G.R. No.

206941, March 09, 2016

MILAGROSA JOCSON, Petitioner, v. NELSON SAN MIGUEL, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated October 29, 2012 and Resolution3 dated April 16, 2013 issued
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122007, which allowed the application of the "fresh-
period rule" in the filing of a Notice of Appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).

Facts of the Case

On September 10, 2008, Milagrosa C. Jocson (Jocson) filed with the DARAB-PARAD, Region III of San
Fernando City, Pampanga, a Complaint4 for ejectment with damages against respondent Nelson San
Miguel (San Miguel) and all persons claiming rights under him. The case was docketed as DARAB Case
No. 6291-P'08.

In the Complaint, Jocson alleged that she is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land with an
area of 60,241 square meters, located in Magalang, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 473856-R. She asserted that 56,000 sq m thereof became the subject of an Agricultural Leasehold
Contract5 (Contract) between her and San Miguel, with the latter as tenant-lessee. As part of the
contract, they agreed that the subject landholding shall be devoted to sugar and rice production.6

According to Jocson, San Miguel, however, occupied the entire landholding and refused to vacate the
portion not covered by their Contract despite repeated demands.7

On December 15, 2009, Jocson filed a Supplemental Complaint8 alleging that, during the pendency of
the present suit, San Miguel commenced to plant corn on the subject landholding which violated their
Contract.9

In his Answer,10 San Miguel maintained that he had religiously complied with all the terms and
conditions of their Contract and that Jocson has no valid ground to eject him from the disputed
landholding.11

PARAD Decision

On January 26, 2011, PARAD Provincial Adjudicator Vicente Aselo S. Sicat (PA Sicat) rendered a
Decision,12 the decretal portion of which reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. TERMINATING the existing leasehold contract of the parties as well as their tenancy relationship;

2. ORDERING [San Miguel] and all persons claiming rights under him to peacefully vacate and surrender
the land to [Jocson];

3. DISMISSING all other claims for want of evidence.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.13 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

San Miguel filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 (MR) dated February 10, 2011 but it was denied in an
Order15 dated May 31, 2011.

On June 15, 2011,16 San Miguel filed his Notice of Appeal.17

Thereafter, on June 28, 2011, Jocson filed an Omnibus Motion to: (i) expunge the Notice of Appeal from
the records of the present case; (ii) dismiss the said appeal; and (iii) issue a writ of execution.18 She
alleged that the Notice of Appeal filed by San Miguel was filed not in accordance with the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure, specifically the non-payment of appeal fee and the failure to attach therein a
Certification against Non-Forum Shopping pursuant to Section 2, Rule IV of the Rules.19
On July 27, 2011, PA Sicat issued an Order20 denying due course to San Miguel's Notice of Appeal and
thereafter declared the case final and executory. Aside from failure to pay the required appeal fee and to
attach the required certification, the PARAD held that the Notice of Appeal was likewise filed out of
time.21

The PARAD held that under Section 12, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, "[t]he filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party shall have the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal. Said period shall not
be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice of denial."22

The PARAD found that San Miguel, through his counsel, received his copy of Decision dated January 26,
2011 on February 3, 2011 and thereafter filed his MR on February 15, 2011, thus, he could have only
three (3) days within which to file his Notice of Appeal upon its denial. The MR was denied on May 31,
2011 and San Miguel, through his counsel, received his copy of the Order on June 2, 2011 and he filed
his Notice of Appeal on June 15, 2011 or after twelve (12) days, which, following the rules
abovementioned, is already beyond the period allowed.23

San Miguel filed his MR24 but the same was denied in an Order25 dated October 18, 2011, which likewise
directed the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision rendered by the PARAD.

Undaunted, San Miguel filed a Petition for Certiorari26 (with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Application for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction) with the CA.

