People vs.

Alapan (2018)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU PRIVATE COMPLAINANT BRIAN VICTOR

BRITCHFORD vs. SALVADOR ALAPAN
G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018

MARTIRES, J.:

Facts: Accused-appellant Salvador Alapan and his wife Myrna Alapan were charged
with 8 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 after they borrowed ₱400,000.00 and issued 8
postdated checks in favor of petitioner Brian Victor Britchford. The checks were
dishonored when they were deposited. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty to the
charges.

The Municipal Trial Court convicted Alapan of 8 counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22 with
a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment. After a writ of execution was issued, the writ
was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty
for respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.

Both the MTC and RTC denied the motion. Likewise, the CA dismissed the petition for
it was filed without the intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to question the trial court's
order.

Ruling: Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.

Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited
only to the civil liability arising from the crime.

In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for
which he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment pursuant to
Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and 13-2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the
imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the
criminal aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face value of
the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, petitioner
could not appeal the imposition of fine as penalty which was not even questioned by the
People through the OSG. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor
the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law.

Ratio Decidendi: In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom.

Gist: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA, which
dismissed the petition seeking the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
nonpayment of fine in eight (8) cases of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22).
Case Brief: Colinares v People

JANUARY 11, 2017JEFF REY

Colinares
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated
homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
from two years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and
one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable
imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision.
Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to the
Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation
in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that
under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the
accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme
Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of
frustrated homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court

Ruling:
Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of
his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for
probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for
frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the
judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme
Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal,
the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his
own, therefore defying fairness and equity.

G.R. No. 168546 Case Digest

G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
Michael Padua, petitioner
vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Quisumbing

Facts:
June 16, 2003, Padua and Edgar Ubalde were charged before the RTC Pasig of
violation of R.A. No. 9165 [Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs act of 2002] for selling
dangerous drugs. When arraigned, Padua assisted by counsel de officio entered a plea
of not guilty. During the pre-trial, Padua’s counsel de officio manifested that his client
was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail the
benefits granted to 1st time offenders. The prosecutor interposed no objection, thus the
not guilty plea was withdrawn, Padua re-arraigned and pleaded guilty.

Padua then filed a petition for probation alleging that he is a minor and a 1 st time
offender, and that he possess all qualifications and none of the disqualifications of the
probation law. RTC ordered for the post-sentenced investigation and recommendation
and comment of the probation office and the city prosecutor relatively.

Pasana, the chief probation and parole officer recommended Padua to be placed on
probation. However, Judge Reyes-Carpio issued an order denying the petition for
probation on the ground that under R.A. No. 9165, any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law.

Padua filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He filed for a
petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed his petition.
 Issue: Whether Padua can avail the benefits of the Probation Law.

Held:
(1) CA did not err in dismissing Padua’s petition for certiorari. The requisites for the
certiorari must occur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of
authority. There is “excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or
acts without any statutory authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

(2) Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, can not avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No.
968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and
phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined
from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it
says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or
speech is the index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

(3) Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the “Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006” was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the “Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law” has
application in this case. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.

Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be
considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of
Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

Case Brief: Panaguiton vs DOJ

JULY 24, 2019JEFF REY

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI,
respondents.
Facts:
Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business
associate, Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the
signature of both in payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the
checks were dishonored. Petitioner, Panaguiton, made demands but to no avail and so
he filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-
affidavit. Tongson alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and
they are not associates. Panaguiton showed documents proving the signatures of
Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a resolution, City Prosecutor
found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation.

Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson

since the offense had already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the
Department of Justice thru Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed.
But on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
declared that the offense had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time
by Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense has prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of
special acts and that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when
judicial proceedings are instituted.

Held:
SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg.
22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be
not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold
the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation
of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in
the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and
the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the
peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

The court ruled and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s
filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and
thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had
been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of
probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no
longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo Case Digest

Facts:

Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section 178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. During the execution of judgment on
October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of
arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years
later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the
penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial
court.

