G.R. No.
173473 December 17, 2008 the said accused, representing themselves to have the power and capacity to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BETH TEMPORADA, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification the May 14, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant Beth Temporada of the crime of large
scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and
five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles,
Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth
Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC),
recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants Rogelio
Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn Estacio
and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The accused and appellant
were then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred
business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After complainants had submitted all
the requirements consisting of their respective application forms, passports, NBI
clearances and medical certificates, the accused and appellant, on different dates,
collected and received from them placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from
Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00; b) from Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from
Evelyn Estacio – P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle – P69,520.00 and e) from Luz
Minkay – P69,520.00. As none of them was able to leave nor recover the amounts
they had paid, complainant lodged separate criminal complaints against accused
and appellant before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002,
Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations
against the accused and appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under
Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended, and the rest for five (5) counts
of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:
Criminal Case No. 02-208371:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M.
MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between the months of
September 2001 and January 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment
to REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., DENNIS T. DIMAANO, EVELEYN V. ESTACIO,
SOLEDAD B. ATTE and LUZ MINKAY without first having secured the required
license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law,
and charge or accept directly or indirectly from said complainant[s] the
amount of PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00, PH69,520.00,
PH69,520.00, respectively, as placement fees in consideration for their
overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than that
specified in the scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and without fault of the said complainants, failed to actually
deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expenses they incurred in
connection with the documentation and processing of their papers for
purposes of their deployment.
Contrary to law."
Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five (5)
Informations for estafa contain substantially identical averments as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-208372:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE M. MIRANDA,
BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between November 23, 2001 and
January 12, 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., prior
to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they
have the power and capacity to recruit and employ ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., as
technician in Singapore and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and
succeeded in inducing said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give and deliver, as in fact
he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P57,600.00 on the strength of
said manifestations and representations said accused well knowing that the same
were false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in
fact they did obtain the amount of P57,600.00, which amount, once in their
possession, with intend to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR. in the
aforesaid amount of P57,000.00 Philippine Currency.
 Contrary to law."
The other four (4) Informations for estafa involve the following complainants and
amounts:
1. DENNIS T. DIMAANO P66,520.00
2. EVELYN V. ESTACIO P88,520.00
3. SOLEDAD B. ATLE P69,520.00
4. LUZ T. MINKAY P69,520.003
Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at
large. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
After joint trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant of all
the charges:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth
Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING
the said accused, as principal of the offenses charged and she is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum for the estafa committed against complainant
Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.; the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis Dimaano,
Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven (11) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.
The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants actual
damages as follows:
1. Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr. P57,600.00
2. Dennis T. Dimaano 66,520.00
3. Evelyn V. Estacio 88,520.00
4. Soledad B. Atte 66,520.00
5. Luz T. Minkay 69,520.00
SO ORDERED.4
In accordance with the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,5 this case was referred to the
CA for intermediate review. On February 24, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification the
Decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
208373, 02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.6
Before this Court, appellant ascribes the lone error that the trial court gravely erred in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa despite the
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed for
the five (5) counts of estafa.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. – x x x
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said
Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.7
In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her
co-accused, misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business to
obtain overseas employment upon payment of a placement fee which was duly collected
from complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano, Evelyn Estacio, Soledad Atle and
Luz Minkay. Further, the certification8 issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and the testimony of Ann Abastra Abas, a representative of said
government agency, established that appellant and her co-accused did not possess any
authority or license to recruit workers for overseas employment. And, since there were
five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found appellant liable for illegal recruitment in
large scale.
Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the
requirement of her employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove
that she was aware of the latter’s illegal activities and that she actively participated
therein. In essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower courts.
The contention is untenable.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.9 Appellant actively took part in the illegal
recruitment of private complainants. Rogelio Legaspi testified that after introducing
herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a
technician in Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor. In addition
to the placement fee of P35,000.00 which he paid to accused Bernadette Miranda, he
also handed the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant who, in turn, issued him a receipt for
the total amount of P45,000.00. Upon the other hand, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay, who
applied as factory workers in Hongkong through co-accused, Emily Salagonos, declared
that it was appellant who briefed them on the requirements for the processing of their
application, and assured them and Dennis Dimaano of immediate deployment for jobs
abroad. For her part, Evelyn Estacio testified that aside from the placement fee of
P40,000.00 that she paid to co-accused "Baby" Robles in connection with her purported
overseas employment, she also gave appellant P10,000.00 for which she was issued a
receipt for the amount of P5,000.00.
The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable
participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of
complainants. As aptly found by the CA:
Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to
complainants as general manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining them,
briefing them on the requirements for deployment and assuring them that they
could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts, unerringly show
unity of purpose with those of her co-accused in their scheme to defraud
private complainants through false promises of jobs abroad. There being
conspiracy, appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even
if she herself did not personally reap the fruits of their execution. We quote
with approval the trial court’s findings on the matter:
"xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her co-accused Rosemarie
"Baby" Robles, Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan, and Jojo Resco in
convincing complainants xxx to apply for overseas jobs and giving
complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis Dimaano guarantee that
they would be hired as factory workers in Hongkong, complainant Rogelio
Legaspi, as Technician in Singapore and Evelyn Estacio as quality controller
in a factory in Hongkong, despite the fact that the accused was not licensed
to do so.
It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the Alternative
Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth Temporada introduced
herself as ATTC’s General Manager. Saod accused was also the one who
received the P10,000.00 given by complainant Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. and the
P10,000.00 given by complainant Evelyn Estacio as payment for their visa
and plane ticket, respectively."10
Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of
the activities of her co-accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even
assuming arguendo that appellant was indeed unaware of the illegal nature of said
activities, the same is hardly a defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment.
Under The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.11 Thus, the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary and the fact alone that the accused
violated the law warrants her conviction.12
In the instant case, we find no reason to depart from the rule that findings of fact of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded
great respect by an appellate court. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court because it is in the position to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.13 Further, there is no showing of any
ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against appellant. Absent
such improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full weight and credit.
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore, properly meted the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on the appellant.
Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the
same. Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the RPC.14 The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party
suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. 15 The same evidence
proving appellant’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability
for estafa. As previously discussed, appellant together with her co-accused defrauded
complainants into believing that they had the authority and capability to send
complainants for overseas employment. Because of these assurances, complainants
parted with their hard-earned money in exchange for the promise of future work abroad.
However, the promised overseas employment never materialized and neither were the
complainants able to recover their money.
While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that
the CA erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated
from the doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres;16 hence its decision should be reversed
with respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the appellate
court’s Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate
penalties imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the
latter, were erroneously computed and must necessarily be rectified.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is within the
range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year
of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión
mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should
be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 6517 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the
maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.18 The incremental penalty, when proper, shall
thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the
discretion of the court.19
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by
P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall
be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan20 in consonance
with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused.
The doctrine enunciated in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was
utilized in computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In
accordance with the above procedure, the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentences imposed by the RTC should be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC
sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum
term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
mayor, and not 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the amounts
defrauded were P66,520.00, P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid
three estafa cases. Since the amounts defrauded exceed P22,000.00 by P44,520.00,
P47,520.00, and P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period
of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be
validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor, and not 10 years and
1 day of prisión mayor.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00,
the accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months
of prisión correccional as minimum, to 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum.
Since the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be added
to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum
term, therefore, that can be validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21 days
of reclusión temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.
Response to the dissent.
In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Court has consistently followed the doctrine
espoused in Pabalan and more fully explained in Gabres. The dissent argues that Gabres
should be reexamined and abandoned.
We sustain Gabres.
I.
The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the
maximum term shall first be computed by applying the incremental penalty rule, and
thereafter the minimum term shall be determined by descending one degree down the
scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel but erroneous interpretation of the
ISL in relation to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is not clear
how the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the legal
justification therefor is not clear because the meaning of the terms "penalty,"
"prescribed penalty," "penalty actually imposed," "minimum term," "maximum term,"
"penalty next lower in degree," and "one degree down the scale of penalties" are not
properly set out and are, at times, used interchangeably, loosely and erroneously.
For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of certain terms
in the sense that they will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be aligned to
what the dissent appears to be proposing in order to clearly address the points raised by
the dissent.
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined
therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the
"prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 24922 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty
for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of
imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances
which when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty
to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the
"imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under
the RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable
penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is
the "penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of
homicide with a prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the imposable
penalty is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided it
is within said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal,24 which is a single fixed penalty, with no
minimum or maximum term.
With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum
and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence.25 Section 1 of the ISL provides –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.
Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the
pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand,
the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the
maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the
minimum term could be anywhere within the range of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day
to 12 years) which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have possibly been imposed.
If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term
based on the maximum term after the attending or modifying circumstances are
considered, the basis for computing the minimum term, under this interpretation, is the
imposable penalty26 as hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at odds with Section 1
of the ISL which clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
"within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense." Consequently, the basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed
penalty,27 and not the imposable penalty.
In People v. Gonzales,28 the Court held that the minimum term must be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense "without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability."29 The Gonzales’ ruling that the minimum term must be
based on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal
liability" is only a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be
taken from within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and
from nowhere else).30
Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise that its so-called "regular
formula" has generally been followed in applying the ISL. To reiterate, according to the
dissent, the "regular formula" is accomplished by first determining the maximum term
after considering all the attending circumstances; thereafter, the minimum term is
arrived at by going one degree down the scale from the maximum term. As previously
discussed, this essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the minimum
term shall be taken from the penalty next lower to the imposable penalty (and not the
prescribed penalty.) In more concrete terms and using the previous example of homicide
with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would mean that the minimum term for
homicide will no longer be based on reclusión temporal (i.e., the prescribed penalty for
homicide) but reclusión temporal in its maximum period (i.e., the imposable penalty for
homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance) so much so that the minimum
term shall be taken from reclusión temporal in its medium period (and no longer
from prisión mayor) because this is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal in its
maximum period. The penalty from which the minimum term is taken is, thus,
significantly increased. From this example, it is not difficult to discern why this
interpretation radically departs from how the ISL has generally been applied by this
Court. The dissent’s "regular formula" is, therefore, anything but regular.
In fine, the "regular formula" espoused by the dissent deviates from the ISL and
established jurisprudence and is, thus, tantamount to judicial legislation.
II.
There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or "stagnating" the minimum term within the
range of prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that the minimum term taken
from the aforementioned range of penalty need not be the same for every case
of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,31 the
Court provided some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty:
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in
Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not
be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by said Code for the offense."32 We are here upon new ground.
It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the
courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever
had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first,
the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the
minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors
and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
xxxx
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum
penalty, namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the
term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the
basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem
valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General,
Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the
criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens
up an almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the
court to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view
that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social
order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be
considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral;
(6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his
demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8)
the manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the
gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave
crimes – this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for
analogous crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward
his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important
factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of
protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive
individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and
other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to
individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.33
Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines in Ducosin, will
impose the same minimum term to one who commits an estafa involving P13,000.00 and
another involving P130 million. In fact, to a lesser degree, this is what happened in the
instant case where the trial court sentenced the accused to the same minimum term of 4
years and 2 months of prisión correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208372, 02-208373,
02-208375, 02-208376, and 02-208374 where the amounts defrauded were P57,600.00,
P66,520.00, P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However, there is no
absurdity and injustice for two reasons.
One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by a court would be the same,
the maximum term would be greater for the convict who committed estafa involving
P130 million (which would be 20 years of reclusion temporal) than the convict who
swindled P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisión correccional maximum
to prisión mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).34 Assuming
that both convicts qualify for parole after serving the same minimum term, the convict
sentenced to a higher maximum term would carry a greater "burden" with respect to the
length of parole surveillance which he may be placed under, and the prison term to be
served in case he violates his parole as provided for in Sections 635 and 836 of the ISL.
Under Section 6, the convict shall be placed under a period of surveillance equivalent to
the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release
and discharge by the Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the convict with the higher
maximum term would have to serve a longer period upon his re-commitment in prison in
case he violates his parole because he would have to serve the remaining portion of the
maximum term, unless the Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a
new parole to the said convict as provided for in Section 8.
Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities, to this
limited extent, the ISL still preserves the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for a
convict who commits estafa involving a greater amount as compared to one who
commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether these differences in treatment are
sufficient in substance and gravity involves a question of wisdom and expediency of the
ISL that this Court cannot delve into.
Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the range of the
penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty is, likewise, applicable to other offenses
punishable under the RPC. For instance, the minimum term for an accused guilty of
homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance vis-à-vis an accused guilty of
homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances would both be taken
from prisión mayor – the penalty next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict
guilty of homicide with three ordinary aggravating circumstances committed a more
perverse form of the felony. Yet it is possible that the court, after applying the guidelines
in Ducosin, will impose upon the latter the same minimum term as the accused guilty of
homicide with one generic mitigating circumstance. This reasoning can be
applied mutatis mutandis to most of the other offenses punishable under the RPC.
Should we then conclude that the ISL creates absurd results for these offenses as well?
In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the legislature to
be beneficial to the convict in order to "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness."37 By the legislature’s deliberate design, the range of penalty from which the
minimum term is taken remains fixed and only the range of penalty from which the
maximum term is taken changes depending on the number and nature of the attending
circumstances. Again, the reason why the legislature elected this mode of beneficence to
a convict revolves on questions of wisdom and expediency which this Court has no power
to review. The balancing of the State’s interests in deterrence and retributive justice vis-
à-vis reformation and reintegration of convicts to society through penal laws belongs to
the exclusive domain of the legislature.
III.
People v. Romero,38 De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,39 Salazar v. People,40 People v.
Dinglasan41 and, by analogy, People v. Dela Cruz42 do not support the formula being
proposed by the dissent.
The instant case involves a violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC.43 The penalty for
said violation is–
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x
In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar involved violations of Article 315 of the RPC
as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 168944 because: (1) the funds defrauded
were contributed by stockholders or solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public, (2) the amount defrauded was greater than P100,000.00, and (3)
the estafa was not committed by a syndicate. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 provides–
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable
shall be reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua if the amount of the fraud
exceeds 100,000 pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the prescribed penalty is reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua, the minimum
terms were taken from prisión mayor, which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty.45 As can be seen, these cases involved a different penalty structure that does not
make use of the incremental penalty rule due to the amendatory law. Thus, the
comparison of these cases with Gabres is improper.
Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing checks
which is punishable under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 488546–
Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and fifteen is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
and P.D. No. 81847–
Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusión temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusión perpetua; x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum
was increased to reclusión temporal by the amendatory law. Consequently, the penalty
next lower to reclusión temporal is prisión mayor from which the minimum term was
taken. This is the reason for the higher minimum term in this case as compared to
Gabres. In fact, Dinglasan is consistent with Gabres–
Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is criminally liable
for estafa, exceeds P22,000, the penalty abovecited must be "imposed in its
maximum period, adding 1 year for each additional P10,000." Pursuant to
People vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, Oct. 28, 1999, an indeterminate
sentence shall be imposed on the accused, computed favorably to him. In this
case, the indeterminate sentence should be computed based on the maximum
period of reclusión temporal as maximum, which is from 17 years, 4 months,
and 1 day to 20 years. The minimum period of the sentence should be within
the penalty next lower in degree as provided in the Revised Penal Code,
i.e., prisión mayor, which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment.
Considering that the excess of the fraud committed, counting from the base of
P22,000, is only P4,400, which is less than the P10,000 stated in P.D. 818, there
is no need to add one year to the maximum penalty abovecited.48 (Emphasis
supplied)
As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisión mayor) was determined without
considering in the meantime the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00
on the prescribed penalty (i.e., reclusión temporal).
Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty for qualified
theft is two degrees higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty structure for
simple theft49 and estafa is similar in that both felonies (1) requires that the prescribed
penalty be imposed in its maximum period when the value of the thing stolen or the
amount defrauded, as the case may be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2) provides for an
incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00. It should be pointed out, however, that the prescribed penalty for simple
theft is prisión mayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is lower at prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum.
Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is, thus, reclusión
temporal medium and maximum, while the minimum term is taken from the range
of prisión mayor maximum to reclusión temporal minimum, which is the penalty next
lower to reclusión temporal medium and maximum. The penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess of
P22,000.00 consistent with Gabres. In fact, Dela Cruz expressly cites Gabres–
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusión temporal medium and maximum, the penalty next
lower would be prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusión temporal in its
minimum period. Thus, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
anywhere within ten (10) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.
 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved in the present case
exceeds P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full
indeterminate sentence, not in the initial determination of the indeterminate
penalty. (citing Gabres) Thus, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
in this case is the maximum period of reclusión temporal medium and
maximum, which ranges from eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty
one (21) days to twenty (20) years, as computed pursuant to Article 65, in
relation to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.50 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting Opinion’s thesis that the minimum
term should be computed based on the maximum term. Quite the
contrary, Dinglasan and Dela Cruz are consistent with Gabres.
IV.
The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as analogous
to a modifying circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation that the "attending
circumstances" mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL are limited to those modifying
circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. Section 1 of the
ISL is again quoted below –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit "attending
circumstances" as referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended
that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it
could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other modifying
circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as "attending
circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism under
Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this provision, "any person who shall commit a felony
after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence,
or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony." This circumstance has been interpreted by the
Court as a special aggravating circumstance where the penalty actually imposed is taken
from the prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic
mitigating circumstances.52 Since quasi-recidivism is considered as merely a special
aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is computed based on the
prescribed penalty without first considering said special aggravating circumstance as
exemplified in People v. Manalo53 and People v. Balictar.54
The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and spirit
of "attending circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by the Court
in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule is analogous to a
modifying circumstance.
Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides –
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period
to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x
Under Gabres, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is the prescribed
penalty55 for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special aggravating
circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually imposed shall be taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the
prescribed penalty without in the meantime considering the effect of the amount
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00.
What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the amount
defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its
maximum period but there is imposed an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule
applicable to estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to
the maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty
actually imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).
This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to
interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the
letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL.
Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted
as referring to such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in
the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on the
prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially
meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00
and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its
core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing the
penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it
serves the same function of determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying
circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which
the former accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the
incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying
circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental penalty rule falls
within the scope of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of inclusion because this interpretation is more favorable to the
accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.56 Thus, even if the Dissenting
Opinion’s interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and
the dissent’s interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since it is the interpretation
more favorable to the accused.
V.
The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the minimum
term does not make sense within the meaning of "degrees" under the RPC because the
minimum and maximum terms consist of single fixed penalties. At any rate, the point
seems to be that the penalty from which the minimum term is taken should only be one
degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken.
As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term
fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in
this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the
case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is
taken from reclusión temporal in its maximum period which is within the prescribed
penalty of reclusión temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisión
mayor which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal; hence, the one-degree
difference observed by the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the
prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years
of reclusión temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisión correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated
general rule.57
However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the minimum term
is taken is only one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is
taken, and completely another thing to claim that the penalty from which the minimum
term is taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from which the
maximum term is taken.
The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general observation from the
application of generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances in the RPC in
relation to the ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree difference as an
essential requisite of an "attending circumstance." If the application of the incremental
penalty rule deviates from the one-degree difference, this only means that the law itself
has provided for an exception thereto. Verily, the one-degree difference is a mere
consequence of the generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances created by
the legislature. The difficulty of the dissent with the deviation from its so-called one-
degree difference rule seems to lie with the inability to view these "attending
circumstances" as mere artifacts or creations of the legislature. It does not make sense to
argue that the legislature cannot formulate "attending circumstances" that operate
differently than these generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, and
that, expectedly, leads to a different result from the one-degree difference–for it would
be to say that the creator can only create one specie of creatures. Further, it should be
reasonably assumed that the legislature was aware of these special circumstances, like
the incremental penalty rule or privileged mitigating circumstances, at the time it
enacted the ISL as well as the consequent effects of such special circumstances on the
application of said law. Thus, for as long as the incremental penalty rule is consistent with
the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, there is no obstacle to its
treatment as such.
VI.
Much has been said about the leniency, absurdity and unjustness of the result
under Gabres; the need to adjust the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty to
make it commensurate to the gravity of the estafa committed; the deterrence effect of a
stiffer imposition of penalties; and a host of other similar reasons to justify the reversal
of Gabres. However, all these relate to policy considerations beyond the wording of the
ISL in relation to the RPC; considerations that if given effect essentially seek to rewrite
the law in order to conform to one notion (out of an infinite number of such notions) of
wisdom and efficacy, and, ultimately, of justice and mercy.
This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of debate. The Constitution forbids it, and
the principle of separation of powers abhors it. The Court applies the law as it finds it and
not as how it thinks the law should be. Not too long ago in the case of People v.
Veneracion,58 this Court spoke about the dangers of allowing one’s personal beliefs to
interfere with the duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later, once again
assumes much relevance in this case:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, the law becomes meaningless. A government
of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of
their own personal beliefs.59
VII.
Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental penalty rule
based on the phrases "shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case
may be" and "for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code" found in the last
sentence of said rule, viz:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in
construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable60 but contradictory constructions,
the one more favorable to the accused should be upheld, which in this case is Gabres.
The reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory construction in
this wise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be
strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce
statutory penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought
to be imposed. This simply means that words are given their ordinary meaning
and that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of
anyone subjected to a criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been
accorded the status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not
subject to abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several
justifications based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused
individuals. Strict construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to
mean that penal statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in
language people generally understand, about actions that would result in
liability and the nature of potential penalties. A number of courts have said:
… the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed … is a
fundamental principle which in our judgment will never be altered.
Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and
subjects of making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission
of which the citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the
canons of interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to criminal
statutes, and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction]
…. The burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their
power, it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.
xxxx
Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary
discretion by officials and judges. As one judge noted: "the courts should be
particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not overthrown, in order to
reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to be, sheltered behind them."
But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not clearly
and unequivocally prescribed it could result in judicial usurpation of the
legislative function. One court has noted that the reason for the rule is "to
guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not
within the contemplation of the legislature." Thus the rule requires that before
a person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the
statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute is open to more than one
interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts further
rationalize this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground that it
 7 People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 135382, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 451, 458.
was not the defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the
statute. Along these same lines, courts also assert that since the state makes
the laws, they should be most strongly construed against it.61 (Emphasis 8
Exhibits "A," "L," and "L-1."
supplied; citations omitted)
9 People v. Cabais, G.R. No. 129070, March 16, 2001, 354 SCRA 553, 561.
Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable
10 CA rollo, pp. 9-10.
interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe penalty was
adopted.62
11 Supra note 7 at 462.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the
12
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit: Id.

