12. G.R. No.
158467 October 16, 2009 territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b) for
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA,
RTC Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, Respondents.
Facts:
Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-
Organized Crime Division filed two (2) applications for search
warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking permission to search:
(1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta.
Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St.,
Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI
Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was
founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness
Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of
surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners’
house. A search warrant was then issued. Consequently, they
were able to seize various amounts of dried flowering tops and
cash in the amount of ₱15,200.00.
An Information for Violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was filed against
petitioners who in turn, filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant
and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized on the following
grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed outside
the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where
the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued the
questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue
a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the
questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence
illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
likewise denied by respondent court. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1)Whether or not the court had jurisdiction to issue the search
warrant
2)Whether or not the application for the search warrant was
defective considering that it was not personally endorsed by the
NBI Head but only by the Deputy Director.
3)Whether AM No. 99-10-09 SC enacted on January 25,2000
was repealed when the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
took effect on December 1, 2000 and that the latter should
govern the case
Ruling:
1) Yes. The search warrant issued by Judge Mario Guariña III,
the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in
order considering that AM 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes
executive judges and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may
be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases
where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI. It
authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications
for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on
application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.
This is an exception to the provisions of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that the application
for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose
compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
2) No. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of
the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their
ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant
to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other
subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be
specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not
inconsistent with law. Director Wycoco’s act of delegating his
task of endorsing the application for search warrant to Deputy
Director Nasol is allowed by the law unless it is shown to be
inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasol’s
endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement
issued by Director Wycoco himself.
3) No. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the
enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M.
No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled
Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties,
which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila
and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.
In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners’ Motion
to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally
Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guariña III had complied with
the procedural and substantive requirements for issuing the
questioned search warrant.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both
issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED
13. RE: REQUEST OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO I. RAZON FOR AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE THE
ENDORSEMENT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT.
A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC July 7, 2009
Facts:
Two letters were sent to the Supreme Court by then Police
Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr., Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP); and from Police Director General Jesus
A. Verzosa, the succeeding Chief of the PNP. Both letters were
addressed to then Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, and
involved the procedural requirement that applications for search
warrant filed before Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) of Manila and
Quezon City should be personally endorsed by heads of the
PNP, NBI, and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF) of the AFP.
On the first letter, P/Dir. Gen. Razon manifested his
apprehension. He stated that the concerned Executive Regional
Trial Court Judges have required that the applications for search
warrants in accordance with the [Section 12, Chapter V of the
Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive
Judges (A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC)] need to be endorsed personally
by the P/Dir. Gen., otherwise the application would not be acted
upon. He alleged that due to the numerous demands of his
office, may not be able to act expeditiously on the required
endorsements of application for search warrant. Any
unnecessary delay in the application would be prejudicial to the
PNP to render its duty the public. Thus, he recommended to be
allowed to delegate the endorsement of the application for
search warrants to the Director of the Directorate for
Investigation and Detective Management.
In a Resolution dated 15 April 2008, the Court granted the
request of P/Dir. Gen. Razon. Thereafter, on 25 November
2008, (second letter) the PNP, this time under the headship
P/Dir. Gen. Verzosa, asked the Court for "clarification regarding
the construction on the duration or effectivity" of the 15 April
2008 Resolution of the Court. The necessity for clarification
resulted from an incident that occurred on 11 November 2008,
wherein the application for search warrant filed by the Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF), was denied.
The denial for the application was due the ground that the
authority to delegate was "already inoperative for it only applies
to the incumbency of P/Dir. Gen. Razon being the requesting
party."
Issue:
Whether or not the authority granted to the former P/Dir. Gen. to
delegate the endorsement of the applications for the search
warrants must also be applicable to the subsequent P/Dir. Gen.
Ruling:
YES. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and the Office
of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) agree that it may be best for the
Court to amend the guidelines since Section 12, Chapter V of
the Guidelines for Executive Judges appear to be the hindrance
to immediate action on applications for search warrant in the
cases mentioned therein. Thus, they recommend that the
current Chief of the PNP, as well as all his successors thereafter,
should be allowed to delegate to the Director of the DIDM, PNP,
the authority to endorse applications for search warrant, which
are to be filed before the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.
The Supreme Court shares the same view. It is evident that for
the PNP to function more effectively and efficiently in its
campaign against criminality, the safeguard in Sec. 12, Chapter
V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, i.e., requiring the PNP Chief’s
personal endorsement of an application for search warrant, calls
for a review. The amendments of Sec. 12, Chap. V of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC, will not only enable the Chief of the PNP, but the
heads of the NBI and ACTAF of the AFP, as well, to delegate to
their duly authorized representatives the duty to endorse
applications for search warrant to be filed before the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City.
The amended Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
14. FERDINAND V. TOMAS v. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG)
G.R. No. 208090 / November 09, 2016
Facts:
Private respondent filed four (4) complaints for violation of
Sections 155 and 168 in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No.
8293. The first two (2) complaints were against petitioner
Ferdinand V. Tomas, Federico Ladines, Jr. and Ryan T. Valdez.
The third and fourth ones were against Ferdinand V. Tomas.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG)-Anti-Organized Crime Division
(AOCD), on October 24, 2007, presented four (4) applications
for issuance of search warrants before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. The applications were signed by P/Chief
Inspector Helsin B. Walin and approved by Police Director
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief of the CIDG. Executive Judge
Reynaldo G. Ros, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch
33, issued four (4) search warrants, which the members of the
PNP CIDG-AOCD used in conducting a search on the premises
of FMT Merchandising.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the Search
Warrants and/or to Suppress Evidence Obtained thereby
assailing the applications for search warrant for being in violation
of SC Administrative Matter No. 03-8-02-SC. He claimed that the
application for search warrant, which may be filed by the
following agencies, namely, NBI, PNP and ACTAF, should be
personally endorsed by the heads of said agencies. According
to petitioner, the quashal of the warrants must be granted
because the four (4) applications for issuance of the search
warrants were merely endorsed and/or approved by P/Director
Edgardo M. Doromal, Head of the CIDG, when at the time, the
Chief of the PNP was Director General Avelino Razon.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner contends that by
virtue of Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled
"Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive
Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties",
every application for search warrant shall be personally
endorsed by the heads of such agencies. If an application for
the issuance of a search warrant is being made by the PNP, then
the Chief of the PNP must personally endorse it. This in an
exception to the rule provided under Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the issued search warrants must be quashed.