Issue:

Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had prescribed

Held:

No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties
shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same
Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of
peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence.
But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion
only to those who are deserving. Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded
therefor. (Del Castillo vs. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002)

People v Jalandoni G.R. No. L-57555 August 28, 1984

MARCH 16, 2014LEAVE A COMMENT
To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted
would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of
litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
Facts: Teresa Jalandoni was accused of estafa. The information alleged that she issued
several checks drawn against the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in favor of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI); that the checks were dishonored for lack of funds,
a fact which was known by the accused; and that as a result thereof the BPI suffered
damage in the amount of P1,391,780.00. Subsequently, BPI filed the aforesaid Motion
to Modify Judgment. BPI invoked a Court of Appeals decision People vs. De Castillo,
where the court acquitted the appellant who was accused of malversation of public
funds on the ground of reasonable doubt but nonetheless ordered her to pay the amount
of her civil liability. Accordingly, BPI prayed that in the interest of justice and to avoid
multiplicity of suits, a second paragraph be added to Our judgment,

Issue: Whether or not Jalandoni was denied due process by not affording to her a
separate hearing.

Held: There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be
filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process
has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time,
effort, and money on the part of all concerned.

Jalandoni’s claim that “[t]he amount of the civil liability, if any, is unsettled and requires
necessarily the introduction of proof (Rollo, p. 161) is utterly devoid of merit. As shown
above the appellant has formally admitted that BPI suffered damage in the amount of
P1,391,780.00. For her now to assert that the civil liability, if any, is unsettled is an
insult to the dignity of this Court. We cannot allow a party to state a fact only to disown
it afterwards because of convenience.
Maximo vs. Gerochi Jr. GR. L47994-97

228 Phil. 311

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner Lidelia Maximo to
compel the public respondent Judge Nicolas Gerochi, Jr. to include in his judgment of
acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-XII-1067, 1073, 1074 and 1129, the civil liability
which the private respondent Conchita Panghilason admitted in court.

On June 28, 1976, the City Fiscal of Bacolod filed with the Circuit Criminal Court,
12th Judicial District, Bacolod City, four (4) informations for estafa against respondent
Conchita Panghilason. The informations alleged that Panghilason willfully issued four
(4) checks amounting to P35,586.00 drawn against the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank in favor of the petitioner; that the checks were dishonored for lack of
funds or that her account with said bank had been closed; and that she refused to
make the necessary deposit within three (3) days from receipt of notice to redeem the
said checks.

The petitioner intervened in the case through her private prosecutor on July 10, 1976.

On December 5, 1977, the respondent judge rendered the following judgment:

"Verily, for all said, the Court strongly believes that in the case at bar, the prosecution,
to say the least, failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. That, herein, it appears that if accused had any obligation, it is simply civil in
nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and considering that the prosecution failed
to establish the guilt of accused Conchita Panghilason beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Court finds accused Conchita Panghilason NOT GUILTY of all the above-entitled four
(4) criminal information, and ACQUITS her therefrom, with costs de oficio."

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration praying "that the portion of the
decision regarding the civil liability of the accused be reconsidered and thereafter the
accused who had admitted her civil liability be ordered to pay the sum of P33,586.00
plus 12% interest from the filing of the information."
This motion was denied by the court in an order dated February 20, 1978. The order
stated that the award of civil liability "would not have been a problem if the accused
was convicted, for then, this recovery of civil liability is deemed included in the offense
proved, but the question is not indubitable because the accused was acquitted in all
the four (4) informations she was charged of."

The petitioner, therefore, came to this Court with the present petition.

The lower court is wrong.

If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising
from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment.

The prevailing rule as enunciated by this Court en banc in the case of Padilla v. Court
of Appeals (129 SCRA 558) is that the Court may acquit an accused on reasonable
doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in the same case
without need for a separate civil action. This ruling was reiterated in the case
of People v. Jalandoni (131 SCRA 454) where the accused formally admitted the
amount of civil damages.