San Miguel argued that the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure adopted the "fresh period rule" enunciated
by this Court in Neypes v. CA27 to the effect that it allows litigants a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file a notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion
for reconsideration as provided for under Section 1, Rule IV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure.28

Ruling of the CA

On October 29, 2012, the CA issued a Decision29 granting San Miguel's petition and remanding the case
to the DARAB-PARAD for further proceedings. The CA held that the "fresh period rule" enunciated
in Neypes should be applied in the instant case. The CA decision reads in part:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an
appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to
pending actions, such as the case at bar. The raison d'etre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize
the appeal period provided in the Rules of Court and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day
appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by
the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Litigants today need not
concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is
now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution.30 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
Jocson filed her MR but it was denied in a Resolution31 dated April 16, 2013.

Hence, the present petition.

Issues

Jocson argued that the CA committed grave abuse and substantial error of judgment amounting to
errors of law:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

I. IN REJECTING THE APPLICATION OF THE 2003 DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE

NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY SAN MIGUEL AND UPHOLDING THE APPLICATION OF THE
"FRESH PERIOD RULE" PROVIDED UNDER THE NEW 2009 DARAB RULES OF
PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS SUIT BEFORE THE
PARAD, IN THE CASE AT BAR.

II. IN APPLYING THE NEYPES RULING IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE RULING
IN PANOLINO V. TAJALA32 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE NOT
ISSUED BY A COURT.33

Ruling of the Court

This Court finds the petition to be meritorious.

Application of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure

San Miguel alleged that due to the effectivity of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, its provisions
should be applied instead of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

This Court rules in the negative.

It must be noted that Section 1, Rule XXIV of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure explicitly states that:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

Sec. 1. Transitory Provisions. These Rules shall govern all cases filed on or after its effectivity. All cases
pending with the Board and the Adjudicators, prior to the date of effectivity of these Rules,
shall be governed by the DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of their filing. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Complaint was filed on September 10, 2008 prior to the date of effectivity of
the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure on September 1, 2009. Thus, pursuant to the above-cited rule, the
applicable rule in the counting of the period for filing a Notice of Appeal with the Board is governed by
Section 12, Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, which states that:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The filing of the Motion for Reconsideration shall interrupt the period to perfect an appeal. If the motion
is denied, the aggrieved party shall have the remaining period within which to perfect his appeal. Said
period shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from the receipt of the notice of denial.
Application of the "fresh period rule" enunciated in the Neypes ruling

This Court likewise finds no merit to San Miguel's contention that the "fresh period rule" laid down
in Neypes is applicable in the instant case.

In Panolino, this Court held that the "fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
[CA]; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]; and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

xxxx
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to
Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts to the [CA] or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to
the [CA]); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the [CA]); and Rule 45 (appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the
DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the
motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the
period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed,
the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal.34 (Citation omitted and emphasis
ours)
The same principle was applied in the recent case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group,
Inc. and Oscar Violago v. Ma. Cristina F. Bayang,35 wherein this Court reiterated that the "fresh period
rule" in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided
for under Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not judicial but administrative in
nature. As such, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no application therein.

As correctly observed by PA Sicat, San Miguel should perfect his appeal during the remainder of the
period of appeal, but not less than five (5) days, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial of his
MR or until June 7, 2011.

As a final note, it is worthy to emphasize that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
The right is unavoidably forfeited by the litigant who does not comply with the manner thus prescribed.
In addition, the liberal application of rules of procedure for perfecting appeals is still the exception, and
not the rule; and it is only allowed in exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice.36This exceptional situation, however, does not obtain in this case. chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated October 29, 2012 and Resolution dated April 16, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 122007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated July 27, 2011 and October
18, 2011 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry

G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM AND MR. DAVID LIM, Petitioners, v. IGNACIO B.
TAGYAMON, PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADAYOS, GRACE B. MARCOS, ROGELIO C. NEMIS,
ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ AND CYNTHIA L. COMANDAO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No.
105236. The assailed decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondents Ignacio B.
Tagyamon (Tagyamon), Pablito I. Luna (Luna), Fe B. Badayos (Badayos), Grace B. Marcos (Marcos),
Rogelio C. Nemis (Nemis), Roberto B. Ilao (Ilao), Anicia D. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), and Cynthia L.
Comandao (Comandao), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate the
petitioners with full backwages less the amounts they received as separation pays. In case
reinstatement would no longer be feasible because the positions previously held no longer exist, the
private respondent shall pay them backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pays equal to
one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
addition, the private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the petitioners moral damages in the amount
of P20,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.3
The Facts

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the

Philippines engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.4 Respondents
were its regular and permanent employees, but were affected by petitioner’s retrenchment and
voluntary retirement programs.