Ruling:
No. The fact that the application for search warrants were not
personally endorsed by the Chief of the Philippine National
Police but only by the Chief of the CIDG in violation of Section
12 of Administrative Matter No. 03-8-02-SC issued by the
Supreme Court, is of no moment. If indeed there was such
violation, such violation may jeopardize only the concerned
police officers to incur administrative liability but would certainly
not render nugatory the effect of the assailed search warrants.
It must be remembered that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant are:
1. probable cause is present;
2. such probable cause must be determined personally by
the judge;
3. the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce;
4. the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and
5. The warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
These requisites are taken from the provisions of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution.
Consequently, a motion to quash a search warrant may be
based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1)
the place searched or the property seized are not those
specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
Thus, a search warrant is valid as long as it has all the elements
set forth by the Constitution and may only be quashed if it lacks
one or some of the said elements, or on those two grounds
mentioned earlier. In this case, it was an error to quash the
search warrant simply because the application thereof was
without the personal endorsement of the Chief of the PNP.
15. Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC / September 5, 2017
Facts:
This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary
results of the spot audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City. On April 26, 2016, the OCA sent a team to
conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications raffled to
Branch 170, due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged
irregular issuance of search warants by Presiding Judge Zaldy
B. Docena (Judge Docena).
The OCA’s report yielded the following results:
• First, a total of 938 applications for search warrants
were filed before the RTC of Malabon City from January 2015
up to April 13, 2016.
• Second. the RTC of Malabon City exceeded the
number of search warrants issued by the RTC of Manila and the
RTC of Quezon City notwithstanding the fact that the latter
courts are allowed to issue search warrants which are
enforceable nationwide.
• Third, out of the 761 applications assigend to Branch
170, Judge Docena issued 113 search warrants which are
enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City.
The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2(a) of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court which provides that an application for a
search warrant shall be filed with "any court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed."
• Fourth, Judge Docena issued 418 search warrants
which are also enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC of Malabon City, but this time the applicants specifically
invoked Section 2(b) of Rule 126 which allows, for compelling
reasons, the filing of the application with any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed or where the
warrant shall be enforced.
The OCA, however, pointed out that said search warrant
applications merely cited the bare allegations of possible
leakage of information and/or that the person subject of the
application is influential in the area, or has friends working in the
local government offices and the courts.
Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued a
Resolution dated May 31, 2016 placing Judge Docena under
immediate preventive suspension for a period of six months.
In his Comment dated October 28, 2016, Judge Docena submits
that he granted the search warrant applications before him "in
the good faith belief that there was probable cause for their
issuance and in compliance with law and procedure." As for his
issuance of search warrants involving crimes committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon City, Judge
Docena denies having violated Section 2(a) of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02.
He argues that given that the issuance of search warrants is
inherent in all courts, venue in search warrant applications is
merely procedural and not jurisdictional.
In addition, Judge Docena maintains that he granted the search
warrant applications in the good faith belief that there is merit to
the compelling reasons provided by the applicants. He insists
that this determination should be respected unless it is shown
that he is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not judge Docena violated Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court for issuing search warrants outside his court’s
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides for the
proper venue where applications for search warrant should be
filed:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be
filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
a) Any court within whose jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any
court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if
the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
It is settled that the inclusion of a statement of compelling
reasons in a search warrant application that is filed in a court
“which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
commission of the alleged crime” is a mandatory requirement,
and the absence of such statement renders the application
defective. The absence of a statement of compelling reasons,
however, is not a ground for the outright denial of a search
warrant application, since it is not one of the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant. Section 4 of Rule 126 is clear on
this point.
In other words, the statement of compelling reasons is only a
mandatory requirement as far as the proper venue for the filing
of search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed
as an additional requisite for the issuance of a search warrant.
It is also important to stress that an application for a search
warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in itself
a criminal action. The rule, therefore, that venue is jurisdictional
in criminal cases does not apply thereto. Simply stated, venue
is only procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Note, too, that the determination of the existence of compelling
reasons under Section 2(b) of Rule 126 is a matter squarely
addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such
application is filed, subject to review by an appellate court in
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.
Given these circumstances, The Supreme Court cannot agree
with the OCA's findings that Judge Docena violated Section 2 of
Rule 126 by simply issuing search warrants involving crimes
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Malabon City. It is obvious that Judge Docena simply exercised
the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction over a special criminal
process when they took cognizance of the applications and
issued said search warrants.
16.CHU vs JUDGE TAMIN
Procedure to determine probable cause to search
FACTS:
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
CENRO dela Cruz of the DENR, applied for a search warrant
with respondent judge. CENRO dela Cruz claimed that
complainant was in possession of “forest products of dubious
origin”. On the same day, respondent judge issued Search
Warrant No. 364 ordering the seizure of several pieces of
mangrove lumber from complainant’s fishpond. On 22
September 1999, complainant obtained from Branch 23 a copy
of the complete records of the issuance of Search Warrant No.
364, as certified by the Clerk of Court. On 24 September 1999,
complainant again obtained, for the second time, a copy of the
complete records of the case, also certified by Clerk of Court.
These certified copies did not contain any transcript of
respondent judge’s examination of CENRO dela Cruz or his
witnesses as required under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, complainant filed this
administrative complaint.
The complainant pointed out that this was the 5th time that the
respondent judge issued under questionable procedure, search
warrants against him for violation of PD 705. In addition, the
complainant alleged that the records of the 4 previous warrants
did not also contain any transcript of the required examination of
the witnesses. In response to the directive of OCA to comment
on the complaint, the respondent judge denied the
complainant’s allegations and he contended that he personaly
examined a certain Reynaldo Cuaresma, a witness, before
issuing the warrant in question. He further claimed that a
transcript of the examination was included in the records. The
OCA found judge liable for gross ignorance of the law abd
recommended the imposition of fine.