The rationale behind the rule is stated in the Padilla case as follows:

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established
in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charge. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The aforementioned case further declared that:

A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established
or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully
terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case, Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate
civil action to be filed.
The evidence taken in this case is summarized by the lower court as follows:

Prosecution evidence tends to show that on January 31, 1976, accused purchased rice
from Mrs. Maximo and paid her the amount of P11, 775.00 in a form of a check which
she accepted after the accused assured her that the check was covered by sufficient
funds which check when presented encashment to the bank was dishonored for
reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A", PCIB Check No. 161478; Exhibit "A-1",
signature of accused; Exhibit "B", the return slip; Exhibit "B-1", remark "account
closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1129;

That on February 1, 1976, accused again purchased rice from her in the amount of
P7,000.00, and in payment for which accused issued a check dated the same day,
February 1, 1976, which she accepted after the accused assured her that it was
supported by sufficient funds hence accused again was able to secure the rice in the
amount of P7,000.00; that she (accused) issued PCIB Check No. 165511, Exhibit "A"
in CCC-XII-1073; that when the check was deposited by a certain Enrique Oh to
whom she indorsed the check, the same was also dishonored for reason of "account
closed." Exhibit "A" the check; Exhibit "A-1," the signature of the accused; Exhibit "B",
the return slip; and Exhibit "B-1", remark "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No.
CCC-XII-1073;

That on February 6, 1976, accused again bought rice from her in the amount of
P11,500.00, and in payment of which was made in check dated the same day
February 6, 1976, PCIB Check No. 161479, which she accepted after the accused
assured her that the same was likewise supported by sufficient funds, hence, again on
February 6, 1976, accused was able to secure rice from her in the amount of
P11,500.00; that the said check when deposit (sic) by Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed it,
it was similarly dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A", the check;
Exhibit "A-1", the signature of the accused; Exhibit "B", the return slip; and Exhibit
"B-1", reason for return, "account closed;" all for Crim. Case No. CCC-XII-1074;

Again on February 7, 1976, accused purchased rice from her in the amount of
P5,300.00 and with the same assurance given her as the previous checks, she
accepted a check which when deposited by Mr. Oh to whom she indorsed the same,
the same was dishonored for reason of "account closed." Exhibit "A" PCIB Check No.
161490; Exhibit "A-1", signature of accused; Exhibit "B", return slip; and Exhibit "B-
1", reason of return, "closed account." All for Crim. Case No. CCC-X11-1067;

That all these sale transactions of rice occured at the Capitol Shopping Center,
Bacolod City, and that all these checks were signed in the presence of complainant
Mrs. Maximo; that accused, despite repeated demands failed to settle the matter with
her hence she was compelled to bring the matter to the Court, and, in the process,
retain the services of counsel to which she covenanted to pay as attorney's fee for
P3,000.00; that the actual total damage incurred by Mrs. Maximo as a result of the
dishonor of the checks in question summed up to P35,500.00; that out of these four
transactions, accused merely made partial payment of P500.00 on December 17,
1975, as shown by Exhibit "1".
Defense evidence, on the other hand, tends to show that accused came to know
complaining witness sometime in 1973; that it was her late husband who used to have
transactions with the latter who allowed her husband to purchase rice on credit; that
she took over the business of buying and selling rice when her husband got sick; that
likewise Mrs. Maximo allowed her to purchase rice on a 15-day credit basis; that she
was allowed to issue postdated checks dated 15 days after the actual purchase; that
consequently, she purchased rice from Mrs. Maximo weekly; that after she got the
rice, she would issue a check for the previous purchases she made, as evidenced by
the checks she had issued to Mrs. Maximo, Exhibit "2" up to Exhibit "21", although all
these checks did not represent all the transactions she had with her amounted
approximately to P480,000.00; that all the checks in question involved in the above-
entitled criminal cases were all issued on January 15 and 21, 1975, and not on the
dates they appeared therein; that the check dated January 31, 1976, covered in Crim.
Case No. CCC-XII-1129 involved a transaction that transpired on January 15, 1975,
and the check was issued on January 21, 1975, and actually postdated January 31,
1975; that the check dated February 1, 1976, in the amount of P7,000.00 was in
payment of a rice transaction that took place on January 15, 1975, and actually
postdated February 1, 1975; that the check dated February 6, 1976, was also in
payment of a rice transaction that occurred on January 21, 1975, and postdated
February 6, 1975; that the check dated February 7, 1976, in the amount of P5,000.00
involved a transaction that actually transpired on January 21, 1975, and a check was
issued in payment for it on January 31, 1975, and also postdated February 7, 1975;
that at the time she was not able to make the necessary deposits because her
husband was then hospitalized and she pleaded to Mrs. Maximo not to encash the
checks, and the latter consented thereto as Mrs. Maximo know that her husband was
really sick, and in fact, he later died on December 3, 1976; that consequently Mrs.
Maximo brought the matter to the PC at the PC Headquarters at Bacolod City, and
they agreed before the PC that she would pay in installment, and on December 17,
1975, she deposited the amount of P500.00 with her, Exhibit "I", that later, Mrs.
Maximo tried to collect thru the Silay Police, and again later thru the PC, and she
offered to pay up to P1,000.00 but Mrs. Maximo refused unless she would pay
P5,000.00 which she went to the PC again in the accompany (sic) of her eight-year old
girl but Mrs. Maximo was not there, and then Sgt. Villanueva asked her to initial all
the questioned checks to be dated 1976; that first she refused but later on she
consented after the assurance of Sgt. Villanueva that no case will be filed against her.

