CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
them of the
E. Express Waiver
PEOPLE VS. UYBOCO
640 SCRA 111 (2011)
FACTS:
● Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos (appellant) guilty of three (3)
counts of kidnapping for ransom.
● Appellant, along with now deceased Colonel Wilfredo
Macias (Macias) and several John Does were charged in
three separate Information
CLAIMS OF THE PROSECUTION/ FACTS ACCORDING TO
PROSECUTION
At around 10:30 a.m. on 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her wards,
siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson Kirby Dichaves were riding in the
Isuzu car of the Dichaves family, together with Yusan Dichaves
(Yusan). Driver Pepito Acon (Acon) dropped off Yusan at Metrobank
in Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. While waiting for Yusan, Acon
drove along Bilibid Viejo, Sampaloc. When the vehicle passed by in
front of San Sebastian Church, a stainless jeep with two men and one
woman described as a tomboy on board, suddenly blocked its way.
One of the men, who was in police uniform accosted Acon and
accused him of hitting the son of a Presidential Security Group (PSG)
General apparently with a stone when the vehicle ran over it. Acon
denied the charges but he was transferred to the stainless jeep while
the man in police uniform drove the Isuzu car.
They were brought to a house in Merville Subdivision, Parañaque.
While still in garage of the house, Nimfa was able to sneak out of the
car and place a call to the secretary of her employer to inform the
latter that they were in Merville Subdivision.
Jepson was at his office at 10:00 a.m. of 20 December 1993. He
received a call from his wife asking him if Nimfa or Acon called up,
as she had been waiting for them at Metrobank where she was
dropped off earlier.
When Jepson arrived at Metrobank at around 11:30 a.m., he received
a call from his secretary informing him that Nimfa called about their
whereabouts. When Jepson got back to his office, his secretary
informed him that an unidentified man called to inform them that he
has custody of the children and demanded P26 Million.
Jepson, through Jamie's help, went to the house of then Vice-
President Joseph Estrada (Vice-President Estrada) at 8:00 p.m.
Thereat, he met General Jewel Canson (Gen. Canson), General
Panfilo Lacson (Gen. Lacson) and Major Ray Aquino (Major
Aquino). Vice-President Estrada ordered the police generals to rescue
Jepsons sons and arrest the kidnappers.
At 6:00 p.m., the kidnappers called Jepson and reduced the ransom to
P10 Million.That night, Nimfa was able to speak to Jepson when two
men handed the telephone to her.
On the following noon of 21 December 1993, the kidnappers called
up Jepson numerous times to negotiate for the ransom. In one of those
calls, Jepson was able to recognize the voice of appellant because he
had several business transactions with the latter and they have talked
for at least a hundred times during a span of two to four years.
On 22 December 1993, the parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5
Million. Jepson offered P1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be
paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol. Appellant asked Jepson to
bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial
Center. Jepson called up Gen. Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform
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pay-off.
At 3:00 p.m., Jepson drove his white Toyota Corolla car and
proceeded to Pancake House in Magallanes Commercial Center. He
placed the money inside a gray bag and put it on the backseat. Jepson
received a call from appellant at 4:00 p.m. who ordered him to put the
bag in the trunk, leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away for ten (10)
minutes without turning back. Later, appellant checked on his trunk
and the bag was already gone. Appellant then apprised him that his
sons and helper were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along
South Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and
found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas station
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission Task Force Habagat and one of the team leaders of
Special Project Task Force organized on 22 December 1993 with the
primary task of apprehending the kidnappers of Dichaves children
and helper. His group was assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await
instructions from the overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson.
They had been waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they
received information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed.
At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that the suspects
vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in their direction. A few
minutes later, they saw the red car and tailed it until it reached
Dasmarias Village in Makati. They continuously followed the car
inside the village. When said car slowed down, they blocked it and
immediately approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted the
suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant suddenly
pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took place. They
managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed him. Appellant was
requested to open the compartment and a gray bag was found
inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry and a gun inside the bag.
Appellant was then brought to Camp Crame for questioning
At 8:00 p.m., Jepson received a call from Gen. Lacson asking him to
go to Camp Crame. He and Nimfa went to Camp Crame where he
saw appellant alone in the office of Gen. Canson. He then saw the bag
containing the ransom money, pieces of jewelry and his gun on the
table. Photographs were taken and Jepson was asked to identify them.
It was found out that a portion of the ransom money was missing. It
was then that appellant revealed that the missing money was in the
possession of Macias. Appellant accompanied P/Supt. Cruz and his
team to the residence of Macias in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Supt. Cruz
waited for Macias until 4:00 a.m. on the following day and placed
him under arrest. Macias was asked where the rest of the ransom
money was and Macias went inside the house and retrieved a red bag
inside a small cabinet. P/Supt. Cruz prepared a receipt of the seized
property from Macias. Macias placed his signature on the receipt.
CLAIMS OF THE DEFENSE
Appellant testified that he came to know Jepson when he was
introduced to him by Col. Navarro in 1989 as the importer of police
equipment and accessories. Jepson wanted to buy revolving lights,
police sirens and paging system. Through Navarro, appellant also met
Macias who was then selling his security agency in July 1993. He
admitted that Jepson had been lending him money since 1990 and his
total borrowings amounted to P8.5 Million in December 1993.
At 3:00 p.m. of 20 December 1993, he received a call from Jepson
asking for P1 Million, as partial payment of his loan. Jepson informed
appellant that his sons were kidnapped and he requested appellant to
negotiate with the kidnappers for the release of his children. Out of
pity, appellant agreed. He actively participated in the negotiations
between 20 to 22 of December 1993, where he successfully
negotiated a lower ransom of P1.5 Million.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
While the criminal cases were undergoing trial, Macias died.
Consequently, his criminal liability is totally extinguished under
Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
RULING OF THE RTC
On 30 August 2002, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.
The trial court held that the prosecution had established with the
required quantum of evidence that the elements of kidnapping for
ransom were present and that appellant was the author of said crime.
RULING OF THE CA
On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
Decision of the RTC
LEGAL ISSUE
WON the consent for the warrantless search was valid
If yes, WON it constituted as an express waiver
Both answered in the affirmative by
RULING OF THE COURT
the search conducted inside the car of appellant was legal because the
latter consented to such search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent for the police to
search the car, they can still validly do so by virtue of a search
incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court
“SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter’s reach; Meaning of the phrase “within the area of his
immediate control.” In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and
the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the
one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase
“within the area of his immediate control” means the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Therefore, it is only but expected and legally so for the police to
search his car as he was driving it when he was arrested.
F. Search of Warehouse in Violation of Customs and Tariff Code
or to enforce customs laws
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. OGARIO
329 SCRA 289 (2000)
FACTS: On December 9, 1998, Felipe Bartolome, District Collector
of Customs of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of
25,000 bags of rice bearing the name of “SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan”.
Reported to have been illegally imported by the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB Region VII), the rice was
landed in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then placed in sacks with
its marked name. Then it was shipped to Cebu City on board the
vessel M/V Alberto.
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The next day, respondent Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks of
rice and his buyer, respondent Ogario filed a complaint for
injunction, alleging that:
1. The defendants alleged that the rice were smuggled from
abroad without providing any proof of herein claims;
2. That the acts of the defendants in stopping the loading and
unloading activities of the plaintiffs laborers have are unlawful
and illegal
3. That they operated solely on mere suspicion
4. That the Warrant of Seizure and detention issued by
Collector of Customs be quashed because aside from being
illegal, the continuing act of detaining said sacks of rice will lead
to the deterioration of the same
5. That no public auction sale of the same should be
conducted by any government agency or authority
RTC’s ruling: In favor of the respondents. It ruled that the Warrant
of Seizure and Detention was issued merely to shift the burden of
proof to the shippers/owners of the goods to prove that the bags of
rice were not imported or smuggled. The issuance of such is
the Court. therefore, without legal basis, anchored merely on the suspicion of the
petitioners.
It therefore ordered that the 25,000 bags or rice be returned + 8M
bond.
Collector of Customs of Cebu’s decision: that the bags of rice, the
vessel M/V “Alberto”, and the two trucks were all forfeited in favor
of the government as they were found to have strong reliable, and
convincing evidence that the articles were all included in the crime of
smuggling. Proof: certifications that the vessel never docked in
Palawan, certification of the officer in charge in the NFA that her
signature was forged, and laboratory analysis stating that the sample
does not compare with any of their IRRI released varieties).
ISSUE: WON THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
CURRENT FORFEITURE PROCEEDING
RULING: NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the review of
the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings
conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with
these proceedings. The Collector of Customs has exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the
seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.
Re: Hierarchy of Courts
RA 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) as well as The
Tariff and Customs Code) as amended provides the basis that the
actions of the COC are appealable to the Commissioner on Customs,
whose decision in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from there to the
Court of Appeals.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of Appeals that regular
courts still retain jurisdiction "where, as in this case, for lack of
probable cause, there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing
the articles under Customs jurisdiction through seizure/forfeiture
proceedings."[11] They overlook the fact, however, that under the law,
the question of whether probable cause exists for the seizure of
the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional Trial Court to
determine. The customs authorities do not have to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that the articles on board a vessel were
imported from abroad or are intended to be shipped abroad before
they may exercise the power to effect customs searches, seizures, or
arrests provided by law and continue with the administrative
hearings.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
RIETA VS. PEOPLE
436 SCRA 237 (2004)
FACTS:
Petitioner and his six co-accused -- Arturo Rimorin, Fidel Balita,
Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre, Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto
Miaco -- were charged with violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 34, in relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
Version of the Prosecution:
On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, the[n] Chief of the Police
Intelligence Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group
(MISG for brevity), received information that certain syndicated
groups were engaged in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area,
Manila. It was further revealed that the activities [were being] done at
nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and delivery
truck [were] being escorted by some police and military personnel.
He fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following night
along Roxas Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge,
whereby they were to watch out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-
SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it.
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col.
Lacson and his men returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson
posting himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information, the
said cargo truck will come out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment.
COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime Battalion.
The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning.
About 3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd
COSAC Detachment. It returned before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.
"At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock that morning, a green cargo
truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC
Detachment followed and escorted closely by a light brown Toyota
Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on board. At that
time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about
the car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to intercept only the
cargo truck. The cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed
that the Toyota car following the cargo truck suddenly made a sharp
U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck [that] was going
south. Almost by impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a U-turn and
gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was running between
100 KPH to 120 KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase
lasted for less than 5 minutes until said car made a stop along
Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col. Lacson and his
men searched the car and they found several firearms, particularly:
three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also
discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota
car, and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer,
Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging to the
2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with
mission orders.
"When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305
cases of blue seal or untaxed cigarettes were found inside. The cargo
truck driver known only as 'Boy' was able to escape while the other
passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police
Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat. Felicisimo Rieta
of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Lacson's men hauled the intercepted vehicles, the arrested men and
confiscated goods to Camp Crame, Quezon City. All the 371 cases
(305 + 66) of blue seal cigarettes were turned over to the Bureau of
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Customs. Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba executed an Affidavit of Arrest
together with Arnel Acuba. The Booking and Information Sheet of
Ernesto de Castro showed that he was arrested by the MISG after
delivering assorted blue seal cigarettes at 185 Sanciangco St.,
Tonsuya, Malabon."9
Version of the Defense:
In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he met Boy in front of the
Kawit Town Hall. He learned that Boy will haul household
appliances from Divisoria. They boarded a jeep driven by Boy and
they proceeded to Cartimar, Pasay City. At Cartimar, Boy left him at
a gasoline station, and told him to standby because Boy will get the
cargo truck they will use. When Boy returned, he had companions,
who were introduced to him as Gonzalo Vargas and Sgt. Rimorin, the
petitioner's co-accused in Criminal Case No. CC-VI-138 (79). From
Cartimar, the four (4) of them proceeded to Divisoria and they passed
under the Del Pan Bridge. While passing therein, he told Boy that he
was hungry, so that when they passed by a small restaurant, he
alighted and Sgt. Rimorin followed. Boy told them that he and
Gonzalo will proceed to the Port Area and will be back. After thirty to
forty five minutes, Boy and Gonzalo returned, and he and Sgt.
Rimorin boarded the truck and proceeded to Roxas Boulevard. While
they were along Roxas Boulevard near the Daily Express Building,
two (2) vehicles intercepted them and ordered them to pull-over. The
passengers of the said vehicles introduced themselves as Metrocom
soldiers, and ordered them to alight and to raise their hands while
poking guns at them. They were ordered to l[ie down] flat on their
belly on the pavement and were bodily frisked and searched. The
Metrocom soldiers did not find anything from their bodies.
Thereafter, they (Rieta, Rimorin and Gonzalo) were ordered by the
Metrocom soldiers to transfer to a jeep. While they were aboard the
jeep, he overheard from the Metrocom soldiers that their driver was
able to escape. Likewise, they were also informed by the Metrocom
soldiers that the cargo truck was loaded with blue seal cigarettes. The
cargo truck was not opened in their presence, nor were the contents
thereof shown to them upon their apprehension. From the time he
boarded the cargo truck in Cartimar until he and Sgt. Rimorin
alighted to take their snacks, up to the time they were apprehended by
the Metrocom soldiers, he had not seen a pack of blue cigarette in the
cargo truck. He did not notice whether the Metrocom soldiers opened
the cargo truck. At Camp Crame, he was investigated without the
benefit of counsel, but, nonetheless, he executed and signed a
statement because as far as he was concerned he has done nothing
wrong. He was detained at Bicutan for more than a year.
"In the early morning of October 15, 1979 he was not carrying any
firearm because he has no mission order to do so, and besides Manila
was not his jurisdiction. He was suspended from the service, but was
reinstated in January 1981. After he was released from Bicutan, he
looked for Boy so that he could clear the matter, but he [did not find]
Boy anymore.
Issues:
"1. The respondents trial and appellate courts committed grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when
[they] convicted herein petitioner notwithstanding the prosecution's
failure to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
"2. The evidence obtained against the accused is inadmissible in
evidence because petitioner and his co-accused were arrested without
a warrant but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order (ASSO) which
was subsequently declared illegal and invalid by this Honorable
Supreme Court."12
Ruling:
Petition has NO MERIT.
Corpus delicti proved by other means
Corpus delicti refers to the specific injury or loss sustained.13 It is the
fact of the commission of the crime14 that may be proved by the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
testimony of eyewitnesses.15 In its legal sense, corpus delicti does
not necessarily refer to the body of the person murdered,16 to the
firearms in the crime of homicide with the use of unlicensed
firearms,17 to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom,18 or -- in the present case -- to the seized contraband
cigarettes.19
Petitioner argues that the receipt issued by Abrigo, a customs official,
was beset with doubt because: 1) it did not state specifically that the
blue-seal cigarettes identified therein had been confiscated from
petitioner and turned over to Abrigo by Colonel Lacson and/or his
men; and 2) it mentioned 371 (instead of 305) cases of confiscated
blue-seal cigarettes.
We note, however, that Colonel Lacson himself identified the
Custody Receipt as the same one issued for the 305 cases of cigarettes
found in the cargo truck, in which petitioner and his co-accused rode,
and from which the 66 cases of cigarettes -- subject of Criminal Case
No. CCC-VI-138(79) -- were confiscated in Malabon, Metro
Manila.22This fact (305 plus 66) explains why 371 cases were
indicated therein. At any rate, petitioner argues on minor
discrepancies that do not affect the integrity of the Receipt, issued in
due course by a customs official who was duty-bound to put the
seized contraband cigarettes in safekeeping.
The existence of the 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes found in the
possession of petitioner and his co-accused was duly proven by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses -- Lacson and Abrigo. They
had testified in compliance with their duty as enforcers of the law.
Their testimonies were rightly entitled to full faith and credit,
especially because there was no showing of any improper motive23
on their part to testify falsely against petitioner. Further, the Court
accords great respect to the factual conclusions drawn by the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in this
case.24
Absurd is the claim of petitioner that, because Colonel Lacson was
not the officer who had actually intercepted the cargo truck in which
the former rode, the latter's testimony was therefore hearsay. The
testimony of the colonel on his participation in the apprehension of
the truck sufficiently rebutted this contention.
Lacson testified that he had personally received information regarding
the smuggling activities being conducted by a syndicated group in
that place. He was also informed that smuggled items would be
transported from the 2nd COSAC Detachment in the Port Area to
Malabon by a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167. During the
stakeout surveillance on the night of October 14, 1979, he saw -- from
his post within the vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment -- the
identified cargo truck coming out of the Port Area. While trailing
behind, he radioed his men posted along Roxas Boulevard to stop the
truck. Later in court, he described how his men had actually
intercepted it.25
Petitioner insists that Colonel Lacson, who had given chase to a
Toyota car and was not among the officers who had intercepted the
truck, could not have seen him as one of the passengers of the latter
vehicle. Notably, however, the chase of the Toyota car had lasted no
more than 5 minutes, and the colonel's team immediately returned to
the subject truck after the chase.26 Lacson, however, categorically
said that he had seen 305 cases of blue-seal cigarettes inside the cargo
vehicle, and that petitioner was one of its passengers.
It should be borne in mind that Colonel Lacson -- as head of that
particular surveillance operation -- had full knowledge, control and
supervision of the whole process. He had organized the surveillance
teams and given orders to his men prior to the apprehension of the
vehicles suspected of carrying smuggled items. Furthermore, he was
present during the surveillance operations until the apprehension of
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the cargo truck. Thus, he was clearly competent to testify on the
matter.
Prima Facie Proof of Nonpayment of Taxes Sufficient
The truth of the negative averment that the duties and specific taxes
on the cigarettes were not paid to the proper authorities is fairly
indicated by the following circumstances that have been established:
(1) the cargo truck, which carried the contraband cigarettes and
some passengers including petitioner, immediately came from the 2nd
COSAC Detachment;
(2) the truck was intercepted at the unholy hour of 4:00 a.m.;
(3) it fitted the undisclosed informer's earlier description of it
as one that was carrying contraband; and
(4) the driver ran away.
Hence, it was up to petitioner to disprove these damning
circumstances, simply by presenting the receipts showing payment of
the taxes. But he did not do so; all that he could offer was his bare
and self-serving denial.
Knowledge of the Illegal Nature of Goods
Persons found to be in possession of smuggled items are presumed to
be engaged in smuggling, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.29 The burden of proof is thus
shifted to them. To rebut this presumption, it is not enough for
petitioner to claim good faith and lack of knowledge of the unlawful
source of the cigarettes. He should have presented evidence to
support his claim and to convince the court of his non-complicity.
In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal
importation under the foregoing statute three requisites must concur:
(1) that the merchandise must have been fraudulently or
knowingly imported contrary to law;
(2) that the defendant, if he is not the importer himself, must
have received, concealed, bought, sold or in any manner facilitated
the transportation, concealment or sale of the merchandise; and
(3) that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge that
the merchandise had been illegally imported. If the defendant,
however, is shown to have had possession of the illegally imported
merchandise, without satisfactory explanation, such possession
shall be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction
The absence of any suspicious reaction on the part of petitioner was
not in accordance with human nature. The involvement or
participation he and his co-accused had in the smuggling of the goods
was confirmed by their lack of proper and reasonable justification for
the fact that they had been found inside the cargo truck, seated in
front, when it was intercepted by the authorities. Despite his
protestation, it is obvious that petitioner was aware of the strange
nature of the transaction, and that he was willing to do his part in
furtherance thereof. The evidence presented by the prosecution
established his work of guarding and escorting the contraband to
facilitate its transportation from the Port Area to Malabon, an act
punishable under Section 3601 of the Tax Code.
Validity of the Search and Seizure
Prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity
of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact
negating the acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive
act was in operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be
valid in all respects.35 The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under
General Order No. 60 -- long before our Decision in Tañada and the
arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can no longer be
disturbed or simply ignored.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Furthermore, the search and seizure of goods, suspected to have
been introduced into the country in violation of customs laws, is
one of the seven doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional provision. Such provision mandates that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
who has personally determined the existence of probable cause.37
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search, seizure and arrest
may be made even without a warrant for purposes of enforcing
customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly
obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police
authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure,
warehouse, store or building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board; or to stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding
or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law.
SALVADOR vs. PEOPLE
463 SCRA 489 (2005)
Facts:
On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the Philippine Air
Force Special Operations Squadron conducted routine surveillance
operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of
alleged drug trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain
PAL personnel.
They kept a close watch on a carrier which arrived at the NAIA from
Hong Kong. After its passengers disembarked and its cargo unloaded,
it was towed by the PAL ground crew and parked at the ramp area.
Three persons had boarded the aircraft. Later, they disembarked with
their abdominal areas bulging. They then boarded an airplane tow
truck with its lights off.
The surveillance team blocked and stopped the tow truck. The 4
persons were later identified as Tomas Salvador (petitioner), Aurelio
Mandin, Danilo Santos (all aircraft mechanics employed by the
Philippine Air Lines) and Napoleon Clamor (driver). They were
found possessing 13 packets containing assorted smuggled watches
and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
They were charged before the RTC with violation of Section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code.
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted
by the PAF operatives is illegal.
Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure was illegal.
Ruling:
No. The Constitutional provisions [Sections 2 and 3(2), Article 3] do
not prohibit searches and seizures, but only such as are unreasonable.
Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and
seizures may lawfully be effected sans a search warrant. These
recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2)
search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented
searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Here, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct a
surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and
smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In
other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his
co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team
properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant
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since it exercised police authority under the customs law.