ISSUE:
WON a probable cause for the issuance of search and seizure
warrant against the complaint was present?
RULING:
No. Section 5, Rule 1266 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court, in Pendon v. Court of Appeals,7 reiterated the
requirements of Section 2 on the issuance of search warrants,
which judges must strictly observe,8 as follows:
Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is
justified only upon a finding of probable cause. x x x In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
(1) the judge x x x must examine the x x x witnesses personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions
and answers.
Respondent judge had stated that the certified copies of the
records obtained by complainant did not include the transcript of
his examination because the clerical staff in his office who
prepared the certified copies inadvertently failed to do so.
However, Respondent judge’s own Clerk of Court certified twice
that the 29-page copy of the records obtained by complainant
constitutes the entire record of the matter. This renders
improbable respondent judge’s claim that the transcript already
formed part of the records but the legal researcher in his office
inadvertently missed it in preparing the copy obtained by
complainant on 22 September 1999. The alleged legal
researcher, who presumably also prepared the second certified
copy, could not have committed the same mistake, twice in a
row, within two days of each other.
If, as respondent judge claims, he personally examined a certain
Cuaresma as the witness of CENRO dela Cruz, he should have
secured the affidavit of Cuaresma. Respondent judge should
also have secured the affidavit of the unnamed "legal
researcher" who allegedly prepared the copies of the records
obtained by complainant. Respondent judge failed to secure
their affidavits to corroborate his claims.
The Court uphold the OCA’s findings that respondent judge, who
had earlier professed ignorance of the rule in question, failed
either to examine any witness before issuing Search Warrant
No. 364 or to reduce the examination in writing.
17.SONY MUSIC vs JUDGE ESPANYOL
FACTS:
In a criminal complaint filed with the DOJ, the Videogram
Regulatory Board (VRB)3 charged herein private respondents
James Uy, David Chung, Elena Lim and another officer of
respondent Solid Laguna Corporation (SLC) with violation of PD
No. 1987. As alleged in the complaint, the 4 were engaged in
the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms
without license and authority from VRB. On account of this and
petitioners' own complaints for copyright infringement, the NBI,
through Agent Ferdinand M. Lavin, applied on September 18,
2000, with the Regional Trial Court at Dasmariñas, Cavite,
Branch 80, presided by the respondent judge, for the issuance
of search warrants against private respondents.
In applying for the search warrant, Agent Lavin stated before the
judge that an unnamed person provided them information as to
the presence of pirated CDs Solid Laguna, that Lavin and the
other witnesses were accompanied by unnamed persons to
enter the premise for investigation. The judge then issued two
warrants: one for violation of PD 1987 and for probable violation
of RA 8293. The search warrants were enforced and items were
seized from the premises thereafter.
Solid Laguna, then, presented a certification that they are
actually authorized to manufacture and sell CDs by the VRB at
the same time it asked the court to quash the search warrants
and return the items seized. Judge Espanyol then quashed the
search warrant issued for probable violation of PD 1987.
Judge Espanol later quashed the other warrant because the fact
that the items seized as a result of the two warrants were
commingled hence they cannot be examined properly. Judge
Espanyol also ruled that the issuance of warrant stemmed from
the imitation made by petitioners that Solid Laguna was not
authorized to manufacture and sell Cds but in fact they were
authorized by the VRB. This being, the warrants are of no force
and effect because of lack of probable cause.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrants are valid?
RULING:
No. In Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz -
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. 'A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause . . . to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
Complementing the aforequoted provisions is Section 5 of the
same Rule... (insert SEC. 5. Examination of the complainant;
record)
A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the
existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place to be searched" And when the law speaks of facts, the
reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the
applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element
of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the
facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause
and is a nullity
The issuance of the search warrant in question did not meet the
requirements of probable cause. The respondent judge did not
accordingly err in quashing the same, let alone gravely abuse
her discretion.
Agent Lavin and his witnesses, judging from their answers in the
deposition, had no personal knowledge that the discs they saw,
purchased or received were, in fact, pirated or infringing on
petitioners' copyrights. It is not enough that the applicant and his
witnesses testify that they saw stacks of several allegedly
infringing, pirated and unauthorized discs in the subject facility.
The more decisive consideration determinative of whether or not
a probable cause obtains to justify the issuance of a search
warrant is that they had personal knowledge that the discs were
actually infringing, pirated or unauthorized copies
18.MANLY SPORTSWEAR VS DADODETTE ENTERPRISES
FACTS:
On March 14, 2003, Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for a search
warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
based on the information that Dadodette Enterprises and/or
Hermes Sports Center were in possession of goods, the
copyright of which belonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc.
(MANLY).
After finding reasonable grounds that a violation of Sections 172
and 217 of Republic Act (RA) No. 82936 has been committed,
Judge Estrella T. Estrada of RTC-Quezon City, Branch 83,
issued on March 17, 2003 Search Warrant No. 4044(03).
Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search
warrant contending that the same is invalid since the requisites
for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that
the sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the
name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not among
the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.
On June 10, 2003, the trial court granted the motion to quash
and declared Search Warrant No. 4044(03) null and void based
on its finding that the copyrighted products of MANLY do not
appear to be original creations and were being manufactured
and distributed by different companies locally and abroad under
various brands, and therefore unqualified for protection under
Section 172 of RA 8293. Moreover, MANLY’s certificates of
registrations were issued only in 2002, whereas there were
certificates of registrations for the same sports articles which
were issued earlier than MANLY’s, thus further negating the
claim that its copyrighted products were original creations.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
quashal of warrants.
RULING:
NO. Based on the ruling in Solid Triangle Sales Corp vs Sheriif
of RTC, inherent in the courts’ power to issue search warrants
is the power to quash warrants already issued. In this
connection, this Court has ruled that the motion to quash should
be filed in the court that issued the warrant, unless a criminal
case has already been instituted in another court. In which case,
the motion should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since
been incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. When the court, in determining probable cause for
issuing or quashing a search warrant, finds that no offense has
been committed, it does not interfere with or encroach upon the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation.