The private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner. Her
defense was directed only towards proving the fact that the checks were issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation, not that the obligation is non-existent or paid in
full. We further note that the private respondent failed to submit her answer to this
petition despite several notices from this Court. She has waived her defenses to the
petition. In his answer, the trial judge justified his refusal to award civil liability with
a statement that the civil liability did not arise from any criminal act but only from a
civil contract connected to the crime. He stated in his denial of the motion for
reconsideration that the action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil court."

The foregoing argument is erroneous in view of the Padilla v. Court of

Appeals and People v. Jalandoni rulings earlier cited which are applicable to the facts
of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The order of the lower court denying
the motion for reconsideration is set aside. The private respondent Conchita
Panghilason is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of P33,586.00 with 12% interest
from July 10, 1976 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211166

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA, Accused-Appellant

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

In a Resolution1 dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision2 dated July 25,
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-
appellant Porferio Culas y Raga (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Statutory Rape, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
July 25, 2013 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS
said Decision finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to
Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, with MODIFICATIONS as to the
amounts of civil indemnity and damages awarded. Thus, [accused-appellant] is
ordered to pay the following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱l
00,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards from the
dated of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 3

However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court
received a Letter 4 dated September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections
informing the Court of accused-appellant's death on February 8, 2014, as evidenced
by the Certificate of Death 5 attached thereto.

As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside said
Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and enter a new one dismissing the criminal case
against accused-appellant.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final
conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against
him.1âwphi1 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;

x x xx

In People v. Layag, 6 the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an
accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,] based solely thereon.1âvvphi1 As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 7

Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it
is well to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts
against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case,
AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be
warranted by law and procedural rules. 8

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated July
18, 2014 in connection with this case; (b) DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754
before the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 by reason of the death of
accused-appellant Porferio Culas y Raga; and (c) DECLARE the instant
case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V. JUGUETA G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016 Murder, Attempted Murder
JUNE 29, 2018

FACTS:

Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by
side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when
suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his companions.

They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for
mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately, having hit and killed his
two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½ years
old respectively.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder.

However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial
Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and Multiple
Attempted Murder.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the CA, which rendered
a Decision affirming appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.

RULING:

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing
of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as
treachery or evident premeditation.

The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery
attended the killing of Norberto’s two children.

Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the
manner of, the commission of the crime.

The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for
attempted murder.

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into
account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations
to that effect.

In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that “[i]t has been held in a long line of cases
that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to
human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.” Dwelling aggravates a felony where the
crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has
not given provocation therefor.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify
the penalties imposed on appellant.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify
the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable
penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder.

