Di Siock Jian vs Ong Pacuo

- W/N the donation is pure. NO, conditional obligation because of The fifth clause of the deed of
donation contains an obligation on the part of the person, accepting the donation on behalf of the
donees, to provide the donee with lodging, food, clothing, and laundry, medical attendance and
medicine, and all other things necessary for his subsistence during his lifetime, this obligation to
cease upon the destruction of the property by accident or fortuitous event.

- W/N this donation was duly accepted. Article 626 of the Civil Code provides that persons who
cannot enter into a contract cannot accept conditional or onerous donations without the
intervention of their legal representatives, and according to paragraph 3 of the stipulation of facts,
the mother of the minors had not been appointed by the court as guardian of her children when
she accepted said donation. Not being then the legal representative of her children, she could not
validly accept said donation, for while she is considered as the natural guardian of her minor
children and by virtue thereof she has the right to have them in her custody and educate them,
yet this right does not extend to the properties of said minors unless declared so by the court. If
the donation was not duly accepted in accordance with article 629 of the Civil Code, it was not
perfected, as provided in article 623, there was not any contract binding upon the donor, and
nothing could, therefore, prevent Him from withdrawing the offer, as he did, in the document
Exhibit D.

Santos vs Alana
- Santos and Alana are half blood sibs and they both asserting their right over a parcel of land which
their father owned. At their father’s lifetime, he donated the said lot solely to Santos and Alana
now contends that the donation is inofficious
- W/N the donation is officious. YES accdng to Art 752 Civil Code we held that inofficiousness may
arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the
net value of the estate of the donor deceased. Gregorio’s donation is inofficious as it deprives
respondent of her legitime, he left no property other than the lot in controversy which, under
Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and
the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each
being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.

Ganuelas vs Cawed
Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is immediately
operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor, while in the latter,
nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
- Ganuelas executed a deed of donation in favor of Cawed which reads: “ That for and in
consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the faithful
services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR does by these presents
transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE should die
before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and
effect.” It was revoke by Ganuelas and Cawed now contends that it is a donation inter vivos
- W/N this is a donation inter vivos. NO, it is a donation mortis causaIn the donation subject of the
present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated
properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ―to
 become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that
Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during
her lifetime. More importantly, the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die
before the donor, the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect
shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition.

Abellana vs Sps Ponce

- Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, in order that the donation of an immovable property may be
valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The acceptance may be made in the same
deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done
during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor
shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

Del Rosario vs Ferrer

- Sps Gonzales executed a deed of donation in favor of their son, although denominated as mortis
causa, there was no attestation clause and witnessed only by 2 persons.
- If the donation does not have the quality of “revocability” then it is not a donation mortis causa
even it is title Mortis Causa
- W/N the donation was mortis causa. NO, It was a donation inter vivos. The fact that the
document in question was denominated a sa donation mortis causa is not controlling if a
donation by its terms is inter vivos. In Austria Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
“irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,
where “revocability”is precisely the essence of the act. In the present case, the donors plainly
said that it is”our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected
by the surviving spouse.” The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes even clearer by
the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. The donors in
this case of course reserved the “right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property” and made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently
held that such reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means
that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the
donated property while they lived.

Dolar vs Barangay Lublub

- The pet owned a parcel of land situated in brgy lublub and then they donated the land to brgyt
lublub on the condition that the subject land shall be for the purpose of building public plaza and
shall be initiated and completed within 5 yrs from the execution of this deed of donation. If the
conditions are not satisfied, the property will be reverted back to the pet.
- 1989 the execution of deed of donation, 1998 the filing of quieting of title, pet contends that his
motion is imprescriptible.
- W/N the action for quieting title is proper. NO, In all, petitioner's right of action to revoke or
cancel the donation had indeed prescribed(it must be done within 4 yrs), regardless of whether
the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144 of the Civil Code. It
should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had disputed the existence
of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to revoke, claiming it had already
complied with the construction and development conditions of the donation. From the records,
it would appear that respondent barangay's boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see
it, the establishment on the donated area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile
 force, and a courtroom, all for the benefits of the barangay residents, substantially satisfies the
terms and conditions of the subject donation. The concrete paving of roads and the construction
of government offices, sports complex for public enjoyment and like infrastructures which, per
respondent barangay's estimate, cost not less than P25 Million,27 add persuasive dimension to
the conclusion just made.
Petitioner's long silence vis - Ã -vis the kind of development structures that Barangay Lublub had
decided to put up or allowed to be established on the subject area cannot but be taken as an
indicia of his satisfaction with respondent barangay's choice of public service projects. The
prolonged silence was broken only after the provincial and municipal governments advertised,
then sold the property in a public auction to satisfy questionable tax liabilities.

