Monge v.

People
G.R. No. 170308
March 7, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in
possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the DENR. Petitioner
has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate himself from liability, he claims that it
was Potencio, the owner of the lumber, who requested his assistance in hauling the log down
from the mountain and in transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is
unavailing. During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. Trial ensued. Potencio was
discharged to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor. Accordingly, he testified
on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested
by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the
mountain. Potencios testimony was materially corroborated by Molina. Petitioner did not contest
the allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that
it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site to the sawmill where the same was
to be sawn into pieces.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he challenged the
discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of
the offense and that there was no absolute necessity for his testimony.
Issue:
Should Potencios’ testimony as a state witness be dismissed based on the allegation of the
petitioner that he was the least guilty of the offense?
Ruling:
No. Petitioners challenge against Potencios discharge as a state witness must also
fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn
state witness is left to the exercise of the trial courts sound discretion limited only by
the requirements set forth in Section 17,[24] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the
accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively
an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court,
it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with
respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in
case of grave abuse of discretion.[25] No such grave abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to
say that issues relative to the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they
cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.[26]
Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused
from the information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an
acquittal.[27]Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future development showing
that any or all of the conditions provided in Section 17, Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled
will not affect the legal consequence of an acquittal.
ANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 209195 and 209215, 17 September 2014

Facts: Manuel A. Montero confessed his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda naming
Manuel J. Jimenez and several others as co-conspirators. His statements detailed where the alleged
steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a cadaver near the
place which he pointed. Montero filed a motion for discharge as a state witness for the prosecution, to
which Jimenez opposed. The motion to discharge was granted by Judge Zaldy B. Docena stating that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the
requisites of granting the said motion. Jimenez opposed Judge Docena’s ruling averring that the Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge because: (1)the requirements
for granting a motion were not properly complied; (2)there is no absolute necessity of the testimony of
Montero; (3)Montero’s testimony do not corroborate with the prosecution’s evidence; (4) and Montero
is favored as a state witness though he appears to be the most guilty.

ISSUE: Did Judge Docena gravely abuse his discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero
as a state witness?

RULING: No. Jurisprudence has defined “grave abuse of discretion” as the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner.To resolve a
motion to discharge under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, itonly
require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in
its material points, not on all points.A trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial,
to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may develop in the course of the trial with
respect to the guilty participation of the accused. It is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state witness
satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the
very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the
prosecutor’s findings and evaluation. “Most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty
imposed. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized. Thus, as a rule, what are
controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. The Court draws
attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be found to be the least guilty; he or
she should not only “appear to be the most guilty.”
YU VS. RTC JUDGE

G.R. NO. 142848, JUNE 30, 2006

FACTS:

Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver
Eduardo Constantinowere abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, where they were both
shot to death. The Department of Justice issued a Resolution in the preliminary investigation of the case,
finding probable cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas, Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol,
Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los Santos and Ochoa for
the kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, Eduardo Constantino. Petitioner
and his wife, were also named respondents. The charges against them however were dropped for lack
of evidence to establish probable cause. Thereafter, an information was filed against several accused,
namely private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos among others.. After the
information was filed and while under custody of the PACC Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate
sworn statements implicating petitioner in the abduction and killing of Atty. Tan and Constantino. The
PACC re-filed the complaint for murder and kidnapping against petitioner. During the preliminary
investigation, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements of
private respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but also failed to establish probable cause
against him. The DOJ investigating panel denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Thereafter, three (3)
separate informations were filed against petitioner. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with the aforesaid
court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny issuance of warrant of arrest and to
quash information.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in discharging the accused despite the failure of the
prosecution to present evidence to show that the private respondents are entitled to be discharged as
State Witness.

RULING:
As found by the DOJ, based on the extrajudicial statements executed by the private respondents
regarding their participation in the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, it appears
that they were included in an alleged military operation and unaware that the persons they abducted
were innocent civilians because they were misled by their military superiors into believing that these
individuals were unnamed communist rebels. From their account, private respondents claim to have
been oblivious that the persons subject of their surveillance were to be abducted and subsequently
killed.

The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness
because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment
of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion, which we find not present in the case at bar.
SOBERANO VS PEOPLE
GR No. 154629
October 5, 2005

FACTS:
Dacer, together with his driver, Corbito, was abducted. Their burned remains
were later found. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the (DOJ) through a
panel of prosecutors. AnInformation was filed by the panel of prosecutors including
herein petitioners. Thereafter, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information which was granted and the Amended Information was admitted by the trial
court which added that the victims were abducted at the corner of Osmena Highway
(formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought
them to Indang, Cavite. Then, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato
Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information which was
denied
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information dated 17 September
2001 was filed by the prosecution. TheAmended Information (1) discharged accused
Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the
State; (2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and (3)
charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II
and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via. Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato
and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information in an Opposition dated 28 September 2001. They prayed that the Motion to
Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused Dumlao, Diloy and the
brothers Lopez be denied.
In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit
Amended Information. The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated 24 October 2001.On 16 November 2001, the prosecution
moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from hearing the case. Acting on this
motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the case be re-raffled.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto
A.S. Laguio. On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme
Court praying that the Orders of then Judge Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October2001
be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio of Branch 18 be
restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance with said
orders. On 04 April 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision which
ordered the admission of the Amended Information dated September 17, 2001
substituting SPO3 ALLANCADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO VILLANUEVA
as accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO,P/Senior Supt.
CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIA as additional accused, and
discharging or excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM L. LOPEZ and
ALEX B. DILOY and to CONTINUE with the proceedings therefrom with utmost
deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the original information filed on May 11, 2001
stands insofar as P/SeniorSupt. GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is concerned. Accused
Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision. In a Resolution dated 12 August 2002, the motion was denied for lack of
merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying Sec. 14 of Rule 110 in allowing the discharge of accused
Diloy and the Lopez brothers.