However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the
death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for
each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole.

With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for
each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty
should be imposed in its maximum period.

[ GR No. L-21805, Feb 25, 1967 ]

PEOPLE v. FIDEL TAN
DECISION

125 Phil. 822

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

Appeal from the order, dated 4 January 1963, of the Court of First Instance of Samar,
in its Criminal Case No. 4097, denying the government's motion for the re-arrest of the
accused-appellee, Fidel Tan.
The aforesaid appellee was, under a modified Judgment, sentenced by said court to
suffer --
"an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS & FOUR (4) MONTHS, as
minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum, both
of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, indemnify the
heirs of Sinforoso Volfango P3,000.00, and pay the costs."
He appealed, but upon his own motion the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, in a
resolution of 1 August 1958.
The sentence having become final, the accused was committed to the Director of
Prisons, on 2 March 1959, through the provincial warden.
The provincial warden did not, however, commit the prisoner to the national
penitentiary but retained him in the Samar provincial jail.
Thereafter, the warden took it upon himself to apply the provisions of Article 97 and
99 of the Revised Penal Code as well as Act No. 2489, and credited the prisoner with
good conduct time allowance. After the prisoner's actual confinement in Jail for 2
years, 8 months and 21 days, the warden released him on 23 November 1961.
On 6 September 1962, the provincial fiscal moved for the re-arrest of the accused and
to order him recommitted to the national penitentiary, on the ground that
the provincial warden had no authority to release him with good
conduct time allowance. The motion was unopposed.
Acting on the motion, the court required the warden to explain why the prisoner was
kept in the provincial Jail and not "sent to Manila" and to
answer the fiscal's allegation that he released the prisoner without an order from the
Director of Prisons and before the service of the full term of the sentence.
The warden explained as follows:
"That said prisoner was not made to serve his imprisonment in the national
penitentiary because sometime in 1959 our office received a communication from the
Director of Prisons to withhold transfers of prisoners from the provincial jails to the
New Bilibid Prison due to congestion resulting in the bloody riots. In same year when
my attention was called why prisoner Fidel Tan, was not yet sent to Muntinlupa
inspite of the cessation of the riots, I have explained in a letter dated October 1, 1959,
to the Assistant Director of Prisons, that same prisoner could not be sent as he was
undergoing close medical treatment of his left lumbar region where previous wound
was located, his left thigh, and presence of blood in the urine as evidenced by a
medical certificate sent together with my explanation. Being of the opinion and belief
then that if this prisoner be transferred to the national penitentiary he might be
involved in another occasional and undetermined riots, where his physical condition
cannot resist the fear and which may aggravate his ailment, that for the sake of
humanity, until his physical condition should improve but which did not until his time
of release.
"That said prisoner was released without order from the Director of Prisons on the
ground that he cannot be made to still be lodged in the provincial jail when the date of
his release was already due, much less send him to Muntinlupa when the term of his
sentence minus good behavior credit has expired.
"That said prisoner was released after having served the term diminished by the credit
of good conduct time allowance in accordance with the provisions of Art. X1, Sec. 1 (a)
and (b) of the Revised Rules and Regulations for the Government of Insular and
Provincial Prisoners in the Philippines. That the computation made by me was correct
according to my interpretation in good faith of the aforementioned provision based on
the maximum term of sentence of 4 years 2 months."
On 21 September 1962, the lower court issued an order requiring the appearance of
the warden to show the veracity of his information and, on 4 January 1963, it issued
the order that is now the subject of this appeal denying the fiscal's petition to
recommit the accused.
The excuses tendered by the provincial warden are clearly inacceptable. The alleged
fear that the convict Tan might be involved in occasional riots in the Insular
Penitentiary is but a flimsy pretext for evading the warden's plain duty of remitting the
prisoner to his proper place of confinement. Having been sentenced to more than one
year of imprisonment, the convict was not a provincial prisioner but an insular
prisoner (Adm. Code, section 1740), and there being no showing that his life would be
endangered by the trip to Muntinlupa penitentiary, the warden's failure to send him
thither was a breach of duty for which said officer should be held accountable. It
needs no stressing that to allow provincial wardens to retain insular prisoners without
proper authorization would open the way to all sorts of discrimination in the treatment
of prisoners and constitute a standing invitation for the commission of abuses and
anomalies for personal or political motives.
Nor do we find in the record any justification for the warden's usurping the authority
of the Director of Prisons in crediting the prisoner with good conduct time
allowance. Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests such authority exclusively in the
Director and no one else.
Assuming that appellee Tan was entitled to good conduct time allowance, his release
by the provincial warden, after an imprisonment of only 2 years, 8 months and 1 day,
