01 Mendoza vs.

Arrieta
Facts:

On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-
Arthur Highway Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned and driven by petitioner, a
private jeep owned and driven by respondent Salazar and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As a consequence, separate
informations were filed against Salazar and Montoya.

At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the left and hit
his car. He further testified that before impact, Salazar jumped from the jeep not
knowing that Salazar was hit by the truck of Montoya. Montoya affirmed this. On the
other hand, Salazar tried to show that after overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal
showing his intention to turn left but was stopped at by a policeman directing traffic at
the intersection which he contends to be the time he was hit by the truck causing his
jeep to hit petitioner’s car.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the damages ensued to the vehicle of petitioner shall be the liability
of the driver of the jeep or of the truck.

(2) Whether or not the truck’s owner may be held liable for damages caused by him
employee.

Held: Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's
car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant
against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.

That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict
is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his
car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his car That the sudden
swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of
Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck in
the same direction as Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision,
petitioner's car suffered extensive damages.

Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1)
plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of aMercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's
delict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's employee,
Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve and collide with
petitioner's car, were alleged in the Complaint.

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Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent
Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-
owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused Freddie
Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of the jeep
driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar. Considering that the collision between the jeep
driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the
result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this
Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held able for the damages
sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's car.

02 Cuadra v Monfort
FACTS:

Maria Teresa Cuadra 12 and Maria Teresa Monfort 13 (Grade 6) were both classmates
in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned the
class to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a
headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it at MT
Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the
hospital and stayed for 23 days; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but
she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort
(MT Monfort’s dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that
Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and
attorney’s fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort’s father is liable under Articles 2176 and 2180.

HELD:
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso Monfort
could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any
way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or
the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty
to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was
concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child’s
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
could be attributed to her parents.

DOCTRINE:

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Diligence of a good father- it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in
every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the
damage could have been prevented.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence
accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause
damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different
cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as
in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the
causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be
rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article
shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."

03 Bermudez v. Judge Amuerfina Melencio Herrera

G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988

Facts: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan,
bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding.
The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No.
92944 for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27, 1969 in the said criminal case “A Reservation to
File Separate Civil Action.”

On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages against
Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. Finding that the plaintiffs
instituted the action “on the assumption that defendant Pontino’s negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted aquasi-delict,” the trial court stated that plaintiffs
had already elected to treat the accident as a “crime” by reserving in the criminal case
their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the
dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the
hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence is finally terminated.

Issue: Whether or not the present action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code
and therefore could proceed independently of the criminal case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence.

Ruling:

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party

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chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer’s defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to
file a civil action for quasi¬delict. The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an
independent civil action. In fact, even without such a reservation, the Court allowed the
injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused to
recover damages based on quasi-delict. It does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

04 REYES vs. SEMPIO-DIY,

G.R. No. L-71914 January 29, 1986

FACTS:

This petition arises from the case filed by the petitioner Zenaida Reyes against Cristina
Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor. In said case, Reyes was represented by
a private prosecutor Atty. Barayang. Malicsi pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the
court to a fine of 50 PHP. However, Reyes failed to present evidence to prove damages
as well as to make a reservation of her right to file a separate action for damages.
Instead, she filed a new action for damages due to defamatory words uttered by Malicsi
against her.

Reyes admitted the said failure and that the purpose of appearance of the private
prosecutor was to prove damages against Malicsi. The court ruled in favor of the
defendants by dismissing the separate case. The court also made no award of
damages to Reyes by such failure

ISSUE:

After the admission, whether or not Reyes, by being represented by a private

prosecutor in the criminal case and for failure to make a reservation in the said case,
was barred from filing a separate civil action for damages against Malicsi. Hence, this
direct appeal.

HELD:

No, Reyes’ failure to make a reservation did not foreclose her right to file a separate civil
action for damages against the accused. Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that there
is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages,

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a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such
reservation is not necessary.

The appeal was granted and ordered the court to proceed with the hearing of the
separate civil case filed by Reyes.