Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 1

Artifact #3

Tort and Liability

Nicholas Vona

College of Southern Nevada

September 16, 2017

Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 2

A middle school student named Ray Knight was suspended from school for 3 days

because of unexcused absences. When a student is suspended, school district procedure is to

notify a student’s parents by telephone and promptly send written notice in the mail. In this case,

the school only gave written notice to the student. Ray threw the notice away and the school

never notified the parents that Ray was suspended. Ray was accidentally shot and killed while

visiting a friend on the first day of his suspension. The question, based on the circumstances, is

whether or not Ray’s parents have grounds to pursue liability charges against the school.

Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1978) will be the first case discussed in

support of Ray Knight’s parents’ grounds to pursue liability charges against the school. In this

case, a 10-year old student named Michael Hoyem was attending summer school classes.

Michael left the school premises before the end of his scheduled classes and was hit and

seriously injured by a motorcycle at a public intersection. Michael and his mother claimed the

school should be held liable for all damages on the grounds that the school district provided

negligent supervision. The school district is responsible for providing reasonable care and

supervision to students while on campus. Failure to provide adequate supervision to students,

especially when it results in injury, is a form of physical child neglect. In this case, the school

argued that it was not liable for Michael’s injuries because he essentially broke policy and left

school grounds on his own determination, attributing to putting himself in danger. True as that

may be concerning Michaels actions, it does not provide the school relief of its duty to provide

adequate supervision, and another person’s negligent act does not pardon the school of its own

act of negligence. When it can be proven that the proximate cause of an injury to a student off of

school grounds is the result of the school breaching its duty of care on school grounds, and/or

while the school has undertaken the responsibility for the student, the school can be held
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 3

responsible. Considering the school broke procedure in not properly notifying Ray Knight’s

parents of his suspension, it is reasonable to say that the school should be liable. Furthermore,

Ray’s own negligent actions of playing with a gun and throwing the note away do not relieve the

school of its own duty to provide reasonable care and make correct decisions.

The next case that supports Ray Knight’s parents’ grounds to pursue liability charges

against the school district is Hanson v. Reedley etc. School District (1941). Here, two students,

Ruth Hanson and Lucile Ledbetter, were injured while getting a ride home from Reedley Junior

College with another student. At Reedley, all students were required by the school to take some

form of physical education. The school permitted students to take after school programs, such as

practicing for the tennis team, to fulfill this obligation. Practice sometimes lasted until around

5:15pm, while the school buses provided by the school, for from and to home transportation, left

the school at 4 o’clock every day. Leaving some students with no way to get home, as some of

them lived 7 and 10 miles away, it was common practice for the teacher in charge to organize a

ride sharing program with other students who had vehicles. Students who drove the other

students were allowed to us the school gasoline pumps for a gallon of gas for every ten miles

they travelled. The gasoline used and distribution of funds for the gasoline was all accounted for

and signed for by the teacher in charge and another employee such as the principle, vice-

principle and the county superintendent. The driver of the car in the case of Hanson v. Reedley

etc. School District (1941) drove a car that was modified into what was known as a bug. The

bug had many unsafe features such as no fenders, bald tires, a speedometer that didn’t work

properly, no horn, and a special carburetor for additional speed. Travelling home from tennis

practice with 5 other students, the driver of the bug crashed his car. Ruth Hanson died and

Lucile Ledbetter suffered serious injuries. The evidence in the case clearly showed that the
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 4

driver of the bug was driving unsafe and committed multiple violations at the time of the

accident making him at least one of the proximate causes of the accident. The school argued that

the driver of the bug, Theodore Eschwig, was not an employee of the district and that the teacher

had no authority to provide transportation for students and that any transportation contract

awarded had to be presented in a competitive bid to the district. The school went on to argue that

the teacher nor the district could be negligent because they had no way of telling that Eschwig

would get into an accident that day and the injuries and death of the students couldn’t be

anticipated. However, when considering the facts that the faculty was well aware of and even

participated in the process by which transportation was arranged after tennis practice, it’s not

acceptable for the school to use their own wrong-doing as a defense to the claim of negligence

on its behalf. The main issue with this case is whether or not the school acted with ordinary care

for the basic needs of the students. The driver was certainly a proximate cause of the crash, but

if the school did not exercise basic common care for the students on their own behalf they too

can be considered a proximate cause of the injuries and death of the students. The fact that it

was witnessed on many occasions by various faculty members where a total of 6 students were

crammed into an unsafely modified vehicle is clearly negligent to the safety of the students while

being transported home. Since the school was very much part of the process by which the

students were supposed to travel home, and they did not follow their own policy and procedure

for accepting bids for transportation, and they knowingly allowed such a disturbingly obvious,

unsafe vehicle to transport the students, it was negligent to providing care for the students. In

relation to the case of Ray Knight, this is similar in that his school also broke procedure by

choosing to allow Ray to deliver his notice of suspension to his parents, as opposed properly

calling Ray’s home and sending a letter immediately. Ray was also killed by another proximate
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 5

cause other than the school’s actions, but that does not relieve the school of its responsibility to

provide adequate supervision to Ray and following procedure upon him being suspended.

Girard v. Monrovia City School District (1953) will be the first case presented in arguing

for the school district’s defense that they are not liable for the death of Ray Knight. In Girard v.