On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and Comandao9 received a uniformly
worded Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:
This is to inform you that in view of a slump in the market demand for our products due to the un-
competitiveness of our price, the company is constrained to reduce the number of its workforce. The
long-term effects of September 11 and the war in the Middle East have greatly affected the viability of
our business and we are left with no recourse but to reorganize and downsize our organizational
structure.

We wish to inform you that we are implementing a retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations.

In this connection, we regret to advise you that you are one of those affected by the said exercise, and
your employment shall be terminated effective at the close of working hours on April 15, 2004.
Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation pay as mandated by law. You will no longer be required to
report for work during the 30-day notice period in order to give you more time to look for alternative
employment. However, you will be paid the salary corresponding to the said period. We shall process
your clearance and other documents and you may claim the payables due you on March 31, 2004.

Thank you for your services and good luck to your future endeavors.10
As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004,
together with fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand.11 PCMC,
however, claimed that they availed of the company’s voluntary retirement program and, in fact,
voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.12

Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMC’s decision to terminate their employment, respondents filed
separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, Mr.
Patricio Lim and Mr. David Lim. These cases were later consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Philippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas
(Philcea case),13 as to the validity of the company’s retrenchment program. They further explained that
PCMC did not, in fact, suffer losses shown by its acts prior to and subsequent to their
termination.14 They also insisted that their acceptance of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a
bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case.15

PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the services of respondents being a necessary
management prerogative. It pointed out that as an employer, it had no obligation to keep in its employ
more workers than are necessary for the operation of his business. Thus, there was an authorized cause
for dismissal. Petitioners also stressed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as they allowed
almost three years to pass making the principle of laches applicable. Considering that respondents
accepted their separation pay and voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC
invoked the principle of estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation from the
service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not dismissed from
employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired from employment to take advantage of the company’s
program.16

On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit.17 The LA found no flaw in respondents’ termination as they voluntarily opted
to retire and were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized, terminated from
employment and were paid separation benefits.18 In view of respondents’ belated filing of the complaint,
the LA concluded that such action is a mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect
more money, taking advantage of the 2006 Supreme Court decision.19

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA decision.20 In addition to
the LA ratiocination, the NLRC emphasized the application of the principle of laches for respondents’
inaction for an unreasonable period.

Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing the
earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the
case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It
stressed that said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive
period.21Citing the Court’s decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the doctrine of stare decisis, in
view of the similar factual circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and Marcos, while
acknowledging their voluntary resignation, the CA found the same not a bar to the illegal dismissal case
because they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC was losing money.22 With the foregoing findings,
the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated with full backwages less the amounts they received as
separation pay. In case of impossibility of reinstatement, the CA ordered PCMC to pay respondents
backwages and in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one month pay or ½ month pay for
every year of service whichever is higher, plus moral damages.23

The Issues

Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on this
ground, to wit:
IN RENDERING ITS DISPUTED DECISION AND RESOLUTION, THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.

a) Res Judicata should not be followed if to follow it is to perpetuate

error (Philippine Trust Co., and Smith Bell & Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil.
30, 36 (1933). The (Supreme) Court is not precluded from rectifying
 errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice
for technicality (Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082,
January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406)

b) Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy.
Waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable settlement of the
laborer’s claims are legitimate and should be respected by the Court
as the law between the parties (Gamo-gamo vs. PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 2, 2002; Alcasero vs. NLRC,
288 SCRA 129) Where the persons making the waiver has done so
voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration
for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as valid and binding undertaking (Periquet vs. NLRC, 186
SCRA 724 [1990]; Magsalin vs. Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs.
National Organization of Working Men (N.O.W.M.], G.R. No. 148492,
May 2, 2003).24
Petitioners contend that the Philcea case decided by this Court and relied upon by the CA in the assailed
decision was based on erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial statement, as well as erroneous
analysis of such financial statements.25 They, thus, implore the Court to revisit the cited case in order to
dispense with substantial justice.26 They explain that the Court made conclusions based on erroneous
information. Petitioners also insist that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case are not
applicable, considering that this case does not involve the same parties as the Philcea case.27 They
likewise point out that not all respondents were involuntarily separated on the ground of redundancy as
some of them voluntarily availed of the company’s Voluntary Separation Program.28 They further
contend that respondents are guilty not only of laches but also of estoppel in view of their inaction for an
unreasonable length of time to assail the alleged illegal dismissal and in voluntarily executing a release,
quitclaim and waiver.29

The Court’s Ruling

Laches

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.30 It has
been repeatedly31 held by the Court that:
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of
law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal
right. x x x Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in
upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a “justice outside legality,” this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be
barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time
limited for the commencement of actions at law.”32
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants’
rights which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article
114633 of the Civil Code. Respondents’ complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal
was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure,
laches may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of
laborers are protected under the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.35

Stare Decisis

The main issue sought to be determined in this case is the validity of respondents’ dismissal from
employment. Petitioners contend that they either voluntarily retired from the service or terminated from
employment based on an authorized cause. The LA and the NLRC are one in saying that the dismissal
was legal. The CA, however, no longer discussed the validity of the ground of termination. Rather, it
applied the Court’s decision in the Philcea case where the same ground was thoroughly discussed. In
other words, the appellate court applied the doctrine of stare decisis and reached the same conclusion
as the earlier case.

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different.36 Where the facts are essentially
different, however, stare decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of
facts might be entirely inappropriate when a factual variant is introduced.37

The question, therefore, is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are substantially the
same as the Philcea case.

We answer in the affirmative.

This case and the Philcea case involve the same period which is March to April 2004; the issuance of
Memorandum to employees informing them of the implementation of the cost reduction program; the
implementation of the voluntary retirement program and retrenchment program, except that this case
involves different employees; the execution of deeds of release, waiver, and quitclaim, and the
acceptance of separation pay by the affected employees.

The illegality of the basis of the implementation of both voluntary retirement and retrenchment
programs of petitioners had been thoroughly ruled upon by the Court in the Philcea case. It discussed
the requisites of both retrenchment and redundancy as authorized causes of termination and that
petitioners failed to substantiate them. In ascertaining the bases of the termination of employees, it
took into consideration petitioners’ claim of business losses; the purchase of machinery and equipment
after the termination, the declaration of cash dividends to stockholders, the hiring of 100 new employees
after the retrenchment, and the authorization of full blast overtime work for six hours daily. These, said
the Court, are inconsistent with petitioners’ claim that there was a slump in the demand for its products
which compelled them to implement the termination programs. In arriving at its conclusions, the Court
took note of petitioners’ net sales, gross and net profits, as well as net income. The Court, thus, reached
the conclusion that the retrenchment effected by PCMC is invalid due to a substantive defect. We quote
hereunder the Court’s pronouncement in the Philcea case, to wit:
Respondents failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the confluence of the essential
requisites for a valid retrenchment of its employees. We believe that respondents acted in bad faith in
terminating the employment of the members of petitioner Union.

Contrary to the claim of respondents that the Corporation was experiencing business losses, respondent
Corporation, in fact, amassed substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003. It found no need to appropriate
its retained earnings except on March 23, 2001, when it appropriated P60,000,000.00 to increase
production capacity. x x x

xxx

The evidence on record belies the P22,820,151.00 net income loss in 2004 as projected by the SOLE. On
March 29, 2004, the Board of Directors approved the appropriation of P20,000,000.00 to purchase
machinery to improve its facilities, and declared cash dividends to stockholders at P30.00 per share. x x
x

xxx

It bears stressing that the appropriation of P20,000,000.00 by the respondent Corporation on

September 16, 2004 was made barely five months after the 77 Union members were dismissed on the
ground that respondent Corporation was suffering from "chronic depression." Cash dividends were
likewise declared on March 29, 2004, barely two weeks after it implemented its "retrenchment
program."