In Papa vs. Mago involving a customs search, we held that law
enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is
reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced
into the Philippines in violation of the tariff and customs law. They
may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person
suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at
bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the State to foil any
fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers who evade payment of
customs duties. The Governments policy to combat the serious
malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility and impotence on
the ground that dutiable articles on which the duty has not been paid
are entitled to the same Constitutional protection as an individuals
private papers and effects. Here, we see no reason not to apply this
State policy which we have continued to affirm.
Moreover, at the time of the search, petitioner and his co-accused
were on board a moving PAL aircraft tow truck. The search of a
moving vehicle is recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid exception
to the requirement for a search warrant. A search warrant may readily
be obtained when the search is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable to obtain a warrant
when the search is conducted in a mobile ship, aircraft or other motor
vehicle since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought. Verily, the articles
involved in the instant controversy were validly seized by the
authorities even without a search warrant, and, admissible in evidence
against petitioner and his co-accused.
G. Exigency
PEOPLE VS. DE GRACIA
233 SCRA 716 (1994)
FACTS:
The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the
coup d' etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements
headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time,
various government establishments and military camps in Metro
Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes.
Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11755, they were found to be in possession
of the following:
Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamites
Six (6) cartoons of M-16 ammunition at 20 each
One hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV bombs
Without any permit
In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia, Chito Henson,
Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does were charged
with attempted homicide allegedly committed on December 1, 1989
in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario who was shot and
hit on the right thigh.
Maj. Efren Soria was conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office with his team. It was pursuant to an intelligence report
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
received by the division that said establishment was being occupied
by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around
ten to fifteen meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon
Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. a group of five men disengaged
themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated
in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt.
Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the
group, then only six meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew
their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover
inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might
be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence a searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a
certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the
building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar
building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano,
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia
was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the
nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the
team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto
Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up
by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed.
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. 15 The
raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office
was being used as headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there
was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the
Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them
to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17
The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories
for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in
the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-
powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder
at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the
vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was
under attack by rebel forces.
Issue:
Whether the instant case is an exemption to the prohibition against a
warrantless search?
Ruling:
Yes. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account
the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that
a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under
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the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed.
Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.
It is in consonance with People vs Malmstedt:
“Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and
seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable
cause
…. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act
accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.”
The court also adds the principle enunciated in Umil vs Ramos:
The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance
of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge
of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial
warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or any other milder acts but really in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find
justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which (are) of the
essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in
case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified.
H. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
PEOPLE VS. MARTI
193 SCRA 57 (1991)
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his wife Shirley Reyes went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila. They wanted to send packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. When asked by the forwarder if they could
examine and inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves. However, the
proprietor opened the boxes for final inspection as part of their
standard operation procedure (SOP). Upon opening, they suspected
that the contents were illegal drugs. The proprietor reported the
incident to NBI which confirmed that the suspected content were
marijuana. In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened
and found dried marijuana leaves inside. After Marti was traced by
NBI, he was charged with violation of RA 6425, the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
against him, which, according to him, is obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication.
Issue
WON the search and seizure of the packages and the dried marijuana
leaves violated Marti’s constitutional right, thus not admissible as
evidence? No.
The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties granted by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government. Its protection is directed only to
governmental action.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why
the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. In this case, the evidence was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention of State authorities.
Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be admitted to
prosecute him. Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made an
illegal search and seizure of the evidence. The Court pointed out that:
a) It was the proprietor who made a reasonable search of the packages
in compliance with SOP
b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected into a warrantless search and seizure. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Marti further argued that since the Constitution expressly declares as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether
the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in laying down the
principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals.
WATEROUS DRUG CORP. VS. NLRC
280 SCRA 735
FACTS:
Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.
On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from
WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning
her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters
accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same
date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company’s control
of purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with
the suppliers.
In another dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor
Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the rush delivery of
medicines without the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez
informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and
Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP).
A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order
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(P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing
purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit.
Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of
P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of
P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988.
Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and
it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc.
Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the
difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren
tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no.
629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico
through China Bank check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she
denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice.
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana
Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00
was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms.
Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan,
bukas. It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been
pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of
the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give
her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that
effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file
containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a
satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaas invasion
of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to
Catolico.
Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received
from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She
also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it
sprang from an earlier incident between her and Cos secretary, Irene
Soliven.
She was effectively terminated on March 8,1990.
On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter
a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal
suspension.
In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez
found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners.
Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners
failed to prove what [they] alleged as complainants dishonesty, and to
show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was
without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal
and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would not
be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded
separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay for every
year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of
P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing 30 days work. Arbiter
Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:
30 days Preventive Suspension P 2,000.00
Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
TOTAL AWARD: P35,401.86
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the
NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that
Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
terminate her
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings
of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to
prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment. It
found that petitioners evidence consisted only of the check of
P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-
employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared
that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2
and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded:
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants, respondents case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence
which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainants dismissal.
The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
- Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.
- Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that
an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable
time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that
management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense, including legal representation.
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to
explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the
memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt
of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted
after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors
memorandum spoke of evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession,
which were not, however, submitted. What the evidences [sic] other
than the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for
the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-MMG Mario R.
Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by
Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co. The purchase orders
were silent as to Catolicos participation in the purchase. If the price
increase was objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should
have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had no
one to blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts
emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation proposed by
petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was no proof that she ever
transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said
suppliers. Again, as the purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at
all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion
for Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an
under the table deal with YSP.
Catolicos dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion,
which in no case can justify an employees dismissal. Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee
for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds and
not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to
which class of employees the term trust and confidence is restricted.
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect
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services. citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that
the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary,
and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities.
PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA
301 SCRA 66 (1999)
FACTS
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia Mendoza,
and their then 10-yearold daughter attended the birthday party of a
relative of Octavio Mendoza held at McDonalds in Harrison Plaza.
While the party was going on, accused-appellant left and proceeded
to Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant where he had some beer.
When it was time for Cecilia and Charmaine to go home, they could
not find accused-appellant, hence, they decided to just leave,
proceeding directly to their residence.
All the lights in their house were on but the screen door was locked.
They knocked at the window but accused-appellant did not respond.
A moment later, however, accused-appellant opened the back door
and mother and daughter went straight to the master’s bedroom
While inside the masters bedroom, accused-appellant who was drunk
instructed Charmaine to get cold water and to douse him. She
willingly obliged, after which she was told to go to her room. She
change her clothes and readied herself for bed. While in her room,
Charmaine heard her parents quarrelling over the issue of Cecilia and
Charmaine having left accused-appellant at the party. Thereafter,
Charmaine suddenly heard three gunshots. Running out of her room,
Charmaine saw her mother Cecilia down on the floor of their living
room, bleeding profusely. Charmaine saw accused-appellant hiding a
gun under the bed in her parents’ room.
Accused-appellant subsequently called his brother-in-law, Sgt.
Antonio Gabac, and told him that Cecilia had been shot and is already
dead. Gabac, on the other line, told accused-appellant not to touch
anything and that he would be arriving shortly.
Gabac was handed the .38 caliber revolver with the serial number
41001 that shot and killed Cecilia.
Evidence was also recovered by Cecilia’s father in the form of pieces
of paper that contained the memorandum receipt that allowed
respondent to carry the firearm.
ISSUE:
WON the search and seizure of the documents and the weapon
violated Mendoza’s constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure
HELD
NO, the search and seizure of the documents and the weapon did not
violate Mendoza’s constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
The Solicitor General is correct in explaining that such right applies
as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies.
The case in point is People vs. Marti (193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where
this Court had the occasion to rule that the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and it cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it
within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and mission order were
discovered by accused-appellants father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
PEOPLE VS. BONGCARAWAN
384 SCRA 525 (2000)
FACTS:
March 11, 1999, an interisland passengership, M/V Super Ferry 5
sailed from Manila to Iligan City. When it was about to dock at the
porn of Iligan City, security officer Mark Diesmo received a
complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry.
She suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four other members of the security force accompanied
her to search for the suspect whom they later found.
The suspect was identified as accused Basher Bongcarawan who was
informed of the complaint and then invited to cabin 106. With his
consent, he was bodily searched but no jewelry was found. He was
then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy section to get
his baggage. The accused then took a Samsonite suitcase and brought
this back to the cabin. He opened the case, revealing a brown bag and
small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. The
security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain
and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents
and also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
Lt Robert Patrimonio and others arrived at about 6:00am and took
custody of the accused and seized the items-- the suitcase, a brown
bag and 8 small packs of the white crystalline substance. The accused
explained that he was just requested by one Alican “Alex” Macapudi
to bring the suitcase to the latter’s brother in Iligan City. The accused
and the items were later turned over to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). He was brought to the
PAOCTF Headquarters while the packs of white crystalline substance
were sent to the NBI in CDO for lab exam were it was confirmed to
be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase
containing shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his
consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to
such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
RTC found the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of violation of Sec 16, Art 3, RA No. 6425 as amended by
RA 7659 and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua
(walay CA derecho supreme court o.o)
ISSUE 1:
WON the drug confiscated is admissible evidence against the
accused?
RULING:
Yes.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of
this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between
invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that
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protection is against transgression committed by the government or
its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, "in the
absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was
searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found
"shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee
and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police
officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of
enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them
and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be invoked.
ISSUE 2:
WON the court erred in holding that the accused owned the
confiscated evidence and therefore is not admissible evidence?
RULING: No.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that
the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and
were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not
given credence by the trial court.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be
owned by him. To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to
present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the
accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of
the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case
at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant.
Stories can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone
allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is
not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to possess the same.
J. Jail Safety
PEOPLE VS. CONDE
356 SCRA 525 (2002)
FACTS:
Apollo Romero, a resident of Santolan Street, Kalookan
City, Metro Manila, testified that on May 25, 1992 at about 8:00
A.M., when he was home, saw four men in Santolan Street block the
path of two Indian nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle
(approximately 25 to 30meters away). One of the men later identified
as Oscar Conde poked a gun at the two Indians while his three
companions approached and stabbed the Indians. He later identified
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
the other two assailants as Alejandro Perez, Jr., and Allan Atis. He
also saw Allan Atis take the goods which were being sold by the two
Indians on installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the
crime scene. The fourth assailant remained unidentified.
PO3 Rodencio Sevillano was told to investigate the above
cited incident. On May 30, 1992, the police arrested the three
accused. Police recovered the weapons used in the robbery, when
Felicidad Macabare, Condes wife, weapons were found in here bag as
she went to the police station to talk to the accused. Sevillano
admitted, however, that they did not have a warrant of arrest when
they apprehended the accused. Nor did they have a search warrant
when they inspected Felicidads bag and when they searched the house
of a certain Jimmy where they found the stolen items.
Dario Gajardo, a doctor employed in the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service testified that the cause of death was cardio-
respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab
wounds. Biant Singh sustained stab wounds on his lower stomach
while Sukhdev Singh sustained stab wounds at the back and right
portion of the ribs.
The defense presented five witnesses: Alejandro Perez, Jr., Oscar
Conde, Allan Atis, Danilo Acutin and Anita Santos.
Alejandro Perez, Jr. testified that Oscar Conde and Allan
Atis were his town mates from Catbalogan, Samar. According to
Perez, on May 25, 1992, at about 7:00 A.M., he went to the Madrigal
Compound at Las Pias, Metro Manila, to visit his cousin Danilo and
apologize for not attending his uncles 40th death anniversary and
their fiesta. Upon his arrival they went to the cemetery and visited the
graves of his uncle and their grandfather. From the cemetery, they
went home where they drank some beer until late afternoon. Together
with Oscar Conde and Allan Atis, he was arrested in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City on May 30, 1992. Danilo Acutin corroborated
Alejandros testimony.
Oscar Conde testified that on May 25, 1992, he was in
Barangay Polo Street, Paraaque mending his fishing net. He was with
his wife, Felicidad Macabare; and his uncle, Tancio Loto. He said the
police arrested Alejandro Perez, Jr., Allan Atis, Felicidad Macabare
and him in Tandang Sora, Quezon City on May 30, 1992.(Later
reports indicated, however, that Felicidad was not among those
arrested.)
Allan Atis stated that he was in MCU where he worked as a
construction worker for a certain Romy Ramos on May 25, 1992. He
denied having anything to do with the death of the two Indian
nationals.
The courts found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for the deaths of Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh and to indemnify the
heirs of each victim in the amount of 50,000.
Atis argues that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as one
of the perpetrators of the crime. He alleges that Apollo Romero only
saw him in court. Atis likewise claims that he was arrested without
any warrant of arrest several days after the crime.
Oscar Conde claims that he was illegally arrested by the
authorities. He adds that the Indian Embassy was pressuring the
police to solve the murder. He avers that the testimony of Romero is
insufficient to sustain his conviction. He cites the delay of Romero in
reporting what he saw, hence Romeros testimony is unbelievable.
Lastly, Conde wants this Court to disregard as evidence the stolen
items and weapons illegally seized by the police.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, filed its
appellees brief only in regard to Oscar Condes appeal. According to
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the OSG, the testimony of Apollo Romero deserves full faith and
credence since the appellants failed to show any improper motive on
his part. The same is true for the testimony of PO3 Sevillano who also
enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
duties. In conclusion, the Solicitor General prays that the conviction
of the appellants be affirmed. Citing People vs. Escandor, 265 SCRA
444, 445 (1996), the OSG stresses that the findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, because the trial court is in the best
position to make an honest determination of the witnesses behavior
and deportment during trial.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the identification made by Apollo Romero
deserves credence;
(2) Whether or not the arrests of the appellants were illegal due to not
having a warrant;
(3) Whether or not the alleged stolen objects, i.e., the beach towel and
umbrella, can be presented in evidence.
RULING:
Anent the first issue, we are in agreement with the
submission by the Office of the Solicitor General. First, factual
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon this Court and its
evaluation regarding the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight and respect unless there is a showing that the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
case. Being in a better position to observe the witnesses for the
prosecution as well as the defense, the trial courts appreciation of
their testimony, truthfulness, honesty and candor deserves the highest
respect. There is nothing in law and jurisprudence which requires, as
a condition sine qua non for the positive identification by a
prosecution witness of a felon, that witness must first know the latter
personally. The fact that Romero never saw Atis before the crime was
committed does not detract from the credibility and reliability of
Romeros testimony
.
Oscar Conde insists that the delay of Romero in reporting
the incident makes his testimony unworthy of credence. However,
delay in divulging the names of perpetrators of a crime, if sufficiently
explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and his
testimony. Likewise, credibility is not affected by the initial
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information. It is not uncommon
for witnesses to a crime to show some reluctance about getting
involved in a criminal case as, in fact, the natural reticence of most
people to get involved is of judicial notice.
Romero categorically identified both Oscar Conde and
Allan Atis as two of the perpetrators of the crime. Appellants failed to
adduce any improper motive on his part which would motivate him to
implicate them in the said crime. Absent such motive, the testimony
Romero should be accorded full faith and credence as the testimony
of a disinterested party who only wants to see justice upheld.
The two appellants interposed the negative defenses of alibi
and denial. But as held in several cases, these defenses cannot
overcome the straightforward testimony and the positive
identification made by a prosecution witness.
We now turn to the appellants vehement assertion that they
have been illegally arrested. The records of the case will show that
the arrests of the appellants came after the lapse of 5 days from the
time they were seen committing the crime. At the time they were
arrested, the police were not armed with any warrants for their arrests.
Section 5 of Rule 113, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
enumerates the instances when an arrest can be made without
warrant, namely:
(a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
None of the above circumstances is present in this case.
Appellants were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and
were not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime
had just been committed. Five days had already passed from the time
of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said that the arresting
officers had probable cause based on personal knowledge. PO3
Sevillano admitted that they learned about the suspects from Apollo
Romero and certain unnamed informants. The third circumstance is
patently not present. The lapse of five days gave the police more than
enough time to conduct surveillance of the appellants and apply for a
warrant of arrest. Clearly, appellants rights provided in Sec. 2, Art. III
of the Constitution were violated.
Unfortunately, appellants did not assert their constitutional
rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to their case. An accused
is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to
move for the quashing of the Information against him before his
arraignment. When the appellants entered their pleas on arraignment
without invoking their rights to question any irregularity, which might
have accompanied their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been made
before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for appellants to
raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the
information upon arraignment constitute clear waives of their rights
against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after trial free from error. The warrantless arrest, even if illegal,
cannot render void all other proceedings including those leading to
the conviction of the appellants and his co-accused, nor can the state
be deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on
record point to their culpability.
As for the stolen objects presented in evidence, their seizure
is assailed by appellants. We agree that the warrantless search in the
house of a certain Jimmy, based on the confession of accused
Alejandro Perez, Jr. is definitely questionable. The use of evidence
against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission
without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation
if proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution.
Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of
the poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state should not
be used to gain other evidence because the illegally obtained evidence
taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, the objects
confiscated at said house are inadmissible as evidence.
The identification of Allan Atis by Apollo Romero as the
one who took the items was more of an afterthought and was not even
responsive to the question made by the prosecutor. Aside from this,
the ownership of the towel and the umbrella was not even established.
In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery
must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself, otherwise, the
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crime would only be homicide or murder, as the case may be. In this
case, only the facts and causes of deaths were established with moral
certainty. Hence, there can be no robbery with homicide. The
appellants are only liable for two counts of homicide.
On the other hand, we find in order the search of the bag of
Felicidad Macabare, at the time she was visiting her husband who
was a detainee. PO3 Sevillano testified, this search is part of police
standard operating procedure, and is recognized as part of
precautionary measures by the police to safeguard the safety of the
detainees as well as the overall security of the jail premises. However,
the weapons confiscated from Felicidad Macabare, were not formally
offered as evidence by the prosecution, hence probatively valueless.
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and “Areal Target Zonings”
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
178 SCRA 211 (1989)
FACTS : On Jan. 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to the LOI of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP. Its mission was to conduct
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioner’s contentions:
Petitioners (Ricardo Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates
for People’s Rights (ULAP) aver that such installation of checkpoints
bring about the residents’ fear of harassment and danger, as their
safety was being placed at the disposition of the militory check-ups at
night or at dawn without the benefit of a search warrant and/or
court order. This was bolstered by the fact that on July 9, 1988, a
man named Benjamin Parpon was gunned down allegedly in cold
blood for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint.
They further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a
blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the constitution.
ISSUE : WON PETITIONER’S ALLEGATIONS ARE
SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO DECLARE THE
CHECKPOINTS AS PER SE ILLEGAL
RULING : NO. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed
committed specific violations of petitioner’s right against unlawful
search and seizure or other rights. The constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to
be infringed. Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation is not
sufficient to enable the court to determine whether there was indeed a
violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure as
he failed to state the details of the incidents which amount to a
violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but
is to be rsolved according to the facts of each case (e.g. officer
looking into the vehicle, or flashes a light therein do not constitute
an unreasonable search).
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and
probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to
enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro
Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the
rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the
checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command
Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director.
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
185 SCRA 665 (1990)
FACTS:
In the Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989, petitioners’ petition
for prohibition seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as
unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed.
Petitioners have filed the instant motion and supplemental motion for
reconsideration of said decision. Before submission of the incident for
resolution, the Solicitor General, for the respondents, filed his
comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. The checkpoints are
nonetheless attacked by the movants as a warrantless search and
seizure and, therefore, violative of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether installment and operation of checkpoints is unconstitutional
and constitutes warrantless search.
HELD:
No, it is the basic right of the State to defend itself from its enemies
and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended
for public welfare; and in the pursuit of those objectives, the
government has the equal right, under its police power, to select the
reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The
checkpoint is evidently one of such means it has selected.
Routine checkpoint stops do not intrude similarly on the motoring
public.
First, the potential interference with legitimate traffic is minimal.
Motorists using these highways are not taken by surprise as they
know, or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints
and will not be stopped elsewhere.
Second, checkpoint operations both appear to and actually involve
less discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in
which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence,
reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops are duly
authorized and believed to serve the public interest. The location of a
fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective
allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that
such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class, and since field
officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less
room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in
the case of roving-patrol stops.
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Moreover, a claim that a particular exercise of discretion in locating
or operating a checkpoint is unreasonable is subject to post-stop
judicial review.
Under exceptional circumstances, checkpoints may be allowed
and installed by the government.
It should be stated, at the outset, that nowhere in the questioned
decision did this Court legalize all checkpoints, i.e. at all times and
under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints
are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as
where the survival of organized government is on the balance, or
where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government. Implicit
in this proposition is, that when the situation clears and such grave
perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to
remain.
Checkpoints have been regarded by authorities as a security
measure designed to entrap criminals and insurgents and to
constitute a dragnet for all types of articles in illegal trade.
Recent and ongoing events have pointed to the continuing validity
and need for checkpoints manned by either military or police forces.
The sixth (6th) attempted coup d'etat (stronger than all previous ones)
was staged only last 1 December 1989. Another attempt at a coup
d’etat is taken almost for granted. The NPA, through its sparrow
units, has not relented but instead accelerated its liquidation of armed
forces and police personnel. Murders, sex crimes, hold-ups and drug
abuse have become daily occurrences. Unlicensed firearms and
ammunition have become favorite objects of trade. Smuggling is at an
all-time high. Whether or not effective as expected, checkpoints have
been regarded by the authorities as a security measure designed to
entrap criminal and insurgents and to constitute a dragnet for all types
of articles in illegal trade.
As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded
as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search.
Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain
extent, on motorist’s right to “free passage without interruption”, but
it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of
travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to answer
a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search.
If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of
some probable cause which justifies reasonable belief that either
the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or
have been instruments of some offense.