RATIO: No.
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires
complete jurisdiction over it, We are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of
the Supreme Court that the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is
essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. Applying the import of Section 14, Rule
110, it appears that the Amended Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner
finds sufficient support therein, considering, firstly, that there has been no arraignment
yet . Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA granted the
motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in effect a prior leave
of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct the same,
substantially complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who
should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial
one. The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. By virtue of the trial
court having granted the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed
to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having
brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with
discretion -- wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof.
 People v. Dominguez

GR no. 229420, Feb. 19, 2018

Facts:

On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted by a group of men. Evangelista's
charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.

Mendiola and Ferdinand Parulan (Parulan) voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) and executed extrajudicial confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez
(Dominguez Brothers) as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing before the Quezon City
RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the respondents for Carnapping with Homicide under the
AntiCarnapping Act. The RTC stated that there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a
regular witness during trial proper to secure his acquittal.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken off the records.

Ruling:

The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be
inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness. However, the
motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus,
whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically deemed part of the records of the
Criminal Case and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule. Mendiola's testimony was not
incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be.
PP v. Antonio Pailano

G.R. No. L-43602, January 31, 1989

Facts:

The complainant, Anita Ibañez, fifteen years old, alleged that she was raped by the accused. She
alleged that she was dragged by the accused to a bushy place on the seashore and that she was not able
to resist because she was threatened with a scythe. She could not cry out because she was afraid.
However, according to the accused Antonio Pailano, 69 years old, the sexual intercourse between them
was voluntary.

Issue:

Can the accused be convicted for the offense not alleged in the Information?

Ruling:

No. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1) By using force or
intimidation; 2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3)When
the woman is under twelve years of age. The criminal complaint in this case alleged the
commission of the crime through the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at
the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he violated
Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible
under the criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as having been committed by
"Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, who did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita
Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her will." No mention was made of the second circumstance.

Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she was
unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and intimidation, which was the
method alleged in the Information would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. This right is safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can
prepare an adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. Hence, the accused is acquitted for the crime of rape.
People vs. Licayan
G.R. No. 203961
July 29, 2015

Facts:

In an On-August 15, 2001 Decision, the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the RTC Decision
convicting Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom of Joseph
Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay, and sentencing them to the penalty of death. A Writ of
Execution was issued ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on January 30, 2004 at 3:00
p.m. Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, two of their co-accused in the
original Information were arrested. Pedro Mabansag, a double arm amputee and suspected
mastermind of the kidnapping, and Rogelio Delos Reyes. The Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case which the SC granted on
the condition that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned, the evidence already
taken shall stand, although additional evidence may be introduced to be taken and considered.
The prosecution evidence showed that the victim Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called
Goodies Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular
routine was for him and Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to
make the rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-over food and cash
sales.

On August 9, 1998, while Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over
food into the back of his Tamaraw FX service vehicle, three men approached him from behind.
The men were armed with two caliber 45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any
mask. Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. They refused.
One of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out. Co and
Manaysay were amde to board the Tamaraw and their hands were tied and their eyes taped,
and that they were made to wear caps over their heads. They were brought inside a room of a
house and the masking tape was removed from their eyes. Accused Lara was left to guard them
inside the room. On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan who was guarding them at
that time fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed
by the look-out outside their room. Complainants took refuge in a house from which Co was
able to call the Marikina Police Headquarters. Lara and Licayan were thereafter identified by Co
and Manaysay in a line-up. Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, also
testified that he was twice called in his office by unidentified persons who demanded P10 million
for the release of complainants.In 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail.
The trial against Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. In 2009, the RTC of Marikina City
rendered its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced them each to reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos
Reyes in toto. In the appeal now before the Supreme Court, accused Delos Reyes reiterates his
defense that the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while
accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence presented during their retrial.

Issue:
Whether or not Licayan and Lara should be acquitted based on purportedly newly
discovered evidence

Held:
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule
121, Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court, which provides:”when a new trial is granted on the
ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-
discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in .the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record”.

