1.

Rule 132, Section 20 - Proof of Private Documents

G.R. No. 73010 April 27, 1990

REVA RAZ petitioner,

vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FOURTH CIVIL CASES DIVISION and ENCARNACION VILLANUEVA, respondents.

The subject of this petition is a Conditional Assignment of Rights and Interests over a Foreclosure Judgment entered into between
petitioner Reva Raz and the original private respondent herein, Encarnacion Villanueva, on August 7, 1972. 1

The said judgment was rendered in favor of Villanueva on February 5, 1969, and ordered the defendants therein to pay her the amount
of P35,000.00, with 12% per annum interest from August 7, 1965, and other amounts, in default of which the property subject of the
proceeding would be sold at public auction to satisfy the amounts owing her. 2 This property was a parcel of land located at Quezon
City which had been mortgaged by the defendants to secure the payment of a loan she had extended to them. The judgment was
pending appeal before the respondent court at the time of the execution of the Conditional Assignment.

By virtue of the Conditional Assignment, Villanueva transferred all her rights and interests in the said judgment to Raz in consideration
of the sum of P75,000.00 to be paid by the petitioner as follows:

a) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the sum of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND (P22,000.00), upon the
signing of this agreement.

b) The ASSIGNEE shall pay the ASSIGNOR, her heirs and/or assigns the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00), within one year
from August 7, 1972, and not later, August 7, 1973;

c) The balance of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND (P33,000.00) plus costs mentioned in the said judgment shall be paid within the next
following year and not later, August 7, 1974. It is further understood that the full consideration mentioned in paragraph 3, and the costs
mentioned in par. c, hereof shall be fully liquidated in two (2) years time from the signing of this agreement and not later, August 7,
1974.

It was also stipulated in Par. 3 (d) of the agreement —

d) That the ASSIGNOR shall, as soon as the decision in the aforementioned case shall become final and executory, proceed with the
execution of the judgment and the auction sale if allowed by law of the property subject matter of the aforementioned case, and the
ASSIGNOR and/or her heirs shall as soon as the full consideration hereof is fully satisfied, and if by operation of law shall become the
legitimate owner of the said property, execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the ASSIGNEE or her heirs, and/or assigns in order to make
this CONDITIONAL ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS permanent. All expenses for such execution and auction sale and
other expenses necessary thereto shall be for the account of the ASSIGNEE.

The petitioner paid the first installment of P22,000.00 on August 7, 1972, and the second installment of P20,000.00 on August 7, 1973.
However, she refused to pay the third installment of P33,000.00, which was supposed to be due on August 7, 1974, on the ground that
Villanueva had not complied with her obligation under their agreement.

On April 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the private respondent, claiming that
the latter had reneged on her duty to deliver the property to the assignee in accordance with their agreement. In her answer, Villanueva
alleged that it was the petitioner who had defaulted in her payments and thus given just cause for the rescission of the agreement. This
was authorized in its Par. 3(h) reading as follows:

h) If for any reason, any of the above terms and conditions cannot fully be complied, the same may be considered rescinded by either
party, in which event the ASSIGNOR shall return whatever money she or her heirs may have received from the ASSIGNEE, and the
said ASSIGNEE, shall relinquish any and all rights which if any she or her heirs may have, and this contract shall forthwith be
considered null and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
To support her claim, Villanueva presented two letters 3 she said she had sent Raz, the first to remind her of the third installment that
had not yet been paid and the second to tender her the refund of her earlier payments in view of the rescission of their contract. These
letters follow:

April 22, 1975

Reva Raz

16-A A. Matiyaga St.

Quezon City

Dear Mr. Raz:

I am writing you this letter to remind you of your obligation under the Deed of Assignment we have entered into. You
have not complied with your promise to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and expenses corresponding thereto.

Hoping that you give this matter your preferential attention. Final demand is hereby made that you pay the aforesaid
amount otherwise I will be constrained to rescind the contract and avail of my rights provided for in the contract. Truly
yours,

(Sgd.) ENCARNACION G. VILLANUEVA

xxx xxx xxx

May 13, 1975

Mr. Reva C. Raz

16-A Matiyaga St.