The checkpoints are nonetheless attacked by the movants as a
warrantless search and seizure and, therefore, violative of the
Constitution. As already stated, vehicles are generally allowed to pass
these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If
vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense.
Warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints quite similar to
searches and seizures accompanying warrantless arrests during
commission of a crime or immediately thereafter.
Besides these warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are
quite similar to searches and seizures accompanying warrantless
arrests during the commission of a crime, or immediately thereafter.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Court’s decision on checkpoints does not in anyway validate nor
condone abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints.
Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way,
validate nor condone abuses committed by the military manning the
checkpoints. The Court’s decision was concerned with power, i.e.
whether the government employing the military has the power to
install said checkpoints. Once that power is acknowledged, the
Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether is abuse in a particular situation is a different
“ball game” to be resolved in the constitutional arena.
PEOPLE VS. EXALA
221 SCRA 494 (1993)
FACTS:
On 2 November 1982, Restituto B. Bocalan together with his co-
accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala were stopped at a
police checkpoint in Cavite City for routine inspection regarding
unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. Pfc. Ricardo
Galang,member of the inspection team inspected the vehicle and
asked about the contains of a bag. They became silent and fidgety
raising suspicion so Pfc. Galang ordered the bag to be opened and
found more than 2 kilos of marijuana.
Bocalan was found guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."as
principal and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Bocalan appealed and contended that the trial court erred in
admitting the bag as evidence against him since it was obtained
through a warrantless search.7He also added that the search was
conducted prior to the arrest, therefore it was not incident to a lawful
arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search of the bag prior to the
arrest was illegal rendering the evidence to be inadmissible to the
court.
RULING:
The warrantless search and seizure was lawful.
There are instances where search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the
“stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints
after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles
are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an
offense.
In this case, the incident happened in the police check-point and there
was probable cause which justified the belief of the police that the
person is a law-offender.
The accused were silent and fidgety when they were asked about the
bag containing the marijuana. The accused clearly appeared to be in
fear of being discovered. The probable cause justified a more
extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery
of the prohibited stuff.
GUANZON VS, DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
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Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to
prohibit the military and police officers represented by public
respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation
Drives" in Metro Manila. The forty one (41) petitioners who are bona
fide residents and tax payers of Metro Manila, and leaders of their
respected communities, stayed that that they have a common or
general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of
their human rights and the reign of peace and order in their
communities. They claim to represent "the citizens of Metro Manila
who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before this Court."
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target
zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to
be search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of arrest
served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely
rouse from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
houses. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and
herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for
the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained
that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents
of mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
confessions and tactical information. The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies.
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose
the petition contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file
the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the
action. The public respondents stress two points in their Comment
which was also adopted as their Memorandum after the petition was
given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation
drives. And second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners
about a deliberate disregard for human rights are total lies. Second,
there can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police
action of the nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and
blatantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If
the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to
flush out and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent
with the constitutional and statutory rights of all the people affected
by such actions. Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to
government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for
the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were
intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by
the communities were the said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation
to witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of
violation of human rights.
Ruling: (The petition was REMANDED)
According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested
in the saturation drives covered by the petition. Not one of the several
thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described
by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice.
None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of those
affected has apparently complained. The Solicitor General
commented in the statement that local and foreign co-respondents
joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the events. In
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
other words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in
full view of media. Where there is large scale mutiny or actual
rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat areas,
enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and
otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure
search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents,
however, that there was no rebellion or criminal activity similar to
that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have been no
impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before
any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were
arrested. There is no strong showing that the objectives sought to be
attained by the "areal zoning" could not be achieved even as the
rights of squatter and low-income families are fully protected. Where
a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the
Constitution is involved, it is the duty of the court to stop the
transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state
may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of
the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present
petition where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims
of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of
alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to
stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced
that the event actually happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. This is so in spite of the alleged pleas of
barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." We
cannot imagine police actions of the magnitude described in the
petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken without
some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain
abuses. However, the remedy is not to stop all police
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing
wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas.
Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not
move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners
would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where
search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured.
The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly
procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If
our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the
police that occasional saturation drives are essential to maintain the
stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy
guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only
be evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing
human rights abuses and identifying violators is necessary. The
problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. Under
the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or
policeman whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear
facts ascertained through an orderly procedure, no permanent relief
can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'
charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy
implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie showing that some
abuses were probably committed and could be committed during
future police actions, the petition was REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the
petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and
where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
ABENES VS. CA
515 SCRA 690 (2007)
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FACTS:
Three days prior to the May 11, 1998 national and local elections, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pagadian City created a team
composed of seven policemen with a directive to establish and man a
checkpoint in Barangay Danlugan at said city, for the purpose of
enforcing the Gun Ban which was then being implemented by the
COMELEC.
At about 10:30 in the morning of the same day, a red Tamaraw FX
trying to pass through the check point was stopped by the team and
directed to park at the side of the road.
As the occupants within the vehicle could not be seen through its
tinted windows, SPO1 Eliezer Requejo knocked on the vehicle’s
window and requested the occupants to step down for a routine
inspection. The eight occupants, including Abenes, alighted from the
vehicle. SPO1 Requejo and SPO3 Pascua noticed that a holstered
firearm was tucked at the right waist of Abenes. The firearm was
readily visible to the policemen; it was not covered by the shirt worn
by Abenes. Abenes was then asked by SPO3 Pascua whether he had a
license and authority to carry the firearm, and whether his possession
was exempted from the Gun Ban being enforced by the COMELEC.
Accused answered in the affirmative. The policemen then demanded
for the pertinent documents to be shown to support Abenes’ claim. He
could not show any. Hence, SPO1 Requejo confiscated Abenes’
firearm, which was later identified as a Norinco .45 caliber pistol
bearing Serial No. 906347, including its magazine containing seven
live ammunitions.
A certification dated May 18, 1998 from the Firearms and Explosives
License Processing Section of the PNP, Pagadian City disclosed that
Abenes is not a registered nor a licensed firearm holder .
The RTC rendered its Joint Decision finding the petitioner GUILTY
of Violation of Section 264, in relation to Section 261, paragraphs (p)
and (q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and illegal possession of
firearms.
CA Affirmed with modification
ISSUE: Whether or not the checkpoint was validly established?
HELD: The Court upheld the validity of the checkpoint.
The petitioner insists that the prosecution should have produced the
mission order constituting the checkpoint.
The petitioner is wrong. In the present case, the production of the
mission order is not necessary in view of the fact that the checkpoint
was established three days before the May 11, 1998 elections.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution
imposing a gun ban during the election period (pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were
held on 8 May, the second Monday of the month. The incident, which
happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which
are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine
checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free
passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle’s
occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long
as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a
body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual
search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an
individual’s right against unreasonable search.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban
enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to
implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual
search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such
ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said
period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily
perpetrate their malicious designs.
In the instant case, the firearm was seized from the petitioner when in
plain view, the policemen saw it tucked into his waist uncovered by
his shirt.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of
an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The "plain view"
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
All the foregoing requirements are present in the instant case. The law
enforcement officers lawfully made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were properly in a position from
which they particularly viewed the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, the policemen came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the petitioner where they saw the gun tucked
into his waist. The gun was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when the petitioner alighted from the vehicle.
As accurately found by the CA:
xxx It must be emphasized that the policemen discovered the firearm
[on] the person of the [petitioner] shortly after he alighted from the
vehicle and before he was frisked. SPO3 Pascua’s testimony[,]
corroborated by that of SPO1 Requejo[,] convincingly established
that the holstered .45 caliber pistol tucked at the right waist of the
[petitioner] was readily visible to the policemen . xxx
Nor can the Court believe petitioner’s claim that he could not have
freely refused the "police orders" issued by the police team who were
"armed to the teeth" and "in the face of such show of force." The
courts a quo consistently found that the police team manning the
checkpoint politely requested the passengers to alight from their
vehicles, and the motorists who refused this request were not forced
to do so. These findings of fact are fully supported by the evidence in
the record.
PEOPLE VS. MANAGO
801 SCRA 103 (2016)
FACTS: At around 9:30 in the evening of March 15,2007, PO3
Antonio Din (PO3 Din) of PNP Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to
get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when two persons entered
and declared a holdup. P03 Din identified himself as a police and
exchanged gun shots with the two suspects.
After the shootout, the suspects escaped. One of them boarded a
motorcycle and the other boarded a red Toyota Corolla.
P03 Din noted the plate numbers of both getaway vehicles and upon
verification of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), the police
officers found out that the motorcycle was registered in Manago’s
name (respondent), while the red Toyota Corolla was registered in the
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name of Zest-O Corporation where Manago worked as a District
Sales Manager.
With all the forgoing information at hand, the police officers
conducted a “hot pursuit” operation one day after the robbery
incident. (March 16, 2007). The team advanced the operation by
setting up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait.
At around 9:30 in the evening, the red Toyota Corolla, then being
driven by Manago, passed through the checkpoint, prompting the
police officers to stop the vehicle. The police officers then ordered
Manago to disembark , and thereafter, conducted a thorough search of
the vehicle.
As the search in the vehicle produced contraband, the police officers
then frisked Manago and discovered 1 plastic sachet containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The pack weighed 5.7158 grams and authorities then found out that
only 0.3852grams is shabu while the rest is potassium aluminum
sulphate or tawas.
RTC found Manago guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A
9165 also known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.”
CA allowed Manago to post bail in the amount of 200,000php noting
that the quantity of shabu seized from him was only 0.3852 grams,
thus bailable. Later affirmed Manago’s conviction in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the checkpoint is valid as to the
determination of the lawfulness of the warrantless search?
RULING: No, the checkpoint was not valid. Setup of military or
police checkpoints are not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is
justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorist.
SC further discusses that routine inspections in checkpoints are not
regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
searches if limited to the following:
a. Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked in a public
fair grounds;
b. Simply looks into a vehicle;
c. Flashes a light therein without opening the car’s
doors;
d. Where the occupants are not subjected to a
physical or body search
e. Where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to
a visual search or inspection
f. Where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area
Such warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probably case to
believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
Consequently there was no checkpoint in this case for the purpose of
searching the subject vehicle, it was merely arranged for the targeted
arrest of Manago and it cannot be qualified as a routinary and
indiscriminate search of moving vehicles.
Hence, the search conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the
person of Manago was unlawful.
The said search was made even before he was arrested and thus,
violated the cardinal rule on searches incidental to lawful arrests that
there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made.
SC reversed and acquitted Manago.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
826 SCRA 382 (2017)
FACTS: At about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen
called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was
later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to
obtain illegal drugs.9
P03 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and
P02 Alvin Vergara (P02 Vergara) who were both on duty. 10 Chief of
Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up
a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna. 11
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a
passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. 13 They flagged
down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The
police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check
for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing
what appeared to be marijuana." 16 POI Cabello confiscated the tea
bag and marked it with his initials.
The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.
For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San
Pablo City on January 15, 2008.23 After participating in the festivities,
he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound for
Nagcarlan.24 At around 10:00 a.m., the jeepney passed a police
checkpoint in Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan.25 Veridiano noticed that
the jeepney was being followed by three (3) motorcycles, each with
two (2) passengers in civilian attire.
the motorcyclists flagged down the jeepney.27 Two (2) armed men
boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found
nothing on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to
the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was ...
found in his possession.
ISSUE:
1 whether there was a valid warrantless arrest
2 whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner
RULING
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was
seized in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was
merely seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He
did not act in any manner that would give the police officers
reasonable ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or
that he was committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable
information is insufficient to constitute probable cause that would
support a valid warrantless arrest. 49
Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues· that "the accompanying
[warrantless] search was likewise illegal."50Hence, under Article III,
Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the
Constitution, the seized tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible
in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous tree."
Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana
is admissible in evidence, petitioner contends that the prosecution
failed to preserve its integrity.54 The apprehending team did not
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strictly comply with the rule on chain of custody under Section 21 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165.
1
Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be
a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."78
For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a
valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a
warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely
a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence
of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.10
The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a
crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
2
The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable
suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.
A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua 107 as "the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope
of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons."109
Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement
measure specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a
need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 110
Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop
and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and
frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch.
111
Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that
criminal activity may be afoot. 112 Reliance on one (1) suspicious
activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not
exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to
believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will
act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to
show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would
reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
4.Wire tapping
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING
AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not
in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or
spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this
Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for
any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in
section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
GAANAN VS. IAC
145 SCRA 112 (1986)
FACTS: In the morning of Oct. 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the latter’s living
room when they offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault
they had filed against Laconico after demanding 8k from him. After
they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a
telephone call to Laconico.
The same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant (his lawyer) to
come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct
assault case because his regular lawyer had gone on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. The appellant heard the complainant enumerate the
conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
20 minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he
was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered “Yes”.
Complainant then told Laconico to give the money to his wife at the
office of the then Department of Public Highways. In an entrapment
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operation upon receipt of the money, Atty. Pintor was subsequently
arrested.
Complainant Pintor thus charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
LOWER COURT: found that both were guilty of violating Sec. 1 of
RA 4200; sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with costs
IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused was private in
nature, and was therefore covered by RA 4200. It also held that
petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge
and consent of the complainant, and that the extension telephone
used is covered in the term “device” in Sec. 1 RA 4200.
ISSUE: WON AN EXTENSION TELEPHONE IS AMONG THE
PROHIBITED DEVICES IN SEC. 1 OF RA NO. 4200
RULING: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph, or the other devices enumerated
in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
“tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just so
happened to be there for ordinary office use.
It is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, the
penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
phone. The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable, must
strictly be with the use of enumerated devices in RA 4200 or
others of similar nature.
5. What may be seized
RULE 126
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be
filed. — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (n)
6. Remedies in Cases of Violation
A. Exclusionary rule
STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued (by Respondent
Secretary of Justice Hon. Jose W. Diokno, et. al.) at different dates
against petitioners (Stonehill, et. al.) and the corporations of which
they were officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.” were to be seized.
Stonehill’s Contention:
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void
for being general warrants as having contravened the Constitution and
the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not describe the
documents, books and things to be seized particularly.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the search warrant has been
validly issued?
2. Whether or not the seized articles may be
admitted in court?
Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major
groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations;
and (b) those found and seized in the residences of the petitioners.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no
cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof. The petitioners have no cause
of action against the contested warrants on the first major group. This
is because corporations have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of their officers, directors and
stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third
parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be
settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches
and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if
the answer is no, whether said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable
searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection to
this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if
based upon probable cause determined personally by the judge by the
manner set in the provision; and (2) the warrant shall describe the
things to be seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the
warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses committed
were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges to
determine the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility of
such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid
search warrant.
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described
with particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three
residences of petitioners are null and void.
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PASTRANO VS. CA
281 SCRA 254 (1997)
FACTS:
-A group of students reported to Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, then
intelligence operations officer of the Philippine Constabulary, at
Camp Naranjo, at Oroquieta City, that Clyde Pastrano was beaten up
by his father, Petitioner Pedrito Pastrano, and reported that the latter
carries firearms.
-On February 20, 1989, two sons of Petitioner Pedrito Pastrano by his
estranged wife - James Pastrano and Clinton Pastrano - also went to
Capt. Maoza, seeking his assistance in connection with the death of
their brother, reporting that their father and his common-law wife
were keeping unlicensed firearms in their house.
The brothers executed a joint affidavit on February 20, 1989 in
which they stated that they had personal knowledge of the fact that
their father Pedrito Pastrano was keeping three (3) firearms of
different calibers in the bedroom of his house.
-On the basis of the affidavit of the Pastrano brothers, Capt. Maoza
applied for a search warrant on the same day.
After examining complainant and the two brothers, Judge Teodorico
M. Durias of the Municipal Trial Court of Oroquieta City (Branch I)
issued a search warrant which Capt. Maoza later served at the
residence of Pedrito Pastrano at Capitol Drive, Oroquieta City.
-Seized from petitioners dwelling was a sack containing the
following:
One (1) Revolver Cal. 22 Magnum with Serial No. 07345. Made in
Germany ROHMGMBH SONTHEM/BRENZ;
One (1) round ammunition for Cal. 22 Magnum;
One (1) Revolver Cal. 32 with Serial No. 233833 Colt Made in
U.S.A.;
Six rounds of live Ammunition for Cal. 32 revolver.
On the basis of the evidence thus seized, petitioner Pedrito Pastrano y
Capapas and his common-law wife, Erlinda Ventir y Sanchez, were
charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition as
penalized under P.D. No. 1866.
On January 14, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision finding
petitioner guilty, even as it found his common-law wife, Erlinda
Ventir, innocent of the charge.
CA - upheld RTC's decision.
PASTRANO'S CONTENTION RE ILLEGAL SEARCH:
-Petitioner contends that Capt. Rodolfo Maoza, who applied for the
search warrant, did not have personal knowledge of the facts on
which the warrant was based.
-Petitioner finally assails the absence of a written deposition showing
that the judge had examined the complainant and his witnesses by
means of searching questions in writing and under oath as required by
Rule 126, 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
4. Examination of complainant, record. - The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests

them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted. Nor is there any merit in petitioners contention that since the .32 cal.
revolver is covered by a license issued to its former owner, petitioners
ISSUEs: possession of the same firearm is legal. The permit/license or
(1) W/N The Search Warrant issued by Judge Teodorico Durias authority to possess firearm contemplated by P.D. No. 1866 and its
is invalid Implementing Rules is one which is issued to the applicant taking into
(2) W/N the CA erred in ruling there was illegal possession of account his qualifications. Contrary to petitioners contention,
firearms therefore, the possession of firearms is unlike the registration of
motor vehicles. A permit/license or authority to possess firearms is
RULING: not transferrable to the purchaser of the firearm.
(1) No, the basis of the trial courts finding of probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant was that of the Pastrano B.Civil Action for damages (Art. 32, NCC)
brother's testimonies, and not of Capt Maoza. AND, PEDRITO
ABERCA VS. VER
PASTRANO HAS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE
20 SCRA 383 (1988)
LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH.
Facts of the case:
The RTC actually examined the two brothers, James Clement G. ● This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures
Pastrano and Clinton G. Steve Pastrano. These two were the ones and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs
who reported the matter to Capt. Maoza. They gave information of by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
the illegal possession of firearms by their father, petitioner herein, on Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM),
ordered by General Fabian Ver “to conduct pre-emptive
the basis of personal knowledge.
strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
Rule 126, 4 indeed requires the examination of the complainant and plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.”
his witnesses to be put in writing and under oath. But although this is
a ground for quashing a search warrant in this case, petitioner did CLAIMS OF THE PETITIONERS
nothing to this end. He did not move to quash the information before b. elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in
the trial court. Nor did he object to the presentation of the evidence most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during
these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
obtained as being the product of an illegal search.
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs;
c. that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued
In the case of Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, we held: by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the visits of relatives and lawyers;
admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived d. that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights
when no objection to the legality of the search warrant was raised to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
during the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the evidence
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order
obtained through said warrant. to punish them;
e. that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part
Petitioner thus waived any objection based on the illegality of the of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
search. As held in People v. Omaweng,[5] the right to be secure incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and
against unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by
can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly or defendants.
f. plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting
impliedly.
to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00
each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of
We find that the prosecution clearly established the elements of the at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney’s
crime charged and that the Court of Appeals and the trial court fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
correctly found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. CLAIMS OF THE DEFENSE
a. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their
counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1)
(2) No, Pedrito Pastrano was proven that he did not have license
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of
to possess the firearms seized from him. their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that
The possession of any firearm without the requisite permit/license the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune
secured from the Chief Constabulary is unlawful as provided by P.D from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties;
No. 1866. In this case two witnesses for the prosecution, both from and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
the Philippine Constabulary, testified that petitioner had no license to
RULING OF THE RTC
possess the firearms seized from him. Sgt. Eugenio Salingay, officer- b. On November 8, 1983 the Regional Trial Court, National
in-charge of the licensing of firearms at Camp Naranjo in Oroquieta Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding,1
City, testified that petitioner and his common-law wife Erlinda Ventir issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss.
were not in the list of registered firearm holders in Misamis c. H. sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants’
Occidental. Neither did they have any pending application for a gun contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
permit. circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests

because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
suspended; (2) that assuming that the court can entertain the present when the person confessing becomes a State witness:
action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
performance of their official duties; and (3) that the complaint states unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute
no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
the defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs’ purely (19) Freedom of access to the courts.
personal properties in violation of their constitutional rights, and with
the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
Bienvenido Balabo, committed acts of torture and maltreatment, or defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and
control of their subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter
be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
SECOND RULING OF THE RTC AFTER JUDGE FORTUN
INHIBITED FROM RESOLVING THE CASE AFTER The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages
PETITIONERS FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE; may also be adjudicated.
LEAVING IT IN THE SALA OF JUDGE LISING
a. failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge
8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said other penal statute.
Order is now final against said plaintiffs
b. It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision
LEGAL ISSUE: is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
a. whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. strongest to yield—borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio
b. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be Teehankee—to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
held liable for such violations necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties
are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or
First issue is answered in the NEGATIVE by the Court. Second imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail,
issue’s answer is: only the military personnel directly involved or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles
and/or their superiors as well. and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law
to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT the community. “Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty,
a. ART. 32 of the New Civil Code is the heart of the case at of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by
bar: him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter,
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless
person shall be liable to the latter for damages: controls.”