The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new
trial was supposed to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and Delos
Reyes, who both denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of
Mabansag and Delos Reyes, however, would have been given more weight had they personally
admitted their own involvement in the crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the
defense, Mabansag stated in his interview with Gus Abelgas that he (Mabansag) does not know
anything about the kidnapping.74 We cannot give weight to his denial that Licayan and Lara
participated in the crime if he, himself, claims that he does not know anything about the
kidnapping. On the other hand, Delos Reyes swears that he was merely forced at gunpoint to
guard the victims, and was at the scene of the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of August
10, 1998.75 Delos Reyes claims that Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just
happened to pass by.76 Co and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the crime in
the early morning of August 10, 1998,77making the testimony as regards his absence from 3:00
p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand, denies having been in the
safehouse on August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home in San Mateo,
Rizal.78 The testimony of Delos Reyes that Licayan passed by the safehouse sometime from
3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was therefore even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.
Cabarles vs. Hon. Judge Maceda and People
G.R. No. 161330 | Feb 20, 2007

FACTS
In an original action filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Rene Cabarles
seeks to annul the Order issued by respondent Judge Maceda which cancelled the scheduled
promulgation of judgment and reopened the case for reception of evidence from two prosecution
witnesses who were not presented during trial.

ISSUES
1) Did Judge Maceda act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing motu proprio the April 1, 2003
Order reopening the case, before judgment was rendered, to receive the testimonies of two
prosecution witnesses after both parties had rested their case?
2) Did the said order violate Cabarles’s right to due process and speedy disposition of his case?

HELD
1) YES.

The April 1, 2003 Order was issued under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 24, Rule 119
and existing jurisprudence stress the following requirements for reopening a case: (1) the reopening must
be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative
or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated
within thirty days from the issuance of the order.

A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had formally offered
and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after promulgation but before
finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline governing a motion to reopen is the paramount
interest of justice. This remedy of reopening a case was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

However, while Judge Maceda is allowed to reopen the case before judgment is rendered, Section 24
requires that a hearing must first be conducted. Judge Maceda issued the April 1, 2003 Order without
notice and hearing and without giving the prosecution and accused an opportunity to manifest their
position on the matter. This failure, to our mind, constitutes grave abuse of discretion and goes against
the due process clause of the Constitution which requires notice and opportunity to be heard. The
issuance of the said order, without the benefit of a hearing, is contrary to the express language of Section
24, Rule 119.

Although the defense counsel had cross-examined Pedrosa and had participated in the proceedings after
the case was reopened by Judge Maceda, the same does not amount to a waiver of Cabarles’s objection
to the April 1, 2003 Order. To be effective, a waiver must be certain and unequivocal.

2) YES.

Although the matter of reopening a case for reception of further evidence is largely a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court judge, this judicial action must not, however, be done whimsically,
capriciously and/or unreasonably. In this particular case, the prosecution was given ample opportunity to
present all its witnesses but it failed to do so. The failure of the prosecution to take full advantage of the
opportunities given does not change the fact that it was accorded such opportunities.

Since Judge Maceda issued the questioned order without complying with the third requirement of Section
24, that there be a hearing conducted before the order to reopen is issued, then the assailed order must
be annulled and set aside for having been issued contrary to law and consequently with grave abuse of
discretion.
Rivac v. People

G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018

Facts:

Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Fariñas where she received
several pieces of jewelry which she would sell on consignment basis. Fariñas and Rivac agreed that after
7 days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return the unsold jewelry
to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the aforesaid period, Rivac
failed to perform her obligation, causing Fariñas to send her a demand letter.

The RTC found Rivac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa. After the
promulgation of the aforesaid Judgment and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac moved to reopen
proceedings on the ground that she intends to present the testimonies of Fariñas and a certain Atty.
Blando to prove the true nature of her transaction with Fariñas. The RTC partly granted the motion
insofar as Fariñas's testimony was concerned.

Issue:

Was it improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings?

Ruling:

No. The RTC correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's subsequent
testimony in order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and potentially,
determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable. Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in
verbatim: "At any time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or
upon motion, with hearing in either case, reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The
proceedings shall be terminated within thirty (30) days from the order granting it.
Dinglasan v CA

GR No. 145420. September 19, 2006

Facts:

On December 30, 2002, Rafael C. Dinglasan, Jr. filed a Petition for New Trial and, in the
alternative, for the Reopening of the Case on the ground of newly discovered evidence. He was
found guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks
Law, and wherein he was convicted of the said crime. Dinglasan claimed the evidence which is
the affidavits, together with the transmittal letter attached to Solidbank Manager's check sent by
Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan made good of the check within
five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of
violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one of the essential elements of the offense, that is, the
drawer failed and refused to make good the said check within five banking days from the notice
of dishonor, is absent.
Respondent, in contrast contends that the petition should be dismissed because it is
procedurally and substantially defective, as the conviction of the accused has become final.
Issue:

Whether or not the Petition for New Trial and Reopening of the Case.

Ruling:

The judgment of the trial court has become final and executory, hence the filing of the
petition was made way beyond the prescriptive period for doing so. Such judgment was also
recorded in the Entry of Judgment. The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be
made to depend on the convenience of the party. In order for the Court to grant the reopening of a case, it
must have satisfied the standard stated under the “Berry Rule” to wit: a) that the evidence has come to his
knowledge since the trial; b) That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner; c) that it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted; d)
that it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial;
e) that the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for; and f) a new
trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a
witness. Verily, the claim of Dinglasan’s claim of newly discovered evidence is a falsity because such
was already offered as evidence in a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.