If respondent Corporation were to be believed that it had to retrench employees due to the debilitating
slump in demand for its products resulting in severe losses, how could it justify the purchase of
P20,000,000.00 worth of machinery and equipment? There is likewise no justification for the hiring of
more than 100 new employees, more than the number of those who were retrenched, as well as the
order authorizing full blast overtime work for six hours daily. All these are inconsistent with the
intransigent claim that respondent Corporation was impelled to retrench its employees precisely because
of low demand for its products and other external causes.
xxx

That respondents acted in bad faith in retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is buttressed by the fact
that Diaz issued his Memorandum announcing the cost-reduction program on March 9, 2004, after
receipt of the February 10, 2004 letter of the Union president which included the proposal for additional
benefits and wage increases to be incorporated in the CBA for the ensuing year. Petitioner and its
members had no inkling, before February 10, 2004, that respondent Corporation would terminate their
employment. Moreover, respondent Corporation failed to exhaust all other means to avoid further losses
without retrenching its employees, such as utilizing the latter’s respective forced vacation leaves.
Respondents also failed to use fair and reasonable criteria in implementing the retrenchment program,
and instead chose to retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of the dismissed 88 employees.
Worse, respondent Corporation hired new employees and even rehired the others who had been
"retrenched."

As shown by the SGV & Co. Audit Report, as of year end December 31, 2003, respondent Corporation
increased its net sales by more than P8,000,000.00. Respondents failed to prove that there was a
drastic or severe decrease in the product sales or that it suffered severe business losses within an
interval of three (3) months from January 2004 to March 9, 2004 when Diaz issued said Memorandum.
Such claim of a depressed market as of March 9, 2004 was only a pretext to retaliate against petitioner
Union and thereby frustrate its demands for more monetary benefits and, at the same time, justify the
dismissal of the 77 Union members.

xxx

In contrast, in this case, the retrenchment effected by respondent Corporation is invalid due to a
substantive defect, non-compliance with the substantial requirements to effect a valid retrenchment; it
necessarily follows that the termination of the employment of petitioner Union’s members on such
ground is, likewise, illegal. As such, they (petitioner Union’s members) are entitled to reinstatement with
full backwages.38
We find no reason to depart from the above conclusions which are based on the Court’s examination of
the evidence presented by the parties therein. As the respondents here were similarly situated as the
union members in the Philcea case, and considering that the questioned dismissal from the service was
based on the same grounds under the same circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the issues
presented herein. In short, we adopt the Court’s earlier findings that there was no valid ground to
terminate the employees.

A closer look at petitioners’ arguments would show that they want the Court to re-examine our decision
in the Philcea case allegedly on the ground that the conclusions therein were based on erroneous
interpretation of the evidence presented.

Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission,39 although the Court was confronted with the
same issue of the legality of a strike that has already been determined in a previous case, the Court
refused to apply the doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of backwages was concerned because
of the clear erroneous application of the law. We held therein that the Court abandons or overrules
precedents whenever it realizes that it erred in the prior decision.40 The Court’s pronouncement in that
case is instructive:
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular
case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the
Court is justified in setting it aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is
not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow
blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.41
The Abaria case, however, is not applicable in this case. There is no reason to abandon the Court’s ruling
in the Philcea case.

Do we apply the aforesaid decision to all the respondents herein? Again, we answer in the affirmative.

Just like the union members in the Philcea case, respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and
Comandao received similarly worded memorandum of dismissal effective April 15, 2004 based on the
same ground of slump in the market demand for the company’s products. As such, they are similarly
situated in all aspects as the union members. With respect to respondents Marcos, Nemis and Ilao,
although they applied for voluntary retirement, the same was not accepted by petitioner. Instead, it
issued notice of termination dated March 6, 2004 to these same employees.42 And while it is true that
petitioner paid them separation pay, the payment was in the nature of separation and not retirement
pay. In other words, payment was made because of the implementation of the retrenchment program
and not because of retirement.43 As their application for availing of the company’s voluntary retirement
program was based on the wrong premise, the intent to retire was not clearly established, or rather that
the retirement is involuntary. Thus, they shall be considered discharged from
employment.44 Consequently, they shall be treated as if they are in the same footing as the other
respondents herein and the union members in the Philcea case.

Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims

“As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they
are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits
would not amount to estoppel.”45 To excuse respondents from complying with the terms of their waivers,
they must locate their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in
obtaining the waivers; (2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable; or (3) the
terms of the waiver are contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.46 The instant case falls under the first
situation.

As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as the
employees’ consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims
and releases by employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal
responsibilities.47 The circumstances show that petitioner’s misrepresentation led its employees,
specifically respondents herein, to believe that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the
implementation of the voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of
the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim.48

It can safely be concluded that economic necessity constrained respondents to accept petitioners’
monetary offer and sign the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents are supervisors
and not rank-and-file employees does not make them less susceptible to financial offers, faced as they
were with the prospect of unemployment. The Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek
payment of benefits and a manager to sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a consideration, they
executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their employers from liability.49
x x x There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which the employee held in the
company when it concerns the pressure which the employer may exert upon the free will of the
employee who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in the
present case, who is confronted with the same dilemma of whether [to sign] a release and quitclaim and
accept what the company offers them, or [to refuse] to sign and walk out without receiving anything,
may do succumb to the same pressure, being very well aware that it is going to take quite a while
before he can recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is only after a protracted legal battle
starting from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The Court
understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever, coupled with the probability of not
immediately getting any gainful employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough
pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of some amount of
money which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on company practice and policy or by
law.50
The amounts already received by respondents as consideration for signing the releases and quitclaims
should be deducted from their respective monetary awards.51 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 105236
are AFFIRMED. chanRoblesvi rtual Lawli bra ry

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

The appellants in their own behalf.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. — Under the Spanish
criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts were allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By
section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so amended that appeals can be taken to
the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This
amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the
purpose stated — that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon
which the judgment was predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been the
interpretation of section 43 by this court.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of
chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance,
where they were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court
because the validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court
below.

Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this court required
under the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendants?

The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States v. Joson
(26 Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is
unnecessary.

With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants’ having in the lower
court questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they have been convicted,
this case has been brought to us in all its details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the
trial, on which the Court of First Instance founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning the
defendants. While, on the other hand, it is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not]
authorized to examine, are those which are essential to be examined for the purpose of determining the
legality of Ordinance No. 35 and the penalties provided for therein, and no other.

At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to
the promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.

The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of September 4,
1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as amended in accordance
with the recommendations of the code committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands, as
well as the Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective four months
thereafter.

According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the justices of the peace,
or gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.

Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives notice that there has
been committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal Code which can be
prosecuted by the Government, he shall issue summons for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to
the alleged culprit, and to the witnesses who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and
hour for holding the trial. If this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall
also be summoned." Rule 3 provided that the same procedure should be followed in those cases which
can only be prosecuted at the instance of a private party, except that the promotor fiscal was not cited.

Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos acordados
prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the Laws of Criminal Procedure of
1879 was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must
be signed by the complainant, and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The
authority or official who receives it shall rubricate and seal every page in the presence of the person who
presents it, which also he may do himself or through another person at his request.

"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or official who
receives it, wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such information as the complainant
may have regarding the act complained of and the circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the
bottom. If the complainant cannot sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request." cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a complaint." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date when the justice of
the peace or the gobernadorcillo received information that the offense had been committed (Rule 4), the
procedure being that provided for in Rule 9, which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with the
reading of the complaint, if any there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned and
the introduction of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take
part, may request and the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent.
Immediately thereafter the accused shall be given a hearing, the witnesses who appear in his defense
shall be examined, and such other evidence as the justice or the gobernadorcillo may declare to be
admissible shall be adduced. The parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in
support of their respective contentions, the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part,
then the private complainant, and finally the accused.