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech; c. Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiff's’ complaint, the
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered
publication; by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; performance of official duties or functions. We find respondents’
(5) Freedom of suffrage; invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts
law; done by officers in the performance of official duties within the ambit
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken of their powers.
for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; d. lt may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as
against unreasonable searches and seizures; they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation No, 2054
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for 27,1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive
purposes not contrary to law; strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
Government for redress of grievances; untrammelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his e. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public
behalf; officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said
article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
f. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained
from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic
from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or
without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and
imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that
in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal
safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith
will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the
struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The
linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once
that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
g. We find merit in petitioners’ contention that the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy
petitioners’ right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The
suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to
seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
h. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case,
in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible
for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who
must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the
aggrieved party.
i. By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes
a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his
vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in
the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights
and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people
power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the
government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible
for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly
be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless
be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code
makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
j. Firstly, it is wrong to limit the plaintiffs’ action for damages
to “acts of alleged physical violence” which constituted delict or
wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or
in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights
and liberties enumerated therein.
k. The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with
abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and
liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and
impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others,
searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued
or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs
and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor
covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs
without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
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“safehouses” where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to
physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and
brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory
statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses
perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
FORBES VS. CHUOCO TIACO
16 PHIL 534 (1910)
FACTS:
(**Character background:
The plaintiffs are: W. Cameron Forbes, the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, and J.E. Harding, Chief of the Secret Service of
the city of Manila. Defendant Crossfield is one of the judges in the
Court of First instance of the city of Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco
is a foreigner of Chinese nationality + resident of the Philippine
Islands for the last 35 years who also has a family and some
properties.)
On April 1, 1910, Crossfield issued an inhibition against Forbes et. al
from spelling, deporting, or threatening to expel or deport
Chuoco Tiaco. In turn, Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for
writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective
plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public
interest and at the request of the proper representative of the
Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately
reported to the Secretary of War. The complainants were demurred
to, but the SC:
1. Overruled the demurrers
2. Granted the prohibition,
3. And ordered the actions dismissed.
The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of
error, was thus made a respondent, on the ground that the
plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of
law.
ISSUE: WON THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL CAN BE SUED IN
A CIVIL ACTION
RULING: NO. The Governor-General is not liable for his acts
committed in the performance of his official duties.
The principal of non-liability, as in this case, does not mean that
the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-
General. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the
guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad,
destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from
interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean either that
a person injured by the executive authority by an act
unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in
silence. On the contrary, it means simply that The Governor-
General, like the judges of the courts and the members of the
Legislature may not be personally mulct in civil damages for the
consequences of an executive in the performance of his official
duties. This is forbidden by public policy (Art. 32).
Power of the Judiciary; Legal Remedy Available
The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of
the Gov-Gen. illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
status quo any person who has been deprived of his liberty or his
property by such act.
Exception: The official is liable when he acts in a case so plainly
outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right
to act.
à The official will be protected from personal liability for damages
not only when acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority provided he actually used discretion and judgment
(judicial faculty) in determining whether he had authority to act or
not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority.
C. Criminal Cases under the Revised Penal Code
7. Requirements for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest
RULE 112
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SECTION 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by
the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this
Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge
may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
(5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. — When required
pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the
preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court
may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When
conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a
warrant or arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a)
of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge
himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this
Rule. If the findings and recommendations are affirmed by the
provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy,
and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion of the
investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds
after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant
and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers,
that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.
(c) When warrant of arrest not necessary. — A warrant of
arrest shall not issue if the accused is already under detention
pursuant to a warrant issued by the municipal trial court in
accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, or if the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule or is for
an offense penalized by fine only. The court shall then proceed in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction. (6a)
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RULE 126
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SECTION 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines. (3a)
PEOPLE vs.MARTINEZ
637 SCRA 791 (2010)
Prosecution:
On September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1
Azardon was on duty at the Police Community Precinct II along
Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a concerned citizen entered the
precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1
Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela Cruz), and members of the Special
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad Subdivision,
Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located.
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused
Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately
arrested him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold
Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R.
Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by the presence of the
police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The
items found in the room were seized and turned over to the
Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp.
Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the
seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used
aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were
subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Defense:
The three of them were along Arellano Street in Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who
bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the
materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the
subdivision looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his
house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they were
talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen
emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought
to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were
incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the arrest was illegal
(2) Whether or not the evidence obtained from said search can
be admitted
(3) Whether or not the chain of custody was followed
Ruling:
The arrest was illegal, however it was deemed waived when
accused did not raise the issue at the trial court. However, the
same should not apply to the evidence seized.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his
arrest if he fails to raise such issue before arraignment.5 However, this
waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects
only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver
of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless
arrest.
Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of
procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of
justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to
defeat substantive rights.9 Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the
accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in
the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accused’s right to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
ignored.
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee,
intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,
papers and effects.10 Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition
against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures
in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a
warrant:
(i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;11
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) stop and frisk; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.12
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the
circumstances under which a warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
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delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal
and the subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof.
According to the testimony of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13
with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of
accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen
that a pot session was going on in said house.
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both
require probable cause to be present in order for a warrantless arrest
to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused
is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had
just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime,
as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an
offense. As admitted in the testimony of PO1 Azardon, the tip
originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal
knowledge of the information that was reported to the police.
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view.
The elements of plain view are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest
in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police
who have the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and,
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers
intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or
investigation before they discovered the accused with the subject
items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to
be insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the
warrantless search in this case be struck down. Neither can the search
be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one under
exigent and emergency circumstances.
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the
acquittal of the accused would still be in order for failure of the
apprehending officers to comply with the chain of custody
requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not
established with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be
questionable, the authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21
and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug Board (DDB)
Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation
No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that:
(i) there was no prior coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA);
(ii) no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the
crime scene;
(iii) no photograph of the items taken;
(iv) no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to
sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and;
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
(v) no showing of how the items were handled from the
time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime
laboratory for testing.
Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing
reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the
presumption of innocence in their favor was not overcome by the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous
drugs are:
(i) the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug,
(ii) such possession is not authorized by law, and
(iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.25
Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the
dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2)
persons.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is
mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no
physical inventory was conducted in the presence of the accused, or
their representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was
prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required
by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,36admitted that no
photographs were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by
him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that
the situation happened so suddenly.
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit
with PO1 Dela Cruz does it appear that the subject items were at all
marked. It was only in the letter-request for laboratory examination
that the subject items were indicated to have been marked with
"DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing,
however, as to who made those markings and when they were made.
Moreover, those purported markings were never mentioned when the
subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses when they
took the stand.
LUZ vs.PEOPLE
667 SCRA 421 (2012)
Facts:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, a traffic enforcer, on March 10, 2003 at
around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, Rodel Luz,
driving a motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires
all motorcycle drivers to wear a helmet while driving said motor
vehicle.
He invited Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where
he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station;
While they were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket. He told Luz to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luz
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container, including 2 cellphones,
1 pair of scissors and 1 Swiss knife. He asked Luz to open the
container. Upon his instruction, Luz spilled out the contents of the
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container on the table which turned out to be 4 plastic sachets, the 2
of which were empty while the other 2 contained suspected shabu.
RTC convicted Luz of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found
that Luz had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then
subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person
of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The CA affirmed.
Petitioner now claims that:
- There was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest.
- There was no lawful arrest since he was not even issued a citation
ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance.
- Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid arrest
Whether the warrantless search was valid
Ruling:
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and
solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of
the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.
Under RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter.
Similarly, the PNP Operations Manual provides the procedure for
flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station
may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the
trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went
to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down
almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of
convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to
take petitioner into custody.
The U.S. Court in Berkemer v. McCarty thus ruled that, since the
motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at
the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under
custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda
rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as
the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can
petitioner here be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic
citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which
was violated by Luz, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a
warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even under the assumption that petitioner was deemed arrested upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were
not complied with.
Att the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show
that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of
their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement they might make could be used against them. It may also be
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been
arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing,
to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the
custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individuals will
to resist, and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact,
whether particular confessions were voluntary.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he
was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waited for his
ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a
second time after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs as
he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:
(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of
evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None are
applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3
Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and
intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely
told to take out the contents of his pocket.
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. The
following are the characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given:
1) the age of the defendant;
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2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked
on;
4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence would be
found;
7) the nature of the police questioning;
8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.
It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely
and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning,
accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While
the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or
unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search
of outer clothing for weapons.
In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police
officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a
citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not
authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court
therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search
when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
alight from the car or doing a patdown.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may
have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest
opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.
The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes
conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
PEOPLE VS. MARIANO
685 SCRA 592 (2012)
Appellants Godofredo Mariano Y Feliciano (Godofredo) were held
guilty of the crimes of illegal sale of shabu and illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia, and Allan Doringo y Gunan (Allan) guilty of the
illegal sale of shabu by the lower courts.
There was a buy bust operation conducted. While the officers were
testing the shabu, they declared an arrest.
An Affidavit of Arrest was prepared and signed by PO1 Olleres and
PO3 Razo. PO1 Olleres also prepared a receipt of the property seized
containing his and appellants’ signatures.
Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in admitting the seized
dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia as evidences against them.
They assail the validity of their warrantless arrest by stating that the
arresting officers should have secured a warrant because they were
| 25
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
already in possession of pertinent information, such as the identity of
their target, upon which an application for a warrant could be based.
Thus, the alleged shabu obtained by virtue of an invalid warrantless
arrest is inadmissible.
In its appellee’s brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
supports the convictions of the appellants. It justifies the legality of
the warrantless arrest of appellants as they were caught in flagrante
delicto. Moreover, the OSG avers that appellants are estopped from
questioning the legality of their arrest having raised them only on
appeal.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid?
Held:
Yes.
Appellants’ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest
equally lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows
a warrantless arrest under any of the following circumstances:
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first
mode or aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3
Razo personally witnessed and were in fact participants to the buy-
bust operation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were
found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that
appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a
crime, in full view of the arresting team.
Anent the absence of counsel during the execution of an inventory
receipt, we agree with the conclusion of the appellate court that
notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the inventory receipt, the
prosecution has sufficiently proven the guilt of appellants, thus:
Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the
"Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence if it was
obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the
accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a
tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that
appellants signed receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel,
this only renders inadmissible the receipt itself.
In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of
Property Seized is irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able
to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted to entrap
appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established that
the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti,
which is the shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other
members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that they were
the same drugs placed in four (4) plastic sachets seized from
appellants.29
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FENIX VS. CA
796 SCRA 117 (2016)
FACTS
Angelito Santiago brought Technical Sergeant Vidal D. Doble, Jr.
(Doble), a member of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (ISAFP), to the San Carlos Seminary where they met
petitioner Rez Cortez and Bishop Bacani. While there, Doble heard
Ong over the radio making a press statement about an audio tape of a
conversation between then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and a
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano regarding the 2004
presidential elections.
Former Deputy Director of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Samuel Ong (Ong) arrived at the seminary and told Doble that
he would be presented to the media as the source of the audio tape.
Ong approached Santiago and said "PARE, AYOKO NA, SUKO NA
KO," the latter told him to stay put and not go out of the room.
Doble informed a group of priests who had gone to his room that he
was being held against his will. The priests brought him to another
room in another building and was fetched by Bishop Socrates
Villegas and turned over to the custody of ISAFP in Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Doble charged petitioners and Ong, with
serious illegal detention.
Cortez denied the allegations in his counter-affidavit and that he was
at the seminary to give support to Ong. Ong denied the allegation that
he had armed men guarding Doble during their three-day stay in the
seminary. In fact, he and Santiago were both unarmed, while Doble
had his .45-caliber pistol. Santiago corroborated the statements of
Ong.
In her affidavit, Santos companion of Doble during his alleged illegal
detention recanted all her previous affidavits in support of Doble's
complaint. She made clear that she and Doble had voluntarily sought
sanctuary in San Carlos Seminary and that at no point were their
movements restricted or closely monitored. They only transferred
from room to room as a safety measure after an ISAFP agent had
been seen around the premises.
In his affidavit, Bishop Bacani narrated that he had agreed to give
sanctuary to Ong and the latter's group at Bahay Pari and that Doble
and Santos did not say to Bishop Bacani that they were being
detained against their will. Rather, they feared that government forces
would find them.
The Investigating Panel of Prosecutors found probable cause to
charge petitioners and Ong with serious illegal detention. It ruled that
the evidence on hand sufficiently established the fact that the offense
had indeed been committed against Doble, who was a public officer
detained for more than three days.
The panel did not give any serious consideration to the counter-
affidavits, and that they had failed, despite notice, to appear and
affirm those counter-affidavits before the panel.
RTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 05-1768 for lack of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and
Ong and that there was no evidence or allegation whatsoever
regarding the involvement of Fenix in the alleged detention.
CA ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. While a
judge is required to personally determine the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, this determination must
not extend to the issue of whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
held for trial.
Petitioners and Ong filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Meanwhile, Ong passed away on 22 May 2009.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Issue
WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of
arrest?
Held No.
The power of the judge to determine probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest is enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.
It implies that a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon a judge's
personal determination of the evidence against the accused. Further,
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that judges
may very well (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record has
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest
upon a finding of probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause. When judges dismiss a
case or require the prosecutor to present additional evidence, they do
so not in derogation of the prosecutor's authority to determine the
existence of probable cause.
In this case, the panel did not give consideration to the counter-
affidavits of Ong and Santiago, the recantation of Santos or the
affidavit of Bishop Bacani. As correctly pointed out by the RTC,
there was no justification for the rejection of the counter-affidavits
upon the failure to subscribe and swear to them before the panel.
Also, the failure of Ong and Santiago to appear before the panel did
not justify the exclusion of their duly submitted counter-affidavits and
annexes. We have stressed that the court's dismissal of a case for lack
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest must be done
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause.
In this case, the narration of Bishop Bacani clearly shows that Doble
and Santos were not seized and detained against their will. Ong,
Santiago, Cortez, Doble and Santos all sought sanctuary at the San
Carlos Seminary. They were brought there out of fear for their
security following the magnitude of the impact of Ong's revelation.
All of them voluntarily entered the seminary to seek protection and
eventually left it on their own accord.
The statements Bishop Bacani were neither controverted nor denied
by Doble or his witnesses. Some points were even corroborated by
Doble himself in his complaint, in which he stated that he met Bishop
Bacani at the San Carlos Seminary and was transferred from one
room to another, albeit for a different reason. The room transfers and
the reason therefor as stated by Bishop Bacani were also corroborated
by Santos in her recantation affidavit.
After the RTC received and examined all the sets of evidence passed
upon by the panel, including those of petitioners and Ong, it correctly
found no probable cause to order their arrest. Accordingly, it
dismissed the criminal charge of serious illegal detention. As
discussed, that power was lodged with the RTC, which validly
exercised it without grave abuse of discretion.
NAPOLES VS. DE LIMA
797 SCRA 1 (2016)
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FACTS:
This case stems from a Joint Sworn Statement executed by Arturo
Francisco Luy, Gertrudes Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy on
March 8, 2013. They alleged that a family member, Benhur Luy, had
been detained against his will since December 19, 2012, transferred
from place to place in a bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies'
anomalous transactions involving the Priority Development
Assistance Fund. Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies,
and her brother, Reynald Lim (Lim), allegedly masterminded the
"pork barrel scam" and the detention of Benhur Luy.charobleslaw
Acting on the Joint Sworn Statement, Secretary of Justice Leila M.
De Lima (Secretary De Lima) directed the National Bureau of
Investigation Special Task Force to investigate the matter. This led to
a "rescue operation" on March 22, 2013 to release Benhur Luy who,
at that time, was reportedly detained in a condominium unit at Pacific
Plaza Tower, Bonifacio Global City. Lim, who was with Benhur Luy
at the condominium unit, was arrested by operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation
In the March 23, 2013, National Bureau of Investigation Director
Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas (Director Rojas) requested the prosecution
of Lim and Napoles for serious illegal detention.
In their respective Counter-Affidavits, Lim and Napoles denied
illegally detaining Benhur Luy. Both claimed that Benhur Luy loaned
P5,000,000.00 from Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. under the name of Napoles. The loan, allegedly
unauthorized, angered Napoles. To obtain Napoles' forgiveness,
Benhur Luy voluntarily went on a three-month spiritual retreat at
Bahay ni San Jose in Magallanes Village, Makati City beginning
December 19, 2012.hanrobleslaw
Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Assistant State
Prosecutor Juan Pedro V. Navera (Prosecutor Navera) recommended
the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention in June 10,
2013. Prosecutor Navera believed that Benhur Luy voluntarily stayed
at Bahay ni San Jose for a spiritual retreat, as attested to by
Monsignor Josefmo Ramirez and the five(5) Chinese priests residing
in the retreat house.
As to the claim that Benhur Luy was detained to cover up the alleged
anomalous transactions of the JLN Group of Companies involving the
Priority Development Assistant Fund, Prosecutor Navera said that the
claim was "too speculative and not sufficiently established.” He
added that he did not "dwell too much on ... [the] alleged diversion of
government funds" because the case is for serious illegal detention,
not for corruption or financial fraud.
On August 6, 2013, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the
Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M. Villanueva (Prosecutor
Villanueva) reversed the June 10, 2013 Resolution and recommended
filing an information for serious illegal detention against Lim and
Napoles.
The case was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M.
Alameda (Judge Alameda). Recommending no bail for Napoles and
Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest.chanrob
Napoles filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Secretary De Lima,
Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva, Director Rojas,
and of Judge Alameda. She contended that there was no probable
cause to charge her with serious illegal detention, and that Judge
Alameda erred in issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency of
her Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
In deciding Napoles' Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals said
that "full discretionary authority in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation has been delegated to the
executive branch, particularly at the first instance to the public
prosecutor, and ultimately to the [Department of Justice]." Hence,
absent any grave abuse of discretion, courts will not disturb the public
prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
The Court of Appeals observed that the Review Resolution "show[ed]
the reasons for the course of action [the prosecution] had taken which
were thoroughly and sufficiently discussed therein. Moreover, the
prosecution "painstakingly went over the pieces of evidence adduced
by the parties and thereafter resolved the issues by applying the
precepts of the law on evidence."
With respect to the issuance of the arrest warrant, the Court of
Appeals noted Napoles' "attempt to quash the warrant of arrest issued
against her by way of... petition for certiorari."38 Moreover, since
Napoles failed to attach copies of the arrest warrant in her Petition for
Certiorari, the Court of Appeals refused to squarely rule on the issue
of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in its issuance.
On September 11, 2014, Napoles filed before this Court her Petition
for Review on Certiorari with Application for a Temporary
Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.Respondents Secretary
De Lima, Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva,
Director Rojas, and Judge Alameda,- through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment, to which Napoles filed a Reply.
slaw
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari, Napoles maintains that
respondents whimsically and arbitrarily found probable cause against
her. She emphasizes that, without introduction of additional evidence,
the Department of Justice reversed its initial Resolution dismissing
the complaint for serious illegal detention. In Napoles' view, the
Review Resolution was issued not because Benhur Luy was illegally
detained but because the government "need[ed] to get hold of [her] in
connection with the allegations of Benhur Luy on the misuse of [the
Priority Development Assistance Fund] by
legislators[.]"hanrobleslaw
Napoles adds that under Rule 112, Section 6 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Alameda had 10 days from the
filing of the information to personally evaluate the prosecutor's
Resolution and its supporting evidence.' Yet, Judge Alameda issued
the arrest warrant the very day the records of the case were
transmitted to Branch 150. This allegedly showed the hastiness with
which Judge Alameda issued the warrant for her arrest. Judge
Alameda allegedly "succumbed to the extraneous pressure and
influence from the mass and social media to appease the growing
public clamor of crucifying [Napoles] for her alleged involvement in
the [pork barrel] scam.”
In their Comment, respondents point out how Napoles failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by failing to file a petition for review
before the Secretary of Justice. The present Petition is also
dismissible, respondents claim, because Napoles failed to implead an
indispensable party: the People of the Philippines.chanrobleslaw
Respondents echo the Court of Appeals' pronouncement and argue
that the determination of probable cause for filing an information in
court is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, as in
this case, courts of justice may not interfere with that finding.
Neither was Judge Alameda's issuance of the arrest warrant attended
with grave abuse of discretion, according to respondents. For them,
"what is essential is ... that [Judge Alameda] was able to review the
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[prosecutor's finding] and, on the basis thereof, affirm[ed] the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause.chanrob
leslaw
ISSUE:
Whether the there is need for an issuance of warrant of arrest
HELD:
This Petition must be denied for being moot and academic. In any
case, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. There was no grave abuse of discretion either in the filing
of information in court or in the issuance of the arrest warrant against
Napoles.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is
the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted
himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose
of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused, [sic] or the right of the People to
due process of law.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence[.] (Citations omitted)
It is true that the Constitution allows the exercise of the power of
judicial review in cases where grave abuse of discretion exists.In this
case, however, a petition for certiorari before this Court was not the
"plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"
because, as discussed, the trial court already acquired jurisdiction
over the case. The proper remedy for Napoles was to proceed to trial
and allow the exhaustive presentation of evidence by the parties.