Quezon City

Dear Mr. Raz:

I am writing you this letter again to inform you that inasmuch that you failed to pay me the P33,000.00 the costs and
expenses corresponding thereto as provided in our contract of August 7, 1972, I am making to you this formal tender of
payment of the P42,000.00 you paid me before.

Please give this matter your preferential attention because if I will not hear from you within a period of two (2) days from
receipt hereof I will be constrained to consign aforesaid amount in court at your own costs.

Yours truly,

(Sgd.) ENCARNACION VILLANUEVA

For her part, Raz contended that it was the private respondent who had incurred in delay and bad faith.1âwphi1 The petitioner pointed
out that the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the appellants on August 16, 1972, and was granted by the Court of Appeals in a
resolution dated December 15, 1972. Yet it was only on August 16, 1973, that the private respondent filed a motion for execution of the
foreclosure judgment.

This motion was granted by the trial court on October 6, 1973. The property was sold at public auction on January 23, 1975, and the
certificate of sale was issued in favor of Villanueva on February 25, 1975. This was registered on March 26, 1975, and the period of
redemption expired one year later. However, it was only on February 9, 1978, that the court, on Villanueva's motion, ordered the
confirmation of the sale and a new certificate of title was issued in her name.

According to the petitioner, the two letters allegedly sent to her by the private respondents should not have been admitted in evidence
not only because there was no proof that she had received them. No less importantly, their genuineness had not been established in
accordance with Rule 132, Section 21, reading as follows:

Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. — Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;

b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or

c) By a subscribing witness.

The petitioner likewise submitted that the rescission of the agreement was improper because it was Villanueva who had violate d the
contract by refusing to deliver the property to her. Moreover, every rescission, even if extrajudicial, requires proper notice to the other
party, and there was no proof that such notice had been served on her.

4
The Court has deliberated on the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that the respondent court committed no reversible
error in sustaining the trial court 5 and dismissing the appeal.

The petitioner was actually arguing against herself in invoking Rule 132, Section 21, for one of the modes prescribed therein for proving
the execution and authenticity of any private writing is "by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker." This mode
must be read with Section 23 of the same Rule, which says that —

. . . Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

We have made such comparison and find that the signature of Encarnacion G. Villanueva on the Conditional Assignment (which is not
disputed) is similar to the signatures affixed to the two letters sent to the petitioner. There is no doubt that the agreement and the two
letters were signed by private respondent Encarnacion G. Villanueva. Consequently, their authenticity and execution having been
established, we hold that the letters were admissible as evidence of the private respondent.

The Court is also convinced that the two letters were correctly sent to and personally delivered at the petitioner's address as stated in
the Conditional Assignment, were actually received there and later presumably conveyed to her. Indeed, the signature of the person
who received the first letter closely resembles that of one of petitioner's counsel as an examination of her pleadings will reveal. 6 At any
rate, even if they were not really transmitted to the petitioner and the letters were correctly rejected as inadmissible, Raz would still be
bound by her own admission in the complaint, where she made the following allegations in Par. 8:

a) A week or so before August 7, 1974, defendant demanded from plaintiff the payment of the balance of P33,000.00 of the
consideration;

xxx xxx xxx

e) In view of plaintiffs insistence that the P33,000.00 would be paid only after defendant had obtained ownership of the subject property
and would thus be ready to execute the corresponding deed of sale, defendant instead offered to return the amount of P42,000.00
already paid to her by plaintiff and have the contract rescinded, clearly revealing her interest not to recognize the aforesaid contract.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The last quoted-paragraph is especially telling because it belies the petitioner's insistence that she had not been notified of the
rescission. By her own words, she has admitted understanding the letter of May 13, 1975, as informing her that because of her failure
to pay the balance of the stipulated payment, the contract was being rescinded by the private respondent. As she herself alleged,
Villanueva "offered to return the amount of P42,000.00 already paid to her by the plaintiff and have the contract rescinded." This is a
judicial admission that the petitioner cannot now disavow. 7

While it is true that a certain degree of delay did accompany the registration of the property in Villanueva's name, this was not entirely
imputable to her. Good faith is presumed except in the face of the strongest evidence to the contrary, which is not present here. The
Court also notes from her conduct that the petitioner is not entirely blameless either. Considering the investment she had made in the
land, having already paid thereon the sum of P33,000.00, we feel she should have been more vigilant in the protection of her interests.