Calanasan vs Dolorito
- Petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been mortgaged for Pl5K. The
donation was conditional: Evelyn must redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to
possess and enjoy the property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the
donation and its terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property, had
the title of the land transferred to her name, and granted the petitioner usufructuary rights over
the donated land. the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J. Calanasan, complained with
the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude against her.
- Whether or not the petitioner may revoke the donation because of acts of ingratitude. NO.
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value
of the burden imposed." The SC agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee
the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the donation was onerous. As an
endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract;
hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the NCC finds no application with
respect to the onerous portion of the donation.

- Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation
exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the
provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation.
She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the
ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it was her husband who committed them.
Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister
who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the
purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

Cano vs Cano
- Respondents claim of ownership is bases on a sale, while pet ownership is bases on unregistered
propter nuptias. Pet contend that propter nuptias is valid despite of being unregistered.
- W/N the propter nuptias should prevail over the sale. NO pursuant to the Civil Code, , all rights
over immovable property must be duly inscribed or annotated on the Registry of Deeds before
they can affect the rights of third persons. In the absence of proof that respondents participated
in the transaction, or had knowledge of petitioners’ interest over the land at the time the
property was purchased in 1982, this Court must rule that they are not bound by the
unregistered donation. Hence, the conveyance had no effect as to respondents.
 Province of CamSur vs Bodega Glassware
- The court has affirmed the validity of “automatic revocation” clause in donations
- That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of
land subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building
to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used
by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. in connection with its functions under its
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High
School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage
or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of
any party and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to
above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this
donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and of no
further force and effect. It asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation
when it leased the property to Bodega.
- In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause.
The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked x x x."[50] We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic
revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased
the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted
to it. Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it,
the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner

The Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Fatima vs Alzona

- The pet is a religious group that help abandoned and neglected elders. Purificacion donated
parcels of land to the pet and when she died her brother filed motion for nullification of the said
donation contending that the pet had no authority to accept donation because it was not
registered as a corp in SEC.
- W/N the pet has legal capacity to accept donation? YES It held that Purificacion dealt with the
Missionary Sisters as if it were a corporation. While the underlying contract which is sought to be
enforced is that of a donation, and thus rooted on liberality, it could not be said that Purificacion,
as the donor, failed to acquire any benefit therefrom so as to prevent the application of the
doctrine of corporation by estoppel. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel is founded on
principles of equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. It applies when a non-
existent corporation enters into contracts or dealings with third persons. In which case, the
person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with the non-existent corporation is estopped to
deny the latter’s legal existence in any action leading out of or involving such contract or dealing

Republic vs Sps Llamas

- DPWH seeks to appropriate the lands of respondent for the widening of Sucat Rd. The RTC
approved the 12,000 pesos per sqm but DPWH did not obey the RTC contending The
Department of Public Works and Highways insists that the road lots are not compensable since
they have "already been withdrawn from the commerce of man
- W/N the subject lands are now not within the commerce of man? NO, the court held that a
"positive act" must first be made by the "owner-developer before the city or municipality can
acquire dominion over the subdivision roads." As there is no such thing as an automatic cession
to government of subdivision road lots, an actual transfer must first be effected by the
subdivision owner: "subdivision streets belonged to the owner until donated to the government
or until expropriated upon payment of just compensation." Stated otherwise, "the local
government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be
utilized as a public road."