During the pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the
Petition for Certiorari stemmed was decided by the trial court. In its
April 14, 2015 Decision, Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City found Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious
illegal detention, punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. She was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and was ordered to pay Benhur Luy P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.ableslaw
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
All the more should this Petition be dismissed. Napoles has been
found guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond reasonable
doubt, a quantum of evidence higher than probable cause. Resolving
whether there was probable cause in the filing of information before
the trial court and in the issuance of an arrest warrant would be "of no
practical use and value."chanrobleslaw
In any case, despite the mootness of this Petition, we proceed with
resolving the issues presented by the parties for the guidance of the
bench and the bar.chanrobl
No less than the Constitution commands that "no
. . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]"
This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in
Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure:hanrobleslaw
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an
information in court and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are
different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court
acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court.”blelaw
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the arrest
warrant against Napoles. That Judge Alameda issued the arrest
warrant within the day he received the records of the case from the
prosecutor does not mean that the warrant was hastily issued. "Speed
in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For one's prompt dispatch may be another's undue haste."
slaw\\\\\
Judge Alameda was under no obligation to review the entire case
record as Napoles insists. All that is required is that a judge
personally evaluates the evidence and decides, independent of the
finding of the prosecutor, that probable cause exists so as to justify
the issuance of an arrest warrant. As explained in Ho v. People:
[I]t is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by
the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.82(Emphasis supplied)
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In his August 14, 2013 Order, Judge Alameda declared that he
personally evaluated the records of the case, including the Review
Resolution and the Sworn Statements of the witnesses; and that based
on the records, he found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant
against Napoles:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After personally evaluating the Review Resolution issued by Senior
Deputy State Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva, Chairman-Task
Force on Anti-Kidnapping and approved by Prosecutor General Claro
A. Arellano, together with the Sworn Statements of the complainants
and other evidence on record, the undersigned finds the Review
Resolution to have factual and legal basis. Likewise, the undersigned
after personally reviewing the finding of Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva based on the evidence on record,
finds probable cause for the issuance of Warrant of Arrest against the
accused for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention "under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code there being probable cause to believe that
the crime of Serious Illegal Detention has been committed by the
accused.c
We find this declaration sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement of personal evaluation.
Moreover, Judge Alameda did not gravely abuse his discretion in
issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency of the Motions for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause filed by Napoles and Lim.
Hearing these Motions would be a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion[s], the judge is duty-bound to personally
evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
We afford respondents the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. Napoles failed to show capriciousness,
whimsicality, arbitrariness, or any despotic exercise of judgment by
reason of passion and hostility on the part of respondents.
PEOPLE VS. MANAGO
801 SCRA 103 (2016)
FACTS
The police officers, comprised of a team including PO3 Din and
S/Insp. Ylanan, conducted a "hot pursuit" operation one (1) day after
the robbery incident, or on March 16, 2007, by setting up a
checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait. At around 9:30 in the evening of even
date, the red Toyota Corolla, then being driven by Manago, passed
through the checkpoint, prompting the police officers to stop the
vehicle. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark, and
thereafter, conducted a thorough search of the vehicle. As the search
produced no contraband, the police officers then frisked Manago,
resulting in the discovery of one (1) plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers seized the plastic pack,
arrested Manago, informed him of his constitutional rights, and
brought him and the plastic pack to their headquarters. Upon reaching
the headquarters, S/Insp. Ylanan turned over the seized plastic pack to
PO3 Joel Taboada, who in turn, prepared a request for a laboratory
examination of the same. SPO1 Felix Gabijan then delivered the said
sachet and request to Forensic Chemist Jude Daniel Mendoza of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, who, after conducting an examination,
confirmed that the sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.
ISSUE:
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
WON the arrest conducted without a valid arrest warrant can be
sustained
HELD:
NO, the arrest conducted without a valid arrest warrant cannot be
sustained.
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With
respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be
complied with:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
there are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may
be lawfully effected. These are:
(a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had
just been committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential
that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the
element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and
resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto
will be rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary
rule of the 1987 Constitution.
With the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5 (b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw
or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were
within a very limited period of time.
In the case at bar, it should be reiterated that the police officers had
already conducted a thorough investigation and verification
proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the identities of the
robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the
ownership of the getaway vehicles used in the robbery, i.e., the
motorcycle and the red Toyota Corolla.
As adverted to earlier, these pieces of information were already
enough for said police officers to secure the necessary warrants to
accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no longer any
exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting
up the checkpoint in this case for the purpose of searching the subject
vehicle. In addition, it is well to point out that the checkpoint was
arranged for the targeted arrest of Manago, who was already
identified as the culprit of the robbery incident. In this regard, it
cannot, therefore, be said that the checkpoint was meant to conduct a
routinary and indiscriminate search of moving vehicles. Rather, it was
used as a subterfuge to put into force the capture of the fleeing
suspect. Unfortunately, this setup cannot take the place of - nor skirt
the legal requirement of - procuring a valid search/arrest warrant
given the circumstances of this case. Hence, the search conducted on
the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was
unlawful.
8. When arrest may be made without a warrant
(A) Strict enforcement of rule
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PEOPLE VS. RIVERA
797 SCRA 699 (2016)
FACTS: Donna River y Dumo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165. The case stemmed from two Informations charging appellant
with illegal sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu..
That on or about the 26th day of January 2009, in the
Municipality of Agoo, Province of La Union, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of [this] Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
for and in consideration of the sum of P500.00 did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver one (1) plastic
sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY
FOUR (0.0484) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, to IOI JAIME J. CLAVE, JR., who posed as buyer
thereof using marked money, ONE (1) piece of TWO hundred peso
bill bearing serial No. DQ540638; TWO (2) pcs. of ONE HUNDRED
PESOS bill bearing serial nos. of EQ913638 and JM093792
respectively and FIVE (5) PCS. TWENTY PESOS bill bearing serial
nos. of W783296; SC613989; V500855; W637658 and ZG282032
respectively without the necessary authority or permit from the proper
government authorities.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both
charges.
Acting on a tip from an informant that appellant was selling
drugs in San Nicolas Central, Agoo, La Union and upon confirmation
with the Intelligence Division of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Regional Office in San Fernando City, La Union,
Police a buy-bust team on 26 January 2009 composed of Intelligence
Officer 2 Jaime Clave (IO2 Clave) as poseur buyer and Lanibelle
Ancheta (Ancheta), as immediate back-up. Intelligence Officers
Rosario Vicente (Vicente), Jojo Cayuma (Cayuma), Ricky Ramos
(Ramos) and IO2 Natividad also joined the operation.
The team proceeded to the target area, IO2 Clave and the
informant approached appellant, who was then seated on a bamboo
bench. The informant introduced IO2 Clave to appellant as the one
who wanted to buy shabu worth P500.00. IO2 Clave then gave
appellant the marked bills. Appellant, in turn, took out an elongated
plastic sachet form her pocket and handed it to IO2 Clave. Upon
inspection of the sachet, IO2 Clave sent his pre-arranged signal to the
other PDEA officers by wearing his sunglasses on top of his head.
Ancheta then rushed to IO2 Clave’s side and introduced themselves
as PDEA officers. Appellant was arrested and subjected to a body
search. Three (3) more elongated plastic sachets and four (4) small
plastic sachets of suspected shabu were recovered from her. The
confiscated items were marked and inventoried by IO2 Clave in the
presence of the barangay officials, a representative from the media
and other witnesses.7 IO2 Clave brought them to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated
specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
In her defense, appellant presented a different version of the
incident. She narrated that on 26 January 2009 at around 4:00 p.m.,
she was waiting for her grandmother on a bench located outside the
latter's house when five armed men approached her and asked if she
was "Donna Rivera." Appellant confirmed her identity. She was
thereafter frisked. She and her live-in partner were arrested and
brought to the PDEA office. Her live-in partner was later released
| 30
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
while she was detained. She further claimed that during the
investigation, she was not accompanied by counsel.
On 29 June 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
appellant guilty of sale and illegal possession of shabu. The CA
having affirmed also with the assailed decision of the RTC.
Furthermore, the appellate court found that a consummated sale of
shabu transpired between IO2 Clave and appellant. The appellate
court gave full credit to the testimony of the PDEA officers relative to
the presence of all the elements for illegal possession and illegal sale
of shabu.
Appellant contends that the PDEA officers had sufficient
time to secure a warrant of arrest but failed to do so. Appellant asserts
that a buy-bust operation should not be used to dispense with the
requirement of a warrant. Appellant insists that she was merely sitting
on a bench and waiting for her grandmother when the PDEA officers
came and apprehended her. Moreover, appellant argues that the items
allegedly seized from her are not admissible in evidence because they
were a product of an invalid warrantless arrest.
ISSUE:
W/N accused can be arrested without a warrant of arrest?
RULING:
SC held that The accused can be arrested without such warrant of
arrest.
In every prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following
elements must be sufficiently proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.14
On the other hand, to prove the complicity of the accused to illegal
possession of a dangerous drug, there must be proof that (1) the
accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by
law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of the drug.
The prosecution has duly established all the elements of the two
crimes charged. As culled from testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
the PDEA officers caught appellant inflagrante delicto selling shabu
to a PDEA officer. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur buyer
and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummated the buy-bust transaction. After her arrest, she was
frisked and eight (8) plastic sachets of shabu were recovered in her
possession.
The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline
substance inside the plastic sachets confiscated from appellant. This
was further corroborated by the presentation of the marked money in
evidence.
The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires
strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the
law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their
official duties. Bare denials of appellant cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no
evidence of any improper motive on the part of the PDEA officers
who conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against
appellant.
Appellant questions the propriety of the buy-bust when a
warrant of arrest should have been secured.
Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
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offense." Appellant was caught in the act of committing an offense.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound
to arrest him even without a warrant.
In People v. Agulay,the Court reiterated the rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant
inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest," in line with
the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court proceeded to state that:
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in
recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode
of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the
idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If
carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
Appellant was caught in possession of 0.1649 gram of
shabu. The illegal possession of dangerous drugs is punished under
Section 11, paragraph 2(1 ), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty
(50) grams;
On the other hand, selling of shabu, regardless of quantity, is
punishable by life imprisonment under Section 5, paragraph 1 of the
same law, viz:
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (Pl0,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug,
including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Accordingly, we sustain the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, as it is within the range provided for by law.
SINDAC VS. PEOPLE
802 SCRA 270 (2016)
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from an Information dated May 30, 2007
filed before the RTC charging Sindac of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II
of RA 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On April 17, 2007, the Philippine National Police, Real, Quezon
(PNP Real), conducted surveillance operations on Sindac's alleged
drug trade. At around 7 o'clock in the morning of April 17, 2007, the
PNP Real conducted a briefing, and thereafter, proceeded to the port
of Barangay Ungos. There, PO3 Bonifacio Peñamora (PO3
Peñamora) and PO1 Erbert Asis (PO1 Asis) saw Sindac headed for
Barangay Poblacion Uno, prompting them to follow him. Along the
national road of said barangay, PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis saw
Sindac meet with a certain Alladin Cañon (Cañon) who sold and
handed over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the sachet
contained shabu, PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis rushed to the scene
| 31
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
and introduced themselves as police officers. Cañon escaped but the
policemen were able to apprehend Sindac. When ordered to empty his
pocket, Sindac brought out his wallet which contained a small plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. After initially
determining that such substance is shabu, the policemen arrested
Sindac and brought him to the police station. There, Sindac's arrest
was recorded, the seized item was marked in Sindac's presence, and a
request for chemical test was prepared. A laboratory examination
later confirmed that the plastic sachet seized from Sindac contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
In his defense, Sindac denied that he possessed illegal drugs. He
claimed that at around 7 o'clock in the morning of April 17, 2007, he
was riding a tricycle bound for Barangay Ungos when PO3 Peñamora
stopped the vehicle and ordered him to get off. PO3 Peñamora then
invited him to the police station, to which he complied. There, he was
made to undress and was frisked by PO3 Peñamora, who found
nothing. PO3 Peñamora left with Sindac's wallet and mobile phone,
and when he returned, his wallet was searched anew and a sachet of
suspected shabu was found inside, to his surprise. PO3 Peñamora
then made Sindac sign a blank piece of paper which turned out to be a
receipt for evidence seized. Upon arraignment, Sindac pleaded not
guilty to the charges levelled against him.
RTC Ruling
In a decision dated October 12, 2012, the RTC found Sindac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC found that the prosecution had
established all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs:
(a) Sindac possessed a sachet of shabu; (b) he was not authorized by
law to do so; and (c) he freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. In this regard, the RTC held that the policemen substantially
complied with the chain of custody rule as they adequately justified
their failure to strictly comply thereto and they had preserved the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized contraband. Finally, the
RTC opined that the policemen committed a valid in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest on Sindac pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.
Aggrieved, Sindac appealed his conviction before the CA
The CA Ruling
Affirmed Sindac’s conviction. Sindac moved for a reconsideration
but was denied.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the arrest was valid
2. Whether Sindac's conviction for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
RULING:
1. No. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit
of a poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a
search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
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A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With
respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be
complied with:
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two
(2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is essential.
In this case, the Court finds that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest made on the person of Sindac. Based on the
records, the arresting officer, PO3 Peñamora, himself admitted that he
was about five (5) to ten (10) meters away from Sindac and Cañon
when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to the former.
Suspecting that the sachet contained shabu, he and PO1 Asis rushed
to Sindac to arrest him. PO3 Peñamora's testimony on direct
examination reveals Considering that PO3 Peñamora was at a
considerable distance away from the alleged criminal transaction the
Court finds it highly doubtful that said arresting officer was able to
reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to
prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and,
thereupon, a warrantless search.
2. All told, since the shabu purportedly seized from
Sindac constitutes inadmissible evidence in violation
of Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
and given that the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Sindac's
conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.
NOTE: RA 9165(Sec. 11, Art. 2) convicts drug possessors based
on the QUANTITY of dangerous drugs possessed. The Penalty is
life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Php 500,000 to Php
10,000,000.
PEOPLE VS. BADILLA
802 SCRA 86 (2016)
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the Decision
of the RTC finding herein appellant Enrico Briones Badilla guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (R.A. No.) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Version of Prosecution:
PO2 Paras received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing
him that someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at BMBA
Compound, 4th Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2 Paras, PO2 Ronquillo,
P03 Baldomero and PO2 Woo, responded to the call and saw
appellant Enrico Briones Badilla, standing along the alley. Appellant
was suspiciously in the act of pulling or drawing something from his
pocket; thus, thinking that a concealed weapon was inside his pocket,
PO2 Paras immediately introduced himself as a police officer, held
appellant's arm, and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his
pocket. It turned out that appellant was holding a plastic sachet with
white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the plastic sachet
from appellant, informed him of his constitutional rights, and arrested
him.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
The white crystalline substance was found positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, while the urine sample taken from
appellant was found positive for methamphetamine.
Version of Defense:
Appellant narrated he was walking along 4th Avenue, Caloocan City
when a male person called him. Recognizing the man as a police
officer who frequented their place, he approached the man. When he
got near the man, the latter's companion poked a gun at him. By
instinct, he shoved the gun away and it fell on the ground.
According to appellant, the police officer then arrested him, shoved
him aboard the police vehicle, and brought him to 3rd Avenue,
Caloocan City. When the police officers failed to see their target
person at the said place, they left and went to the police station where
he was told that he would be charged with a non-bailable offense. He
only saw the plastic sachet containing shabu in court. He denied the
accusations against him and stated that he was arrested because the
police officers thought he would fight back when he shoved the
police officer's gun. The police officers asked P20,000.00 from him
allegedly because they knew that his father had a junk shop business,
but he refused to give them money. He questioned the positive result
of the drug test because allegedly no examination was conducted on
his person.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant’s arrest was illegal.
HELD: No.
The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the
quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment.
The appellant failed to question the legality of his arrest before he
entered his plea. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure
in the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
Warrantless Arrests
Appellant was arrested during the commission of a crime, which
instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5(a) of
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Such arrest is
commonly known as in flagrante delicto.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be
valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and,
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
Probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has
been committed or about to be committed.
Appellant’s act of pulling something from his pocket constituted an
overt manifestation in the mind of PO2 Paras that appellant has just
committed or is attempting to commit a crime. There was, therefore,
sufficient probable cause for PO2 Paras to believe that appellant was,
then and there, about to draw a gun from his pocket considering the
report he received about an indiscriminate firing in the said place.
VILLAMOR VS. PEOPLE
821 SCRA 326 (2017)
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FACTS: Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA
9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game
locally known as “lotteng”
Version of the Prosecution
On June 17, 2005, at around 9:00 a.m., PD Peñaflor received a call
from an informant regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at
Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at the residence
of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1
Rolando Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra’s
residence to confirm the report.
According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of
counting bets.
When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced
themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the
table consisting of cash amounting to P1,500.00
Version of the Defense
On June 17, 2005, at around 8:30 a.m., Villamor went to Bonaobra’s
house to pay a debt he owed to the latter’s wife, Jonah. Villamor gave
Bonaobra P2,000.00 which the latter placed on top of the table.
Bonaobra then went outside the house to answer his cell phone. When
Bonaobra was at the door, a man later identified as PD Peñaflor
kicked the fence of Bonaobra’s house, grabbed Bonaobra’s right arm,
and said, “Caught in the act ka!”
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Bonaobra was
lawful.
RULING:
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they
barged into Bonaobra’s compound without a valid warrant of arrest or
a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar.
Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in
violation of the said right.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113,
two elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
After a review of the records of the case, the Court finds that there
was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was not properly
established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts
were done in the presence of the arresting officers. Based on the
testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were positioned
some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the
police officers and the petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the
police officers were able to determine that a criminal activity was
ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto
warrantless arrest and a search incidental to a warrantless arrest
thereafter.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded
by a bamboo fence 5’7” to 5’9” in height, which made it harder to see
what was happening inside the compound.
Note: in flagrante delicto - "in blazing offence" a legal term,
indicates that a criminal has been caught in the act of committing an
offence
PEOPLE VS. GAYOSO
821 SCRA 516 (2017)
Facts:
Based on the testimonies of SPO3 Victorino de Dios (SPO3 De
Dios), SPO3 Rolando G. Salamida (SPO3 Salamida), PO2 Rex Isip
(PO2 Isip), SPO4 Josefina Bandoy (SPO4 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar
Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto), and the
documentary exhibits, the following facts emerged:
PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed SPO3 De Dios
to conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving several reports
that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SPO3 De
Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged in illegal drug
activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant.
However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber
decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SPO3 De
Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him P200.00 marked money for the
operation. On March 24, 2004, SPO3 De Dios and a civilian asset
proceeded to the house of appellant and asked her if they could buy
shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked
money from SPO3 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu. SPO3
De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the
successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of police
officers who were positioned 100 meters away rushed towards the
house of appellant. He also instructed SPO3 De Dios and the civilian
asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness the search of the
house. When he arrived together with a kagawad and a media
representative, SPO3 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SPO4 Bandoy found a tin foil under
the mattress. SPO3 De Dios took it from SPO4 Bandoy and gave it to
SPO3 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition
to the four sachets of shabu found inside the right pocket of the short
pants of appellant. The search of the house also revealed several drug
paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and the
same was signed by the BarangayChairman, PO2 Isip, SPO4 Bandoy,
and appellant. The sachets of shabuwere brought to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the
examination verified that the seized sachets contained shabu. The
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale
and illegal possession of shabu. It declared that the prosecution ably
established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu
through the testimonies of its witnesses who arrested appellant after
selling a sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for
possessing 11 sachets of the same drug in her house after enforcing a
search warrant immediately thereafter.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee praying for
the affirmance of the appealed Decision. It argued that the evidence
on which the RTC based its determination of probable cause was
sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that the
"'test buy operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The
OSG maintained that the shabu confiscated from appellant was
admissible in evidence since the prosecution established the proper
chain of custody. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding
appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and possession of shabu. The
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CA ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were established
during the "test-buy operation".
Issue: Whether or not there was a probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant. Whether or not the chain of custody was
established
Ruling:
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance
of the search warrant. She claims that PI Barber had no personal
knowledge of her alleged drug dealings. There is no merit in this
contention. Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." The probable cause must be "determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." Probable cause does not mean actual and
positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. Here, the records
reveal that the trial court issued the search warrant after deposing two
witnesses, namely PI Barber and SPO3 Salamida. In particular, the
deposition of SPO3 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge
of appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for the
finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
Thus, whether or not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal
drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect the
findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search
warrant. The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is
not prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in this
case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police
received an intelligence report that appellant habitually deals with
shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by
engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof
that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an
acquittal.
As a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated
item must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of
the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was
established at all. The so-called links in the chain of custody show
that the seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the
actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as
well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court
therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that the shabu
confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented tor
laboratory examination and then presented in court.
Here, the Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to properly
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of
custody could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to
offer testimony to establish a substantially complete chain of custody
of the shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling the evidence
prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's chance of
successfully prosecuting a drug case. Another procedural lapse casts
further uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu.
This refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
most basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody and
disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II of RA
9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as
follows:
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media,
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.
In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items at the place where the search warrant
was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of
Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant
after their initial custody and control of said drug, and after
immediately seizing and confiscating the same. Neither was an
explanation offered for such failure. While this directive of rigid
compliance has been tempered in certain cases, "such liberality, as
stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only
when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are
properly preserved." Such an exception does not obtain in this case.
"Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu] in
view of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
accorded to the [apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot
arise."
VERIDIANO VS. PEOPLE
826 SCRA 382 (2017)
Facts:
At about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a
certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police
Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later
identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain
illegal drugs.
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PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and
PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both on duty. Chief of
Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up
a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.
They allowed some vehicles to pass through after checking that he
was not on board. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon
Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo,
Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their
t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets.
The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing
what appeared to be marijuana." PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag
and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of
his constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station.
At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to
PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.20 PO1 Solano then made a
laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the
seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.
The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.
Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was
seized in violation of his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. He asserts that his arrest was illegal. Petitioner was merely
seated inside the jeepney at the time of his apprehension. He did not
act in any manner that would give the police officers reasonable
ground to believe that he had just committed a crime or that he was
committing a crime. Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is
insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a valid
warrantless arrest.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?
