.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant U.S.A has immunity from suit.
Ruling:
Yes, the U.S.A has immunity from suit in the said case.
Rationale:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application
of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
western Europe.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a
State but the legal nature of the act
Judgment of lower court is reversed and set aside.
28. U.S.A vs Guinto
Facts:
Several cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to
dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is
now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force
stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for
barber services in the said base.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the
U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been
ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove
had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a
board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the Center and
its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This
was effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat
Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was to file Ms complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners.
In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick,
officers of the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators
(AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-named officers testified against him at his trial. As a
result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of
their acts that he was removed.
In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
herein petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained by the
plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs
on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them.
The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the
dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the dogs
were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for treatment of
their wounds.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity is applicable on the said cases.
Ruling:
The answer depends on each and every case involved.
Rationale:
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local
jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the
state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the
privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-
suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling
tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does
not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that
the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under
which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
action between private parties.
When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the
other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
16
Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim.
There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private
capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no
such waiver may be implied.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their
official functions as officers or agents of the United States. However, this is a matter of
evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion
that their acts are imputable to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to
be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the
United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order
dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED.
The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order
dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
29. Minucher Vs C.A
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the
University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was
appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines.
When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the
United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National
Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
May 13, 1986 – Minucher came to know Arthur Scalzo private defendant which expressed his
interest in buying caviar. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and
other Iranian products was the business of Minucher after Khoemeni government cut his
pensions.
Upon knowing that defendant was working in the US embassy in the Philippines as special
agent of Drug Enforcement Administration expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife
and the wife of a countryman. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of
$2,000.00 per visa.
May 26, 1986 - defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at
Kapitolyo, Pasig.
May 27, 1986 – defendant visited petitioner for the payment for the visa. A while later the
defendant was with a few Americans and arrested petitioner for drug trafficking.
The petitioner’s arrest as heroin trafficker was well publicized throughout the world, in various
newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was
identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. The arrest of defendant was likewise
on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said
places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.
Minucher filed a case in the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to set aside
the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court
set the case for pre-trial. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. RTC denied the motion.
Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction in this court(SC) but was referred to the C.A.
asking that the complaint by minucher be dismissed. C.A. sustained diplomatic immunity of
Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. S.C reversed the decision of
C.A. and ordered the continuance of the trial and ordered the trial court to decide on the case.
RTC ruled he should still be liable for the damages although he is an agent entitled to immunity
for it is committed outside his official duties. C.A. reversed the decision of the trial court and
sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during
his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving
State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Issue:
Whether or not whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Ruling:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
Rationale:
Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the
government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are
virtually tied. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who
possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to
the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity.
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the
judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded
While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not
apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the
powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and
the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of
Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the
activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then
be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting
as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of
his official function or duties.
Decision of C.A. is affirmed. Defendant has immunity.
30. Republic of Indonesia vs Vinson
Facts:
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of
Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a
consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex
Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The
equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the
agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless
cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.
Petitioners informed respondents that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of
the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to
arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of
Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory
and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.
Respondents claim that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence respondent filed a
complaint. Petitoner being the accused at that time filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity
from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further
alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as
defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic
immunity
In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon
the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement:
“Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the
laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.”
Respondent’s opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor
Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice
and bad faith.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. C.A. affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or a stipulation in a Maintenance Agreement can waive the state’s immunity
from suit.
Ruling:
No, the stipulation in an agreement cannot be a waiver of immunity from suit.
Rationale:
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private
party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular
conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or
commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act
or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or
an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out
of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified
court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be
given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A
sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the
State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and
equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.
It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign
activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of
the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:
xxx
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State.
He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving
State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor,
administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic
agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said
provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any
professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.
Petition is granted. Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside.
Summary: Tecson vs. Commission on Elections (GR 151434, 3 March 2004)
Tecson vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR 161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on
Elections [GR 151824]
En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1 on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official
leave, 3 dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ),
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the
illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On
23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26
January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision
of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824,
would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the
President of the Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution.
Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and
jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the
parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage
certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
(2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married
to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5)
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate
of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section
74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and
willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Summary: Altajeros vs. Commission on Elections (GR 163256, 10 November 2004)
Altajeros vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 163256, 10 November 2004]
En Banc, Azcuna (J): 10 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2 on official leave, 1 on leave
Facts: Ciceron P. Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections. On 15 January 2004, Jose Almiñe
Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the
COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Altajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy that “[he] was not a permanent resident of or
immigrant to a foreign country.” Almiñe, et. al. alleged that based on a letter from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an
Alien Certificate of Registration E139507 issued on 3 November 1997, and an Immigration
Certificate of Residence 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration. On
26 January 2004, Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among others, that he did not commit false
representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as 17 December
1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on
Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act 8171. Thus,
Altajeros claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run
as mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought the dismissal of the petition. Atty.
Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of the
case, recommended that Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of
mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and local elections; on the ground
that Altajeros failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of Section 2 of
Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship inasmuch as
he has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March 2004, the
COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. On
25 March 2004, Altajeros filed a motion for reconsideration. On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en
banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for utter lack of merit. On
10 May 2004, the election day itself, Altajeros filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether Altajeros is eligible to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, in light of his
repatriation under RA 8171.
Held: Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected “by taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.” Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a
citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of Allegiance on 17 December 1997, but his Certificate
of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after 6 years or on 18
February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on 1 March 2004. Altajeros, therefore,
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act 8171 has impliedly repealed
Presidential Decree 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-
born Filipinos. The Court’s ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one’s application for repatriation subsists. Accordingly,
Altajeros’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore,
qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying Altajeros to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. However,
considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the
requirements of repatriation,as he submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with
the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC
en banc could no longer consider said evidence. It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for
an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their
repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of the present
case.
Summary: In RE Bermudez (GR 76180, 24 October 1986)
In RE Bermudez
[GR 76180, 24 October 1986]
Resolution En banc, Per curiam: 7 concur
Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, Saturnino V. Bermudez, as
a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides that "the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the 7 February 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1992. The first regular elections for the President
and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May 1992."
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to
declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the
present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to
under the said Section 5 (not 7) of Article XVIII of the Transitory Provision of the proposed 1986
Constitution refers to.
Issue: Whether Aquino and Laurel are the legitimate President and Vice President of the
Philippines.
Held: The petition states no cause of action. Bermudez's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness
of the provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon
C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the
extension of their term to noon of 30 June 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections.
Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second
Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under
said 1986 Constitution. Mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Further, the legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people
of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government."
3. Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda
[GR L-13250, 29 October 1971]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 6 concur, 1 concurs in result, 2 took no part
Facts: Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira died in Tangier (North Africa), on 2
January 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a
permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death. She left properties in Tangier as well
as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and
many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. The real
estate situated in the Philippines had a market value of P1,109,483.50 and her personal
properties also in the Philippines had a value of P396,308.90. On the real estate, Antonio
Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and
the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the
Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due
on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the
payment of said taxes pursuant to Section 122 of the Tax Code. The Collector of Internal
Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and
inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of
intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira. On appeal the Court of Tax Appeals reversed
the decision of the Collector, without costs. Campos Rueda elevated the case to the Supreme
for review. On 30 May 1962, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for
the reception of evidence or proofs on whether or not the words "bienes muebles", "movables"
and "movable property" as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace "intangible personal
property", as used in the Tax Code.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
On 30 October 1957, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the action taken by the Collector of the
Internal Revenue, holding that the element of reciprocity was not lacking based on copies of
Tangier legislation. The CTA held that "the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso
of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign
power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not
impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein,
or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that
Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the
exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code." The Collector appealed.

Issue: Whether Tangier qualifies as a “foreign country” to which Section 122 of the Tax Code
would apply.

Held: If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's
formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control
bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government functioning under a regime of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal
competence to exact obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic
organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the
general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of
the nation." This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into
government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other
institutions. McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain
within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the
latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of
statehood. So Hyde did opine. EHerein, even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of
international personality, the Collector of Internal Revenue has not successfully made out a
case. It bears repeating that 4 days after the filing of the present petition on 6 January 1958 in
Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, that Section 122 of the Tax Code does not require that
the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. Thus, the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.