13 People v. Guambor, G.R. No. 152183, January 22, 2004, 420 SCRA 677, 683.
(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as 14 People v. Ballesteros, G.R. Nos. 116905-908, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 193, 212.
minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum.
15 Id. at 213.
(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión 16 335 Phil. 242 (1997).
correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as
maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases. 17
ARTICLE 65. Rule in Cases in Which the Penalty is Not Composed of Three Periods. – In cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained in
(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as forming one period of each of the three portions.
minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión temporal as
18
maximum. People v. Saley, G.R. No. 121179, July 2, 1998, 291 SCRA 715, 753-754.

19 Id. at 755.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
20 331 Phil. 64 (1996).
SO ORDERED.
21 332 Phil. 710, 730-731 (1996).
Footnotes

22
1 ARTICLE 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill
CA rollo, pp. 121-136. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article,
Amelita G. Tolentino and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusión temporal.

2
Penned by Hon. Reynaldo G. Ros. 23 3 Phil. 437 (1904).

3 CA rollo, pp. 121-124. 24 Id. at 440.

4 Id. at 125-26. 25
The penalty is considered "indeterminate" because after the convict serves the minimum term, he or
she may become eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period
5 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640. between the minimum and maximum term indeterminate in the sense that he or she may, under the
conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in whole or in part. (People v. Ducosin,
6 CA rollo, p. 135. 59 Phil. 109, 114 [1933])
26In the other portions of the dissent though, there is also the impression that the basis is the penalty 31 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
actually imposed as hereinabove defined. Whether it is the imposable penalty or penalty actually
imposed, the dissent’s interpretation contravenes the ISL because the minimum term should be fixed 32
This wording of Act No. 4103 was later amended to the current wording "minimum which shall be
based on the prescribed penalty.
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense" by Act No.
4225.
27See Aquino and Griño-Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1997 ed., pp. 772-773; Padilla, Criminal
Law: Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1988 ed., pp. 211-214. 33 Supra note 31 at 116-118.

28
73 Phil. 549 (1941). 34
Similarly, in the instant case, the maximum term imposed on the accused increased as the amount
defrauded increased in the various criminal cases filed against her as a consequence of the incremental
29
Id. at 552. penalty rule.