was premature. Under paragraph No. 1, Article 97, of the Revised Penal Code, he may
be allowed a deduction of five (5) days for each month of good behavior during his first
two years of imprisonment, which would be 24 months multiplied by 5, or 120 days;
under paragraph No. 2, he may be allowed a deduction of eight (8) days a month for
the next three years. For the balance of eight (8) months, multiplied by 8, we have 64
days; so that the total credit for good behavior would be 184 days, equivalent to 6
months and 4 days.[1] The prisoner's actual confinement of 2 years, 8 months and 21
days, plus his possible total credit of 6 months and 4 days, would give the result of 3
years, 2 months and 25 days. Since the maximum term of his sentence is 4 years and
2 months, appellee Tan, assuming that he is entitled to good conduct time allowance,
has an unserved portion of 11 months and 5 days.[2]
The court below denied the fiscal's motion for the re-arrest of the accused-appellee on
the following grounds: (a) that when the accused-appellee commenced serving his
sentence and was committed to the warden, the court lost jurisdiction over the
prisoner's "person with respect to his imprisonment"; (b) that to re-arrest him after his
release would amount to double jeopardy, or deprive him of his liberty without due
process of law; and (c) that the accused abided by the judgment and served it in good
faith, even if the act of the jailer was irresponsible and erroneous.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the lower court had already lost jurisdiction
to amend or alter its judgment of conviction, but not over its execution
or satisfaction. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the
convict to the jail authorities -- the commitment was but the start in carrying out of
the court's decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to
see to it that the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully authorized
administrative agencies of the state, the convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful
grounds, set at liberty sooner than the expiration of the sentence imposed.
The prisoner's re-arrest[3] would not place him twice in jeopardy because his re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served
due to the erroneous act of the warden; it is not a new or subsequent
conviction. Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty without due process of
law, because he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released. Service of
penalties and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even elaborately, governed
by the Penal Code and do not depend upon the good faith of the warden and of the
prisoner.
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order is hereby reversed and a new one
entered, ordering the re-arrest, and the continuance of the imprisonment, of
the accused appellee, Fidel Tan, for one (1) year, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
more.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Director of Prisons, who is hereby
directed to incarcerate the appellee in the national penitentiary, if present conditions
thereat would allow his accommodation, or if not, in any other suitable jail, without
prejudice to credit for good behavior from the time he was jailed on 2 March 1959, in
accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code.
Let another copy of this decision be sent to the Secretary of Justice, that he may take
action, if warranted, against the warden concerned.
No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.

[1] The Solicitor-General's computation is 6 months and 10 days.

The Solicitor-General's computation is 10 months and 29 days. The foregoing
[2]

computations suffer from clerical errors and disregard par. 2, Art. 97.
Some authorities hold that a fresh warrant is not necessary (4 Moran 120, 1963
[3]

Ed.).
Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez

Facts: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez
was sentenced to life imprisonment while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before the period for appeal
had expired, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all
persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of
the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed
during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where
the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez
decided to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same.
The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having
committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue: Is admission of guilt necessary in amnesty?

Held: The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong
conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by
the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence"; while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is
not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the
criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient
that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes
within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the
benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the accused does
not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty
Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed
the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the
interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the
accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits
of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the
nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty
Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should
take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming
within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such
offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to said
benefits. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)