"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors, whenever he is
cited thereto, in accordance with Rule 2." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly set forth, and
signed by all the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)

After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of First Instance
within the first day next following that on which notice of the rendition of judgment was served. The
appeal suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been allowed, the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo remitted to the Court of First Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear
within the period of five days before the appellate court. This time could be extended, if the
circumstances of the case required. (Rule 14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial;
but if he did not appear, the appeal was dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16 provides the procedure for the
trial in the second instance. This rule reads: "The hearing at the trial shall be public, and all the
proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the parties or their attorneys may speak in their
turn, and thereafter the judgment shall be pronounced and communicated to them.

"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that which, offered in
the first instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of the parties who had offered it." cralaw virtu a1aw lib rary

Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and there will be no
recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the audiencia del territorio." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration, are as follows: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in
all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts an appeal may be taken to the
Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgments of justices of
the peace in criminal cases to the courts of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter
thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a
statute, wherein appeal may be made to the Supreme Court." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justice’s court shall be tried in all respects anew in the court to
which the same are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be necessary, unless the
appeal shall involve the constitutionality or legality of a statute, that a written record of the proceedings
be kept; but shall be sufficient if the appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form
prescribed in the next preceding section." cralaw vi rtua1 aw lib rary

Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in
which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court
as hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the
peace in a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice
within fifteen days after the entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward
to the Court of First Instance all original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and
the provincial fiscal shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the prosecution. The judgment
of the Court of First Instance in such appeals shall be final and conclusive, except in cases involving the
validity or constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that the military
governor and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the word "statute" found in
section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the amendment of this section by section 34 of that Act does
not affect the issue in the instant case. The original section provided that "an appeal may be made to
the Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as
amended, authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of cases.

It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same rule
of construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to the
same term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be
a correct position in some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of
the term "appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co.
v. Bunn (168 Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"The distinction between a ’writ of error,’ which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of
questions of law only, and an ’appeal,’ which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is
vital. These remedies have their origin and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law
and courts of equity, differences which are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the
laws of Congress. The ’writ of error’ is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in
the final judgment of a common-law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias de
novo. The ’appeal’ is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law along with the fundamentals
which go to make up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the entire cause, and
it subjects the transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial."
cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is
dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and
distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the
same manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as
used in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to
another in its entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be
interpreted by the ordinary rules of construction.

The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain that intention the
provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time
of its promulgation.

At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance
came to the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the facts to a review or retrial. But
the audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not review the judgment of a Court of First Instance in
any case tried on appeal from courts of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction.
Such judgments were final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The
only recourse he had was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of the
provisions of Book 3 of the Penal Code over which justices of the peace then had jurisdiction were
generally arreto or arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in force at the time section 43
(supra) was framed and these were the conditions confronting the framers of that section at that time.
What changes did the section make?

Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts of First Instance
"and in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts." This part of the section is
limited to judgments rendered in criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily
true because the latter part of the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade
(which were Courts of First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices’ courts final and
conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that the
former procedure was amended by section 43 so as to also authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in
the cases mentioned in the latter part thereof when the validity or constitutionality of a statute was
drawn in question. To this extent only was the former procedural law changed in so far as, the question
at issue is concerned. Among the reasons which induced the lawmakers to make this change was the
fact that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was "extended to all offenses which the Penal Code
designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its grades." (Sec. 108.)