The Court also reiterated that The RTC had jurisdiction to delve
into and resolve the issue whether the petitioner’s utility models
are copyrightable and, if so, whether he is the owner of a
copyright over the said models. It bears stressing that upon the
filing of the application for search warrant, the RTC was duty-
bound to determine whether probable cause existed, in
accordance with Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
G.R. No. 152950 August 3, 2006
19.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER CHOI, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:
A search warrant dated 27th April, 1999 was issued by Judge
Lourdes Gatbalite after she examined the witnesses presented
by the applicant against respondent Christopher Choi for
violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3 (a) and (c), in
relation to Section 169 of RA 8293, also known as the
Intellectual Property Code. The search was conducted on the
same date. Respondent filed a motion to quash search warrant
and supplemental motion to quash. However, both motions were
denied by herein judge as well as the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the case to the CA wherein the
latter court favored the respondent. According to CA, in
determining whether there was probable cause to believe that
the cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of
RA 8293, Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and probing
questions of witness David Lee Sealey. In addition, the CA ruled
that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion when
she merely relied on the conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes
he received from Nieto were fake. She should have at least
required Sealey to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes
and the genuine ones for comparison, instead of relying on his
testimony alone.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA can overturn the findings of probable
cause by a Judge.
2. Whether or not Judge Gatbalite failed to establish probable
cause in issuing the search warrant.
Ruling:
1.. YES! THE REVIEWING COURT CAN OVERTURN SUCH
FINDINGS ONLY UPON PROOF THAT THE JUDGE
DISREGARDED THE FACTS BEFORE HIM OR IGNORED
THE CLEAR DICTATES OF REASON.
2.. NO! THE TESTIMONIES AND OTHER EVIDENCE ON
RECORD CONSTITUTED ADEQUATE BASES TO
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSE HAD BEEN COMMITTED.
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge
also heard the testimony of applicant Nieto. The foregoing
testimonies and applying the established standards in
determining probable cause, the Court cannot say that Judge
Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
search warrant. Her questions were sufficiently probing, not at
all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent
with each other and the narration of facts was credible. The
testimonies and other evidence on record constituted adequate
bases to establish probable cause that the alleged offense had
been committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and
findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who
had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses,
the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing
court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason. We thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalite’s
findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59587 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is
hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-17 as VALID.
20.G.R. No. 166061 July 6, 2007
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner here was arrested while he was inside the
Condominium unit (Unit 615) subject of the search warrant
issued by RTC Manila; enforced by Police Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG). PARAC upon searching found
on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of transparent
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances later
confirmed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic
chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an
improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets.
Petitioner was charged for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425 and was found guilty by the Trial Court.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA wherein the
latter court affirmed the trial court’s ruling with modification.
Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment before the
Supreme Court. Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of
the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that petitioner
was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives
proceeded anyway with the search and his resulting arrest.
According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that
where a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
described premises and not of a person, the omission of the
name of the owner or occupant of such property in the warrant
does not invalidate the same. Petitioner contends that this
doctrine applies only if the search warrant does not indicate with
all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to be
searched; on the contrary, the subject search warrant indicated
with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the omission of the name of the owner or
occupant of such property in the search warrant does not
invalidate the same.
2. Whether or not the warrantless arrest against petitioner is
valid.
RULING:
1.. NO! NOWHERE IN SAID RULE OR ANY OTHER
PROVISION IN THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS IT REQUIRED THAT THE SEARCH
WARRANT MUST NAME THE PERSON WHO OCCUPIES
THE DESCRIBED PREMISES.
Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is it required that the search warrant must
name the person who occupies the described premises. In Uy v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Court has definitively ruled that
where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
described premises only and not for the search of a person, the
failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the
affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and
where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be
searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a
fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be
searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the
officer making the search as to the place to be searched.
2.. YES! WHILE PETITIONER MAY NOT BE THE PERSON
SUBJECT OF THE SEARCH, THE FACT THAT HE WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO NECESSITATED HIS
VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST.
A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police
officers were ordered to make an immediate search of the
premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu.
Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons to be dealt
with as the law may direct." While petitioner may not be the
person subject of the search, the fact that he was caught in
flagrante delicto necessitated his valid warrantless arrest.
Therefore, the fact that petitioner’s name was not indicated in
the search warrant is immaterial.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY
QUELNAN y QUINO is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to
Three (3) Years of prision correccional in its medium period as
maximum.
21.G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant,
petitioner,
vs.
QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E.
GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA", respondents.
BRION, J.:
Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for
hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion
Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair
competition under the IP Code. The basis for the issuance was
for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. The local police
seized and brought to the MTC's custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036
eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for
Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces)
empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Naga a complaint against two Pepsi officers for
violation of Section 168.3 (c) in relation to Section 170 of the IP
Code. The named respondents, also the respondents in this
petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E. Galicia
(Galicia) and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr.
(Gomez).
In response, the respondents also filed motions for the return of
their shells and to quash the search warrant. They contended
that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the
search warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
and their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells. However,
MTC denied the twin motions as well as the motion for
reconsideration.
Unsatisfied with the decision of MTC, respondents filed an
appeal before the RTC wherein the latter court voided the
warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of
the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws
may have been violated by the respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search
Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles
from Pepsi's yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of
the IP Code.
RULING:
NO! THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY MTC WAS ON AN
INVALID SUBSTANTIVE BASIS - THE ACTS IMPUTED ON
THE RESPONDENTS DO NOT VIOLATE SECTION 168.3 (C)
OF THE IP CODE.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition
for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported
by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the
belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched. Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an
underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In other words,
the acts alleged, taken together, must constitute an offense and
that these acts are imputable to an offender in relation with
whom a search warrant is applied for.
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case
and one that the parties did not consider at all in the search
warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it
in its search warrant application since the "one specific offense"
that the law allows and which the petitioner used was Section
168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is
to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case
is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the
petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause
to support the disputed search warrant at once becomes
apparent.
We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC
decision, our agreement is more in the result than in the reasons
that supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying the search
warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis -
the acts imputed on the respondents do not violate Section
168.3 (c) of the IP Code.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Accordingly, we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-01,
issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is
NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner.