30The dissent cites several cases to establish that Gonzales has not been followed in cases outside of
estafa. An examination of these cases reveals that this assertion is inaccurate.
1. Sabang v. People, G.R. No. 168818, March 9, 2007, 518 SCRA 35; People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474,
June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 169060, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA
660; People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 296; People v. Abulon, G.R. No.
174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675.
Gonzales was applied in these cases.
2. People v. Miranda, G.R. No. 169078, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 555; Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858,
July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 827–belongs to the class of cases involving accessories and accomplices as well as
the frustrated and attempted stages of a felony.
Strictly speaking, these cases do not deviate from Gonzales. Here, the prescribed penalty for the principal
and consummated stage, respectively, should be merely viewed as being lowered by the proper number
of degrees in order to arrive at the prescribed penalties for accomplices and accessories as well as the
frustrated and attempted stages of a felony. In turn, from these prescribed penalties, the minimum term
is determined without considering in the meantime the modifying circumstances, as in Gonzales.
3. Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 827–belongs to the class of cases involving
privileged mitigating circumstances.
35 Sec. 6. Every prisoner released from confinement on parole by virtue of this Act shall, at such times and
in such manner as may be required by the conditions of his parole, as may be designated by the said
Board for such purpose, report personally to such government officials or other parole officers hereafter
appointed by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence for a period of surveillance equivalent to the
remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence as herein provided. The officials so designated shall keep such records
and make such reports and perform such other duties hereunder as may be required by said Board. The
limits of residence of such paroled prisoner during his parole may be fixed and from time to time changed
by the said Board in its discretion. If during the period of surveillance such paroled prisoner shall show
himself to be a law-abiding citizen and shall not violate any of the laws of the Philippine Islands, the Board
of Indeterminate Sentence may issue a final certificate of release in his favor, which shall entitle him to
final release and discharge.
36Sec. 8. Whenever any prisoner released on parole by virtue of this Act shall, during the period of
surveillance, violate any of the conditions of his parole, the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may issue an
order for his re-arrest which may be served in any part of the Philippine Islands by any police officer. In
such case the prisoner so re-arrested shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum
sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, unless the Board of Indeterminate Sentence
shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the said prisoner.
37 Supra note 31 at 117.
38 G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 90.

These cases are, to a certain extent, an exception to the rule enunciated in Gonzales. Here, the prescribed 39
G.R. No. 103065, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 397.
penalty is first reduced by the proper number of degrees due to the existence of a privileged mitigating
circumstance. As thus reduced, the penalty next lower in degree is determined from which the minimum 40 G.R. No. 149472, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 162.
term is taken. To the extent that the privileged mitigating circumstance, as a modifying circumstance, is
first applied to the prescribed penalty before the penalty next lower in degree is determined, these cases
deviate from Gonzales. However, this interpretation is based on the special nature of a privileged 41 G.R. No. 133645, September 17, 2002, 389 SCRA 71.
mitigating circumstance as well as the liberal construction of penal laws in favor of the accused. If the
privileged mitigating circumstance is not first applied to the prescribed penalty before determining the 42 383 Phil. 213 (2000).
penalty next lower in degree from which the minimum term is taken, it may happen that the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence would be lower than the minimum term, or that the minimum and
43Estafa committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
maximum term would both be taken from the same range of penalty–absurdities that the law could not
have intended. These special considerations which justified a deviation from Gonzales are not present in qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar
the instant case. As will be shown later, Gabres is a reasonable interpretation of the ISL in relation to deceits.
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, and any contrary interpretation would be unfavorable to the accused.
44 Effective April 6, 1980.
45 See Article 61 of the RPC. paragraphs within a single article. Under Article 315, the penalty for estafa when the amount defrauded is
over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 and when such amount exceeds P22,000.00 is lumped
46 within the same paragraph. Thus, the penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum
Effective June 17, 1967.
may be reasonably considered as the starting point for the computation of the penalty actually imposed,
and hence, the prescribed penalty when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. As will be discussed
47 Effective October 22, 1975. shortly, the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 may then be treated as a special aggravating
circumstance and the incremental penalty as analogous to a modifying circumstance in order to arrive at
48 Supra note 41 at 80. the penalty actually imposed consistent with the letter and spirit of the ISL in relation to the RPC.

56 People v. Ladjaalam, 395 Phil. 1, 35 (2000).

49 ARTICLE 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

57Cases involving privileged mitigating circumstances would, likewise, deviate from this general rule since
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the maximum term would be taken from a penalty lower than the prescribed penalty. See note 13.
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall 58
G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995, 249 SCRA 244.
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión 59
Id. at 251.
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x

60The aforesaid phrases are broad enough to justify Mr. Justice Azcuna’s interpretation, however, they
50 Supra note 42 at 227-228.
are vague enough not to exclude the interpretation under Gabres. The said phrases may be so construed
without being inconsistent with Gabres. (See Articles 90 and 92 of the RPC)
51ARTICLE 160. Commission of Another Crime During Service of Penalty Imposed for Another Previous
Offense – Penalty. – Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall commit a felony 61 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59:3 (6th ed.)
after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving
the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
62 Id. citing Buzzard v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 641, 114 S.E. 664 (1992).
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the
age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of
such clemency.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y
52
See People v. Perete, 111 Phil. 943, 947 (1961).
SUNGA, respondent. REGALADO, J.:

53
G.R. No. L-55177, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 98, 110. Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with
a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known
54 G.R. No. L-29994, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 500, 511. as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about
October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of
The dissent argues that the use of quasi-recidivism as an example of an "attending circumstance" which is marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum
outside the scope of Article 14 of the RPC is inappropriate because quasi-recidivism is sui generis. The of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
argument is off-tangent. The point is simply that quasi-recidivism is not found under Article 14 of the RPC positive for marijuana.1
yet it is treated as an "attending circumstance" for purposes of the application of the ISL in relation to the
RPC. Hence, there are "attending circumstances" outside the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. For
the same reason, the incremental penalty rule is a special rule outside of Article 14 which, as will be Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest
discussed later on, serves the same function as modifying circumstances under Articles 13 and 14 of the following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was
RPC. See also Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, 14th ed., 1998, p. 766. temporarily detained,2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial
conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.
55
The common thread in the RPC is to fix the prescribed penalty as the starting point for determining the
prison sentence to be finally imposed. From the prescribed penalty, the attending circumstances are then
considered in order to finally fix the penalty actually imposed. Further, the designation of a prescribed
penalty is made in individual articles, or prescribed penalties are individually designated in separate
 I Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a
NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga.
Capt. Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in
the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz and
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money from
Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they
had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers thereof. When they
reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who
consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant
answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left
and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and
Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then
scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed around ten to fifteen meters
away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the
back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he was placed under
custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator.4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired
between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who confiscated
the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant.5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust
team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around two
hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that
transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant
after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial
investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent,
to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court
below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf
was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry
by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the
correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the
purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant.7
the day after the latter's apprehension, and the results were practically normal except for
his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury
on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's
complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that
appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal pain
and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same
complaint but, except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained
normal.8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming
that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met
before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was
told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a
different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the camp,
he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach
eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or
the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket
of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office
but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he
was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of his uncle, Bienvenido
Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he
consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana
Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for three
days.9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized
at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He
likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the
latter's arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan
District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal
pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic
ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion
on his body.11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay
a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower
court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding his
defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to
the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves, while
the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession,14 the
latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold
and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue
presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea
bags allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct
issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is not
charged herein.16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established.17 To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration.18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant
actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who
acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we
are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal
sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt
that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward,
positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of
poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless,
such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them,
aside from the fact that they are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of
having been framed,22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it
all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him
to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23 confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from
appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana.24 Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness.25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities
in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the
matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court,
Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in
the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one
who seized the same.26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will
not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant is
charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy
refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty.27 Besides, there
was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did not
take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated
from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal
procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by
Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such
operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are
lacking that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased only
in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
 Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as
well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for
that powder because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir. 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used
for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case of the
prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an
evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by
other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor
any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures
taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in
the custody of any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be
witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by
the taking of pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant
in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to
effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the
police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore
mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the
marked bills from him.33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in
evidence. Appellant's conformance to these documents are declarations against interest
and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as
a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being
nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel.34 Although appellant
manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the
waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel,35 hence whatever
incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in
writing, is not allowable in evidence.36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and
hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby
be extricated from his predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of
marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction37 which
happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller.38 In the present case,
and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any
peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-
pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that
may be committed at any time and in any place.40 It is not contrary to human experience
for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger,41 for what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting
the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such
sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse circumstances of person,
time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that
occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the
arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was placed
under custody.43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on
the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale
sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant.
What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which
he had been suffering even before his arrest.47 His own brother even corroborated that
fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason
whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp
after his arrest and during his detention there.49 Significantly, he also did not even report
the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors
despite the opportunity to do so50 and with the legal services of counsel being available
to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was
baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him at all
costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act
needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he
was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion
could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No.
7659 effective December 31, 1993,52 which supervenience necessarily affects the original
disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now
resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case
at bar, are to this effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8
and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of
marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted for
the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently
favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle
him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally
amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal
Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient
provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to
crimes punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article would not apply to those
convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third
time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa
or falsification.55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have
then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be
whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on
appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et
al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a
felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under
obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has
applied for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the prescription of the
crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided
in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the accused is
serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations
would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for
relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to
have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further
amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the
penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said
Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole
law,57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant
with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence
covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20,
as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section
20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend
upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a
principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereby, the
modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component
penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by
the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can be used to fix
the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our
aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation,
the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three,
with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases
for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according
to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to
be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500
to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjunctive penalty
only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the
penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary
and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible
penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table
provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the
penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision
correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances
modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review
of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was
because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses
punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to
those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would
consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose
main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in
Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code
on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application
to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated
in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special
law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as
in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under
the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on
this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from
the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the
penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States
but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish
origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations,
such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into
periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law contemplated in and
referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law61 were passed during
the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an
offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same
manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No.
30362 penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed
therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by
section one of this Act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by
such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses
similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four,
sub-paragraph two (a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the
same manner as therein provided.63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were
specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the
Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion
Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to
death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run
from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving firearms), the penalties
wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14
years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4
months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different
from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there
can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code
or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for
felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539.
While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not
given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping
attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in
the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to
Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects
thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded
upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While
these are special laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those
provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the
related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application
to said special laws, in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special
laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an
integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could
never have been the intendment of Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No.
533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the
prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to
said special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely
distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the
penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties
as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are
ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the
offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable
provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64
of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the
Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the
Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that where
the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty
prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions
of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no
explicit grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty
prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of
penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries of experience in
the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of
penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on
the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing the
penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for
graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425,
except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the
discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the
caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect
the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and
the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64,
when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and
68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the
aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid
anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some
manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower
in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale
in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would
be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further
reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio
fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that
the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot
be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the
case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has
appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and
the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate
sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special
law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the
Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said
that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence
for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type
of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of
penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule
for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but
an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such
offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first
part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence
the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission
of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court
has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty
actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law,70 and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the
concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to
that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity
in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the
best mode of interpretation.71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should
be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a
period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may
merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement.73 It
does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue
serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period
when the convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole
may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be
ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the
penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed
through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty
to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference, which could
thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest
in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by
the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with
the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in appropriate cases where the penalty to
be imposed would be prision correccional pursuant to the second paragraph of Section
20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be
meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended), should
be that whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower, i.e., arresto mayor;
and (b) the presence of two or more mitigating circumstances not offset by any
mitigating circumstances or of a privileged mitigating circumstance shall not reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees if the penalty to be imposed, taking into account the
quantity of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 had unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also
their technical signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code
for the offenses penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended,
the latter offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code
for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No. 4103, as amended by Act. No.
4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum prescribed by the same (Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which should be taken into account in
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by the Revised
Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined and penalized in Book
II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES. To simplify further,
a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is included in the classification of
Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or special
law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both its definition
and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by a
special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the special law. That the
latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of penalties
does not make an offense in the special law punished by or punishable under the Revised
Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that defines the offense
and imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of penalties.
In short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can
by no means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished or punishable" by the
Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No. 7659 had adopted the penalties
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to drugs should now
be considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are
also bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are mala in se and to apply the
Articles of the Revised Penal Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the nature
of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties (Articles 40-45), application of penalties
to principals, accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.), complex crimes (Article
48), and graduation of penalties (Article 61), among others. We cannot do otherwise
without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties
in the Revised Penal Code does not make an offense under the Dangerous Drugs Act an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper penalty to
be imposed under Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate sentence to be meted on
the accused should be that whose minimum should not be less than the minimum
prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for in Section 20 of
the Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz.,
prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article
77 of the Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being
the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet,
considering that under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends on
the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception to
Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as
amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the
modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
period of the component penalty shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the
proper principal penalty should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no
aggravating circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional
in its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares:
 The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even
reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties
reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for
this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of
Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and
that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs
involved — by two degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged mitigating circumstances of, say, minority
(Article 68, Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless
of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one
degree because the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional. Finally, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be
allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within
the same second paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we
both allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses by providing
quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine only to
cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an accused who is
found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed
would be reclusion temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an
accused who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which
case the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled to a
reduction thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances
as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority of the accused,
then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant to Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. —
When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of this Code,
the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted
from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two
degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next
lover than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised
Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in another.Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y
CORDOVA, accused-appellant. ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative.
This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged
crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the
pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is
the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final
judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a
judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the
Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a
las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia
firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."
What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It
says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it,
the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior thereto,
should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni
reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or
not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple
reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised
Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a
criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down
to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised
Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has
not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely
guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where,
as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the
decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the
civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100,
p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which
the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the
civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
 Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is
out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability.
But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect
remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be
called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal
liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella,
et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally
liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the
criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing
the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law,
1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability
of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in
view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view
of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386)
that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed
out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for
damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still,
since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of
the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the
criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not
exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by
death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant
case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused
who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second
vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore
concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished
his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human
relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of
his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the
final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the
defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained
this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused
should be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for
civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only
to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it
was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action
already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977
stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67
SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the
settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's
extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling
in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death
supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil
action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense
independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to
prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that
is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or
invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex
delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during
appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal
action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even
necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering
civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This
is but to render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such
cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal
inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi.
Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of
the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such
that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant
pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil
liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and
enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is
contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a
separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental
distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article
30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would
be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved
in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable
therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It
may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
 where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now
the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been
followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal
procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the
latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in
Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims
while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of
what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for
the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex
delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he
must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file
a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on
other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action
is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate
civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the
estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other
than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This
separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., is on leave.
#Footnotes
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.
2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
3 supra.
4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.
8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.
10 Supra.
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988,
166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357, November 27,
1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No.
L-32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA
410; People v. Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA
558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the
need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is without having to
prove the criminal liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended
party is proven by preponderance of evidence.
13 Supra, p. 134.
14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator
commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the
debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in
such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall
be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before
the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.
16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages sought, as a result of the
felony committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to be
recovered must be claimed against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.

18 Ibid.

19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil
action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, except when by statutory
provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in
Article 33 of the Civil Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:

Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also arises
simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as
stated in Torrijos and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or
from a quasi-contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil action, as in Belamala.
Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his property
or recovery of damages therefor, as would have been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the
provincial government in Sendaydiego."

20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related provisions of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.

21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is
a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor.

22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.