The petitioner's counsel repeatedly says it was informed of each development in the sale and registration of the property "later on." 8 By
this vague statement, which suggests that it was not following up the matter closely, it would absolve its client of all negligence. We do
not agree.

It seems to us that in view of her substantial stake in the property, it behooved the petitioner to see to it that the private respondent
discharged her part of the bargain without delay, especially so since no specific date was imposed upon the private respondent to
transfer the land to the petitioner. If Raz felt that Villanueva was dilly-dallying, she should have taken steps to make her move faster
(short of refusing to pay the last installment). As the trial judge observed, "plaintiff could very well have paid the whole amount and then
substituted herself as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10109." But she did not and just stood by, waiting to hear of developments "later on."
The sum of it all is that the petitioner, in insisting on the registration first in her name of the subject property before p aying the balance,
was invoking a right not stipulated in the Conditional Assignment. What was clearly provided therein was that the balance of
P33,000.00 would be paid by her within two years from the date of the agreement and not later than August 7, 1974. For her refusal to
make this payment, the contract was, pursuant to its terms, properly rescinded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. NO. 190475 : April 10, 2013

JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision 2
dated 06 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong)
of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.

Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said accused, with intent of gain for himself or for another. did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving thirteen (13) truck tires worth
P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been
derived from the crime of robbery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued, and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing Law and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.

SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the records, the RTC's finding of guilt was affirmed by the
appellate court in a Decision dated 18 August 2009.

Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.

The Facts

The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same
for the total amount of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing
and marketing of Firestone tires. Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 dated November 10, 1994
and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked the
tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720 San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San
Antonio Valley 1, Sucat, Parañaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the warehouse, was in
charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.

On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the
warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery to the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.

Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to locate the
stolen tires. On February 24, 1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned
and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to
which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized as
one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon. Private complainant asked
appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock, which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the store
and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the Southern Police District.

On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila.
The team was composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private
complainant's companion Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur-buyer.

On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's
store in Paco, Manila. The team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza proceeded to the store while
the rest of the team posted themselves across the street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck
tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display, which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant
if he had any more in stock.

Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse, which was located beside his store. After
the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same
tires which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buy-bust
team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen from the warehouse.

After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team went inside appellant's store. However, appellant
insisted that his arrest and the confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the barangay and his own
lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station for
investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by
poseur-buyer Tito Atienza. The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his warehouse. 5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires
for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. He further averred
that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan,
Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995
and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link). 6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed
tire in his store and came back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store, confiscated the tires, arrested
Ong and told him that those items were stolen tires. 7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen (13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a
prima facie evidence of fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day
to six (6) years of prision correcional.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

OUR RULING

The Petition has no merit.

Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who
is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused,
intent to gain for oneself or for another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of
fencing are present in this case.

First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the
caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 17
February 1995. Azajar was able to prove ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 4565 11 dated 10 November 1994 and an
Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang
Salaysay13 taken at the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14 The report led to the conduct of a buy-bust operation at Jong
Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of
Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of
robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial numbers of
stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession. 15 Ong likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link
in the total amount of ?45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No. 980. 16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,18 ought to have known the ordinary
course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and
he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. 19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires
happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires
considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in
the streets.

In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived
from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord
with the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly engaged
in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies
the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is, according to the Court,
"reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft." xxx.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or
entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer
or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced
the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular transaction,
he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised prudence.

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a
sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that
defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that
Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the
legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the
stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.

Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused
of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the 25 property.

The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for each tire recovered, or in the total amount of
P65,975. Records show that Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3
(p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the
regularity of the transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.

In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the
ruling of the CA affirming the trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the minimum penalty imposed by
reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.