22. ROMER SY TAN vs. SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN
SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG,
SY YU SAN and BRYAN SY LIM
G.R. No. 174570. February 22, 2010
FACTS:
An Information for the crime of Robbery was filed against
respondents for the alleged taking of P6,500,000.00 cash, 286
postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy Cognac, a television
set, a computer set, and other documents from the Guan Yiak
Hardware.
Consequently, Police Inspector Edgar A. Reyes filed two
separate applications for the issuance of a search warrant
before RTC Manila.
In the said applications, P/Insp. Reyes alleged that he had
personal knowledge that respondent Felicidad Chan Sy had in
her possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, as well as 286
company checks taken from Guan Yiak Hardware. He prayed
that the court issue a search warrant authorizing him or any
other agent of the law to take possession of the subject property
and bring them before the court.
In support of the applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the
sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy Tan and witnesses
Maricho Sabelita and Anicita Almedilla. On April 22, 2003,
presiding Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas posed searching questions
to the applicant and his witnesses to determine if probable cause
existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
Thereafter, or on April 22, 2003, Judge Lanzanas issued Search
Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612, directing any peace officer
to make an immediate search of the 8th floor, 524 T. Pinpin,
Binondo, Manila for five boxes of Hennessy XO; and the 7th
floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for various checks payable
to the Guan Yiak Hardware, respectively; and, if found, to take
possession thereof and bring the same before the court.
The warrants were later served in the afternoon of April 22,
2003. Under Search Warrant No. 03-3611, three boxes
containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven
Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the enforcement of
Search Warrant No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.
On May 21, 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrants, which petitioner opposed.
On September 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the
motion.
On appeal, the CA granted the Motion to Quash Search Warrant
Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612.
The CA agreed with the respondents and concluded that there
was no probable cause for the issuance of the subject search
warrants; thus, respondents’ motion to quash should have been
granted by the RTC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON there was probable cause warranting the issuance by
RTC of the subject search warrants.
RULING:
YES. The RTC judge complied with all the procedural and
substantive requirements for the issuance of a search warrant.
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and to bring it before the court.18 The
issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, the relevant sections of which provide:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge
is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application
is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist,
he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests
upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge
himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly
describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.
Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for
the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to
believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.
In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., this Court stressed
that: “The determination of probable cause does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
prosecution need not present at this stage reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown
trial.”
Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing
the subject search warrants.
The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the
trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions. A finding of
probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search
warrant, needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed
by the accused. The determination of whether probable cause
exists as to justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left
to the sound discretion of a judge.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and
August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28,
2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-
3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED. SO ORDERED.
23. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L.
YU, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PLDT COMPANY
G.R. No. 161106. January 13, 2014
PLANET INTERNET CORP. vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY
G.R. No. 161266 (Consolidated Cases)
FACTS:
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional
Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the PNP filed
applications for warrants before the RTC of Quezon City, to
search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web
Corporation (WWC) located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza
Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as
the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation
(Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square
Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.
The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal
toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the
Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to
the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT).
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose
Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the
Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified
as witnesses.
Gali alleged that PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally
connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the
international calls and bypassed PLDT’s International Gateway
Facility, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as
amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone
connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through
their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and
with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted
contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925,
because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the
payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-
backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure,
thus stealing its business revenues from international long
distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of
Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of
customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type
approval license from the latter.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of
the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor
plans showing the location of particular computers and servers
that would be taken.
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for
search warrants. The warrants were implemented on the same
day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police
Office.
Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central
processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes
that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls,
such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken
computers, were also seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically
the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without
probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute
theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3)
the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects
seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the
warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants. Thus,
the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered
released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied on
the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City
Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section
5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC
Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and
effective.
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and
Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet to assail the CA Decision and
Resolution. The Court consolidated the two Petitions.33
ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal
despite the following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no
personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon
probable cause, considering that the acts complained of
allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed
search warrants were not general warrants.
RULING:
I.
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.
Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the
quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the
public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public
prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "all
criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information."
However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a
complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an
application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process,"
rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process,
the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent
to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of
a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of
a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of
parties to question orders quashing those warrants. Accordingly,
we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves
for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash
search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process
conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already
filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the
criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has
already been filed before the trial court is significant for the
purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial
of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending
criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to
be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the
guilt of the accused therein."
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in
anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing
the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the
grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be
done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this
case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted
as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal
actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently
quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the
trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final
orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken
therefrom.
II.
Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their
judicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing
courts when the finding has substantial basis.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires
"such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the
place to be searched."
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in
the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent
on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their
judicial function. They determine probable cause based on
"evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed" by the offender.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the
existence of probable cause necessitates the prior
determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed
in the first place. In support of their contention that there was no
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants,
petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it.
Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the
act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed
that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to
appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively
evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass
charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of
taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT
concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives
"legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the
compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly
routed through its network." As such, toll bypass operations
constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are
present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that
there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly
taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future earnings and
lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain,
anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT
cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and
opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements
must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of
PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the
consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with
categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties
of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, we have already held
that the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its
consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that
is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property
to be seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer
executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant
may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the
offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid
search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty
faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be
searched, especially when these items are technical in nature,
and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown
to them. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity.
Technical precision of description is not required. It is only
necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as
to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so
that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed,
the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the
rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain
a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to
look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that
will enable the officer making the search with reasonable
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the
particularity of the description of the place to be searched and
the things to be seized is required "wherever and whenever it is
feasible." A search warrant need not describe the items to be
seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when
it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to
be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the
description of the things to be seized when the things described
are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection
between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants
and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals
decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27
November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
Rule 126 Sec 4-5
24. Comerciante vs People
G.R. No. 205926 July 22 2015
FACTS: At around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003,
Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03
Bienvy Calag II were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area
while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay
Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers
per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about
10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a
certain Erick Dasilla - standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain
shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and
Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later
confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.
HELD:
No, the search was not valid and the accused was acquitted.
Under Section 2, Article III21 of the Constitution mandates that
a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search
and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within
the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article
III 22 of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which
instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. On the basis of
such testimony that P03 Calag cannot identify which hand of
Comerciante is holding the shabu, the Court finds it highly
implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect
vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy -
especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while
aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside
two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.