Monrovia City School District (1953), Gerald Girard, a 9-year-old student, was killed when he

was walking home from school and a car hit him. Gerald was in a public crosswalk at the time

of the accident. Gerald’s parents originally brought a wrongful death suit against the Monrovia

City School District and Azusa City School District. Gerald’s parents claimed that the two

districts were negligent because the schools advised and permitted Gerald to attend Monroe

Elementary, which is in Monrovia, as opposed to Santa Fe Elementary in Azusa. According to

his home address, Gerald should not have been permitted to attend Monroe Elementary in

Monrovia. By attending the school in Monrovia, Gerald was forced to cross the heavily travelled

Huntington Drive, and that the district did not provide Gerald with safe transportation to his

home or a safe means of crossing Huntington Drive. In order to hold the school liable for

negligence, it must be proven that the schools action was a proximate cause of Gerald’s death. It

would not be negligence if it were merely a remote cause, such as this where the facts showed

the proximate cause of death was that he was hit by a car while in an intersection. With regard to

the claim that the school was negligent in permitting the student to attend Monroe Elementary, it

was proven that the district did not owe any duty to students being enrolled in any particular

school in their district. Gerald’s parents argued that if Gerald had taken a different root home

from a different school, the accident would never have occurred. However, it’s impossible to

foresee any such traffic conditions or hazards that may occur on any given root at any time.

Also, the claim that the school failed to provide safe travel home does not hold up because the
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 6

facts showed that the Monrovia District was only responsible for providing transportation from

home to school. Negligence was not proven in this case because nothing the school did was a

proximate cause of Gerald’s death, and they were not responsible for his transportation home. It

was simply an accident in which the fault rested on the irresponsible driver. Considering the

case of Ray Knight, it could be argued many unpredictable variables caused the death of Ray.

The school could argue it was not a proximate cause of the death since they had no way of

knowing Ray would go to a friend’s house on his first day of suspension, that there would be a

gun at that house, and that the firearm would be triggered and a bullet would hit Ray Knight.

The second case presented in defense of the school district is Kerwin v. County of San

Mateo (1959). In this case, a 6-year-old student named Thomas Courtney became ill while at

school. The school called his home and spoke with Richard Courtney, Thomas’ 11-year-old

brother. Richard, who was home due to illness, is also a student at the same school and was

directed to come to school to take his little brother home. Richard picked his little brother up

from school with a bicycle that was built for one rider. On the way home, Richard crashed the

bicycle and he was injured. He sued the school district, alleging that the school had a duty to

protect both students when they were on school property and that the school negligently failed to

provide them a safe means of transportation home. Also included in the complaint, was that a

bicycle built for one rider was an unsafe means of transportation for the two children and the

school knew or should have known this was not a safe means of transportation. However, the

facts showed that the school had no knowledge that the boys were riding on a bicycle built for

one, and that there was no reason that the boys could not have walked home. Also, the school

only directed Richard to provide Thomas with transportation home, they did not tell him

specifically how to transport his little brother. Since the school did not offer to provide the
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 7

children with transportation home, it did not have the responsibility of the children’s safety while

off campus and in transport on their way home. The focus of the complaint in this case was that

the school owed the boys a duty to provide them with safe transportation home. Since the school

did not offer the boys transportation home and did not break any policy or responsibility

undertaken by itself, there was no negligence on the school’s behalf. Also, there was no reason

brought forward as to why the boys could not walk home as opposed to riding a bike built for

one rider, therefore, there is no reason to say the school would be the proximate cause of the

injuries. In relation to the case of Ray Knight, Kerwin v. County of San Mateo (1959) would

support the school’s defense because they did not have a duty to provide Ray with safety on his

way home since there was no mention of the school offering transportation for Ray. Also, there

was no logical reason mentioned why Ray needed to be around a loaded gun as opposed to doing

something safer with his time.

My determination is that Ray Knight’s parents do have grounds to pursue liability

charges against the school. The school was physically negligent due to the fact that they failed to

follow their own suspension policies and procedures that were in place for the safety and well-

being of the students. Although Ray did not bring the note home to his parents as he was

expected to do, and he was playing with a gun as he should not have been, does not relieve the

school of its responsibility to uphold its own duty to follow its own procedures that are in the

best interest of the students. This is similar to Hanson v. Reedley etc. School District (1941),

where the driver being a proximate cause of the injuries and death did not exempt the school

from its duty to use common care in providing adequate supervision and make reasonable

prudent decisions to keep the student safe. Likewise, in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School

District (1978), where it was determined that the involvement of another proximate cause of
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 8

injury, or even the students own wrong-doing, is not enough to relieve the school of its own

liability once it has committed a negligent act and failed to provide proper supervision. Ray

should have given the note to his parents, and he probably should not have been playing with a

gun at a friend’s house. However, this is not enough to pardon the school of its duty to make

reasonable decisions and provide adequate care and supervision in handling his suspension.
Artifact #3 Tort and Liability 9

References

Girard v. Monrovia City School District, 121 Cal. App.2d 739 (1953). Retrieved September 20,
2017
http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/121/737.html

Hanson v. Reedley etc. School District, 43 Cal. App. 2d 646 (1941). Retrieved September 20,
2017
http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/43/643.html

Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, 22 Cal. 3d 512 (1978). Retrieved September
20, 2017
http://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/22/508.html

Kerwin v. County of San Mateo, 176 Cal. App. 2d 306 (1959). Retrieved September 20, 2017

http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2d/176/304.html

Underwood, J., & Webb, L. (2006). School Law for Teachers: Concepts and Applications. Upper
Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.