Held:
This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be
a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."For
there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid
warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a
warrant.
There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When
Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and
| 35
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner facts and circumstances indicating that the accused killed the
who has escaped from a penal establishment or victim:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
place where he is serving final judgment or is The policemen arrested Gerente only some three
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
has escaped while being transferred from one killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital
confinement to another. and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto wood and a concrete hollow block which the
arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
the overt act test as explained in Cogaed: eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the those circumstances, since the policemen had
person to be arrested must execute an overt act personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace
indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed
presence or within the view of the arresting his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
officer." would have fled the law as his two companions
did. (Emphasis supplied)
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of
delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest facts surrounding the commission of an offense was underscored in In
was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused Re Salibo v. Warden.
did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers
suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he In Re Salibo involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers
was apprehended. suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the
Maguindano Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the
The warrantless search in People v. Racho was also considered authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation, Salibo was
unlawful. The police officers received information that a man was in apprehended and detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed
possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for out that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process or
Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man was "wearing a red order. Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid
and white striped [t]-shirt." The police officers waited for the bus warrantless arrest:
along the national highway. When the bus arrived, Jack Racho It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented
(Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a tricycle. himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to
Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the clear his name and to prove that he is not the
police station since he was suspected of having shabu in his accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
possession. As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white Salibo was in the presence of the police officers
envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu. of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense.
In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court The police officers had no personal knowledge of
observed that Racho was not "committing a crime in the presence of any offense that he might have
the police officers" at the time he was apprehended. Moreover, committed.Petitioner Salibo was also not an
Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip. Although there are cases escapee prisoner. (Emphasis supplied)
stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante
exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches. delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He
was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence
arrest. The rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a crime was in fact warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a
arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
of arrest. committed, or is about to be committed.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113,
crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of facts and Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
committed it. indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for
murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425. He assailed the
admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as evidence on the ground that
they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest.
On appeal, the accused's conviction was affirmed. This Court ruled
that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of
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A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law
enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a
crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a
warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
PEOPLE VS. COSGAFA
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
830 SCRA 482 (2017)
Facts: Ronald Manatad, Panfilo Baura, Rosbill Manatad, Joseph
Bryan Mendez and Joseph Mantahinay were at the victim’s house for
the fiesta. After dinner, they finished half a gallon of Bahaina – an
aged native coco wine. At around 1am the following day, the group
decided to go to the disco held at a nearby school. On their way, they
stopped by a sari-sari store owned by a retired police officer Pedrito
Lapiz to talk to a certain person who called the victim.
While waiting, Rosbill Joseph and Panfilo proceeded to the bridge
and sat on the railings. When they got there, accused-appellants were
already sitting on the railings across them. Suddenly one of the
accused-appellants, Gio, approached Rosbill and tried to box him but
did not hit. Rosbill and his friends ran back to where they left and
reported to the rest of the group what happened.
Upon learning what happened, the victim proceeded to the bridge to
confront Gio but when he got there, the accused-appellants took turns
in holding and stabbing the victim and then ran away.
The victim was then brought to the hospital but was pronounced dead.
Dr. Torregosa examined the body and found that the victim sustained
nine stab wounds inflicted by an ice pick and batangas knife.
PO3 Mascariñas and SPO1 Sabang, while posted as a security in the
school where the disco was being held, around 2:40am of October 26,
2002, they responded to a report about a stabbing incident nearby.
They learned from Lapiz that accused-appellants were the ones
responsible for the crime and immediately conducted a hot pursuit,
which resulted to the accused-appellants’ arrest.
The accused-appellants admitted to the open court that they killed the
victim but interposed self-defense, which was not given merit by the
court.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful?
Ruling: Yes, the arrest of Allan and his co-accused resulted from
a hot pursuit is lawful. The operation was immediately conducted by
the police officers in the area upon learning, through a report from
Baranangay Tanod Cabug-os and investigating about the incident that
just occurred. The arresting officers had personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the persons to be pursued and arrested are
responsible for the crime that had just been committed.
The arresting officers had probable cause to pursue the accused-
appellants based on the information from witnesses in the area that
they gathered from their immediate investigation.
IBP PANGASINAN VS. DOJ
832 SCRA 282 (2017)
Facts:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
to search “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers),” as “the
subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of
the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense,” which is described in the applications
adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code.”
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as
their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
being general warrants.
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The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority
of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
Issue:
Whether petitioners can validly assail the search warrant against the
corporation.
Held:
No. As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no
cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of
the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that
said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that
the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of
the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
MIGUEL VS. PEOPLE
833 SCRA 440 (2017)
FACTS:
PROSECUTION’S VERSION OF EVENTS
In the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Brgy.
San Antonio Village named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was
doing his rounds when he received a report of a man showing off his
private parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez then
when to the said street and saw that the man was visibly intoxicated,
urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front
of a gate enclosing an empty lot. The two officers asked for his
identification card, but petitioner failed to produce one. BB
Velasquez then repeated the request for an ID, but petitioner Instead
emptied his pockets, and found: a pack of cigarettes containing one
stick of cigarette, and 2 pieces of rolled paper containing
marijuana leaves. This prompted the officers to seize the foregoing
items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him over to SPO3
Castillo.
PETITIONER’S VERSION OF EVENTS
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, alleging that he was
simply urinating in front of his workplace when the two Bantay
Bayan operatives frisked him, took away his belongings, and
thereafter handcuffed him and brought to the barangay hall. After
being detained, and taken to the Ospital of Makati, he returned to the
hall – and it was there that they showed him 2 sticks of marijuana
joints allegedly recovered from him.
RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt; RT min-med; 300,000 php
fine.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
CA: affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, ruling that the search made
on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as
it was done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts in
public. As such, the said marijuana is admissible in evidence and is
thus sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.
ISSUE: WON THE ARREST AND SEARCH WERE VALIDLY
MADE
RULING: No.
The Bantay Bayan operatives are civilian volunteers
The Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any
barangay-based or other volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas have the color of a state-related function. As such,
they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose
of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987
Constitution to them.26
The Bantay Bayan operatives failed to conduct a lawful arrest
before the search
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two
(2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.32
GEN. RULE: There must first be a lawful arrest before a search can
be made and that such process cannot be reversed.
On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to
believe petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay
Bayan operatives chanced upon him. The latter then approached
and questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search his
person, which purportedly yielded the marijuana seized from him.
Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his
private parts was belied by the operatives’ testimonies. Clearly,
these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante
delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting
a crime committed by petitioner in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances
necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay
Bayan operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that
petitioner had just committed an offense.
More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the
prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on
petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts
because if it was indeed the case, then the proper charge should have
been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any showing
that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening
the view that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a
search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process
cannot be reversed.
PERALTA VS. PEOPLE
838 SCRA 350 (2017)
FACTS:
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On 18 November 2008, Joselito Peralta was caught in possession,
custody and control of of one (01) caliber 45 with Serial Number
4517488, with a magazine containing 5 live ammunition. He did
not have authority to possess the same, therefore Peralta was
charged in violation of Section 1 Presidential Decree 1866, as
amended by Republic Act 8294.
PROSECUTION:
Around 11 o'clock in the evening of November 18, 2008, a team
consisting of Police Officer 3 Christian A. Carvajal (PO3
Carvajal), one Police Officer Lavarias, Police Officer 2 Bernard
Arzadon (PO2 Arzadon), and Police Officer 3 Lucas Salonga
(PO3 Salonga) responded to a telephone call received by their
desk officer-on-duty that there was a man firing a gun at the back
of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. Upon
arrival thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later
identified as Peralta and his companion, Larry Calimlim
(Calimlim), holding a gun and a knife respectively. Upon seeing
the police officers, the men became uneasy, which prompted the
police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they recovered a
caliber .45 pistol from Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. The
men were then brought to the Region I Medical Center in
Dagupan City, and later, to the community precinct for paraffin
and gun powder residue test. Meanwhile, the pistol and the
magazine with live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty
investigator.
DEFENSE:
He was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were
flagged down by the police officers. While admitting that the
latter recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta vigorously denied
having a firearm with him, much less illegally discharging the
same. He pointed out that it was impossible for him to carry a gun
at the time and place of arrest since they were near the barangay
hall and the respective residences of Police Officer Salonga and
mediaman Orly Navarro. Peralta averred that upon arrival at the
police station, he was forced to admit possession of the gun
allegedly recovered from him, and that they were subjected to a
paraffin test but were not furnished with copies of the results
thereof. Peralta claimed that he and Calimlim were merely
framed up, after his brother who operated a "hataw" machine went
bankrupt and stopped giving "payola" to the police officials.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Peralta's conviction for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
RULING:
YES, the CA did not err in adopting the RTC's conviction in toto.
The prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the aforesaid elements, considering that: (a) the
police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a
.45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with magazine and
live ammunitions, which was seized from him and later on,
marked, identified, offered, and properly admitted as evidence at
the trial; and (b) the Certification[30] dated August 10, 2011
issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office of the Philippine
National Police which declared that Peralta "is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre,
specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial
Number 4517488 per verification from the records of this office
as of this date."
Lawful Arrest, with or without warrant
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should
be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before
a search may be effected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed.
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With
respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule -
be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113,
two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
On the other hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its
application that:
(a) at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed, and;
Braganza · Nengasca · Verana · Puerto · Caybot · Libang · Balbastro · Senerado · Pe Benito · Magdangal · Luna · Cullo · Plaza · Chan · Dollente · Bejano · Nudas · Ladores · Ho · Melchor
(b) the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the accused had committed it.
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact
of the commission of an offense is essential. Under Section 5
(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the
same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival at
Pantal District, Dagupan City, they saw Peralta carrying a pistol,
in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to
confront Peralta regarding the pistol, and when the latter was
unable to produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit to carry
the same, the former proceeded to arrest him and seize the pistol
from him. Clearly, the police officer conducted a valid in
flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus, making
the consequent search incidental thereto valid as well. At this
point, it is well to emphasize that the offense of illegal possession
of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law and, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it
is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even
if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent. In People v. PO2 Abriol, the court ruled that the carrying
of firearms and ammunition without the requisite authorization - a
clear violation of PD 1866, as amended - is enough basis for the
conduct of a valid in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest. Given
these, Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and
the admissibility of the items seized from him on account of the
search incidental to such arrest.
ANNOTATION ON WARRANTLESS ARREST
283 SCRA 190
What Constitutes Arrest
A person is said to be imprisoned in any case where he is arrested by
force and against his will, although it be on street or elsewhere, and
not in a house. But mere words will not constitute an arrest; and if the
officer says “I arrest you” and the party runs away, or having a
weapon in his hand, keeps the officer from touching him and so get
away, there is no arrest. If, however, the officer touches him, in the
attempt to take him into custody, there is an arrest, though the officer
may not succeed in stopping and holding him.
There must be some sort of coercion, for if one, of his own free will,
remains where he is, though at liberty to depart if he pleases, he is not
imprisoned at all. But actual power to enforce compliance is not
required; it is because one thinks a paper shown to him to be a writ of
warrant, the detention should be imprisoned, even if the writ is void
or not a writ at all. A pretended legal authority is sufficient to make
the arrest and the imprisonment unlawful.
Philippine Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Article III, Bill of Rights of the Philippine Constitution:
Sec. 1. “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.”
Sec. 2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and of any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
Article 32(4), of the Philippine Civil Code reads:
“Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages.”
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention.
Rules Governing Warrantless Arrest
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court provides:
“A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
1. (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
3. (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
The aforesaid Rule was taken from Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of
Court with significant amendments, and in turn reproduced from
Section 9, Rule 109, and on Rule 27-30 of the Provisional Law for the
application of the Penal Code.
The provisions on arrest without warrant being an exception to the
general rule, they must be interpreted strictly against the arresting
authority and liberally in favor of the right of liberty of the individual.
“Stop-and-Frisk Rule” and Use of Military Checkpoints
At least in “buy-bust operations” for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, there is quite a consensus among members of the Supreme
Court on the legality of warrantless arrests.
There is no consensus, however, on the legality of military
checkpoints arrests on searches and seizures. In Valmonte vs. Gen.
De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989)], the constitutional legality of
military checkpoints for searches and seizures without warrant was
held to be legal. The majority opinion said:—“True, the manning of
checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible for abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.”
Arrest Without Warrant of Escaped Convicts
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Under paragraph (c) of Section 5, a convict who evades sentence by
escaping from the custody of a policeman or penal institutions may be
arrested without warrant by a police officer or by a private individual.
However, if the person escapes after having been arrested, section
5(c) does not apply. The situation is governed by Section 13 of Rule
113, Rules of Court which authorized the rearrest of an escapee.
The rights of arrest without warrant of a person who escaped from
prison is founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the
escapee is in the continued act of committing a crime, i.e., evasion of
service of sentence.
Reasonable period to Apply for Warrant of Arrest
Warrantless arrest is not justified considering the fact that three (3)
days had elapsed from the date of the ambush killing. It shows lack of
credibility of prosecution witness. Warrant is required to arrest
suspect and for the search and seizure of his personal effects if the
same was done 49 hours after the commission of the crime.
Section 2(a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 7438 simplifies further the
duties of the arresting officer or private individuals.
Duty to Deliver Arrested Person to Police or Judicial Authority
The human rights of a person illegally arrested is violated if he is not
delivered to the proper judicial authority within the specified period
as provided by law.
A public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of 12 hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, 18 hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, 36 hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties shall be penalized under
Art 125 of the Revised Penal Code
If the arrest is made by a private individual and he does not turn over
the arrested person to the proper judicial authority within the period
provided by law, he is guilty of illegal detention under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code.
ANNOTATION ON WARRANTLESS ARREST AND
WARRANTLESS SEARCH IN BUY-BUST OPERATIONS
607 SCRA 830
Illustrative Cases of Warrantless Arrest and Warrantless Search in
Buy-Bust Operations
1) People vs. Agulay, G.R. No. 181747, September 26, 2008, 566
SCRA 571, 594, the Supreme Court ruled:
“xxx A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent
years has been accepted as a valid mode of apprehending drug
pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding
him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction. xxx”
The Supreme Court further held: “xxx Considering that the
legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is beyond question, the
subsequent warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
permissible.
2) People vs. Guiara, G.R. No. 186494, 600 SCRA 310
“xxx In our jurisprudence, a buy-bust operation is a recognized means
of entrapment using such ways and means devised by peace officers
for the purpose of trapping or capturing a law breaker. It is legal and
has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.
In the prosecution of illegal sale of shabu, the essential elements have
to be established to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The delivery of
the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the
marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction
xxx”
3) People vs. Quiaoit, Jr., G.R. No. 175222, July 27, 2007, 528
SCRA 474, 487, the Supreme Court pronounced:
"there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The
Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers"
4) People vs. Lim, G.R. No. 187503, September 11, 2009, 599
SCRA 712, 725. The Supreme Court articulated:
the objective test in the buy-bust operations demands that the details
of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown.
This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and
the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the
consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of
the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to
purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or to the
police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure
that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense. xxx”
5) People vs. Bohol, G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA
232, 240, the Highest Court of the Land decreed:
an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid
under Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. xxx
Considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless arrest, the subsequent
warrantless search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu found on
this person is likewise valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the
arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the
offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
6) People vs. Vinecario, et al., G.R. No. 141137, January 20, 2004,
Braganza · Nengasca · Verana · Puerto · Caybot · Libang · Balbastro · Senerado · Pe Benito · Magdangal · Luna · Cullo · Plaza · Chan · Dollente · Bejano · Nudas · Ladores · Ho · Melchor
xxx” 420 SCRA 280, 290-294, 296, the Supreme Court stressed
“xxx Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they
are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. xxx
x x x Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a
certain extent, on motorists’ right to “free passage without
interruption,” but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a
brief question or two. x x x”
These routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area are even less
intrusive.
7) Gwyn Quinicot vs. People, G.R. No. 179700, June 22, 2009, 590
SCRA 458, 470, 471, 472, the Supreme Court mandated:
absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality
of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting
buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police
authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.
A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary,
especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during the entrapment
The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection
of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. If a police operation
requires immediate implementation, time is of the essence and
sometimes only hasty preparations are possible. The fact that the
police officer who acted as back-up (or any other member of the
team) was briefed only for a few minutes does not prove that there
was no buy-bust operation that happened. A buy-bust operation can
be carried out after a long period of planning or, as in the case hand,
abruptly or forthwith; without much preparation. The conduct thereof
depends on the opportunity that may arise under the circumstances.
The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the
prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police
8) People vs. Sevilla, G.R. No. 174862, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA
292, 295, the Supreme Court mandated:
Testimonies of police officers who conduct buy-bust operation are
generally accorded full faith and credit as they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner. This presumption can be
overturned only if the accused is able to prove that the officers acted
with improper motives
9) People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589
SCRA 625, 647, 648, the Highest Tribunal expounded
Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are
required to testify in court. There is nothing in R.A. No. 9165 or in
any rule implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established
to have not been broken and the prosecution did not fail to identify
properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness
stand.
The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is not for
the court to decide. The prosecution has the discretion as to how to
present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes to
present as witnesses
Concluding
In concluding this paper, let the legislative body pass a bill to increase
the penalty for illegal drug trade sellers, buyers and/or their agents,
most probably, let the death penalty be revived so as to give a lesson
to all these offenders and put an end to these illegal drug trade
activities or if it is not stopped totally, perhaps the consolation that we
can get, is reducing these activities to the minimum level.
(B) Exceptions to strict enforcement
(1) Illegal Possession of Guns or Drugs
PEOPLE vs. PEÑAFLORIDA
551 SCRA 111 (2008)
FACTS:
Respondent Peñaflorida was charged of transporting prohibited drugs,
in violation of Republic Act (RA) 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.
Prosecution:
SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that he received a
tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by
appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur. Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of
police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as
team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos
and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and
proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon. They overtook
appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant
down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also
found in appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated these
items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to
the headquarters where he was booked.
Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP,
recounted that at around 1:00 p.m. on 7 June 1994, he was called by
Competente and was briefed about the operation. While they were in
Nasulan, the members of the police team caught a man riding a
bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so
the latter was brought to the police headquarters and turned over to
the desk officer.
Major Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was presented as an expert
witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after
taking a representative sample from the 928-gram confiscated dried
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leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana. The findings were
reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-26-94 dated 9 June 1994
Defense:
Appellant, who is a resident of Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
testified that in the morning of 7 June 1994, he first went to the house
of Igmidio Miranda (Miranda) in Sagnay, Camarines Sur. The latter
accompanied appellant to the house of Arnel Dadis in San Francisco,
Tigaon to buy a dog. They, however, failed to get the dog; prompting
them to leave. On their way home, they met Boyet Obias (Obias) who
requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to
Jimmy Gonzales (Gonzales). Appellant placed it in the basket in front
Statement of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. He
and Miranda parted ways when they reached the place.
Appellant dropped by the grocery store and the blacksmith to get his
scythe. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was
invited to go with them to the headquarters. Upon inspection of the
package in his bicycle, the police discovered the subject marijuana.
Appellant tried to explain that the package was owned by Obias but
the police did not believe him. He was sent to jail.
Miranda corroborated the testimony of appellant that the two of them
went to San Francisco, Tigaon, Camarines Sur in the morning of 7
June 1994 to buy a dog. On their way back to the town proper of
Tigaon, they met Obias who requested appellant to bring a package,
which Miranda thought contained cookies, to Gonzales. Upon
reaching the town proper, they parted ways.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was justified
RULING:
YES, the arrest was justified..
Identity of appellant determined
Acting on an asset's tip, a police team was organized to apprehend
appellant who was allegedly about to transport the subject marijuana.
Appellant is wrong in concluding that the asset did not name
appellant. As early as 16 November 1996, appellant through counsel
had already conceded in his Memorandum filed with the trial court
that based on the tip, he was about to transport the contraband. It
further cited excerpts from the result of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the judge on Competente.
On cross-examination, the defense counsel even assumed that
according to the asset's tip it was appellant who was assigned to
deliver the contraband. And the witness under cross-examination
affirmed it was indeed appellant who would be making the delivery
according to the tip.
Warrantless arrest made was justified
Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated
on lack of a warrant of arrest. The OSG correctly justifies the failure
to apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the
essence in appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that
there is no law requiring investigation and surveillance upon receipt
of tips from assets before conducting police operations.
The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was
transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time
to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit
and already committing a crime. The arrest was effected after
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his
bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating
that a crime was then already being committed. Under the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant
was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified.
Transport, defined
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
states:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. x x
x.
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one
place to another."30 In the instant case, appellant was riding his
bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was
about to convey the package, which contained marijuana, to a certain
Jimmy Gonzales.
Appellant, however, denies any knowledge that the package in his
possession contained marijuana. But the trial court rejected his
contention, noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware
of the contents of the package because "marijuana has a distinct sweet
and unmistakable aroma x x x which would have alarmed him.
In crimes mala prohibita, intent, motive or knowledge not necessary
The appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one
commits the crime under R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a
prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or
knowledge thereof is not necessary.
Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously
possess marijuana. In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there
can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused
knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that
animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession
or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is
subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the
accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in
question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus
shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since
courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its
perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary.
Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-
to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from
the attendant events in each particular case.
Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of
possession in the instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the
bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first
readily saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out
of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask
Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do
the delivery errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper
and weighed almost one kilogram.