Rule 126 Sec 7
26. People v. Tira
G.R. No. 139615 May 28, 2004
FACTS:
SPO3 Manibog formed a team to conduct the surveillance at the
residence of Tira due to reported rampant drug activities. The
group observed that more than 20 persons had gone in and out
of the Tira residence. They confronted one of them and the
person revealed that Amadeo sold shabu, and that he was a
regular customer. The group reported this to P/Supt Victorio,
who instructed them to make an affidavit of surveillance
preliminary toan application for a search warrant. Judge Gayapa
subsequently issued a search warrant. A team then
implemented the search warrant. They proceeded to the Tira
residence, where they found Ernesto Tira, father of Amadeo at
the porch. They introduced themselves and told him that they
had a warrant authorizing them to search the premises. Ernesto
led them inside. The policemen found the newly awakened
Amadeo inside the first room of the house. With Brgy Kagawad
and Amadeo Tira, they proceeded to search the first room to the
right and found the items (shabu, paraphernalia, etc).The Tiras
contend that the search conducted by the policemen was made
in their absence, thus, in violation of Sec7, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. They argue that the articles are
inadmissible in evidence, being the fruits of a poisonous tree.
ISSUE:
Was the search in compliance to Sec 7 Rule 126? YES
HELD:
SEC. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in
presence of two witnesses. – No search of house, room, or any
other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence
of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.
Contrary to their claim, Amadeo Tira was present when the
policemen searched the inner room of the house. The articles
and substances were found under the bed on which Amadeo
slept. The policemen did not find the articles in any other room
in the house.
Also, Amadeo was not the only witness to the search; Kagawad
Conwi and Ernesto were also present. Ernesto even led the
policemen inside the house.
The Tiras also contend that the inner room searched by the
policemen was occupied by other people: Chris Tira and
Gemma Lim. This was rejected by the court. We are in full
accord with the trial court. It bears stressing that the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the house of the appellants,
and thus, had first hand knowledge of the layout of the house.
Rule 126 Sec 8
27. SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. BRIGHT
FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
G.R. No. 169156 February 17, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (SCEI) filed a
complaint against respondent Bright Future Technologies Inc.
(BFTI) for copyright and trademark infringement. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) issued search warrants and thereafter
conducted a raid on the premises of BFTI and seized several
items.
BFTI filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and/or to Exclude or
Suppress Evidence and Return Seized Articles. BFTI argued
that SCEI had no personality to represent the People of the
Philippines and to file the opposition to the motion because
SCEI’s agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the
issuance of the search warrants. However, the said motion was
denied.
BFTI filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC granted the
motion for reconsideration and held that the two-witness rule
was violated. BFTI subsequently filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Return Seized Articles which the RTC granted. BFTI
subsequently filed the required bond and the seized items were
turned over to its custody.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a valid search was conducted on the premises
of BFTI.
HELD:
The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the
right to participate in search warrant proceedings was
addressed in the affirmative in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip
which stated that a private individual or a private corporation
complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged with
the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may
appear, participate and file pleadings in the search warrant
proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search
warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the
properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed;
such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or
such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a
motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a
motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such
motion to quash.
When SCEI then opposed BFTI‘s Urgent Motion to Quash
and/or to Suppress or Exclude Evidence and Return Seized
Articles, the RTC correctly recognized the participation of SCEI
in the proceedings.
As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of
BFTI, it was, under the circumstances, reasonable, contrary to
the RTC‘s finding that it was unnecessary. For, as the RTC itself
found, after the members of the searching team introduced
themselves to the security guards of BFTI and showed them the
search warrants, the guards refused to receive the warrants and
to open the premises, they claiming that “they are not in control
of the case.”
The RTC‘s finding that the two-witness rule governing the
execution of search warrant was not complied with, which rule
is mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search
warrant, is in order, however. SCEI insists, however, that the
searching team waited for the arrival of the barangay officials
who were summoned to witness the search, and that “even
when the enforcing officers were moving towards the actual
BFTI premises . . . they were accompanied at all times by one
of the security guards on duty until the barangay officials
arrived.” SCEI‘s position raises an issue of fact which is not
proper for consideration in a petition for review on certiorari
before this Court under Rule 45, which is supposed to cover only
issues of law. In any event, a security guard may not be
considered a “lawful occupant” or “a member of [the lawful
occupant‘s] family” under the earlier quoted Section 8 of Rule
126.
As the two-witness rule was not complied with, the objects
seized during the April 1, 2005 search are inadmissible in
evidence. Their return, on motion of BFTI, was thus in order.
28.ROSARIO S. PANUNCIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 165678 , July 17, 2009
Facts:
Operatives of the LTO and the Special Mission Group Task
Force Lawin of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
led by then Philippine National Police Superintendent Lacson
and Police Senior Inspector Ouano, Jr., armed with Search
Warrant No. 581-92 issued by then Regional Trial Court Judge
Pardo, raided the residence of Panuncio (petitioner), a jeepney
operator.
The operatives confiscated LTO documents, 17 pieces of private
vehicle plates, a copying machine, several typewriters, and
other tools and equipment.
Petitioner signed a certification of orderly search, together with
Barangay Chairman Antonio Manalo (Manalo), petitioner’s
employee Myrna Velasco (Velasco), and one Cesar Nidua
(Nidua.Juan V. Borra, Jr., Assistant Secretary for the LTO filed
a complaint against petitioner for violation of Articles 171, 172,
176, and 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended;
Presidential Decree No. 1730; Sections 31 and 56 of Republic
Act No. 4136; and Batas Pambansa Blg. 43. Later on, an
information was filed against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation, which the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107 (trial court), granted.
The Department of Justice, through State Prosecutor Mario A.M.
Caraos, submitted its Resolution5 recommending that petitioner
be prosecuted for falsification. The trial court set the
arraignment, and on 28 June 1994, petitioner entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, pre-trial and the trial of the case ensued.
Petitioner denied that she was the source of the falsified
documents. She alleged that she was not at home when the raid
took place, and when she returned home, the police authorities
had already emptied her shelves and she was just forced to sign
the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of
orderly search.