If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and unconstitutional, the
judgment appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would have no interest
in presenting to us the evidence taken at the trial. But we have maintained the legality of that
ordinance, and in so doing have we exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section
43 does not expressly so limit our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the testimony
touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation and the
correctness of that imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and between the
illegality of the ordinance and that of the proceedings or actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An
ordinance may, from the standpoint of the regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of
its enactment, be absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or
intrinsically illegal or unconstitutional. On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and
yet the ordinance be illegal or unconstitutional by reason of some fact or circumstance connected with
its passage. It may, for instance, have been presented in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not
voted for as directed by law. It is to facts of this class or character that section 43 refers when it says
"the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality
of a statute."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the latter part of
section 43, already quoted, especially when they are considered in the light of the former practice above
indicated. Under that practice no appeals whatever were allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments
of Courts of First Instance in cases originating in justices’ courts. We must assume that the framers of
section 43 had knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to
the extent only of providing a way by which statutory questions, which might arise in these cases, could
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This object could be very imperfectly obtained, if, when the court
assumed jurisdiction of such a case, it would not only determine the statutory questions, but also inquire
into and determine every other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would
entirely destroy the former practice, because it would render it possible to bring every case here in its
entirety. All that would be necessary would be to raise some statutory question, whether material to the
decision of the case or not, and the right of appeal and reexamination of the whole case would be
assured. Clearly, no such result was intended, nor is it manifest from the language employed in section
43. But it is urged that our ruling in this matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case
and turning over one fragment to one court and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on Appellate
Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is speaking of appellate jurisdiction where the distinction
between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He says: "Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for
one purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The same author recognizes a difference in the two
systems of appellate jurisdiction — that is, the one where the distinction between law and equity is
maintained and, the other, where the two are blended. (Section 24.) In this last section the author says:
"In some respects an appeal under the code system may be less comprehensive in its scope than an
appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein he said that "it is evident that an appeal
under the code system does not necessarily bring up the entire case." In view of the fact that the code
system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and providing for one
remedial system, our holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate Procedure.

It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S.,
472), and followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U.
S., 84), is directly opposed to our holding in the case under consideration. These two cases went to the
Supreme Court of the United States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with
the provisions of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or
writs of error may be taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts, direct to the
Supreme Court in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the distinction between "appeals"
and "writs of error." In each case above cited the Supreme Court of the United States held that it not
only had jurisdiction to review the constitutional questions, but also every other question properly
arising. The court then proceeded to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions of fact,
for the reason that the cases were before the court on writs of error. Even granting that the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction under the Act above mentioned to review both questions of law and fact in cases
appealed to that court, such holding would not be antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the
reason that our power to review the facts touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be
found in section 43 of General Orders No. 58. Our view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that
section did not intend to confer upon this court that power. And all must admit that the military
governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had the power to limit or restrict the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the character of the one under
consideration.

Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court.

In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts stated in the
complaint the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such appeal the only
question to be considered will be that of the validity or invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the
evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which may appear in the record." cralaw virtua 1 aw libra ry

In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the municipal court of
the city of Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of First Instance, where
he was again convicted. An appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the
constitutionality or validity of the ordinance was drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted,
among other things, that the trial court erred in deciding the case without first consulting with the two
assessors. This court held the ordinance valid and, after quoting with approval the language used in the
case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (supra), said: "In cases where the appeal involves the constitutionality or
validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the judgment of the Court of First Instance
on appeal does not authorize this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to
the question of the validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the facts touching
the due enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid, but the facts touching
the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone into.

In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12: "While we have
discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the appellants, nevertheless, the only
question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the law, in the first instance, is whether or not the
ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is
legal and within the express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with
costs in this instance against the appellants in equal parts." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony of a sanitary
inspector and after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case, which is undisputed, is
sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the
defendant himself having introduced substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently
from other persons in that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been
required to do, or that he had in any way been discriminated against in the application of this ordinance
to the facts of his case, or that its application was oppressive or unreasonable in this particular
instance.

"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said, "The sole
question raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that the ordinance in
question is unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that the court did not intend to hold that it had
authority to examine into the question of the guilt or innocence of the Appellant.

In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were convicted of a violation
of Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance,
an appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing of this case the court said: "Precisely this question was
presented in the case of the United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in
which we held that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case is
on all fours with the present one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First Instance is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellants, on the authority of that case." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the
appellants.

In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816); United States
v. Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G.,
No. 7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No. 7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915);
United States v. Li Tia (R. G., No. 7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported,
the appellants were convicted for a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and,
having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this court. This court,
upon the authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed the appeals and directed the
records to be returned to the court below for execution of the sentences.

Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have followed in the
instant case the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In fact, the court has not, since
its organization, held in any case that it has the power to review the facts touching the guilt of an
accused person in cases of the character of the one under consideration.

Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final disposition of cases
wherein the statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The judgment is affirmed," and
at other times we have said "the appeal is dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of little
importance which expression we use. But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing
the legality of the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be
executed without the sanction of this court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment as
the case may be.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendants. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.