PEOPLE VS. SEMBRANO
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628 S 328 (2010)
Facts:
On 26 July 2004, the operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs
(SAID) of the Novaliches Police Station arrested Michael Sembrano
in broad daylight, in the course of a buy-bust operation and after a
follow-up search on him.
Two separate Information were filed against him for (1) illegal sale
and (2) illegal possession of shabu.
Details on the buy-bust operation:
Around 3 pm of 26 July 2004, a confidential informant relayed
information regarding illicit drugs trade operations conducted by a
certain Michael Sembrano alias Takol in the area of Gulod in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
A a buy-bust team proceeded to the entrapment operation. PO1
Manaol was designated poseur-buyer. He was handed 2 P100-bills
which he marked with his initials JAM on the lower right side
thereof, right below the image of the Philippine Flag. PO1 Manaol,
together with the confidential informant, then proceeded to the target
site. The other members of the team acted as back-up.
Upon Sembrano’s arrival, the confidential informant introduced PO1
Manaol to him as an interested buyer of shabu. PO1 Manaol handed
the marked money to Sembrano, who, in turn, handed 1 plastic sachet
containing shabu to him. The transaction having been consummated,
PO1 Manaol executed their pre-arranged signal and scratched his
head. Sembrano was then arrested. A follow-up frisk on Sembrano
resulted in the confiscation of 2 other plastic sachets of shabu.
The defense anchored on its claim that the warrantless arrest against
appellant was unlawful. Consequently, applying the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during such
unlawful warrantless arrest cannot be used as evidence. The defense
proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly seized from Sembrano during
the buy-bust operation should have been declared inadmissible.
Alleging he is a victim of frame-up by the police officers, he attacks
the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In sum, appellant seeks
acquittal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was lawful
Ruling:
Yes. Sembrano was arrested during an entrapment operation where he
was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made
during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be
secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
xxx
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years
has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug
pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving
Sembrano, deserves judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless
arrest and warrantless search and seizure conducted on the person of
Sembrano were allowed under the circumstances. The search,
incident to his lawful arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity.
Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu recovered during the
legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were properly
admitted in evidence against him.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
His defenses of denial and frame-up are both self-serving and
uncorroborated, and must fail in light of straightforward and positive
testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the seller of shabu.
(C) Waiver of Illegality of Arrest
PEOPLE VS. RACHO
626 SCRA 633 (2010)
FACTS:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted
through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The
agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the
Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the
appellant.
During the operation, appellant was about to board a tricycle, the
team approached him and invited him to the police station on
suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the
accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a
white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug.
The team then brought appellant to the police station for
investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police
Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials
and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations
on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation
of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous
drugs
At the trial, appellant denied liability, He claims, As to the
circumstances of his arrest, that the police officers, through their van,
blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought
him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then
brought him to the police station for investigation.
RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting appellant of Violation
of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but
acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
R.A. 9165.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Appellant argued the legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search.He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous
tree.
Issue: Whether the the appellant’s arrest and warrantless search was
legal and valid?
Ruling:
After a review from the court, the SC held that appellant can no
longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu
seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
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The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he
raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active
participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary
for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure
must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] Said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.[18]
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the
uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured.
The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto,
declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime
or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending
officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of
shabu.[20]Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid
as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest,
the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with
an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
make the arrest at the outset of the search.[21] Thus, given the factual
milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers
had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.
The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause
necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19,
2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular
phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported
the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a
team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m.,
appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on
board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the
day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members
posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at
around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed
to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about
to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the
police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled
out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the police
station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in
the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations
on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even
without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant
would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance
gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is
sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even
without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant
would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance
gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is
sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable
information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there
was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some
overt act indicative of the criminal design.
Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and
was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending
to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would
not have been confiscated.
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that
would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified
to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting
team, their office received the tipped information on May 19, 2003.
They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants
physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain
that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly,
the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.[39]
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous
tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be
sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with
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it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
(D) Effects of declaration of Illegal Arrest
PEOPLE VS BIYOC
532 SCRA 528 (2007)
Private complainant AAA was in a room on the second floor of the
family house taking care of her one-year-old sister when her father,
accused Rodolfo Biyoc, raped her. Biyoc was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the Trial Court which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
In his Brief, appellant raised only one assignment of error- the Trial
Court erred in convicting the accused-appellant in the crime of rape
and in his Supplemental Brief appellant raised additional assignments
of error which may be summarized as follows:
(1) The trial court erred in appreciating AAAs testimony that she had
long been sexually molested by appellant, it being hearsay and, in any
event, no criminal charges were filed therefor, and (2)The findings in
the medico-legal report did not support the claim of the prosecution
that AAA was raped.
In another vein, appellant claims that his arrest was illegal because a
warrantless arrest was effected even before the statement of the
private complainant was taken.
Issue
WON Biyoc can claim that he was illegally arrested?
Held: No.
Objections to the legality of arrests must, however, be made prior to
the entry of plea at arraignment; otherwise, they are considered
waived.
We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing
the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the
information against him before his arraignment. Since the legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused, any defect in his arrest may be deemed cured when he
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court as what was
done by the appellants in the instant case. Not only did they enter
their pleas during arraignment, but they also actively participated
during the trial which constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in their
arrest.
In the present case, appellant failed to question the illegality of his
arrest before entering his plea, hence, he is deemed to have waived
the same. Appellant is guilty of Simple Rape, aggravated by
relationship.
VALDEZ VS PEOPLE
538 SCRA 611 (2007)
FACTS:
This case stems from a Joint Sworn Statement executed by Arturo
Francisco Luy, Gertrudes Luy, Arthur Luy, and Annabelle Luy on
March 8, 2013. They alleged that a family member, Benhur Luy, had
been detained against his will since December 19, 2012, transferred
from place to place in a bid to cover up the JLN Group of Companies'
anomalous transactions involving the Priority Development
Assistance Fund. Napoles, owner of the JLN Group of Companies,
and her brother, Reynald Lim (Lim), allegedly masterminded the
"pork barrel scam" and the detention of Benhur Luy.charobleslaw
Acting on the Joint Sworn Statement, Secretary of Justice Leila M.
De Lima (Secretary De Lima) directed the National Bureau of
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Investigation Special Task Force to investigate the matter. This led to
a "rescue operation" on March 22, 2013 to release Benhur Luy who,
at that time, was reportedly detained in a condominium unit at Pacific
Plaza Tower, Bonifacio Global City. Lim, who was with Benhur Luy
at the condominium unit, was arrested by operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation.chanrobleslaw
In the March 23, 2013, National Bureau of Investigation Director
Nonnatus Caesar R. Rojas (Director Rojas) requested the prosecution
of Lim and Napoles for serious illegal detention.
In their respective Counter-Affidavits, Lim and Napoles denied
illegally detaining Benhur Luy. Both claimed that Benhur Luy loaned
P5,000,000.00 from Air Materiel Wing Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. under the name of Napoles. The loan, allegedly
unauthorized, angered Napoles. To obtain Napoles' forgiveness,
Benhur Luy voluntarily went on a three-month spiritual retreat at
Bahay ni San Jose in Magallanes Village, Makati City beginning
December 19, 2012.hanrobleslaw
Finding no probable cause against Lim and Napoles, Assistant State
Prosecutor Juan Pedro V. Navera (Prosecutor Navera) recommended
the dismissal of the complaint for serious illegal detention in June 10,
2013. Prosecutor Navera believed that Benhur Luy voluntarily stayed
at Bahay ni San Jose for a spiritual retreat, as attested to by
Monsignor Josefmo Ramirez and the five(5) Chinese priests residing
in the retreat house.chanrobleslaw
As to the claim that Benhur Luy was detained to cover up the alleged
anomalous transactions of the JLN Group of Companies involving
the Priority Development Assistant Fund, Prosecutor Navera said that
the claim was "too speculative and not sufficiently established.” He
added that he did not "dwell too much on ... [the] alleged diversion of
government funds" because the case is for serious illegal detention,
not for corruption or financial fraud.
On August 6, 2013, Senior Deputy State Prosecutor and Chair of the
Task Force on Anti-Kidnapping Theodore M. Villanueva (Prosecutor
Villanueva) reversed the June 10, 2013 Resolution and recommended
filing an information for serious illegal detention against Lim and
Napoles.
The case was raffled to Branch 150 presided by Judge Elmo M.
Alameda (Judge Alameda). Recommending no bail for Napoles and
Lim, Judge Alameda issued a warrant for their arrest.chanrob
Napoles filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Secretary De Lima,
Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva, Director Rojas,
and of Judge Alameda. She contended that there was no probable
cause to charge her with serious illegal detention, and that Judge
Alameda erred in issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency of
her Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.
In deciding Napoles' Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals said
that "full discretionary authority in the determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation has been delegated to the
executive branch, particularly at the first instance to the public
prosecutor, and ultimately to the [Department of Justice]." Hence,
absent any grave abuse of discretion, courts will not disturb the
public prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
The Court of Appeals observed that the Review Resolution
"show[ed] the reasons for the course of action [the prosecution] had
taken which were thoroughly and sufficiently discussed therein.
Moreover, the prosecution "painstakingly went over the pieces of
evidence adduced by the parties and thereafter resolved the issues by
applying the precepts of the law on evidence."chanrobleslaw
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With respect to the issuance of the arrest warrant, the Court of
Appeals noted Napoles' "attempt to quash the warrant of arrest issued
against her by way of... petition for certiorari."38 Moreover, since
Napoles failed to attach copies of the arrest warrant in her Petition for
Certiorari, the Court of Appeals refused to squarely rule on the issue
of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in its
issuance.39chanrobleslaw
On September 11, 2014, Napoles filed before this Court her Petition
for Review on Certiorari with Application for a Temporary
Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.Respondents Secretary
De Lima, Prosecutor General Arellano, Prosecutor Villanueva,
Director Rojas, and Judge Alameda,- through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment, to which Napoles filed a Reply.
slaw
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari, Napoles maintains that
respondents whimsically and arbitrarily found probable cause against
her. She emphasizes that, without introduction of additional evidence,
the Department of Justice reversed its initial Resolution dismissing
the complaint for serious illegal detention. In Napoles' view, the
Review Resolution was issued not because Benhur Luy was illegally
detained but because the government "need[ed] to get hold of [her] in
connection with the allegations of Benhur Luy on the misuse of [the
Priority Development Assistance Fund] by
legislators[.]"hanrobleslaw
Napoles adds that under Rule 112, Section 6 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Judge Alameda had 10 days from the
filing of the information to personally evaluate the prosecutor's
Resolution and its supporting evidence.' Yet, Judge Alameda issued
the arrest warrant the very day the records of the case were
transmitted to Branch 150. This allegedly showed the hastiness with
which Judge Alameda issued the warrant for her arrest. Judge
Alameda allegedly "succumbed to the extraneous pressure and
influence from the mass and social media to appease the growing
public clamor of crucifying [Napoles] for her alleged involvement in
the [pork barrel] scam.”
In their Comment, respondents point out how Napoles failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by failing to file a petition for review
before the Secretary of Justice. The present Petition is also
dismissible, respondents claim, because Napoles failed to implead an
indispensable party: the People of the Philippines.chanrobleslaw
Respondents echo the Court of Appeals' pronouncement and argue
that the determination of probable cause for filing an information in
court is an executive function. Absent grave abuse of discretion, as in
this case, courts of justice may not interfere with that finding.
Neither was Judge Alameda's issuance of the arrest warrant attended
with grave abuse of discretion, according to respondents. For them,
"what is essential is ... that [Judge Alameda] was able to review the
[prosecutor's finding] and, on the basis thereof, affirm[ed] the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause
ISSUE:
Whether the there is need for an issuance of warrant of arrest
HELD:
This Petition must be denied for being moot and academic. In any
case, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari. There was no grave abuse of discretion either in the filing
of information in court or in the issuance of the arrest warrant against
Napoles.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is
the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of
the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted
himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose
of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of
said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should
be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the
case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court.
The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused, [sic] or the right of the People to
due process of law.
....
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence[.] (Citations omitted)
It is true that the Constitution allows the exercise of the power of
judicial review in cases where grave abuse of discretion exists.In this
case, however, a petition for certiorari before this Court was not the
"plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law"
because, as discussed, the trial court already acquired jurisdiction
over the case. The proper remedy for Napoles was to proceed to trial
and allow the exhaustive presentation of evidence by the parties.
During the pendency of this Petition, the main case from which the
Petition for Certiorari stemmed was decided by the trial court. In its
April 14, 2015 Decision, Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City found Napoles guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious
illegal detention, punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. She was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and was ordered to pay Benhur Luy P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.ableslaw
All the more should this Petition be dismissed. Napoles has been
found guilty of serious illegal detention with proof beyond reasonable
doubt, a quantum of evidence higher than probable cause. Resolving
whether there was probable cause in the filing of information before
the trial court and in the issuance of an arrest warrant would be "of no
practical use and value.”
In any case, despite the mootness of this Petition, we proceed with
resolving the issues presented by the parties for the guidance of the
bench and the bar.
No less than the Constitution commands that "no
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. . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]"
This requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in
Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure:hanrobleslaw
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. —
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule.
In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an
information in court and that for issuance of an arrest warrant are
different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial court
acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court.”
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the arrest
warrant against Napoles. That Judge Alameda issued the arrest
warrant within the day he received the records of the case from the
prosecutor does not mean that the warrant was hastily issued. "Speed
in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For one's prompt dispatch may be another's undue haste."
Judge Alameda was under no obligation to review the entire case
record as Napoles insists. All that is required is that a judge
personally evaluates the evidence and decides, independent of the
finding of the prosecutor, that probable cause exists so as to justify
the issuance of an arrest warrant. As explained in Ho v. People”
[I]t is not required that the complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by
the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging
them to examine the complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause.(Emphasis supplied)
In his August 14, 2013 Order, Judge Alameda declared that he
personally evaluated the records of the case, including the Review
Resolution and the Sworn Statements of the witnesses; and that based
on the records, he found probable cause to issue an arrest warrant
against Napoles:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
After personally evaluating the Review Resolution issued by Senior
Deputy State Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva, Chairman-Task
Force on Anti-Kidnapping and approved by Prosecutor General Claro
A. Arellano, together with the Sworn Statements of the complainants
and other evidence on record, the undersigned finds the Review
| 47
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Resolution to have factual and legal basis. Likewise, the undersigned
after personally reviewing the finding of Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor Theodore M. Villanueva based on the evidence on record,
finds probable cause for the issuance of Warrant of Arrest against the
accused for the crime of Serious Illegal Detention "under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code there being probable cause to believe that
the crime of Serious Illegal Detention has been committed by the
accused.c
We find this declaration sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement of personal evaluation.
Moreover, Judge Alameda did not gravely abuse his discretion in
issuing the arrest warrant despite the pendency of the Motions for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause filed by Napoles and Lim.
Hearing these Motions would be a mere superfluity, for with or
without such motion[s], the judge is duty-bound to personally
evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting
evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
We afford respondents the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties. Napoles failed to show capriciousness,
whimsicality, arbitrariness, or any despotic exercise of judgment by
reason of passion and hostility on the part of respondents.
PEOPLE V. SANTOS
555 SCRA 578 (2008)
FACTS
On 5 August 2003, the parties, however, agreed to re-open the Pre-
Trial Conference and they entered into a stipulation of facts as to the
testimony to be given by the first prosecution witness, Forensic
Chemist Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza Cejes.9 As contained
in the Pre-Trial Order dated 5 August 2003, the parties stipulated on:
(1) the due execution and genuineness of the Request for Laboratory
Examination dated 8 March 2003, and the stamp showing receipt
thereof by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory;
(2) the due execution, genuineness and truth of the contents of
Physical Science Report No. D-405-03E issued by Forensic Chemist
P/Insp. Lourdeliza Cejes, the finding or conclusion appearing on the
report, and the signature of the forensic chemist over her typewritten
name appearing therein; and (3) the existence of the plastic sachets,
but not their source or origin, contained in a brown envelope, the
contents of which were the subject of the Request for Laboratory
Examination
ISSUE
WON the arrest buy bust and in effect the warrantless arrest are valid
HELD
The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also
lacks merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find
any objection by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to
their arraignment. We have held in a number of cases that the illegal
arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused. It is much too late in the day to complain about the
warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the accused
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arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him.
Nevertheless, our ruling in People v. Cabugatan 69 provides that:
The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless
arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, which
states:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
As we have already declared the legality of the buy-bust operation
that was conducted by the police, it follows that the subsequent
warrantless arrests were likewise legally effected. Furthermore, any
search resulting from the lawful warrantless arrests was also valid,
because the appellants committed a crime in flagrante delicto; that is,
the persons arrested committed a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers
PEOPLE vs. EDAÑO
729 SCRA 255 (2014)
On August 2, 2002, 4 police officers who are members of the Metro
Manila Drugs Enforcement Group together with a female informant,
went to the parking area of McDonalds in west avenue to conduct an
entrapment operation against a certain alias “Nato”.
At around 7:00 pm, the accused arrived on board a space wagon,
driven by Siochi (co-accused). The informant waived at PO3 Corbe.
While Corbe was approaching the accused, the latter went out of the
vehicle and ran away. Carbo, together with 2 other police officers
chased the appellant; Carbo was able to grab the accused causing the
latter to fall on the ground. Carbo recovered a “knot-tied” transparent
plastic bag from the accused’s right hand, while the other officer,
PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked on the accused’s waist. The other
members arrested Soichi. Soichi, the accused and the seized items
were then brought to the police station for investigation.
Upon examination at the Police Crime Lab, the seized items were
found to be positive for the presence of shabu.
The RTC found Edano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
The RTC however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA held
that the warrantless arrest was valid, explaining that the appellant’s
act of running when Corbe was approaching him reinforced the
latter’s suspicion that “something was amiss”.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest was valid and the seized items admissible as
evidence?
RULING:
No. The warrantless arrest is invalid and the seized items
inadmissible.
The court resolves to ACQUIT the appellant.
In Flagrante Delicto
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a
crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the
informant were just talking with each other when he approached
them.
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant
were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and
drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the
informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not
the pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been
consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he
had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug
and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe
approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as
adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that
the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly
committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the
alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized
from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid
search and seizure.
Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the appellant’s
warrantless arrest was valid, the latter’s acquittal is still in order due
to the prosecution’s failure to establish the evidence of the corpus
delicti with moral certainty.
Corpus Delicti Not Proved With Moral Certainty
There are various lapses committed by the police in the handling,
safekeeping and custody over the seized drug tainted the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu.
First, we find it highly unusual and irregular that the police officers
would let the appellant mark the drugs seized from him, instead of
doing the marking themselves.
Marking, as used in drug cases, means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized. "Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly
ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation.
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The Forensic Chemical Officer also points out that the police
forwarded two plastic bags containing white crystalline substances
for examination – one marked with initials “OR” and the other with
“GS”. Both were used as evidence against the accused. The court
expresses doubts on whether the plastic bag marked with “GS” was
the same taken from the co-accused Siochi.
Second, the police didn’t inventory or photograph the seized drugs
which is a required procedure embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1,Article II of R.A. No. 9165
In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the
shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the
prosecution's failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act,
compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to
adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged.
ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS VASQUEZ
714 SCRA 78 (2014)
FACTS: Appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of
illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under Sections
15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of
Section 15 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which
was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34
grams, 51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total
weight of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-
EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent plastic
sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose
from an alleged violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be committed in this
manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17
grams, 0.21 grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams,
[0].51 grams or all with a total weight of four point zero three grams
of white crystalline substance contained in twelve (12) transparent
plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription thereof.6 On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not
guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was held
on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties
entering into any stipulation of facts.
The prosecution’s case
The prosecution’s case rested on the testimonies of P/insp.
Fajardo and PO2 Tarambulo. They stated that on April 3, 1998 a buy-
bust was performed by them to capture the accused. Upon the success
of the operation, Fajardo also learned found out that alias Don was in
fact the appellant Donald Vasquez. She learned of his name when he
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
brought out his NBI ID while he was being booked. P/Insp. Fajardo
also learned that the name of the appellant’s companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police
station. P/Insp. Fajardo explained that after she gave the buy-bust
money to the appellant, the latter handed the same to Siscar who was
present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon
receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag,
Siscar looked at the contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp.
Fajardo marked the drug specimen and brought the same to the Crime
Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo and PO1
Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante
who then turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on
duty. The police officers previously weighed the drug specimen.
Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory weighed the
specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of
the laboratory examination.21
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of
shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in
a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When
the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her
initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were
markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y
Sunga" but she did not bother to check out what they were for or who
made them. When she interrogated the appellant about the brown
envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to
the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant
worked as a Laboratory Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She
identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs that her team
recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp.
Fajardo also stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2
Trambulo conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search
yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the appellant. The 12
sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope.
P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As
to the 12 sachets, the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and
signed by PO2 Trambulo.22
This testimony was then corroborated by PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on
the results of her examination of the drug specimens seized in this
case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr. initially
examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to
another office. The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran
were laid down in Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp.
Dequito first studied the data contained in Physical Science Report
No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She entered
that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug
specimens and examined the white crystalline substance from each of
the plastic sachets. She examined first the specimens marked as "A-
1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6." P/Insp. Dequito’s
examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26 She also examined
the contents of 12 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also
contained crystalline substances. The 12 plastic sachets were marked
"B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the 12 plastic
sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
P/Insp. Dequito’s findings were contained in Physical Science Report
No. RD-17-98.27
The defense’s case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecution’s version of events.