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of falsification of a public document.
Petitioner appealed from the trial court’s Decision. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision with modification.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the search warrant did not suffer
from any legal infirmity because the items to be seized were
already specified and identified in the warrant. The Court of
Appeals declared that the court’s designation of the place to be
searched and the articles to be seized left the police authorities
with no discretion, ensured that unreasonable searches and
seizures would not take place and abuses would be avoided.
The Court of Appeals further ruled that the Rules of Court do not
require that the owner of the place to be searched be present
during the conduct of the raid. The Court of Appeals noted that
the search was conducted not only in the presence of petitioner
but also in the presence of Manalo, Velasco, and Nidua.
Issue:
Whether the search was regularly conducted
Ruling:
YES. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in
presence of two witnesses – No search of a house, room, or any
other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence
of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the
house was not present when the search was conducted, the
search was done in the presence of at least two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Manalo was the barangay chairman of the place while Velasco
was petitioner’s employee.17 Petitioner herself signed the
certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence.
Clearly, the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court were complied with by the police authorities who
conducted the search. Further, petitioner failed to substantiate
her allegation that she was just forced to sign the search
warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of orderly search.
In fact, the records show that she signed these documents
together with three other persons, including the barangay
chairman who could have duly noted if petitioner was really
forced to sign the documents against her will.
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and
seizures are inadmissible as evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution.18 However, in this case, we
sustain the validity of the search conducted in petitioner’s
residence and, thus, the articles seized during the search are
admissible in evidence against petitioner.
29.MABINI EPIE, JR. and RODRIGO PALASI, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NELSONIDA T. ULAT-MARREDO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148117 - March 22, 2007
Facts:
In an Information dated September 22, 1998, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet Province charged Mabini Epie,
Jr. and Rodrigo Palasi, petitioners, with violation of Section 68
of Presidential Decree No. 705 (possession and transportation
of lumber without license or permit).
When arraigned, both petitioners, with the assistance of counsel
de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 2:30 p.m.
of September 6, 1998, SPO2 Alberto Ngina of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Tublay Station received an information
from a confidential agent that a jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117
at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber.
SPO2 Ngina immediately relayed the information. They then
swiftly established a checkpoint.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives
spotted the jeepney heading toward La Trinidad. They flagged it
down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to
Shilan, La Trinidad where it finally halted.
The found some pieces of lumber under a womboc. The driver
and his companions admitted they have no permit to transport
the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated
petitioners, Marso Insiong Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben
Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of Section
68 of the Revised Forestry Code.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioners,
through counsel, filed a "Motion to Suppress Evidence of the
Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine
lumber were illegally seized. Respondent judge denied the
motion.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, it
was denied.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petition, holding that respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers
is valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are admissible
in evidence against the accused.
Issue:
Whether the police officers have a probable cause to believe
that the subject vehicle was loaded with illegal cargo and that,
therefore, it can be stopped and searched without a warrant.
Ruling:
YES. As a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried
through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and
seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People
v. Sarap,7 we listed the exceptions where search and seizure
may be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to
a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search
in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk;
and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. The only
requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable
cause. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place to be searched.
Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where
a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted by peace
officers. The only issue we should determine is whether there
was probable cause to justify such warrantless search and
seizure.
We recall that at around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a
confidential informer disclosed to SPO2 Ngina that a passenger
jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine
lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered
with assorted vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in
Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept the jeepney. At around 4:00
p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle. They
flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it
until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle
disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners
could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport
the same.
In People v. Vinecarao,10 we ruled that where a vehicle sped
away after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been
flagged down by police officers, in an apparent attempt to
dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there
exists probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part
of the law enforcers that the persons on board said vehicle were
officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which
were instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies
to the present case.
30.OLYMPIO REVALDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 170589. April 16, 2009
DOCTRINE:
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in “plain view” of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of
premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992, in
the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Southern Leyte, the
accused with intent of gain feloniously possess 96.14 board ft.
with a total value of P1,730.52 without any legal document as
required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper
government authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the
government. The trial court rendered judgment convicting
petitioner of the offense charged. Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere
possession of the lumber without the legal documents gives rise
to criminal liability.
Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items
seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
Petitioner argues that the police officers were not armed with a
search warrant when they went to his house to verify the report
of Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the
corresponding license. Because the search was illegal, all items
recovered from petitioner during the illegal search were
prohibited from being used as evidence against him. Petitioner
therefore prays for his acquittal.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted
by the police officers was illegal.
HELD:
No. The court ruled that that even without a search warrant, the
personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut, gathered
or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 8013of the Forestry
Code. There is no question that the police officers went to the
house of petitioner because of the information relayed by Sunit
that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut lumber. When
the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber
were lying around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber
were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling
in “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence.
When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess
the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the
repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There was thus
probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant.
Wherefore, the Court affirmed the appealed Decision convicting
petitioner for violation of Section 68 (now Section 77) of the
Forestry Code.
31.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BELEN
MARIACOS, appellant.
G.R. No. 188611. June 21, 2010.*
DOCTRINE:
The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted
exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge after personally determining the existence of probable
cause.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article
II, Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. That on or about
the 27th day of October, 2005, in the Municipality of San Gabriel,
Province of La Union the accused unlawfully and feloniously
transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic) grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops without the necessary permit or authority from the proper
government agency or office. PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him
that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded on a passenger
jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further,
the agent described a backpack bag with an “O.K.” marking.
PO2 Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and positioned
himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found
the black backpack with an “O.K.” marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrap ped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of the
jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted
together with the other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not
notice who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He
only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three
(3) other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being
carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women
and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they
were under arrest, but one of the women got away. PO2
Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein
accused-appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search conducted was valid.
HELD:
Yes, warrantless search conducted was valid. The vehicle that
carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave.
PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the
essence in this case. The searching officer had no time to obtain
a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle
before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night before
appellant’s arrest, the police received information that marijuana
was to be transported fromBarangay Balbalayang, and had set
up a checkpoint around the area to intercept the suspects. At
dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent
from the Barangay Intelligence Network, who informed him that
a baggage of marijuana was loaded on a passenger
jeepneyabout to leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc
had probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing
illegal drugs.