The appellant’s brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a
concise summary of the defense’s counter-statement of facts.
According to the defense:
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Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI,
working as a Laboratory Aide II at the NBI Forensics Chemistry
Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena clerk,
receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police
agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also
rendered day and night duties, and during regular office hours and in
the absence of the laboratory technician, he would weigh the
specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the
trial courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order
to testify, or bring the drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in
Managerial Statistics between 6:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. Thereafter,
he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at Quiapo. From
there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 o’clock that
evening, where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the
latter a confidential informant of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 o’clock in the morning, Donald’s
household help, Anatolia Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo
that time, was eating while Donald was asleep. She heard a knock on
the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter two (2) men
entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3)
others. The door to Donald’s room was kicked down and they entered
his room. Donald, hearing noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo
pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six (6) policemen
searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them
opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s] possession in
relation to his work as a laboratory aide. The drugs came from two
(2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and
DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen
contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for
presentation on 3 April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the
policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, and his wallet
containing ₱2,530.00.
The decision of the RTC and CA
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the
crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome.
The trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence
that would show that the police officers in this case were impelled by
an evil motive to charge him of very serious crimes and falsely testify
against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the shabu
involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03
grams for illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively.
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
of the appellant. The appellate court ruled that the prosecution
sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and
illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the
conduct of the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and
categorical. As the appellant failed to adduce any evidence that
tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers to
falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the
part of the police officers had not been controverted in this case.
ISSUE:
1. W/N such arrest on the accused was valid for not having a warrant
of arrest?
2. W/N the accused was authorized to possess the illegal drugs
seized?
RULING:
1. SC held that such search was VALID.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no
longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated in People v.
Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an
arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are
now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial
court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that
the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to
an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is
deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless
arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the
illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. We held in People
v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures
have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of
(1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs
searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrest of escaped prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking
belatedly the invalidity of his arrest and the subsequent search upon
his person.
2. Courts held that such possession was illegal
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should be
satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, "what is material is proof that the
accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court
of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal
possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and
PO2 Trambulo established that a buy-bust operation was legitimately
carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant.
P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant
as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were
contained in a big brown envelope for the price of ₱250,000.00. She
likewise identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the
markings she placed thereon after the same were seized from the
appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white
crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for
shabu. We find that P/Insp. Fajardo’s testimony on the events that
transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust operation was detailed
and straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in her
narration even in the face of the opposing counsel’s cross-
examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the
exchange of the drug specimens seized and the buy-bust money,
P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from the appellant
of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was
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arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body
search on the appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12
more plastic sachets, the contents of which also tested positive for
shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was amply corroborated by
PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the former’s narration
of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve
plastic sachets of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken
by the appellant to criminally or administratively charge the police
officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling and possessing
illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting task for
the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of
the NBI, the appellant could have easily sought the help of his
immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him
from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence
were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he
was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the
original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof
were not at all presented in court did nothing to help the appellant’s
case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant
failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the
arresting officers that the appellant was caught red-handed selling
and possessing a considerable amount of prohibited drugs on the
night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing
that the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts
or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the
trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the
witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh
the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the
factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial
court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that
such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that
the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the
crimes charged.
9. Immunity from arrest of members in Congress
Article VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
10. Privacy (Art. III, Section 2)
OPLE VS. TORRES
293 SCRA 201 (1998)
NOTE: 293 scra 201 is annotated from this case which tackles the
issue of violations on rights of privacy
[G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998]
FACTS:
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December
12, 1996 for the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Reference System. It was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January. Petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, on the grounds that:
1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of
privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in
the Bill of Rights.
RULING:
The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to
privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection.
The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308
is predicated on two considerations:
1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant
the issuance of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In the case at
bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures
the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services.
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
The National Computerized Identification Reference System As
Violation of the Right to Privacy (293 scra 201)
In Blas F. Ople vs. Ruben D. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23,
1998, the Supreme Court ruled that Administrative Order No. 308,
Dec. 12, 1996 adopting a National Computerized Identification
Reference System was violative to the constitutional right to privacy
and was declared null and void
The decision resolved four (4) main issues namely:
(1) Whether the petition presents a justifiable case;
(2) Whether the petitioner Blas F. Ople has the personality to file a
taxpayer suit;
(3) Whether the Administrative Order and question is an observation
of a legislative power.
(4) Whether the Computerized ID System is a violation of the
constitutional right to privacy.
This annotation will mainly dwell on the basic issue on the right
to privacy as constitutional guarantee and as human rights in
accordance with the international instruments on human rights
and its new concepts.
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.”
It may be noted that the right to privacy mentioned in the
aforementioned articles refers only to privacy of communication and
correspondence.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a broader concept.
Art. 12 of the said Declaration states:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.”
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Implementing the said provision is Art. 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which reads:
Sec. 1. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
Sec. 2. “Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
Right to Privacy as a Basic Human Right
The right to privacy as stated in the Philippine Constitution
refers only to the privacy of communication and correspondence.
Recent developments however, have shown that said right covers
broader aspects of human activity of individual, to his family, home
and reputation.
Generally, the right to privacy now involves most basic
rights of the individual conduct and choice. The right to privacy
includes the right of the person to prevent intrusion into certain
thoughts and activities which includes the freedom of speech, to form
or join association. It also includes the constitutional freedoms of
unreasonable searches and seizures and the freedom from self-
incrimination.
This annotation further discussed these topics as it is applied in
US:
1. The right to privacy in marriage and family
2. Rights to reputation
3. Sterilization
4. Contraceptives
5. Abortion and the use of public funds for abortion
6. The Right to die (Euthenasia)
7. Homosexuality
8. Gays in Military service
9. Computer Files as invasion to privacy
10. Moral and religious perspectives on the right to privacy
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
570 SCRA 410 (2008)
NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC)
and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA), regarding the
constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of
secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office
with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far
as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be
done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test
which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo
drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and
regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers
and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or
overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt
with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal
offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than
six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004
elections. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
(4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice
Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally
infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can
be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And
for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also
seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that
Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process
and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE:
Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause?
HELD:
The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL;
while paragraphs (f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only
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paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.
The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165(c) requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable, but
may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to
be promoted and protected.
The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA
9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d)
for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard
that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable,
an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed
to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and
constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1
and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the
right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as to the
basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
“translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state’s exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of
the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer
and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test,
nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who
is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as
contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the
very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of
the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court.
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their
right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The
operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness”
and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
to incriminate themselves.
If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with
utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined
limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and,
ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and
other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard
of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should
pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are
required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
LEE VS. CA
20 SCRA 383 (1967)
Facts: Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh)
entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They
had 11 children. In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman
named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid.
Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved
into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that
Tiu’s children with Lee claimed that they, too, were children of Lee
and Ke.
In an investigation conducted by the NBI it stated that it
was very obvious that the mother of the 8 children is certainly not keh
shiok cheng, but a much younger woman, probably Tiu Chuan.
Based on the NBI report, respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from
the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s
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other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu
to indicate her true mother’s name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an
ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case.
Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may compel Tiu to testify
in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed
for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Keh’s daughter.
Ruling: Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the
subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it
was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter
would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth
to the other Lee children. But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds
cited—unreason-able and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad
duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the
possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe
on the right against invasion of privacy.
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus
provides:
“SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena.—The court may quash a
subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event,
at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and
oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does
not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued
fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.”
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action,
obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the
mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee.
Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to
court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court
would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it
would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against
her stepdaughter.
A. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might
subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts
duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an
examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of
advanced age.[8]
B. The privilege (parental right) cannot apply to them because
the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a
family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has
no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus
provides: Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those
who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those
from whom he descends.
Note.—A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring
him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines,
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
or for the taking of his deposition. A subpoena ad testificandum
is used to compel a person to testify while a subpoena duces
tecum is used to compel the production of books, records, things
or documents therein specified.
MANILA ELECTRIC vs. LIM
632 SCRA 66 (2010)
Facts:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO
Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG
MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON
ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June
5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By
Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head
of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F
OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "…
reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her]
from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise
[her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben
A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s Human
Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the
matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to
a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence
in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation
of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No
response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition5 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 213-M-2008. By respondent’s allegation,
petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued
failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about
the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security, correctible by habeas data. Additionally, respondent prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang
Sector.
Issue:
1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain
MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work
of its employees
2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set
forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
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Ruling:
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend
is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously
crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially
questioning the transfer of her place of work by her
employer" and the terms and conditions of her employment which
arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondent’s place
of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-
Circular No. 79-2003 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or
injunctive writs in labor-related cases. Petitioners go on to point out
that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the
writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals
or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home;
and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such
activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data
allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the
province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy,
thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to
life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the
grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context
of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably
lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or
security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
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reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10,
2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could
be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue
is labor-related. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7
in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
______________________________________________________
ANNOTATION: Right to Privacy
(293 SCRA 201)
THE NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM AS
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
A Review of the Principles and Jurisprudence
on Privacy As Human Rights
By JORGE R. COQUIA*
New Directions on the Right to Privacy, p. 203
§ 1.Right to Privacy as a Basic Human Right, p. 203
The right to privacy as stated in the Philippine Constitution refers
only to the privacy of communication and correspondence. Recent
developments however, have shown that said right covers broader
aspects of human activity of individual, to his family, home and
reputation.
Generally, the right to privacy now involves most basic rights of the
individual conduct and choice. The right to privacy includes the right
of the person to prevent intrusion into certain thoughts and activities
which includes the freedom of speech, to form or join association. It
also includes the constitutional freedoms of unreasonable searches
and seizures and the freedom from self-incrimination.
§ 2.Historical Background of Right to Privacy, p. 203
The right to privacy has been expressed several thousands of years
ago with the maxim that “A man’s house is his castle.” The
expectation of privacy within one’s home is found in the Talmud, the
Jewish civil and religious law and the Code of Hammurabi. These
principles eventually have been incorporated in the Bills of Rights in
several state constitutions. The Philippines in its Malolos
Constitution adopted in 1899 states that “no person shall enter the
domicile of a Filipino or foreigner residing in the Philippine Islands
without his consent, except in urgent cases of fire, flood, earthquake,
or other natural danger or unlawful aggression proceeding from
within, or in order to assist a person within calling for help.” The
Americans in their fight for independence from England questioned
the quartering of armed troops in their homes.
§ 3.Right to Privacy as Interpreted and Applied in the U.S., p.
204
The Supreme Court and the Congress of the United States are very
liberal in invoking the right to privacy in the exercise of the
individual freedom guaranteed in the freedom of speech, press,
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unreasonable searches and seizures and the freedom from self-
incrimination.
§ 4.The Right to Privacy In Marriage and the Family, p. 205
Any statute that arbitrarily interfered with the family unit was held as
invalid. The Court said in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 US 4911
(1997) that the constitution protects the sanctity of the family,
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and tradition. Accordingly, the Court sustained the
validity of a New York law that provided for expedited procedure for
removing a child from foster parents and placing the child with their
natural parents. The liberty interests in family privacy has its source
and its contours are ordinarily sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic
human rights
The right to marry is left to the choice of an individual and should not
be subjected to unjustified interference by the state.
§ 5.Right to Reputation, p. 206
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides for the right to protect one’s reputation.
§ 6.Too Liberal Application of the Right to Privacy (Moral and
Religious Perspectives), p. 207
The U.S. Supreme Court decisions have gone too far in applying the
right to privacy. Based on moral and religious considerations some
U.S. decisions on issues of sterilization, right to use contraceptives,
the right to die, (euthanasia) and the freedom of homosexuality are of
doubtful validity.
§ 7.Sterilization, p. 207
The early U.S. Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 US 200
(1927), affirmed the State law on sterilization of unfit people as a
proper use of the police power to prevent the transmission of insanity,
idiocy, imbecility, epilepsy, and crime. The court ruled that crime and
other social problems could be controlled by sterilization.
§ 8.Use of Contraceptives, p. 207
A statute prohibiting a single person to use contraceptive methods is
also unconstitutional. The U.S. Court in Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 US
453 [1972], invalidated a Massachusetts law penalizing the giving
away of drug, medicine or instrument for the prevention of
conception except when physicians or registered pharmacists gave
them to married persons. The Court ruled that the statute violated the
rights of single person. If the right of privacy mean anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion into matter so fundamental affecting a person
on the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
§ 9.The Right to Commit Abortion, p. 209
The issue of the freedom of a pregnant woman to abort her
pregnancy, and state interest in protecting the life of the mother and
child had aroused so much public interest and emotional debates in
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
the United States. The controversial “abortion on demand” case was
decided in (Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 [1973]. The Court held that a
woman had a qualified right to terminate her pregnancy under the
trimester plan. Within first three months of her pregnancy the woman
has the right to abort with the assistance of her physician. After the
first three months, the state may regulate the abortion procedure in
order to protect the health of the mother. If the fetus becomes viable,
which is about seven months, the state may prohibit abortion except
for the preservation of the life and health of the mother. In declaring
the Texas abortion law void, the Court said that it abridged the
woman’s right to personal privacy.
§ 10.Use of Public Funds for Abortion, p. 210
Another issue arose as to whether public funds can be used for a
woman who decides to abort her pregnancy. In Beal v. Doe, 432 US
438 [1977]), the Court upheld a Pennsylvania law denying needed
financial assistance for non-therapeutic abortions under the Federal
medical program. Although the Court regarded the issue as moral
question to be decided by state legislatures not the judiciary, it held in
Maker v. Roe, 432 US 464 [1977] that the Constitution does not
obligate states to pay the pregnancy related medical expenses of
indigent women.
§ 11.The “Right to Die” (Euthanasia), p. 212
Federal Constitution does not forbid Missouri to refuse “clear and
convincing evidence” that an incompetent, permanently unconscious
person whether the withdrawal of life-support systems. The court
likewise held that a competent person has a constitutional right to
refuse such life-support systems. States may adopt more liberal laws
that individuals may protect their privacy rights by signing a “living
will” that express their desire to reject life-support systems
§ 12.Homosexuality, p. 213
Several States in the United States have enacted laws to criminalize
homosexuality as “crimes against nature,” “deviancy” and “sodomy.”
Opponents contended that the statutes violate the right to privacy and
regard them as unreasonable control of consensual sex between
adults.
§ 13.Gays in the Military Service, p. 214
Gays in the military service have been discharged due to homosexual
conduct. A federal appellate court held that the policy of the navy to
discharge gays for homosexual conduct does not violate
constitutional rights to privacy or the equal protection of laws. If the
government may prosecute homosexual conduct by civilians as ruled
in Doe v. Commonwealth, 403 Fed. Supp. 1199 (1975) such military
regulation is sustainable in the military conduct where discipline and
good order justify restrictions. The values protected in marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationship and rearing of children
are not present in homosexuality.
§ 14.Computer Files as Invasion to Privacy, p. 214
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The use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and
transmit data has greatly advanced research methods. The new
technology, however, poses new threats to privacy
because it interferes with and may deprive the right of the individual
of the right to control the flow of information about himself. The
computer technology has advanced rapidly with the global internet
system.
The computer system and other media tends to intrude into privacy as
it can handle personal information by disseminating evidence of
present or past actions or association which the individual may not
have consented for said information. There is also the probability of
introducing inaccurate information that might create an erroneous
information which the individual has no control.
§ 15.Right of Privacy in Philippine Jurisprudence, p. 215
There is not much jurisprudence in the Philippines directly declaring
with the right to privacy. The right to privacy has rarely been invoked
in court litigations as an independent constitutional guarantee. One
reason is that the Philippine Constitution expressly guarantee only the
privacy of communication and correspondence
§ 16.Moral And Religious Perspectives on the Right to Privacy, p.
217
The inclusion of abortion, use of contraceptives, family planning,
sterilization and the right to die (euthanasia) among the
constitutionally protected rights to privacy has been challenged on
moral, spiritual and religious doctrines. The modern trends on the
liberal application of right to privacy are threats against human life
itself and promote the “culture of death.”
11. Privacy of Communications
Article III, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 3: The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
1. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
ZULUETA VS. CA
253 SCRA 699 (1996)
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo
Martin. On March 26, 1982, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband,
a doctor of medicine and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husband’s clinic and took certain possessions and documents
belonging to Dr. Martin. It was to be used as evidence for the suit
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II Case Notes and Digests
Cecilia filed against her husband. Dr. Martin filed an action before
the RTC of Manila.
RTC: Rendered a decision that declared him as the “capital/exclusive
owner of the properties”. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier
issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia and her attorynets were
enjoined from using or submitting as evidence the documents and
papers in question.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS FORCIBLY
TAKEN MAY BE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE
RULING: NO. The documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself as
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is that there is a “lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law”. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
OPLE VS. TORRES
293 SCRA 141 (1998)
Facts: Senator Blas Ople prayed to invalidate Administrative Order
No. 308 also known as “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System”, which aims to establish a
computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations.
on the following grounds:
a. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate;
b. It is impermissibly intrudes the people’s protected zone of
privacy
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general
circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-
Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
ISSUE: Whether or not AO 308 violates the right to privacy?
RULING: Yes, AO 308 is a violation to the right to privacy. The
essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” The right of privacy
is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of the Constitution.
It is expressly recognized in several provisions of the Bill of Rights,
Civil Code and even the Revised Penal Code.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O
No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
1. The need to provide citizens and foreigners with the facility
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities;
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2. The need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services
Furthermore, Section 4 of A.O No. 308 provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to
establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of
biometrics technology and computer application designs. It is
noteworthy that A.O No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be
used to identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the
banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O No. 308, the
fear that it threatens the right to privacy is not groundless.
Additionally, it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone or for identification puRposes. The
indefiniteness of A.O 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through the PRN.
SC granted the petition and declared A.O 308 null and void for being
unconstitutional
IN RE: ALEJANO
468 SCRA 188 (2005)
FACTS:
On 27 July 2003, 321 armed soldiers-led by junior officers, entered
and took control of Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments. The
soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planed
explosive devices. The junior officers renounced their support for the
administration and calledfor the resignation of PGMA and several
cabinet members.
At around 7pm on the same day, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered
after several negotiations and defused the explosive devices.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an information for
coup d’état in RTC Makati Br. 61 against the soldiers involved in the
incident. RTC issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of
junior officers Lt. SG Trillanes IV and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the
Commanding officers of ISAFP.
Petitioners filed with the SC a petition for habeas corpus, and on 12
August 2003
the court issued a writ of Habeas corpus directing respondents to
make a return ofbthe writ and to appear and produce the persons of
the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for
hearing and further proceedings.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention
Center violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when
the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes
and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). Petitioners further
claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against
cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the
detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the
ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron
grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and
ventilation in the detainees cells.
ISSUE: W/N ISAFP violated the detainees right to privacy of
communication by opening and reading the personal letters of
Trillanes and Capt. Maestrecampo
RULING: Petitioners point out that the letters were not in a sealed
envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the
ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution
prohibits the infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless
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authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the (i) It allows access to personal confidential
ISAFP officials opened the letters. data without the owners consent.
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and (ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate
reading of the detainees letters in the present case violated the safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a provisions.
sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid (iii) There are no compelling reasons that
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.
for the inspection of contraband.
4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public
not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The hearing;
petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and 5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal
Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier
protection of laws and results in the discriminatory
and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing.
treatment of and penalizes those without ID.
In the present case, since the letters were not confidential ISSUES:
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials · Petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right
of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
to privacy.
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. HELD: The petition is without merit.

On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU) vs THE DIRECTOR- · All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other
GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
AUTHORITY performance of their governmental functions. There have
487 SCRA 623 (2006) been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these
FACTS: government entities violate their right to privacy. There have
· This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities
prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in the collection and recording of personal identification data.
seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) · In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the
on the ground that it is unconstitutional. ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate
· EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such
13 April 2005, REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT claim, they even have less basis to complain against the
AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only
AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND system under EO 420 will even require less data collected,
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to
SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES EO 420.
· Under EO 420, the President directs all government · Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government
identification (ID) systems. entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data
· Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government
unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific
functions by the executive branch of the government. data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.
Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens
· Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to
right to privacy.
government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection,
· Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void
recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to
based on the following grounds:
protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420,
the following safeguards are instituted:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the
decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No.
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be
127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as
used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a
the Social Security Act of 1997.
person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3
2.The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she
of this executive order;
has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other
the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
data in violation of a persons right to privacy be
purpose.
allowed or tolerated under this order;
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to
privacy
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c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the
identification system shall be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be
kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal
or written authorization of the Owner shall be
required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected
by advanced security features and cryptographic
technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification
card shall be required for any correction or revision of
relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card
shall prescribe.
· On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity
because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of
government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to
protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the
prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards.
· The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of
reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one
hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems. Other
countries which do not have national ID systems have sectoral
cards for health, social or other public services. Even with EO
420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not
have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral
cards for social security, health services, and other specific
purposes.
· Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their
right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a
mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly
draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while
prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not
authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy
because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly
drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the
ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is
decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is
only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court.
· EO 420 applies only to government entities that already
maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such
government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance
in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized
Identification Reference System a national ID system that did
not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a
national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a
new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.
· In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less
costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
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the Presidents constitutional power of control over government
entities in the Executive department, as well as under the
Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
· WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive
Order No. 420 is declared VALID.
IN RE: SABIO
504 SCRA 214 (2006)
FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced
Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.”
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the
invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened
Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has
gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v.
Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the
Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate”.
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote
transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed
with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation.
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