This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
“SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.” For this rule to apply, it
is imperative that there be a prior valid arrest.
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary. Appellant’s alleged lack of
knowledge does not constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where
the crime charged ismalum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere
possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug, without legal
authority, is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULE 126, SECTION 14
CASE DIGEST
32.WILLIAM A. GARAYGAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 135503. July 6, 2000
Facts:
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
issued a Search Warrant authorizing a search of the house of
petitioner William Garaygay. The petitioner’s house is located in
Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court. By virtue of the search warrant
issued, Garaygay’s house was searched and several items were
seized including firearms, explosives, ammunitions and other
prohibited paraphernalia.
An information was filed against the petitioner for the violation of
PD 1866. The said information was filed before the RTC of Lapu-
Lapu City to which the petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized
Evidence on the ground that the search warrant was issued in
violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 19, and that is was a
general warrant. The prosecution argued that the motion to
quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which
issued the warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court of Lapu-Lapu City is authorized to
resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant issued by the RTC
of Manila.
Held:
YES. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion to
quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may
be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed
for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the
criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative,
not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion
does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings
thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule
against forum-shopping.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner’s Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence was
properly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City.
33.MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC. v.
DADODETTE ENTERPRISES AND/OR HERMES SPORTS
CENTER
G.R. NO. 165306. September 20, 2005
Facts:
The Special Investigator of NBI applied for a search warrant
before the RTC of Quezon City against Dadodette Enterprises.
The application was based on the information that the
respondents were in possession of goods, the copyright of which
belonged to the petitioner. After finding reasonable grounds that
the respondents violated Sections 172 and 217 of Republic Act
No. 8293, the RTC of Quezon City issued the search warrant.
Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search
warrant contending that the same is invalid since the requisites
for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that
the sporting goods manufactured by and/or registered in the
name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, not among
the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.
The trial court granted the motion to quash and declared Search
Warrant null and void based on its finding that the copyrighted
products of MANLY do not appear to be original creations and
were being manufactured and distributed by different companies
locally and abroad under various brands, and therefore
unqualified for protection under Section 172 of RA 8293.
Moreover, MANLY's certificates of registrations were issued
only in 2002, whereas there were certificates of registrations for
the same sports articles which were issued earlier than
MANLY's, thus further negating the claim that its copyrighted
products were original creations.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC exercised grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the quashal of the warrants.
Held:
NO. The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested
with the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial function. As
such, the power to quash the same also rests solely with them.
After the judge has issued a warrant, he is not precluded to
subsequently quash the same, if he finds upon reevaluation of
the evidence that no probable cause exists.
Inherent in the courts' power to issue search warrants is the
power to quash warrants already issued. In this connection, this
Court has ruled that the motion to quash should be filed in the
court that issued the warrant unless a criminal case has already
been instituted in another court, in which case, the motion
should be filed with the latter. The ruling has since been
incorporated in Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it entertained the motion to quash considering
that no criminal action has yet been instituted when it was filed.
The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier
issued after finding upon reevaluation of the evidence that no
probable cause exists to justify its issuance in the first place. As
ruled by the trial court, the copyrighted products do not appear
to be original creations of MANLY and are not among the
classes of work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293. The
trial court, thus, may not be faulted for overturning its initial
assessment that there was probable cause in view of its inherent
power to issue search warrants and to quash the same. No
objection may be validly posed to an order quashing a warrant
already issued as the court must be provided with the
opportunity to correct itself of an error unwittingly committed, or,
with like effect, to allow the aggrieved party the chance to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous
35.Securities and Exchange Commission v. Mendoza
G.R. No. 170425. April 23, 2012.
Third Division;
Abad, J.
Facts:
On March 26, 2001,
application for search warrant can question its issuance or seek
suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the
issuance of a search warrant does not partake of an action
where a party complains of a violation of his right by another.
Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target
the residence or offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to
file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress the use of the
seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and
the NBI to immediately turn these over to the issuing court, the
Makati RTC. The Makati RTC is the right forum for such motion
given that no criminal action had as yet been filed against
Mendoza, et al. in some other court.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied with

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the issuance
of a search warrant covering documents and articles found at
the offices of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad. The NBI
alleged that these documents and articles were being used to
(a) violate the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), and (b)commit
estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Makati
RTC granted the application. Acting on the search warrant, NBI
and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) agents searched
the offices mentioned and seized the described documents and
articles from them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal
complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) against Rizza
Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma. Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera,
Rey Beltran, Rex Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo,
Ma. Loda Calma, and Teresita Almojuela (Mendoza, et al.) for
violation of Sections 24.1 (b) (iii), 26, and 28 of the SRC.

On July 11, 2001, Mendoza, et al. filed a petition for prohibition

and injunction with application for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction against the NBI and the SEC
before a Muntinlupa RTC. They alleged that, three months after
the search and seizure, the NBI and the SEC had not turned
over the seized articles to the Makati RTC that issued the search
warrant. This omission, they said, violated Section 1, Rule 126
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which required the officers
who conducted the seizure to immediately turn over the seized
items to the issuing court. Essentially, the petition sought to
prevent the SEC and the NBI from using the seized articles in
prosecuting Mendoza, et al. and the DOJ from proceeding with
the preliminary investigation of their case, using the same.
Simultaneous with this action, Pastrana and Abad, filed with the
Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject search warrant for
having been issued in connection with several offenses when
the Rules of Criminal Procedure require its issuance for only one
specific offense.

Issue:
Whether or not the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain
Mendoza, et al.’s action for the suppression of evidence whose
seizure had become illegal for failure of the SEC and NBI to turn
them over to the issuing court, the Makati RTC?

Held:
No. Section 14 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is clear. Questions
concerning both (1) the issuance of the search warrant and (2)
the suppression of evidence seized under it are matters that can
be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case,
no criminal action has in the meantime been filed in court. The
rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be parties to the search
warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to
suppress. It is not correct to say that only the parties to the